PH.D History Imtiaz Abbasi

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
DURING ZIA ERA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
PAKISTAN PEOPLE PARTY (1977-1988)
Session (2008-2011)
Ph.D. History
Researcher Supervisor
Imtiaz Ahmed Abbasi Professor Dr. Muhammad

Roll No: 02 Akbar Malik
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
The Islamia University of Bahawalpur

DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this thesis entitled “An Analytical Study of Political Parties During Zia
Era with Special Reference to Pakistan People’s Party (1977-88)” is a result of my personal
and independent investigation, except where I have indicated my indebtedness to other
sources.
I hereby certify that this thesis has not been submitted for any other degree nor is it being
submitted concurrently in candidature for other degree.
Imtiaz Ahmad Abbasi

Roll No. 02
Ph.D. (History)
Session: 2008-2011
i
Certificate
I hereby recommended the thesis prepared under my supervision by Imtiaz Ahmad
Abbasi entitled “An Analytical Study of Political Parties During Zia Era with
Special Reference to Pakistan People’s Party (1977-88)” be accepted in partial
fulfillment for the degree of Ph.D. in History.
Prof. Dr. Muhammad Akbar Malik

Department of History
The Islamia University of Bahawalpur
ii
APPROVAL CERTIFICATE
This thesis entitled “ An Analytical Study of Political Parties During Zia
Era with Special Reference to Pakistan People’s Party (1977-88)” which

has been prepared under my supervision, is hereby approved for submission to The
Islamia University of Bahawalpur in partial fulfilment of the requirement of the
degree of Ph.D. (History).
Supervisor: ___________________________________
External Examiner: ___________________________________
Coordinator ___________________________________
Chairman: ___________________________________
Date: ___________________________________
iii
To
My Parents
iv
Acknowledgement
First, I bow my head before Almighty Allah, who give me strength and courage to conduct
this study successfully. All respect for His Holy Prophet Hazrat Muhammad (S.A.W) who
enlightened our mind to recognize ourselves. It is pleasure for me to express my feelings of
gratitude for my supervisor Professor Dr. Akber Malik for his valuable guidance who
bestowed me a glorious chance to benefit from his immense knowledge. He has always been
very kind, friendly, easy to reach and helpful. Similarly, Dr. Shahid Hassan Rizvi and Dr.
Khursheed Ahmed provide me the chance to get their informative company. Moreover, I wish
to express my sincere feelings towards my family for their affections. I am thankful to my
wife Abida Shaheen, my daughters Khansa Kanwal and Sabahat Imtiaz, and my sons Haris
Imtiaz Abbasi, Zargham Imtiaz Abbasi who remember me in their prayers and support me to
continue higher studies.
Although, all of my Ph.D class was very caring and loving but I am grateful to Mushtaq
Ahmed and Syed Tariq Shah whose care inspired me a lot during my research work.
I also thank to my friends Professor Jalil Asghar Satti, Sardar Masood Ahmed Advocate,
Mahar Javed, Zulfaqar Ali Raja, Muhammad Asim, Zia-ur-Rehman Abbasi, and Abdul
Rehman Abbasi, Saffir Ahmad Abbasi whose cooperation facilitate me to complete my
research.
Imtiaz Ahmed Abbasi
Ph.D in History
Session 2008-11
v
Abbreviations
COAS Chief of Army Staff
CPC Communist Party of Pakistan
HRM Human Resource Management
ICJ Intentional Court of Justice
JUI Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam
JUP Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan
NAP National Awami Party
PDP Pakistan Democratic Party
PML Pakistan Muslim League
PPP Pakistan Peoples Party
SCP Supreme Court of Pakistan
TI Tehreek-i-Istiqlal
UK United Kingdom
UNESCO United Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization
UNICEF United Nations International Children Emergency Fund
USA United States of America
USSR United Soviet Socialist Republic
Z.A.B Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto
vi
Table of Contents
Contents Page Numbers
Abstract 1
Introduction 3
Chapter 1 11
The Role of Political Parties From 1947-77 11
Pakistan Muslim League 13
Pakistan Democratic Party 16
Tehrik-E-Istaqlal 17
National Awami Party 18
Jamaat-E-Islami 18
Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam 23
Jamiat-Ulema-e-Pakistan 24
Jeay Sindh Qoumi Mahaaz 24
Communist Party of Pakistan 25
Republican Party of Pakistan 26
Tashkand Agreement And Its Impacts 28
Failure of Democracy And Imposition of Martial Law 1969 31
Martial Law of 1969 And Its Political Consequences 35
Chapter 2 39
Political Activism And The Rise of Pakistan People’s Party 39
Bhutto’s Rising of Power: 39
Bhutto And The Bureaucracy 46
Bhutto's Reforms 49
Agrarian Reforms 56
vii
Industrial Reforms 60
Constitutional Reform 63
Social Reform 66
Constitutional Engineering During Bhutto Regime 69
Economic And Social Change During Bhutto Regime 71
Labor Reforms During Bhutto Regime 72
Nationalization Policy of Bhutto 74
Foreign Policy of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto And His Fall 75
Chapter 3 93
Major Steps of Zia-ul-Haq And Pakistan People’s Party 93
Zia’s Attitude Towards Political Forces 93
PPP’s Leadership And Zia Regime 98
Zia-ul-Haq As President 104
Politicization of Supreme Court 106
Five Year Plan (1978-83) 109
Constitutional Engineering And The Elections of 1985 112
Nussrat Bhutto Case And Its Political Effects 115
Chapter 4 123
MRD: The Revolutionary Movement 123
The Participation of Other Parties in MRD 127
Benazeer’s Exile 143
Election of 1985 And Movement For Restoration of 152
Democracy
Chapter 5
The End of Martial Law And The Beginning of Controlled 195
viii
Democracy
Participation of Other Political Parties 199
Differences Between Zia-ul-Haq And Junaijo 201
End of Zia-ul-Haq Regime And The Elections of 1988 206
Chapter 6 208
Conclusion 208
Appendixes 228
Bibliography 249
ix
Abstract
Although Pakistan had experienced two Martial Laws before, but the Zia
regime was the most crucial in the history of Pakistan where political cleansing was
occurred officially with the help of Pakistan Army. Besides Pakistan Peoples Party,
policies of General Zia-ul-Haq showed that he was against all the democratic force of
Pakistan. And, his such attitude became the reason of starting a Movement for
Restoration of Democracy. Although, the rightist political parties were supporting
Zia’s policy of Islamization, referendum of 1984 and non-party based elections of
1985, but the popularity of MRD grew up day by day. Junaijo’s demand of getting
democratic powers was due to the pressure building by the MRD whose basic
objective was to restore parliamentary system in original shape as described in the
Constitution of 1973. The results of 1988 election showed that, this movement was
against the dictatorial politics of Zia-ul-Haq.
This study highlights the role of Pakistan Peoples Party in the politics of
Pakistan since its emergence. It covers the issues such as Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as
Foreign Minister during Ayub regime, Chairman of Pakistan Peoples Party, Civilian
Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan, and Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Similarly, this study focuses upon the political environment which was designed after
the military coup of General Zia-ul-Haq, where workers and leaders of Pakistan
Peoples Party were suffered a lot. After the hanging of Bhutto and implementation of
Zia’s policies of Islamization, Movement for the Restoration of Democracy started
which is the case study of this research. The consequences of this movement on Zia’s
referendum of 1984, non-party based elections of 1985 and Zia-Junaijo differences
are also observed here. Keeping in view the organization of the study the thesis deals
with the introduction consisted of the statement of the problems, justification and
objectives of the study, hypothesis, research questions and organization of the study.
It is divided into six chapters. Chapter one focuses upon the role of political parties in
1
Pakistan during different regimes since 1947-77. Chapter two highlights emergence
and rise of Pakistan Peoples Party since 1967 and presented different policies and
reforms under the leadership of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Chapter three defines imposition
of MRD as revolutionary Movement. Participation of other political parties,
Benazeer’s hardships, Election of 1985 and its effects on the history of Pakistan.
Chapter four tries to evaluate the major steps of Zia-ul-Haq and consequences of
controlled democracy. Chapter five deals with the ending of Martial Law and the
beginning of controlled democracy. Chapter six is based on conclusion, findings and
recommendations.
2
Introduction
As the Pakistan Movement was based on two-nation theory, the conclusion of

the desiring Muslims of British India to establish a separate homeland for the
Muslims. This was a movement against British as well as Hindu oppression that did
not allow Muslims of India to live freely according to their customs and traditions. On
the other hand, the Pakistan Movement was faithfully opposed by some of religious
leaders, famously called “Mullahs”. They were against the leadership as well as
movement, initiated by the All India Muslim League.
After the independence of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan became the first Prime
minister of newly independent country while Muhammad Ali Jinnah became the first
Governor General. This newly country was consisted of two wings that was called
West Pakistan (including Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, NWFP now (Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa), Tribal Areas, Northern Areas now (Gilgit-Baltistan and Kashmir) and
East Pakistan (East Bengal). The government of Liaqat Ali Khan faced several
difficulties in East and West wing of Pakistan. In the same year, India and Pakistan
went for a War of 1948 that began for Indian illegal claim over the region of Kashmir.
Both Liaqat Ali Khan and Muhammad Ali Jinnah were strong-minded to discontinue
the riots and the refugee problems, and to make an effectual executive system for the
new country. Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan did the revolutionary work for the
foreign policy of Pakistan as well taking several initiatives towards the making of new
constitution. In 1949, he presented the Objectives Resolution in Constituent Assembly
as guided principle for the future constitution of Pakistan. It had been called as
"Magna Carta" in the constitutional history of Pakistan. Both the United States of
America and Soviet Union send their invitations to Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan.
However, firstly, he choose to visit United States. Moscow perceived it as a Pakistani
turn towards capitalist world. So, Soviet behavior had been changed towards Pakistan
although Liaqat Ali Khan tried to keep Pakistan natural in the Cold War. He then,
think over the visit Soviet Union but did not make it possible due to the cold attitude
of this big power.
3
Same year, Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared Urdu as an official language of
Pakistan and this decision was criticized in East Pakistan where Bengali language was
spoken by majority of population. Governor General, Muhammad Ali Jinnah also
faced serious problems from Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army; General Sir
Douglas Gracey who refused to act upon his orders. General Gracey argued that
Muhammad Ali Jinnah as a Governor General, is representing the British Crown and
not send troops in Kashmir.
During Liaqat Ali Khan's tenure, India and Pakistan agreed to decided the
Kashmir dispute in peaceful way. According to this accord, a ceasefire was enforced
in Kashmir on January 1, 1949. Both the countries agreed that a free and impartial
plebiscite will be held under the United Nations.
In 1948, after the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah Pakistan faced attacks from
religious minorities through militant organizations and groups of West Pakistan.
Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan was involved in this preche. On the other hand, Liaqat-
Nehru pact was signed on 1950, which aimed at to reduce tension between Pakistan
and India and to protect the religious minorities in both the countries.
In East Pakistan, Bengali people started their movement in favor of Bengali

Language that converted into civil disobedience movement in 1952. In reaction of
police, seven protesters had been killed and movement spread all over the East
Pakistan. In the end, Government of Pakistan agreed to provide equal status to both
the languages; Urdu and Bengali which even later, agreed in the constitution of 1956.
In East Pakistan, the Language Movement reached to its peak on February 21,
1952, when the police and army opened fire on the students near Dhaka Medical
College, protesting to receive equal status for Bengali against Urdu. Several protesters
were killed, and the movement gained further support throughout East Pakistan. As a
result, Government agreed to provide equal status to Bengali as a national to Bengali
as a state language of Pakistan.
4
In 1951, unsuccessful attempt was made by some of the civil and military
elements to over though the government with the help of Communist party but this
attempt had been crushed by the Pakistani Army. This attempt was called then the
Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case. The conspiracy was infact a plan to bring about
communist revolution. As a result, the Government banned the registration as well as
the working of Communist Party in Pakistan.
In 1958, Ayub Khan imposed first Martial Law in Pakistan. This was a
revolving point in Pakistan's history and now the system had been converted into
presidential form of government. With the end of Sino-Indian war of 1962, some of
Pakistani Armed Offcial made a plan to start Operation Gebralter in Kashmir.
Pakistan Army send Mujahideen in Kashmir, which converted into direct war over
Kashmir in 1965. India suffered great loss near the border of Chawinda. Pakistan had
been captured some areas of Amritsar. On the request of India in United Nations,
Ayub started negotiations in Tashkent with Indian Prime minister, Lal Bahadue
Shastri. This accord was called Tashkent Declaration, which was opposed by Bhutto
and on return to Pakistan he resigned from the cabinet of Ayub Khan, formed his own
political party, called Pakistan Peoples Party.
After resigning of Ayub khan, due to huge protest in Pakistan against his rule,
Yahya khan imposed third Martial Law all over the country and announced first
general elections of Pakistan in 1970. In these elections, Awami League, led by
Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman got simple majority in the National Assembly due to his
six point agenda, while PPP got seats of National Assembly from Punjab and Sindh.
Political crisis had been started in Pakistan for shifting the government to Awami
League. Even, Yahya Khan announced that “Mujeeb will be the next prime minister
of Pakistan” but Bhutto opposed it. Pakistan Peoples Party started civil disobedience
movement in reaction of announcement for shifting political powers to Awami
League. Mujeeb demanded separation of East Pakistan from United Pakistan. Military
Operation had been initiated by the government and Mujeeb was arrested and
poisoned in Faisalabad jail. Civil war had been started in East Pakistan, and India was
supporting militant group of Awami League, called Mukti Bahni. In November 1971,
5
India directly attacked on East Pakistan and on December 16, 1971, Pakistan Army
surrendered in front of Indian forces. East Pakistan converted into Bangladesh just
due to Mujeeb-Bhutto political conflict.
Yahya Khan lost his control over the country and resigned. Bhutto became
First Civilian Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan. He started his
work on making new constitution and soon with the consent of all the members of
National Assembly, got approval of new constitution from the National Assembly.
This constitution was enforced on August 14, 1973 and Bhutto has become the Prime
Minister of Pakistan. Chaudhary Fazal Elahi was appointed as the President of
Pakistan.
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto disapproved the capitalist policies of President Ayub

Khan and introduced socialist economic reforms. He announced policy of
Nationalization for the welfare of poor class. He also announced labor policy for the
welfare of working class and declared their rights and powers of trade and labor
unions.
PNA (an alliance of Jamat-e-Islami, Jamiat ulama-e-Islam Mufti mehmood

Group, National Awami Party and Tehreek-e-Istaqlal) started movement against these
reforms. Scholars argued that PNA movement was fully funded by the capitalist
world as well as domestic industrialists of that time. So, in the elections of 1977, this
movement also faced defeat but did not stop its protest and blamed rigging in the
elections in favor of PPP. This sponsored movement ended with the imposition of
Martial Law by Zia-ul-Haq and the dismissal of Bhutto’s Government.
Zia announced new elections within 90 days but due to the popularity of PPP
and the fear of his court martial, he postponed new elections. Moreover, Bhutto was
hanged on April 4, 1979 in a controversial murder case. Now, Zia announced his
policy of implementing Islamic laws, called “Islamization”. Actually, this was an
effort to strengthen his rule over the country.
6
Pakistan Peoples Party and its Allies had understood that this is a pure politcal
effort. Soon they initiated a movement for restoration of democracy, called, MRD
(Movement for Restoration of Democracy). This movement got popularity within
days and Zia used military power to crush this movement, especially in Sindh where
gunship helicopters fired on peasants who were protesting against illegal rule of Zia.
Soon, this movement spread all over the country, and due to the fear of
popular political parties, Zia announced non-party elections in 1985. MRD boycotted
these elections but rightist political parties like Pakistan Muslim League and Jamat-e-
Islami participated in it. Due to 8th amendment in the constitution of 1973, political
system of Pakistan had been converted into semi-presidential system. Therefore, new
government of Junaijo was nominal and actual powers were belonged to Zia-ul-Haq.
Soon, on Afghan conflict and several domestic political affairs, Zia had several
differences with Junaijo and he dismissed National Assembly in 1988. He announced
new elections but again keeping in view the popularity of MRD and decided to hold
these elections on non-party bases.
But, on August 18, 1988, Zia had died in plane crash near Bahawalpur and
Ghulam Ishaq Khan became new president of Pakistan. Elections were held on party
bases which was a clear victory of MRD. Pakistan Peoples Party got simple majority
and Benazeer Bhutto became first female prime minister of the Muslim world. Even,
system was still semi-presidential due to 8th amendment of Zia-ul-Haq, but people of
Pakistan were happy to see their elected representatives in the National Assembly.
The political parties play an important role in setting new trends and reforming
the social stucture. In the west, people join a party while keeping in view its
constitution and manifesto. In the third world, this tradition is weak due to the lack of
political insight in the common people. In Islamic countries, like Pakistan, religion
could not be separated from the politics.
In fact, the culture of political parties is very weak in our country. Most of the
parties do not fulfill the basic requirements of a political party of a democratic
society. On the other hand, mushroom growth of political parties has made
7
meaningless the true sense of a political party. In other reason the weak democratic
traditions, promoted the imposition of Martial Law repeatedly in Pakistan.
The remarkable thing of the PPP is that it was formulated against Martial Law
and dictatorship, and continued its struggle against the military rule. It was a leftist
party and wanted to promote socialism in the country. The eparchy ruled over the
country from 1971-77. After that, its decline started and remained till 1988. During
this period, the PPP played a significant role as an opposition party in the politics of
Pakistan. Because, it was a single party which had country wide roots in the masses.
So, it is necessary to analyze circumstances and activities of the PPP during this
period.
Further we see that PPP put forward and perceived Islamic theme of socialism
and upheld the interest of Muslim majority in various parts of the world. It always
supported the Muslims of Kashmir and Palestine for their right of self-determination
and unification of the Muslim world. So, it will be important to comprehend the
whole struggle of this political party.
The selected period of studies for research is very important due to its,
transition of from dictatorship to democracy. The research work is also be important
as it would be the first research work on the role of opposition during mentioned
period.
There are many political leaders whose characters, achievements and role is
still hidden from the eyes of the people of Pakistan. The present study will be helpful
to understand the political issue and the remedies. Anyhow, the objectives of the
study were as under:
1) To critically evaluate the role of PPP as a prominent political party and

opposition it performance as an opposition organization in the political
history of Pakistan from 1977-88.
2) To highlight the issues related to the intellectual and international aspects of

Pakistani politics.
8
3) To offer and insight full analysis of the PPP’s politics and to pin point various
mile stones in its policy and structure during this period.
4) To know the value of various events, roles and personalities in the context of
overall political system of Pakistan during the set period.
5) To see the impacts of Martial Law in the politics of Pakistan.
6) To know about the nature and political will of the parties, especially of the
PPP during the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in
Pakistan.
7) To emphasize the role of MRD and other political parties during the Zia’s
Islamization, non-party elections of 1985, specially during the Junaijo
government.
Pakistan Peoples Party has exposed Zia’s so-called Islamization, constitutional

engineering, referendum and non-party based electoral system, for strengthen his
illegal rule. Keeping in view this reality there arose some research questions which I
have discussed in this study. These were as follows:
1) Why Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto established his new Political Party?
2) What was the role of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as a Civilian Martial Law
Administrator and President after the Fall of Dhakka and resigning of
President Yahya Khan?
3) How Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto led the country as an elected prime minister during
his regime?
4) Why opposition opposed the policies of Pakistan Peoples Party?
5) Why Zia-ul-Haq feel fear to held elections within 90 days?
6) What were the causes of Bhutto’s hanging?
9
7) How Zia strengthened his rule?
8) Why Junaijo was appointed as a prime minister by the Zia-ul-Haq?
9) Why political parties did not participate in the elections of 1985?
10) How MRD got popularity in the country; especially in Punjab and Sindh?
11) After the dismissal of Junaijo, what was the policy of Zia-ul-haq?
12) In the elections of 1988 weather the success of Pakistan Peoples Party was
actually the success of MRD?
This research is based on historically descriptive, comparative, analytical and

qualitative methods. All the data is collected from books, newspapers, journals,
articles, speeches, internet and interviews of several politicians, historians and
scholars.
10
Chapter 1
The Role of Political Parties From 1947-77
The Political history of Pakistan is marked with unnecessary delay in

constitution making, breakdown of constitutional order, political instability, Military
rule, extra Parliamentary pressure and agitation for political change. Pakistan had
three regular constitutions which were significantly abrogated by the military
dictators1. During the years of parliamentary rule, the political parties often violated
the spirit of the constitution and democracy. They got engaged in ruthless struggle for
power, regional and narrow political interests and priorities which supersed the needs
of political consensus building and shared decision making2. In the fifties, Pakistan
suffered from a serious problem of political instability and confusion. The elected
Government often resorted to authoritarian ways, using the state apparatus to suppress
dissent. These tendencies were reinforced during military rule. Pakistan returned to
democratic path in 1985 after long period of Martial Law. Though this transition was
commendable, the performance of the political parties was absolutely unsatisfactory,
raising doubts about institutionalization of the democratic process3. It is important to
understand the dynamics and causes of these developments that:
1) Why Pakistan could not evolve viable political institutions and faced serious
problems of political and economic management? And;
2) Why the civil and military establishment able to expand their role and become
important power wielders?
There are many issues about military rule in Pakistan and there impacts on
political process. Pakistan returned to democracy and its slow spectacular transition is
1
Hameed Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, London, 2005,
p.57.
2
Rafiullah Shehab, The Politcal History of Pakistan, The University of Michigun, Michigun, 1995, p.31.
3
Christophe Jaffrelot, The History of Pakistan And Its Origins, Wimbledon Publishing, London, 2004,
pp.20-23.
11
another important aspect of country’s politics and democracy4. Ian Talbot states that
the first decade of parliamentary politics was marked by miserable failure5. The state
was governed through Government of India Act 1935, now governed through the new
constitution of 1956 that was ratified the Muslim League, the only nationwide
political organization had disintegrated and tradition had been established of
executive dissolution of both provincial and national government. In the absence of
nationwide general elections, Pakistan had to wait until 1970 for this democratic land
mark6. The parliamentary system was unable to strengthen its roots. Prime Ministers
moved through revolving doors of office with increasing rapidity as power slipped to
Army. The political and constitutional crisis exacerbated the tension between center
and provinces7.
McGrath advocated that the system which was designed by the politicians for
experiencing democracy had been failed during this period. The road which was
going towards Martial Law, paved with the corruption and malpractices of
politicians8. Khalid Bin Sayeed traced Pakistan’s democratic failure back to the early
days of Jinnah’s Governor General ship9.
Pakistan began with dominant party system. The Muslim League was the
dominant party in the early years of independence while, several small parties existed
in legislature and the outside. Most of these parties having weak organizational
structure often fell in victim to inter-dissension and conflicts10. Actually, these
political parties consisted of small interest groups and influential personalities. These
political parties had also suffered due to periodic disruption of the democratic process
4
Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in The Twenieth Century, Oxford University Press, London, 1999, p.12.
5
Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, C.Hurst & Company Publishers Limited, London, 2009, p.14.
6
Ibid., p.125.
7
Ibid., p.126.
8
Allen McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy, Oxford univesity Press, London, 1996, p.58.
9
Khalid bin Saeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, The Pakistan Publishing House, Karachi, 1960,
p.171.
10
Shoukat Ali, Pakistan: A Religio-Politcal Study, The National Institute of Historical And Cultural
Research, Islamabad, 1997, p.28.
12
by the imposition of Martial Laws. When the political parties either disallowed to
function or severe restrictions were imposed on their activities, Pakistan’s return to
democracy in 1973 had provided yet another opportunity to the political parties and
the leaders to perform their role in strengthening democracy and consolidating the
national identity11. It was reassuring that regardless of difficulties and problems, these
political parties had strived for democratic course. However, there was the need to
improve their performance12. The following discussion provides a historical sketch of
major political parties and their performance in political process.
Pakistan Muslim League
The Muslim League (PML) founded in 1906, is the oldest Political Party in
Pakistan. It waged the Muslims’ struggle for independence, changed the political map
of the sub-continent and created Pakistan. Therefore, it enjoyed a unique position in
Pakistan and was the natural inheritor of state power at the time of freedom. The
Muslims have great emotional attachment with the Muslim League, because its name
was synonymous with the Muslim liberation movement. This phenomenon had an
impact on post-independence politics. Several political parties which emerged after
the independence adopted the name of “Muslim League”. These were the Jinnah
Muslim League, The Awami League, the Qayuom Muslim League and the Quaid-a-
Azam Muslim League13.
After independence, Muslim League formed the government in center and

provinces. During its long spell of power since 1947-54, it enjoyed undisputed
supremacy in politics. However, it failed to develop feasible and comprehensive
program for the welfare of the people. Most of its leaders were interested in capturing
office than serving the nation. They started controversies against each other rather to
11
Ibid., p.30.
12
Ibid., p.31.
13
Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq, Greenwood Publishing, Westport, 2012, p.213. Also see
Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan: Role of Muslim League And Inception of Democracy 1947-54, Jang
Publishers, 1997, pp.166-171.
13
strengthen the country14. They were largely responsible for damaging the prestige of
the party and democratic process in the country. Their differences and rivalries
undermined the organization and discipline of the party and caused its disintegration.
Some of its members left the party. Division of Muslim League started in 1947 and it
was bifurcated the party into two parts. In 1948, the PML Council adopted a party
constitution which disqualified ministers from holding any office in the party
organization. When Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s name was proposed for the
president, he refused. As a result, Muslim League could not get benefits from the
leadership of Jinnah. Chaudhary Khaliq-uz-Zaman was elected the chief organizer
and was assigned the responsibility of organizing the party at different levels. But, he
could not prove himself as an alternative of the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali
Jinnah’s charismatic and dynamic leadership qualities. He was unable to run the party
in more organized manner. He patronized his supporters in the provinces and the party
became as his loyalist group. As the internal divisions sharpened, the PML began to
lose its integrity. Due to poor state of affairs, he was forced to resign from the office
as the president of the party15.
After the exit of Khaliq-uz-Zaman, PML amended the party constitution to

pave way for election of Liaquat Ali Khan as its president. The amendment was so
smooth that he was easily elected as the president of the party in 1950. Even Liaquat
Ali Khan could not revive and retrieve party status and reputation for several reasons
given bellow:
 In fact firstly, he was too busy in government affairs rather than to pay
attention in party affairs.
 Secondly, party was identified and handmade of the government.
14
Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, The Muslim League And The Demand for Pakistan,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp.114-119. Also see Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul-
Haq,p.218.
15
Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, pp.120-124. Also see Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul-
Haq, pp.220-221.
14
 Thirdly, Liaqat Ali Khan encouraged personal affiliations in the provinces
against rivals. Therefore, party was going towards division16.
After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, khawaja Nazim-ud-Din became

the prime minister of Pakistan and he was also elected the party president after the
amendment in party constitution to facilitate him. Nazim-ud-Din was essentially weak
person who showed lack of interest in running the party. He did not even nominate all
the members of working committees for consulting national affairs. Gradually, it
became so weak when Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad dismissed Nazim-ud-
Din in 1953, and appointed Muhammad Ali Bogra as prime minister, he was readily
accepted the PML president. These events exposed the worthlessness of the party
organization, and shock the confidence of the people in its capabilities17.
In 1956, the constitution of the party was amended to exclude ministers from
holding party offices. After this, Sardar Abdur-Rab Nishtar was elected its president.
He was indeed a man having strong leadership qualities. He restored discipline of the
party. After his death, Abdul Qayuom Khan was elected as new president of the PML.
He kept up firm control on the activities of the PML members in the assembly
according to party discipline. Under his partnership, Muslim League regained its
reputation and integrity to great extent. In 1958, first Martial Law was imposed which
banned all the Political activities.18
Mushtaq Ahmad highlighted the role of Muslim League in politics thus soon;
party was deprived of its top leadership. Party organization was thrown out of gear by
the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. The leaders of the party were neither sincere
nor they possess capability to organize party on strong basis. For these reasons, party
16
Haq, pp.232-236.
17
Haq, p.152.
18
Aleem Al-Razi, Constitutional Glimpses of Martial Law: In India, Pakistan And Bangladesh, 1988,
pp.141-144.
15
was divided and lost its glamour and glory soon after partition19. Party was packed
with yes men of the president. It could not perform its main function of controlling the
policies of the government. It had not courage to place any program before the
assembly. It would meet and dispersed at the sweet will of the president20.
Pakistan Democratic Party
The Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) came into existence in1969 after the
merger of political parties namely Nizam-e-Islam Party, Awami League, National
Democratic Front and the Justice Party. At the time of merger, these parties’ leaders
were Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, Nawabzada Nasurullah Khan, Nur-ul-Amin and Air
Martial Asghar Khan respectively. They were noted for their moderate views and
strong belief in the unity and solidarity of Pakistan. The PDP aimed at creating a
democratic social order and Islamic values of justice, equity, freedom, universal
brotherhood and human dignity in conformity with the Holy Quran and Sunnah21.
The PDP maintained a national policy at the time when several other parties
had adopted regional approaches for national problems. It was a broad based party
with liberal political perception and its members were lawyers, old political workers
and ex-service men. In 1970 elections, the Manifesto of the party called for the grant
of fundamental rights, acceptance of 1956 constitution with certain amendments in
pursuance of independent foreign policy, separation of judiciary from executive,
withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO, teaching of Holy Quran and Islamiat22 to
Muslim children, elimination of economic and social disparity, nationalization of big
industry and the need of land reforms23.
19
Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Kahn Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-69, The University of Michigun,
Michigun, 1971, p.199.
20
Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, pp.178-179.
21
Nazeer Ahmed, political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead. The University of Michigun,
Michigun, 2004, pp.67-69. Also see Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan,
pp.132-136.
22
Islamiat mean ‘Islamic Studies’.
23
Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, pp.170-178.
16
During 1971-77, the PDP played an active role in the opposition ranks. It was
extremely critical of the PPP’s government and undemocratic and authoritarian
political management. The PDP refused to accept the election results due to the
charge of rigging of the election by the ruling party. It took active part in agitation
against Bhutto’s government and demanding fresh elections. Nawabzada Nasurullah
Khan played an important role in the movement and the PNA for resolving the
political crisis. After the imposition of Martial Law by General Zia-ul-Haq, PDP
joined the government24.
Tehrik-E-Istaqlal
Air Marshal (retired) Muhammad Asghar Khan is the founding father of the
party. He entered in politics at the most appropriate time. In October 1968, the
movement against Ayub Khan was gradually picking up pace. The students and labor
agitation and demonstration against government had become regular feature. The
Tehrik-e-Istaqlal(TI) gathered in its ranks various ideological and political elements
comprised socialist, moderate, rightists and fewer bureaucrats. In its program the
party advocated, economic amelioration, fair distribution of wealth, Islamic justice
and independent foreign policy25. During the 1977 elections, it joined the PNA against
the PPP. It played an important role in PNA election campaign and the subsequent
movement against election rigging in 1977. The PNA and PDP combined in a military
take over when General Zia-ul-Haq constituted federal cabinet representing the armed
forces and the PNA, the Tehrik-e-Istaqlal refused to join and withdrew from the PNA.
The Tehrik resumed its role in the opposition, when Zia-ul-Haq did not honor his
promise to hold elections in 197926. It demanded withdrawal of the Martial Law, fresh
general elections and restoration of the 1973 constitution. The Tehrik joined the MRD
and fully participated in its activities. The Tehrik boycotted in 1985 nonparty
elections in pursuance of the decision taken by the MRD but actively participated in
1988 elections. In its manifest party promised the abolition of feudal system, in
24
Ibid., pp.179-180.
25
Rafiullah Shehab, The Politcal History of Pakistan, pp.141-143.
26
Ibid., pp.161-166.
17
expensive justice, religious freedom free press, elimination of corruption, self reliance
unemployment allowance and non-aligned foreign policy. But party could not fare
well in the elections in spite of its long history of political struggle and well-organized
party structure27.
National Awami Party
National Awami Party (NAP) was established in 1957. It was merger of six
minor parties including Azad Pakistan Party, Red Shirt, Sindh Awami Mahaz and
Sindh Haari Committee28. The NAP’s main objectives were the breakup of One Unit
in West Pakistan, introduction of land reforms, regional autonomy, and abrogation of
defense pacts with the west and adaption of independent foreign policy. Earlier, the
leaders of this party opposed the demand for the creation of Pakistan and sided with
the Indian National Congress (INC) in the freedom struggle. Since then, they had
worked for united India. They naturally faced problems regarding finding their role in
the national politics of Pakistan. It could not get support in national level by the
masses over its stance of provincial autonomy regarding establishment of
Pakhtunistan for the Pathans and Sindhu Desh for the Sindhees. This party was not
properly organized and its different factions held opposite ideology29.
Jamaat-E-Islami
The Jamat-e-Islami (JI) was established in Lahore on August 26, 1941, as a

movement to endorse Socio-Political Islam30. There were just 75 people in its first
meeting. Before the foundation of Jamat-e-Islami, Sayyad Abul Aa'la Moududi was
recognized for his writings regarding the role of Islam in South Asia. As an advocate
of the ideological state, Moududi played a significant and debatable role during the
27
Ibid., pp.170-178.
28
Anthony Hyman, Pakistan: Zia And After, Abhinav Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, pp.210-211. Also see
Peter R. Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study, Oxford University Perss, London, 1996, p.222.
29
Ibid., pp.223-224.
30
Irfan Ahmad, Islamism And Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami, Princeton
University Press, New Jersy, 2009, p.23.
18
regime of Pakistan Movement. His ideology had since been prominent among Islamist
fundamental groups around the world, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood (a
political party and organization) in Egypt31.
Abul Aa’la Moududi adopted Islamist philosophy after analyzing various

factors including the Khilafat Movement, the end of the Ottoman Caliphate by
Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, the leadership crisis in all over the Muslim world, Influence
of Indian Nationalism over Muslims, and the approach of the Indian National
Congress and Hindus. At last in 1940, (when the All India Muslim League passed the
Lahore Resolution, later called Pakistan Resolution) he promulgated among Muslims
of British India that they are not just a nation and their purpose is not only the
founding of a national government, but they are also as a preacher and messenger
nation32.
Moududi wrote essays and articles about political problems. He gave

comprehensive discussions regarding patriotism and opposed the propaganda of
congressional scholars who were arguing that all the people of the British India were
just one nation, and trying to congregate every one under the guidance of Congress
against the British administration33. Moududi condemned the leaders of Indian
National Congress (INC) by saying that these so-called nationalists were asking for
the autonomy that he considered as worse than the British rule. He considered them
equivalent to the Robert Clive, and an English author Wellesley, and several other
Muslims who were following them are same like Meer Jafar and Meer Sadiq. The
circumstances and situations were diverse, but he believed the natural history of the
contention and sedition was the same things. He not even rejected them but also
countered them by arguing that Communism and Nationalism are not dissimilar than
the Shuddhi Movement. He argued that there was no difference in consequences and
everyone should refuse to accept all of them. Due to such socio-political Islamic
views of Moududi, Allama Muhammad Iqbal advised Muslims of India to leave
31
Ibid., pp.24-26.
32
Irfan Ahmad, Islamism And Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami,pp.27-30.
33
Ibid., pp.32-33.
19
Congress and join Moududi34. Hussain Ahmed Madni supported Indian Nationalism
and derived his motive from the Constitution of Medina. Moududi rejected his
arguments and views and said that the Charter was not about designing joint
government, mutual council, shared courts, combined party, united society, united
education or majority based political structure.35
Zafar Ahmad Ansari who was Joint Secretary of All India Muslim League(ALM),
analyzed the essays and articles related to the topic of nationalism and reached at the
conclusion that it was not only a debate but it was also a mutual slap of ideology of
Congress and Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind.36 Moududi believed that the INC to be a
deceitful organization and was a voice of Pundat Jawahar Lal Nehru. He said that
Nehru opposed religion openly and was an opponent of any separation on foundation
of religion. He argued that Nehru assessed that Muslims were morally weak and he
was trying to amalgamate Islam into the Hindu religion37.
JI has been started working actively in Pakistan by willingly helping in relief

camps for migrants. It amplified the societal work, started congregation covering of
sacrificial animals on Eid-ul-Azha and established many clinics and hospitals.38 In
1953, JI led a movement against the Ahmadiya community (called Mirzai or Lahori)
in Pakistan that became the cause of Lahore unrest in 1953, and selective
announcement of Martial Law.39 Moududi was under arrest by the military operation,
headed by Lieutenant General Azam Khan and Rahim-ud-Din Khan, and punished to
death on the accuse of writing a treasonable booklet about the Ahmadiya issue. He
turned down the chance to enter an appeal for sympathy, expressing a first choice for
death rather than looking for forgiveness. Strong public stress eventually persuaded
34
Ibid., pp.34-36.
35
Irfan Ahmad, Islamism And Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami,
Press,pp.37-39.
36
Ibid., p.41.
37
Ibid., pp.51-55.
38
Ibid., pp.56-59.
39
Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And Coercion:Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan, Guenica
Edition Inc, Montreal, 1989, pp.143-144.
20
the government to convert his death punishment to life custody. Eventually, his
punishment was canceled40.
As a consequence of insist for an Islamic state, various activists of Jamat-e-

islami were sent to jail41. Even with all this, Jamat-e-islami continued its resist until
Chaudhary Muhammad Ali structured and imposed the Constitution of Pakistan in
1956, which was parallel to the ideology of Jamat-e-islami. This party initiated the
strong movement in support of a separate electoral system for various religious sects
and communities in the era of Suharwardy’s government. However, Hussain Shaheed
Suharwardy arranged a meeting of the National Assembly at Dhakka and by creating
a coalition with Republicans, passed a bill for a mixed voting system in Pakistan 42. In
1958, JI shaped a coalition with the Muslim League, led by Abdul Qayum Khan; and
with the Nizam-e-Islam Party, headed by Chudhary Muhammad Ali. They criticized
behavior of Iskandar Mirza. Due to the actions of this coalition, the status of Iskandar
Mirza was strongly spoiled and seeing no potential he determined to implement
Martial Law in the country43.
After the Martial Law of 1958, Muhammad Ayub Khan met with Molana
Moududi and directed him not to participate in politics. When Ayub Khan left up the
ban over political parties, Jamat-e-Islami was first to be energetic. Similarly, in the
presidential elections of 1964–65, Jamat-e-Islami supported Fatima Jinnah (sister of
Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: founder of Pakistan). In 1965 during Indo-Pak
war, Jamat-e-Islami helped the Ayub government for appealing of Jehad to the
people, serving war sufferers and receiving economic and ethical support from several
Arab countries. The leadership of Jamat-e-Islami focused upon nationalistic speeches
from Radio Pakistan. Jamat-e-Islami had also the main strength in Pakistan
Democratic Movement against Ayub dictatorial regime. When Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto
40
Ibid., pp.145-146. Also see Wison John, Pakistan: The Struggle Within, Oxford University Press,
London, 1989, p.96.
41
Ibid., p.97.
42
Ibid., p.98.
43
Ibid., p.101.
21
and Molana Bhashani raised the motto of Socialism throughout this movement,
Jamat-e-Islami resisted it44.
In the manifesto for first general election in 1970, Jamat-e-Islami supported

provincial autonomy (not up to six points of Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman) and stated
the Quran and Sunnah as foundations of law45. Separating judiciary from government
and assurance of fundamental rights of minorities was also included in this policy. A
strong association with the Muslim world was suggested in foreign policy. Jamat-e-
Islami was totally against the nationalization but in favor of grabbing the unlawful
property. Maximum possession of land was recommended to be 100 acres and 200
acres for rainy and canal areas respectively46. So, the irregular economic
circumstances can be controlled. The agenda of economic impartiality was purposed
as an alternative of economic equality and promised equal jobs opportunities for
unemployed people. The Bonus Share Scheme was publicized so that factory
employees and human resource can own shares of their company. Some days before
holding the elections, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan broke the alliance which became a
reason of defeating Jamat-e-Islami who was contesting against the Pakistan Peoples
Party and Awami League, having slogans of provincial autonomy and socialism.
Now, Jamat-e-Islami won only four seats of National Assembly and four of Provincial
Assembly47.
Jamat-e-Islami resisted till the last minute against the separatist movement of
East Pakistan by the Awami League. Islami Jamiat-e-Talba (a student wing of jamat-
e-Islami) organized the Al-Badar force and struggled against the Bengali nationalist
army, Mukti Bahini. In this civil war of 1971, members of Jamat-e-Islami had been
44
Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And Coercion: Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan, pp.159-
160. Aso see Wison John, Pakistan : The Struggle Within, p.102.
45
Ibid., p.103.
46
Ibid., p.104.
47
Ibid., p.105. Also see Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And Coercion : Ahmadi Muslims And
Orthodoxy in Pakistan, pp.161-162.
22
accused of vigorously collaborating with the Pakistan Army in killing millions of
innocent Bangalis48.
During Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's administration, Vice-Ameer of Jamat-e-Islami

Dr.Nazir Ahmad was murdered and many other activists including members of Islami
Jamiat-e-Talba, were sent to jail. Several members had been politically victimized.
But when, the Pakistan Peoples Party remained unsuccessful to get political power in
colleges and universities, and youth started criticism on Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. That
resistance became a reason of birthing many leaders who are now in the leading
political parties in Pakistan49.
In 1976, Jamat-e-Islami's streets influence increased by two hundred thousand

new workers when it vowed to organize marches towards Islamabad for implementing
Islamic laws. In 1977, Moududi paved jointly a grand coalition of rightist religious
parties and commenced a "civil disobedience campaign" leading to his detain50. Now,
Jamat-e-Islami had become so influential that the Sunni (Vahabi sect) Government of
Saudi Arabia intervened to protect Moududi's release by hanging the specter of
revolution in Pakistan. Jamat-e-Islami had also very important position in the Pakistan
National Alliance's (PNA) resistance against the Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's government
before imposition of 1977 Martial Law51.
Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam
Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) was founded in 1945, and Molana Shabbir

Ahmad Usmani was elected its president. This party made significant contribution to
the Muslim League’s victory in winning 1945-46 elections52. Its services were greatly
48
Wison John, Pakistan: The Struggle Within, p.106. Also see Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And
Coercion:Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan, pp.162-163.
49
Wison John, Pakistan: The Struggle Within, p.107. Also see Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And
Coercion:Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan, pp.164-165.
50
Ibid., pp.107-108.
51
Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And Coercion:Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan,pp.166-
167.
52
Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Brooking Institute Press, London, 2004, p.234.
23
recognized by Pakistan Muslim League leadership. This party contested election in
1970 and won seven national assembly seats. Its general secretary Mufti Mehmood
defeated Bhutto in constituency from Dera Islamil Khan. It has worked and demanded
imposition of Islamic Sheriah. This party has shown flexibility and tolerance in
politics53.
Jamiat-Ulema-e-Pakistan
Jamiat-e-Ulema-Pakistan (JUP) was set up by the Barelvi School of thought in

