I.

Requisites of Marriage (Articles 1-34, Family Code)

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088
July 19, 1996

Judge solemnizes outside his jurisdiction. He may only solemnize in his chambers or in open court.

FACTS:
On October 27, 1994, the Judge Dumagtoy allegedly performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. Del Rosario outside of the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction. Such wedding was solemnized at the respondent’s
residence in municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within the respondent’s jurisdictional area of Sta. Monica Burgos.
For his defense, Dumagtoy maintained that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and
Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph one (1) of the Family Code, which states that “Marriage may be solemnized
by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was within the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction.

HELD:
NO. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7,
marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.” Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the marriage between
Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court’s jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can
be held outside of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no
pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents. G.R.
No. 187462 June 1, 2016

Respondent files for declaration of nullity of marriage. Marriage is void because it was performed without a license.

FACTS:
In the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner Raquel’s parents instructed the clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer to
arrange and prepare the necessary papers required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent Veronica to take
place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony. Petitioner and
respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o’clock before
dawn of June 1, 1972.
Twenty-five (25) years later, petitioner filed an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and respondent on
the ground of the absence of marriage license. He argued that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply
for marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a
marriage license. He presented a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested
to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and
respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

ISSUE:
Is the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that it has no record or copy of the marriage
license adequate to prove the non-issuance of such license, thus, sufficient to declare the marriage null and void?

HELD:
Yes. The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract which include “a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character”.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void.
In this case, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar attesting that the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar has no record or copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.
Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome
and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. However, the
respondent was not able to discharge that burden. Respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to
the court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said
marriage license. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent and the marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners, vs. LUIS G.
ANSON, Respondent. G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016

Respondent declares that he was divested of his share in conjugal properties upon the death of his wife. This does not
stand, since the spouses had no marriage license to prove his conjugal rights.

FACTS:
Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and Gerard Salgado (Spouses Salgado) seeking the annulment of the
three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson. They were married in a civil
ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on
December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship. During his marital union with Severina,
they acquired several real properties, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed
properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate
Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said
properties. When Severina died Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis
adjudicating herself as Severina’s sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties. Luis claimed that because of the
preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of
Severina. The Spouses in defense raised the nullity of the marriage which took effect prior the effectively of the family code for
lack of marriage license. RTC and CA rendered its Decision in favor of Luis.

ISSUE:
Is the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the FC valid in the absence of marriage license?

HELD:
No. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license number was indicated
therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act
No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor.
The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public document, the marriage
contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina’s marriage contract are prima facie proof that at the time of their marriage,
no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character
under Article 77 of the Civil Code.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites,
or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this
Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was
solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform
to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as
the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the
religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony
is purely religious in nature.
Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil ceremony
officiated on December 28, 1966 – the only date of marriage appearing on the records.
Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was not
solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage
does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which
are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior
ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is required for Luis and
Severina’s marriage to be valid.
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE
NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., Petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, Respondent. G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

Respondent declares that he was divested of his share in conjugal properties upon the death of his wife. This does not
stand, since the spouses had no marriage license to prove his conjugal rights.

FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones, out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. Subsequently, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of
the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for “annulment of marriage” under Article
47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

HELD:
Yes. The heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death. The Code is silent
as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to
have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except
those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding coownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and
44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

Republic vs. Dayot GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

Wife accuses respondent of bigamy despite absence of their marriage license. Cannot stand. No marriage license, invalid
marriage.

FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a
sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action
for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a
complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa
was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the
marriage license requirement.

HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified
their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and
Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

ROSARIO D. ADO-AN-MORIMOTO V. YOSHIO MORIMOTO and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 247576 March 15, 2021, THIRD DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

Marriage was simulated in order to acquire benefits. Void as it lacks essential and formal requisites.

