Suggested Answers To Jurists Political Law Mock Bar Examination

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™
SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO 2022

POLITICAL LAW MOCK BAR EXAM
Peter was prosecuted for violation of a law that he assailed to be oppressive,

whimsical, arbitrary, unreasonable and against the rudimentary notions of justice. After
trial, he was convicted. In his appeal, Peter claimed that there was a violation of his right
to substantive due process. The prosecution countered that there was no such violation
since Peter was duly heard. How tenable is the argument of the prosecution?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The argument of the prosecution is not tenable.
Under Constitutional Law, procedural due process refers the requirement of due
notice and hearing while substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of the
law, including its reasonableness.
Here, the challenge of Peter was on the reasonableness of the law, not on the
lack of notice and hearing.
Hence, the prosecution’s argument is untenable.
The Legal Education Reform Act of 1993 (R.A. 7662) was passed by Congress.
It created the Legal Education Board (LEB) and empowered it to administer legal
education and to supervise and administer the law schools in the country. The act also
empowered the LEB to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the
pursuance of its mandate.
Alarmed by the dismal pass rate in the bar examinations and the proliferation of
substandard review centers, the LEB issued a memorandum order requiring all bar review
centers to apply for and obtain a permit from the LEB as a condition for providing bar
review services to law graduates. The memorandum order further requires all
independent bar review centers to be operated by or affiliated with a duly recognized law
school and to meet performance benchmarks as a precondition for the grant of permit.
You are the legal counsel of Bar Busters Review Center, an independent bar review
center, and the owners request your opinion on whether the memorandum order is valid.
What would your opinion be?
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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
My opinion would be that the memorandum order is unconstitutional and thus

invalid.
Under the principle of separation of powers, an exercise of legislative power by a

government regulatory agency is unconstitutional and invalid since legislative power is
vested solely in Congress.
Here, the memorandum order is an undue exercise of legislative power since it in

effect amends the Legal Education Reform Act by including bar review centers within the
administrative and supervisory powers of the LEB. [See Review Center Association of
the Phils. v. Ermita, 2 April 2009]
Hence, the memorandum order is unconstitutional and thus invalid.
Mayor Naivette is a well-meaning but otherwise inexperienced politician. In her

attempt to be of service to her constituency, she came up with certain programs which
resulted in various lapses related to documentation requirements. She was eventually
charged with the complex crime of malversation through falsification of public
documents. Taken separately, neither malversation nor falsification carries the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. But if complexed, the resulting penalty would be reclusion
perpetua. Mayor Naivette wants to post bail in the meantime that her case is pending.
The Public Prosecutor opposes, claiming that since the complex crime is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not available. Is the stance
of the prosecutor correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the stance of the prosecutor is not correct.
The Supreme Court has stated that under the Constitution all persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, are entitled to bail as a matter of right and that “punishable” refers to the
prescribed penalty, not the imposable penalty.
Here, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty but the imposable penalty
since it can be imposed only after trial and after proof of the existence of a modifying
circumstance, that is, that the complex crime of malversation through falsification of
public documents was really committed. Thus, bail is available to Mayor Naivette since
she is entitled to it as a matter of right.
Hence, the prosecutor’s stance is not correct. [People v. Valdez, 776 SCRA 672
(2015)]
A bill, certified as urgent by the President, is introduced in and approved by a

simple majority of the Senate. It provides, among others, for the raising of funds to be
reserved for the use, by way of loan arrangements, of distressed public utility corporations
so as to enable them to continue providing the public with their services and facilities.
Said bill proposes the imposition of enforced contributions from manufacturers of sin
products, such as cigarettes and liquor. It authorizes the Department of Finance to
promulgate rules for purposes of determining the entities to be subjected to said enforced
contributions as well as the beneficiaries of the subject loan facilities in accordance with
standards clearly specified out in the bill, provided that said determinations shall be
subject to the approval of the Senate’s Committee on Finance. The bill likewise
authorizes the granting of exemptions from the enforced contributions over and above
those which may be granted by the Department of Finance, provided that said exemptions
shall be approved by a majority of all the members of Congress. Said bill, fully concurred
in by the House of Representatives, is forwarded to the President for appropriate action.
Discuss the validity of this measure.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The measure is unconstitutional.
Under the Constitution, all revenue bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives; otherwise, the bill shall be unconstitutional. [Sec. 24, Art. VI,
Constitution]
Here, the bill is a revenue measure since it aims to raise money for the government
by way of enforced contribution. However, the bill was introduced by and originated from
the Senate.
Hence, the measure is unconstitutional.
Congressman Mel Makapal, a party-list representative, is serving his third term as