1948, with Molana Abdul Hamid Badauni as its president54. It wanted Islamic system
in Pakistan. It enjoyed the support of Peers and Mushaikh. Its first direct participation
in the election was in 1970, and it managed to win some seats. During 1977 elections,
it joined the Pakistan National Alliance and introduced the slogan of Nizam-e-
Mustafa (Islamic System); a slogan which became popular in the opposition against
Bhutto’s Government in 1977. When the PNA joined Zia’s cabinet, JUP dissociated
itself from the alliance. After that, it struggled for lifting of Martial Law and
restoration of democracy under 1973 constitution. The JUP did not take part in 1984
non-party based elections. The manifesto of the party had been demanded for
enforcement of Islamic laws in the country. The electoral support of this party was
limited55.
Jeay Sindh Qoumi Mahaaz
Ghulam Murtaza Shah Syed was the founder of Jeay Sindh Qoumi
Mahaaz(JSQM) in 1972, and its basic aim was to get separation of Sindh from
Pakistan and converting it into Sindhudesh56. This demand was on same paradigm as
Awami League demanded for East Pakistan. The supporters of this party claimed that
federation of Pakistan was against the rights of Sindhies as well as they are
53
Ibid., p.235.
54
Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan,p.180.
55
Ibid., pp.180-186.
56
Farah Hanif Sadiqui, The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan, Routledge, Oxon, 2012, p.115.
24
demanding for separate country according to the Lahore Resolution of 1940, which
was an actual demand of more than one state57.
After formation of Pakistan, Ghulam Murtaza Shah Syed (called G.M Syed)
firstly, acted as a Chairman of Sindhi Abadi board in 1947. Then, in 1955, he was an
active politician in formation of Pakistan National Party. He established Bazm-e-
Sufia-e-Sindh in 1966, and in 1969, he established Sindh United Front. After
separation of East Pakistan, He formed Jeay Sindh Mahaaz. He was a supporter of
Pakistan’s division into several linguistic states58.
Communist Party of Pakistan
Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) was established in March 6, 1948, in

Calcutta (India). During the second session of Communist Party of India, the party
decided to separate its sessions for newly independent state of Pakistan. So, Sajjad
Zaheer became general secretary of CPP for West Pakistan while East Pakistan
Provincial Committee had also been established during this session. This party faced
sanctions from the Government of Pakistan in reaction of Rawalpindi Conspiracy
Case in 1951. So its leaders had been poisoned in an accuse of initiating communist
revolution in Pakistan59.
CPP worked in East Pakistan with Awami League and its 23 members were
elected as the member of provincial assembly in 1954. On the other hand, due to ban
on its working in Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, CPP leadership established Azad
Pakistan Party in 1957, which later merged into another leftist party; National Awami
Party. All Pakistan Peasants Association was initiated in 1958, from this platform.
According to United States Department, CPP had 3,000 members in 1960s. CPP
launched its Magazine in Urdu Language in Europe as well which name was
“Baghawat” (Rebellion). During Sino-Soviet Split; a group which was favoring
57
Ibid., p.116.
58
Ibid., pp.116-117.
59
Shafique Ali Khan, The Demand for India And The Communist Party of India, Pakistan Historical
Society, Islamabad, 1986, p.69.
25
Chinese side, got separation from East Pakistan Provincial Committee of CPP. In
1968, during fourth session of CPP, decision was taken that there must be a separate
communist party for East Pakistan. So, Communist Party of East Pakistan was
established which later converted into Communist Party of Bangladesh60.
Republican Party of Pakistan
The Republican Party of Pakistan(RPP) was established by the supporters of

West Pakistan province in October 195561. This was actually a separated group of
politicians from the Muslim League. Dr. Khan Sahib was its first president. The
formation of this party was facilitated by civil-military bureaucracy. Malik Feroz
Khan Noon, who was the Central Parliamentary Leader of this party, became the
Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1957 to 195862. Nawab Muzafar Ali Khan, Sardar
Ameer Azam Khan, Meher Muhammad Sadiq and Fazal Elahi Chaudhary from
Gujrat, Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan from Muzaffargarh, Syed Amjad Ali from
Lahore, Syed Hassan Mehmood from Rahim Yar Khan, Begum Khadija from
Faisalabad, Nawab Sajjad Ali Khan from Gujranwala and Chaudhary Abdul Ghani
from Sialkot were the prominent politicians from the Punjab Province63. Qazi
Fazllulah From Larkana, Mirza Mumtaz Hassan from Khairpur, Meer Ali Ahmad
Khan from Hyderabad, Syed Khair Shah from Nawabshah, Peerzada Abdus-Sattar
from Sukkur and Najmuddin Laghari from Badin were the famous leaders from the
Sindh Province64. Sardar abdul Rasheed Khan, Noor Muhammad Khan, Jalal-ud-Din
Khan and the President of the Party; Dr. Khan Sahib were from the Bannu District of
North West Frontier Province (Now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)65. Similarly, Meer
Ghulam Qadir Khan from Lesbela, Nawab Akbar Bugti from Dera Bugti and Sardar
60
Ibid., pp. 70-71.
61
J. Henry Korsan, Contemporary Problems of Pakistan, E. J. Brill, London, 1974, p.150.
62
Khursheed Kamal Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1958, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Islamabad,
2007, p.35.
63
Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power, W. Morrow Publications, Michigun, 1970, p.82.
64
Ibid., p.82.
65
Ibid., p.83
26
umar Waleed Rind from Turbat were the renowned politicians from the Balochistan
Province66.
Political parties are the core institution of the democratic process. Its
significance for Pakistan is immense because the country itself is the product of a
political and constitutional struggle. Political history of Pakistan has hindered in the
smooth and harmonious development of the political parties. But, except for the first
period of first Martial Law, they have maintained their presence on the political scene.
Political parties in Pakistan have no specific method of maintaining the organization.
The interrupted political process and lack of proper elections within parties have not
only resulted in as unnecessary proliferation of political parties but also have impeded
the emergence of responsible leadership with a national outlook. As a result, the
leaders prefer to lead smaller parties with approach, and regional sectarian agenda
undue derision and character assassination of the values are the major weapons
especially in election campaigns. Such attitude generates intolerance and restricts the
development of a stable party system and healthy polity. These political parties often
have high slogans and unrealistic programs and promises. They use slogans of the
topical nature to charm the politically uneducated masses in their ranks. Religious and
economic issues are commonly exploited in an environment of poverty and illiteracy.
The policy statements and speeches of the leaders hardly reflect any deep and serious
understanding of the socio-economic problems and the ways and means to cope with
these problems. It is important that the political parties develop a mature and
articulate approach to socio-economic problems and engage in popular mobilization
in realistic manners. The stabilization and success of the democratic process depends
mainly on the quality of the political leadership and how the political parties
discharge their primary responsibilities in the politics67.
66
Ibid.
67
Ravi Kalia, Pakistan: From The Rhetoric of Democracy To The Rise of Militancy. Routledge, New York,
2012, pp.15-16.
27
Tashkand Agreement And Its Impacts
The year 1965 was quite eventful for Pakistan. The two most important events
were the presidential elections and Indo-Pak war, both with great bearing for the
Ayub regime and the future Politics of Pakistan. The presidential elections were held
through the system of Basic Democracy. All the political forces in Pakistan had been
opposed the indirect and party-less system of elections, but Ayub Khan rejected their
demand for direct election68.
In 1965, war broke out between India and Pakistan. This war continued for 17
days and both sides were exhausted within a few days. There was the critical situation
on all the sectors during the war. So, pressure built up on both countries for a
ceasefire. The scene for talk was UN Security Council. Pakistan’s conditions for the
ceasefire were; complete withdrawal of troops from Jammu and Kashmir, induction of
an Afro-Asian UN force to maintain peace and security and a plebiscite within three
months of the ceasefire. The soft spoken and mild mannered law Minister S.M Zafar
was first sent to plead Pakistan case. When he was considered to be ineffective,
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto went to plead Pakistan. In a passionate speech, he put forward
Pakistan’s point of view over Jammu and Kashmir. His speech described ever best
heard there. This speech in UN extolled his status69.
In Pakistan, the US and the Soviet representatives showed remarkable

understanding in pushing through the Security Council and agreed ceasefire
resolution. Surprisingly, it was French representative who unsuccessfully tried to get
an anti-Pakistan resolution in biased tone. Ayub Khan attempted but failed to
persuade the US to accept an active mediatory role. Even after this failure and despite
advice to the contrary from certain sections of the opposition and Chinese leadership,
he accepted the ceasefire resolution. The war showed actual relationship of Pakistan
with the rest of world. It demonstrated that the rift that had occurred in the Muslim
68
Ghulab Mishra, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To The Simla Agreement,
Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1987, p.414. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak
Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement, Deep & Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1981, p.81.
69
p.415. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement, p.82.
28
world following the sign of Baghdad pact had somewhat been bridged. But, Muslim
countries could provide only moral and diplomatic support, not material support to
Pakistan70.
China supported Pakistan absolutely since it perceived that India had launched
attack with US involvement to punish Pakistan for developing relations with China.
China supported Pakistan on Kashmir having no knowledge of Pakistan operation in
the Kashmir, China president denounced this action as naked aggression that violated
international law and threat to peace in Asia when president Ayub Khan was signing
the agreement they warned him about the pitfalls in signing a peace agreement but
never interfered with the process of negotiations. Ayub Khan had expected positive
response from Pakistan western alliance. When India launched attack, he immediately
invoked the assurance, given to Pakistan under bilateral and multilateral agreement.
But, the response from allies was disappointing. However, Soviet Union showed work
keenness for mediatory role mainly with the intension to keep China away from South
Asian scene71. Soviet Union showed neutrality in the Indo-Pak war and other disputes.
Soviet premier appealed Ayub Khan to end hostility in Kashmir and offered the
Soviet good office to settle all disputes, by negotiation72.
After 17 days bloody conflicts, Soviet Union was able to convince India and
Pakistan to facilitate agreement on the re-establishment of peace. He offered to
participate in the meeting if desired by both sides. Ayub Khan took some time to
accept Soviet offer for peace. The UN resolution of 20th September demanded
ceasefire from Pakistan and India by 22th September and withdrawal of all armed
personnel back to the position held by them before 5 August, 1965. It promised steps
to assist towards a settlement of the political problems and underlying the present
conflict Fighting between the two countries stopped on 23 September. Pakistan
70
71
p.417. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement,p.84.
72
29
worked for the post war Pak-India talk to be focused on the settlement of the Kashmir
dispute under the US auspices but did not succeed in this Mission73.
He took time to realize that Soviet offer had American blessing and he had no
other option but to accept it74. Ayub Khan and Shastry met in Tashkent in two days
meeting’s talk two leaders agreed only to tolerate the friendly links that each insisted
on having with the principle enemy of the other. No formal agenda was decided
before the Tashkent meeting. The talk between the two countries was not expected to
be smooth affair. Ayub Khan took along with him Zulfaqar Ali Bhuttto and some
other officials. When the two sides sat down to decide the agenda, both soon reached
at the dead lock. The stumbling block was Kashmir. India regarded non negotiable
while Pakistan insisted the settlement of Kashmir issue. The deadlock was serious,
after five days of talk it was reported that the delegations might leave Tashkent
without any formal agreement. The talks were saved from total collapse at the last
moment when Ayub was pressurized to change his stance on Kashmir otherwise he
may lose the friendship of Soviets as well. The agreement reached by the two leaders
was essentially Indian drafted in which Soviets make marginal changes75.
Ayub Khan deliberately kept out Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed who were opposed
to any agreement on Kashmir, away from final negotiation. This enhanced
apprehension of Bhutto who believed that Ayub Khan need not have succumbed to
the pressure directly accused of him. The nine point agreement was signed on January
10, 1966, marked by ambiguity, was open to different interpretations. The war end
Tashkent declaration influenced the politics and economy of the country a great deal
Bhutto Skillfully exploited the Tashkent agreement against Ayub Khan and it
contributed the decline of Ayub Khan76.
73
Ghulab Mishra, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To the Simla Agreement,
74
Ibid., p.85.
75
p.419. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement,1981,p.86.
76
p.420. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement,p.87.
30
Failure of Democracy And Imposition of Martial Law 1969
The first decade of Pakistan parliamentary politics was marked by miserable

failure. Endless constitutional wrangling meant that state was governed under the
Government of India Act 1935 until 1956. By the time, the first Pakistan constitution
was ratified. The Pakistan Muslim League was the only nationwide political party had
been disintegrated and tradition was set of dissolution of provincial and national
government. In its judgment, Supreme Court of Pakistan legitimized the Governor
General, Ghulam Muhammad’s dismissal of the first Constituent Assembly. In the
absence of nationwide elections, Pakistan had to wait until 1970 for the parliamentary
system. Power slipped from Karachi to Army headquarters in Rawalpindi. The
political and constitutional crisis generated tension between provinces and the center.
Central government was identified with Punjab because the majority of military and
civil bureaucracy came from Punjab. There were the major reasons of failure of
democracy in Pakistan77.
Ian Talbot has explained the causes of failure of democracy in Pakistan. He

wrote in this context the simplest reason of 1958 Martial Law, which depicts the
politicians as bringing the country to its knees through their misuse of power
corruption and factional maneuverings. The Army as an institution had its motives
and intensions for interventions78.
Khalid Bin Saeed traced Pakistan democratic failure back to early days of
Jinnah’s Governor General Ship and his continuation of visceral system inherited
from the British Raj. The executive got more and more powerful in early years of
Pakistan. Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad (1951) and President Sikandar
77
Nasim Hassan Shah, Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in
Pakistan,Oxford University Press,London,1993,p.69. Also see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in
Pakistan: The Parallel State, Routledge, New York, 2008, p.35.
78
Nasim Hassan Shah, Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in Pakistan,p.70.
Also see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,p.35.
31
Mirza (1956–58) who were also seasoned bureaucrats were responsible for the failure
of democracy in Pakistan79.
Safdar Mehmood has linked Pakistan’s weak parliamentary politics directly

with the performance of Muslim League. He cites among other factors the League’s
corruption, institutional weakness and dominance of land lord interests. In comparison
with the Indian National Congress during early independence era, Muslim League had
been failed to evolve its role for the betterment of the country80.
Ayesha Jalal has convincingly depicted the contradiction between the

requirement of state consolidation and political participation in Pakistan early years.
The state’s pressing financial problems and strategic insecurities are portrayed as
working against the decentralization of resources, and authority which would have
enables the Pakistan Muslim League to secure popular basis of support. In these
circumstances, it suffered from beginning and its decay furthered strengthening the
states alliance on the army and bureaucracy for the exercise of authority. There also
existed conflict between center and the provinces81. Aisha Jalal concludes her analysis
of the back ground to the 1958 Martial Law by maintaining that the political process
in the provinces had been curbed but not entirely crushed during the consolidation of
state authority around its non-elected institutions82. Ravi Shekhar explains the
political failure due to the bureaucracy and Military axis supported by USA83.
In highly secretive game of musical chair which followed Liaqat’s death,

disregarding all constitutional conventions. The music stopped with Khawaja Nazim-
ud-Din’s transfer from governor general seat to prime minister’s, in a portentous
move for future, Gulam Muhammad became the Third Governor General of Pakistan.
79
Nasim Hassan Shah, Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in Pakistan, p.71.
Also see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, p.36.
80
Nasim Hassan Shah, Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in Pakistan, p.72.
Also see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, p.37.
81
Nasim Hassan Shah, Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in Pakistan,p.73.
Also see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,p.38.
82
Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,p.39.
83
Ravi Shekhar Narain, The Military Factor in Pakistan, Lancer Publishers, London, 2008, p.69.
32
He was an intelligent, ruthless and highly ambitious and was expected to play active
role in politics; on the other hand Nazim-ud-Din was pious but indolent figure. During
his two years tenure Muslim League further atrophied and tension between eastern
and western wings of the country intensified. He was also eager to become president
of Muslim League. Once he installed, he failed miserably in his duty. Muslim League
disintegrated due to lack of proper leadership and internal rifts of the Leaguers.
Problems of the country like food shortage, inflation, and unemployment remained
unattended and unrest, hatred was created among the people who were waiting for the
man who could solve their problems. With the decline of Kawaja Nazim-ud-Din, the
parliamentary system was survived for five years more. Real power now lay with
Sikandar Mirza and Ayub Khan. When Muhammad Ali Bogra took the charge of
prime minister, things had already gone uncontrolled and Muslim League suffered
humiliating defeat in by-elections in different parts of the country. During this period,
Military establishment developed relation with U.S and received heavy aids from the
U.S. In 1956, Sikandar Mirza took the post of the president. General Ayub was
watching this situation very closely. The president had thoroughly exploited the
weakness in the constitution and had got everywhere connected with the political life
of the country, utterly exposed and discredited. However, President Mirza could not
have pursued his Machiavellian policies without the help of military. General Ayub as
Commander-in-Chief had been the most powerful man in 1954-1955, when
integration of Pakistan had been brought about throughout right intimidation. This
policy had set in motion a chain reaction that President Mirza was trying to control.
Mirza and Ayub were the two dominant leaders of the civil-military oligarchy that
had decided that Pakistan could govern best by tightening the grip of these two
institutions on its government and people84.
Khalid Bin Saeed writes in this context that among political leaders
Suharwardy was perhaps the only leader who was firmly committed to freeing the
political process from the clutches of the civil-Military oligarchy. He was prime
Minister during 1956–1957 and try to build coalition with other political parties. But
84
Ashok Kapur, Pakistan in Crisis, Routledge, New York, 1991, pp. 118-120. Also see Veena Kukreja,
Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, NBO Publishers Distributrs, New Delhi, 1985,
p.51.
33
Mirza felt that coalition between Awami League party and West Pakistan Republican
party would weaken his position he forced Suhrawardy to resign and he was
successful in his mission85.
After his resignation, when Feroz Khan Noon became the prime Minster.
Suharwardy pursued his plan of forging alliance between Punjab and Bengal,
something that had not been attempted before. He was able to forge alliance between
the two parties at provincial level. He was shrewd enough to realize that political
stability at the federal level was not possible without some kind of an understanding
between the major areas of Pakistan but the fatal flaw of his plan was that Punjabi
leaders were hopelessly divided. An almost insurmountable obstacle that he faced was
the opposition of President Mirza and General Ayub Khan because his plan countered
their interest. The landed interests and the lower Middle class would have not only cut
across ethnic divisions but might have out flanked the military and civil service
oligarchy. It was significant that two leading figures Suharwardy and Ayub were
being supported by the USA. As early as 1958, Mirza and Ayub had separately
conveyed their opinion to US ambassador that only dictatorship would work in
Pakistan. The whistle has to be blown before any democratic success might be scored
in the promised national elections. It was the end of the beginning of Pakistan’s
experiment with democracy. Mirza in 1400 words, statement justifying the
introduction of Martial Law made specific reference to the disgraceful scenes in
political field. He also castigated the politicians, ruthless struggle for power,
corruption and prostitution of Islam for political ends. Before the Supreme Court
judgment which legalized the regime, president Mirza announced the formation of
cabinet. The Youthful Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was appointed as Commerce Minster and
Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Administrator. The first public strain in Mirza-Ayub
relationship appeared when both made contradictory statements about lifting the
Martial Law. They may also have been friction resulting from his promotion of
Lieutenant General Musa to CNC of army. The catalyst of Mirza’s dismissal however,
was his reported meddling in Army affairs and attempt to instigate a counter Martial
85
Khalid bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, pp.112-116.
34
Law on October 27, 1958. He was dismissed with the imposition of Martial Law by
General Ayub Khan86.
Martial Law of 1969 And Its Political Consequences
After the existence of Ayub Khan, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan
succeeded him. Ayub believed that his exist would be orderly and Yahya would
quickly stabilized the country, using existing political system as the frame work of his
actions87. Morris Jaowitz had noted Ayub never developed a personal Military
dictatorship but during Yahya administration, the Military came to resemble a form of
cabinet government without an electorate. In the beginning however, Yahya played
the collegial game to perfection and thus was able to neutralize efforts aimed at
having Ayub tried for what were allegedly by serious improprieties. In his period,
Pakistan improved relations with US and China, and Yahya was encouraged to use his
China connection in opening the way for a Washington-Beijing dialogue. But Yayah
most immediate concern upon assuming power was the future of Pakistan’s political
experience with Bhutto in the wings and significant influence over ruling Junta party
political activity was rapidly reinstated in 1970. In spite of the prevailing Martial Law
and politicians were bold enough to make demand of elections and lifting of Martial
Law. Yahya Khan was imposing upon to permit political debate and immediately
question turned toward need of new constitution. Attacks on presidential system
appeared to guarantee that only a new parliamentary system would be acceptable and
it was this objective in mind that Yahya Khan announced the general elections would
be conducted on October 5, 197088.
Muhammad Siddique says that Yahya’s preference for the parliamentary

system was supported, but not without resistance89. Lawrance Ziring stated that
Yahya agreed with his colleagues that one unit scheme should be scrapped and former
86
Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,pp.101-113.
87
Dilip Mukerjee, Yahya Khan's Final War: India Meets Pakistan's Threat, NBO Publishers Distriburs,
New Delhi, 1972, p.3.
88
Ibid.,pp.3-6.
89
Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,p.128.
35
provinces of Pakistan must reconstitute. Thus, a Legal Frame Work Order (LFO) was
proclaimed on March 30, 1970. The military Junta thus established the frame work for
the new political order. In the beginning, he tried to curb corruption and improve
public discipline. Among other developments like the formulation of laws for food
adulteration, the publications against Islam and disrespectful to Quaid-e-Azam were
punishable. System of accountability was established for the accountability of civil
servants who could be dismissed for inefficiency, corruption and misconduct. Yahya
announced the appointment of Council of Ministers on Augest 5, 197090.
Hamid Khan says in the preparation for the resumption of political activities, a
regulation was promulgated in 1969 by the CMLA, laying down rules and guidance
for the conduct of political campaign. According to this regulation, no party shall
propagate opinions that were against the ideology of Pakistan and security of the
country. In conformity with the reforms announced in 1969, full scale political
activity in Pakistan began but election had to be postponed because of destruction
brought by flood91.
Around twenty four parties were in contest. Since no one knew about voters
preferences, each group believed that it had a chance. However, it was quite clear that
Mujeeb in East Pakistan and Bhutto in the west wing would emerge as leading
political leaders. Both were good orator and took full advantage of the radio and
television to put forward their programs. They spoke out against concentration of
wealth in a few hands and in advocating the nationalization of the industries. Bhutto
laid stress upon foreign policy in his speeches. He was critical of USA and friendly
towards china and espoused Kashmir cause of self-determination. Mujeeb’s platform
was his condemnation of West Pakistan for everything that was wrong in East
Pakistan92.
Election resulted in an over whelming victory of Mujeeb in East Pakistan and

a large majority for Bhutto in West Pakistan. Bhutto and Mujeeb both wanted to
90
Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in The Twenieth Century,pp.233-237.
91
Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan,pp.74-75.
92
Dilip Mukerjee, Yahya Khan's Final War: India Meets Pakistan's Threat, pp.6-7.
36
become prime minster and none of them was ready to surrender premiership. As the
transfer of power delayed with the passage of time, misunderstanding between the
two increased. Mujeeb started demand of separate country instead of becoming prime
Minister. This situation developed due to poor policy of Yahya Khan and the role of
Bhutto in transfer of power was not positive93. In January 1971, Mujeeb and Bhutto
met in Dhaka and they decided power transfer issue would be solved through talks94.
Munir Ahmad has put forward the case admirably. He says that problem of
power could have been decided if Yahya did not demanded to remain president. He
refused to quit power and asked both parties to accept him as president. Yahya Khan
called the parliament session on February 15, 1971, but Bhutto wanted it to be
postponed at least for six weeks. Session again was convened in March 1971, but both
leaders failed to reach on power transfer formula. Consequently, Yahya Khan banned
political activities and Mujeeb was arrested in the Charge of high treason. Yahya
approached small scale army operation in East Pakistan. In December, India invaded
East Pakistan and disintegrated East Pakistan form the west wing95.
From the above discussion, it may be safely concluded that Martial Law proved
disastrous. It caused gloom and hopelessness all over the country. People felt
wounded, institutions were destroyed, economy of the country showed rapid decline,
political parties and politician played fowl and they prefer power and brought country
to be torn into parts. In the back drop of such holocaust and destruction, Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto gained power96.
Political scenario of Pakistan, since 1947 to 1977, had several ups and downs. Till
1958, Pakistan had experienced indirect bureaucratic rule. After assassination of
Liaqat Ali Khan, bureaucracy played its role without any hesitation in influencing
political affairs till 1958. After 1954, military bureaucracy had also been involved in
this procedure when Ayub Khan became Chief of Army Staff. After imposing of
93
Ibid., p.7.
94
P. Sukumaran Nair, Indo-Bngladesh Relations, A.P.H Publishers Corporation, 2008, p.133.
95
Peter R. Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study, Oxford University Press, London, 1996, pp. 231-232
96
Ibid., p.233.
37
Martial Law, Pakistan experienced presidential system and in 1969, again Martial
Law had been imposed in Pakistan by Yahya Kahn. With his resigning after the fall of
Dhakka, Bhutto became Civilian Martial Law Administrator. He became first elected
prime minister of Pakistan after implementation of the new constitution of 1973. And,
after second general elections, he again became a democratic prime minister for
second time.
38
Chapter 2
Political Activism And The Rise of Pakistan People’s

Party
Bhutto’s Rising of Power:
The rise of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto to the position of the highest authority is the
land marked and the climax of an extraordinary political career that began in October
1958, when at the age of thirty, he firstly entered the cabinet formed by President
Iskander Mirza after the abrogation of the constitution of 1956, as Martial Law was
imposed in the country. Although Iskandar Mirza was replaced shortly afterwards by
General Muhammad Ayub Khan, but Bhutto was retained as a minister in the latter's
cabinet. As a foreign minister, Bhutto's name was linked with a policy of close
association with China and Islamic countries. He was a Westernized, well-educated,
young and brilliant politician who made an impression at home and abroad.1
Those who took this revolution against Ayub Khan, dig their graves when they
saw that Ayub Khan gave control of the government to the Chief of Army Staff
General Yahya Khan and invited him for second Martial Law. In fact, he was forced
to leave the presidency after a huge protest.2 As people were trying to snatch their
socio-political rights and wanted to mold the political system according to their own
will and demands, Ayub Khan said in his last speech as quoted by Lal Khan:
It is my wish that the political power should persist and to be relocated in

constitutional manners into the condition existing in the country. It is
1
Syed Abdul Qudoos, Zulfikar Ali bhutto: Politics of Chrisma, Lahore Publishing, Lahore, 1994, p.12.
Also see Anwar Hussain Syed, The discourse And politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Macmillan, New York,
1992, p.58. And Junejo Rajputs: Muhammad Khan Junejo, Jan Muhammad Junejo, Jam Sadiq Ali,
Chakar Ali Khan Junejo, (Historical Description), Books Group Staff, Islamabad, 2010.
2
Stanley A. Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life And Times, Oxford University Press, London,
1993, pp.251-252. Also see Asghar Khan, We Have Learnt Nothing From History,http:/
www,urdumania,com/urdu-topics-second-Martial-Law-in-pakistan.php (accessed on December 2,
2012).
39
impossible to convince the national assembly some members even may not
dare to attend the assembly session. It hurts me deeply that the situation is no
longer under the government control and all the government institutions have
become victim of concertina terror and threats. Each issue of the country is
being decided in the streets. The imposition of Martial Law was in reaction of
the socio-political crises that had deep roots in the society and were hosteling
capitalist system. None of the leaders opposed its imposition. Instead, they
welcome it at that time when the political circumstances had rapidly changed
beyond their control with the masses making a shattering impact on the
politics of Pakistan. In view of the confused situation, Yahya Khan made
some peace-making remarks preceding the imposition of Martial Law had
brought to face an unparalleled degree of Militancy in the labour movement
when the government needed to control.3
To this end, Noor Khan made statements with the reference of social and
economic circumstances under which thousands of workers were not receiving good
treatment.4 Zafar Shaheed wrote in this context that the labour movement which
workers initiated could not be controlled or changed by the rules and regulations.
Similarly, the industrial conditions in this period were as the president of the entire
textile Mills complained to the government that textile industry had been besieged by
labour since 1969, when Yahya Khan imposed restrictions on political activities
during his initial periods and this extended to industrial activities. This state of affairs
indicates no fundamental change in government policy. Indeed government was
neither competent nor eager to start essential changes in the economic system that was
compulsory pre-region site for hurting the sort of amicable industrial relation. In any
case, government was preoccupied with the political affairs of the country which
proceeded from January to December 1970 and then with political chaos which led to
war with India and the formation of Bangladesh.5
3
Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto And Pakistan: 1967-1977, Oxford University Press, London, 1997,
pp.175-176.
4
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, Oxford University Press, London, 1988, P.213.
5
Hassan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise And Realization of Bengli Muslim
Nationalism, Oxford university Press, London, 1996, pp.241-242.
40
The leftists in Pakistan had already faced the severe blow of the role of
Communist Party of India (CPI) leadership during the national liberation struggle and
the suffering of partition. The new government in Pakistan intensified its repression
against them since soviet conflict further damaged the unity and growth of the leftist
forces in the country. In 1960, the major conflict between the different leftist and
communist parties was further marred by the Sino-Soviet Split. Although there were
no ideological and theoretical contradictions and dissent, they were blindly following
Chinese philosophy and Stalinist patterns that were considered as guideline for the
socialist groups and parties at that time.6 But the clash between the Stalinist7
bureaucracies on national level added further uncertainty among the large number of
population throughout the world even among the advance workers while creating
assured opportunities for the ideas of Marxism; it further complicated the mission of
revolutionary Marxism.8
At the time of the partition, the Muslim communists of the CPI joined Muslim
League as if the communists were believers in the sectarian division of the people. It
was not accidental that the author of the election manifesto and program of the
Muslim League was communist. Danial Litifi and Stalin’s classification proved to be
an ideological and political disaster for the CPI in the practical politics of South Asia.
The CPI later in its various meetings condemned this mistake however, it was too late.
In Pakistan, Communist Party could never become even a mssodest mass party due to
its ideological policy. There was no doubt that successive government in Pakistan was
essentially so weak and left the movement in the region. Hence, throughout the first
five decades, every regime was against the left activists even when they were not a
substantial enough force to cause any serious threat to the state and established
system.9
6
Leonard Binder, Religion And Politics in Pakistan, The University of California, California, 1961, p.181.
Also see Raheem Khan, Future of Communist Party of Pakistan,…..(Urdu Column), The Daily Jang,
Karachi, March 20, 1971.
7
Stalin was The second President of Soviet Union.
8
John L. Esposito, Islam And Democracy: Center of Muslims-Christians Understanding, The
Georgetown University, New York, 1996, P.114.
9
Ibid., pp.115-117.
41
The uninterrupted repression by the state was one of the factors which to some
extend hindered the growth of the communist parties in Pakistan but when and where
had Bolshevik party, not been subjected to state repression. Nevertheless, they did
gain a mass basis led safe socialist revolution and transformed society. The main
causes of the failure of communists in Pakistan were not religion nor the
organizational or individual characteristics and personalities of the leaders not to
blame.10
Populism was mainly the product of the contradiction between the Stalinist
ideology of two Slageism11 and the socialist aspirations and character of the mass
movements that had corrupted mainly in ex-colonial countries, particularly in the post
second world war period. The most significant examples have been Peronism12 in
Argentina, Soekarnoism13 in Indonesia, Nasserism14 in Egypt. The phenomenon of
modern populism was based on individual leaders who came to force through
historical accidents and who gained support by revolutionary sloganeering and
socialist rhetoric. It also reflected a certain primitive culture that gave rise to an
exaggerated role and dependence on individuals as liberator and hero of the people.
This extraordinary reliance and popularity get them immense political and authority to
enhance their support, they could go to the extent of radical reforms. As for overthrow
capitalism they neither had understanding with the revolutionary ideology and
organizational structure and the ability to overthrow the old order. However, in the
absence of traditional workers, they became new political traditional modes of
expression of the people.15
10
Ibid,. p. 120.
11
Stageism is an ideology of three stages. First stage is democratic revolution in third world countries,
second stage is economic development in these countries and the third stage is socialist revolution
that happens when these countries achieve economic development.
12
Peronism means Social Justice. This was a movement, initiated by Justicialist Party in Argentina.
13
A political and economic philosophy of Indonesian first president Soekarno.
14
This was a political philosophy of the second Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nasser. This
philosophy combines the elements of Arab socialism, International non-alignment, developing world
solidarity, anti-imperialism, nationalism and republicanism.
15
John L. Esposito, Islam And Democracy, Center of Muslims-Christians Understanding, pp.121-134.
42
Zulfaqar Ali Bhuto was very shrewd politician, had sense of observing the
mood of the masses, and also had embarked upon the need for socialism. The PPP
program clicked the masses and it became the largest party of the people in the history
of Pakistan. Lal Khan narrates:
The founding convention of the PPP was held at Dr.Mubashir Hassan home
at Lahore in 1967. The founding documents were prepared by Bhutto and
J.A. Rahim. They were very radical for socialist change in the aims and
objectives of the new part.16
The founding document of PPP said:
The ultimate objective of the party is the attainment of a classless society

which is only possible through socialism in our time. Bhutto made very
passionate and vigorous speech. In the speech he said, we have to tackle basic
anomalies, change this system and put an end to exploitation. This can only
be done by socialism. That is why our party stands for socialism. After
founding convention, Bhutto went into full political action across the country.
In fact, people desired for radical change. To galvanize those burning
aspirations, he went all over the country, presenting himself as the
revolutionary socialist who would lead the transformation of society through
revolutionary change. In one of speech Bhutto said: “My dear friends it is
said that I am a wealthy man and feudal lord. It is said that I have no right to
struggle for socialism without distributing my wealth among the people.
Socialism can be introduced only when all means of production are brought
under state control. But even so I hereby announce that if my wealth can be
of any good I will not hesitate to give it away.17
The men and women who gathered to found PPP were diverse in terms of their
social identities and previous political affiliation, ideological proclivities and general
characteristics. Students and anti-feudalists regarded Bhutto as a genuine progressive
16
Kalim Baahadur, Democracy in Pakistan: Crisis And Conflicts, Oxford univesity Press, London, 1998,
p.322.
17
Pakistan People’s Party. www.ppp.org.pk (accessed March 07, 2013).
43
democratic socialist, who would with the aid of a highly organized political party seek
a socialist reconstruction of the economy and society of Pakistan.18
The PPP had emerged a broad based opposition movement held together by a
single dominating figure since in power; it faced the problem which had defeated its
predecessors. PPP claimed to be a revolutionary party but in the subsequent event,
PPP failed to break with Past patterns of Political organization in Pakistan. Party
functioning instead of elected institutions and formal structures, revolved around the
utilization of patronage. The result was growing factionalism, dependent on Bhutto’s
Personal support for authority and an increasing rift between the leftist groups who
attached more importance to organization. They were also disillusioned by the entry
of rural notables into the party. The situation might have been different if the party
had been move strongly institutionalized before it came into power.19
Ian Talbot made very interesting comments on the situation. The

comprehensive reorganization which took place in December 1976 still emphasized
personal loyalties over effective institutionalization. Bhutto himself selected higher
office holders in his secretariat and those at the district level and below unfortunately
decision making power was totally been centralized and Bhutto had personalized the
PPP much as Indra Gandhi stood for the Congress in India. At this juncture, PPP real
decline and downfall started. As Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was surrounded and encircled by
sycophants and they replaced creative thought as the key to influence in the formation
of the party. Even person like J.A. Rahim who had drafted the PPP foundation, found
himself out in the cold in July 1974, after he had the boldness publically to disagree
with Bhutto’s handling of affairs. In third world countries like Pakistan, democracy
was passing through evolutionary phase, it has been the dilemma of these countries,
here personalities not institutions rule the people and they made decisions regarding
the fate and future of the state. So, that was the case with PPP.20
18
Maleeha Lodhi, Bhutto, The Pakistan People’s Party And Political Devemopment in Pakistan: 1967-
1977, The University of London, London, 1980, pp.342-346.
19
Ibid., pp.346-347.
20
Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, C.Hurst & Company Publishers Limited, London, 2009,
pp.263-267.
44
Ziring writes that factional divisions went hand in hand with the PPP’s
increasingly clientele politics. This was illustrated most clearly by the clash in Punjab
between Sheikh Rasheed and Ghulam Mustaf Khar.21 Ghulam Mustafa Khar, a land
lord from Muzzafar Garh used the well-established techniques of harassment not only
on personal rivals but on ideological opponents such as Mahmood Ali Kasuri, who
protested against the party’s growing authoritarianism at both national and province
level.22The rising tide of violence as seen in the assassination and attacks on
opposition and PPP figures like those who died by the bullets included Molvi
Shahabuddin, Khawaja Rafique and Abdus Samad Wali Khan and Asghar Khan
cheated death on number of occasions.23Talbot argued that corresponding to Rashid
and Khar in Punjab and Jaam Sidiq and Rasual Bakhsh Talpur in Sindh and in the
frontier province, Humajaan Saifullah and Habibullah Khan.24 With the speech of
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on August 16, 1973, violence got increase.25 This seems that from
the above discussion that party deterioration and downfall began soon after its
foundation. Party was not given due time and right policies to establish itself on
strong footing. Things began to slip from the grip of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.26
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto failed to introduce fair and transparent democratic system
rather one can say he introduced preferential politics in the country. Sindhees were
disproportionately represented in the main institution of the Pakistan. This situation
created various differences among Sindees,Mohajars and others ethnic groups. The
situation was further exacerbated by the national government’s introduction in 1973, a
new quota system for federal employment. Mohajars hold one third of the gazetted
posts in the civilian bureaucracy although their share of the total population by the
21
Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twenieth Century, Oxford University Press, London, 1999, pp.275-
277
22
1977, p.113.
23
Ibid., p.114.
24
Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp.169-172.
25
The Daily Jang, Karachi, August 17, 1973.
26
1977, pp.390-392.
45
early 1970 was very low. The resentment caused by this discrimination in favor of
rural Sindhees was intensified by the extension of the application of the quota system
in educational institutions and the domicile issues.27
Bhutto And The Bureaucracy
Bhutto sought to limit the power of the military and civil establishment. These
unelected institutions of the Pakistan inherited and upheld the pre-independence
traditions of Britian. Their disarray and disappointing role in the wake of succession
of Dhakka provided him with an unparalleled opportunity for breaking with the past.
But, the hopes for radical change in the traditional civil-military configuration of
power were to be cruelly disappointed. Bhutto became easily reliant on both the army
and the civil service.28 Hassan Askari Rizvi has detailed the steps which Bhutto take
in order to establish control over the army whose myth of invincibility has been
shattered in the swamp of east Bengal. Twenty nine senior officers of the military
were removed from their offices within first four month of Bhutto’s assumption of
power including the chief of the army staff, General Gul Hassan khan who was
replaced by General Tikka Khan and seemingly plant General Zia was to succeed him
on his retirement in 1976. A commission, chaired by Humood-ur-Rehman; Chief
Justice of Pakistan was set up to move into the military catastrophe in Pakistan. Its
findings have never been made public. In addition Bhutto took number of measure to
reduce military long term influence in the state affairs. These include the restructuring
of the military high command in order to disperse power and the reduction of the
tenure of chief of Army staff to three years. The most controversial reform was the
creation of the Federal Security Force (FSF) under the control of federal government
27
Subarta Kumar Mitra, Political Parties of South Asia, Greenwood Publishing, Westport, 2004,
pp.17.18.
28
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto:A journey of Renaissance; A pictorial record of President Bhutto's Whirlwind
Tours of Africa And Middle East, Research Report, Department of Films and Publications, 1972. Also
see Krishna K. Tummala, Comparative Bureaucratic Systems, Rowman And Little Field Publishing
Group, Maryland, 2005, pp.251-252.
46
and its duty was to assist police in maintaining law and order. This was highly
professional and well equipped task force, opponents of Bhutto criticized it as an
oppressive private army and its existence along with People’s guard reminded serving
army officers of Bhutto’s earlier call for the replacement of a conventional force by
people’s Army. Such anxieties were increased when on returning from an overseas
visit Bhutto inspected a guard of honor of the people guards rather than an Army
contingent. Military resentment and displeasure was expressed in the refusal to train
FSF recruits. Significantly, one of the first action of Zia regime was to disband the
force.29 Ziring maintains a number of clauses in 1973 constitution were particularly
designed to discourage future military intervention. Its third clause serving military
men were to take an oath that they would not take part in political activities of any
kind. Article 245 defined high treason as an attempt to abrogate or subvert the
constitution by the use of force. These clauses strengthened the legal cover provided
by the 1972 Supreme Court verdict in Asma Jilani case which ruled that Yahya Khan
assumption of power in 1969 was illegal and unconstitutional.30
Despite the favorable background, Bhutto always feels uneasy in his relations
with army generals. He was even ready to take the wrath of left wing supporter when
he exempted army officers holding from the March 1972 land reforms and made
strenuous efforts to dispel any notion of Tashkent, following the July 1972 Simla
Agreement.31 A people’s army could not provide security in the regional context after
the raised issue by Afghan Government of Sardaar Muhammad Daud, following the
over thrown of king Zahir Shah on July 17, 1973, and nuclear explosion by India in
1974. There was also need of replacement of military equipment after 1971 war with
India.32 Pakistan defense expenditure rose by over 200 per cent during Bhutto era
even more important reliance or army increased for internal security as well. This
enabled malitary to renew their taste for power and drew their back into politics. The
29
Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, Progressive Publishers, Michigun, 1976,
pp.200-201.
30
Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twenieth Century, p.278.
31
P. R. Chari, The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise, Manohar Publishers & Distributors,
New Delhi, 2001, p.74.
32
Ibid., p.75.
47
army was called for action on July 19, 1972, to restore law and order in Sindh
following the language riots in the province.33
Army remained involve in Balochistan from 1973 to 1974 that caused large
scale deployment of troops in Balochistan to deal with tribes, separatists, autonomists,
which was disapproved by the other political parties. The use of force carried echoes
of Yahya ill-conceived in East Pakistan. The tension between the federal Government
and the NAP-JUl administration in Quetta was kept in check until July 1972.34
Different tribes like Marri tribe, the Balochistan National Liberation Front (BNLF)
established basis in Kandahar, Baghdad as well as in Balochistan. At the height of
struggle the Pakistan air force received assistance from the Shah of Iran who had also
Baloch insurgency in Seesten-o-Balochistan Province of Iran.35
Conflict between army and separatists claimed over lives and gravely under
mined the Bhutto’s regime. S.A. Qureshi writes in the context that Bhutto
acknowledged the army overrode his plans for withdrawal because the generals
wanted to spread their tentacles throughout Balochistan. This involvement of Pakistan
armed forces provided them a chance to re-establish and re-organized effective role in
the politics of Pakistan.36
Talbot commented that the civil establishment had drawn adverse comments
in government reports from 1950 onwards but they were highly organized and well
established, and were called the sultan of Pakistan. Burki had commented that radical
opinion hoped that Bhutto would make good earlier gestures toward reforms
especially in the light of animosity towards bureaucracy during 1968-69 campaign
against Ayub Khan. Two of the ringing slogans of the time were “Death of the
Serving Kings” and “Ending of corruption”. On assuming power, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto
33
Ibid., p.76.
34
Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan And The Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, Ashgate
Publishing Company, Burlington, 2005, p.40.
35
Ibid., p.41.
36
Shoukat Ali, Pakistan: A Religio-Politcal Study, The National Institute of Historical And Cultural
Research, Islamabad, 1997, pp.223-224. Also see Kalim Baahadur, Democracy in Pakistan: Crisis and
Conflicts, pp.114-115.
48
dismissed leading civil servants associated with military government which he dubbed
as one of Nokarshahi (Bureaucratic) rule by the civil servants.37 Charlas Kenedy
noted that Bhutto’s reform of the bureaucracy, despite the abolition of Civil Services
of Pakistan and introducing unified grade structure, key positions in the central
secretariat continued to be headed by the members of the former elite cadre and the
functions of civil servants were never changed by the PPP government. Bhutto’s
personal control over the administration was nevertheless secured through the creation
of special posts and the establishment of a lateral entry scheme administered not by
Federal Service Commission but by a political establishment division. Critics claimed
that it raised an army of sycophants’ appointee’s relatives of federal ministers.38 In the
later period of his regime, Bhutto came increasingly to rely on the bureaucracy just as
he did on army. This was unintended consequence of his institutional and socio-
economic reforms for all his attempts to break with the past. Bhutto was ultimately
dependent on Bureaucracy for the maintenance of his rule as had been done by his
predecessors.39
Bhutto's Reforms
To appreciate the reforms instituted during Bhutto's time, some major factors
must be borne in mind: the populist nature of his regime and the global tendency
towards increased nationalization of economic activity. Understanding of these factors
emphasizes the context of these reforms and demonstrates that similar changes were
taking place in other parts of the world. Pakistan's experience was not unique but
formed a part of the pattern observable in other countries facing similar conditions.40
A thorough analysis of populism goes beyond the scope of this chapter which
is concerned with the policies adopted during the Bhutto regime. A few relevant
37
Soofia Mumtaz, Pakistan: The contours of State And Society, Oxford University Press, London, 2002,
p.111.
38
Ibid., p.130.
39
Ibid., p.131.
40
Ali Farazmand, Administrative Reform in Developing Nations, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2002,
pp.80-81.
49
remarks will serve the purpose of determining the context of these reforms. The
growth and emergence of populist parties show some important common features:
these parties generally emerge in underdeveloped or semi-developed countries where
industrial growth and capitalist development has remained stunted.41 The social
impacts of industry are limited and a large proportion of the population is only
peripherally touched by its growth. Some theorists have called this phenomenon an
enslaved form of capitalist development. The vitality of industrial growth does not
rejuvenate every walk of life; instead it burn under folds, emitting pale whiffs of
smoke. Each area of its activity remains retarded: industrial plants are generally
middle scale; distributive outlets are small; the infrastructure is shaky; lacking of
training facilities; discipline is absent and the environment gives an impression of
premature decay. Income disparities between the rich and the poor are considerable:
homelessness and shantytown areas exist in bitter contrast to the palatial residences of
the urban and rural rich. The literacy level is low and the facilities of sanitation and
health are poor.42
Petty production and small producers dominate both the urban and rural social
landscape. Rural labor consists of small farmers and tenant cultivators. In the cities,
thousands of petty producers and non-producers swell the ranks of the urban dwellers.
These include street-hawkers, shopkeepers, taxi drivers, bus conductors, café owners,
skilled and semi-skilled mechanics, masons, printers, religious pundits, servants,
beggars and of course the multitude of' the unemployed. The bazaar, rather than the
factory, often controls the heartbeat of social organization.43 Hassan Rizvi says,
Political parties are dominated by landed classes which the industrial classes normally
handle. The industrial classes do not have independent parties; nor have the industrial
41
Ibid., p.81.
42
Ibid., pp.81-82.
43
Muhammad Abrar Zahoor, Economic Reforms Under The Government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, VDM
Publishing, New York, 2011, p.120. Also see Ali Farazmand, Administrative Reform in Developing
Nations, p.83.
50
workers. In fact, the organizations of industrial workers are weak, and independent
trade unions do not exist.44
The second feature of populist parties is their historical worthlessness and the
rapidity of their growth. Economic injustice and political alienation often lead to
explosions of social unrest. A generalized movement may even threaten political
stability. The heterogeneous collection of masses on the streets cannot be
accommodated by the political parties of landlords.45 A Populist element is formed
which gathers strength as the movement builds. Its membership grows within a period
of weeks and months. Its class composition is as heterogeneous as the composition of
the masses on the streets. Industrial workers, peasants, shopkeepers, small
industrialists, the intelligentsia, the middle classes and even enlightened or
opportunistic sections of the elite class, all are to be found in its ranks. The program
of the party attempts to compromise between the heterogeneous, often conflicting,
interests of its membership. Thus, inherently these parties are unstable; they suffer
evermore from tensions created by the diffused mob of its members.46
The third interesting feature of these parties is their organizational structure.