DOCTRINE: A simulated marriage used as a front for illicitly obtaining benefits is totally inexistent, as the parties
to it have no genuine intent to enter into marital relations. Courts must recognize such a marriage as void. To insist on its
validity is to enable a greater affront to the institution of marriage than the perceived dangerous tendency of readily
declaring it null.
FACTS:
Sometime before December 2007, a friend introduced Rosario Ado-an to Yoshio Marimoto as one with whom she can
simulate marriage as a way to facilitate her acquisition of a Japanese visa. She acceded. Thus, Rosario and Yoshio met at the
Manila City Hall where they signed a blank marriage certificate, but were assured by the solemnizing officer that the
certificate will never be registered or recorded in the Civil Registry. It was the last time Rosario saw Yoshio. Sometime later,
Rosario went to the Philippine Statistics Authority to secure a Certificate of No Marriage. To her surprise, she found out that a
Certificate of Marriage, registered in the City of San Juan, indicates that she married Yoshio on December 5, 2007, in a ceremony
officiated by a certain Reverend Roberto Espiritu. It also appears that the marriage was predicated on Marriage
License No. 6120159, issued by the Office of the Civil Registry of San Juan. Rosario filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. She maintained that the marriage attested to by the
marriage certificate she discovered never actually happened and was never backed by a marriage license.
ISSUE:
Should the registered marriage between Rosario D. Ado-an-Morimoto and Yoshio Morimoto be declared null and
void?

RULING: Yes, the marriage should be declared null and void for having been simulated and lacking in the essential and
formal requisites of marriage. This Court takes petitioner's assertions to be corresponding with the truth, or otherwise "afford[ing]
the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute." They are convincing proof that no marriage between her and respondent Yoshio
ever took place. In any case, petitioner's assertions do not stand by their lonesome. They are bolstered by the Assistant City
Prosecutor's Report indicating that there is no collusion between petitioner and respondent Yoshio to obtain a favorable ruling
from the Regional Trial Court. This works to thwart any claim that respondent Yoshio's not having directly
contradicted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity, or otherwise insisting on the subsistence of their supposed
marriage, indicates duplicity on petitioner's part. More importantly, a Certification was issued by the Office ofthe Civil Registrar,
Philippine Statistics Authority, stating that "said office mistakenly certified that a marriage was solemnized between
[petitioner and respondent Yoshio.]" This categorical turnaround should, once and for all, negate any lingering doubt on whether
the supposed marriage

