Received December 11, 2018, accepted December 21, 2018, date of publication January 14, 2019, date of current

version February 4, 2019.

Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2891940

Research on Unmanned Underwater Vehicle

Threat Assessment
HONGFEI YAO 1,2 , HONGJIAN WANG1 , YIMING LI1,3 , YING WANG1,4 , AND CHUNSONG HAN2
1 College of Automation, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China
2 College of Mechanical Engineering, Qiqihar University, Qiqihar 161006, China
3 College of Control Science and Engineering, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
4 Economic Research Institute, State Grid Heilongjiang Electric Power Co., Ltd., Harbin 150036, China

Corresponding author: Hongjian Wang (cctime99@163.com)

This work was supported in part by the China Natural Science Foundation under Grant 61633008, in part by the Natural Science
Foundation of Heilongjiang Province under Grant F2015035, in part by the Heilongjiang Province Postdoctoral Science Foundation under
Grant LBH-Z15043, in part by the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant 2016M591514, in part by the Science Foundation
of the Heilongjiang Province Education Department under Grant 135109242, and in part by the Natural Science Foundation of
Heilongjiang Province under Grant F2017028.

ABSTRACT The unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) plays an ever increasing and important role in
the modern marine environment. In particular, the tasks of underwater reconnaissance and surveillance,
underwater mine hunting and anti-submarine warfare, all poses a serious and dangerous threat to humans.
UUV has become the forerunning technology to accomplish such missions. In this paper, a method based on
dynamic Bayesian network modeling was proposed to evaluate the UUV in an underwater threat situation.
We divided the UUV threats into three categories: environmental factors, platform factors, and mission
factors. Through each of these categories, we carried out factor extraction and set up the priori probability
according to the characteristics. Setting up the static Bayesian network involved the addition of state
transition probability and establishment of the model for assessing the dynamic Bayesian threat situation.
By comparing the results of the static and dynamic Bayesian simulation, it was shown that the dynamic
Bayesian is superior. Moreover, by analyzing the sensitivity, we recognized the greatest current threat and in
response, determined the appropriate UUV countermeasures. The results showed that the dynamic Bayesian
method has great practical significance and value for threat assessment.

INDEX TERMS Dynamic Bayesian, threat assessment, unmanned underwater vehicle.

I. INTRODUCTION Many exploratory studies have been carried out on threat

With the development of unmanned underwater technology,
the UUV (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle) has attracted
significant and increasing attention from countries all over
the world [1], [2]. Underwater vehicles are confronted with
varying and numerous threats while engaged in missions.
These include geographical issues, such as ocean currents and
complex terrain, engineering and technical problems includ-
ing actuator and sensor malfunctions, as well as inevitable
dynamic threats. Only by correctly assessing the severity,
scope and consequences of each threat can they make deci-
sions that lead to a successful course of action. In short,
dynamic threat assessment is necessary for unmanned under-
water vehicles. With respect to the assessment of dynamic
threats in response to an enemy during wartime, or while
engaged in scientific research during peacetime, a set of
practical methods is of immense value.
assessment in the country and abroad. The primary theoretical
methods are as follows: Grey correlation analysis [3], [4],
analytic hierarchy process [5], multi-attribute decision
theory [6], fuzzy logic [7], [8], and use of Bayesian networks.
Threat assessment technology research has been lagging in
China when compared to other countries. According liter-
ature, the United States has developed very well perform-
ing prototype systems such as TCAC (US Army Analysis
System) and BETA (Battlefield Development and Target
Acquisition). Similarly, the United Kingdom has developed
IKBS (Intelligent Knowledge Base System) for integrating
its domestic warship sensors, wireless data chains and signal
intelligence. South Africa has also developed a threat assess-
ment system, Future, to assist its navy in detecting threats
in the surrounding waters. On the other hand, Canada has
developed the TADMUS system using fuzzy logic theory and