Feudal parties, in general, are combinations of landed classes at the leadership level,
and their followers who are directly under the control of each feudal lord. The source
of this following lies in the economic, social and mystical way of the lords over the
peasantry. There is no need for a democratic or hierarchical structure for selection of
leadership. Parties of the industrial classes, on the other hand, tend to develop internal
democratic structure. The existence of democratic structure is partly due to the lack
that a consensus of opinion does not exist among individual units of capital as it does
among landed classes. There may be competition and conflicts of interest amongst
separate units of industry. Further, the industrial class attempts to cement sections of
the workers to its organization, and democratic structures, at least in principle, allow
political mobility within the party. Socialist and Communist Parties tend to develop
44
Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, pp.210-211.
45
Ali Farazmand, Administrative Reform in Developing Nations, p.84.
46
Ibid.,pp.84-85.
51
democratic centralist structure, developing ideologically trained cadres at the
membership level.47
The populist parties appear to combine various characteristics, showing signs

of feudal, industrial and Socialist tendencies in different aspects of their
organizational structure. Between the leader and the led, a direct rapport exists. The
party itself is quite superfluous in terms of being a communicational system between
the leadership and the masses. Over and above the party members and the leader can
speak to the masses.48 In some ways this is similar to feudal parties where file tactical
leader has direct support from the populace, independent of the party. He enters the
party on the basis of this support and does not acquire the support via party. Similarly,
a populist leader has the direct clientage of the masses. His following exists in the
masses and the party is constructed simply to win parliamentary seats, etc. Usually,
therefore, populist leaders are charismatic figures. They inspire confidence, love, fear
and other emotions through fiery speeches and public rhetoric. However, the
articulation of the interests of diverse groupings requires a party structure. At the level
of membership, the Populist Party wishes to think of its party workers as cadres as in
a socialist party. This is sometimes purely populist rhetoric: sometimes it is inspired
by the missionary-type zeal of populist leaders. However, the party worker lacks both
training and discipline and begins to suffer self-delusion from party members upwards
to the party leader, a democratic structure in file shape of capitalist/industrial parties is
designed. However, the stature, at least in the eyes of the masses; is so grand that he is
neither containable, nor accountable to the middle ranks of party leaders. In fact, the
middle level leaders soon begin to find that it is the relationship of the party leader
with the masses, independent of the party itself, on which the structure of the party
exists. Thus, autocratic, democratic and socialistic tendencies' tend to exist at different
level of the organizational structure.49
47
Ibid., p.87.
48
Ibid., p.88.
49
Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, p.114. Also see Contemporary Forms of
Slavery in Pakistan, Human Rights Watch, New York, July 1995,p.134.
52
Finally, populist parties are inherently less stable. There are several conflicts
in their composition, program, organizational structure and .relationship with
propertied classes and the state. The conflicts constantly weaken the party. It is the
task, of the leader to constantly inspire the public and keep them on the march through
new ideas and slogans. However, these conflicts create fluidity in the party's
ideological direction. It can serve from right to left under different pressures.50
Mehmood Says that in generally, a cohesive factor has normally been found
by populist parties in the spirit of nationalism. These parties are usually far more
intensely nationalistic in their public posture than other groupings. All
underdeveloped countries, whether they achieved independence with or without a
prolonged mass struggle, find a resurgence of national pride among their people for
some time after independence. However, in many cases, this spirit is difficult to
maintain. In cases where internal unity between different strata or between, people of
different regions cannot be maintained, because economic reconstruction either, does
not take place or results in disparities, the natural growth of nationalism was
collectivity suffer. The state has to make a concerted effort to arouse the weakening
spirit of nationalism. In several underdeveloped countries, a negative form of
nationalism appears; reasons for mutual love are replaced by objects of common
hatred. A common enemy against the collectivity is to be defended produces a
common purpose. Though nationalism remains an essential part of the political
discourse in underdeveloped countries, populist parties have to increase its dose due
to internal pressures: the rapidity of their growth and the heterogeneity of their
membership have forced them to become, at times, hysterically nationalistic.51
In fact, the multiplicity of classes and the diversity of production methods

have injected populist tendencies among other political groupings as well. Various
aspects of populism are to be found in nearly all parties in the less developed
countries. The second factor to be considered in the assessment of Bhutto's reforms is
the international tendency towards increased state control of economic activity. Since
the First World War, countries at different stages of economic development, with
50
Ibid.,p.156.
51
Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, pp143-144.
53
different historical and geographical backgrounds, have experienced a growth in the
public sector.52
On the one side, there are socialist countries where revolutions resulted in the
taking over of political power by parties committed to a centrally-planned economy.
On their coming to power, large-scale industry and big feudal estates were
nationalized. State-ownership of other sectors makes weak the economy in different
countries. Then, there are the industrially advanced countries in the West. Up to the
First World War, state intervention in economic activity was minimal. State
administrators were mainly concerned with defense law and order, and the
management of foreign affairs: State taxes were imposed to collect revenue to finance
these operations. Economic activity in the, country was left to the market forces.
However, since the First World War and in particular since the depression of 1929,
there has been a gradual increase in the public sector. A large number of industries
were brought under state-management. The arguments for state control were varied;
some industries were nationalized because these were declining due to structural
changes in demand; because they required heavy capital outlay and gave returns only
in the long run; others because they were considered risky investments by the private
sector; and still others because they had social welfare implications. In several
countries, industries like steel, coal-mining, shipyards, oil .drilling, education, health,
transport, telecommunication or nuclear energy were completely or partially brought
under state control. Apart from this, the state also embarked upon demand
management of the economy. To stabilize production at the employment, intervention
by the state if the market mechanism was required. Thus, fiscal and monetary controls
were required if Western economies were to achieve balanced growth and near full
employment, some of these countries, the public sector accounts for nearly fifty per
cent of the national output. To this, if we add the demand management and other
economic policies (e.g. regional or exchange management) of the state, the element of
planning in these countries becomes quite substantial.53
52
Anne O. Krueger, Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries, The Ohlin Lectures,
New York, 1993, pp.54-59.
53
Ibid., pp.54-59.
54
Ziring says finally, government intervention in the economy of an under-
developed country is also an increasing trend. The state involves itself in economic
affairs in two ways: either through a system of subsidies and taxation or through an
extension of direct state control over industrial and commercial activities. There are
many reasons for this phenomenon: nearly all underdeveloped countries gained their
independence in the wake of a technologically advanced industrial world54.
Developmental planning had to take place if these countries wished to catch up in the
economic race. Even political sovereignty required a degree of economic
independence. However, a large number of these countries inherited entrenched
landlord classes, and weak and poorly organized industrial classes, in some cases, and
even the infrastructure for the development of industry was absent. Private industry
could not be expected to finance the construction of this infrastructure.55
The growth of the public sector in the economy and the strengthening of the
populist tendencies in political parties is more or less a generalized phenomenon in
the underdeveloped countries. Its degree and specific form may vary from country to
country, but the' trend is unmistakable. In Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto entered the political
arena after the end of Ayub's regime. Descended from a feudal Sindhi family, having
studied at the universities of Southern California, Berkeley, and Oxford, Bhutto had in
the fifties, served the Ayub regime at ministerial level. In his person he combined
various qualities reflective of his background. Western influence and education had
created a liberal-progressive outlook; yet he could be accused of autocratic and
arbitrary behavior corresponding to his class origins.56
The Pakistan People's Party was formed in the wake of the anti-Ayub
movement. The radicalized demands of the urban poor, till lower middle classes and
the intelligentsia could not be adequately articulated by the old political parties. In the
person of Bhutto, the heterogeneous masses found a charismatic leader; he was above
them and yet he was willing to voice their feelings. Restoration of income and
regional parities was the core of the economic demands of the anti-Ayub movement.
54
Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in The Twenieth Century, pp.344-345.
55
Ibid., p.345.
56
Ibid., p.363.
55
Then there are political demands: more liberalization, and less centralization of
political power. The movement, therefore, was able to attract the urban middle
classes, professionals, students and the politically deprived sections of the landed
classes. Thus, very rapidly, the People's Party grew in size, carrying within its ranks a
multiplicity of rural and urban classes. Its program included social and economic
reforms, focused mainly on distributional aspects of the economy. It counterpoised
freedom to Ayub's authoritarianism. The ambiguity of the results of the 1965 war with
India allowed Bhutto to rekindle the spark of nationalism. It was this nationalistic
posture which enabled Bhutto to restore dignity and pride for the nation which had
suffered humiliation in the 1971 war.57
The overwhelming success of the PPP in the elections, in West Pakistan, gave
Bhutto the political strength to push through policies, which a weak government could
not done. The economic content of some of the major policies was compatible with
the worldwide trend of expansion in the state sector.
Agrarian Reforms
Power of big landlords created impacts on green revolution and increased

unrest in the rural areas. The rural poor small peasants and tenants, who constituted
the silent majority of the PPP supporters, had to be appeased. Two major reforms
were introduced: a new ceiling on landownership, and security of tenancy.58During
the Ayub period, the legal ceiling on landownership was five hundred acres in
irrigated areas and one thousand acres in non-irrigated areas. After the introduction of
the Green Technology-tractors, tube wells, pesticides and high-yield seeds,
productivity on both canal-irrigated and non-irrigated farms increased. The ceiling, on
landownership was therefore, be reduced without a serious cut back in the individual
incomes of big farmers. The excess land would obviously be sold to small peasants to
57
Ibid., pp.363-365.
58
Rashid Faruqee, Strategic Reforms for Agricultural Growth in Pakistan,The World Bank, Washington
D.C., 1999, p.12.
56
raise their income levels. The new ceiling was 250 acres of irrigated land and 500
acres of non-irrigated land.59
Properly, enforced and truly implemented, this would have dealt a serious
blow to the very big landlords. However, serious obstacles existed in the way of
enforcing these reforms. Firstly, the restrictions of landownership by Bhutto were
anticipated by the big landowners. In fact the restrictions were far less than expected.
Thus even before Bhutto took power a large number of-landowners transferred the
landownership to other members of the extended family, Secondly, the very big
landowners who were left with large surplus areas devised an ingenious system of
avoiding restrictions. They transferred ownership to some of their trusted tenants who
were given lands on a long term lease agreement. 60 The lease-period covered several
generations. Thirdly, productivity of land was to be assessed by revenue officers who
consequently determined the productivity units owned by each landowner. Personal
influence and bribery often ensured that the land's productivity would be under
estimated. Just by recording half of the actual productivity, twice the area could
remain under ownership.61
To ensure security of tenancy, the single most important reform was the right
of pre-emption granted to tenants for the area cultivated by them. According to this,
on the sale of land, which included tenant-cultivated area, the sitting tenants would
have the first right for the purchase of the land cultivated by them. In the past, tenants
had already been given legal protection against arbitrary evictions. However, their
position remained weak when the sale of land automatically resulted in a change of
masters. By giving them the first option to buy the land, the tenant-cultivators were
given a choice either to accept the new landlord and his terms, or to buy the land
themselves. It also afforded them the possibility of owning the land they cultivated.
Thus inseparability of the tenants from the land cultivated by them became possible.
59
Ibid., pp.13-15.
60
Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring The Power
Structure, p.38. Also see Rashid Faruqee, Strategic Reforms for Agricultural Growth in Pakistan, p.15.
61
Structure, p.39. Also see Rashid Faruqee, Strategic Reforms for Agricultural Growth in Pakistan,p.16.
57
They could not arbitrarily be evicted or removed if they wish to continue as tenants in
case the sale of that land which is cultivated by them.62
Apart from considerations of social justice, this reform had implemented for
land-productivity: the potential inseparability of the tenant-cultivator from the land
created an incentive for tenant to make improvements on the land to raise productivity
in the long run. More thorough the use of fertilizers, a more productive system of crop
rotation, construction of irrigational inlets, reclamation of previously uncultivable
pieces of land, etc., would all raise and sustain productivity. The tenant-cultivator
would establish a long-term, stable relation-ship with the land, rather than having a
short-term, alienated outlook.63
On papers, these reforms make a great deal of sense. Its implementation,

however, may be quite difficult. In fact, the practical effects may turn out to be
diametrically opposed to what was intended. There are several reasons for this: first,
the anticipation of the introduction of these reforms on Bhutto's coming to power,
resulted in the mass eviction of tenants from hundreds of farms. In many cases, the
landed classes expected more radical measures than those actually introduced by the
Bhutto government. Thus, many landlords were illegally evicted tenants and have
civil suits on their hands than to wait the introduction of reforms and the severity of
which could not be gauged beforehand. The unfortunate implication of this policy was
an acceleration of tenant evictions, an outcome quite opposed to the intentions of the
policy-makers.64
Second, like other rural reforms, this policy underestimated the social strength
of the landed classes. For decades, it has been the landlord who has controlled the
means of livelihood of all the villagers, he has connections with the police, the
revenue collector, and the administration; he has influence in the orbits of political
62
Structure, p.40. Also see Rashid Faruqee, Strategic Reforms for Agricultural Growth in Pakistan, p.17.
63
Ali Farazmand, Administrative Reform in Developing Nations, p.18. Also see Shahrukh Rafi Khan,
Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring The Power Structure, p.41.
64
Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring The Power Structure, p.42.
58
power: governments change and rulers come and go, but the landlord's reign in his
village remains unchallenged. The rural poor are like his subjects. It is best to be in
his good books, even if it involves compromises. It is better to live under his
benevolence than to incur his displeasure. Take the case of a small tenant-cultivator:
the land occupied by him is being sold and he wishes to buy his part against the desire
of the landowner. Firstly, he risks the landlord's antagonism. He may be living in
quarters built by the landlord; he may also be in debt to the latter; there may even be a
threat of violence to his family; he may be cast out by the rural community since he
has been out of favor with the landlord; he also loses protect against outside forces,
for example the police, the tax-collector, the public administrator, the local bank
manager, the irrigation sector, the electricity supplier, etc. He now faces the problem
of raising funds for the purchase of this land. His cash savings are insufficient. He
may, in fact already be in debt. However, suppose that be manages to raise the money.
The landlord may then decide to illegally evict him, which would mean the tenant has
to seek justice through the courts. This means legal fees, court charges, and still the
decision may be against him, since the landlord can afford a better solicitor or may
have fiends in the local judiciary, and not only this; the civil suit may also take a long
time. Indeed, it would be a determined tenant who would muster the courage to stand
up for his rights.65
A third method used by landlords to get around the policy was to reclassify the
mode of cultivation of their land. The local revenue officer has always been
considered as an important government functionary who has historically remained the
recipient of favors from the landed classes. One of the duties of this officer is to
record arrangements of the land. It is by no means-impossible for landowners to
persuade the revenue officer to record tenant-cultivated areas as owner-operated areas
in the revenue books. Such miss recording can of course be challenged in courts but at
high legal and personal costs, which a poor cultivator cannot afford.66
65
Ibid., pp.20-21. Also see Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan:
Ignoring the Power Structure, pp.43-44.
66
Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring the Power Structure, p.45.
59
The Bhutto government's land-reforms, therefore, encountered essentially the
same problems which the Ayub government faced in its agrarian policies, the problem
of the social and economic power of the landed classes. In fact, the same problem has
been faced in nearly all underdeveloped countries in similar circumstances. The issue
of the strength of the landowner in foiling the implementation of land reforms is so
universal that the sincerity of regimes insistent on introducing such reforms, becomes
a little doubtful. One wonders if the purpose behind reform is a real desire for change
or simply an exercise in public rhetoric.67
Industrial Reforms
The Bhutto government left its greatest mark also on the industrial sector. The
main thrust of his policies was the nationalization program. Large amount of the
important industry; rice threshing, vegetable oil production, and the sugar industry
were all fully nationalized. Large companies in some of the other industries were also
taken over. This included tractors, fertilizers, steel, etc.68
A multiplicity of reasons explains the nationalization program. Firstly, it was

in the urban sector that industrialization of the Ayub period had created vast
distributional inequalities. Large scale industry was concentrated in a few hands.
Industrial and white-collar workers had both been excluded from sharing the wealth
created by the industrialization program. Secondly, the urban areas, owing to the
concentration of people and their organizational level, became the centers of vocal
opposition and mass mobilization. Effective protest against government measures
cannot be easily organized in geographically dispersed rural areas, in fact, political
movements in the city attract the peasant who will often travel long distances to join
and support an organized urban political agitation. The urban population, therefore,
often provides leadership to mass movements. An important part of the active popular
support for the PPP had come from the urban workers and middle classes. There was
a great deal of pressure on the PPP to introduce radical industrial reforms. Thirdly, the
67
Ibid., p.46. Also see Rashid Faruqee, Strategic Reforms for Agricultural Growth in Pakistan, p.23.
68
Irving Brecher, Foreign Aid and Industrial Development in Pakistan, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2005, p.129.
60
industrialist class was yet in its adolescence: it had a limited history of twenty years
and its historically progressive role had not yet become evident. It had grown
hesitantly, with state help and foreign assistance. It had been nurtured in an
atmosphere of authoritarianism. The members of the industrialist class in particular
the large-scale industries were only a handful: twenty industrial houses owned eighty
per cent of the large scale industry.69 The industrialist class was therefore, numerically
weak, ideologically wavering and socially isolated. Unlike the landed classes, the
industrialist class did not pose a threat to a popular government wishing to undermine
it. Fourthly, the particular nationalization program of the Bhutto government
corresponded to the worldwide tendency towards the expansion of the state sector. It
is as though the development of the system could not proceed indefinitely within the
framework of a private market. After initial growth, private industry appears to meet
hurdles, which it cannot overcome; its expansion; therefore, is retarded. In many
countries, the first burst of industrialization generates political destabilization:
unbridled private enterprise creates urban centers lacking basic facilities, income
disparities between the rich and the poor and regional disparities due to the
geographical concentration of industry; and all these happen in a short period of a
decade or two.70 The real problem is that even after the initial impetus, often the
industrial take-off does not materialize. Private industry appears to have its hands tied.
Its indigenous market is restricted owing to internal impoverishment, engendered in
particular by the non-transformation of the rural economy. It cannot compete
internationally since foreign markets are fully controlled by the big western
industrialist. The size of investment required to match up to the technologically
advanced multinationals is so large that private industry in underdeveloped countries
often reconciles itself to the status of a poor relative in the world market. The
industrial units in the underdeveloped world are more, like backyard extensions of the
advanced capital.71
69
Ibid., p.130.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid., p.130. Also see Christopher Candland, Labor, Democratization And Development in India And
Pakistan, Routledge, New York, 2007, p.87.
61
The nationalization program of a government in an underdeveloped country,
therefore, aims to satisfy a number of requirements: through state-planning, the
government may restore regional parities; it may support industries which face a
decline due to short-term changes in demand. It may rationalize production and save
the costs of competition: it may raise the scale of output as the industries are
centralized and managerial costs reduced; it may allow planners to aim for social
returns rather, than profits, and distribute surplus between wages and investment on
social criteria instead of simple profitability: it may allow a pricing policy of goods
compatible with the social needs, export policies or anti-inflationary program of the
government; it may satisfy the populist demands for economic change without
arousing great resistance, since the industrial bourgeoisie lacks social influence.72
The nationalization program of Bhutto's government had many such

considerations. The private commercial banks were nationalized; a step which several
governments of other under developed countries has also taken to control the supply
of money on the one hand, and to regulate the allocation of resources within the
economy on the other. Through control over the lending policy of the banking system,
it is possible to channel investible funds into agriculture or dairy farming or industry,
in line with the sectorial planning of the government. These controls may also be used
to direct the distribution of investment among different geographical regions.73
A number of considerations were made for the nationalization of the cotton,

sugar, and vegetable oil industries. The monopolistic nature of production had created
a problem of high prices for some of the essential manufactured goods. This led to
social unrest and put inflationary pressures on the economy. In order to have a
rationalized system of prices, some of these industries were taken over by state. Some
industries were being adversely affected by the recession in the world market, which
started in the seventies. The cotton industry was particularly hit by the recession and
its survival inflation in Western economies resulted in a rise of the cost of capital
imports while the international demand for goods declining. This made growth in
72
Kalim Baahadur, Democracy in Pakistan: Crisis and Conflicts, p.188.
73
Irving Brecher, Foreign Aid And Industrial Development in Pakistan, p.132. Also see Christopher
Candland, Labor, Democratization And Development in India and Pakistan, pp.88-89.
62
industry extremely difficult. Thus even if the workforce problem had been overcome,
a smooth growth of industry could not have taken place. In fact, it is even possible to
say that whereas, a public sector industry was able to cushion the impact of the world
recession due to state subsidies, the private sector might have to close-down a large
number of industrial units.74
Constitutional Reform
Meluka explains that after the departure of the Ayub regime, Pakistan had its
first elections on adult franchise basis in December 1970. The PPP emerged as the
majority party in West Pakistan and after the creation of Bangladesh; Bhutto formed
the government in Pakistan in 1972. Ayub Khan's constitution of 1962 had already
ceased to exist after the imposition of Martial Law by General Yahya Khan. In April
1973, the Bhutto government promulgated a new constitution; it is relied heavily on
the principles of the constitution drawn up in 1956.75
According to the 1973 constitution, Pakistan was to become a parliamentary

democracy. The National Assembly members were be elected through adult franchise
for a period of five years. The leader of the political party, with a majority in the
Assembly, would be asked to form a government by the President who,
constitutionally, was a figurehead. The prime minister would select his cabinet. A
vote of no-confidence in the government by a majority in the National Assembly
would result in the Prime Minister dissolving the government and calling for fresh
elections.76
An important innovation introduced by the 1973 constitution was the

establishment of a Senate or Upper House. The Senate would consist of an equal;
number of members from each province, independent of its population strength.
These would be the persons nominated by the members of each Provincial Assembly.
74
Irving Brecher, Foreign Aid And Industrial Development in Pakistan, p.133. Also see Christopher
Candland, Labor, Democratization And Development in India And Pakistan, p.89.
75
Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Constitutional Law of Pakistan: Text, Case Law And Analytical
Commentary, Vanguard, Michigun, 2002, p.1491.
76
Ibid., p.1491.
63
Any bill passed by the National Assembly had to be approved by a majority in the
Senate before it could become the law of the land. Similarly, any bill passed by the
Senate had to be approved by the National Assembly, before being adopted as a law.
The Senate offered two advantages: it could work as a think-tank consisting of people
who were specialists, professionals, scientists, academics. etc. In other words, those
having no electoral base could enter the supreme decision-making body in the system.
Secondly, and extremely important the minority provinces had an equal status in the
Senate which, therefore, could safeguard their interests. The less-populated provinces
could no longer be at least in theory swamped by the majority provinces77.
Sohail Bhutti remarks that at provincial level, there were four Assemblies, one
for each province. The members of these assemblies were elected on the basis of adult
franchise in each province. The leader of the majority party in the provincial assembly
would form the Government. This ensured a high degree of political autonomy for
each province. The National Assembly could not make any change in the political
leadership of provinces without amending the constitution itself by at least a three-
fourth majority. The sensitive issue of self-management of the provinces, therefore,
appeared to have been, in principle, resolved.78
The Bhutto government's constitutional arrangement suffered from a number

of weaknesses. The overwhelming majority enjoyed by the PPP in the National
Assembly tended to concentrate a lot of power in the hands of the' government which,
due to the structure of the populist People's Party, effectively meant that the total
point of political power rested with the party leadership, in particular with the person
of Bhutto. The government could democratically change the constitution, because of
its overwhelming majority in the House and the dependent status of the PPP
parliamentarians on Bhutto himself who enjoyed a direct relationship with the masses
without requiring the mediation of the party members. This manifested itself quite
clearly when the government was able to make appropriate amendments to the
77
Commentary, Vanguard, Michigun, 2002, pp.1492-1493.
78
Aleem Al-Razi, Constitutional Glimpses of Martial Law: in India, Pakistan And Bangladesh, The
University of Michigan, Michigun, 1988, pp.173-175.
64
constitution (of course, democratically), to dismiss some of the provincial Chief
Ministers, replacing them with heads of provinces selected by the government.79
The experiment of parliamentary democracy during Bhutto's period

highlighted some fundamental problems, which undermine democratic tendencies in
underdeveloped countries; serious political scientists largely agree that a democratic
form of government may not be fully compatible with the economic and social
conditions prevailing in the Third World. Historically, the landed classes have never
instituted democratic rule: the cliental nature of the relationship between the rural
masses and the big landowners, the nature and the selection of rural political
leadership, the organization of social and economic life, all tend to develop autocratic
forms of behavior and do not necessitate the development of democratic tendencies. It
is not an accident, therefore, in the countries of Europe and North America, the
development of democratic institutions has coincided with the emergence of industrial
classes. The organization of production, the communicational links between the mass
of workers and their employers, the independence of labor from the industrial
employers, the mutual competitiveness between individual units of industry and the
need for consensus in policy making, all tend to foster democratic ideas and
institutions, however, more is required than this for the maintenance of a democratic
form of government: there must exist economic stability and an ideological unity
between the mass of the population, and the political leadership. The existence of
socially powerful landed classes, the lack of development of independent, self-reliant
and dynamic industrial classes, economic stagnation and the cynicism of the masses
regarding political and economic institutions in underdeveloped countries, all weaken
and undermine the development of democratic forces. It is again not an accident that
nearly all underdeveloped countries have been unable to develop genuine and stable
democratic terms of government.80
In the Third World countries, where democracy appears to exist, it is usually

equated with electoral means of transforming of political power. Democracy
79
Commentary, pp.1494-1495.
80
Ibid., pp.1496-1498.
65
somehow comes to life once five years, when people are invited to cast their votes.
However, election once in five years from the one part of the democratic process; they
should be the culmination of all uninterrupted process of democratic activity which
expected to take place in between elections. If during the years preceding elections,
political activity is curtailed, newspapers and media censored processions and
demonstrations banned, political leaders jailed and other fundamental rights of
freedom, such as the right to speak and to organize, denied, then the electoral process
is devoid of democratic content. Malvlea stated that the constitution of 1973,
therefore, may have been a well-meaning political document, but it could not
strengthen or stabilize democratic forces and institutions in Pakistan. A time passed,
the constitution was gradually eroded by social and economic pressures.81
Social Reform
According to Yousaf, the rationalization of the education system and an

ambitious mass literacy program were the most important features of the intended
social upgrading in Bhutto's period. All primary education was made free and this
involved an increase in demand which the existing capacity could not satisfy. New
schools had to be built as nearly all private sector schools and colleges, were
nationalized82. The nationalization of private schools was necessitated by the need for
ideological streamlining in education on the one hand and the desire to even out the
social discrepancies between private and public sector schools on the other. The aims
were certainly lofty and they required time and planning before positive effects could
be realized. Bhutto’s regime however, did not last long enough to systematically build
a uniform and integrated educational set-up which would both increase literacy rate
and raise academic standards in a harmonious way in all schools and colleges. Free
education (up to primary Level) for all and the nationalization of the private-sector
academic institutions were also in line with the image of a populist leader who related
81
Ibid., pp.1494-1503.
82
Sohail Mahmood, Good Governance Reform Agenda in Pakistan: Current Challenges, Nova Science
Publishers, New York, 2006, p.54.
66
to the masses through public resource to the sentiments of social justice and
equality.83
In nearly all countries where governments have attempted to rationalize and

equalize the educational system, the short-term effects have invariably been negative
and have resulted in a downgrading of the academic standards in the beginning.
Firstly, exceeding results amongst the existing institutions since it takes time for new
schools and colleges to be built. The time-lag in underdeveloped countries will of
course be greater due to the shortage of finances. Secondly, the effect on reputable
institutions with high standards is immediate; the policy of leveling of differences
lowers their standards. However, the promotion of educational standards in poorer
schools takes a long time. The change in curriculum, the employment of better trained
teachers and the provision of technical and scientific apparatus, etc., all require time
and resources.84
The immediate effect of the Bhutto government's educational reforms was,

therefore, a downgrading of the overall system, as might be expected: existing schools
and colleges had an increase in student population without a corresponding increase in
the provision of academic facilities. Lack of funds coupled with bureaucratic
inefficiencies and the absence of integrated planning produced all ill-administered and
ill-planned education system. Equally, important was the limited time that the
experiment of nationalization had. Before the system could recover from the initial
depression of standards and before lessons could be learnt and the lethargic
bureaucratic machine could be persuaded to move in the right direction, the lease of
the Bhutto government had come to an end.85
Eradication of illiteracy by the provision of free primary schooling was indeed

an ambitious aspiration which appears to be rooted less in realism and more in ill-
conceived idealism, if not in an exercise in image-building. Just as the advisers to the
83
Ibid., p.159.
84
Ibid, pp.57-58. Also SeeRubya Mehdi, The Islamiazation of The Law in Pakistan, Roultedge, Oxon,
1994, pp.160-161.
85
Ibid., p.59.
67
Ayub government and blundered in attributing economic irrationality to household-
size planning of the peasants, the social reformers of Bhutto's government missed
some of the equations, which underlie the problem of a low literacy rate in
underdeveloped countries. To put it quite simply, free education does not generate an
abundance of customers; the cost of education to the mass of poor people is not just
the tuition fee. In fact, tuition fees constitute a very small part of the economic cost.
Notwithstanding the costs of books, stationery and the uniform, the single most
important cost of a child in school for a poor household is the loss of earnings to the
family.86 Child labor is extensively used in nearly all underdeveloped countries and
makes a significant contribution to the household budget. The poor household, living
on the margin of economic existence, can scarcely afford to withdraw a member from
the labor force and continue to bear the burden of feeding and clothing. The
apparently untrained and rustic peasant may be quite aware about the lack of
opportunities existing for the literate in an under-developed country. Low and
uncertain returns from education have to be included in the equations of planning by
governments attempting to raise literacy levels in the Third World countries.87
Burki thinks that the biggest indictment of the usefulness of a service is that,
even when freely provided, it remains un-availed. Is it not possible that the lofty
schemes of mass literacy designed by governments do not relate to the needs of the
rural and urban poor? Perhaps the peasant requires education and training in
improving productivity on the land, reducing water wastage or killing pests, and the
urban unemployed require vocational courses that lead to skilled jobs. The content of
literacy schemes often reflects the convoluted and vulgar notion of “education” of
university degree holders, for whom the ills of poverty and underdevelopment are
rooted in the inability of the masses to read and write.88
86
Ibid., p.60.
87
Rubya Mehdi, The Islamization of The Law in Pakistan, pp.161-162. Also see Sohail Mahmood, Good
Governance Reform Agenda in Pakistan: Current Challenges, p.60.
88
Shahid javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, Oxford university Press, London, 1988, p.197.
68
Constitutional Engineering During Bhutto Regime
Bhutto lifted the Martial Law from the country after four month of assumption
of his office. He introduced interim constitution in the country. This constitution was
based on 290 clauses and seven schedules and approved by those representatives who
were elected in 1970 elections. The interim constitution provided for a centralized
government with a presidential system at the center and a parliamentary system in the
provinces.89 Burki writes in this context that by the time the national assembly started
clause by clause examination of the new permanent constitution, tension escalated
between PPP and the opposition parties over the various issues. On the other hand
conditions started deteriorating in Balochistan very quickly. Things apparently went
out of control in no time. On March 2, 1973, opposition parties grouped together over
Balochistan issue to form united democratic front under Peer Pagaaro leadership. The
opposition parties demanded strongly that Islamic clauses be included in the
constitution and asked for more regional and provincial autonomy. The united
democratic front in melodramatic fashion voted on April 10, 1973, in the favor of
constitution despite its earliest walk out from the Assembly Sessions.90 There trued
out to be sheered and marked contrast with Pakistan first constitution and its adoption
had taken just year and enjoys the approval and consent of opposition parties. In
contrast with the second it generated optimism and seeds of hope that genuine and
real democratic system will be established in the country. The constitution came into
operation on August 17, 1973. This constitution provided for a parliamentary system
in which power would reside in the hands of prime minister and the president of the
country will only be the nominal head of the state. Article 48 stipulated that he should
be bound by the Prime Minister’s advice that his ordinance would not have legal
sentence unless approved by the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
The latter was to be elected by a majority of the 200 member National Assembly
which also resided initiatory powers of legislation. The senate upper house could but
not veto a bill passed by the national assembly. Its members were to be divided
89
Abdul Ghafoor Bhurgi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Falcon of Pakistan, SZABIST, Karachi, 2002, pp.122-
123.
90
Shahid javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, p.132.
69
equally from four provinces and these members would be elected by combine sitting
National Assembly and four Provincial Assemblies. The more prominent features of
the 1973 constitution were that it ensured independent judiciary and allocation of the
resources to provinces and it also guaranteed fundamental human rights under article
153 created a council of common interest to settle and resolve economic disputes
between the federating units but a long list of concurrent subjects and the powers of
the center to interfere in the provincial affairs, remained considerable.91 The claim
that the 1973 constitution had finally resolved Pakistan long standing issues of
composing differences between the provinces and the center .Bhutto despite his clear
and expressed sentiments in favor of federalism was no more willing to shift power
from the center to the provinces. The Islamic provisions included declaration that
Islam was the state religion and only Muslim could held the offices of prime Minister
and president of the country. The state was also enjoined to provide facilities and
opportunities to the Muslims of Pakistan. To shape and revise individually as well as
collectively to the teaching of Islam and to promote the teaching of the Quran and
Sunnah, all possible efforts will be made and steps will be taken by the Government
of Pakistan to teach Islamic Studies and the Holy Quran in order to ensure that the
laws were in agreement with the teachings of Islam.92 Account of Islamic Ideology
was to be appointed by the president as an advisory body. Simultaneously, article 34
for the first time in the history of the country introduced the new principle that steps
shall be taken to ensure full participation of women in all walks of national life,
because women in Pakistan constitute the half of population. No country can make
progress unless its women work side by side of the man. Initial protection was also
provided against the respect of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) of 1961.
Despite its limitation of Zia’s 8th amendment, like 1973 constitution has proved more
durable than any of its predecessor in painting the way to safeguard and protect the
rights and to pave the way for democratic Pakistan. Similarly, civil liberties as well as
91
Abdul Ghafoor Bhurgi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Falcon of Pakistan, pp.133.
92
Ibid., p.134.
70
provincial autonomy have been legally overridden by extraordinary powers accorded
to the rulers of state.93
Economic And Social Change During Bhutto Regime
Bhutto sought to consolidate and strengthen PPP among the people of