a representative of the Mandurugas Party. He resigns and changes his party seven
months before the expiration of his third term, and is now nominated by his new party for
purposes of the next party-list election.
1. What effect, if any, would his resignation from the Mandurugas Party have on
his tenure as a member of the House of Representatives?
2. Would his nomination by his new party be valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
1. The effect of Congressman Makapal’s resignation from the Mandurugas Party

is that he is considered as having forfeited his seat as a party-list representative.
Under the Law on Elections, any elected party-list representative who changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat. [Sec. 15,
RA 7941].
2. No, Congressman Makapal’s nomination by his new party would not be valid.
Under the Constitution, no member of the House of Representatives shall serve

for more than three consecutive terms.
Here, Congressman Makapal had already served for three consecutive terms.
Hence, he can no longer run for a fourth consecutive term.
Hence, his nomination by his party would not be valid. [Constitution, Art. VI, Sec.
7]
Congressman Mas Makapal, an incumbent party-list representative representing

the youth sector of a political party, upon turning thirty years of age during the last six
months of his term, changes his sectoral affiliation, but remains a member of the same
political party, because of his anticipated disqualification to be nominated for re-election
as his party’s youth sector representative for purposes of the next election. Would he be
qualified for nomination by his new sector?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Congressman Makapal would not be qualified for nomination by his new
sector.
Under Election Law, if a party-list representative changes his political party or

sectoral affiliation within six months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as a party-list representative under his new party or organization. [Amores v.
HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010; Sec. 15, RA 7941]
Manny Mandirigma, who lost in the election following his first term as mayor, later
dislodges his opponent in a recall election. He serves out the remainder of the latter’s
term and is thereafter elected to the same position for another term. Would he be
qualified to run again for the same office after his last term?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Mandirigma would be qualified to run again for the same office after his last
term.
The Supreme Court has held that a victory in a recall election is not considered a
term of office within the three-term limit rule. [Adormeo v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 147927, February 4, 2002]
Here, Mandirigma’s victory in the recall election meant that he did not serve for
three consecutive terms since such victory is not considered a term of office.
Hence, Mandirigma is qualified to run again for the same office.
The Supreme Court forms a sub-committee for the revision of the Rules of Court.
The sub-committee comes up with a draft amendment of the rules on appeal providing
that appeals from the RTC which raise only legal questions shall be brought to the Court
of Appeals first by ordinary appeal and not to the Supreme Court directly via a petition for
review on certiorari. You are a consultant to the sub-committee and your opinion on the
validity of the proposed amendment is requested. What would be your opinion?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
My opinion would be that the proposed amendment is unconstitutional and thus

invalid.
Under the constitutional principle of separation of powers, legislative power is

vested solely in the legislature and may not be validly exercised by the judicial department
or Supreme Court.
Here, the amendment by a subcommittee of the Supreme Court would in effect

increase the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and would thus constitute an
exercise of legislative power since jurisdiction may be conferred only by law.
Hence, the proposed amendment would be unconstitutional and invalid.
9
An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City
against Rolando Lunar for the murder of Joseph Doe, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 9th day of March 2008, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill and with treachery, did then and there knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon one JOSEPH DOE, by then and there hitting and
beating his head with a baseball bat, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which
caused his death.
The killing of the aforesaid victim is qualified by the circumstance of treachery.
Rolando pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned. After trial, Rolando was
convicted of murder by the RTC. He appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which
affirmed the finding that Rolando unlawfully killed Joseph but downgraded his conviction
from murder to homicide. The CA stated that while the prosecution was able to prove
treachery, such circumstance could not be taken into consideration in qualifying the killing
since it was not alleged with particularity in the information.
a) Did the CA act correctly in downgrading Rolando’s conviction to homicide?