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Bayesian networks. The Portuguese Air Force Development
and Innovation Research Center has analyzed scenarios con-
cerning unmanned underwater vehicles [9] under threat, prov-
ing that it is feasible to determine the risk probability through
Bayesian network learning. Meanwhile, the Russo [10] team
at the University of Alsace has used Bayesian networks
to assess the threat severity of rear-end collisions. In this
research, traffic instances were used to carry out simulation
experiments, proving that the results were in line with what
had been expected.
In the recent years, research into threat assessment has been
on the rise in China. Liu et al. [11] of Harbin Engineering
University utilized double Bayesian estimation to assess the
motion state of dynamic threats. This method has the potential
for more accurate results, leading to an improved outcome.
Another study of Liu et al. [12] from the Air Force Engineer-
ing University used both a dynamic Bayesian network and a
fuzzy neural network to assess the threat level of abnormal air
conditions while engaged in air defense operations. Results
from the simulation using their GeNIe software are in line
with the expectations. Bian and Yang [13] implemented a
dynamic Bayesian network to analyze the factors that threaten
the formation assumed for air defense. The simulation results
showed that the model could effectively identify the cate-
gories and the intentions of the subject.
Dynamic Bayesian networks are commonly employed to
solve problems in the domain of dynamic threat assessment.
A Bayesian network is a framework for knowledge represen-
tation and probabilistic reasoning. It has been widely used in
cases where the target to be assessed is shrouded by intrinsic
uncertainties. Some examples include target threat assess-
ment in battlefields, prediction of transportation conditions,
and data mining. Dynamic Bayesian networks have various
advantages, including a good dynamic nature and excellent
robustness. In Bayesian networks, nodes and arcs repre-
sent relationships between elements: nodes represent element
incidents and arcs represent probability relationships between
elements. Relationships can be either unidirectional or bidi-
rectional, and depend on the domain and the problem being
solved. The priori probability loaded into the model can be
directly set based on expert knowledge or derived via self-
learning using the sample data.
As can be seen from the above research, the majority
of effort has been directed towards the Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV). Applications include air defense, air combat,
missile targeting and avoidance, as well as other types of
assessment using Bayesian networks. However, there has
been very little research on threat assessment involving the
UUV. In this paper, a method was proposed for threat assess-
ment based on the dynamic Bayesian network (DBN). This
accounted myriad threats that were encountered during their
missions, including complex sea conditions and other dan-
gers. The study began with the implementation of a static
Bayesian network (SBN) model. In order to address the
problem of the network’s inability to effectively assess a
dynamic threat, the state transition probability was added.
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Using the personally developed model to evaluate our results,
we have carried out simulation-based experiments that effec-
tively mimic typical mission cases.
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE BAYESIAN NETWORK
A. TYPICAL BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL
The Bayesian network is a graphical model describing
the dependencies between random variables, and is widely
used to solve problems involving uncertainty. Formally,
the Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph with nodes
representing random variables and directed arcs between
nodes representing conditional dependencies between ran-
dom variables. It is rooted in probability theory [14] and
has the characteristics of two-way reasoning. It can manage
both casual reasoning, namely, deduce a posterior probability
from a priori probability, and also be competent for diagnostic
reasoning. In this case, it will deduce a priori probability from
a posterior probability using a formula. Fig.1 shows a typical
Bayesian network model for threat assessment, which will be
able to determine the causality by setting a priori probability
of the threat level with respect to the type and the number
of targets. When the new data arrives, it will compute the
corresponding prediction and assessment.
FIGURE 1. Typical Bayesian network model for threat assessment.
B. DYNAMIC BAYESIAN NETWORK
The ordinary static Bayesian network can accurately analyze
and predict data at a specific time; however, it is unable to
effectively judge a variable that changes over time. In con-
sideration of variables subject to change with respect to time,
the dynamic Bayesian network is introduced. Unlike the
static Bayesian network, a dynamic Bayesian network uses
techniques that take into account the relationship between
moments in time. This relationship is referred to as the
state transition probability. In this way, improved results are
obtained from the network’s ability to learn and make effec-
tive use of a change in value between various points in time.
Let the set of the nodes changing over time be X =
{X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn }, where Xi [t] shows the state value of the
i variable at time t. The DBN can be defined as: (B0 , Bτ ),
where B0 represents the initial BN, with the probability dis-
tribution P(X [0]), for the initial state X [0]. Bτ indicates the
transfer network, with the transition probability specified as
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H. Yao et al.: Research on UUV Threat Assessment