ARTICLE 26
1. Ambrose v. Suque-Ambrose, G.R. No. 206761, June 23, 2021
DECISION
GAERLAN, J.:
This is a direct recourse through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
Decision2 dated February 13, 2013, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89, in Civil Case No. Q-07-60216
and its Order3 dated April 8, 2013, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner Paul Ambrose (petitioner), a citizen of the United States, married respondent Louella Suque-Ambrose (respondent) on
March 13, 2005 in Manila, Philippines.4
On April 20, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition5 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, as amended.
The petition was amended on May 15, 2007. Thereafter, the respondent filed her Answer with Counterclaim. After pre-trial, trial
ensued. Only the petitioner presented evidence as the respondent failed to appear and participate during the hearing on the merits.
After the presentation of evidence by the petitioner, the RTC rendered the herein assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacks the legal capacity to sue. According to the RTC, under the
nationality principle provided for under Article 15 of the Civil Code, the petitioner, an American Citizen, is not covered by our
laws on family rights and duties, status and legal capacity.
On April 3, 2013, the petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal but the same was denied due course by the RTC in its Order11 dated
April 8, 2013, on account of the petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration as required by Section 20(1) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
This prompted the petitioner to file the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging in support thereof that:
a) The lower court committed a patently null and void decision and order contrary to Art. 36 of the Family Code and Section 2(a)
of the Rule when it ruled that petitioner has no legal personality to file the petition for being a foreigner pursuant to Art. 15 of the
Civil Code;
b) The Supreme Court may suspend Section 20 (1) of the Rule and allow petitioner to avail of Rule 45 in the interest of
procedural due process and afford him his last chance for obtaining full appellate review of the patently null and void decision
and order of the lower court solely on the legal question raised as allowed by the Court in several cases.12
On January 26, 2015, the respondent filed her compliance13 with the Court's Resolution14 dated October 22, 2014, in which she
manifested that she will no longer be filing any comment in response to the Petition.
The petition is meritorious.
Procedural rules are essential in the administration of justice.15 Rules are established to provide order and enhance the efficiency
of our judicial system.16
However, the Court recognized on certain occasions that procedural rules may be relaxed, particularly when their strict
application frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. The relaxation of the rules is also warranted considering the nature
and the issues involved in the case.17
In this case, the RTC denied the petitioner's notice of appeal for failure to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court notes
nonetheless that the notice of appeal was filed well within the same 15-day period required for the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Due regard must also be given to the fact that the decision appealed from is a dismissal of the petition that is
based not on the sufficiency of the ground raised but solely for lack of legal capacity on the part of the petitioner.
Thus, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court resolves in view of the attendant circumstances of this case, to disregard
the procedural lapse committed in order to give the parties the amplest opportunity to fully ventilate their claims and to fully
ascertain the merits of the case.18
Proceeding to the meat of the instant controversy, the petitioner argues that Article 15 of the Civil Code does not apply, as "the
legal capacity to get married and its consequences, including the nullification of void marriage is governed by the law of the
place where the marriage was entered into and not by the nationality principle.
The Court agrees.
Lex loci celebrationis is a latin term, literally translated as the law of the place of the ceremony. It means that the validity of a
contract is governed by the place where it is made, executed, or to be performed.20 It is adhered to by Philippine law, as
enunciated under the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, viz.:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and
(6), 3637 and 38.
Otherwise stated, a marriage formally valid in the place it is celebrated is valid in the Philippines.
Lex loci celebrationis is a conflict of law principle that comes into play when there are substantive issues relating to a contract
that is celebrated elsewhere than the place of citizenship of its parties.21 Philippine courts apply the same, not only with respect
to marriage but to other contracts, in order to determine the law that is to be applied in resolving disputes that arise as a result
thereof.
Applied to this controversy, the marriage between the parties having been celebrated in the Philippines, is governed by Philippine
laws. The same laws holds true with its incidents and consequences. Thus, all matters relating to the validity of the contract of
marriage, such as the presence or absence of requisites, forms, or solemnities are to be judged in relation to the law in which it
has been celebrated or performed.
Along this line, it is useful to state that when the marriage is celebrated elsewhere, its validity does not depend fully on foreign
law. While accepted in the jurisdiction in which it is celebrated, it may be held invalid in the Philippines when it falls under the
instances mentioned in par. 1, Article 26 of the Family Code such as incestuous or bigamous marriages. As well, irrespective of
the place of solemnization of marriage, Philippine laws bind the contracting Filipino citizen with respect to "family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity"; any controversy arising therefrom would then have to be determined in accordance
with the same law.22
Herein, it is indubitable that the action relates to the validity of the marriage celebrated in the Philippines. The petitioner's action
assails the psychological incapacity of the respondent to perform the essential marital obligations. Ultimately, therefore, the result
of the action would have an effect on the personal status of the respondent. With this, there is no reason to foreclose the
petitioner's right to institute the instant petition for nullity of marriage.
Furthermore, a review of procedural rules present no obstacle in the instant action being instituted by a foreigner. Legal capacity
to sue or the capacity to institute legal action is governed by Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, under which,
"[o]nly natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." The absence of legal capacity
to sue indicates the general disability of a plaintiff to sue as when a plaintiff is not in the exercise of his or her civil rights, does
not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation; which may be on
account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality, or other similar grounds for disqualification.23
Lack of capacity to sue is distinguished from lack of legal personality to sue while the former refers to the general
disqualification of a plaintiff to institute an action, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. As
defined under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." A real party in interest is one who possesses a
substantial interest in the case as a result of breach of a legal right.24
Both "lack of legal capacity to sue" and "lack of legal personality" to sue are affirmative defenses.25 In the first, the ground is
"that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue,"26 while in the second, the ground is based on the fact "that the pleading asserting
the claim states no cause of action."27
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the petitioner has both the legal capacity and personality to sue. His legal personality
proceeds from the fact that it is his marriage to the respondent, which, in turn, relates to his civil status, that stands to be affected
by the petition for nullity that he instituted. He has legal personality in the action as he has personal and material interest in the
result of the action.28
With respect to his legal capacity to sue, the statement as to who may institute an action a petition for nullity of marriage does not
distinguish between citizens of the Philippines and foreigners. Section 2 of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC, provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
A. Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
The provision is clear in that either of the contracting parties may file a petition to declare the marriage void. It is a basic rule in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. No distinction should be made in the application of the law where none has been indicated. Courts can only
interpret the law; it cannot read into the law what is not written therein.29
In view of the foregoing, therefore, the RTC should not have dismissed the case on the absence of the petitioner's legal capacity
to sue. By doing so, it failed to resolve factual issues necessary to resolve whether or not the marriage between the parties should
be nullified on the ground of psychological incapacity. Considering that a petition for review on certiorari is limited to questions
of law and the Court is not a trier of facts, the remand of this case to the RTC for the proper resolution of this case on the merits
is most appropriate.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the
Decision dated February 13, 2013 and Order dated April 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City Branch 89, in
Civil Case No. Q-07-60216 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC for further
proceedings and judgment on the merits.
SO ORDERED.

2. Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002

Facts:

Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued
by an Australian family court.

In 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, in Cabanatuan City.

In 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Rederick on the ground of bigamy. She alleged
that Rederick had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her which she learned in 1997 only.

In his Answer, Rederick averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to Grace his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace in 1994.

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is,
Rederick's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.

Hence, the appeal.

Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce
decree before our courts. She argued that respondent's failure to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes
absence of a substantial requisite voiding their marriage.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution. Respondent also contend that
the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under
Australian law.

Issues:

1. Was the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson proven?

2. Was respondent proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?

Held:

1.) NO Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case
the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

2.) NO We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as
to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate
mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly
presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part
of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding
that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it
may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on
the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12,
1994. (Garcia vs. Recio, G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001)

3. Rep. vs. Cipriano Obrecido III, G.R No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the
United States, bringing one of their children with her. A few years later, Cirpriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized
as an American citizen, and sometime in 2000, he learned that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and was remarried to
Innocent Stanley. Because of this, Cipriano filed a petition for authority to remarry, invoking Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines which states: Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
The Office of the Solicitor General contended that the said provision cannot be applicable in this case since Article 26 talks about
mixed marriages, i.e., that of a Filipino to a foreigner. However, this was not the case in Cipriano and Lady Myros’ marriage
since both were Filipinos at the time of the marriage
Issue:
1. Does paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply in this case?
2. Can Cipriano remarry?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court looked at the legal intent of the provision and found out that the Civil Code Revision Committee’s intent in
including Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation wherein the Filipino spouse is deemed to remain married to the foreigner
when, after obtaining the divorce, the foreigner is no longer married to the Filipino. The Court then set the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2, Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The Court made it clear that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. Hence, since Lady Myros was already an American citizen at
the time she obtained the divorce abroad, Article 26 may be applied to the case.
2. Yes. As stated earlier, Lady Myros obtained the divorce in the United States at the time when she was already an American
citizen. This makes her divorce valid and has in fact incapacitated her to remarry. Cipriano, then, can also remarry as provided in
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

4. Republic vs. Manalo, GR No. 221029, 24 April 2018

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and after
due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage
between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to Justice Alicia
Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of
having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According
to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce
obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign
spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated
by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of
the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by
the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to
certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said that the limitation
provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection
clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and
Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances
are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue
favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to defend, among
others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those
foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid or constitutes
absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.

5. Rivera v. Republic, G.R. No. 238259, February 17, 2021

FACTS
This case involves a petition for recognition of a divorce granted in Japan filed by Irene Diaz Rivera, a Filipino citizen, in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City. Rivera claimed that she was married to Sadao Hida, a Japanese national, and that
their marriage ended in divorce on June 28, 2013. The RTC granted the petition, recognizing the divorce obtained in Japan.
However, the Court of Appeals (CA) set aside the RTC's decision, ruling that Rivera failed to prove the fact of the divorce decree
and the national law of Japan allowing divorce by agreement. Rivera appealed to the Supreme Court.
Doctrine:
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner that is validly celebrated and is
subsequently dissolved by a valid divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitates the Filipino spouse to remarry under
Philippine law. However, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven in accordance with
the rules of court.