Pakistan, including rural and urban areas of the country. F. Rehman has written that
Pakistan people’s party supported the poor by policies of land and labor reforms and
by the nationalization of industries, financial institutions and schools. Such reforms
were condemned half-heartedly by leftist groups, associated and grouped with
Pakistan people’s party who were already dissatisfied by the opportunist entry of
landlords into its ranks and by Bhutto’s mere up popularity and personalization of
power. At the same time the reforms created powerful enemies among the propertied
classes. The economics of the country has already suffered serious setback at the hand
of worldwide inflationary pressure generated by the 1973 Arab-Israel war.94 Of
savings investment and output had already declined. The devaluation of the rupee on
May 11, 1972 stoked inflationary pressures, dependence on foreign aid and from the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to ride over the deteriorating
balance of payment situations from 1974 onwards was a mixed blessing as aid also
found its way into pockets of the regime’s Islamic opponents. For a common man the
rhetoric of egalitarianism sounded mere singly hollow when confronted with annual
price rises twenty per cent.95
Bhutto, in his 1970 election campaign, had called for the removal of the
remaining of vestiges of feudalism. The land reforms which he introduced two years
later were certainly radical than Ayub’s. Craig Baxter added that maximum land
ceilings were reduced to 150 acres of irrigated land and 300 acres of un-irrigated land
orchards and stud, livestock and forms were brought under the tax system and it was
gigantic step indeed. On the other hand, Bhutto’s law reforms efforts were not well
93
Ibid., pp.135-136.
94
James P. Farwell, The Pakistan Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability, Oxford University
Press, London, 2011, pp.251-252.
95
Ibid., p.252.
71
articulated and by and large they were ill conceived, though they were well
intentioned. As in 1959, only a limited amount of land was ultimately made available
to redistribution. This consisted of even poor quality land than before as the absence
of compensation predictably encouraged and reinforced owners to retain their most
fertile holding.96
The Bhutto Reforms suffered from the save irregularities in their

implementation as the Land Reforms of 1959. In numerous instances the landless
were made owners if the rescued areas in name only or fictitious transfers were
entered. Ironically, the reforms, rather than signaling a suit in the balance of power in
the favor of talents, encouraged Punjabi land lords to enter the PPP’s ranks in order to
safeguard their position. The success with which large number of land lords concealed
their lands as much to official patronage as administrative inefficiency Craig Baxter
had pointed out that the remarkable ability of the leading land lords families to
accommodate themselves to successive regimes. Despite his popular slogan Bhutto
liberally dispensed PPP election tickets to the land lords in 1977.97 Those people who
suffered a great deal at the hands of Bhutto under the Land Reform Legislation almost
invariably came from families politically opposed. To compensate the earlier failure
Bhutto announced most severe and string out land reforms on the eve of the 1977
elections, ceilings were lowered to 100 acres of irrigated land and 200 acres of an un-
irrigated land. The loopholes of defining land owner ship in the form of ten years
interest leaving bonds. The PPP also announced in January 1973, that land revenue
would be replaced by agricultural income tax revenues and reduce tax envision by
individual whose wealth in reality urban rather than rural based. These measures were
suspended with the introduction of Martial Law on July 5, 1977.98
Labor Reforms During Bhutto Regime
On February 10, 1972, Bhutto announced a far reaching comprehensive and

elaborate labor policy and Labor Reforms which revealed the radical influence of
96
Ibid., pp.253-254.
97
Ibid., p.255.
98
Ibid., p.256.
72
Muhammad Hanif, Minister for labor union power was increased with the setting of
Works Councils and special Labor Courts for the resolution of industrial disputes. He
introduced a compulsory system of elected shop stewards was established in factories.
The workers lot was also to be improved by increasing profit sharing measures.
Employers were also called on to provide cheap housing and education to
matriculation level for at least one child of every worker. The state also held out the
promise of old age pensions and insurance against injuries. As with the other reforms
Bhutto government had to face stiff resistance and planned obduracy of vested
interests and met with unseen consequences which diminished the gratitude of their
beneficiaries. Emboldened by the reforms and legislation, workers fixed their muscles
in series of strikes which hit production in the feebly handled newly nationalized
heavy industries. A bloody confrontation ensued between the army and strikers in
Karachi which precipitated the radical labor based Mairaj group broken by Bhutto.99
The fact that labor reforms did not apply to piece workers further separated PPP leftist
activist as it failed to introduce a minimum wage. The extension of the definition of
may lower middle class PPP supporters with the cost of pension, medical and welfare
benefits and of workers participation in management decisions as brought under the
purview of the reforms. The regime found itself caught between two constituencies of
support and was unable to please and appear none of the two many small scale
enterprises were located in Punjab in such towns as Gujrat, Wazirabad and Kamoke
part of the collapse of the PPP of stronghold in the Punjab in 1977 election is
attributable to the alienation of the small entrepreneurs. The erosion of business
confidence hit investment which declined across the country industrial sector leading
to rising unemployment for workers whose lives were already been made miserable
and deplorable by spiraling the prices of the load stuffs, ironically the improved
conditions, which some sections of the working class experienced for more
encouragement of the export of the labor to its wanted reform program.100
99
Christopher Candland, Labor, Democratization And Development in India And Pakistan, pp.116-119.
100
Ibid., pp.120-127.
73
Nationalization Policy of Bhutto
In January 1972, Bhutto government introduced the nationalization of over

thirty large firms in the basic industries. These measures which kept the promise of
PPP manifesto undertaking was intended to eliminate once for all poverty and
discrimination in Pakistan. In reality it was more important in clipping the wings of
the twenty two families than achieving the later goal, as the heavy industrial sector
did not possess a dominating economic influence.101 Burki has maintained that the
subsequent mismanagement of these newly nationalized industries by the board of
management chaired by Dr. Mubashir Hassan not only depressed production but
weakened the standing of leftist groups in the PPP. Two months latter nationalization
was extended to the financial sector with the takeover of the life insurance companies.
During the following November, the government setup a state life insurance
corporation of Pakistan.102 The next burst of nationalization took place in and it
involved ghee industry quite contrary to previous measures this affected the small
industry owner who had supported the PPP in 1970. It was justified by the
profiteering which had occurred in the wake of sever monsoon flooding. The
confidence of small businessman in the regime was further undermined by the
subsequent nationalization in July 1976 of the rice husking and cotton trading
industries.103 Significantly, small traders and merchants were at the forefront of the
1977 anti-Bhutto movement. After beginning of 1974, for the people of Pakistan,
Bhutto had announced the nationalization of all private banks.104Indra Ghandi
motivated by similar popular ideas and had adopted this policy. The nationalization of
the colleges was introduced in September 1972.105 During following month it was
extended to the private school sector as middle class demand was growing rapidly in
the main urban centers. No provision for compensation was provided for the owners
101
Anwar Hussain Syed, The discourse And politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Macmillan, New York, 1992,
p.120.
102
Shahid javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, pp.247-248.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid., p.249.
105
Ibid., p.250.
74
of colleges and schools. This policy was also opposed from missionary run
institutions which traditionally maintained high academic standard and were afraid
that standard would fall in the absence of sufficient support deteriorating educational
standard, was indeed one further factor which encouraged urban middle class
opposition to the government in 1977.106 Similarly, labor reforms, support from the
poor groups did not outweigh the opposition from the personal and vested interests
which government trade policies generated. However, nationalization policy was
accompanied by the provision of free education for children up to the age of thirteen.
It was significant achievement but the goal of universal education still was not
realized while poor parents no longer had to afford fees, there was still need of their
children labor.107 Added to this there was cultural resistance to sending girls to
schools in the more consecrate rural areas. Enrolment rates consequently did not
improve dramatically but the government stress on educational development
continued to win support even from its opponents. By and large nationalization policy
was not supported by the majority of trade owners of the schools and colleges and
they develop deep hate and feeling of revenge against Bhutto and they have been
waiting for the time opportunity. Ultimately, anti-Bhutto movement provide chance to
over through Bhutto as these people were on the forefront against Bhutto.108
Foreign Policy of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto And His Fall
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was performing efficiently as Foreign Minister since

1960, and deployed his diplomatic skills perfectly in foreign affairs, and ultimately
occasioned his great victory in 1972, in Simla Summit.109 In Bhutto’s own mind his
pursuit of Pakistan’s independent interest with regards to nuclear policy by going
ahead with nuclear reprocessing plan ultimately presented an opportunity for an
external hand to secure his downfall. The emphasis on close ties with China and the
106
Ibid., p.251.
107
Ibid., p.252.
108
Anwar Hussain Syed, The Discourse And Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, p.121. Also see Shahid javed
Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, p.253.
109
Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1971-1994, I.B Tauris
& Co, London, 1997, p.204.
75
Middle East, and the nuclearization of Pakistan must all be understood in this context.
China as we have already seen had become an indispensable arms supplier, by the end
of the 1970s. The most spectacular example of Sino-Pakistan cooperation was the
construction of the strategic Karakoram Highway, which on its completion in 1978,
connected Pakistan’s Northern Area with Xinjiang province through the Kunjerab
Pass .Shortly, after Bhutto came to office; he embarked on a morale-boosting tower of
the Middle East and North Africa.110 The need for Pakistan to develop closer links
with the Islamic world and to look westwards towards the Middle East rather than
elsewhere in Asia, was a constant theme of his regime. He also sought to boost
Pakistan’s self-esteem by emphasizing the break with the pre-1947 era and its earlier
reliance on the United States. Pakistan thus left the Common Wealth on January 30,
1972 and the SEATO111 Security Pact on November 8, 1972, Bhutto hoped that these
steps would help to pave the way for his country to become more acceptable in the
counsels for the third world112. Indeed he aspired to play a leading role in this
emerging international grouping by hosting the first third Muslim world summit.113
Bhutto had a pick-up of the pieces left by the Bangladesh conflict. These
included the tricky issues of whether or not to recognize the new state, the need to
secure the release of 93,000 prisoners of war from whom 195 were claimed war
criminals and the Indian occupation of almost 6,000 square miles of Pakistan territory.
Behind these problems lay the necessity for bilateral talks which India had greatly
strengthened its strategic position vis-a-vis Pakistan. So, Preliminary talks were held
in the spring of 1972 between Indian and Pakistani officials.114
Bhutto was quite a remarkable person: a fine writer, a captivating orator, a

mass mobilizer, a bold agitator, a populist leader; he had traveled widely and had won
110
Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1971-1994, p.206.
111
South East Asian Treaty Organization was signed for protecting South-East Asian countries from
the threats of Communism. United States was leading this treaty and Pakistan was its member due to
the geographical and sea links of East Pakistan with other South-East Asian countries.
112
Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1971-1994, p.207.
113
Ibid., p.208.
114
Ibid., pp.210-211.
76
the respect of several Third World leaders.115 Yet he was quite native in many matters
of statesmanship: he was unable to comprehend fully the loci of effective power in an
underdeveloped state. He challenged the power of the propertied classes and provoked
the army and irritated the West. The opposition to him, which had become
accustomed to his populist methods, showed immunity to his counter-attack and,
instead, used his own tactics to dislodge him. Perhaps he did not conceive of this
eventuality and did not adequately prepare in advance, in which case his novelty in
this matter matched his brilliance in other areas.116
According to several scholars, tragedy was that during his years in power, he
gradually alienated all those classes or at least sizeable sections of them which have
the capacity of self, as well as mutual organization, while endearing him to the vast
silent majority of the peasantry. The first to be hit by his regime were the industrialists
whose enterprises were nationalized. Even those whose assets were not taken over by
the state, included traders fell in victims of fears and uncertainty. The industrial
workers and the urban employees demonstrated confidence towards their employers
due to their wage demands, strike activity, go-slow tactics and occupation of factories,
adversely affected production and profits. The business community: therefore, was
quite disaffected by the state of affairs brought upon by the government labor laws. In
addition the traders and the shopkeepers, historically the most conservative forces in
any society, opposed the socialist aspirations of the PPP and disapproved of the
erosion of traditional morality. The Mullah, custodian of the Muslim ethic, was
naturally aligned with the trader and the shopkeeper. To none of these classes did
Bhutto deal a bray blow. They were allowed to exist, though they were hampered
their continued existence, gave them resilience so that they fought back with the field
strength when cracks appeared in Bhutto's hold on power117
115
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak....., Pakistan Book Dipot,
Lahore, 1988, p.387.
116
Ibid., pp.389-390.
117
Abdul Ghafoor Bhurgi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Falcon of Pakistan, pp.276-277. Also see Salman
Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.393-394. Further
Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto And Pakistan: 1967-1977, pp.178-179.
77
The list of Bhutto's antagonists does not end here. A large section of the
workers and student leaders too turned against him. The popular movement, which
had put the PPP into power, consisted of student radicals, lawyers, teachers, as well as
urban workers. Their confidence was high and their aspirations lofty. After the initial
euphoria of industrial reforms and nationalization, the government had to put an end
to the demands for “move” and “better” by its own supporters. The guns aimed at that
the enemies were now timed against the urban agitators. Police action to end the Tory
occupations, even irritate calling in of the army to quell urban agitation, led to scenes
of blood and filly. Slowly, Bhutto was losing he affection and confidence of the only
class left in the cities capable of organized action. But more important than this, he
had lost the zealous support of the urban activists capable of organizing grass root
activity.118
The intelligence, too, was disgruntled, because Bhutto could not deliver what
he had promised. Economic backwardness, the lack of organized and disciplined
manpower, and the strict and merciless demands of the world economy were forces
too strong to respond to the piecemeal reforms of Bhutto's government. In fact, his
regime had no option but to degenerate into an oppressive machine. Given the strong
tendencies of populism in the Third World, the tendency towards autocracy is
invariable, and Bhutto's regime could not escape it either. Thus economic malaise
concedes with the curtailment of political rights, freedom of the press, freedom of
speech, and the rights to agitate and organize were gradually suppressed. Politicians
were banned from speak and were even harassed and intimidated. Bhutto lost support
of a large section of the country's intelligentsia: the students, the teachers, the lawyers
and the journalists etc.119
It is, therefore, not surprising that in his last days of despair. Bhutto was the
man who even from his prison cell, mobilized and roused masses, was tillable and
unwilling to live the call to rally supporters. Instead they chose the courts of laws his
arena and asked his foreign friends to plead on his behalf. This was a harsh contrast
118
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.401-
402.
119
Ibid., pp.402-403.
78
with the actions of the man who had in his time torn up UN resolutions to show his
contempt for the injustice of international law. It is also not surprising that no
spontaneous and uncontainable movements of agitation erupted upon the news of his
arrest or even upon his execution.120
This split with organized civil support, so necessary for Third World civilian
regimes to negotiate power sharing with the armed forces, was bound to dislocate
Bhutto sooner or later. Bhutto was also an irritant in world politics. He was a capable
man, more thoughtful and more knowledgeable than the Henry Kissinger of the
world. He aspired to unify the Third World into some kind of block. Which could
exert the pressure of international relations? He tended to be rather independent in
regional policy orientation instead of being lined to one superpower. This was his
image and perhaps his aspiration. Of course, the realities of world politics, the class-
bound nature of Pakistan society, and the dependence of its industry upon Western
technology, as well as the historical ties between Pakistan and the Western world. Yet
despite these restrictions, Bhutto could not restrain himself from gestures against
“imperialism” which often made him an unreliable ally of the west.121
The destabilization process could engulf the entire Middle East which at this
time was both politically and economically central to the Western world. Pakistan, a
traditional ally of the West, whose army had always been, equipped by the West,
required playing an unequivocal and decisive role in the impending upheavals in the
region. Bhutto’s fluctuating politics and his dreams of relative independence which
appeared with his wish to reinforce by committing Pakistan to becoming a nuclear
power were no longer acts of playful disobedience they were doing right important
and gravel unwise given the global balance of forces at this stage.122
The changing political climate of the region from the mid-seventies onwards
had almost sealed Bhutto's fate. His removal from office was only a matter of time.
120
Ibid., p.404.
121
Ibid., p.405.
122
Ibid., pp.405-406.
79
His humiliation and final execution of course, not quite expected.123 Despite the
disillusionment of the urban classes with Bhutto’s government, the vast majority of
people in the country and the peasantry was still behind him. Bhutto could achieve an
electoral victory but could not control the streets, He had the tacit to show goodwill
for the millions of peasants dispersed all over the country but had lost the active
support of classes which were capable to organize themselves into a power full
combative force. He had shielded to the opposition the organizational power of the
rank and file activist in the urban centers.124
Ghafoor Ahmed125 said about Bhutto's party that the PPP was able to win quite
convincingly the elections of 1977. Of course, there were regulations. No one of these
was rather amusing, as in the case where the election results in a particular
constituency were amounted on television long both the official counting commenced.
It was possible that Bhutto himself had not sanctioned such rigging. Though, third
world rulers often display paranoia with regard to the uncertainty of the outcome of
general elections. The reasons for this paranoia are manifold firstly, the degree of
power enjoyed by a Third world rulers over the class of the population is
comprehensibly greater than the powers of a prime minister in Western democracy,
and to part with this requires immense moral courage.126 Secondly, during their reign,
third world leaders, due to the autocratic nature of their ruler, rend to make so many
enemies that they cannot afford to be separated from the seat of power, as this may
result in their physical annihilation127. Thirdly, it is true that in some underdeveloped
countries elections may take place after an interval of five to six year but apart from
this privilege of casting their vote, the involvement of the masses in the democratic
123
Ibid., p.407.
124
Ibid., p.408.
125
Ghafoor Ahmed was one of the popular leaders of Jamat-e-Islami at that time.
126
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.409.
127
Ibid.
80
process is smallest between elections and the fundamental freedom normally remain
suspended.128
It may, therefore, not be incorrect to say that no underdeveloped country has

yet experienced the democratic process through its government, by the system of
elections. It was a source of considerable difficulty for the political parties, including
the ruling party for predicting with confidence that what will be the outcome of
elections. No indicators of public opinion exist between elections. The paranoia of the
rulers with regard to the outcome of elections is, therefore, not without reason129.
There are, however, other reasons for electorate, even if the leadership does not
sanction it. The candidates themselves, in particular those who, because of their social
position have immense power in their localities, engage with malpractice. Then, there
is the case of the corrupt civil servant who is almost programmed to manipulate things
in favor of the ruling party.130
The charges of widespread electoral rigging by the ruling party in the 1977
elections may or may not be well founded: the important point is that the PPP was
likely to win, owing to its support among the rural masses. However, countrywide
elections are events of national mobilization in underdeveloped countries. The urban
centers become hotbeds of agitation. The defeated opposition in 1977, consisting of
an electoral alliance of nearly all the political parties in Pakistan called the Pakistan
National Alliance (PNA), immediately accused the government for large-scale rigging
and called upon the PPP leadership to declare the election results null and wide and to
make arrangements for fresh elections. The urban leaders by the traders, the
shopkeepers, the Mullah and the democratically-aligned intelligentsia vehemently
echoed the call of the opposition. The PNA found itself leading a mass urban
government against the PPP.131 The movement was entirely reactionary in the sense
that it did not have any possible economic or political program and was alarmed
128
Ibid., p.410.
129
Ibid., p.411.
130
Ibid., p.412.
131
Ibid., pp.413-414.
81
solely as a reaction to the PPP. The peasants who had voted the PPP were incapable
of demonstrating their strength in the form of any organized movement. The PPP had
lost control of the streets and Bhutto, an experienced populist campaigner, isolated in
terms of rank and file support in the urban centers. He could only resort to the army
combat the mass movement on the streets.132
The deployment of the army till disorder has several implications in the third
World: it signifies weakness in the ruling party; it antagonizes the masses, since the
street clashes often result in bloodshed: and. perhaps most importantly, it engages the
army on internal political fronts. Such was the scene in Pakistan in 1977.133
Bhutto tried to fight the opposition on two fronts, he invited the army to
restore order while at the same time he tried to neutralize the opposition by accepting
some of' its demands. He agreed to hold re-elections in some of the disputed
constituencies or even to concede these to opposition candidates. To appease the
religious factions, he banned drinking, restricted the sale of liquor, closed down
betting and gambling dens and declared Friday the weekly holiday. Of course, every
concession, he made, raised the morale and strength of the opposition. History turned
full circle: Bhutto who, in his previous ten years, had refused to meet and negotiate
with the democratically-elected leaders of Pakistan, now he was facing boycott by the
combined opposition determined to wrangle him.134
On July 5, 1977, after two months of confrontation, the army took over with
the declared intention of holding fresh elections within ninety days during which
period the protagonists were expected to organize election campaigns.135The army
take-over affected the mood of the people: Bhutto's fortune could turn at the last time.
The PNA's movement, which had taken several months to build and consolidate,
132
Ibid., p.415.
133
Ibid., pp.416-417.
134
Ibid., p.418.
135
Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, NBO Publishers
Distributors, New Delhi, 1985, p.34. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se
Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.419.
82
could be taken on. As a leader ousted by the army, as a loser, Bhutto could turn the
tables and build a counter-movement. Bhutto, the arch-populist, felt the changing
pulse of the masses and decided to go on offensive. He immediately charged the army
with partisan behavior and accused the opposition of being a tool in the hands of
“imperialism” which conspired to take away all the gains that the oppressed and the
exploited had made during his regime. It was a conspiracy planned at a global level,
proclaimed Bhutto, and his voice found an echo in all corners of the country. Bhutto
out of power found himself on home ground fighting a populist campaign against
those whom he considered.136
This was an unexpected turn of events, as unexpected overwhelmingly victory

of Mujeeb in the elections of 1970. The opposition had overestimated its strength that
Bhutto can find cracks in its ranks and hijack many of its supporters. So, within hours
of starting his campaign, Bhutto was restrained front taking it to the masses. Without
further loss of time a case conspiracy to murder was invoked and Bhutto was
arrested.137
The rapidity of events as restrictions on his political movements, his arrest, the
charges and then the trial, denote that somehow Bhutto’s glorious days had been
overthrew. Bhutto’s trial lasted for nearly two years. He was hanged in the early hours
of April 4, 1979.138
Hassan Askari Rizvi writes in his book "The Military and Politics in Pakistan
1947-86" that the emergence of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as Pakistan's President on
December 20, 1971, in place of General Yahya Khan, was a logical outcome of the
defeat in the war with India and the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Bhutto's
136
Hassan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise And Realization of Bengli Muslim
Nationalism, p.420.
137
A. M. K. Maswani, Subversion in East Pakistan, Amir Publications, Dhaka, 1979, pp.154-155. Also
see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.423.
138
Chakar Ali Junejo, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Memoir, Pakistan Publishing, Karachi, 1996, p.154. Also see
83
People Party proved a leading party in 1971 polls in the West Pakistan. His reign
consists of six years from 1971 to 1977.139
Khalid Bin Saeed writes in his book, “politics in Pakistan" that an obvious
cause of downfall was the rigging in elections. The resulting explosion was much big
and involved too many risks and losses of human life on the part of the demonstrators
to be explained alone. The PNA felt confident to capture a reasonable number of'
seats in the National Assembly and thus emerge as a formidable opposition. When the
results of the National Assembly polls were declared the PPP swept the PNA. The
PPP success in the elections proved short lived because the PNA alleged massive
ragging of the polls by the ruling party. As a mark of' protest, the PNA boycotted the
provincial elections which were held on 10th March and successfully staged a country
wide strike on 11th March. Encouraged by the popular response, the PNA decided to
launch a mass protest of their major demands which included the scrapping of
election results, the holding of Fresh polls, and the removal of the Chief Election
Commissioner and the resignation of Bhutto.140
The second main cause of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's downfall was nationalization
of the industries. It was apparent that big business had suffered because of
nationalization. An important cementing and sustaining force was the commercial and
monetary interests of the shopkeepers and merchants who were against the
government because of its nationalization of big industries, declining private
investment and above all nationalization of cotton ginning and rice husking mills in
July 1976 which meant that the small merchants and traders could not become
investors and small industrialists by investing in such mills. It was the nationalization
of this rice and cotton mills that attracted the arhti’s (middlemen) of the Mandi
(market) in the PNA movement. The merchant class particularly those trading in cloth
had to vast network that linked cities like Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad and Multan. It
was significant that with these interlinked interests and contacts, the merchant class in
139
Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, pp.254-256.
140
Khalid Bin Saeed, Islam And The Paths of Pakistan’s Political Development,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/17754810/Islam-and-the-Paths-of-Pakistans-Political-Development
(accessed March 12, 2013).
84
all these cities supported the demonstrations. The refugee middle class had suffered
because of shrinking job opportunities caused by decline in private investment due to
the quota system of the new Government. These refugees had also their baradaries
(families) in the certain cities of Punjab which accentuated or reinforce their sense of
solidarity.141
Another cause of the downfall of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was that the PPP
strongmen and the mohallah chairman (locality chairman) derived benefits from the
government like a ration depot or a route permit and used their position to extract
fines, bribes and payments from the merchant class. These sorts of grievances came
through when the reporters of various newspapers interviewed the leaders of merchant
groups in the walled cities of Lahore and Multan.142
The most important slogan which provoked the public against the Bhutto
government was the slogan of Nizam-e-Mustafa. This slogan inspired the
precisionists to face the police sticks or even bullets were the establishment of Nizam-
e-Mustata.143 This was a powerful symbol because it combined the religion of Islam
and the personality of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Devotion to Islam was
there, but the love that the Holy Prophet's (PBUH) personality inspired for the
common man was perhaps even more electrifying. This explains why the name of
Haji Aftab, a cloth merchant of Lahore became a legend for leading the procession
against police fire. It was the deadliest blows struck at the Bhutto regime. It was a
"miracle" reason or logic could not explain that People who did not strictly follow
Islam advanced to the bullets in the name of Nizam-e-Mustafa. They felt that it was
141
425.
142
Ibid., p.426.
143
Eamon Murphy, The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical And Social Roots of Extremism,
Oxford University Press, London, 2012, p.79.
85
divine help and the Islamic favor of the masses for Nizam-e-Mustafa had enabled
them to overcome Bhutto.144
Mosques and walled cities provided certain advantages, for example, during
the agitation, when Section 144 of P.C. banning the assembly of more than five
persons was imposed, mosques where more than five persons assembled for prayers
and other activities did not normally come under the purview of Section 144. When
mosques became the nerve centers of the demonstrations where Bhutto and his
socialism was denounced as anti-Islamic forces, members of the police and FSF did
enter the mosques either to arrest or beat the demonstrators. Such action was regarded
as sacrilegious and tended to provoke more violent and demonstrations. Furthermore,
it was not easy for the police to close or arrest demonstrators in the walled cities
where the narrow lanes and streets restricted movements of personnel and vehicles.
The lower middle class, who were tinder the influence of the Jamat-e-Islami and the
Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Pakistan really felt that Bhutto would cause incalculable harm to
the Islamic ideology. These misgivings were further reinforced by his repression.145
Bhutto appointed Zia as Chief of Staff in March 1976. General Zia was a
religious man. He regularly studies some of the journals and publications of the
Jamat-e-Islami. It may be noted that Zia was a refugee from East Punjab. The head of
the Jamat-e-Islami was one of the prominent political leaders who applauded the
imposition of Martial Law on July 5, 1977. Bhutto, while making his statement in the
Supreme Court, observed: I appointed a Chief of Army Staff belonging to Jamat-e-
Islami and the result is all of us.146 So, Zia's Martial Law was the end of Bhutto's
regime.
144
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.425. Also
see Eamon Murphy, The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical And Social Roots of Extremism,
pp.79-80.
145
426. Also see Eamon Murphy, The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical And Social Roots of
Extremism, pp.81-82.
146
Ibid., pp.84-85.
86
Although Bhutto constantly referred to Islamic Socialism, neither he nor the
party spelled out clearly how Islam and Socialism were to be combined or were to
influence each other. In the election manifesto of the PPP in 1970, the four mottos of
the party were stated as: Islam is our teeth. Democracy is our policy. Socialism is our
economy. All powers to the people. It was significant that in such a formulation,
Islam was described only as a faith and as neither linked clearly with democracy or
with the socialist economy.147 When one reads the manifesto in its details, one again
finds that there is no mention of how Islam justifies or supports nationalization of
certain industries or measures and objectives like land reforms and the elimination of
feudalism. Where Bhutto and the PPP being deliberate in putting forward the concept
of Islamic Socialism but not explaining how Islam would inspire or justice certain
radical measures that the party was advocating. Did they perhaps feel that Islam as a
religion or as an ideology could not be readily used? Of course this was just for
purposes of creating class-consciousness and launching a class struggle.148
Bhutto was able to defeat the Islam oriented and conservative parties in 1970
elections with the help of a radical program, find a political slogan like Islamic
Socialism. During 1972-77, his regime and his policies created sufficient class tension
that, in turn, alarmed the conservative forces to such an extent that he was eventually
overthrown through urban demonstrations in 1977.149 It is conceivable that his party
had produced an intellectual and political synthesis between socialism and Islam he
might not have been as vulnerable. This is a question that has never been
systematically explored. The fillet remains that in the case of the conservative groups
who had coalesced in the PNA movement against Bhutto and the military regime that
finally toppled the Bhutto's policies had heightened class conflict to alarming
Proportions.150
147
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), Pakistab
Book Dipute, Lahore, 1988, p.427.
148
Ibid., p.428.
149
Ibid., p.429.
150
Ibid., p.430.
87
Khalid Bin Saeed writes in his book “Politics in Pakistan” that there were
certain weaknesses in Bhutto's personality. In an interview given to the well-known
Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, Bhutto admitted that lie was often torn by many
conflicts, which were a part of his mental make tip. He further said:
There are many conflicts in front of me. I'm aware of that. I try to reconcile
them and overcome them, but I don't succeed and I remain under this strange
mixture of Asia and Europe. I have a layman's education and a Muslim's
upbringing. My mind is Western and my soul is Eastern.151
The main cause of his downfall was his strong desire for power. The autocratic
government of Ayub Khan was his ideal way of administration. The constitution of
1973 made it clear that the key player of the entire government structure whether it is
concerned with decision making process in the central government, or whether it
related to matters with the provincial governments was the Prime Minister. All this
clearly indicated that the Prime Minister could neither be controlled by the president
nor be challenged by the Assembly.152 The latter feature was extraordinary because
the spirit of parliamentary government was that a Prime Minister was both
accountable and removable by the Assembly. As it has often been remarked the
Government of Pakistan under Ayub was that of the president, by the president and
for the president, could it be said that in the Bhutto regime the Prime Minister's
position was equally dominant? It seemed that Bhutto was not satisfied even with the
power of the Prime Minister awarded by the constitution. During 1975-76, he had
started thinking and bringing the parliamentary system under still greater control of
the Prime Minister so that tie could push certain pieces of legislation through the
parliament with practically no delay or obstruction.153
When Bhutto was in full power, he organized the FSF not only to suppress
such movements but also reduce the reliance in the army. Again, he was trying to
151
Khalid Bin Saeed, Islam And The Paths of Pakistan’s Political Development,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/17754810/Islam-and-the-Paths-of-Pakistans-Political-Development
(accessed March 12, 2013).
152
153
Ibid., pp.431-432.
88
increase his autonomy. He eliminated the monopoly of the civil service of Pakistan by
throwing open top civil service jobs to all other civil servants and to those who had
been brought in through lateral entry. In August and November 1973, the existing
civil service cadres, including the CSP, were abolished and thousands of civil servants
were amalgamated into the 22 pay grades. Even though the CSP Cadre was abolished,
officers who belonged to this cadre were still occupying key positions in the centre,
the provinces, urban centers and the districts. Bhutto weakened the power of these
officers not only for the maintenance of law and order but also for coercing his
political opponents and for rewarding the party faithful.154
The fatal flaw in this grand design was the Bhutto, while retaining the majority
of the mass support particularly in Punjab and Sindh failed, to activate and mobilize
the organizational support of the PPP. Being confident of the mass support he tended
to de-link his political power from the populist movement, had became increasingly
dependent on the coercive instruments of the state like the FSF and the armaments.
He had not only analogized practically all the left-leaning leaders in his own party.
When his government was faced with massive urban protest organized by mostly the
petty business class under the sponsorship of the Pakistan national alliance during the
spring of 1977, Bhutto had relied primarily on the FSF and the army to suppress such
a movement. In such kind of political polarization which Bhutto's policies and actions
had brought about, the army that had weight with the help of PNA and thus, Bhutto
was overthrown at the Murree hill station.155
Actually, Bhutto had to pick up the pieces left by Bangladesh conflict. These
were included on the issues of whether or not to recognized the new state, use demand
to secure the release of ninety three troops captured in 1971 war and the Indian
occupation of Pakistani territory. Behind these problems lay the necessity of bilateral
talks with Indian which had greatly strengthened its strategic position visa Pakistan
preliminary talks between the two countries in Murree during the spring of 1972,
which paved to use the way for a Summit meeting, in the formal meeting between the
premiers of India and Pakistan. The Pakistani President realized they are involved in
154
Ibid., pp.433-434.
155
Ibid., pp.435-436.
89
high risk due to the Indian pressure, held all the story cards yet and sign of concession
on his part could prove as seriously and fatally injurious, as had the Tashkent Summit
for Ayub Khan.156 Bhutto had the depth of negotiating from a position of weakness in
this first meeting of the two countries leaders since Tashkent that the agreement
signed in the early hours of July was in Pakistan as a great triumph. The subsequent
attempts by his opponent for his trial with claiming secret clause agreed to the
personal acceptance of the status on Kashmir failed to return from this achievement.
Bhutto reached there with smile accompanied by a large entangle which included his
nineteen year old daughter Benazeer Bhutto, who was here due to Harvard summer
vocations. Bhutto was ready to leave the place without an agreement rather than agree
on Indian demands for an explication war pact or the recognition of Bangladesh by
Pakistan. The talks continued for a number of days without any sign and it was a
massive success of Bhutto. From Bhutto’s point of view the fact that the agreement
did not included a no war pact or Pakistan recognition of Bangladesh, yet with drawl
of India from Pakistani Soil was major cause of celebration and rejoice. Despite
Indian hops there was no final solution of Kashmir issue but both leaders agreed that
Indian and Pakistan would resolve their issue through bilateral talks, this agreement
buried the dispute as an international issue which could be brought before the unified
nation in terms of accepting ceasefire line as the new line of control in Kashmir. But,
the similar agreement allowed the resumption of trade and communication including
over fight and called for promotion of scientific and cultural exchanges. A part from
Indian, Bhutto visited china and other Muslim countries and improved relations with
them. He was able to convene OIC conference in Lahore in 1974. He also tried to
seek to maintain good relationship between Russia and Pakistan. He raised the voice
for the Muslims and third World countries on international forums.157
Bhutto had decided to hold elections in June 1976, when Rafi Raza announced
on January 7, 1977, concerning to hold the national and Provincial elections, was
unexpected for the public. The (PNA) was founded on 11 January comprised nine
political parties emplacing the range of secular leftist and Islamist outlooks.
156
Ibid., p.437.
157
Ibid., pp.438-439.
90
Surprisingly, its electioneering was focused mainly on the grievances arising from
inflation of bad Government and unemployment. The move of positive aspects of its
programmer was vague as over the issue of denationalization. Although a
commitment to Islamization was given.158
It was also revealed that defensiveness of the government was campaigning on

Islamic issues. Government also used its machinery and intimidator tactics against
large crowed collected to PNA rallies. It was expected that PPP would make clean
sweep in the elections. Hassan Askari Rizvi commented on announcement of
elections in 1977, called a general astonishment and led to an immediate claim that
the elections had been rigged. PPP had apparel captured 155 seats out of 200 National
Assembly seats. The PNA immediate response was staged a nationwide strike on 11th
March. The PNA movement got full swing which was to end in introduction of
Martial Law159. After the 5th July, a white paper was issued listing Bhutto’s misdeeds
and his counter claim of army and external support for PNA campaign set down at
length. The reality seems to be that PPP victory was inflated by local officials which
may have affected 30-40 seats. Bhutto was unprepared for the further accomplice and
had not thought that some opponents accused the order to secure two third authorities
necessary to bring constitutional change.160
No doubt Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had a personality of convincing others, Since his arrival
into politics during the rule of President Sikandar Mirza. During Ayub regime, he was
foreign minister and played vital role in maintaining good relations with communist
world like Peoples republic of China and Soviet Union. With opposing Tashkent
Declaration, he formed his own political party, named Pakistan People’s Party, which
won first general elections of Pakistan in 1970 from two provinces of Pakistan. It
became second largest political party in the National Assembly after Awami League
which got simple majority. Due to political crisis in shifting power to Awami
Laeague, Civil war had been started in East Pakistan. With Indian support, several
158
Ibid., p.440. Also see Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto And Pakistan: 1967-1977, p.181.
159
Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, p.117.
160
442.
91
rebellions were attacking on Pakistan Army. In November 1971, India openly
attacked East Pakistan and with the help of Awami League, Indian Army fought for
the separation of East Pakistan from The United Pakistan. On December 16, 1971,
Pakistan Army accepted its defeat in Paltan Ground of Dhakka and East Pakistan
became Bangladesh. But, till 1974, Pakistan had been accepted the separation of East
Pakistan through 1st amendment in the constitution of 1973. Now, Bhutto had to
refine pre-existing infrastructure of remaining Pakistan and he introduced several
reforms and a system of nationalization which opposed by PNA. So, PNA started its
movement in all over the country and it ended with imposition of Martial Law on July
5, 1977.
92
Chapter 3
Major Steps of Zia-ul-Haq And Pakistan People’s

Party
Zia’s Attitude Towards Political Forces
The subjugation during the Military rule of Zia-ul-Haq was the period of Cold
War environment. The history of Pakistan indicated the massive political, biased and
military suppression occurred during the military rule of Zia-ul-Haq who gave the
permission of political restriction over the secular, communist, liberal, and democratic
parties and groups during 1977 to 1988.1 It engaged the large-scale wash out of all
political groups with left core orientation on the left-right political variety, oppression
of peasants2, higher-ranked military leaders3, characterized by widespread police
observation, widespread doubt of "saboteurs", custody, and subjective executions of
the Pro-Soviet parties opposing the country's secret participation to arm the Afghan
Mujahideen4 against the USSR in Afghanistan.5
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Zia-ul-Haq, on July 5, 1977, arranged a plan to

bring down the national and democratically elected rule of Prime minister Zulfaqar
Ali Bhutto in a bloodless coup d'état6 which codename was “Operation Fair Play.7”
After the imposition of military rule in Pakistan, the military tyrannical regime moved
1
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq, Westview Press,
2
Oppression of peasants was held usually, in the rural areas of Sindh, where most of the peasants
population was supporting Pakistan People’s Party.
3
Leaders those were supporting Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, were suppressed by Zia-ul-Haq.
4
Mujahideen are those militant who fight for the survival of Islam.
5
Ibid., p.27.
6
It is a French word, which means “Military Rule”
7
The code name of 1976 Martial Law was Operation Fair Play.
93
quickly to spoil any opposition or prospective resistance against Zia-ul-Haq's regime,
whereas, the initial public reaction against the implementation of Martial Law was
limited to the drawing rooms, the harassment and resistance augmented in the run-up
to the passion and the death sentence of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Afterward, the
opposition and at the same time, the maltreatment became more structured with the
initiation Movement for Restoration of Democracy under the leadership of Zulfaqar
Ali Bhutto’s daughter, Benazeer Bhutto.8
The victims of maltreatment ranged from political workers and activists to

ethnic and religious minorities, intellectuals, communists, journalists, poets and to
many others. Estimate of the people murdered openly on the orders of military regime
or through staged trials in civil or military courts is varied in between five to twenty
thousand approximately. In addition, thousands were assassinated in state supported
sectarian and ethnic aggressions in incidents like Qasba-Aligarh9 Massacre where
almost 400 people were raped and murdered under just two hours, in Karachi.10
On July 5, 1977, the armed forces of Pakistan speedily moved to take into
custody the Prime Minister Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, inserting several other leaders and
members of cabinet affiliated with Pakistan People’s Party under house arrest.11 All
the party leaders were arrested; the government faced slight opposition until the death
punishment for Z.A. Bhutto, announced on March 18, 197812. A non-aggressive and
non-violent mass protest was started throughout Sindh and in some parts of Punjab.
The protest in Nawabshah13 was crushed, is the first example of mass murder by the
government where hundreds of peasants were killed by using combat helicopters on
8
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq, p.27.
9
Qasba Aligarh is a backward town in the rural Sindh where Pakistan People’s Party had vast political
support.
10
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq, p.30.
11
Ibid.
12
Ravi Kalia, Pakistan: From The Rhetoric of Democracy To The Rise of Militancy, Routledge, New York,
2012, p.67.
13
This city was considered a hub for Pakistan People’s Party.
94
the orders of the governor of Sindh, Lieutenant-General S.M. Abbasi, during protest14.
The imposition of curfew in Nawabshah, Sukkur, Larkana, Hyderabad and some parts
of Karachi was occurred due to massive reaction of people. Thousands of PPP
workers were arrested throughout Punjab and Sindh provinces. A strict ban was
imposed over the Pakistan Peoples Party’s flag or its related symbol. Cities in all over
the Sindh province remained in frequent state of curfew until April 4, 1979, when
Bhutto was secretly hanged, without any pre-publicized date15.
There was preventive curfew in all over the Sindh province and due to the fear
of reaction; curfew was imposed in Bahawalpur, Multan and several other cities of
Punjab as well16. More than 51 people who were protesting in Peshawar, Rawalpindi
and Lahore were arrested and poisoned accused of disturbance in civil order and
national disloyalty17.
President Zia-ul-Haq, on September 27, 1982, issued the administrative ruling

as the Martial Law Regulation No.53 for legalize the death punishment as the
prescribed penalty for any crime liable to cause uncertainty, terror or hopelessness
amongst the public18. Crimes carrying a punishment under such activities, which
disturbed civil law, included any work or act with intention to damage the efficiency
or hamper the working of, or cause is smashing up of public possessions or the soft
and smooth performance of government. Similarly, this law provided an authority to
military court, on the base of police or any other inquiry administration alone may,
unless the divergent is confirmed, presume that this blame has committed the crime
charged. With other provisions, the announcement that was confirmed "shall be
estimated to have taken effective from the date of July 5, 1977" that was the day Zia-
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid., p.69.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., p.70.
18
Syed F. Hasnat, Global Security Watch – Pakistan, ABC-CLIO, New York, 2011, p.119.
95
ul-Haq overthrew his predecessor elected Prime Minister of Pakistan People’s Party;
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto19.
Faraz Wahlaah who was the six years old child was waves the PPP flag during
protest against Zia regime in the mid of 1980s, was declared as a youngest political
hostage of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy20.During the 11 years of
Zia-ul-Haq regime, several international human rights groups and organizations
repeatedly pointed out and expressed concerns over the army's brutal actions to
suppress disagreements21. The Amnesty International in his report which was released
on May15, 1978 highlighted that:
We have so many concerns at the using of spanking in Pakistan and are

troubled that this abnormal sentences are also being imposed on political
prisoners for obligating acts which often come into view to be no new than
use of the rights regarding freedom of expression and speech guaranteed in
the constitution of 1973. The first open hanging took place in the month of
March after death punishments were legalized by a military court on the
issue of three civilians convicted for assassination. Overall, 16 prisoners
have been sentenced to spankings for political activities.22
Further Added:
Several relatives, in whom many of them were teenagers, have been hostages
until the wanted person was found. Yahya Bakhtiyar who was Attorney General
during Bhutto era, was beaten up in his compartment in Quetta jail in same
month. His family was received his bloodstained dress for cleaning.23
19
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), Pakistan
20
Ibid., p.353.
21
Ibid., p.353.
22
Ibid., p.354.
23
Ibid., p.355.
96
During commenting on Zia-ul-haq regime's repression, the Economist said:“The
Pakistan army has been brutal in its crackdown”24Furthermore, a survey which was
held by the Geneva based International Commission of Jurists which report was
published by the Lahore bar Association, charged that:
In 1984, systematic torture was occurred in five prisons of Lahore, mainly at

a prison where many political prisoners were held. Military courts are
utilized increasingly to clear the accumulation of cases in regular courts. The
survey published its reports that the military courts have been decided to
solve cases in minutes and have been refused defendants regarding
delivering their rights through lawyers. Special military courts were
established that were tried serious offenses allowing defense guidance but
the politicized judges often barricade the lawyers in their working.25
On November 19, 1985, the Amnesty International also blamed the Zia-ul-Haq
regime of crushing, torturing and denying fair trials to political prisoners trialed by
special established military courts. It cited that:
In September of 1985, more than 130 political prisoners were facing

sentences were between the age of seven and 42 years after special
established military courts blamed and convicted them of political
crimes or politically oriented criminal crimes and offenses. The military
courts frequently use as facts acknowledgments extracted by torture and
at the same time, as prisoners were hung upside down and brutally
beaten, given strong electric shocks, strapped to the blocks of ice,
deprived of foodstuff and doze for two or three days including burned
with cigarettes. Many political prisoners were held in manacles and
handcuffs. People, often were tried in courts held in closed sitting and
refused the right of petition to the higher court.26
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., pp.355.356.
26
Ibid., p.356.
97
Hundreds of political prisoners faced prison without trail and shoot dead in
such behave of military courts.27 On September 7, 1987, International Commission of
Jurists once more published information that was stating that:"Several human rights
abuses are continuing in Pakistan, including alleged military attacks on common
villagers, despite the so-called lifting of Martial Law approximately twenty months
ago."28
The ICJ29 cited according to villagers who said that their villages were attacked,
raided and burgling by soldiers. Sometimes this act was accompanied by local
policemen. "Several male villagers were shot to death and brutally beaten the women.
In at least two cases, pregnant women had faced miscarried"30. Daily “Le Monde” (a
newspaper published from Paris) wrote on August 18, 1988 that:"Surely, no defender
of human rights or democracy was going to shed tears over Zia-ul-Haq's death"31.
During suppression of opposition, there is an estimate that approximately