P(X [t + 1]X [t]) for the variable state change from time t to
time t + 1. Take note that the state probability at time t + 1,
is related to time t, and no other point in time. We make the
assumption that the conditional probability of adjacent time
is stationary in a finite time range; that P(X [t + 1]X [t]) is
constant, independent of time.
Based on this assumption, there are two parts in a dynamic
Bayesian network for joint probability distribution estab-
lished on the time axis of the random process:
(1) A priori network B0 shown in Figure 2(a), as the
probability distribution for the initial state;
(2) A transfer network Bτ shown in Figure 2(b), as the
transition probability between the two moments.
FIGURE 2. Dynamic Bayesian network. (a) Priori network. (b) Transfer
network.
In summary, for a given dynamic Bayesian network model
(X [1], X [2], . . . , X [t]), the formula for the joint distribution
probability is:
P(X [1], X [2], . . . , X [t])
YT
= PB0 (X [1]) PBτ (X [t + 1]X [t])
i=1
where P(X [1], X [2], . . . , X [t]) represents the joint distribu-
tion of the nodes in the network,PB0 (X [1]) is the probability
distribution of the node at time t, and PBτ (X [t + 1]X [t])
represents the state transition probability.
where P(X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn ) is the joint distribution of all nodes
in the established evaluation model, and Pa (Xi ) is the set of
parent nodes for Xi .
For the static Bayesian network model, assuming that the
network has n hidden nodes and m observation nodes, the fol-
lowing inference mechanism can be obtained by combining
the above formulas and assumptions:
P(x1 , x2 , . . . , xn |y1 , y2 , . . . , ym )
Q Q
j P(yj |Pa (yj )) i P(xi |Pa (xi ))
=P (4)
Q Q
x1 ,x2 ,...,xn j P(yj |Pa (yj )) i P(xi |Pa (xi ))
where i in the formula can be valued from 1 to n, and j from
1 to m, xi represents the value of the Xi , yj represents the value
of the observation variable Yj , Pa (xi ) and Pa (yj ) respectively
indicate the set of the parent nodes for xi and yj .
The formula (4) shows the reasoning mechanism for the
static Bayesian network. If it is extended along the timeline
to be a dynamic network to include T time points, then the
reasoning mechanism for the dynamic Bayesian network can
be obtained. When the observation values have only one com-
posite state, the hidden variables will be distributed as in (5),
shown at the bottom of this page, where, i = 1, 2, . . . , T ;
j = 1, 2, . . . , m; k = 1, 2, . . . , n; xij represents a value state
of the Xij . The first subscript represents the i time point, while
the second subscript represents the j hidden node within this
time point. yij represents the value of the observation variable
Yij . Pa (yij ) represents the set of the parent nodes for yij . If the
observation value is in multiple states, then the following
will hold as (6), shown at the bottom of this page, where,
(1)
i = 1, 2, . . . , T ; j = 1, 2, . . . , m; k = 1, 2, . . . , n; yijs indi-
cates the state of the j observation node xij , within the i time
slice. P(yij = yijs ) is the probability of yij in the corresponding
state. In its entirety, this describes the inference mechanism
of the dynamic Bayesian network.

C. DYNAMIC BAYESIAN EVALUATION INFERENCE III. CONSTRUCTION OF BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL

MECHANISM FOR UUV THREAT SITUATION ASSESSMENT
The essence of DBN reasoning is the probability calculation A. STEPS FOR UUV THREAT ASSESSMENT BASED ON
based on the established model, with the Bayesian formula BAYESTAN NETWORK
and independence hypothesis adopted as its basis, as follows: When using the Bayesian network to evaluate the UUV threat
P(xy) P(xy) situation, the first task is to consider the types of threats
P(x|y) = = P (2) that might be encountered. Following this, the threat factors
P(y) P(xy)
Yxn must be extracted and the state parameters for these must
P(X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn ) = P(Xi |Pa (Xi )) (3) be determined. Specifically, the system must pinpoint which
i=1

P(x11 , x12 , . . . , x1n , . . . , xT 1 , xT 2 , . . . , xTn |y11 , y12 , . . . , y1n , . . . , yT 1 , yT 2 , . . . , yTn )