6. Abel v. Rule, G.R. No. 234457, May 12, 2021

LEONEN, J.:
In a foreign divorce between a Filipino and an alien, it is immaterial which spouse initiated the divorce proceedings abroad in
light of the fundamental equality of women and men before the law. Once a divorce decree is issued by a competent foreign
court, the alien spouse is deemed to have obtained the divorce as required in Article 26(2) of the Family Code.

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders2 of the
Regional Trial Court, which dismissed a Petition for recognition of foreign judgment for being contrary to public policy.

On December 18, 2005, Raemark S, Abel (Abel), a citizen of the United States of America, and Mindy P. Rule (Rule), a Filipino
citizen, got married in the City of Los Angeles, California.3

On November 18, 2008, Abel and Rule jointly sought the summary dissolution of their marriage before the Los Angeles Superior
Court.4 They neither acquired community assets or liabilities nor bore any children during the time they were married. 5
Their Joint Petition for the summary dissolution of marriage was timely filed within five years from the date of their marriage.
They also waived their rights to appeal, move for a new trial, and ask for spousal support in their petition.6

On July 31, 2009, the Superior Court of California dissolved Abel and Rule's marriage.7 Seven days later, Abel received a copy
of the judgment of dissolution.8

Meanwhile, Abel reacquired his Filipino citizenship and became a dual citizen of the Philippines and the United States of
America on December 3, 2008.9 On the other hand, Rule became a citizen of the United States of America on September 21,
2012.10

On January 10, 2017, an authenticated California judgment dissolving Abel and Rule's marriage was recorded with the City
Registry Office of Manila.11 Abel then filed a Petition for the judicial recognition of foreign divorce and correction of civil
entry12 before the Regional Trial Court.

On February 22, 2017, the Regional Trial Court13 found the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance and directed Abel to
cause its publication in a newspaper of general circulation, once a week, for three consecutive weeks.14

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an Opposition15 to Abel's petition. It claimed that the divorce sought to be recognized
was not obtained by the alien spouse, contrary to law, because Abel and Rule jointly filed the petition for summary dissolution of
marriage.16 The Office of the Solicitor General stated:
25. For the same reason, while she was still a Filipino citizen, private respondent cannot file for and obtain a divorce
decree jointly with her foreigner spouse, as apparently allowed under California law, since private respondent is incapacitated to
do such act under her own national law. She does not have the legal capacity to give consent to a divorce that requires the
approval of both spouses to be given legal effect. Private respondent, as a Filipino citizen, is prohibited by her national law to
initiate, pursue, and conclude divorce proceedings of whatever sort, whether solely at her own instance or together with her
foreigner spouse.17 (Emphasis in the original)

The Office of the Solicitor General also claimed that the Joint Petition was tantamount to a severance of marriage upon a
stipulation of facts, confession of judgment, or even collusion between the parties, which are all against State policy. 18

In his Reply,19 Abel asserted that the divorce was obtained in the course of judicial proceedings and not through mutual
agreement.20 He also denied that the divorce was against public policy because he, as the foreign spouse, was the one who
obtained it. Further, he maintained that Article 26(2) of the Family Code does not state that the foreign judgment should be solely
obtained by the foreign spouse.21 Abel then emphasized that the divorce was not vitiated by collusion or any other vice that would
cause the denial of recognition of the foreign judgment.22

On July 5, 2017, the Regional Trial Court23 found merit in the Opposition and dismissed the Petition.