20,000 political workers and activists were hunted down and hanged or executed
during this regime, whereas, thousands had been forced to leave Pakistan for Western
Europe, United States of America and Middle East, specially, just for seeking
asylum32.
PPP’s Leadership And Zia Regime
Zia-ul-Haq had designed long planning to inflict the Martial Law as he

became Chief of Army Staff in 197633. On numerous occasions, Zia-ul-Haq purposely
covered intelligence information and tried to misguide Bhutto on various political
27
Ibid., p.356.
28
Ibid.
29
ICJ stands for International Court of Justice.
30
Ibid., p.356.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid., p.357.
33
Abdul Qayyum, Zia-ul-Haq And I, International Consortium of Consultants And Technical Services,
98
affairs. That’s the result that soon all the opposition parties of that time, were
demanding overthrow of Bhutto’s government34. When political and civil disorder
was intensified, it had been converted into massive unrest. Bhutto on advice of Zia-ul-
Haq imposed Martial Law in the major cities of country including Lahore, Karachi
and Hyderabad35. Though, a negotiation agreement among Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and
opposition was eventually reported. The negotiating theory was generated next day
after the showing off armed rally by the workers of Pakistan People’s Party but Zia-
ul-Haq had been planned the Martial Law carefully, because he knew that Zulfaqar
Ali Bhutto had huge links in the intelligence services of Pakistan armed forces and
have links with several military high ranked officers36. Chief of Air Staff, General
Muhammad Zulfaqar Ali Khan and Major General Tajamul Husain Malik who was
GOC of 23rd Mountain Division, Major General Nasirullah Baber, (Director General
for the Military Intelligence) and Vice-Admiral Syed Muhammad Ahsan, were
considered to be loyal with Bhutto37. In the meantime, one intelligence unit and the
army formations were stationed in the Prime minister secretariat whose purpose was
to keep an eye on Bhutto's activities and movements, tapping phone calls and also
keeping a record of invitees in the Prime Minister's secretariat. General K.M. Arif
who was the closest ally of General Zia-ul-Haq, had tried to get together with Bhutto
in different attempts, but such efforts were disillusioned by Zia-ul-Haq. Finally, on
April 5, 1977, General Arif succeeded in having meeting with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto
behind closed doors, enlightening the scheme against him. Bhutto remained not to
persuade this and still unimpressed, reportedly asking that how his protégé Zia-ul-Haq
could do such unconstitutional acts against him38. Therefore, Bhutto dismissed
General K.M. Arif later due to conveying him such “wrong” information39.
34
Ibid., p.23.
35
Ibid., p.24.
36
Ibid., p.25.
37
Ibid., p.25.
38
Ibid., p.26.
39
Ibid., p.28.
99
Due to showing off this intelligence information, Zia-ul-Haq clandestinely
contracted with the British active duty SAS armed officers to continue a staff course
for the Army human resources, while at the same time Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral
Muhammad Shareef silently removed naval personnel loyal to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.
Zia-ul-Haq ordered Bhutto's trustworthy officers to go to a staff and command course
and they were not allowed to depart the course until midnight40. In the meantime, Zia-
ul-Haq with his close military officers as well as Admiral Muhammad Shareef
(Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee at that time) arranged the coup in the
evening of July 5, 197741. So, before the declaration of any accord or agreement,
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and other members of his cabinet were under arrest by troops of
Military Police on the order of Zia-ul-Haq in the evening. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto tried to
call Zia-ul-Haq but all telephone lines had been disconnected. One army officer came
in the Prime minister secretariat and arrested Bhutto. After realizing that warnings of
K.M. Arif were not hoax, he was listening from that military officer that he was
apologetic but has been obligatory to perform this unpleasant task of arresting him42.
Zia-ul-Haq and his military administration portrayed the Martial Law as an

"impulsive reply to difficult circumstances" but his reaction was entirely
contradictory43. Soon after imposing Martial Law, Zia-ul-Haq gave interview to the
British journalist Edward Behr of Newsweek that:
I (Zia-ul-Haq) am the only man who took this decision (about Operation Fair
Play for imposing Martial Law) and I did this after 17 Hours from listening the
press statements that negotiations and talks between Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and
the opposition parties had been broken down. Had an accord been reached
40
Ibid., p.29.
41
Ibid., p.30.
42
see Abdul Qayyum, Zia-ul-Haq and I, International Consortium of Consultants, p.32.
43
Abdul Qayyum, Zia-ul-Haq And I, p.32.
100
between them, I surely would never have completed it.44
Though, during the rule of Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff, General Khalid
Mahmood Arif contradicted Zia-ul-Haq's this statement when K.M. Arif noted that
the Martial Law had already been structured, and the senior ranked leadership of
Pakistan Army had solid information45. Therefore, he met with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on
urgent situation, stressing and trying to urge Bhutto to rush discussions with the
opposition. According to K.M. Arif and several other independent experts, accounts,
the discussion had not been broken down even though the Martial Law was designed.
Zia-ul-Haq further argued that Operation Fair Play against Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had
been demanded by the outlook of a civil disobedient and Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was
making a plan to distribute weapons among his supporters46. But, K.M. Arif strongly
rejected Zia-ul-Haq's explanations on Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, and said that there was no
proof that weapons were recovered or found from any of the political party's election
office, the military administration in fact, did not put on trial Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on
the accuse of preparation or planning of civil war.47
Immediately, Admiral Muhammad Shareef, the Chief of Naval Staff at that

time, announced his support with other navy strong officers for Zia-ul-Haq and his
military government48. But General Muhammad Zulfakar Ali Khan, the Chief of Air
Staff, remains unsupported, whereas, Genral Muhammad Shareef, the Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee, remains neutral and he noiselessly expressed his mental
support to the Prime Minister Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.49 Zia-ul-Haq, in 1978, pressured
President Fazal Elahi Chaudhary to appoint General Anwar Shameem as Chief of Air
44
Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan; General Zia-ul-Haq's Interviews to Foriegn Media.
Official documents, Directorate of Films & Publications, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting,
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1988.
45
Javed A. Siddiqi, Operation Fair Play-5 July-1977, Pakistan Publishing, Islamabad, 1985, p.211.
46
Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), Dost Publishing, Lahore, 1996,
p.113.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid., p.114.
49
Ibid., p.115.
101
Staff and in 1979, Admiral Karaamat Niazi appointed as Chief of Naval Staff. On Zia-
ul-Haq's advice, President Fazal Ellahi Chaudhary appointed Admiral Muhammad
Shareef as the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and principal military adviser for
overlooking all the affairs of inter-services including Chiefs of the Staff of respected
forces50. In 1979, the Chiefs of Army, Air Force and the Navy including the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff legalized the Martial Law as constitutional and lawful under the
war-torn conditions, as well promised their support in the favor of Zia-ul-Haq51.
After arrogant power as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Zia-ul-Haq

soon appeared on national television (PTV) and promised to hold new free and fair
parliamentary elections within next 90 days and to shift the political powers to the
civilian representatives52. He also stated that the Constitution of 1973 had not been
abrogated but for the time being, it has been suspended. Zia-ul-Haq did not reliance
on the civilian organizations and institutions, and legislators ensured him that his stay
is necessary for the country's unity, integrity, autonomy and sovereignty. Therefore, in
October 1977, he declared the delay of electoral program and decided to initiate an
accountability procedure for the politicians. On national television, Zia-ul-Haq
strongly defended his policy for delaying the elections and insisted that "inspection of
political leaders is necessary who had involved in misconduct in their past ruling
period"53. As a result, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) adopted its strategy of
"retribution first, elections later". Zia-ul-Haq's strategy severely spoiled his
trustworthiness domestically and internationally because he several times broke the
promises. Another cause was that Zia-ul-Haq extensively assumed that once out of
power the mass of PPP protests and rallies puff up and an improved performance in
up-coming elections was achievable. This fear led to demand for deferment of
elections by the right-wing Islamist parties and groups as well as left-wing socialist
minded people and parties, who were previously allied with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto but
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid., p.116.
52
Abdul Latif Masoom, Dilemmas of A Military Ruler: A Political Study of The Zia Regime, Afsar
Brothers, Islamabad, 2000, p.100.
53
Ibid., p.101.
102
displaced by him in the first place. Zia-ul-Haq transmitted one of the intelligence unit,
known as Political Wing of ISI and sending Brigadier General Tafazzul Husain
Siddiqi, to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's native Province of Sindh, to evaluate whether people
would agree to Martial Law54. The Political Wing of ISI also contacted with several
right-wing Islamist political parties and groups, and also several conservatives
regarding promising election, and offering power sharing formula with PNA. He
successfully divided and alienated the secular political parties and groups from right-
wing Islamist groups, parties and several conservatives, and afterward washed out
each member of secular parties55.
A Disqualification Tribunal was established and several politicians who had

been the members of parliament were alleged with misconduct and banned from
participating in political activities at any stage for the next seven years56. A white
paper manuscript was published by the military administration which was
highlighting the reasons of dismissing Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto’s government57.It is
reported by senior military officers that when Zia-ul-Haq met with federal secretaries
for the first time as leader of the country, after military coup, stated that: "He does not
acquire the legitimacy of Liaqat Ali Khan, personality of General Ayub Khan or
charisma of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. It can be analyzed who have its market"58.
Nussrat Bhutto, the wife of the dismissed Prime Minister, filed a suit against
Zia-ul-Haq's arrival into politics, challenging the soundness of the July 1977 military
rule59. The Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled which later declared as the Doctrine of
Necessity (not like the 1954 Doctrine of necessity but politicization of judiciary as
happened previous in 1954) that given the seriously unstable political circumstances
of the time, Zia-ul-Haq's overthrowing of the Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto government was
54
Ibid., p.102.
55
Ibid., p.103.
56
Ibid., p.104.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid., p.105.
59
Bjorn Dressel, The Judicialization of Politics in Asia, Routledge, New York, 2012, p.157.
103
lawful on the grounds of requirement. The ruling tightened the general's hold of the
military rule. When Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto appeared face-to-face to argue his appeal in
the Supreme Court, he almost convinced judges, presented his views about
unconstitutionally imposed military government and its legitimization from the
judiciary60.
Zia-ul-Haq As President
Despite the discharging of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto government, President Fazal

Elahi Chaudhary was persuaded to carry on in office as a nominal head of the state.
After completing his tenure, Zia-ul-Haq insisted to acquire the office of Presidency.
So, Fazal Elahi Chaudhary resigned and Zia-ul-Haq took the office of President of
Pakistan on September 16, 1978. Thus, his place was covered as the undisputed
monarch of the country. Till the next six years, Zia-ul-Haq issued numerous
agreements which amended the constitution and significantly expanded his political
powers. Most considerably, the Revival of Constitution of 1973 Order settled General
Zia-ul-Haq the authority to dissolve the National Assembly at will.
According to Aftab Qazi and Roedaad Khan:
General Zia-ul-Haq reviled Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and had used

unsuitable language and verbal abuse to describe Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto
and his other colleagues. On April 4, 1979, after the Supreme Court
sustained the death punishment as had been passed by the Lahore High
Court, the ex-elected Prime Minister Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was hanged.
The Supreme Court ruled with four to three judges in favor of death
punishment. The Lahore High Court had given him the death
punishment on accuses of the assassination of the father of Ahmad
Raza Kasuri, a nonconformist politician of Pakistan People’s Party.
Despite a lot of appeals of mercy from international leaders requesting
General Zia-ul-Haq to convert Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's death punishment,
but Zia-ul-Haq dismissed all the appeals and upheld the death
60
Ibid., p.158.
104
punishment. The hanging of democratically an elected prime minister
by a military ruler was condemned worldwide and by the lawyers and
jurists across the Pakistan. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's trial was decidedly
controversial as well.61
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's final personal manifestation and utterances in the

Supreme Court was not the long defense of his behavior; he also made a number of
matters clear in front of judiciary62. He also mentioned the word "heir" for his son
Meer Murtaza Bhutto. He said some observations which indicated that he has views
according to the Sunni sect of Islam, though he was considered Shia. He also
efficiently directed doubt on the dependability of key witnesses against him, for
example Masud Mehmood who was the trained lawyer from U.K. and was not a
police officer or FSF (Federal Security Force) chief63. He talked about repeatedly
Lahori and Ahmedi connection of Masud Mehmood in his witness. He frequently
brought the question of his mistreatment in the death cell. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto made it
plentifully clear even ultimately he wanted either freedom from prison or death, not
something in between it, and appreciated Ghulam Mustafa Khar and thanks to his
lawyer Yahya Bakhtiar64.
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's another lawyer Abdul Hafeez Peerzada filed an appeal
for the releasing of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's associate Mubashir Hassan and Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto himself. The Supreme Court fulfilled that Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's execution can
be valued by the President and Mubashir Hassan's case is being covenanted by the
Military Justice Court led by Zia-ul-Haq, therefore, the civilian courts have no
authority over hearing this petition. Abdul Hafeez Peerzada submitted the appeal to
Chief of Army Staff Directorate but General Zia-ul-Haq claimed that the request
application had been missed. Therefore, Zia-ul-Haq upheld the punishment and
61
Kareem Khan, Zia-ul-Haq as President, http;//www.books.google.com.pk, (accessed on March 21,
2013).
62
T. W. Rajaratnam, A judiciary in Crisis?: The Trial of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Kaanthalakam, New Delhi,
1988, p.27.
63
Ibid., p.28.
64
Ibid., p.29.
105
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was executed on April 4, 197965. Horrified and disturbed
Peerzada left Pakistan for United Kingdom and did not return to Pakistan until the
restoration of democracy in 198866. Before 2000, Pakistani media did not published
this news that the application had been found in the record section called Directorate
General for Military History, at the Generals Combatant Headquarter (GHQ)
Rawalpindi. The application was published after declaring public sphere of influence
when General Pervez Musharraf declassified several secret documents during the
decade of 1970s.67
Politicization of Supreme Court
After imposing Martial Law, Zia-ul-haq firstly appointed several judges on

adhoc bases in Supreme Court of Pakistan. In fact, still he has fear that, Pakistan
People’s Party has a power to collect people domestically as well as he knew that
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto has strong relationship with several heads of states and heads of
governments all over the world specially with Soviet Union and China. Therefore, he
wanted to remove his support on grass root level in such a pattern that he must not be
blamed but this act should be considered as a judicial proceeding68. So, soon after
declaring Martial Law, Zia-ul-Haq advised President Fazal Elahi Chaudhary to
appoint Justice Anwar-ul-Haq as a new chief justice of Pakistan. Immediately,
military administration removed chief justice Yaqoob Ali from the office of chief
justice of Pakistan by force and issued orders of appointment of Justice Anwar-ul-haq
as a new chief justice of Pakistan on September 23, 197769. It was just because of
filed petition by Nussrat Bhutto in the Supreme Court against the arrival of Zia-ul-
Haq into the politics. Zulfqar Ali Bhutto objected the appointment of new chief justice
65
Ibid., pp.30-31.
66
Ibid., p.31.
67
Tariq Aqil, Judicial Murder of Bhutto, http://sixhour.com/judicial_murder.htm (accessed March 13,
2013).
68
Ofer Raban, The Supreme Court Endorsement of A Politicized Judiciary: A Philosophical Criticque,
http://adr.uoregon.edu/assets/facultydocs/ofer/scendorsementofpoliticizedjudiciary.pdf, (accessed
March 14, 2013).
69
Ibid.
106
and highlighted his critical character before and after dismissing his government, but
Anwar-ul-Haq was made a head of that bench who was hiring the petition against
military government of Zia-ul-Haq70.
So, the objection of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was overruled by the new politicized
Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq and now the petition of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was yet
again heard by him as the leading judge of the bench. He presided overall petition of
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto while the Martial Law has been imposed throughout the
Pakistan71. He played his part in declaring Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as guilty in an
ambiguity murder case and announcing death sentence even accuse did not prove.
When Zia-ul-Haq visited Saudi Arabia in 1979, Justice Anwar-ul-Haq became acting
president of Pakistan till his comeback.72
In the beginning f 1980s, Muslim world had suffered from several controversial issues
like Iran Iraq War, Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the status of Palestine. Soon
after taking the power of government, Zia-ul-Haq showed his caring association with
Muslim world. He very much tried to involve in international disputes related to the
Muslim world. So, on January 25, 1981, he represented Pakistan in third OIC Summit,
held in Mecca (Saudi Arab) in which international disputes especially issues related to
Iran Iraq War, Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and status of Palestine were discussed.
Zia-ul-Haq also addressed in this conference and presented several suggestions
regarding solving international disputes related to the Muslim world73. He said that:
Muslim world has need of co-operation and unity for re-gaining its lost glorious
status. As Muslims led the world for the centuries, so Pakistan can perform its
role to united Muslims of world to get back their leading role.74
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Moshe Maoz, Muslim Attitude Towards Jews And Isreal, Essex Publications, London, 2011, p.197.
74
Ibid
107
His suggestions were appreciated by all the participant countries. Even Iran
did not participate in this summit; therefore, suggestions regarding Iran and Iraq lost
their worth. In final ceremony, “Mecca declaration” announced in which suggestions
given by Pakistan were included. Similarly, Pakistan also became a member country
of a committee which was formed for stopping Iran-Iraq War75.
Same as earlier military governments, Zia-ul-Haq did not like the idea of
Parliamentary democracy and he banned all political parties across the country. The
political structure which was built by Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was destroyed, disturbed,
hampered, and not existed in the 1980s. On the other hand, a new political system was
still needed to manage the country where several issues were demanding fast
solutions. Similarly, Zia-ul-Haq decided to establish Majlis-e-Shoora in the absence
of parliament in 1980. This was the theme that the members of Shoora will be
intellectuals, economist, journalists, scholars, and religious experts called “ulama”
and professionalists from different fields. In fact, Zia-ul-Haq decided to replace the
system of parliamentary democracy from the system of like-minded people same as in
Soviet Union. Therefore, all the 284 members of Majlis-e-Shoora were nominated by
president and scholars called it the government of technocrats76.
After Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's judicial murder, the demand of new election was
being raised in all over the Pakistan. International community also forced Zia-ul-Haq
to announce new elections77. But Zia-ul-Haq wanted to secure his position before
holding the elections. A referendum was held on December 19, 1984. On the base of
imposing Islamic laws, Zia tried to get the support of public through referendum and
he got 95 per cent votes in his favor, but international media announced that the
turnout was only 10 per cent78.
75
Ibid., pp.198-199
76
Riyaz Aḥmad Sayyid, Pakistan on Road To Islamic Democracy: Referendum 1984, Historical Research
Institute, Islamabad, 1985, p.65.
77
Ibid., p.66.
78
Ibid., p.67.
108
Five Year Plan (1978-83)
Military government of Zia, after one year of taking power, announced fifth five
year plan in July 1978. This plan converted the development planning till 198379. The
basic projections of this plan were as under:
1) To strengthen national income.
2) To solve problems related to urban areas and the development of rural areas.
3) To increase the quality of living.
4) To control the increase in population.
5) To change banking system according to the teachings of Islam.
6) To fix financial targets in the field of agriculture.
7) To get independency in fulfillment of wheat requirement.
8) To get six per cent annual growth in agriculture productions.
9) To produce cement production according the national need.
10) To enhance the production ability of Karachi Steel Mill.
11) To interlink the industrial sector with the agriculture sector.
12) To increase ten per cent annual growth in overall national development.
13) To increase 23 per cent in export productions80.
In the end of fiscal year of 1983, although Pakistan rejected the offers of American
aid and IMF loans but it was failed to get these targets. Overall national growth was
increased up to six per cent than ten per cent but pure independency in wheat, steel
79
Myron Wiener, The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran And Pakistan, Syracuse
University Press, London, 2007, P.286.
80
Ibid., PP.287-289.
109
and other productions could not be achieved. Similarly, even Zia government was
claiming to impose Islamic laws and showing its intention regarding designing pure
Islamic system in each department, it was failed to convert existing banking system
into Islamic banking on permanent bases. This was not a proper law-making but just a
presidential order that was reversed soon after the death of Zia-ul-Haq81.
It was being considered that the huge protest in Sindh disturbs the economic activities
in all over the country but there were some economic measures of military
government that were appreciated by the public overall. Flexibility and facilities in
the entire economic sector develop the sense of security and people in the large
number, including labor class, were being supported Zia government now82. These
economic measures and developments are as follows:
1) Agriculture based industries were declared excluded from the taxpaying

activities. Similarly, government offered same facilities to the labor and
workers of the public and private industries. Therefore, the owners and the
workers of factories and peasants were supported Zia’s policies of
Islamization83.
2) Government offered open opportunity to import machinery for installing new

industry without any duty charges84.
3) Government offered long-term loans for the development of industries85.
4) Government returned all those industries to the real owners which were
nationalized during Bhutto regime86.
81
Ibid., PP.290-292.
82
Derrick M.Nault, Development in Asia, Universal Publishers, London, 1998, P.197.
83
Ibid., P.198.
84
Ibid., P.199.
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid., P.200.
110
5) Industrial Investment Schedule was announced for the development of private
industry87.
6) Government offered the scheme of mixed-economy for encouraging new

investors on the base of government partnership88.
7) Import of specific raw material and machinery was declared free from custom
duty89.
8) Export Free Zone was established in Karachi for attracting overseas

Pakistanis90.
9) Islamic Banking was introduced. Now, Banks were offered loans on the base
of profit and lose. This was called “Muzarbat Scheme”. People in large
number supported this offer. This also became a reason for increasing per
capita income91.
Industrialists and owners of the factories appreciated these policies of military

government because there was a clear indication of industrial development. These
policies motivated labors and workers in performing their duties efficiently. Now,
they were not become the part of any strike or protest. Such activities increase the
production of yarn, cocking oil, sugar, cement, cycle manufacturing, cigarette
production, paper manufacturing, leather industry and rubber production92.
87
Ibid.
88
Ibid., P.201
89
Ibid., P.202
90
Ibid., P.203.
91
Ibid., PP.203-204.
92
Ibid., PP.205-206.
111
Constitutional Engineering And The Elections of 1985
After getting the office of presidency as a legitimize status, Zia-ul-haq

announced first non-party based elections in February 198593. Most of mainstream
political parties boycotted these elections. For this purpose, 8th amendment was
introduced in the constitution which made a system semi-presidential. Now, prime
minister had become an advisor of president and president had become fully
authorized as well as head of the state and the government. Through this system, now,
president had to appoint a person from parliament called Majlis-e-Shoora and then
that nominated person had to get vote of confidence from the national assembly. So,
Zia-ul-Haq appointed Muhammad Khan Junejo as a Prime Minister of Pakistan who
was so simple in character. Zia wanted to choose such person who do not speak or
oppose his policies94.
Before giving the power to new government, Zia legitimized his policies
through constitutional engineering. 8th amendment in the constitution of 1973
delivered the power of dissolving national assembly to the president. Similarly, all the
powers of appointments had given to the president through this amendment. After this
constitutional engineering, new government was nominal in his working but soon,
Zia-ul-Haq had several disagreements with Junejo’s nominal government95.
Pakistan had controversial relations with Afghanistan since 1947. Issues of

Afghan refugees, Smuggling and propaganda about “Pakhtunistan” were the basic
reasons of conflict among both the countries but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 was the red indication directly for Pakistan. Conspiracy of “Hold on Hot
Waters” was going to be true. Now Soviet Union was directly threatening Pakistan.
On the other hand, thousands of Afghan refugees entered in Pakistan that disturbed
economy of Pakistan at large scale. Similarly, Soviet army’s activities were not only
limited within the territory of Afghanistan but it enlarged within Pakistan in shape of
93
Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, MIT Press, New York, 1988, p.86.
94
Ibid., p.87-88.
95
Ibid., p.90.
112
missile attacks and air strikes. Although Pakistan protested to Afghan “Nazim-ul-
Amoor” but no change occurred in Soviet behavior96.
In this situation, military government of Zia supported Afghan Mujahideen who

stood against the Soviet Union. But at the same time, Pakistan wanted political
peaceful solution of this dispute and withdrawal of Soviet Army from Afghanistan97.
During the whole tenure of Zia-ul-haq, being a head of state, he always said that:
1) Soviet forces should leave Afghanistan without any condition.
2) There should be peaceful circumstances in which Afghan refugees would go

back to Afghanistan.
3) Afghan people should determine their future by their selves.
4) There should be directly elected democratic government in Afghanistan.
5) There should be respect of Afghan territory and sovereignty98.
Even, with the American and Saudian aid, Pakistan was giving training to Afghan
Mujahideen in its tribal areas but officially, military government tried to solve this
problem peacefully and defended its support of Afghan Mujahideen due to external
threats by Soviet forces99.
Political cleansing had been started in Pakistan firstly from 1977 to 1979, and
then in 1983100. Zia as a chief Martial Law Administrator and as a president of the
country tried to eliminate all the suspected rivalry against him. In reaction, a
movement for the restoration of democracy had been started in the small provinces of
the Pakistan, especially in Sindh that was the native province of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.
96
Peter Thomsan, The Wars in Afghanistan, Public-Affiars, London, 2002, PP.112-114.
97
Ibid., PP.115-117.
98
Ibid., PP.118-119.
99
Ibid., PP.120-121.
100
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition) , p.361.
113
Such political cleansing was also opposed by the Indian ex-prime minister Indra
Gandhi on August 13, 1983101.
Several senior military ranked officers such as Air Chief Marshal, Muhammad
Zulfaqar Ali Khan and Major General, Tajjamul Husain Malik were put in prison for
treason and followed a small scale cleansing of Pakistan Army officers who were
sympathetic to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto102. Zia-ul-Haq also curbed the Communist Party
of Pakistan (CPP) by illegitimately kidnapping Jaam Saaqi and Nazeer Abbasi for the
secret trial. Both Nazeer Abbasi and Jaam Saaqi were tortured and then executed into
the hands of Brigadier General Imtiaz Ahmad. An open execution had become
common practice for Zia-ul-Haq and the victims were senior journalists and
politicians. This absolute crucial act further more radicalized the Pakistani society
where narrow-mindedness for other people was reached to its maximum. Zia-ul-Haq's
persecuting and cleansing forced minorities to escaped the country such as the
director of Pakistan's space weapons program; Major General Eric Hall. The senior
leadership of the People's National Party (PNP) took the asylum in neighboring India
and in Afghanistan while many political activists and workers went away either
missing or killed103. One of the distinguished case in 1981, was hijacking of the
Pakistan International Airlines Boeing 720. ISI rapidly founded that the “Al-Zulfaqar”
was at the back of this scheme which resulted in killing one of the military pilot104.
The leader of this ring Salaam-Ullah Tipu was assassinated in prison at Kabul.
Similarly, several others were assassinated by the ISI. The Chief of Afghan Secret
Service (KHAD); Muhammad Najeebullah was also involved in this scheme, but soon
he received his payment from the hands of Taliban in 1996, when he was cruelly
beaten and then hanged on the road of Kabul in front of public105.
101
Ibid., p.362.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid., p.362.
104
Ibid., p.363.
105
Raja Anwar, The Terrorist Prince: The Life And Death of Murtaza Bhutto, Verso, New York, 1997,
p.150.
114
Soon after this event, Zia-ul-Haq also started to hunt down the “Al-Zulfaqar”
that was an organization formed by the children of late Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. The
atrocious poisoning and casualty of Shahnawaz Bhutto who was the youngest son of
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, is broadly suspected to end under Zia-ul-Haq's orders, although
there was no evidences for this argument. Zia-ul-Haq's harassment of Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto's family forced Benazeer, Sanam Bhutto and Murtaza Bhutto to hide their
selves in Arab countries, particularly Syria which provided the official residences to
the Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto’s family106.
Nussrat Bhutto Case And Its Political Effects
Before analyzing Nussrat Bhutto case, we have to study what are the concepts
of behaviorism and post-behaviorism. As behaviorism is a study of actions, behaviors
and acts of persons, this approach has an ability to predict political behavior in future
as well. This approach was introduced in 1960s and 1970s. David Easton was one of
the leading scholars who advocated this approach. Behaviorism has no concern with
the attitude and environment of the organization. This is only related with the
behavior of the acting person107.
On the other hand, post-behaviorism is a reactionary approach of behaviorism.

The advocates of this approach argue that there must be a study of behavior with
special reference to the environment. Behavior of a person is varied according to the
environment in which he is living or suffering. In fact, this approach was a reaction
against the dominance of the behavior108.
Begum Nussrat Bhutto case against the Chief of Army Staff was also studied
according to these approaches. According to the followers of behaviorism, Zia-ul-
Haq’s act against the elected government was a series of PNA protest against Bhutto
government. Everyone was predicting that this situation was going towards imposing
106
Ibid., pp.151-152.
107
Heinz Eulau, Behavioralism in Political Science, Transaction Publishers, New Jersy, 2011, p.109.
108
Philip L. Beardsley, A Critique of Post-Behavioralism,
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/191149?uid=3738832&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=
21102903577701, (accessed March 16, 2013).
115
of Martial Law, and Zia-ul-Haq performed his action as per prediction of the behavior
of masses109.
On the other hand, the advocates of the post-behavioralism argue that hanging
of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was a forceful decision according to the environment that was
supporting Pakistan People’s Party which was not bearable for sustaining Zia regime.
Zia-ul-Haq had realized that if Bhutto will be free and contest elections freely then it
will be dangerous and harmful for his administration. His behavior was also dual
during house arrest of Bhutto in Murree. He, in his each meeting with Bhutto after
dismissing his government, promised him to conduct elections within ninety days, but
as he was experiencing glory of the rule, he did not want to leave the government and
refused to fulfill his promise of conducting elections110.
Judges, at that time, had also been forced to announce decision against Bhutto
just due to the opposed environment. They had been realized that to deliver the favor
in Nussrat Bhutto case to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto is actually a direct threat to their jobs as
well as their lives. That’s the reason; hanging of Bhutto is called “Judicial Murder”.
Judges gave the decision in favor of military arrival into the politics as legal and
according to the doctrine of necessity111. Similarly, hanging of Bhutto was also
considered as a decision according to the doctrine of necessity and to the scholars of
post-behavioralism.
Nussrat Bhutto case was in fact, favoring the spirit of democracy but as PNA
movement was criticizing pre-existing environment of the democratic government
and welcoming Martial Law, it had also welcomed Martial Law. Similarly,
international political environment also welcomed Martial Law because at that time,
due to Cold War and Afghan situation, capitalist world was demanding the support of
Pakistan Army, therefore, it also welcomed Military Coup in Pakistan. Such
environment supported Zia-ul-Haq, and he without any fear, with using religious
109
Jan Mohammed Dawood, The Role of Superior Judiciary in The Politics of Pakistan, Royal Book Co.,
karachi, 1994, p.77.
110
Ibid., pp.77-78.
111
Ibid., pp.80-81.
116
sentiments of Pakistani people, tried to legitimize his rule as well as crush the power
of Pakistan People’s Party. Doctrine of necessity, announced by the judges of
Supreme Court at that time, was also a part of that game112.
This decision, announced by the politicized judges of Supreme Court, created

huge impacts on the political scenario of Pakistan. Some of these are as follows:
1) Judges, after this, did not ready to announce any decision against military at
any time at any issue during violation of constitution.
2) People realized that, in case of military arrival, judiciary will always support
military arrival.
3) The role of military into politics became stronger.
4) Political leaders are not allowed to initiate any step against the constitutional
violations of Army officials.
5) The usage of religion into politics was considered essential for securing
political power.
6) Coalition with theocratic powers deemed necessary for ruling over the
country.
7) Interest groups and organizations realized about new approaches to pressurize

elected governments for the fulfillment of their interests with the help of
uneducated support of the public.
8) Courts lost their trust upon the people.
9) Illegal events were being legalized with the help of judiciary113.
112
Ibid., pp.82-83.
113
Ibid., p.84.
117
According to scholars, Nussrat Bhutto case left several other negative impacts over
the politics of Pakistan and till the years, up-coming generations will face such
consequences114.
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was not declared culpable of assassination but he was
sentenced to death on March 18, 1978. So, on March 12, 1978, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's
former Legal Minister, Abdul Hafeez Peerada filed petition in the Supreme Court for
releasing of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's Advisor for Scientific Research, Dr. Mubashir
Hassan and to re-assess the death sentence to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto based on the rip
decision. The Supreme Court denied Dr. Mubashir Hassan's release as he was
prisoned by Military Police but it had been agreed to pay attention to the arguments.
During all the 12 days of proceedings, the Supreme Court finalized that only the
President of Pakistan can alter the death punishment into life imprisonment. So,
Abdul Hafeez Peerzada filed an application then to the President Zia-ul-Haq. Though,
Zia-ul-Haq did not take action immediately and claimed that the application had been
missing115.
Emotionally crushed Abdul Hafeez Peerzada, then informed Zulfaqar Ali

Bhutto about this development and Zia-ul-Haq's meaning. Therefore, Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto did not look for an appeal while, he was shifted to the death cell in central jail
of Rawalpindi. Now, his family appealed on its own behalf and a trial before the
Supreme Court planned in next May. There was one week for Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto
regarding preparation. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto issued a systematic and careful rejoinder to
accuse, although Zia-ul-Haq banned its pamphlet. Chief Justice of Supreme Court,
Syed Anwar-ul-Haq adjourned the court in the whole month of July 1978, allegedly
because five among nine appeal court judges were eager to override the Lahore High
Court’s judgment. Due to this act, One of the pro-Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto judges had been
retired in July116.
114
Ibid., p.85.
115
Zaiḍ A. Bhutti, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; Shahid-i-Azam, Dost Publishers, Karachi, 1990, pp.12-
13.
116
Ibid., pp.14-16.
118
Chief Justice Syed Anwar-ul-Haq supervised all the trial, even being close to
Zia-ul-Haq and even serving as an acting president, when Zia-ul-Haq was out of the
country. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's lawyers managed to protect him, the right to carry out
his own defence in front of Supreme Court. On December 18, 1978, Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto appeared in public before a secret trial in the courtroom in Rawalpindi. So, he
defended him in the court for four days without any assistance or notes117.
From the death cell, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto wrote his last letter to his daughter in
which he said that:
I did not kill that man. My God is aware of it. I am big enough to admit if I
had done it, that admission would have been less of an ordeal and humiliation
than this barbarous trial which no self respecting man can endure. I am a
Muslim. A Muslim's fate is in the hands of God Almighty. I can face Him
with a clear conscience and tell Him that I rebuilt His Islamic State of
Pakistan from ashes into a respectable Nation. I am entirely at peace with my
conscience in this black whole of Kot Lakhpat. I am not afraid of death. You
have seen what fires I have passed through.118
The appeal was concluded on December 23, 1978. So, on February 6, 1979,
the Supreme Court of Pakistan issued a guilty judgment with the consent of three out
of four judges. His family had just seven days for next appeal. The court arranged a
stay of execution as it considered the petition. From February 24, 1979 onward, when
the next court investigation began, appeals for mercy had been received from many
heads of the states to Zia but argued that such appeals are simply a "trade union
activity" among politicians119. On March 24, 1979, the Supreme Court rejected the
appeal. Zia-ul-Haq endorsed the death sentence. So, on April 4, 1979, Zulfaqar Ali
117
Ibid., pp.17-18.
118
see Zaiḍ A. Bhutti, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; Shahid-i-Azam, p.19.
119
Ibid., p.20.
119
Bhutto was hanged at Central jail Rawalpindi and was buried in his native Village at
Garhi Khuda Baksh 120.
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's children, Murtaza and Benazeer tried to rally on

international support regarding releasing of their father. Colonel Gaddafi of Libya
sent his Prime Minister Abdus-Salam Jallood on an urgent visit of Pakistan to initiate
talks with military government for the releasing of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Jallood told
the journalists in a press conference that Gaddafi had offered Zia-ul-Haq to exile
Bhutto in Libya. So, Prime Minister Jallood stayed in Islamabad where a special
designated Presidential aircraft was waiting for Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. On the other
hand, after one week, staying at airport, Zia-ul-Haq rejected the request of Prime
Minister Jallood while Jalloud had met him in Rawalpindi and award about the death
sentence. The entire Muslim world was quiet on the issue of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's
execution, and Gaddafi was in distress after the requisition of his request and publicly
sympathized Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's family for this loss. Before hanging, Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto said his final words: "Oh Allah, help me for.... I am innocent"121.
April 4, 1979 was the day when Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was executed. The reaction of
PPP leadership was quite disciplined at that time. There is a chronology that is
showing detailed reaction against the judicial murder of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.
 On May 25, 1979, a session of Central executive committee held under the
president-ship of acting general secretary Farooq Laghari, which was a first
session after the hanging of Bhutto. Everyone made silent for five minute
against his assassination. And, Begum Nussrat Bhutto had been selected as the
next chairperson of Pakistan People’s Party122.
 On May 28, 1979, Benazeer Bhutto and Nussrat Bhutto released after a long
house arrest. Firstly, they came to Karachi and then Benazeer Bhutto travelled
towards Larkana by train. At every station, during travelling, she addressed to
120
Ibid., p.21.
121
Ibid., pp.22-23.
122
120
the huge crowd against the Zia regime and expressed her views on
assassination of her father123.
 On June 10, 1979, she interviewed to BBC and condemned judicial murder of
her father124.
 After some days, she listened that her sister is coming in Karachi. So, she left
Larkana for Karachi where she met with her sister after assassination of their
father. Here, due to huge crowd, usually, she addressed to the crowed
whatever she was felt correct according to time, but these statements were
published in every next newspaper.
Pakistan People’s Party, actually, had bearded the loss of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto,
and behaving legally that military government could not put any blame over its
leadership against starting agitation in reaction of Bhutto’s hanging.
Although, leaders of Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) were the member of