Q Q
ij P(yij |Pa (yij )) ik P(xik |Pa (xik ))
=P Q Q (5)
x11 ,x12 ,...,x1n ,...,xT 1 ,xT 2 ,...,xTn ij P(yij |Pa (yij )) ik P(xik |Pa (xik ))
P(x11 , x12 , . . . , x1n , . . . , xT 1 , xT 2 , . . . , xTn |y11s , y12s , . . . , y1ns , . . . , yT 1s , yT 2s , . . . , yTns )
Q Q
ij P(yij = yijs |Pa (yij )) ik P(xik |Pa (xik ))
X Y
= × P(yij = yijs )
y11 ,y12 ,...,y1n ,...,yT 1 ,yT 2 ,...,yTn
P Q Q
x11 ,x12 ,...,x1n ,...,xT 1 ,xT 2 ,...,xTn [ ij P(yij |Pa (yij )) ik P(xik |Pa (xik ))]
ij

(6)

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TABLE 1. Threat elements (nodes) and set of states.

monitoring variables can be used to predict whether certain

factors pose a threat. Once this is complete, the Bayesian
network must be configured in such a way that the relation-
ship between nodes is determined through expert knowledge.
Essentially, this constitutes the reasoning mechanism of the
network.

B. EXTRACTION OF UUV THREAT FACTORS FIGURE 3. Static Bayesian overall model for UUV threat assessment.
UUVs will face a variety of threats underwater; hence,
to assess each situation, the first step is to extract and refine
the observable threat factors and build the nodes of the
threat assessment model. As there are copious threat factors,
we divided them into three categories: environmental factors,
platform factors and mission factors. Table 1 shows the set of
threat factors and their states.
The data in the above table can be used to establish a
static Bayesian overall model for UUV threat assessment,
as shown in Fig.3. In addition, it can be used with static
Bayesian models for the three types of threat factors shown
in Figures 4, 5 and 6. Based on the characteristics of the FIGURE 4. Static Bayesian model for threat assessment of environmental
three types of threat factors and the actual situation, the state factors.
set is determined. Once this is done, the priori probabil-
ity is set according to expert’s experience. As there is an It is important to recognize that when the UUV is engaged
immense volume of data for priori probability, we only show in an actual mission, it will be faced with more complex
the priori probability for environmental factors, as shown conditions that are often related to time. For example, with
in Tables 2, 3 and 4. respect to the threat of enemy submarines, this is a case where

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TABLE 2. Priori probability of underwater obstacles event for environmental factors.
TABLE 3. Priori probability of density event for environmental factors.
TABLE 4. Priori probability of underwater environment event.
FIGURE 5. Static Bayesian model for threat assessment of platform
factors.
FIGURE 6. Static Bayesian model for threat assessment of mission factors.
consideration of the former and latter moments affects the
accuracy of the prediction. Only by summarizing the state
changes along the time line can we reason the correct results
in a relatively accurate manner. Facing this type of dynamic
threat, the static Bayesian network performs poorly, and
therefore cannot be relied upon. As such, it is necessary to use
a dynamic Bayesian network for threat situation assessment.
The dynamic Bayesian network has all of the advantages of a
static network, but is also able to follow changes over time in
order to make more realistic predictions and follow superior
actions.
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Based on the analysis of the environmental threat factors,
those with dynamic characteristics are the distance and ori-
entation of underwater obstacles. As the obstacles do not
have a time attribute associated with themit, a time plat-
form is inserted into the software to account for this data.
The priori probability can be set according to the expert’s
experience or alternatively learned from the existing data
files. Under normal circumstances, the parameters of model
learning will be much closer to reality. However, learning
from massive volumes of data takes considerably takes more
time. This model uses expert knowledge to set the parameters
directly. See Fig.7 for the dynamic Bayesian model used to
assess environmental threats.
FIGURE 7. Dynamic Bayesian model used to assess environmental
threats.
Considering that the former and latter moments are related
when underwater obstacles are dynamic targets, this rela-
tionship can be represented by a special arc. Both start
and end nodes are the same, and this represents the proba-
bility relationship between the former and latter moments.
In this case, the partial priori probability for the underwater
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TABLE 5. Partial priori probability for the underwater obstacle is set at time t.