b) May the prosecution appeal the CA decision to the Supreme Court for the
purpose of upholding the RTC’s conviction of Rolando for murder?
Rolando appeals the CA decision to the Supreme Court.
c) May the Supreme Court modify the CA decision by affirming Rolando’s

conviction for murder?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
a) No, the CA did not act correctly in downgrading Rolando’s conviction to

homicide.
The Supreme Court has held that treachery may be appreciated against the
accused even if not alleged with particularity in the information since this defect is waived
if the accused does not file a motion to quash or a motion for a bill of particulars. [People
v. Solar, 6 August 2019, e.b., Caguioa, J.]
Here, Rolando did not file a motion to quash or a motion for a bill of particulars.
He is thus deemed to have waived the defect of failure to allege with particularity the
circumstance of treachery, which can thus be taken into consideration in qualifying the
killing to murder.
Hence, the CA did not act correctly in downgrading the conviction to homicide.
b) No, the prosecution may not appeal the CA decision for the purpose of
upholding the RTC’s conviction of Rolando for murder.
The Supreme Court has held that an accused would be put in double jeopardy if
the prosecution appeals a conviction for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
c) Yes, the Supreme Court may modify the CA decision by affirming Rolando’s
conviction for murder.
The Supreme Court has held that an appeal by the accused throws the entire case
wide open for review by the appellate court, and this includes the imposition of a graver
penalty or the conviction for a graver crime.
10
Daniel, a private American citizen, a university graduate, and frequent visitor to the
Philippines, was inside the US embassy in Manila when he got into a heated argument
with a private Filipino citizen. Then, in front of many shocked witnesses and as captured
in videotape, he killed the person he was arguing with. The police came and took Daniel
to the nearest jail. Daniel protested his arrest, saying that since the incident took place
within the US embassy, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the matter because
US embassy grounds are not Philippine territory. Is Daniel correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Daniel is not correct.
Under Public International Law, embassy grounds are still considered as part of
the territory of the country in which they are situated, and Philippine courts would thus
have jurisdiction over crimes committed therein.
11
Alavio Jacor, a Filipino citizen, was charged in the RTC of Manila with the violation
of the Cybercrime Prevention Act for hacking, from his personal computer in Manila, the
computer system of Merry Men, Inc., a U.S. online stock trading platform, and obtaining
secret proprietary information. Over Jacor’s objection, a U.S. information technology
expert was allowed to testify from Menlo Park, California, via MS Teams, a
videoconferencing platform. The court gave its imprimatur to the online hearing because
of the difficult travel situation brought about by the pandemic. Jacor’s lawyer participated
in the online hearing conducted by the court and cross-examined the expert. Based
primarily on the testimony of the expert, Jacor was convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment and fine. No appeal was interposed by Jacor within the reglementary
period and thus he proceeded to serve his sentence. You have been engaged as a
lawyer by Jacor and he asks for your advice on whether there is still any legal remedy
available to challenge or set aside his conviction. What would be your advice?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
My advice to Jacor would be that there is still a legal remedy available to challenge
or set aside his conviction, which is to file a petition for habeas corpus as a post-conviction
remedy.
Under Constitutional Law, a petition for habeas corpus is available as a post-

conviction remedy where there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting
in the conviction and imprisonment of a person. [Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil.
741]
Here, there was a violation of Jacor’s constitutional right to confront the witness
against him face-to-face in a criminal case. Such right contemplates a face-to-face in-
court confrontation, not a remote online hearing. This violation resulted in Jacor’s
conviction and imprisonment. The fact that Jacor’s lawyer participated in the hearing and
cross-examined the expert witness would not amount to a waiver of the right because it
is a fundamental and constitutional right.
Hence, Jacor may file a petition for habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy to
set aside his conviction and imprisonment.
12
(Note: Same basic facts as the preceding question, except that Jacor did not
challenge his conviction). After Jacor had been convicted of hacking under the
Cybercrime Prevention Act, an information for violation of the E-Commerce Act of 2000
was filed against him arising from the same act of hacking. Jacor filed a motion to quash
on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution opposed the motion arguing that
although Jacor was being prosecuted for the same act of hacking, it was for a different
offense punished this time under the E-Commerce Act. The prosecution also cited
Section 7 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act which provides that “a prosecution under this
Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code … or special laws.” Resolve the motion to quash.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy should be granted.
Under Constitutional Law, there is double jeopardy when a person who has been
convicted of an offense is prosecuted again for the same offense.
Here, the offense of hacking under the Cybercrime Prevention Act and under the
E-Commerce Act involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same
offense. The hacking arose from the same act of using a personal computer. Section
7 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act is void for being a blatant violation of the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy.
Hence, the motion to quash should be granted. [See Disini v. Secretary of