The Regional Trial Court held that the joint filing of a divorce decree by Abel and Rule contravened Article 26(2) of the Family
Code, which only allowed the alien spouse to obtain a divorce decree.24 It stated:
The fact [that] the subject divorce was jointly filed by the petitioner who was then a US citizen and the private respondent who
was then a Filipino citizen contravenes the tenor of Art. 26(2) of the Family Code. It is clearly stated under the said law that it is
only the alien spouse who is allowed to obtain the decree of divorce for purposes of capacitating him or her to remarry. At the
time the parties obtained the subject divorce, the private respondent was still a Filipino citizen, thus, she is bound by the
lex nationali principle and cannot obtain, by and for themselves, divorce decrees abroad. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce provided the same is obtained by the alien
spouse. Conversely, that paragraph denies recognition of foreign divorce if obtained by the Filipino spouse. Clearly. Article 26
does not allow a Filipino spouse to jointly obtain a divorce with his/her foreign spouse as this is contrary to Article 15 in relation
to Article 17(3) of the New Civil Code.25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The dispositive of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, the Opposition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is given due course and the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED as in (sic) contravenes public policy. This necessarily CANCELS the hearing scheduled
on July 14, 2017.

Meantime, following the dismissal of this case, the Request for the issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Et Ad Testificandum filed
by the petitioner, through counsel on July 4, 2017 and addressed to the Branch Clerk of Court is now moot.

SO ORDERED.26 (Emphasis in the original)

Abel moved for reconsideration, but the Regional Trial Court denied his motion.27 The dispositive portion of its September 6,
2017 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 5 July 2017) is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.28 (Emphasis in the original)

In his Petition for Review on Certiorari,29 petitioner Abel insists that the California Judgment granting his divorce from private
respondent Rule is not contrary to public policy and, hence, is capable of recognition and enforcement in the Philippines. 30

Petitioner asserts that a literal reading of Article 26(2) of the Family Code does not prohibit the recognition of a divorce jointly
obtained by the Filipino spouse and foreign spouse.31 He claims that the legislative intent behind Article 26 of the Family Code
was to eliminate the anomalous situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the foreign spouse even after the latter,
through their national laws, has already been released from their marital bonds. He argues that this legislative intent will be
upheld by recognizing the California Judgment.32

Petitioner likewise points out the peculiarities of his case, where he, as a dual citizen of the Philippines and the United States, is
still considered married to private respondent under Philippine law. On the other hand, private respondent, who has since become
a citizen of the United States, is now free to remarry under the laws of the United States.33 Because of this, petitioner claims that
he is unable to validly register in the Philippines his second marriage in the United States. This allegedly results in his failure to
safeguard the interest of his new spouse and their minor child over properties he has acquired in the Philippines. 34 In the absence
of any ground that would warrant the denial of recognition, petitioner posits that the California Judgment should be recognized as
part of the comity of nations.35

In its Comment36 public respondent Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, stresses that the Philippines still
follows a policy against the recognition of absolute divorce.37 It explains that Article 26(2) of the Family Code only recognizes a
divorce obtained by the alien spouse, not by the Filipino spouse.38 As such, it claims that a divorce jointly obtained by a Filipino
and an alien cannot fall within the exception under Article 26(2) as it is "not initiated or obtained solely by the alien spouse."39 It
adds that the same cannot be judicially recognized in the Philippines as it goes against existing public policy and discriminates
against other Filipinos.40

Additionally, public respondent maintains that a jointly obtained divorce is anathema to the State's policy of disallowing
annulment of marriages and legal separation obtained through collusion by the parties.41

In his Reply,42 petitioner insists that the joint divorce he and private respondent obtained from the California court falls within the
exception provided by Article 26(2) of the Family Code as held in Republic v. Manalo.43 He also maintains that Article 26(2)
does not require the alien spouse to solely obtain the divorce, as alleged by public respondent.44

With his reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, therefore becoming a dual citizen of the Philippines and the United States of
America, and private respondent's naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, petitioner claims that he now finds
himself at a disadvantage as his marital ties with private respondent have been fully severed under foreign law but subsist under
Philippine law, making her his compulsory heir.45

Moreover, petitioner underscores that the joint divorce was not vitiated by collusion as the ground cited for his divorce from
private respondent was "irreconcilable differences [that] have caused the irremediable breakdown of their marriage." 46 He adds
that collusion in divorce proceedings is an agreement between the spouses to make it appear that one or both spouses committed
a matrimonial offense or suppress evidence of a valid defense to enable the other spouse to obtain a divorce. He stresses that
nothing of that sort happened between him and private respondent when they jointly filed for a divorce 47

In lieu of a comment, private respondent sent a Letter-Explanation,48 which was treated by this Court as her comment to the
Petition.49 She says she does not object to the Petition and hopes that her divorce from petitioner be recognized in the Philippines
"so we can fully and freely live our new lives."50

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether a divorce decree jointly obtained by a Filipino and their alien spouse can be
judicially recognized in the Philippines.
I

This is not a novel issue.