TABLE 6. Partial priori probability for the underwater obstacle is set at time t +1.

obstacle is set at time t and time t+1 respectively, as shown

in Table 5 and Table 6.
Based on the analysis of the platform-related threat fac-
tors, those with dynamic characteristics include enemy sub-
marines and mines. The threat of water leakage does not
have the time attribute, so a time platform is inserted into
the software in order to add the time factor related to enemy
submarines and mine threats. Moreover, the threat of an
enemy submarine is strongly uncertain and very threatening.
As the submarines are maneuvered artificially, we need to
consider different threat modes for them. This model has
proposed two modes: chasing and surpassing. According
to their characteristics, the a priori probability needs to be FIGURE 8. Dynamic Bayesian model used to assess the platform-related
threats.
set with consideration of time factors. This model still uses
expert knowledge to set parameters directly. See Fig.8 for the TABLE 7. Priori probability is set for enemy mines at time t.
dynamic Bayesian model used to assess the platform-related
threats.
As in the case of underwater obstacles, the former and
latter moments are related when enemy mines and submarine
threats are dynamic targets. In this case, an arc with the one
node representing both start and end is added to represent IV. SIMULATION OF TYPICAL CASES FOR UUV
the impact of the former moment on the latter moment. The ISR MISSIONS
priori probability is set for enemy mines at time t and t + 1, A. CASE DESIGN FOR ISR MISSION SIMULATION
respectively, as shown in Table 7 and Table 8. Due to the Generally, UUVs will act as the backbone for supporting fleet
large volume of data for other priori probabilities, they are missions in the future. Whether in wartime or peacetime,
not listed extensively in this paper. it is of critical significance to classify typical mission situa-
Based on the analysis of mission-related threat factors, tions. According to the U.S. Navy’s UUV Overall Plan 2004,
this kind of network does not contain any dynamic threats. the primary missions of UUVs are divided into nine cat-
Consequently, the dynamic model is consistent with the static egories [15], of which ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and
Bayesian model for threat assessment. Reconnaissance) is one of the nine typical missions.