Justice, 18 February 2014, e.b.]
13
Unknown persons hacked the computer files of Mossack Fonseca, a Panamanian

law firm specializing in the creation of offshore accounts for high-worth clients, usually
government officials. The hacked files were leaked to the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) and included emails by Congresswoman Kuh Ruff to
Mossack Fonseca directing that $30 million be transferred to her offshore accounts in
Panama. The PCIJ published a report on the leaks which led to the Ombudsman
opening an investigation on the matter. Subsequently, Congresswoman Ruff was charged
before the Sandiganbayan with amassing ill-gotten wealth. The prosecution seeks to
introduce in evidence the emails of Congresswoman Ruff to Mossack Fonseca.
Congresswoman Ruff objects to the offer of evidence on the ground that the emails are
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional right to privacy of
communication and correspondence. Rule on the objection.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Objection overruled.
Under Constitutional Law, the constitutional right to privacy of communication and

correspondence may be invoked only against the State or its agents.
Here, there was no showing that it was the State or its agents which hacked the
emails of Congresswoman Ruff.
Hence, Congresswoman Ruff’s invocation of the constitutional right to privacy of

Communication and correspondence is misplaced and her objection should thus be
overruled.
14
The Philippines ratified the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Charter which provides for the free flow of services, including legal services, among
ASEAN countries. Pursuant to our commitment in the ASEAN Charter, Congress
passed a law allowing lawyers of ASEAN countries to render legal advice concerning
Philippine investment and commercial laws to their nationals working in or having
businesses in the Philippines. What, if any, would be the possible legal challenge to the
law?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The possible challenge to the law is that it would be unconstitutional.
Under the Constitution, the sole power to promulgate rules concerning admission
to the practice of law is lodged with the Supreme Court. [Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, Constitution]
Here, the law would allow foreigners not admitted to the bar by the Supreme Court
to practice law by studying Philippine laws and using their knowledge to advise clients.
Hence, the law can be challenged as unconstitutional.
15
Ramon, a City Legal Officer, and Cyrus, a City Vice-Mayor, filed certificates of
candidacy for the position of City Mayor in the local elections.
a) Was Ramon ipso facto considered resigned and, if so, effective on what date?
b) Was Cyrus ipso facto considered resigned and, if so, effective on what date?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
a) Yes, Ramon was ipso facto considered resigned.
Under Election Law, any person holding a public appointive office shall be
considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Here, Ramon is a City Legal Officer and thus an appointive official.
Hence, he is considered ipso facto resigned, effective on the date of the filing of
his certificate of candidacy. [Sec. 66, Omnibus Election Code; Quinto vs. Comelec,
February 22, 2010]
b) No, Cyrus is not considered ipso facto resigned.
Under Election Law, the provision regarding ipso facto resignation of an official
who files a certificate of candidacy does not apply to an elective official.
Here, Cyrus is a vice-mayor and thus an elective official.
Hence, Cyrus is not considered ipso facto resigned. [Quinto vs. Comelec, February
22, 2010]
16
Stursky was born to a Filipino mother and a foreign father in 1970. His parents
never got married. In 2016, Stursky won a seat in the House of Representatives. A quo
warranto case was filed before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
questioning his qualification, alleging that he was not a natural-born citizen since he never
elected Filipino citizenship pursuant to the Constitution. Is there basis for the quo warranto
petition?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, there is no basis for the quo warranto petition alleging that Stursky was not a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
The Supreme Court has held that under the 1935 Constitution, an illegitimate child
born of a Filipino mother and a foreign father acquires from birth the Filipino citizenship
of his or her mother and is thus a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Here, Stursky was an illegitimate child since his parents never got married. Stursky
is thus a natural-born Filipino citizen, having acquired his mother’s Filipino citizenship and
thus does not need to elect Filipino citizenship.
Hence, the quo warranto petition is without basis.
17
Polneo, a citizen, frustrated with the proliferation and mushrooming of political