Zia’s cabinet but at the time of Bhutto’s assassination, they were opposing it. Even
when Bhutto had been hanged in Central Jail Rawalpindi, within 16 days, all the
leaders of Pakistan Democratic Alliance resigned from Zia’s Cabinet and argued that
Zia-ul-Haq is not sincere in restoration of democracy125.
This was a crucial fact that the welcoming of Zia’s Martial Law and joining
his cabinet show that all the leaders of Pakistan Democratic Alliance are
strengthening Zia regime and they are all agree with the judicial murder of Zulfaqar
Ali Bhutto. Even one of the PDA minister when visited London, then he took the pen
through which the order of Bhutto’s hanging was written. He showed this pen to
several personalities with proud and declared this pen as an historical126.
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid .,p.368.
125
Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal, Ojhri Camp Blast Near Rawalpindi, Defence Journal, p.55.
126
Ibid., pp.55-56.
121
There resign from the cabinet was just a show card. Due to announcement of
new elections on November 17, 1979, election campaign had been started in all over
the country. PDA leaders had been started their meetings with Zia-ul-Haq. Mian
Tufail Muhammad of Jamat-e-Islami, Peer Pagaara of Pakistan Muslim League and
Molana Mufti Mehmood of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam were some of them.
In fact, Zia-ul-Haq had been successful to get association with the right wing
political parties. He was convincing them to participate in the general elections but all
these parties knew very well that Pakistan People’s Party will win these elections.
Therefore, they preferred Zia regime. Due to new rule of registration, Pakistan
People’s Party, like other parties, did not get its registration from Election
Commission of Pakistan. Therefore, Nussrat Bhutto had been banned regarding
participating in the up-coming elections. This decision was also appreciated by
several political parties of right wing127.
Before one month in holding general elections, suddenly Zia-ul-Haq appeared

on Pakistan Television and announced cancellation of elections plan. He strictly
banned all the political activities and sponsorships in newspapers. All the leaders of
political parties had been arrested in their houses. Now, Zia was claiming that the
basic purpose of 1977 movement was to implement Islamic laws. Political parties are
not able to legislate according to Islamic principles. So, Military Government will
enforce Islamic laws in all over the country now. This decision was criticized and
opposed by all the political parties even the leaders of Pakistan Democratic Alliance
who were favoring every act of Zia before. Zia’s this decision discourage their
momentum over trust on Zia regime and now they were feeling guilty for their
support of Zia against Pakistan People’s Party128.
Zia’s usage of Islam for political purposes and for strengthen his rule was
opposed by the majority of public. They had been realized Zia’s intention. Therefore,
movement had been started in all over the country for the restoration of democracy.
Pakistan People’s Party was the leading political party in this movement.
127
Ibid., p.60.
128
Ibid., pp.61-62.
122
Chapter 4
MRD: The Revolutionary Movement
In 1977, Benazeer listened the terrible news that her father’s Government was
overthrown in a Military coup by General Zia-ul-Haq and then her father was in
prison in Muhammad Ahmed Khan Kasoori’s execute case, filed by Ahmed Raza
Kasoori1, who was the son of Muhammad Ahmed Khan Kasoori.2 In this way, Zia-ul-
Haq issued the directorial announcement that the third Martial Law Regulation
enforced on July 5, 1977.3 During the whole period, it was the opinion that the
charges against him, in this case were baseless, but the supporters of Zia-ul-Haq in
Lahore High Court affirmed Bhutto responsible of murder case and finally he was
hanged. Hanging of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on April 4, 1979, was a great shock for his
family as well as for the party workers; Soon after execution, Benazeer and her all
family members were put under house arrest in Karachi.4 After that she became Co-
Chairperson of PPP along with Begum Nussrat Bhutto as Chairperson in Place of
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Benazeer Bhutto was young and vigorous at that time and
Begum Nussrat Bhutto was in shock of her husband due to that reason she was unable
to ponder on the politics as Benazeer Bhutto could. The years which followed her
father’s murder created hard situation for her as well as for her family, so as a Co-
Chairperson of PPP, Benazeer Bhutto, started the great effort from penitentiary for the
restoration of democratic government in Pakistan5.
During this struggle consequently, including ten months in custody, she

remained about five years in the lockup, which was not easy time for her because
1
Ahmad Raza Khan Kasoori is a lawyer and politician. He is a member of All Pakistan Muslim League
now. In 1974, when he was driving and his father, Ahmad Khan Kasoori was sitting with him. A gun
was fired and his father was dead. Bhutto got death sentence in this murder case.
2
A Politician and rival of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.
3
H. Gerdezi, Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, Zed Press, London, 1983, p.294.
4
Anwar Syed, Islam, Politics And National Solidarity, Vanguard, Lahore, 1984, p.46
5
Ibid., pp.47-49.
123
during this period she also faced her father’s bereavement. After some time she was
unconfined for a short period and an alliance was shaped for the restoration of
democracy. The first official meeting of the leaders for the arrangement of Alliance
was held at 70 Clifton Karachi on February 6, 19816.The leaders agreed and the
alliance was signed named Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. The
following political parties joined the alliance:
 Pakistan People’s Party
 Pakistan Muslim League (Khawaja Khair-Ud-din Group)
 Pakistan Democratic Party
 Pakistan Mazdur Kisaan Party
 Pakistan National Party
 National Awami Party
 Quomi Mahaz-e-Azadi
 Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)
 Tehreek-i-Istiqlal (TI)
 National Democratic Party7
Alliance announced a four points agenda: Ending of Martial Law; Restoration

of the 1973 Constitution; Parliamentary elections; and Transfer of power to the public
representatives. Soon after the establishment of MRD, Benazeer was put under arrest
and sent to prison but under international stress she was released in 1984, then she left
Pakistan and went to UK and started struggled for the restoration of democracy8. She
6
Ibid., p.50.
7
Anita M. Weiss Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in A Modern
Society,Syracuse University Press, London, 1986, pp.136-137.
8
Ibid., p.138.
124
stayed there for two years, when her younger brother Shahnawaz Bhutto was
assassinated in France, she revisited Pakistan for the burial of her brother and again
left the country9.
During these days she decided to continue the mission of her father, so for this
purpose she once again decided to return Pakistan, to pressurize Zia-ul-Haq for the
restoration of Democracy. She landed Lahore on April 11, 1986 to fulfill her
promises, “The carefree girl who first left home in 1969 to study at Harvard had now
twisted into a woman with an iron will, to fight the battle left incomplete by her
father”10.
Basically, her aspiration was to join Pakistan’s foreign services, not to become
a politician, she was of the opinion that her predisposition was not towards politics, it
was her father to whom she wanted to please by joining oxford union. Benazeer
Bhutto was warmly greeted by millions of peoples at Lahore airport, Zia-ul-Haq had
panic from it and due to his fear he played a card of Islamization (Policy of
Implementing Islamic Laws) and announced for referendum, Benazeer Bhutto hoped
change for democracy in Pakistan but Zia-ul-Haq also made his clear intention that
authority would be transferred to only those persons who are religious brainpower,
Zia-ul-Haq’s so-called democracy shunned down when on August 14, 1986, Benazeer
Bhutto was detained at her home in Karachi, when she was just preparing to attend
peaceful assembly on Pakistan’s Independence day. She was given thirty days
detention order and once again send to jail11. On the other hand, except Jamaat-e-
Islami, all the other political parties had already joined MRD and they once again
arose against the wicked killing of innocent people in lump sum and capture of
thousands of people by their own military. During movement Zia-ul-Haq was
bothered because he was thinking, if Benazeer Bhutto came in authority then what
will be his position? So he avoided the elections in Pakistan every time. In an
9
Ibid., p.139. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak.....
(Urdu Edition), p.369.
10
Ibid., p.370.
11
Ibid., p.370.
125
interview Zia-ul-Haq said, “It is Miss Bhutto’s superfluous impractical ambition and
her attitude towards acquiring power which is objectionable”12.
Unwillingly, under International stress and the MRD, Zia-ul-Haq had to

release on September 10, 1986, but many people stayed behind in jail13. This struggle
was strengthen against Zia-ul-Haq by PPP along with other political parties under
Benazeer’s leadership. Lubna Rafique wrote, while PPP gained its full strength as
single political institution in Pakistan, on the other hand Zia-ul-Haq denied these
facts, “Bhutto strike back against this by saying that her party was speaking not out of
vengeance, but for nation building”.14
After a long struggle Zia-ul-Haq announced the elections, the superior step
taken by him, through which he made Junaijo the Prime Minister, that step once again
gone into the darkness when he eliminated the assemblies on May 29, 1988, after that
he announced that the new election will be held on November 16, 198815. This news
was the hope of democracy for Benazeer and other political parties but Zia-ul-Haq
publicized on July 21, 1988, that the elections would be held purely on nonparty
basis; the reason was that the PPP has popular support, there was a reason behind the
elections on non-party base. Chandio A. Meer Ali writes: “Zia-ul-Haq preferred the
non-party elections because he was well-aware of the reality that nonpolitical and
non-committed people are easy to control as compare to political and affiliated
people. So he wanted that elected member of assemblies had no political link as well
as membership of any political party or faithfulness to any political leader.” Benazeer
went to the courts and she confronted Zia-ul-Haq’s non-party based elections because
she was of the opinion that in this way the military law of Zia-ul-Haq will come to an
end and the democracy will be restored, she wrote, “Just as a inferior cannot blossom
in a desert, so political parties cannot prosper in a dictatorship.”16 In this way the
12
Ibid., pp.370-371.
13
Ibid., p.372.
14
Ibid., p.373.
15
Mohammad Habib Khan, Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan The University of Michigan: Director
Bureau, 1989, p.115.
16
126
democracy is vital for the political parties where they can work freely without any
hindrance and perform their political activities in a good manner, on the other hand, in
dictatorship there is no way for the political parties because history witnessed that the
dictators tried their most excellent just to extend their rule instead of giving
opportunities for the democratic environment. It was Benazeer Bhutto, for about thirty
months she continued to assemble world opinion for the restoration of democracy and
violation of human rights by Zia-ul-Haq17. He wanted to keep Benazeer away from
competing elections and the election date was suggested by keeping in the view the
pregnancy of Benazeer Bhutto, so that she may not be capable for election
campaign.18
The Participation of Other Parties in MRD
MRD was an alliance of nine political parties. Most of those political parties
who had commenced movement against Bhutto were the part of the Movement for
Restoration of Democracy against Zia-ul-Haq.19 Muslim Fundamentalist antagonism
parties like JUI, Centrist opposition Parties like Muslim League, Nationalist
Opposition parties like National Awami Party (NAP), Leftist political Parties like
Qoumi Mahaz Azadi, Mazdour Kassan Party, PPP, all kinds of parties had connected
the alliance. Jamaat-e-Islami had also divided on the issue of the support of Zia-ul-
Haq’s command. Though Jamaat was not the part of the alliance but it considered that
it promoted the agenda of MRD, due to the criticism of Professor Abdul Ghafoor and
Munawaar Hasan on Zia-ul-Haq rule.20
The movement has divided the scholars into two different sections, one adopts
that the people of Punjab did not cooperate with the movement. The movement
established to be an important landmark in the politics of Sindh but its collapse lay in
its powerlessness to aggravate a response in Punjab. If the Punjab had participated in
17
Ibid., p.375.
18
Ibid., p.376.
19
K. L. Kamal, Pakistan: Democracy At The Cross Roads, The University of Michigan: Yuraj Publishers
And Ditributors, 1990, p.41.
20
Ibid., pp.41-42.
127
the movement, Zia-ul-Haq would not be able to stay.21 They give the following
reasons:
1) Al-Zulfaqar Organization (AZO) established the responsibility of the hijacking

to Meer Murtaza Bhutto, the elder son of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as the leader of
the organization. He himself issued the press announcement and took all the
responsibilities. After this incident many questions were raised about the
leadership of the MRD.22 According to Aitazaz Ehsan, “Government
propagated that it was the scheme of the PPP leadership whom conspiracy
took place against the army and Pakistan. The hijacking of the plane and
particularly, the murder of army Captain Tariq by the hijackers left negative
impression in Punjab”.23 It degraded the tempo of the movement that had
taken the shape of a Sindhi uprising bordering on a Sindhi nationalist
insurgency against the Pakistan Army, particularly in Punjab. A large number
of leaders and workers of PPP and MRD were captured. But policy towards
the public was dissimilar in Sindh and Punjab. This was the reason that the
roads and streets of Punjab were not closed throughout the Movement for
Restoration of Democracy. But in Sindh, people were fighting against the
army. They even did not allow Zia-ul-Haq to land in Dadu”.24
2) According to Husain Bakhsh Naraijo, “No doubt PPP Punjab participated in

the Movement for Restoration of Democracy and their leaders and workers
were also captured, but they could not be successful to rally the common man
against the government. It was a well laid plot and energetic campaign of Zia-
ul-Haq administration to create a division between the Sindhees and the
Punjabis and to press Punjab and Sindh based PPP. By such division between
the people of the country, military administration wanted to extend its rule.
They gave more privileges to the people of the Punjab as evaluated to Sindh.
21
Ibid., p.43.
22
Verinder Grover, Pakistan: Government And Politics, Deep And Deep Publishers, New Delhi, 2000,
p.130.
23
An Interview with Aitazaz Ehsan, The Daily Jang, Islamabad, Decemebr 21, 1984.
24
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition) , p.377.
128
The conduct of the officers as well as the army Jawans, towards the Sindhees,
was humiliating and impertinent. It was due to the reason that the majority in
the army belonged to Punjab and Zia-ul-Haq was afraid of the rebellion from
this province. The Punjab was silent at the time when movement was at its
peak in Sindh. It was proliferated by the Martial Law authority that Sindhi
people were fighting for the freedom, not for democracy. They chanted a
slogan against Pakistan in the rallies and the pageant of Movement for
Restoration of Democracy.”25
3) During interview, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei said, “If the Punjab had contributed
in the movement Zia-ul-Haq would not been able to stay.”26
4) The movement established to be an important landmark in the politics of

Sindh but its failure lay in its inability to provoke a response in Punjab.27
5) Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei also said that it left many impacts on the country and
particularly on the politics of Sindh. The citizens of Sindh considered Pakistan
as Punjabistan.28
6) Jahan Dad Khan during an interview accepted this very fact in these words,
“The Pakistan army and Martial Law were measured to be equal with the
Punjab. Sindhies who were in mainstream, felt that their interests were no
longer secure in the hands of Martial Law and the army dominated Punjab”.29
25
Ibid. , p.377.
26
Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Politician And Parliamentarian: Selected Speeches, 1962-1990, Alvi
Publishers, Lahore, 1997, p.21.
27
Ibid., p.377.
28
Ibid., p.22.
29
Ibid., p.379.
129
7) As Akbar Zaidi said, “The 1983 and 1986 engagements of the Movement for
Restoration of Democracy, due to lack of support in other provinces was
labeled a “Sindhi Rebellion”.30
8) Sayed Mushahid Hussain also acquired that point: “During the autumn of
1983, when complaining in Sindh were getting strength and creating huge
impacts in Punjab, Mrs. Indra Gandhi showed her sympathy with those who
against the military rule. In the reaction, military government projected such
statements of Indra Gandhi as PPP-Indian relationship and argued that this
agitation has Indian support.”31
9) If the people of Punjab contributed in the movement, Zia-ul-Haq might have

decided to hold the elections and left the power. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei said,
“If Punjab supported the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, Zia-ul-Haq
would have left the power and army may gone back to the barracks”.32
10) Aisha Jalal has also of the opinion that Movement for Restoration of
Democracy failed to catch fire in the majority province of Punjab. The
government had exerted influence over the local politics.33 She has the idea
that, “policies of this era regarding segmental support became a cause of
socio-economic development by industrialists and commercial groups.”34
These are the blames given to the people of Punjab by the writers as well as
the politicians of other provinces. It is said that the people of other provinces did not
show so much interest as the Sindhi people had showed. They used to show Sindhi
association which had been launched for the redressed of Sindhi accusations and
30
Ibid., p.379.
31
Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1990, p.162.
32
Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Politician And Parliamentarian: Selected
Speeches, p.23.
33
Ayesha Jalal, Democracy And Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative And Historical Study,
Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 1995, p.83.
34
Ibid., pp.83-84.
130
removal of their sense of deprivation.35 Due to Sindhi tag, the movement lost its
national appeal. It is fact that the landowners and the industrialists did not play role in
ignite the people of Punjab but the real power of PPP was middle and inferior middle
class. The workers and the trade unions of Punjab were offended against the rule of
dictator. In the major cities of Punjab, like Lahore, Faisalabad and Multan, MRD was
very successful in assembling the people. The Punjabis faced the cases and remained
in jails due to their support of Movement for Restoration of Democracy.36 In fact the
movement was not as admired in Punjab as in Sindh but the people of Punjab
rendered valuable services for the restoration of democracy during Zia-ul-Haq regime.
The efforts can be examined as below:
1) In Punjab, on March 26, 1981, the MRD met at Lahore and passed a motion
against amendments in the constitution of 1973.37 The leaders issued the
declaration that Zia-ul-Haq had abrogated the constitution of 1973 and was
therefore, a co-worker. Same statement came from Baluchistan. These
meetings also congratulated those judges who had refused to take pledge.38
2) The middle and inferior middle classes in Punjab showed the harmony with
PPP and tried to achieve the results at the platform of Movement for
Restoration of Democracy.39
3) In Faisalabad, the lawyers fully disturbed against Zia-ul-Haq regime and

supported the Movement for Restoration of Democracy. The prominent
leaders from Faisalabad were Chaudhary Taalib Hussain, Zaman Khan,
Badruddin Chaudhary, Chaudhary Ummar Draaz, Shams-ul-Islam Naaz,
Ahmed Saeed Awan, Fazal Husain Raahi, Ghiyas-ud-din Janbaaz. The people
of Multan also strengthened the movement like Ch. Arshad, Mukhtar Ahmed
35
Ibid., p.379.
36
Ibid.
37
John L. Esposito, Islam And Democracy, Center of Muslims-Christians Understanding, The
Georgetown University, Gergetown, 1996, p.117.
38
Ibid., p.118.
39
Ibid.,p.379.
131
Awan. From Lahore, Aitazaz Ehsan and Mahmood Butt were the well-known
and eminent personalities40. On October 19, 1983, the attorneys organized “a
protest day against the Martial Law rule”. In Lahore, they struggled to take out
a march but police created difficulties through throwing stones and bricks. A
clash took place in the premises of Lahore High Court. The role of Talat
Yaqoub (a lawyer) was very extraordinary in Lahore Bar Association. She
used to shout at the male dominated Lahore Bar Association, chuck off her
glass bangles and challenged the power and authority of police. Few lawyers
were injured and few captured by the police.41
4) The student’s turbulence was started in Dargai42, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan

and Quetta. One student was wounded and some were captured by the
police.43 The students also contributed in the movement through strikes in the
institutions, predominantly in universities. The students in the Frontier
province were the first who come to the streets. The protests also broke out in
the institutions of Multan, Sheikhupura, Bahawalpur and Quetta.44
5) The doctors of Rawalpindi started to join MRD and arranged discussions on

the demands the movement on February 27, 1981.45 Near about twenty doctors
were prisoned by the government in a reaction. One this action of government,
the doctors all over the country decided to go on strike and insisted the release
of the prisoned doctors. They endangered that the strike would go on until
their demand was not met.46
40
Ibid., p.379.
41
Ibid., pp.379-380.
42
This is a small city near Mardan which is famous for the training of armed officials. This area is
located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
43
Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years, p.121.
44
Ibid,pp.379-380.
45
Ibid., p.123.
46
132
6) In February 1983, the leaders of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy
convened in Lahore under the tight security from the government side. It was a
violation of Martial Law regulations47. The leaders decided to observe a
“Political Prisoners day”. The police dispersed this convention by force.48
7) Movement for Restoration for Democracy enrolled the services of Labor

groups and unions. It was an attempt to activate the Labor classes against the
tyrannical rule of Zia-ul-Haq. Due to new labor reforms of Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto and the motto of Islamic Socialism of Pakistan Peoples Party had
created soft corner in the hearts of labor groups and unions. The Pakistan
Railway workers union passed resolution to resist against the government of
Zia-ul-Haq and support the slogans of Movement for Restoration of
Democracy.49 On October 26, 1983, factory and railway station workers took
out the rally in Lahore and shouted anti-Martial Law and anti-Zia slogans. In
the march, near about ten thousand workers participated. Police tried to hold
them but the leader of workers, Basheer Zafar, was indignant. Police tried to
confine them to the railway premises. The workers became harsh, disparaging
and burnt buildings, buses, cars and several petrol pumps. They also burnt the
portraits and photos of Martial Law administrator.50
8) The successful refuse of the 1984 referendum caused the Movement for
Restoration of Democracy to miscalculate their next step.51 Being confident of
public opinion, MRD boycotted the non-party based 1985 elections.52
47
Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's politics: The Zia years, p.123.
48
Ibid., p.380.
49
Muthiah Alagappa, Civil Society And Political Change in Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford,
2004, p.362.
50
Ibid. , p.380. Also see Muthiah Alagappa, Civil Society And Political Change in Asia, p.363.
51
M. D. Dharamdasani, Pakistan Under Democratic Regime, Shalimar Publishers, House, New Delhi,
1994, p.111.
52
Ibid., p.380.
133
From 14 to 16 September in 1984, the meeting of the leaders of Movement for
Restoration of Democracy held in Lahore and they strongly willed to boycott
any elections which were not clean, liberated, fair and according to the
constitution of 1973.53 They also pledged to form an electoral alliance in any
future elections in which the MRD would take part and after the election to
stay together in the government. Later on, the central committee of MRD met
from 18 to 19 January 1985.54 Their main desired was that the elections should
not be held under Zia-ul-Haq rule and that the 1973 constitution had to be
restored before the elections. They also demanded that Military rule must be
lifted before elections and political prisoners must be released. It was also
their proposal that elections must be held on party bases. The leaders decided
that if these conditions were not accepted, they will not participate in any
election under Martial Law. All the political parties which have joined
Movement for Restoration of Democracy not only denied to participate in the
elections which were going to be held under the supervision of military
government but also refused to accept the results of the elections.55
9) Asghar Khan had a different opinion about elections of 1985. He mentioned

the names of those districts in his book “My Political struggle” where the
turnout was very short in Punjab.56 Among those districts were Lahore,
Rawalpindi, Sahiwal, Faisalabad, Vehari, Multan and Sargodha. The turnout
in these areas was near about 30 per cent but the election commission
announced that 52.9 per cent votes had been casted in the National Assembly
polls.57
10) The female section of Movement for Restoration of Democracy was also very
active. In Faisalabad, Lahore and Gujranwala, female workers of MRD
53
Ibid., p.381.
54
Ibid., pp.380-381.
55
Ibid., p.381.
56
Mohammad Asghar Khan, My Political Struggle, Oxford University Press, London, 2008, p.26.
57
Ibid., p.27.
134
disseminated fruits in the jails to the workers. Ameena Zamaan, Shahida
Nafees, Nasreen, Rukhsana Zahour, Nafees Siddiqi, Mrs. Tahira Mazhar Ali
Khan, Mumtaz Noorani were the prominent personalities.58 Women’s Action
Forum led by Mahnaaz Rafi arranged a demonstration in Lahore on February
12, 1983 and 200 women participated here. The police used tear gas and
button charges for dissolving the women. Aitzaaz Ehsan’s mother and wife
were put under house arrest in Lahore. On September 24, 1983, the workers
women took out a procession against the military ruler in Lahore.59 During
this procession, the police captured fourteen women including Asma Jilani.
Even the literary women also contributed in the movement against Zia-ul-Haq
government. Atiya Dawood wrote the poetry against the oppression of
opposition during this rule.60
Fahmeeda Riaz showed hesitation about the atrocities of Zia-ul-Haq era and
the military courts in her poetry.61 Actually, Zia-ul-Haq government tried to
decrease the social status of women through his so-called policies according to
Islam. All the organizations of women protested against military dictator and
his policies. In these organizations, APWA and Democratic Women
Association were incredible.62
11) On August 14, 1988, MRD planned a public gathering in Rawalpindi against
the military rule of Zia-ul-Haq. The gathering used mantra against military
dictator, while the leaders also challenged Zia-ul-Haq and his policies. They
were addressing and telling the crowd that the time of the departure of dictator
had drawn closer.63 Malik Qasim mentioned the departure of Zia-ul-Haq in his
speech and Tikka Khan, general secretary of PPP, spoke against the “Jalandhri
58
Ibid., p.381.
59
Ibid., pp.382-383.
60
Ibid., p.383.
61
Ibid.,p.123.
62
Ibid., p.383.
63
Ibid.,p.213.
135
Group”.64 They also made it clear that they were not against the institution of
army but against those who were defaming the institution through incorrect
policies.65
12) In Punjab, the jails of Sahiwal, Multan, Lahore and Faisalabad were used for
keeping the leaders of Movement for Restoration of Democracy. The
government kept limits to the leaders for at least two to four months.66 In these
months, they were sent from one lockup to other. Benazeer Bhutto had been
brought to Karachi jail from Sukkur. Rafee Butt and Fazaley Bhattee were
sent to Gujranwala jail from Rawalpindi. Mian Mahmood Ali Kasoori had
been shifted from Kot Lakhpat to Sahiwal jail. Aitzaaz Ehsan from Multan to
Lahore and Qayyoum Pahat from Lahore to Multan. Asaaf Vardag had been
sent to Bahawalpur jail from Faisalabad. Omar Kasoori and Khurshid Kasoori
were moved to Kot Lakhpat from camp jail Lahore. Mehnaaz Rafi was moved
to Kot Lakhpat jail from Lahore. In Faisalabad, Few leaders of Pakistan
Peoples Party were regulation abiding gentlemen who went into command of
the police with grace while few went to underground.67
In the district of Faisalabad, the workers were arrested by Police. Chaudhary

Ummar Daraaz, Sayed Zulfaqar Bukhari, Zamaan Khan went into the police
supervision and faced the jails. In those days, Major Arif (DIG Prison) was the
friend of Zamaan Khan (due to this relation, the wife of Zamaan Khan could
easily manage the breakfast, lunch and dinner in the jail. She appreciates the
system of jails of those days).68 Dr. Saleemi who had remained the elected
secretary of Chenab Club was a doctor in jail (Faisalabad) and provided the
treatment to the prisoners in a proper way.
64
Ibid., p.384.
65
Ibid., pp.384-385.
66
Ibid., p.385.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.,p389.
136
Due to the fear of the government few leaders of Movement for Restoration of
Democracy disappeared from the scene for time being so that the police could
not capture them. Chaudhary Talib Hussain, Captain Nisar Akbar, Ahmad
Saeed Awan, Faisal Saleh Hayaat, Badar-ud-Din, Rana Aftab Ahmad Khan
and Chaudhary Zaheer-ud-Din were among those leaders who disappeared
from the scene and went underground. Ghulam Mustufa Khar was also locked
up and sent to the central jail of Faisalabad where he remained for four
months. The orders of the home secretary regarding Khar were very severe
and orders were passed to keep him in separation.69 The agents of the special
branches were deputed in the jails for awareness of the visitors who came to
see the detainees. In spite of all these measures, the divisional administration
adopted a mild manner towards him because the divisional commissioner had
been a secretary of Mustafa Khar when he was governor of Punjab. In Lahore,
Kaswar Gardezi, Malik Qasim, and two sons of Muhammad Ali Qasoori were
arrested by the Lahore police. Mian Mahmood Ali Qasoori was also arrested
and sent to Kot Lakhpat jail. Khurshid and Omar Kasuir were in camp jail in
Lahore. The police of Sindh also captured the political workers. Over fifty
persons had been captured in Karachi. There were also in Mardan70 political
workers suffered the torture of police department.71 Kaneez Fatima, a labour
union leader was also prisoned in Mardan on March 23, 1981. Fazil Rahu who
was MRD leader, was axed to death in his home village. Bashir Riaz, former
editor of “Ammal” in London, acknowledged the threatening calls.72
The captured workers suffered from the military courts which were established
by Zia-ul-Haq. The military courts awarded lashes and custody to citizens for
contribution in the protest rallies against the military rule. The most of the PPP
workers turn off to death and imprisonment declared by military courts. The
69
Ibid., p.386.
70
A city of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
71
72
Ibid.,p.337.
137
example of Hala Town can be quoted here.73 In 1983, more than fifty persons
were awarded lashes and custody by the military courts in the Hala Town.
Similarly, eighteen political prisoners were trialed by a military court in
Rawalpindi.74
13) Punjab government handles the movement very watchfully and carefully, and
therefore, it petered out sooner than expected. The chief minister of Punjab,
Mian Nawaz Sharif, adopted a very severe poster towards the bureaucracy and
warned them that if the Movement became succeeded, the existing officers
would be restored with capable officers who were waiting for their postings.75
He even convened the meeting of the commissioners and suggested them to
eliminate the movement at every cost. The chief minister called the meeting of
his cabinet on the issue of Movement for Restoration of Democracy. The
ministers and the MPAs, like Ghulam Haider Wyen, Sardarzada Zafar Abbas
from Chiniot recommended that the movement be crushed with an iron hand.
A decision was taken to pick up all leaders of the opposition.76
14) The workers were under attack by Zia-ul-Haq government. In the torture cells,
they were given very harsh time through severe punishments. Baldia Centre,
Division 555 in Karachi was notorious, the headquarters of the central
Intelligence Agency in Karachi” Lahore Fort, Birdwood Barracks in Lahore,
Mach jail and Khalli camp were the renowned persecute centers where the
supporters of Movement For Restoration Of Democracy and PPP were kept.77
PPP lawyer of Peshawar, Kanwar Abbas, was tormented by the police and he
had to admit in hospital for treatment. Sherbaz Mazari was captured in forest
rest house in Multan district and during his capture, he suffered from heart
73
Ibid., p.386.
74
Ibid.,p.390.
75Bidanda M. Chengappa, Pakistan, Islamisation, Army And Foreign Policy, APH Publishing, London,
2004, p.2.
76
Ibid., p.3.
77
Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), Dost Publishing , Lahore, 1996,
p.312-333.
138
attack. Haji Yousaf Lacewala died in Karachi jail on September 5, 1983.
Imdad Chandio had been beaten in Larkana police station. Even few met their
death in the torture cells, like Nazir Abbasi, Hameed Baloch, Annayat Maseh,
Gul sher Khan, Lala Asad, whose dead body had been taken from military
agony cell.78
15) Students had also participated in this movement very forcefully.79 They even
launched protests in the universities and colleges. The Zia-ul-Haq government
closed all universities of Pakistan for few days so that the weight of
Movement for Restoration of Democracy might be minimized. The cases were
registered against the students of universities and student Unions were banned
by the Zia government.80
16) The incident of the high jacking of a plan of Pakistan International Airline
opened a new episode of oppressive activities against MRD and PPP workers.
In different cities, police arrested the people and kept them in prison. In Kot
Lakhpat jail, fifty four persons were charged with criminal scheme and
sedition for their alleged involvement with Al-Zulfaqar.81 All of them were
condemnation to life detention along with forty others in absentia, including
Meer Murtaza and Shahnawaz. Jahangeer Badar (Additional secretary general
of the PPP Punjab), Shaukat Mehmood (General Secretary), Nazim Shah
(Finance Secretary), Mukhtar Awan (a former minister) and Faisal Hayat
(Landowner) were captured by the police and tried to establish their links with
the affirmatively occurrence representation.82
In Multan, like Dr. Anwar Hussain, Anees Advocate,and Abdul Rauf were the
supporters of PPP. The police arrested most of the activists from Multan in a
78
Ibid.,p.386.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid., p.387.
82
Ibid.,396.
139
suspicion.83 The workers went underground due to the fear of imprison. Anwar
Hussain took shelter in the house of his pupil, Mehdhi Abbasi Khan. Mohsin Naqvi
also remained in that house for many days. In Sindh, Lala Assad (Later on, he was
fired by the police), the vice president of the Sindhi student’s wing, and Naseer
Baloach who was the representative of PPP in the gigantic Karachi steel Mill, was
also captured by the police. Lala Assad was being sought as a leader of Al-Zulfikar.
Pervaz Ali Shah, a leading member of PPP Sindh; was also restricted at that time
when he was playing cricket with his son. Qazi Sultan Mahmood, general secretary of
the PPP in Rawalpindi city, was captured again and imprisoned in Rawalpindi jail,
then Gujranwala jail and then to the Lahore Fort. The government agencies even did
not leave the women and arrested them. Nasira Rana’s husband was the member of
MRD and the police required to arrest him who was in Karachi at that time. She was
arrested from Lahore and kept in Lahore fort. Begum Arif Bhutti’s husband had been
a provincial minister as well as revenue minister for the Punjab. The police wanted to
capture her husband but he was not at home at that time. That’s why, police captured
and interrogated her, Farkhanda Bukhari and Mrs. Safooran became the political
prisoners and spent few days of their lives in torture cell due to their loyalties with
MRD and PPP. The issue of high jacking was also planned by Zia-ul-Haq command
for gaining multiple purposes.84 Firstly, he tried to divide the members of MRD on the
issue of high jacking and secondly he put the responsibility on the shoulders of
Murtaza Bhutto. Thirdly, he used to squash the political leaders. So it was not Punjab
which played role in the failure of the Movement but a lot of other factors also
contributed it which uncovered the mentality of the people of Sindh.
1) According to Monte Palmer, “The attraction of gaining access to state power

and support were far more tempting than the fascination of individuals and
parties”.85 The government tried to steal the politicians for partnership with the
83
Ibid., p.387.
84
Russel, Murtaza Bhutto,
http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=2fqeMAEACAAJ&dq=murtaza+bhutto&hl=en&sa=X&ei=8mF_U
sL2KenJ4ATZsYCIAw&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAg.
85
Monte Palmer, Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity, And Challenges, Rowman And Littlefield,
New York, 2008, p.127.
140
state and this strategy weakened the disciplines of the political parties. Even
the workers of PPP greeted Zia-ul-Haq, during his first tour to Sindh, after the
assassination of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Few councilors of PPP who had been
elected in the elections of local bodies in 1979 also met with Zia-ul-Haq in
Sindh. Even the son of PPP Sindh chief was also one of them. Benazeer
Bhutto who was house arrest at that time tried to convey message to the
management of PPP that they should issue the direction to the councilors for
not meeting with Zia-ul-Haq but all her efforts proved in vain. The rewards of
the government compelled the councilors to infringe the morality of the
party.86
2) The Sindhi landowners adopted a gentle attitude towards the Zia-ul-Haq due
to his policies regarding land reforms.87 Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei and Abid
Zuberi used to stress on the negotiations with government. Abid Zuberi wrote
a letter to Malik Qasim who was the acting secretary general of MRD. In his
letter, he stated that, “A continuation of the movement would endanger the
feudal socio-economic order and the present social order should maintain”.88
3) Arrival of Benazeer Bhutto in Pakistan, as a Sindhi leader, had become

unbelievable for Pakistani politicians. Her domineering style in party decisions
and with the party workers annoyed those people who had struggled against
Zia-ul-Haq rule under MRD.89 In the coming elections, she was eager for her
party and not to campaign on MRD tickets. She wanted to contest elections
without the support of MRD. She wanted to convince the MRD that they were
nothing without PPP and on the other hand she assured the party leaders that
they owed their political existence to her. While the leaders of MRD wanted
the indemnity that each component of MRD would get a share in the spoils of
86
388.
87
This attitude was the reason of starting movement against Bhutto government. Due to his land
reforms according to his Islamic Socialist ideology, thousands of landlords hated him.
88
Ibid., p.388.
89
Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.343.
141
triumph.90 On the other hand, she did not have faith on those party leaders who
were associated to her father and were secretly hobnobbing with the generals.
She was convinced to be as the only inheritor of the magnetism of Zulfaqar
Ali Bhutto and could easily manage the masses and party singlehandedly. It
was also remarkable that petty rivalries had also developed among the PPP
leaders.91
4) The opposition parties showed lack of harmony due to ideological differences,

common jealousies, and conflict of leadership. Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman (Not
Punjabi, a Pashtun) who was captured on February 24, 1981, passed the
declaration that he joined the movement and signed its declaration in his
individual capacity and as the representative of JUI. It was the reason that the
workers of JUI were not imprisoned. Even the role of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei
(a Sindhi) was being in use with doubts. He was not captured by the
government during the whole circumstances. He was also known for his pro-
government leanings. He was ready to make out Zia-ul-Haq as the head of
state.92
5) In a meeting with Pagaara, Chaudhary Arshad and Molana Noorani on March

2, 1982, it was decided that Zia-ul-Haq should form a national government
with himself as the head and this national government should hold election.
The leaders of MRD did not like such sort of meetings with pro-Zia-ul-Haq
political and social gatherings.93 Few members of MRD were frightened of
Pakistan Peoples Party’s electoral strength. Even the workers of PPP were
irresolute in joining the movement due to Jatoei’s meetings with American
officials and army officers. But with the interference of Benazeer Bhutto, they
decided to join against Zia-ul-Haq government. JUI’s chief purpose to
Benazeer’s candidature for Movement for Restoration of Democracy convener
90
Ibid., p.344.
91
Ibid., p.344.
92
93
Ibid.,p.246.
142
ship on the appeal that she was a woman. But on the interference of Wali
Khan, he was convinced.94
There is no blinking the fact that MRD got momentum in rural areas of Sindh
and the military tyrant fully tried to press it but the people of Punjab who were
committed with PPP and democracy also made sacrifices and faced the atrocities of
the Martial Law era.95 The bogus cases were registered against them, they were
detained in torture cells and jails, they faced the military courts and some even went
underground and left their houses. No doubt, the literacy rate in Punjab was far better
than the Sindhi people, that’s why they had a lot of key posts in army and it was very
difficult for Sindhi people to abide it. There was no alternative for the government
officers to obey the orders of the immediate boss. Similarly, the feudals of Sindh as
usual played a depressing role when the Movement had got impetus. The landlords
always protected the rights of dictators through direct or indirect ways.96
Benazeer’s Exile
Towards the end of 1983, it was finally determined by the government that
they would allow Benazeer Bhutto to go away from the country.97 She made
arrangements with mixed emotions. Since Zia-ul-Haq ousted her father in June 1977,
she had planned to return democracy to Pakistan.98 Even when she was in solitary
imprisonment in Sukkur Prison, she had been a sign of opposition to the Zia-ul-Haq
government. She was forced to departure the country even for the justified reason of
medical concentration, seemed in some ways that she was abandoning the grounds of
PPP and MRD. If she did not have the operation of her contaminated ear, she could
94
Usama But, Pakistan's Quagmire: Security, Strategy, And The Future of The Islamic-Nuclear Nation,
Continuum International Publishing Grup, New York, 2010, p.22.
95
96
Ibid.,p.406.
97
Michelle Parent, Benazir Bhutto: She Once Had A Dream, Publish America, New York, 2009, p.419.
98
Corinne J. Naden, Benazir Bhutto, Marshall Cavendish, London, 2010, p.73.
143
lose her hearing.99 The illness might spread, and foundation nerve can damage
elsewhere. She had already embarked on experiencing complexity with balancing her
health. There were a number of false starts like Benazeer Bhutto and her sister Sanam
Bhutto. Lastly, they were permitted to go abroad by an Air-France flight at 2:30 AM
on January 10, 1984.100 Five and a half years of harassment and imprisonment ended,
and Benazeer Bhutto was finally truly free, for the first time, since her arrest on
September 29, 1979. As Benazeer Bhutto left Pakistan, her future was doubtful. But
her determination to continue the fight against Zia-ul-Haq was as strong as ever. Her
escape took her to Geneva (Switzerland), where she stayed in exile. It was a family
meeting heightened by a phone call from her brothers Shahnawaz and Meer Murtaza
Bhutto. She had no direct contact with her brothers since they had left Pakistan
shortly after Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had been deposed in 1977.101 Her brothers married
while they were living in Afghanistan and now, they were living in France. Meer
Murtaza Bhutto visited Benazeer Bhutto next day in Geneva and transported his
eighteen month old daughter, Fathi, to see her aunt. As much as Benazeer Bhutto
enjoyed to see re-united her family, it was necessary for her to go London for ear
operation.102
London was also the most logical place for any determined labour against Zia-
ul-Haq. There were about 400,000 Pakistanis in England, many of whom had run
away from the fear of jails and torture of the Zia-ul-Haq’s administration. At first,
Benazeer Bhutto was planning to have her ear operation and then to come back
Pakistan as soon as she could. She felt it her accountability,103 but the events forced
her to think again. After the successful ear operation, Benazeer's recovery was very
slow and painful. The doctor who operated her, felt that she might have a follow-up
operation after nine months. Her arrival in England had caused a meeting with
overseas Pakistanis that Zia-ul-Haq would most likely not allow her to leave Pakistan
99
100
Ibid.,p.398.
101
Ibid., p.390.
102
Ibid.,p.423.
103
Ibid., pp.390-391.
144
again. In London, she would be free to focus world notice on the dilemma of those
who were still in the jails.104
When she was strong enough to maintain the fight, she moved into dwelling in
the Barbican, a well-known apartment building in London. Her residence became the
unofficial foreign headquarters of the PPP. Here, Benazeer Bhutto waged a war of
words associated with Zia-ul-Haq and his henchmen.105 She took up the dilemma of a
number of political prisoners who were faithful to her father's memory and the party.
The extra bedroom in Benazeer Bhutto's residence was used as an office. Benazeer
Bhutto and those who supported her set up a letter-writing movement and detailed
information gathering networks so that they could continue alongside each other of
the condition in Zia-ul-Haq's jails. There were only some victories during this time.
The PPP had always been a assorted partnership of groups and interests detained
together at first by the charisma of their leader; Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, and then by their
opposition to Zia-ul-Haq. In London, Benazeer Bhutto was forced to deal as best she
could with the various factions of the party. It was a cheek to her dedication to the
reason that many of the leaders of the party seemed more anxious with their own
positions than with the plight of their brethren suffering in the jails of Pakistan. Many
of these men had held high positions within her father's government and must have
found it hard to try to discuss for power with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's thirty year old
daughter.106
Benazeer Bhutto was constant in her efforts on behalf of those still in Pakistan.
She traveled throughout the Europe, negotiating with concerned people in and out of
government, and with all those Pakistanis who were living in Europe. Because of her
efforts, Benazeer Bhutto received an enticement to speak to the Carnegie donation for
International Peace in Washington, D.C., in April 1985.107 She accepted the
enticement and used the chance, with the support of her friend Peter Galbraith, to the
104
Ibid., p.391. Also see Corinne J. Naden, Benazir Bhutto, Marshall Cavendish, London, 2010,
p.74.
105
Ibid., p.75.
106
Ibid., p.391.
107
Ibid.
145
lobby in Washington against the Zia-ul-Haq government and for human and
constitutional rights in Pakistan.108
Benazeer Bhutto was granted the chance to speak before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that could lead to characterize the entitled demonstration, where
she thanked Senators Pell and Percy for their efforts on her behalf to describe the
committee the conditions within Pakistan.109 At that time, the American Senate was
debating whether to continue aid to Pakistan even though the country's continuing
efforts to build up nuclear weapons. Earlier, the Reagan government had been able to
get around the law which prohibits the United States of America from giving military
assistance to any country that has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Benazeer Bhutto said to the committee that the cutting off aid would help no one and
that aid should be linked with the conditions of human rights. Pakistan did get its
ease, but the United States did nothing to stalk the rush of oppression that reserved
Zia-ul-Haq in power and his political adversaries in jail or in oust.110
In addition to her visit to Washington, she was invited to address before the
European Parliament. She traveled to Strasbourg (France) in June 1985, where she
again affirmed her case against the Zia-ul-Haq’s military rule and for return of
democracy in Pakistan. Although, the European Parliament has little real political
power, Benazeer Bhutto found many concerned listeners among its members. When
in London, Benazeer Bhutto continued to direct the Pakistan People’s Party in the
fight against Zia-ul-Haq era. The harsh message that she and her generation learned
was that Zia-ul-Haq was impermeable to pressure from the world community. As long
as, United States saw Zia as the frontline guard against the USSR,111 he could do as he
desired. To struggle and keep the opposition to Zia-ul-Haq animate, Benazeer Bhutto,
along with Basheer Riaz and the others who were helping her in London, published a
journal in Urdu; the official language of Pakistan called Ammal (which means
108
Ibid., pp.391-392.
109
Ibid., p.391.
110
Ibid., p.76.
111
United Soviet Socialist Republic
146
accomplishment), asked to make clear her conduct, the journal was circulated to
organizations and governments who might be able to put pressure on Zia-ul-Haq and
the official media. It was also circulated among the Pakistani society around the world
and smuggled through them into Pakistan. Ammal, even found its methodology more
sound into the hands of the prisoners by trying to protect, their wish in a nearby
disappointing situation. Zia-ul-Haq's agents in England would disburse the
calligraphers who transcribed the text for the printers, not to work for the journal.
They also tried to influence the publisher not to publish it.112
Despite the efforts made by Zia-ul-Haq to bann Ammal, Benazeer Bhutto and
those working with her were capable to keep it issuing. In the meantime, in Pakistan,
Zia-ul-Haq was manufacturing moves that looked like he planned to return the
country to civilian rule. In December 1984, he had detained a national vote on a
suspiciously worded referendum. Although, thousands of people stayed away from
the polls in objection and protest, Zia-ul-Haq called the means of entrée in the
referendum, consent from the people to carry on his rule for five more years ahead.
Zia-ul-Haq, then called for the elections of national assembly but without constitution,
the national assembly would serve according to his desire. On February 21, 1985,
Benazeer Bhutto called for refuse and boycott of the national assembly elections on
the ground that Zia-ul-Haq's ban on the working of political parties invalids the
elections. The boycott had partial achievement. Though, many of the candidates who
were close to Zia-ul-Haq defeated including seven members of his cabinet. In March
1985, Zia-ul-Haq held to his promise and appointed a civilian prime minister,
Muhammad Khan Junaijo. All the scene was designed by Zia-ul-Haq that was also
criticized in the United State. Several members of Congress were more speaking in
opposition instead of providing aid to Zia-ul-Haq's military rule. Despite the changes,
the authority of the government still rested determinedly in the hands of Zia-ul-Haq,
who retained the status of president and chief of the army staff. During this time, the
tricks of Al-Zulfaqar tapered off. The Bhutto brothers, Shahnawaz and Meer Murtaza,
had been expelled in 1983 from their base of operation in Afghanistan. They were
both still crucial for the Zia-ul-Haq’s government. They had in fact, settled down in
112
Mary Englar, Benazir Bhutto: Pakistani Prime Minister And Activist,Compas Point Boks,
Minneapolis, 2006, pp.59-61.
147
Europe and were no longer involved with Al-Zulfaqar, which had become non-
functional. Although, there has never been any proof to link Benazeer Bhutto or the
PPP with Al-Zulfaqar, Benazeer Bhutto was drawn into the conspiracy at a very
private level.113
In July 1985, the Bhutto family met each other for a break on the French
Riviera. All four children, Shahnawaz Bhutto, Sanam Bhutto, Meer Murtaza Bhutto
and Benazeer Bhutto were there with their mother. Shahnawaz Bhutto, Sanam Bhutto,
and Meer Murtaza Bhutto; all had their spouses and children with them. It was a
happy occasion; only a little dampened by the harms that Shahnawaz Bhutto was
having with his Afghan wife, Rehana. Shahnawaz had been on the edge of seeking a
divorce but had been discussed about it with his eldest sister, Benazeer. All the
Bhuttos’ returned to their different places to change for the evening. Meer Murtaza
returned to the small residence that Benazeer Bhutto along with her mother and sister
were hiring, with the news that Shahnawaz and Rehana were fighting and there was
no hope of compromise. Early the next morning Meer Murtaza returned to his
brother's residence and found him dead. A long inquiry followed and it was
determined that Shahnawaz had been offended. On July 18, 1985, in fact because of
her efforts on behalf of the people of Pakistan, the second male member of the Bhutto
family died.114
Shahnawaz Bhutto and Meer Murtaza Bhutto both carried vials of toxic so that
they could entrust suicide if they were ever prisoned by Zia-ul-Haq. The toxic, in its
straight state, would kill almost immediately. Though, Benazeer Bhutto was able to
gain knowledge from secret sources that the toxic would cause an unhurried and
painful death. The French authorities were able to decide that Shahnawaz Bhutto took
the toxic in a thinned shape and died unhurriedly in the presence of his wife Rehana.
She had run away to the United States. No one was ever emotional with administering
113
Ibid., p.63.
114
Ibid., p.392.
148
the grave for him, but his family and several others consider that he was
assassinated.115
His family went for filing alleges of murder in the French court against some
unknown persons. Several inside and outside of Pakistan believe that the two Afghani
sisters who married with Shahnawaz and Meer Murtaza, were actually agents of
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The murder of Shahnawaz Bhutto set off a
touching outpouring in Pakistan. Thousands of followers visited the Bhutto house at
70 Clifton in Karachi to offer prayers to the second sacrifice of the Bhutto family.116
In all over Sindh province, where the Bhutto family funeral grounds are located,
thousands of people began making their way towards Al-Murtaza in order to attend
the upcoming funeral.117 The government-controlled newspapers tried to disgrace
Shahnawaz Bhutto by claiming that he died due to medicine and alcohol aggression,
were burned in protest. Zia-ul-Haq, whose hold was slipping on the country and who
had freshly squeeze a coup attempt from his junior officers in the military, stated
openly that Benazeer Bhutto was free to return to Pakistan without any limits. He,
even, offered his condolences to the Bhutto family for the murder of Shahnawaz
Bhutto. It was tough for any person in the opposition to trust on the word of Zia-ul-
Haq, because it was the time of revolving down, but Benazeer Bhutto felt that she had
to return Pakistan for her brother's memorial services. When she returned, Zia-ul-Haq
had mounted a huge security attempt to keep as many people as possible away from
Benazeer Bhutto and the memorial service.118
He also put several PPP leaders in jail so that they cannot be able to be there in
the memorial service. Zia-ul-Haq must have felt worried by the Shahnawaz's loss,
became the congregation points for those who opposed his rule. When Benazeer
Bhutto was lastly being able to hold Shahnawaz Bhutto's body back to Pakistan on
August 21, 1985, she was welcomed at Karachi Airport by approximately one
115
M. G. Chitkara, Benazir, A Profile, APH Publishing, New Delhi, 1996, p.18.
116
Ibid., p.392.
117
Ibid., p.19.
118
Ibid., p.20.
149
thousand seriously armed soldiers supported by armored personnel delivery service.
Zia-ul-Haq had effectively reserved the public crowd away from the memorial service
of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. This time, though, he was powerless to control the emotional
masses. When Benazeer Bhutto landed with the dead body of her brother at
Moenjodaro Airport of Larkana, ten thousand mourners welcomed them. The whole
eighteen miles way from the airport to the Bhutto House at Al-Murtaza was lined with
people waving black flags.119 There were many green, red and black buntings of the
banned PPP in the mass as well. The prayer service, the element of the Muslim
funeral ceremony, had to be detained in a sports arena and was attended by twenty
five thousand men120. Some analysts estimated that fifty thousand people had attended
the funeral ceremony in Larkana.121
Following the funeral ceremony, Benazeer Bhutto pledged her hold to the
fight to reinstate democracy in Pakistan. She also confirmed openly that she was
staying in Pakistan to take for granted the leadership of the Pakistan People’s Party. It
observed that there was a tempting force pouring Benazeer Bhutto into the political
front position. After the funeral ceremony, Benazeer Bhutto, along with some friends
and relatives, came back to 70 Clifton in Karachi. Early on the sunup of August 27,
1985, a memorable scene was once again showed out. Zia-ul-Haq's police enclosed 70
Clifton, stated it a sub jail, and handed over Benazeer Bhutto a ninety days custody
order. Zia-ul-Haq was unable to keep his guarantee and prisoned her.122 On December
30, Zia-ul-Haq lifted up the Martial Law. Several politicians and scholars perceived
this as another positive step toward a revisit of democracy. Feeling international
pressure, Zia-ul-Haq had nine months earlier established a counseling national
assembly. Although, political parties were still banned, several seats in the assembly
were won by those people who were faithful to the PPP, and nine of Zia-ul-Haq's
cupboard members unsuccessful to get elected. Many from opposition refused to
119
Ibid., p.393.
120
Ibid., p.134.
121
Ibid., p.21.
122
Ibid., p.393.
150
contribute Zia-ul-Haq's strategy as long as he sustained to direct the military and hold
it as a danger for anyone who went too far in questioning the government.123
The first factual test of Zia-ul-Haq's new liberalization happened when