In Republic v. Manalo51 and succeeding cases,52 we have consistently held that it is irrelevant if the foreign or Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding. Thus, the question that should be raised before the courts "is not who among the spouses
initiated the proceedings but rather if the divorce obtained . . . was valid."53 In Manalo:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have
ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League
of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying
a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation
or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,
resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to many under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter's national law.54 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

This interpretation finds support in the State's constitutional fiat to "ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and
men."55

Republic Act No. 9710, or the Magna Carta of Women, likewise "ensures the substantive equality of women and men" through
"the abolition of the unequal structures and practices that perpetuate discrimination and inequality." 56 Section 1957 of the Magna
Carta of Women then directs the State to eliminate discrimination on matters related to marriage and family relations and ensure
that men and women have "the same rights to enter into and leave marriages."58

Laws do not exist in a vacuum and must be harmonized with other laws and jurisprudence.59 Thus, Article 26(2) of the Family
Code, when read together with Section 19 of Republic Act No. 9710, can only be interpreted to mean that it is immaterial who
initiated the divorce proceedings abroad. In a concurring opinion to Manalo, it was emphasized that "[o]nce a divorce decree is
issued, the foreign spouse is deemed to have 'obtained' a divorce which capacitates him or her to remarry. The same status should
therefore be afforded to the Filipino spouse."60 Moreover, our laws:
. . . never intended for the Filipino to be at a disadvantage. For so long as the Constitution itself guarantees fundamental equality,
the absurd result from a literal and almost frigid and unfeeling interpretation of our laws should not hold. To say that one spouse
may divorce and the other may not contributes to the patriarchy It fosters an unequal relationship prone to abuse in such intimate
relationships.61

II

Here, petitioner and private respondent jointly filed for the summary dissolution of their marriage and their petition was granted
by the Superior Court of California.62

Public respondent avers that the divorce decree cannot be recognized in our jurisdiction because it was not obtained solely by
petitioner, who was then the foreign spouse, as required by Article 26(2) of the Family Code.63

Public respondent is mistaken.

Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws, in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

A clear and plain reading of the provision shows that what is only required is that the divorce must have been validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. It does not impose an additional requirement for the alien spouse to solely obtain the divorce.

Adopting public respondent's strained interpretation will likewise cause this Court to close its eyes to the fact that the laws in
some foreign countries "allow joint filing for a divorce decree to ensure that there be less incrimination among the spouses, a
more civil and welcoming atmosphere for their children, and less financial burden for the families affected." 64

The reality of joint petitions for divorce was acknowledged in Galapon v. Republic.65

In Galapon, Cynthia Galapon, a Filipino, and Noh Shik Park, a South Korean national, got married in Manila. A few months
later, they filed for a divorce by mutual agreement in South Korea and their divorce was confirmed by the Cheongju Local
Court.66

Back in the Philippines, Galapon filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign judgment. Her petition was granted by the
Regional Trial Court. This ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals, holding that "the divorce decree in question cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as Cynthia is concerned since it was obtained by mutual agreement." 67

In reversing the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Regional Trial Court decision, this Court in Galapon referred to the ruling
in Manalo that it is immaterial if the foreign or Filipino spouse initiated the divorce proceeding. 68Galapon emphasized that
"[p]ursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained
by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse."69

Applying Manalo and the later case of Galapon to the present case, that the divorce decree was obtained jointly by petitioner,
then a citizen of the United States of America, and private respondent, then a Filipino citizen, is of no moment. They are deemed
to have obtained the divorce as required in Article 26(2) of the Family Code, capacitating them to remarry under the Philippine
law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The July 5, 2017 and September 6, 2017 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila in Special Proceeding Case No. 17-137507 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

7. Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr. et al., G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United
States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972. In 1982 they were divorced in Nevada, USA. Petitioner re-married in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in the RTC of Pasay City stating that petitioner Alice’s business in
Ermita, Manila, the Galleon Shop, is their conjugal property and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community
property”. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation
he made in the divorce proceedings. Respondent on the other hand maintain that,the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?