dynasties, went to the Commission on Elections to disqualify certain candidates for being
allegedly clearly and undeniably members of political dynasties. Claiming that such
political groupings are prohibited by the Constitution, he wanted the COMELEC to take
action against them. The poll body dismissed the case outright. Polneo then elevated the
case to the Supreme Court, assailing the COMELEC for its alleged abdication of its duty
to enforce the election laws, including what is provided for in the Constitution against
political dynasties. The COMELEC defended its action, pointing out that Polneo really has
no valid right of action. Is the COMELEC correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the COMELEC is correct in pointing out that Polneo has no valid right of
action.
Under the Constitution, the prohibition against political dynasties requires for its
implementation that Congress pass a law defining political dynasties. [Art. II, Section 26]
Congress has not yet passed a law defining political dynasties.
Hence, the prohibition cannot yet be implemented and thus Polneo has no valid
right of action.
18
In a surprise attack, Chinese airborne troops assaulted Kalayaan Island,

overpowered the Filipino garrison, and occupied the island. Subsequently, the
Philippines demanded that China withdraw its occupation force, but China replied that it
would not do so since Kalayaan Island is part of its sovereign territory. China stated that
its position is non-negotiable and not subject to arbitration or dispute-resolution. May
the Philippines hail China before the International Court of Justice for its invasion of
Philippine territory?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Philippines may not hail China before the International Court of Justice.
Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the consent of the parties
is needed for the ICJ to acquire jurisdiction over a case.
Here, China had stated that its position is non-negotiable and not subject to
arbitration or dispute-resolution. Thus, it is clear that China would not consent to the
bringing of the dispute to the ICJ.
Hence, the Philippines cannot hail China before the ICJ.
-oOo-

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JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™

SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO 2022

Peter was prosecuted for violation of a law that he assailed to be oppressive,

The argument of the prosecution is not tenable.

Hence, the prosecution’s argument is untenable.

My opinion would be that the memorandum order is unconstitutional and thus

Under the principle of separation of powers, an exercise of legislative power by a

Here, the memorandum order is an undue exercise of legislative power since it in

Hence, the memorandum order is unconstitutional and thus invalid.

Mayor Naivette is a well-meaning but otherwise inexperienced politician. In her

No, the stance of the prosecutor is not correct.

A bill, certified as urgent by the President, is introduced in and approved by a

The measure is unconstitutional.

Hence, the measure is unconstitutional.

Congressman Mel Makapal, a party-list representative, is serving his third term as

1. The effect of Congressman Makapal’s resignation from the Mandurugas Party

Under the Constitution, no member of the House of Representatives shall serve

Congressman Mas Makapal, an incumbent party-list representative representing

Under Election Law, if a party-list representative changes his political party or

Hence, Mandirigma is qualified to run again for the same office.

My opinion would be that the proposed amendment is unconstitutional and thus

Under the constitutional principle of separation of powers, legislative power is

Here, the amendment by a subcommittee of the Supreme Court would in effect

Hence, the proposed amendment would be unconstitutional and invalid.

a) Did the CA act correctly in downgrading Rolando’s conviction to homicide?

Rolando appeals the CA decision to the Supreme Court.

c) May the Supreme Court modify the CA decision by affirming Rolando’s

a) No, the CA did not act correctly in downgrading Rolando’s conviction to

No, Daniel is not correct.

Under Constitutional Law, a petition for habeas corpus is available as a post-

The motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy should be granted.

Hence, the motion to quash should be granted. [See Disini v. Secretary of

Unknown persons hacked the computer files of Mossack Fonseca, a Panamanian

Under Constitutional Law, the constitutional right to privacy of communication and

Hence, Congresswoman Ruff’s invocation of the constitutional right to privacy of

The Philippines ratified the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The possible challenge to the law is that it would be unconstitutional.

Hence, the law can be challenged as unconstitutional.

a) Yes, Ramon was ipso facto considered resigned.

Here, Ramon is a City Legal Officer and thus an appointive official.

b) No, Cyrus is not considered ipso facto resigned.

Hence, the quo warranto petition is without basis.

Polneo, a citizen, frustrated with the proliferation and mushrooming of political

Congress has not yet passed a law defining political dynasties.

In a surprise attack, Chinese airborne troops assaulted Kalayaan Island,

Hence, the Philippines cannot hail China before the ICJ.

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