ground-breaking demonstrations broke out in all over the country. The protests on
January 5, 1986, celebrated the fifty eighth birthday of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.. Benazeer
Bhutto characterized the changes as craftiness cover planned to persuade the West,
particularly the United States that human rights and democracy were returning to
Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq had placed the year of 1990 as the date for the next national
elections. Benazeer Bhutto and the PPP, along with the other political parties started
the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, hoped to force Zia-ul-Haq to calendar
elections sooner and to give them the chance to crush him in open and complimentary
elections. Shortly, after the lifting of Martial Law, Benazeer Bhutto and a number of
her colleagues, in London, decided that they must return back to Pakistan. Some of
those performing their functions with her in London had pending cases against them
in Pakistan, and their return will be decided by the Zia-ul-Haq. Benazeer Bhutto knew
it was a fault to give Zia-ul-Haq an opportunity to plan for her entrance, so the actual
date for the trip was kept in secrecy.124
This time returning to Pakistan, Benazeer Bhutto visited Pakistan three times.
She also visited Washington, Moscow, and made a religious pilgrimage to Mecca in
Saudi Arabia. Benazeer Bhutto claimed that her visit to Washington was to gain
attention for upcoming test of democracy in Pakistan. Majority believe that she has
gone Washington to assure those in supremacy that if she was successful in her plan
of democratically overthrow of Zia-ul-Haq, she would support United States interest.
Without the inferred approval of Washington, it was doubtful that Benazeer Bhutto
would be able to confront and stand against Zia-ul-Haq. Her visit to Moscow, at the
invitation of a women's organization, was seen as a sign of Benazeer Bhutto's political
confidence. The tour to Moscow placated many of the left-leaning members of her
party who viewed the United States as part of the dilemma because of their long-term
123
Ibid., p.23. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu
Edition), p.393.
124
Ibid., p.395.
151
support for Zia-ul-Haq. In addition, it probably strengthened her position with United
States, who would desire to stay Benazeer Bhutto out of the Soviet sphere of
influence.125 It was at this time that Benazeer Bhutto caught the eye of the media. Her
imminent and optimistically successful return to Pakistan made magnificent news.
Benazeer Bhutto took benefit of the media’s notice to confront Zia-ul-Haq's
agreements of liberties. She appeared on several television channels in Europe and the
United States and was interviewed by the BBC on the radio programme. The BBC put
her on the air in both English and in Urdu; the official language of Pakistan, for
transmit over the BBC associates in Pakistan.126
As the scheduling for Benazeer Bhutto's return has been made she began to
pay attention that at return to Pakistan, she may be shooted. Hopeful reports came
from all over the country, and one of the Bhutto family servants at 70 Clifton awfully
tried to contact Benazeer Bhutto in London. When she finally got the message of her
importance disappointed to know that the man and his young niece had been viciously
murdered. Majority considered that Zia-ul-Haq ordered for their murder due to
opposing his rule. Now, she could not weight more and on April 11, 1986, return to
Pakistan.127
Election of 1985 And Movement For Restoration of Democracy
This part consists of the politics of Sindh after the Movement for Restoration
of Democracy which was followed by presidential referendum of 1984 and then non-
party elections of 1985. These confrontations had profound impact on the future
politics of the country. Proposal of Muhammad Khan Junaijo as Prime Minster by
Zia-ul-Haq and then the dissolution of his government and the assemblies in 1988, are
the events having collision on the nationalistic politics. Zia-ul-Haq announced on
Radio and Television on January 12, 1985, that the elections of National Assembly
125
Ibid., p.393.
126
Tariq Islam, Democracy The Only Way For Pakistan: Interviews of Benazir Bhutto, Shaheed Benazir
Bhutto Archives, SZABIST, Karachi, 2008, pp.53-54.
127
M. G. Chitkara, Benazir, A Profile, p.24. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se
152
and Provincial Assemblies would be organized on 25th and 28th February 1985
respectively. Previously, he declared general elections two times but could not be
materialized. This time he satisfied his guarantee and the elections were held on due
dates on non-party and separate electorate basis. These elections were the result of the
pressure of MRD. There were some motives that Zia-ul-Haq preferred the non-party
elections, one of them was the popular support of PPP which may be resulted in its
victory. Second reason was that he did not want to see a strong parliament and active
members of Assembly, because he knew very well that non-affiliated members would
be weak as compare to convicted members. The detached voters also would come
against the PPP as large number of the Hindus living in rural areas of Sindh, and
majority of them were the voters and supporters of Pakistan People’s Party, which is a
liberal and secular political party. Separate electorate rushed a large portion of the
vote bank of the PPP.128
The first hazard to Zia-ul-Haq appeared in 1983, when Sindh upraised against
his tyrannical and demanding rule. Before this, there was no major problem for Zia-
ul-Haq regime. Even the returning of Bhutto did not create a threat to his rule as was
created by MRD in 1983. Christina Lamb also narrated that: “The greatest threat to
Zia-ul-Haq came in 1983 when the PPP directed the Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy to topple him”.129 Though the MRD was cruelly crushed through a fearful
force but afterwards many measures to minimize annoyance of the masses.130
When Zia-ul-Haq ousted Bhutto from the power Pakistan National Alliance
(PNA) supported him. But during and after movement of 1983, the scenario was
completely changed and majority parties of PNA joined the MRD against the Martial
128
Report on the General Elections, 1985: Detailed result of election, Election Results, Election
Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1987. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se
129
Iftikhar Haider Malik, Culture And Customs of Pakistan, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport,
2006, p.18.
130
395.
153
Law Government131. Christina Lamb wrote that “most of the MRD members had
previously belonged to the PNA movement which helped to push Zia-ul-Haq to power
and he was jolted by its preliminary success. Realizing he needed more than force to
stay on top”.132 Zia-ul-Haq searched out the constitutional means to lengthen his
rule.133 According to the statement of Hamid Khan:“He did not want to face a national
election and risk of recruitment of people against him by the political parties. He
knew that he could not be elected in fair election. Support in the elections was not so
easy and not without risks and dangers. So, ingenious system was made by his
brilliant and contriving advisors. A referendum was to be held for a vote of support to
the process of Islamization (Policy of Implementing Islamic Laws). Who would
against Islam? The affirmative and positively vote was deemed to have given him a
term of five years as President”.134
Zia-ul-Haq declared the referendum and through this, he wanted to get the
vote and to sustain the people’s sport for the Presidency, for another five years term.
He took this step because he was terrified from the political and public
representatives. Even he did not have any trust in the members; they would be elected
on non-party basis elections.135Mushahid Hussain counts the step of referendum as the
“most significant political move by the President being his maiden challenge in seven
and half years to seek a constituency beyond the armed forces”.136The referendum
was held on December 19, 1984. According to Mushahid Hussain: “the aim of the
referendum was to elect Zia-ul-Haq as the President of Pakistan for a additional
period of five years after the Martial Law was lifted”.137
131
Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War on Terror, M.E.
Sharpe, Islamabad, 2006, p.86.
132
Ibid., p.86.
133
Ibid., p.87.
134
Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, London,
2005, p.56.
135
Ibid.,p.395.
136
Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's Politics: The Zia years, p.261.
137
Ibid., p.262.
154
A complicated and puzzling type question was asked from the voters that if
they want Islamization and peaceful transfer of power to the elected representatives
they tick “Yes” and “Yes” means that Zia-ul-Haq has been designated as President for
five years after the lifting of Martial Law.138
General K.M. Arif has also given his opinion regarding the referendum:
The question put to the voters was ‘Do you endorse the process initiated by
the President of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq for bring the laws
of Pakistan in conformity with the injunction of Islam as laid down in the
Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), for the preservation of
the ideology of Pakistan and are you in act of kindness of the constitution of
that progression and for the smooth and logical transfer of power to the
elected representation of the people? Every voter was mandatory to answer
Yes or No.139
Zia-ul-Haq used all means to guarantee that people would participate in the
referendum and cast their votes in column of “Yes”. He used limited Waderaas and
influenced persons as well as the name of Islam to extend his crucial rule and
regulations. The question was that do you want to implement the Islamic laws in the
country or not. It was very complex to any Muslim to say “No”. Therefore, the
majority of the people had determined not to cast their vote in the referendum.140
Before the referendum, Zia-ul-Haq addressed to the nation on December 1, 1984, and
said: “If the majority of the voters and electorate responds to this question in Yes, it
means that the people of Pakistan have expressed confidence in the present
138
Also see Saha, C. Saha, Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries, Greenwood Publishing
Group, Westport, 2001, p.30.
139
Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.395.
140
see Saha, C. Saha, Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries, p.31.
155
government, and authorized his policies and have elected Zia-ul-Haq (as President)
for the next five years”.141
Daily “Nawa-e-Waqt” in its edition of January 1, 1985, a strong supporter of

the Islamization and Martial Law in the early days of Zia-ul-Haq, also observed his
policies and wrote “It is a sour truth and bitter reality that we talk of Islam as a
fashion, while our deeds are apart from Islam”.142 The people did not cast their vote in
the referendum. They got decision for boycott of the referendum in general and the
people of the rural areas of Sindh in meticulous did not respond to the appeal of the
government. Very few people went to the polling stations to cast their votes. Even the
Waderaas and local administration tried and mandatory to the people that they should
go to the polling stations and cast their votes but people neglected them. Hamid Khan
quoted the entire situation of complications in these words, “All the polling stations
gave an abandoned look and the government staff on duty stuffed the ballot boxes
with affirmative votes”.143
Before the referendum, Zia-ul-Haq visited several cities of the country and
prejudiced the people that they should cast votes in his favor. The huge number of
people was seen in the meetings and gatherings of Zia-ul-Haq, but they were
powerfully brought. “The turnout of the people during the campaign meetings was
heavy. The confined administration ensured that the referendum was completely
failed in the country and mainly in Sindh Province. The independent observers
reported that only two to three per cent of the voters participated in the referendum
but government claimed that more than 90 per cent of the voters participated and from
which 97 per cent voted in the favor of the policies of Zia-ul-Haq.144 The Chief
Election Commissioner of Pakistan announced that the polling regarding this act was
fair, orderly and out of 34,992,4256 registered voters, 21,750, 902 (about 62 per cent)
had cast their ballots. And 21,253,758 (97.7 per cent of the total polled) answered in
141
Ibid., p.28.
142
The Daily Nawa-e-Waqt, Islamabad, January 1, 1985.
143
Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, p.57.
144
156
the confirmatory and only 316,919 in negative. The 1,80,227 ballots were found to be
invalid. It was the declaration of the government but people said that referendum was
a big cheat. According to several scholars, the result of the referendum in which
people were asked whether they supported the actions undertaken by the government
to Islamize Pakistan, was an embarrassment for the government. The audiences were
approximately 10 per cent.145
MRD made a call against referendum but Jamaat-e-Islami and Peer Pagaara
fully supported the military government. Jamaat-e-Islami supported Zia-ul-Haq due to
close relations of its leader, Mian Tufail Muhammad with Zia-ul-Haq, as both of them
belonged to Arian clan of Jullundur. Their cultural, social and economic background
was same. Peer Pagaara supported Zia-ul-Haq and his government as a man of
Military. This was admitted on the basis of commitment more than one occasion or
big deal that he was an agent of the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the armed
forces.146
After collapse and the malfunction of referendum government was under

pressure. Mushahid Husain, in 1990, wrote that it was after the referendum that the
President made overture to the MRD; for the first time even according to the
legitimacy and recognition of the opposition alliance by allowing its leadership to
meet the Abbotabad summit in January 1985.147 It was an impact of referendum that
Zia-ul-Haq agreed to allocate the power with the politicians. For that purpose he
contacted to the politicians and other non-political landlords and industrialists to get
help from them for the coming general elections that would be held on the non-party
or irregular basis. Zia-ul-Haq was not ready to hold the elections on the party basis
because he was frightened from the support of PPP and political power. Due to this
fear Zia-ul-Haq made amendments in the political parties Act 1962 in January, a
month before the election of 1985. Zia-ul-Haq guaranteed from those amendments
that no important leader of the Pakistan People’s Party would be elected in the non-
party election even in his individual capacity. The presence of such persons and
145
Ibid.,p.407.
146
Saha, C. Saha, Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries,p.29.
147
Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years,p.268.
157
politicians in the National Assembly or in any Provincial Assemblies or Senate could
cause problems and difficulties to him. He took such type of actions and changes to
protect the assemblies from the politicians which were related with the Pakistan
Peoples Party in past.148 Hamid Khan stated as under:
The Political Parties Act provided that any person who had at any time
after December 1, 1971, been office bearer or even a member of the
executive committee at the national or provincial system of a political
party which had neither been registered nor declared qualified to
participate in elections by October 11, 1979, would not be qualified for a
period of seven years to be elected or selected as a member of parliament
or any Provincial Assembly. However, the members of the federal
commission (selected by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and his
underlings) were not to be hit by the above mentioned disqualification. It
was further provided that any person who had been a federal minister or
minister of State, any advisor or provincial minister at any time between
December 1, 1971 and July 5, 1977 (during Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto regime)
would not be qualified for a period of seven years to be elected as a
member of the parliament or provincial Assemblies. These provisions
undoubtedly and noticeably ensured that the whole leadership of the
Pakistan People’s Party was disqualified from being elected to the
parliament or the provincial assemblies.149
Zia-ul-Haq made plan to meet the politician as well as the non-political

feudals, industrialists and traders. He wanted to produce the group of his supporters
who would contest the elections and after winning, support him on any issue and
matter without asking any question. He was victorious in his strategy; many power-
hungry Waderaas and Chaudharies welcomed the offer of Zia-ul-Haq and guaranteed
him that they would entirely contribute in the forthcoming general elections and assist
him.150
148
397.
149
150
Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.403.
158
After declaration of timetable for the elections, MRD and its component parties
declared that they would boycott the elections. Jamaat-e-Islami and Muslim League
(Pagaaro) completely participated in the elections. Jamaat-e-Islami did not obtain the
countable support in the elections. It won just eight seats, four from Lahore and
Karachi, and four from the rural areas of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).151
Though, Jamaat-e-Islami contested on sixty seats of National Assembly. In
comparison to the religious parties Muslim League Functional (Peer Pagaara group)
won 42 seats of National Assembly, whereas, the nonconformists of PPP won 38
seats. In 1985 elections, majority of the ministers of the Zia-ul-Haq cabinet were got
defeat.152 In these elections, MRD and its component parties boycotted the elections.
According to Aitazaz Ehsan, “Though Benazeer herself favored to participate in the
elections and said that space should not be left for the enemy”.153
But the local leadership of the MRD and PPP decided to boycott the elections.
Benazeer honored the decision of the leaders of the MRD and appealed to the people
of the country for boycott. The participants of the ex-PPP MNAs and MPAs in the
general elections ignored the appeal of the MRD and PPP for the boycott. It increased
the moral support of the military government. It was the big upset for the leadership
of PPP and particularly for Benazeer Bhutto. Several Waderaas and the feudal
families participated in the elections, majority of them were unknown in the politics.
People did not respond to the appeal of the boycott and participated in the election
process. About 44.7 per cent people of Sindh and 59.4 per cent people of the Punjab
participated in the elections. In general, 51.98 per cent people cast the vote in the
elections.154 The elections turnout was really surprise for all the political groups, the
military, the candidates and the opposition.155
151
Filippo Osella, Islamic Reform in South Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p.479.
152
Ibid.,p.456.
153
Corinne J. Naden, Benazir Bhutto, p.83.
154
397.
155
Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, And America's War on Terror,
pp.63-64.
159
People participated in the elections but they rejected Zia-ul-Haq rule. The bulk
of the ministers of Zia-ul-Haq cabinet were defeated and also majority of the
members of the Majlis-e-Shoora could not be successful in the election. Benazeer
commented that the voting was a resounding rejection of Martial Law and Zia-ul-
Haq’s policy of Islamization. Six out of nine Cabinet Ministers who contested for the
National Assembly were defeated, as were many of his other associates. “The
candidates backed by the fundamentalist religious parties, in the provincial elections,
also failed badly. In contrast, candidates who had claimed association with PPP in
spite of our boycott did remarkably well, winning fifty out of fifty two seats”.156
The elections held were totally free and fair, because the government did not
interfere.157 The main proof was that majority of the ministers were defeated in the
elections. Zia-ul-Haq did not allow rigging in the elections because he already
succeeded in his policy that main opposite party PPP and its allies boycotted the
elections. Anyone who would win in the elections eventually will join the team of
Zia-ul-Haq. The second reason was that “era believed in bullet and not ballot and it
only wanted a democratic cover, not democracy.”158
Zia-ul-Haq was extremely happy when Movement for Restoration of

Democracy announced to refuse and boycott the general elections of 1985. It was
good news for him that after the boycott by MRD there was no one in opposition to
confront the government in the forthcoming elections. In the referendum, people
supported the MRD and other parties but in the general elections people ignored the
appeal of boycott and participated in the elections. MRD received great delay and
could not succeed to induce the people for boycott of the non-party elections. Zia-ul-
Haq and his administration were very happy about the results and turnout of the
elections. Unlike the referendum, the people entirely participated in the elections.
Over twelve hundred candidates contested for the 207 seats of National Assembly for
156
Filippo Osella, Islamic Reform in South Asia, p.480.
157
158
Ibid., p.407.
160
the Muslim population.159Turnout was so much large because the candidates
persuaded the voters. They appealed and convinced voters and used the personal as
well as the religious relations. In rural areas of Sindh, Waderaas were most influential
but even then they sent their women to the ladies voters to encourage them to cast the
vote in their support. The turnout of the voters in Punjab was more than other
provinces.160 Total turn-out of the voters in the National Assembly elections was
53.67 per cent of which 60.16 per cent in Punjab, 40.62 per cent in KPK 44.38 per
cent in Sindh and 37.44 per cent in Balochistan.161The turn-out was increased in the
provincial elections due to the result of the National Assembly elections as well as
due to the small constituencies and more number of candidates. It was 57.39 per cent
nationwide from which 62.31 per cent in the Punjab, 48.22 per cent in KPK, 50.53 per
cent in Sindh and 46.89 per cent in Balochistan.162After the elections, The Daily
Pakistan Times on March 3, 1985 reported concerning turn-out that:
The mass participation of the people in the elections, an average of 55 per-

cent which is comparable with the best turnout anywhere and has resulted
in the total isolation of the proponents of negative politics which have
done immense harms to democracy and the political process in the country
in the past. Relatively heavy turnout was definitely a plus for the era
because it allowed everyone to contest individually and local political
rivalries played a big role in ensuring a big turnout but to interpret it as a
vote against political parties was not right. Soon after the appointment of
the Prime Minister, the treasury benches had to join the Muslim League
for better discipline in the house.163
The turn-out in the elections was unforeseen for all. Government and pro-
government politicians and adversary leaders were astonished on the elections results.
159
Report on The General Elections, 1985: Detailed Result of Election, Election Results, Election
Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1987.
160
Ibid.
161
Ibid.,p.124.
162
Ibid.,.p.204.
163
Pakistan Times, Islamabad, March 3, 1985.
161
The component political parties of the MRD were convinced that the people would
react to the request of boycott of the elections as in referendum. Government also
guessed that bulk of the voters would not cast their votes.164 The huge turn-out in the
elections was the result of the unremitting Martial Law and outlawed political
activities. The people wanted political activities, and the elections were its source.
Other point which motivated the people to cast the vote in the elections was the
promise of lifting of the Martial Law after the elections. The rivalries among the
Sindhi Waderaas were one of the main reasons of audience in the province of Sindh.
Some Waderaas bought votes from local chiefs of the clans and small landlords. One
of the example is of Haji A. Meer Bux Junaijo who won the provincial seat from
Khairpur Nathan Shah, District Dadu, buying the votes from the local leading persons
and head of the Bradaris.
An Economist Shahid Kardar also favored this idea by saying that: “A major factor
was the price in the rural Sindh for 20 or more votes, Rs.10,000 considering the
amount of poverty and households which could deliver 20 votes, facing no real
alternative choice, were willing to vote for Rs.10,000, as it ease the burden of the
poverty”.165
So, the money also played key role in the turnout in the elections of 1985. The
political activists augmented and Benazeer Bhutto realized that only way to resist
against previous government was to manage the concentration of masses. The
purchasing of votes put an unenthusiastic impact on voters that they did not see the
program or agenda and character of the candidate while casting the vote. It was not
good symbol for the country. These conditions and acts were not good for the society
because in this way the corruption increased in the country. The members who
invested in the elections would try to get money back from public resources. It was
seen, when Junaijo government gave cash to the members in the name of development
of their constituency. It was first time in the history of the country that development
funds were directly given to the assembly members, and it was on the wish and will
164
165
Shahid Kardar, The Gathering Economic Crisis And The Dwindling Options, Group 83, Islamabad,
p.11.
162
and honesty of the members how they operate the funds, either in suitable or wrong
way.166
There was dissimilarity in the turnout in all the four provinces. The
landowners and owners of the properties of the Punjab and KPK participated in the
elections themselves or put up the candidates of their own preference. But, this was
not the case in Sindh and Balochistan. The tribal chiefs of Balochistan were not more
attracted in the elections. The Sindhi landlords were divided into two camps; one and
large camp supported the line of MRD, while the other camp was struggling to put up
themselves in the proposed structure. Pakistan People’s Party was loser in this game
that many members of PPP contested in the elections who were elected in 1977
election on PPP tickets.167 According to Aitazaz Ehsan: “Even Benazeer talked and
directed many of them directly not to participate in the elections but they ignored all
the instruction and directions of their leader”.168
PPP expelled at least thirty one members in Sindh those were contested in the
elections.169 As the general elections of 1985 were on non-party basis, therefore, the
political issues were not on the agenda of the elections. It left the unconstructive
impacts on the Pakistani poor society, such as the base of election campaign on the
bradari (caste system), tribe, race, language, grouping or sectarianism as well as on
some local issues. So it shaped the racial and sectarian issues in the politics of the
country. Tribes, clan, sects and ethnicity were the factors that appeared to be the
frame of reference for the voters in the recent electoral contest170.Era claimed that the
elections had purpose to take step forward the process of Islamization with the
contribution of the people. But, it was not seen during the elections. Greater part of
the applicants talked about the limited issues and convinced the people on their
166
397.
167
Ibid., p.397.
168
Ibid.,p.399.
169
Ibid., p.406.
170
Ibid.,pp.432.
163
personal and bradari (caste) relations171. A scholar Rai Shakeel Akhtar comments on
the elections as: “Elections primarily concerned were with the local issues and seldom
took up bigger national issue. Islam, Economy, Democracy, Foreign Affairs, Martial
Law, etc. were not part of electioneering. These elections reduced national politics to
municipal level”.172 After the party less election there were many ethnic groups came
into being as a powerful groups such as MQM, PPI, Pashtoon Federation, Sindh
National Alliance and other nationalist as well as ethnic groups.173Benazeer Bhutto,
who was a federalist politician, believed in strong federation and was against the
nationalist movements of Sindh and other provinces of the country. Though, she
boycotted the elections due to the non-party basis, she comments on the impact of the
elections as under:
The non-party elections held by the military administration had furthered

the country’s disintegration. By banning political parties, the military
administration forced candidates to campaign not on a stage of political
ideals, which transcended regional and ethnic boundaries, but on the basis
of personal identification. Vote for me because I am a Shia like you,
candidate in these elections told their ingredients and participators. To get
the attention they raised their slogans “Vote for me, I am a Punjabi.174
So, the remarks of Benazeer Bhutto show that elections of 1985 grew the
ethnic and sectarian line in the people of the country. The feudal class was victorious
in the elections. They easily won the elections, in the absence of any political
program, by convincing the voters through the bradari system and used the power of
criminals to gain the vote by force. In the rural areas of Sindh province the landlords
were powerful, due to their economic hold and their private forces. Many dacoits
were also under their control. It was clear when the foreigners were kidnapped by the
dacoits and than they were returned through the Sindhi Waderaas. Government did
171
Anthony Hyman, Pakistan: Zia And After, Abhinav Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, p.89.
172
Rai Shakil Akhtar, Media, Religion And Politics In Pakistan, Oxford University Press, London, 2000,
p.164.
173
Ibid.,p.187.
174
Ibid., p.399.
164
not touch them because they favored by the military regime. So, in the elections a new
elite class came into being which was non-political as well as the opportunist. There
was no political affiliation of those elected members and nor they were under any
discipline, so they were easy to control. Therefore, Zia-ul-Haq was happy to make
them the junior partner in the power structure. As the elections were on non-party
basis so there was no concept of the majority or minority. However, one thing was
clear from the results, that people of the country in general and particular of Sindh,
rejected the candidates who were close to Zia-ul-Haq’s military government. The
majority of the ministers of the Zia-ul-Haq cabinet were defeated. It showed that
Sindhi people did not support to Zia-ul-Haq. He claimed that the turnout showed that
the people supported the policies of his government, whereas, the fact was that, five
out of nine, his cabinet members were defeated, and sixty three members of Advisory
Council lost the elections. Only nine of its fifty candidates won”.175 It showed the
hatred of the people of Sindh towards the Zia-ul-Haq rule.176
The province of Sindh was more affected from this incident. MQM177 became
powerful and the ethnic riots took place throughout the province. Moreover, the
regional and nationalist organizations became more powerful after the non-party
elections. It proved when local body elections were held in 1987.178 The urban areas
of Sindh province were completely won by the ethno-nationalist as well as the
regional organizations. It was in the interest of the military and feudal ascendancy.
People were divided into bradari system, in other words called whole family or clan
on sectarian lines. The political issues such as foreign policy, economic policy and the
question of the integrity of the country went into waves. Members came into
assemblies without political agenda and programme. Political bribe and corruption
was increased. After the election process, Zia-ul-Haq promulgated the Revival of
Constitutional Orders (RCO) on March 2, 1885. The new constitutional measures
175
176
Mary Englar, Benazir Bhutto: Pakistani Prime Minister And Activist, p.92.
177
MQM Stands for Mutahida Qaumi Movement Led by Altaf Hussain.
178
Ashraf Tariq, Panic in Karachi: Altaf Hussain, MQM And Underground Mafia,Daily Hot News
International, 1999, p. 245.
165
were taken place to protect the Martial Law and secure the power of the President.179
According to the new modification, the executive authority “Shall vest in the
President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers’ assistants
to him”.180 A new provision was added to further strengthen the hands of the
President. It stipulated that “if any question arises whether any matter is or not a
matter in respect of which the President is by Constitution empowered to act in his
discretion, the decision of the President in this discretion will be final and the validity
of anything done by the President shall not be called question on the ground that he
ought or ought not to have acted in this discretion”.181
It means before the sharing of power, Zia-ul-Haq ensured the power of the
President and protected his all actions, which were taken by him from July 1977,
because he was not ready to lose his grip.182 It was the reason that he did not relieve
the post of Chief of Army Staff till death. He kept both of the descriptions in his
hands. Benazeer rightly said about it “The office of Chief of Army Staff and the
President of Pakistan has subordinated the Parliament to the arbitrary will of the
military commander”.183The remarks of Zia-ul-Haq also clarified the power of Prime
Minister in the eyes of Zia-ul-Haq “Prime Minister would be the executive head and I
would be supreme executive”.184 Zia-ul-Haq nominated Muhammad Khan Junaijo for
the Prime Ministership. But before getting the vote of confidence from the National
Assembly, the election of the Speaker of the National Assembly shocked the
President and his team, when official candidate Khawaja Muhammad Safdar was
defeated by Fakhar Imam. Safdar was very close to Zia-ul-Haq, his overwhelm in the
elections showed that even the members of the National Assembly did not support to
179
Constitution of 1973, 8th amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Government of
Pakistan, Islamabad, 1985.
180
Ibid.,p.77.
181
Ibid., p.78
182
183
Ibid., p.400.
184
Ibid., p.407.
166
the policies of Zia-ul-Haq.185After the alteration in the constitution it was the power of
the President to appoint the Prime Minister from the members of the National
Assembly. Because there was no party in the assembly, so there was no question of
the majority and minority. It depended on the will of the President to appoint any one
from the National Assembly for the Prime Minister ship. Those powers were given to
the President according to the RCO. Similarly, the provincial governors were
empowered to nominate the Chief Ministers from the respective assemblies. So, after
the implementation of RCO the National Assembly became powerless and dependent
even in the election of the Prime Minister.186 Hamid Khan wrote about it “That was
exactly what Zia-ul-Haq wanted; divided and dependent assemblies, with all power
gravitating in his own hand and in the hands of his nominated Governors”.187
On one side, the appointment of the Prime Minister by the President was
totally against the parliamentary system and dignity of the Assembly.188 While on the
other hand the selection of the Chief Minister of the Province by the Governor was
totally denial to provincial autonomy and contradictory to the principle of federation
and violation of the will of the people. The Governor was the representative of the
federal government. To appoint the executive of the province at his own will was to
disgrace the vote of the people of the province.189
There were many names for the future Prime Minister such as Nawabzada
Abdul Ghafoor Hooti, Muhammad Aslam Khattk, Meer Zafarullah Jammali, Elahi
Bakhsh Soomro, Makhdoomzada Hassan Mahmood and Hamid Raza Gilani. The
names from the Punjab and KPK were not considered due to their large share in
armed forces. Zia-ul-Haq himself was Punjabi and Chief of Staff belonged to KPK.
The name of Zafarullah Jammali of Balochistan was also under consideration but
185
Shoukat Ali, Pakistan: A Religio-Politcal Study, The National Institute of Historical Cultural
Research, Islamabad, 1997, p.239.
186
Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, The University of Michigan
Michigan, 2004, p.166.
187
188
Ibid., p.400.
189
Ibid., pp.400-401.
167
finally it was rejected due to his inexperience and the favor and support of Sindh in
the politics of the country. The selection of Sindh Province for the Prime Minister
ship also was the result of the peoples struggle against Zia-ul-Haq’s military
government.190 Finally, two names; Ellahi Bakhsh Soomro and Muhammad Khan
Junaijo, for prime minister ship were selected from the Sindh. It was also confirmed
by Lieutenant General Jahan Dad Khan as, “The candidate in the field were Ellahi
Bakhsh Soomro and Muhammad Khan Junaijo. I was asked to give my
recommendations for the future Prime Minister of Pakistan. I recommended
Muhammad Khan Junaijo as the first choice”191. A meeting of MLAs was held in
which the names of Ellahi Bakhsh Soomro and Muhammad Khan Junaijo were
selected for the next Prime Minister of the country. President also agreed with the
recommendations of MLAs.192
K. M. Arif wrote: “On March 18, 1985, a small exclusive meeting was held in
the President’s office. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Sahabzada Yaqoob Khan, General
Rahimuddin Khan, Major General Abdul Waheed and I attended it. The President
apprised the group for the recommendations made in the conference and asked for the
comments. The group endorsed the MLAs’ views. Soomro was preferred to
Junaijo.”193Finally, Zia-ul-Haq appointed Muhammad Khan Junaijo as Prime Minister
of the country on the recommendation of Peer Pagaro. Ellahi Bakhsh Soomro also
confirmed it in these words during his interview on KTN194 that: “President informed
me that my name was suggested for the Prime Ministership, but Peer Pagaara did not
agree”.195
Muhammad Khan was unknown and unpopular in the masses of the country.
Before that he had been the member of the cabinet in Ayub Khan’s government. The
190
Ibid., p.401.
191
Ibid., p.402.
192
193
Ibid.,p.418.
194
KTN is a private television channel which broadcast programs in Sindhi Language.
195
Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.168.
168
main merit beyond the selection of Muhammad Khans Junaijo was Sindhi. He was the
most confidential personality for Zia-ul-Haq. He completely supported to Zia-ul-Haq
government during the Movement for Restoration of Democracy. Zia-ul-Haq also
preferred Junaijo because he had no relations with the army. Zia-ul-Haq was afraid
that if he elected the Prime Minister from KPK or Punjab, there were possibilities that
he might have developed relations with the army generals. It was another reason that
he preferred Prime Minister from the Sindh.196 The recommendation of Peer Pagaara
were important for Zia-ul-Haq, because Peer Pagaara belonged to the native province
of Bhutto. He was powerful person in Sindh due to the large number of his Mureeds
(followers) and militant organization. Many observers agreed to it. Craig Baxter
rightly wrote about the selection of Muhammad Khan Junaijo as the Prime Minister of
the country, because he was Sindhi and it was his merit for the selection197. After the
Movement for Restoration of Democracy of 1983, Zia-ul-Haq was afraid of uprising
any movement from Sindh. Therefore, he tried to compensate the Sindhees in the
government formation. Junaijo was a minor political figure, but had a major
qualification that he was from Sindh.198The first session of newly elected National
Assembly was held on March 23, 1985. President Zia-ul-Haq addressed to the session
and highlighted to the members of the Assembly that they would not link themselves
to any political party. In his address he officially nominated Junaijo as Prime
Minister. After the selection of the Prime Minister the process of the formation of the
government completed. After getting the vote of confidence from the National
Assembly, Muhammad Khan Junaijo announced, “Democracy and Martial Law could
not exist together”.199 This declaration and after the resolution from National
Assembly and three provincial assemblies for lifting the Martial Law was alarming
for Zia-ul-Haq. He became conscious from the representatives of the peoples. It was
also the reason that even after lifting the Martial Law on December 30, 1985 he did
196
Ibid., p.169.
197
Craig Baxter, Pakistan on The Brink: Politics, Economics, And Society, Lexington Books, London,
2004, p.69.
198
Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, pp.169-170.
199
Junejo Rajputs: Muhammad Khan Junejo, Jan Muhammad Junejo, Jam Sadiq Ali, Chakar Ali Khan
Junejo, Historical Description, Books Group Staff, Islamabad, 2010, p.435.
169
not vacate the post of Chief of Army Staff.200Zia-ul-Haq succeeded to
constitutionalize his action in the name of 8th amendment in the Constitution of 1973.
According to this amendment, President became powerful than the Prime Minister.
He had in power to appoint the Prime Minister and also to dissolve the National
Assembly without the consent of the Prime Minster. The power to appoint the Judges
of Supreme Court and the chiefs of the three armed forces went into the hands of the
President.201After the dissolution of National Assembly, it was the discretion of the
President to form the caretaker government. The number of the senate members’ rise
from 63 to 87. The seats were reserved for the women in the National Assembly. Any
amendment in the constitution was to be passed by two third majority of the National
Assembly and Senate. Governors were authorized to appoint Chief Ministers from the
members of the respective assembly and they must get the vote of confidence with in
sixty days. Separate electorate system for the minorities was became the part of the
constitution according to the eighth amendment.202
After 8th amendment, the President became powerful person of the State and
no one has right to ask the question from him. He was not responsible to the
Assembly and everybody was at his (the president’s) mercy and he was at the mercy
of providence alone.203 At this occasion, he gave the statement that my ministers are
answerable to me and I am answerable to God only. Benazeer wrote about the 8th
amendment as: His amendments reconfirmed his Presidency for five years and not
only gave him the sweeping power to personally appoint his own Prime Minister, the
chiefs of the armed forces and the four provincial Governors, but also to dismiss the
national and Provincial assemblies at will.204
From the selection of Muhammad Khan Junaijo as Prime Minister, Zia-ul-Haq

showed that he was not against the Sindhees. Muhammad Khan Junaijo affiliated with
200
201
Constitution of 1973, 8th amendment in The Constitution of Pakistan 1973, p.123.
202
Ibid.
203
204
170
Peer Pagaara but he was not active against Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. “Prime Minister
Junaijo does not have a committed anti-Bhutto identity in the public at large, nor has
he done anything in the past to win the Movement for Restoration of Democracy’s
censure”.205 Zia-ul-Haq disheartend form Junaijo in his first meeting and declared
before him 'He has decided to appoint you as a Prime Minister of the country, in the
reply Junaijo did not say the words of thanks to Zia-ul-Haq, which was expected by
him. Zia-ul-Haq was more conscious when Junaijo asked him “When would be
Martial Law lifted?” So from that day line of the differences was appeared.206
Muhammad Khan Junaijo worked as messenger or middle man between the