HELD:
The divorce decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

8. Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara
got married in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their relationship. Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan declaring her marriage in Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC. However,
the trial court dismissed the petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality file the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
RULING:
Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the said rule
provides for who may file such petition, to wit:
Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. Thus, he has the legal personality to file the petition. PETITION
GRANTED.

9. Edna S. Kondo, represented by Attorney-in-fact, Luzviminda S. Pineda Vs. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No.
223628, March 4, 2020
On March 15, 1991, petitioner Edna S. Kondo and Katsuhiro
Kondo, a Filipina and Japanese, respectively, were married
before the Head of Hirano Ward in Japan. But on July 3,
2000, they obtained a divorce by agreement in Japan for
which they were issued a Report of Divorce. On November 7,
2012, Edna, through her sister and Attorney-in-Fact
Luzviminda S. Pineda, filed a petition for judicial recognition
of the divorce decree, citing Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code. The trial court denied the petition and noted that
under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the foreign divorce
should have been obtained by the alien spouse, not by
mutual agreement, as here. Moreover, the provisions of the
Japanese Civil Code, as presented to the trial court, did not
show that Katsuhiro was allowed to remarry upon obtaining
a divorce. On May 20, 2014, Edna filed a Motion for New
Trial, alleging she had newly discovered evidence which
could alter the result of the case — a copy of Katsuhiro’s
Report of Divorce, allegedly indicating that he had already
married a certain Tsukiko Umegaki. The trial court denied
Edna’s Motion for New Trial. Aggrieved, Edna assailed the
trial court’s Resolution before the Court of Appeals but the
Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the trial court.
Hence, she filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court

Whether or not petitioner-wife should be granted the

opportunitiy to present evidence of husband’s
capacity to remarry.

The Court ruled that the Divorce Report was not a newly discovered
evidence. Edna herself did not deny, as she in fact admitted that the second
Divorce Report was already existing during the proceedings below. To be
sure, Katsuhiro allegedly married Tsukiko as early as May 30, 2001. If this
were true, she should have promptly secured and presented a copy of the document during the trial. The Divorce Report
could not therefore be
deemed as newly discovered evidence. More so, since the trial court gave
her an additional opportunity to present evidence through its Order dated
December 3, 2013, but she still failed to present the second Divorce
Report.
However, the Court added that considering the recent jurisprudence on
mixed marriages under Article 26 of the Family Code, the trial court should
have been more circumspect in strictly adhering to procedural rules. For
these rules are meant to facilitate administration of fairness and may be
relaxed when a rigid application hinders substantial justice.
The Court cited the cases of Republic vs. Manalo, Racho vs. Tanaka, Moraña
vs. Republic of the Philippines, and Garcia vs. Recio to note that it has time
and again granted liberality in cases involving the recognition of foreign
decrees to Filipinos in mixed marriages and free them from a marriage in
which they are the sole remaining party. In the aforementioned cases, the
Court has emphasized that procedural rules are designed to secure and not
override substantial justice, especially here where what is involved is a
matter affecting lives of families. The Court saw no reason why the same
treatment should not be applied in this case so it relaxed the procedural
rules and granted the petition for Edna to present evidence

10. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization in 2000. In
2005, he married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. He went to Canada soon after the wedding. When
he returned to the Philippines four months later, he discovered that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce which was granted.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the registration, an official of the NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage between him
and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with
the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition to Gerbert's petition.

The RTC denied the petition, ruling that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:

1. Does the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction
for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

2. Does the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree?

3. Does the recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate proper?

Held:

1.) No. The provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26
of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse
can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

2.) No. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC
to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with the petition.

3.) No. There is no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. The registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect. (Corpuz vs. Sto.
Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010)