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TABLE 8. Priori probability is set for enemy mines at time t +1.
TABLE 9. Input evidence of environmental.
TABLE 10. Input evidence of platform.
TABLE 11. Input evidence of mission.
FIGURE 9. Static simulation results of environmental.
FIGURE 10. Dynamic simulation results of environmental.
The Navy unequivocally needs continuous ISR, whose
reconnaissance data includes all types of intelligence gath-
ering, target detection and localization, and mapping. UUVs
can operate over long distances, in shallow waters and
autonomously. In addition, they are better suited for conceal-
ment than any other system. In summary, UUVs are ideal for
information gathering.
Based on the analysis of the above-mentioned ISR mis-
sions, it is assumed that we have an UUV performing its task
of surveying the seabed terrain, which is 3-5 nautical miles
away from the host platform. The job involves collecting
data and feeding it back to the host platform for intelli-
gence imaging. Also, this UUV has been working underwater
continuously for 10 hours; the motor power reports 40% as
displayed, and the ocean current is comparatively weak and
moderate in density. The mission load is being reported as
abnormal from time t = 4; a static and separate obstacle is
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found 100m ahead, and its passive sonar has detected enemy
submarines slowly moving 13km to the side.
According to the above case, we can handle the threat
factors, assuming that everything is in good condition before
time t = 4. At this time, SJL = {50-130}; SSL = {single};
SFW = {steady }; DLD = {lack }; RWZH = {bad };
QT = {dangerous}. The rest of the factors are in good condi-
tion while the environmental, platform-related and mission-
based factors need to be used for comprehensive assessment
of the threat. Tables 9, 10 and 11 will present the input
evidence of the three types of network.
B. ANALYSIS OF BAYESIAN SIMULATION RESULTS
FOR ISR MISSIONS
The results are as follows for simulation of the cases stated
in the previous section by using the established static and
dynamic Bayesian network assessment models.
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FIGURE 11. Static simulation results of platform.
FIGURE 12. Dynamic simulation results of platform.
FIGURE 13. Prediction of enemy submarine threats.
FIGURE 14. Simulation results of missions.
FIGURE 15. Histogram of the sensitivity analysis.
Fig.9-Fig.14 show the simulation results. From these the
results of environmental and platform-related dynamic and
as well as static threats, it can be seen that the dynamic
network has a higher sensitivity to the presence of threats.
It is successfully able to considers the changes over time
and the tendency for events to develop. With the enhanced
knowledge of the relationship between the previous and latter
moments, the network is more capable of determining danger.
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H. Yao et al.: Research on UUV Threat Assessment
Consequently, the danger value is often higher in the threat
assessment results for the dynamic network. See Fig.15 for
the histogram of the sensitivity analysis.
Fig.15 gives a quantitative ranking of the threat levels,
showing that the most threatening to the mission is the
enemy submarine (QT), followed by the underwater obsta-
cles (SZAW) and energy margin (NYYL). When these condi-
tions are relayed back to the control center, the UUV will take
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H. Yao et al.: Research on UUV Threat Assessment
action that is prioritized accordingly. It will first deal with
and evade the enemy submarine threat, optimally by returning
to the host platform where it will replenish energy while
monitoring the enemy submarine. At this point, the platform
will determine the next action or strategy.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
With the general notion that China has been increasingly
focusing on ocean engineering and ocean research, wherein
the development of underwater unmanned vehicles (UUV)
has attracted a great deal of attention. In this paper, we have
studied methods for the assessment of UUV threat situations
by adopting the techniques of static and dynamic Bayesian
network modeling. We have simulated various threat assess-
ments on both network types, with the results showing that
the dynamic Bayesian method has more practical signifi-
cance and inherent value. Finally, we have designed a rele-
vant simulation case that is based on typical ISR missions,
in accordance with UUV-specific missions. Our system was
successful in the simulation and has proved the feasibility of
the dynamic Bayesian method for the assessment of UUV
threats. It should be pointed out that the priori probability of
our dynamic Bayesian threat assessment model is set based
on expert knowledge in this field. Inevitably, this is subjective
and limited by the experience of the expert. Reasonable and
scientific determination of priori probability in this model
to enhance its objectivity and reliability shall be the focus
of future work. Additionally, the dynamic Bayesian network
method can be applied in business risk assessment and diag-
nostics.
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HONGFEI YAO received the B.S. degree from
Qiqihar University, in 2003, and the M.S. degree in
automation professional from Harbin Engineering
University, in 2009, where he is currently pursuing
the Ph.D. degree in pattern recognition and intel-
ligent system. He was with Qiqihar University as
a Lecturer. His research interests include auton-
omy control and swarm intelligence for unmanned
systems, intelligent optimization theory and
methods, machine learning, deep learning, deep
reinforcement learning, and target tracking.
HONGJIAN WANG was born in Harbin,
Heilongjiang, China, in 1971. She received the
B.S. degree from Heilongjiang University, in 1993,
and the M.S. degree in computer science and
the Ph.D. degree in control theory and control
engineering from Harbin Engineering University,
in 1998 and 2004, respectively. From 2004 to
2006, she worked in post-doctoral mobile station
with the Harbin Institute of Technology. She has
authored one book, more than 100 articles, and
more than 30 inventions. She holds 14 patents. Her research interests include
autonomy control and swarm intelligence for unmanned systems, intelligent
optimization theory and methods, machine learning, deep learning, deep
reinforcement learning, target tracking, and simultaneous localization and
mapping. She was a recipient of the Young Academic Elite of Heilongjiang
Province, in 2008, and been funded by the National Science Foundation and
the Ministry of education’s doctoral program special research fund. She is a
peer reviewer of the Journal of Automation, the Journal of Control theory and
Application, the Journal of Robot, and the Journal of Harbin Engineering
University.
YIMING LI received the B.S. degree in automa-
tion from Harbin Engineering University, China,
in 2018. He is currently pursuing the M.S. degree
with Shandong University. His research interests
include autonomy control and swarm intelligence
for unmanned systems, intelligent optimization
theory and methods, machine learning, deep
learning, deep reinforcement learning, and target
tracking.
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YING WANG received the M.E. degree from
Northeast Electric Power University, in 2011. She
is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree in control
theory and control engineering with Harbin Engi-
neering University. She was with the Economic
and Technological Research Institute, State Grid
Heilongjiang Electric Power Co., Ltd.
11396
H. Yao et al.: Research on UUV Threat Assessment
CHUNSONG HAN received the B.E. degree in
automation from Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an,
China, in 1999, the M.S. degree in control science
and control engineering from the University of
Science and Technology Liaoning, Anshan, China,
in 2006, and the Ph.D. degree in control science
and control engineering was from the Harbin Insti-
tute of Technology, Harbin, China, in 2014. His
research interests include fuzzy control systems,
descriptor systems, robust control/filtering, and
switched systems.
VOLUME 7, 2019