parliament and the military rule from 1985 to 1988. Junaijo government continued to
face the largest gathering of political parties and decided to launch a campaign against
the whole process of transition”.207 After the successful visit of United States, he had
been assured for the support by American government. He took actions not acceptable
to the military government. Prime Minister in his first major move after returning
from a highly successful tour of the United States in July 1986, removed the two star
Generals and placed a senior Police Officer of his choice as the head of the
Intelligence Bureau.208
The selection of the Prime Minister by President and selection of the Chief
Ministers by the respective Governors was according to RCO. The Chief Ministers of
the three provinces for example, KPK, Punjab and Balochistan were selected from the
respective assemblies, but the Chief Minister of Sindh was selected from the
government employees. According to Jahan Dad Khan there were more than one
names for example, Peer Sibghatullah Shah Rashdi son of Peer Pagaaro, Shafqat Ali
Shah Jamote, Meer Aijaz Ali Talpur and Ghous Ali Shah for the Chief Ministership.
Except Ghous Ali Shah others were the members of the Sindh Assembly. Finally, the
name of Ghous Ali Shah was finalized as the Chief Minister. Peer Pagaara wanted his
205
206
Ibid., pp.170-171.
207
Ibid., p.171.
208
Ibid., pp.171-172.
171
son for it but he was not cleared from the agencies due to some reasons, than he was
agreed for Ghous Ali Shah.209
He was elected from Ghotki, District Sukkur.210 The seat was vacated by the
brother of Sardar Ghulam Muhammad Khan Mahar. Ghous Ali Shah was elected
unopposed on May 14, 1986. Although, other six persons also were interested to
contest the elections, but government did not allow them to file the nomination
papers. Meer Atta Ullah Khan Bulo, Dr.Mumtaz Ahmed Bulo, Rustam Khan Laghari,
Peer Nadir shah Jillani, Noor Muhammad Khan Ghori and Azizullah Khan Laghari
were interested to file the nomination papers on the PS-3 Ghotki.211 Even two persons
entered in the Returning Officer’s office for this purpose but the police captured them
and they were unrestricted when time was over. The selection of Ghous Ali Shah was
basically the choice of President Zia-ul-Haq. Anees Jillani wrote about it, “It is said
that Ghous Ali supported the President in the late seventies when few Sindhees
openly sided with the military era”.212The appointment of the Chief Minister of the
province was highly criticized by the democratic people of the province as well a by
the people of the country. No doubt it was not illegal according to the constitution of
1973, but not right politically when the Chief Ministers of the other provinces were
appointed from the elected members of the Assemblies. The selection of Ghous Ali
Shah also showed mistrust of Zia-ul-Haq rule on the elected representatives. He did
not trust on the elected members of the assembly though they were elected according
to his implemented laws.213 There was no political ground of Ghous Ali Shah or his
political party, so he was fully dependent on Peer Pagaara. Therefore, he paid a high
price for it. Jahan Dad Khan wrote about it as: “he had to pay a heavy price to the
209
Ibid., p.173.
210
Ibid.,p.187.
211
Ibid.,p.173.
212
Ibid.
213
Ibid., p.174.
172
Peer in the form of housing plots, land, agencies and prized posting for certain
officials on the Peer’s recommendations”.214
After the end of Martial Law new Governors were appointed on January 1,
1986. All the Governors were civilian but in Sindh, the same military Governor was
sustained. All three Governors except Sindh belonged to their respective provinces.
So, the questions raised among the Sindhi people that why the military Governor was
not changed in the province of Sindh? Why he was non-Sindhi? So, this action of the
government created the hatred feelings towards the army and Zia-ul-Haq era.215 K.M.
Arif wrote: “Regionalist Sindhees protested that province had received step-motherly
management”.216
Not only the regionalist Sindhi but also the PPP; a federal party and other
political parties were reproachful those behaviors towards Sindh.217 The nationalist
and regionalist organizations raised this issue among the masses and used it
politically. It went against the interest of the federalist politics and thinking.218The
policies of Ghous Ali Shah were not favorable for the integrity of the country,
because he encouraged MQM in Sindh, which was purely ethnic organization.219
Shafqat Mahmood wrote about Sayed Ghous Ali Shah in his column, “Syed Ghous
Ali Shah is accused of deliberately allowing ethnicity to emerge as a fault line in
Sindh politics”.220The policies of Ghous Ali Shah were not even contrasting by the
Governor of the Province. K.M. Arif narrated that “The Governor of Sindh;
Lieutenant General Jahan Dad Khan did not oppose the triple edged strategy adopted
by the Chief Minister, diminishing the influence of JI and encouraging the MQM”.221
214
Ibid.
215
Ibid., p.175.
216
217
218
Ibid., p.176
219
Ashraf Tariq, Panic in Karachi: Altaf Hussain, MQM And Underground Mafia, p.245.
220
221
173
Both, the selection of Chief Minister and the persistence of army Governor raised
many questions in the mind of the people of the Province.222Prime Minister
Muhammad Khan Junaijo was seriously working for lifting the Martial Law. He
thought that Martial Law and democracy could not run together so he was in struggle
to settle down all the problems smoothly. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad writes that Prime
Minster Muhammad Khan dealt with the session of the Senate on July 6, 1985, that
“Under Martial Law, civilian government would not work properly and I would not
become partner in the prolonged Martial Law”.223 These words of Muhammad Khan
showed that he wanted the Martial Law to be lifted as soon as possible. In this regard,
Junaijo moved to stable close relations with the political parties including Bhutto’s
Pakistan People’s Party.224 The politics of the province divided into many lines due to
long Martial Law period. There were federal as well as nationalist parties existed in
the province. The religious as well as ethnic parties also came into the politics and the
law and order situation was in the worst conditions. The dacoit’s activities were at
high scale. None dared to travel after the sunset on the roads of the province. Even
people were kidnapped from the towns during the daylight. The ethnic riots were
continued in the cities of Sindh particularly in the capital of the province. Hundreds
died in the racial violence between the Muhajirs, Punjabis, Pashtoons and
Sindhees.225The development of ethnic politics and degeneration of urban community
in Sindh were perhaps the most significant political developments under the Junaijo
government. The whole province of Sindh presented a scene of rising inter-ethnic
rivalries due to colonization of Pashtoons and Punjabis, and their domination over
jobs and business. As a by-product of Afghan war, Gun culture226 and drug mafia
222
223
Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War on Terror,
p.121.
224
225
Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, And America's War on Terror,
pp.123-124.
226
Gun Culture was also called Kalashank of Culture in Pakistan.
174
introduced in Karachi which spread the use of violation in pursuit of ethnic goals to
an unprecedented level.227
Though it was the result of Martial Law era but Zia-ul-Haq told, “It was the
result of the civilian government. Ghous Ali Shah directly and indirectly supported to
the political line of MQM. For example, MQM was against the settlement of the
Punjabis and Pashtoons in Sindh”.228 The same thinking was of Ghous Ali Shah and
on May 2, 1987, he said in Sukkur, “the migration of the people of the other provinces
to Sindh would be banned”. Ghous Ali Shah openly supported to MQM on 8th
November, he said that: “MQM is the result of injustice in economics and Punjabi-
Pashtoon Itehad (PPI) is the creation of Drug Mafia”.229 It was clear favor and
encouragement of a party and demoralization of the others by the Chief Executive of
the province. It was the result of the support of Sindh Government that MQM with the
majority seats of the local bodies in Karachi and Hyderabad.230The police and other
law enforcing agencies supported to the PPI because the majority of the police official
and other law enforcing agencies belonged to Pashtoons and Punjabis. So, in that
occurrence the law and order situation of the province could not be improved. The
politics of the province was divided along the ethnic lines, which in turn damaged the
unity and reliability of the country.231
Benazeer Bhutto wrote about the law and order situation of Sindh as, “In the parts of
interior Sindh, people no longer traveled after dark, because the roads were taken over
by gangs of bandits armed with automatic weapons and rocket launchers. Large
landlords and industrialists all over the Pakistan began to maintain private armies to
protect themselves and sometimes to launch attacks on their competitors.232 She
227
Ashraf Tariq, Panic in Karachi: Altaf Hussain, MQM And Underground Mafia, p.245.
228
Ibid., p. 267.
229
Ibid., p. 276.
230
Ibid., p. 283.
231
Ibid.,p.245.
232
Ibid., p. 246.
175
further wrote on the same page of her autobiography that even in the mosques,
villagers took refuge were spared”.233
Government machinery absolutely failed to control the activities of the dacoits

in the province. Dacoits attacked on the central jail Sukkur on March 24, 1986, and 37
criminals and dacoits were escaped from the prison. At least 27 from them were given
punishment to death by the military courts.234 The free availability of the weapons in
the secret markets and the Afghan camps were also the main cause of the violence and
lawlessness in the province. It was the phenomenon that even the guns were definitely
available on rent in the cities on hours.235Due to law and order situation and ethnic
violence, Ghous Ali Shah was asked by the federal government that he should submit
his resignation.236 Finally, he submitted his resignation on April 6, 1988, and Akhtar
Ali Qaazi became new Chief Minister of Sindh on April 11, 1988. After it, Ghous Ali
Shah issued the statement that due to fights for the rights of the province he was asked
for the resignation. Additionally, he said that he opposed the construction of Kala
Bagh Dam237, and demanded fairness and justice for Sindh on the allocation of water
resources. He was in opposition to the colonization of the public of the northern
villages and towns in Sindh province. He also initiated the operation against the drug
suppliers and drug mafia in Suharab Goth.238
As a whole, the three years period of Ghous Ali Shah remained as nastiest
period for the Province of Sindh. The situation of law and order was not good. Ethnic
and sectarian riots remained continue in his time. Hundreds were killed and thousand
injured in riots in the urban areas of the Province.239 The rural areas totally were under
233
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition),p.406.
234
Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, NBO Publishers
Distributors, New Delhi, 1985, p.191.
235
Ibid., pp.191-192.
236
Ibid., p.193.
237
This dam was opposed by nationalist parties. The location of this dam is in Noshehra (Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa). Nationalist parties claim that it would be a reason of drying canals in Sindh.
238
Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, p.194.
239
Ibid., p.195.
176
the control of the dacoits. The dacoits kidnapped the people in the daylight; ethno-
nationalist politics grew in his tenure. The federal politics was reduced and
inadequately supported in the province.240Though, the Movement for Restoration of
Democracy was crushed by Zia-ul-Haq’s military administration. But, it was its force
that Zia-ul-Haq became ready to give share to the civilians. In this regard, general
elections held on February 25, 1985, on non-party basis. In the consequences of those
elections, elected government came into being on March 23, 1985.241 Movement for
Restoration of Democracy did not accept the Junaijo government as autonomous
government and launched the movement against Zia-ul-Haq and his nominated
government of Junaijo in 1986.242The semi-democratic government of Junaijo took
several steps against the leaders of MRD, ousting Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei from Punjab
in September 1985.243 The Government imposed ban on his entry in the Punjab. The
leaders of the MRD were not allowed to hold the public meeting in Lahore on
September 23, 1985. MRD leaders faced new challenges after the elected government,
because a large number of the politicians joined or supported government. On the
other side MRD was not as organized as it was in 1983 and differences also appeared
between the leadership. MRD was divided on the matter of the registration of political
parties, provincial autonomy and on the making of the new constitution. Air Martial
(Retired) Asghar Khan; the leader of Tahreek-e-Istiqlal favored the registration while
other leaders opposed it. Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Ghous Bakhsh Bazinjo and Rasool
Bakhsh Paleejo demanded for a new Constitution.244
After the lifting of Martial Law, Benazeer Bhutto felt secure and decided to
come back. She returned to Pakistan on April 10, 1986, and selected Lahore for
240
Ibid.,206.
241
Report on the General Elections, 1985: Detailed result of election, Election Results, Election
Commission of Pakistan.
242
Suranjan Das, Kashmir And Sindh: Nation-Building, Ethnicity, And Regional Politics in South Asia,
K.P. Bagchi and Co., New Delhi, 2001, p.119.
243
Speeches, 1962-1990, p.86.
244
408.
177
landing. The nationalist segments of Sindh criticized Benazeer Bhutto for this
decision and said that she ignored the Sindhi people who struggled for the restoration
of democracy in 1983.245 A large number of her supporters reached Lahore airport and
welcomed her. It was an unprecedented welcome in the known history of Lahore.
Thousands of her supporter were gathered in her rally in the city of Lahore. She
crossed the nine miles in nine and a half hours. She addressed a crowd at various parts
of the city. She also visited the other cities and towns of the Punjab and was received
by large crowds. As a result she became more confident and it was said “She could
take over the Governor House and the government buildings in Lahore that day, if she
wanted”.246Benazeer Bhutto reached Karachi on May 3, 1986: a big crowd of the
people welcomed her on the airport. A big banner was inscribed with a slogan that
“Benazeer Bhutto is the Guarantor of the integrity of the Federation”.247In the end of
political visit, Benazeer announced that 5th July would be celebrated as a Black-Day
throughout the country.248 PPP leader N.D. Khan addressed in the public meeting and
said if the government would not ready to hold the fresh elections in the end of the
year they would launch the protest movement against the government. The same view
was issued by Benazeer on 7th July that “We do not recognize the elections of 1985 if
government would not prepare for fresh elections we shall launch a movement for the
elections on party basis this year”.249The new policy of the Pakistan People’s Party
was insisting for the new elections on party basis and restoration of the original
Constitution of 1973. Muhammad Waseem described the position as:
The real dilemma for the PPP leadership was how to force the era to hold the
midterm elections under the 1973 Constitution. In the aftermath of her
volcanic tour of Pakistan in April 1986, Benazeer called for autumn elections
245
Suranjan Das, Kashmir And Sindh: Nation-Building, Ethnicity, And Regional Politics in South Asia,
p.1120.
246
247
Ibid., p.410.
248
Corinne J. Naden, Benazir Bhutto, p.132.
249
411.
178
in the same year. In pursuit of her demand for election, she enlisted the
support of other Movement for Restoration of Democracy parties and called
for the agitation from September 20, 1986.250
After the huge gatherings and appealing rallies, Benazeer decided to start the
confrontation against the government. She announced that if government would not
hold the elections in September they would launch the movement on September 20,
1986.251 But, movement was started before it on August 14, 1986, when government
did not allow PPP for the public rally at Minar-e-Pakistan, Lahore. The clash started
between the workers of the Pakistan People’s Party and law enforcing agencies. The
day of independence changed into a violent day all over the country. Karachi and
Lahore were the centers of clash between the police and the workers of the Movement
for Restoration of Democracy. At least three people died and more than fifty were
injured.252 Benazeer was captured on 15th August. Her capture was followed by
demonstration and protest rallies all over the Province. The clashes and riots between
the police and the workers of PPP continued in the cities. People targeted the public
property, particularly railway stations, police stations and banks. In Karachi a police
station was fired in the Chakiwara area of Layari, strong hold area of Pakistan
People’s Party. On the same day, the angered mob attacked on jail at Thatta in which
at least 48 prisoners were escaped. Police firing on the processions caused many
people killed and injured. The clash between the law enforcing agencies and the
workers of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy were in epoch, both attacked
on each other. On 17th and 18th of August at least nine people were killed including
two police constables.253
A big procession was arranged at Khesana Mori near Hyderabad. At least two
demonstrators Gul Muhammad and Hakim Ali Wassan were died on spot and many
were injured in the police firing. After that mob went to police station to register the
FIR against the culprits but police denied to register the case and captured the
250
Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985, Vanguard, London, 1987, p.243.
251
252
Ibid., pp.411-412.
253
Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, pp.124-125.
179
villagers. After that police attacked on the village and misbehaved with women and
captured them. On the same day a youth Naeem Khatri died when police opened fire
on procession in Badin.254It was a new strategy of the law enforcing agencies that if
some persons of any village were involved in an anti-government action, the whole
village would be punished. Police and law-enforcing agencies attacked the village of
Thaheem in District Sanghar. Many people were injured including an eight years old
baby Noor. Police captured all the male residents of the village. On 23rd of August,
police repeated the same action in the village Birhmani near Dadu. Police fired on the
villagers and at least 5 people including 80 years old Chhutto Birhmani and 10 years
young boy were killed.255
The police action on the villages of Taeeb Thaheem, Ahmed Khan Birhmani,
and in Khesana Moori; Sadiq Machhi were identified. They attacked and treated the
villagers as an army of enemy. The situation in Sindh was like a guerrilla war. Even
the leadership of MRD was surprised. Many leaders of MRD openly said that they
have no relation with MRD. JUI leader Moulana Fazal Rehman openly said that “it
was the show of PPP”. The militant war was started in Sindh. The demonstrators
attacked public property and the police stations. At least 50 people were killed in the
movement. More than 10,000 workers of the MRD were captured in one day on
August 13, 1986.256This movement was more violent than the movement of 1983. The
people of the Sindh were more concerned in the movement as compare to the other
provinces of the country. So the Sindhees were deeply felt isolated and hopeless from
the people of other areas. Army used the crucial measures to oppress this movement
of the people of Sindh, as compare to use in the Punjab. There was no violence in the
Punjab except the Lahore incident on August 14, 1986, when 3 persons were died.257
After that military avoided the use of bullet and tear gas on the procession in the cities
254
Ibid., p.125.
255
Ibid., p.126.
256
Ibid., p.127.
257
Ibid., p.128.
180
of the Punjab. Correspondingly the attitude of the people was also different in both
the provinces.258 Anees Jillani described it as under:
The differences in the style and intensity of the agitation in the province of
Sindh and Punjab are striking. In Punjab some main PPP leaders have
escaped capture too far, while this is not the case in Sindh. In Punjab,
protests are confined to urban areas while in Sindh, unlike the 1983
agitation, it is intense both in rural and urban regions; in Punjab students
and working class are not as active as in Sindh: in Punjab middle business
men, shopkeepers and commission agents are opposed to the agitators while
in Sindh, they are generally cooperating with them; in Punjab, the
commitment of the protestors is not as deep as in Sindh and consequently
Punjabis are more apprehensive of captures the police generally than the
Sindhees.259
When the movement turned into aggression and violence, the leadership of
PPP decided to stop the movement. This time, Benazeer herself decided to led the
movement and she was disheartened from people of Punjab as she was expecting
much from them. As a result she issued the report on October 8, 1987, which “we
would not want to clash and blood violent, therefore, we withdrawn from the dead
line for the fresh elections”.260PPP led democratic movement and played leading role
in the MRD. Hundreds of its workers were died and injured and thousands were sent
to jails and flogging by the military administration. Therefore, people of Sindh were
not happy with the new strategy of Benazeer. The change in the policy towards the
military era raised many questions in the minds of the people of the country in general
and the people of Sindh in particular. She followed the policy of wait and watch.261
Poor participation of the people of Punjab in the movement of democracy raised
258
413.
259
Anees Jillani, Advance Towards Democracy: The Pakistani Experience, Progressive Publishers,
Islamabad, 1991, p.75.
260
261
Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's politics: The Zia years, p.113.
181
nationalism in Sindh.262As compare to 1983 movement of MRD, the people of Sindh
contributed dimly in the movement of 1986. It was due to ethnic and sectarian
division and share of power which Waderaas have taken from the army. In this
movement the Sindhi Waderaas did not take interest as they took in 1983. Ghulam
Mustafa Jatoei did not participate in the movement while in 1983 he played a leading
role.263 Mumtaaz Ali Bhutto, uncle of Benazeer Bhutto, also opposed the Movement
for Restoration of Democracy, and demanded for a new constitution on the basis of
the confederation. Even many other close relatives of Benazeer Bhutto also left
Pakistan People’s Party and joined the army era. At least 30 members of Parliament
during Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto government from Sindh joined Zia-ul-Haq’s military
administration “which would be described as the assemble party”.264There was a poor
sharing of the urban middle class in the movement; though, it was more as assess to
1983. This time, the people of the Karachi and Hyderabad said “Khuda Hafiz” (Good
Bye) to Islamic fundamentalist and orthodox parties such as JI and JUP. Now they
supported to newly born ethno-nationalist organization, Muhajir Quomi Movement
(MQM). The leader of the MQM, Altaf Hussain appealed to the Muhajirs that they
would support neither Movement for Restoration of Democracy nor government. This
type of appeal went in the interest of the government and used it against the
democratic forces.265During the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, there was a
very crucial situation of the whole province. None was secure in the rural areas also.
The dacoits attacked on the villages and took hostage persons for the ransom.266 Even
the government officials denied traveling by road. Anees Jillani covered entire
circumstances and defined, "Prime Minister when traveling in Sindh prefers to go by
air than by road. Payment of ransom for the hijacked victims by government bodies,
high officials, feudal lords, and common man has become a routine affair there.
Attacks on the army personnel and cantonments have given the whole situation a new
262
Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, p.129.
263
Speeches, 1962-1990, p.92.
264
Ibid., p.413.
265
Rasul Bux Rais, Ethnic Politics in Sindh, H.N. Publishers, Karachi, 1997, p.34.
266
Ibid., p.35.
182
dramatic turn. The traditional image of dacoits is shattered by these attacks on the
army because there are no financial incentives involved. A simple explanation of
these attacks could be that there is some sort of insurgency”.267
According to Hussain Bakhsh Narejo, in such a situation, there was no

uprising against the state. However, it was against the military government. The
hatred feelings and sense of scarcity and deprivation among the Sindhi people against
the military rule was there. So, they completely participated in the anti-military
movement. No doubt some attacks on military personnel in Sindh happened. It was
done by the dacoits because they showed that they are in position to attack on armed
forces and also sent the message to the youth political workers that they would select
the way of militancy for their rights. Some political workers also met dacoits and they
tried to induce them that they participate in the movement but they did not answer and
supposed that “politicians are not sincere with the people”.268
It was the pressure of MRD that Junaijo had been trying to give the jobs to the
Sindhi people, particularly Sindhi speaking who played a basic role during the MRD
in 1983, and also in struggle for the restoration of real democracy and of original
shape of the Constitution of 1973. “Junaijo wanted to reduce the nationalist thinking
in the people of Sindh through jobs for the unemployed youth and they became active
in the nationalist politics”.269Movement for Restoration of Democracy of 1986 left
many impacts on the politics of country, particularly in Sindh. After it, the popular
party of Sindh; Pakistan Peoples Party withdrew from its anti-imperialist role.
Benazeer Bhutto who was also described the conditions in her wall-less cage and
called the book “Daughter of Destiny” in honor of Benazeer, openly condemned those
workers who chanted the slogans against America. After it, Benazeer and other
leadership of PPP said “Khuda Hafiz” to the resistant move and struggle and selected
the way of compromising.270 The role of the Sindhi Waderaas and feudal lords proved
267
Anees Jillani, Advance Towards Democracy: The Pakistani Experience, p.128.
268
269
Ibid., pp.413-414.
270
Ibid., p.414.
183
that they were not honest to the democracy nor with the people. They only were trying
to take share in the power structure. When Zia-ul-Haq’s government agreed to give
them share in power structure, they made line to connect the government.271The leftist
and the nationalist politics increased during those days.272 Awami Tahreek of Rasool
Bakhsh Paleejo, Watan Dost Inqalaabi Party, and some small groups such as Sindh
Dost Inqalaabi Party had successfully introduced themselves to the masses. When the
leftist nationalists grew in the nationalist politics of Sindh, military administration felt
it against their interest and tried to disperse them or use them according to their
interest.273
The urban middle class of Sindh supported MQM, which selected the anti-
Punjabi line and established close relations to Jeay Sindh Tahreek. So, military
administration felt threat to their interest in Sindh and tried to generate racial and
ethnic tension and disturbed the harmony of the people.274If the people of urban and
rural Sindh had united themselves and moved against the government, it would have
been very difficult for the government to suppress the movement. So before unity the
government had succeeded to create the atmosphere in which the riots were started in
the city of Karachi, first between the Muhajirs and Pashtoons and then Muhajirs and
Punjabis. The sentiments of the people were diverted into ethnic riots. The Sindhi
nationalist leader, Qadir Magsi said, “It was the trailer, actually government wanted to
prepare and organize the Muhajirs and Punjabis against the Sindhees”.275 According
to him, “It was proved true in 1987 when MQM occupied the local bodies of Karachi
and Hyderabad and started the quarrels with Sindhees”.276
271
Rasul Bux Rais, Ethnic Politics in Sindh, p.35.
272
Surendra Singh, Politics of Regionalism in Pakistan: A Study of Sind Province, Kalinga Publications,
New Delhi, 2003, p.115.
273
Ibid., p.116.
274
Ibid., p.117.
275
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition),p.414.
276
Ibid.,p.434.
184
So it was the successful strategy of Zia-ul-Haq rule to divide the political
parties on the ethnic basis. In this way he had successful to prevent the anti-army
movement. Even the PPP student’s wing, Sindh Peoples Students’ Federation (SPSF)
also got involved into ethnic riots.277 Zia-ul-Haq was greedy of power so he was
against the popular government. He was also against the parliamentary and federal
form of government. Therefore, he wanted to implement the presidential and unitary
form of government, but he could not do it due to the pressure of the masses. When
Junaijo tried to restore the status of the parliamentary government, Zia-ul-Haq broke
up the Assemblies and dismissed the Junaijo government.278 Shahid Javed Burki
quoted the words of Zia-ul-Haq as under:
It was mistaken on my part to have accepted the advice of some of my

colleagues that a parliamentary system of some kind is the only political
system that would work in Pakistan. I should have gone for a presidential
form of government. After all, it is working in other countries. I am also
not so sure whether a federation based on a four provinces is suitable for
Pakistan. We should perhaps divide the country into twenty or so
managerial units but have a unitary form of government at the center.279
It was clear from the above statement of Zia-ul-Haq that he was not in the
support of Parliamentary Government and nor sustain Federal system of the state. The
dissolution of the assemblies and notice of the government was the result of the
differences between the handpicked civilian Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan
Junaijo and the Army President Zia-ul-Haq. Though, Junaijo was his own choice and
selection, he did not want to work as a puppet Prime Minister, was much interested in
the traditional magnificence of his appointment, as he was in the public manifestation
of the exercise of power. He tried to show that ‘he is a powerful and independent in
277
Muhammad Soaleh Korejo, A Testament of Sindh: Ethnic And Religious Extremism A Perspective,
Oxford University Press, London, 2003, p.136.
278
Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead,p.185.
279
Shahid javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, Oxford University Press, London, 1988, p.267.
185
his rule.280 It is shown from the declaration of Muhammad Ali Durrani, which was
quoted by K.M. Arif in these lines:
In October 1986, Brigadier Muhammad Ali Durrani that was Military

Secretary to the President was posted back to the army. When he made his
farewell call on the Prime Minister Junaijo, he amazed him by saying; I am
trying to run the country in accordance with the formation. If the President
did not like this establishment, he could have promulgated similar to that
of Sri Lanka.281
The seed of the differences grew even before taking the oath by Muhammad
Khan Junaijo as Prime Minister. When Zia-ul-Haq called Junaijo and congratulated
him on winning the elections of National Assembly seat and also declared that he
selected him as next Prime Minister of the country. Zia-ul-Haq expected that when he
would declare the name of Junaijo before him he would say thanks for it. But Junaijo
did not say words of thanks to Zia-ul-Haq. After that he was mindful and was not
happy on his selection.282 K.M. Arif narrated:
The President met Mr. Muhammad Khan Junaijo in his office in the
President’s House at 8 PM on the same evening. The COS was also present.
Warmly greeting Mr. Junaijo, General Zia-ul-Haq congratulated him on his
election to the National Assembly and said ‘I have determined to suggest
you as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The disclosure caused no surprise to
Mr. Junaijo. The Peer Pagaara and the MNAs had already spilled the beans
to him. Without the shadow of emotion appearing on his face, Junaijo heard
Zia-ul-Haq in an offhand manner. Without expressing a word of thanks, he
said unexpectedly that Mr. President, when do you plan to lift the Martial
Law? Shocked at the lack of straightforward courtesy shown to him, General
Zia-ul-Haq kept his cool and said casually Martial Law is now in your
support. It will help you to settle down in your high scheduled time. I will
lift it whenever you are in control of the situation. The relationship between
280
Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead,p.186.
281
282
186
the President and his nominated Prime Minister started on an icy note.283
It was the first gathering of Junaijo and President but it did not left good
impression on President. The question about the lifting of Martial Law by Junaijo in
his first meeting with Zia-ul-Haq created many questions in the mind of the President.
Then in the session of the senate on July, 6 1985, Junaijo addressed to senate and said
that: “in the presence of the Martial Law civilian government could not work
properly, and we would not the party to prolong the Martial Law.”284Though the
Martial Law was lifted on December 30, 1985, even then the President was powerful
than the Prime Minister due to 8th amendment. Muhammad Khan Junaijo as a civilian
designated Prime Minister wanted to hold authority on the government departments
but it could not bear by the authoritarian President, Zia-ul-Haq. After it he watched
the activities of Junaijo very keenly.285According to K.M. Arif, “Zia-ul-Haq-Junaijo
honeymoon was shot lived. Zia-ul-Haq soon found power slipping from his grasp. Mr.
Junaijo found himself politically hamstrung by the label of being the handpicked
candidate of an oppressive ruler”.286
The civil and military relations were not always smooth under Junaijo. One
retired general chose to response on the Prime Minister‘s remarks in his second
budget speech in which he said “we will put Generals in Suzuki.”287 Prime Minister
wanted to have full grip on government. Therefore, he took the measures in the civil
as well as in the military affairs. Zia-ul-Haq could not bear his interference in the
military affairs. Junaijo’s attempt to exert some control over military discipline and
appointments was even more difficult for Zia-ul-Haq to swallow.288
During those days, the foreign office of the government was very important
because of Afghan crisis and American aid. President wanted to control on the foreign
283
284
Ibid., pp.410-411.
285
Ibid., p.411.
286
Ibid., p.467.
287
Ibid., p.412.
288
Ibid.,p.419.
187
office and foreign policy. Prime Minister as head of the government was trying to
control all over the government folios. So in that seesaw Prime Minister replaced
foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqoub Khan. President felt excluded from foreign
policy matters because Yaqoub Khan was known as a man of President. So on this
issue the difference between the President and Prime Minister became sharp. After
this President issue the statement to the Washington Post, “he effectively took charge
of foreign policy, particularly the Afghan issue and became its principal spokesman, if
not its architect”.289
Just after lifting the Martial Law in 1985, relations between the President and
the Prime Minister turned into mistrust on each issue. Both tried to undermine each
other, and the clash of personality started between the staff of the President and Prime
Minster. Mushahid Hussain Sayed illustrated this situation as: “After the end of
Martial Law in December 1985, battle over procedure and personnel started in earnest
between the Prime Minister and President”.290
The replacement of Information Secretary, Lieutenant General Mujeeb

Rehman, by Junaijo breeds more differences between them. At that time federal
secretariat was in trouble. There were two authorities at a time. The employees of the
secretariat were so confused, when two instructions reached to their table in different
shapes and authorities. Due to that confusion they could not work in proper ways.291
K.M. Arif narrated it as that “Many federal secretaries complained that at a time they
receive divergent orders directly from the President and the Prime Minister, which
create problems for them”.292
It was also noted by Zia-ul-Haq that Benazeer criticized only on him not to
Junaijo. “Round Table Conference” on Afghan crisis was convened by Junaijo in
1987. This conference increased the discrepancy between both of them. In this
conference all the parties including PPP were invited. Benazeer Bhutto agreed to
289
Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's politics: The Zia Years, p.199.
290
Ibid., p.200.
291
292
188
attend the conference on the wording that “Zia-ul-Haq would not participate in the
conference”. Prime Minister accepted it and Zia-ul-Haq ousted and was not invited. It
was big shock for Zia-ul-Haq.293 Taken from account of Shahid Javed Burki who
narrated it as:
The first major clash between the two centered on the question of Pakistan’s
Afghan policy. General Zia-ul-Haq and the Inter Services Intelligence
favored a military solution. They believed that only a military victory over
Kabul would put power in the hands of the Mujahideen leaders supported by
Pakistan. Junaijo was in favor of a negotiated settlement, arguing that the
soviet willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan and had obtainable
Pakistan with an opportunity that would be unconsidered to ignore.294
The differences pointed out during Round Table Conference, which was held
to solve the Afghan crisis.295 Muhammad Waseem described it in these lines, “It is in
this perspective that the growing tension between the President and the Prime
Minister can be under stood. Ever since the latter’s initiative in holding the Round
Table Conference with all political parties, largely by passing the President and the
signing of the ‘Geneva Accord, the President felt increasingly insecure about his
future”.296So, the contradiction increased day by day between the Army General and
the civilian Prime Minister. During that cold tussle an American delegate came to
audit the weapons, which were sent by American government for the Afghani Jehadi
Organizations. Before audit an incident took place at Ojharri Camp on April 10, 1988,
in which thousands of missiles flew all around in a radius of 10 miles, affecting the
twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad and causing deaths and serious injuries of
hundreds of people.297
293
294
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq,p.312.
295
296
Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985, p.124.
297
189
In the result one hundred people were killed and approximately 1100 were
injured. The people of Rawalpindi and Islamabad were in trouble in the explosion of
the Ojharri Camp. In this incident 7000 tons of arms and explosive were destroyed.
Two days later two-member Enquiry Commission was formulated. Lieutenant
General Imran-ullah Khan was the head of the Commission. They have to investigate
the causes leading to the incident of the fire in the ammunition depot; to point out the
security lapses and join the responsibility. It was also the responsibility of the
Commission to advise the measures to prevent such kind of accidents in the future.
Commission worked jointly with some military experts and technical persons. Finally,
it submitted their report to government on April 22, 1988. The report of the
Commission was not disclosed. Five member ministerial committee under the
Chairmanship of the Defense Minister, Muhammad Aslam Khattak was also
formulated to examine the report of the Commission. Qazi Abdul Majid Abid, Meer
Ibrahim Baloch, Malik Naseem Ahmed Aheer and Rana Naeem Mahmood were the
members of the Committee. “Some members of the ministerial committee wanted
strict action against all those responsible for dereliction of duty including the policy
makers. Akhtar Abdul Rehman who headed the ISI Directorate till March of 1987,
and his successor Major General Hamid Gul.298 Akhtar Abdul Rehman opposed every
high level investigation and emphasis on the departmental investigation. Zia-ul-Haq’s
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sayed Rafaqat also said that General Akhtar
opposed any high level inquiry.299 Zia-ul-Haq was not happy on the ministerial
committee to examine the Imranullah report and further investigation. The President
was not happy either and wished to file the Imran Report. So, after the Imran Report,
Junaijo held Akhtar accountable to establish the bullets depot in the heavily populated
area. So, the difference between President and Prime Minister further increased on the
issue of the investigation of the Ojharri Camp incident. Muhammad Khan Junaijo said
that the heavy responsibility of the accident goes to the Akhtar Abdul Rehman,
because he established the depot of the weapons and kept it long time in the populated
areas between the two cities. It was disclosed by the Junaijo that General Hamid Gul
accepted the responsibility for the accident and had volunteered to be removed him
298
Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition),pp.411-412.
299
Ibid., p.412.
190
from service.300 Muhammad Khan Junaijo wanted to punish the persons who were
responsible for the accident. In the light of the reports Prime Minister hold the
responsibility on Akhtar Abdul Rehman. K. M. Arif wrote, “Zia-ul-Haq wanted to
protect Akhtar and Hamid Gul. The period was situating for a showdown between the
President and the Prime Minister”.301Muhammad Khan Junaijo did not like Akhtar
and “talked to Zia-ul-Haq about replacing Akhtar”.302 The enquiry report of Ojharri
gave the chance to Junaijo to take action against him. Akhtar Abdul Rehman, Director
General of ISI was nominated as a main accused of the accident. He was very close to
Zia-ul-Haq. On the other hand, Zia-ul-Haq felt the statement a threat from him, and
decided to dismiss the Junaijo government.303
Safdar Mahmood noted the gulf between President and Prime Minister Junaijo
in these words: “Their differences were fostered by policy conflict on such issue as
the Geneva Accord on Afghanistan and Ojharri camp blast”.304 The dispute became
serious matter between the Prime Minister and President, when it was decided by
Junaijo that Federal Public Accounts Committee of National Assembly would also
keep check on the military officials. It was not tolerated by the President as a Chief of
Army Staff and military officials. The contradiction was arisen between the President
and Prime Minister.305Muhammad Waseem quoted it as under:
The very principle of answerability of the civil and military bureaucracies to

the public responsibility was suspected in the eyes of the President. For
example in April 1988 the Federal Public Accounts Committee of the National
Assembly under the Chairmanship of Sahabzada Muhammad Ali Shah had
submitted its report to the Prime Minister. It recommended a debate in the
300
Ibid., p.413.
301
Ibid., p.414.
302
Ibid.,417.
303
Ibid., pp.419-421.
304
Ṣafdar Mahmud, Pakistan: Political Roots And Development, 1947-1999, Oxford University Press,
London, 2000, p.307.
305
191
parliament over the issue as well as its promotion in the press. The President
found it all very disgusting. He grew increasingly intolerant of what he
considered the system of bringing state functionaries into disrepute. Therefore,
he decided to scrape not only the Junaijo Government but also the whole
parliamentary framework.306
Zia-ul-Haq openly expressed his views against Junaijo and showed his
abhorrence against him. In a private dinner at Army House on May 23, 1988, just six
days before the knocked out Junaijo and the National Assembly, Zia-ul-Haq remarked
to the guests “Have you noticed how arrogant Junaijo has become. He even walks and
behaves like Bhutto”307. These remarks of the President showed his anger on
Junaijo308. Eventually, the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies were
dissolved on May 29, 1988. During those days, Prime Minister Junaijo was on a visit
of China. Before the return of Prime Minister, Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the National
Assembly and dismissed the Junaijo government. While dismissing the Junaijo
government, the President announced that “it had failed to keep law and order and
execute Islam in the country. Later he also gave corruption and economic decline as
reasons for his action against Junaijo”309.After dismissal of Junaijo government, Zia-
ul-Haq addressed to the nation on May 30, 1988, and stated it as “The Prime Minister
was compelled to succumb to unwholesome political pressure, which led to rampant
corruption, nepotism and ill administration, finally leading to a complete breakdown
of morality and law and order in the country”310. Muhammad Khan Junaijo did not
challenge the dissolution of the Assemblies in the court nor went to the people. The
politicians were divided on dissolution of the assemblies. Some supported and some
criticized the decision. Benazeer Bhutto and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei supported the
decision of Zia-ul-Haq and demanded for the fresh elections in due time on party
306
Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985, pp.208-209.
307
308
309
310
Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan; General Zia-ul-Haq's interviews To Foriegn Media,
Official Documents, p.258.
192
basis. Tufail Ahmed of Jamaat-e-Islami, who was very close to Zia-ul-Haq, said that it
was time when the rate of the daily usage things was raised the government, lost its
control on the administration. He predominantly indicates it in the Nationalist
Conference known as ‘Sann Conference’, which was held in Sann District Dadu on
May 20, 1988311.No doubt, there was no pageant or a demonstration was launched
against the decision, but some fears became in the minds of Sindhees due to the
dissolution of assemblies and discharge of the centralized and provincial
governments. The Sindhi people felt that there was no place in the power structure for
the Sindhees. They thought that their first elected Prime Minister was hanged and the
second was dismissed and sent back to Sindh. Zia-ul-Haq dismissed the Junaijo
government after the dissolution of the assemblies he selected the eight ministers in
new caretaker government from the Junaijo cabinet. He also appointed Nawaz Sharif
as caretaker Chief Minister of Punjab and Fazal-e-Haq as Chief Minister of KPK. In
Sindh, the circumstances were entirely changed. He did not assign caretaker Chief
Minister of the province, and the only Sindh province was without the Chief Minister.
Zia-ul-Haq appointed General (Retired) Rahim-ud-Din as a Governor of the Sindh
Province. He was non-Sindhi. The inferiority complex increased among the Sindhi
people and hatred thought grew up in the province. These questions raised in the
minds of the people that while the Chief Ministers were appointed in rest of the
provinces, why not in Sindh?312.The Sindhi and Punjabi feudal lords and Waderaas
once again were thrown out from the power construction. They tried to gain the
confidence of the army administration to facilitate them in the new set up. A new race
was brought up between them to change the political loyalties. This action of the
General also went in the interest of the separatists and secessionists. They propagated
that there was no place for the Sindh in the political structure. If any Sindhi is elected
or selected he is totally dependent on the will of the army. While in the army there is
no share of the Sindhees. Therefore, Zia-ul-Haq selected Junaijo and dismissed
him313.The discriminative behavior also continued even after the general elections. All
the Chief Ministers of the three provinces were selected from respective Assemblies.
311
312
Ibid., pp.416-417.
313
193
But, in Sindh, a non-elected member was selected as Chief Minister of the Province.
After lifting Martial Law the civilian Governors were appointed in all the three
provinces, but in Sindh the military Governor was not replaced. The same story was
also repeated when the assemblies were dissolved. The concerned Chief Ministers
were nominated in three provinces but Sindh was under the rule of Governor. So due
to that and other injustice the nationalist sentiments prospered in the Province314.
In fact, this movement had weaken the rule of Zia-ul-Haq and he had been
suffered from several crisis. His own designed non-party system had also been buried
with his own hands due to unpopularity of public as well as his own conflicts with his
so-called representatives of the public. So, he dismissed National Assembly and
announced new elections.
314
Ibid., pp.215-216.
194
Chapter 5
The End of Martial Law And The Beginning of Controlled

Democracy
Through the elections of 1985, Zia-ul-Haq wanted to legalize his autocratic

behavior. Therefore, firstly he introduced 8th Amendment and then after querying
strong political powers along with having a status of army chief, he introduced
controlled democracy in the country. The reasons of introducing this system were as
follows:
1) In the referendum, people of the country followed the Movement for

Restoration of Democracy and boycotted the referendum of 1984; it was the
defeat of Zia-ul-Haq, who preferred the Non-Party elections.
2) Other major reason was the popular support of PPP for MRD and Zia-ul-Haq
did not want PPP to come as force in the National Assembly.
3) Nonpolitical and non-committed people have become the members of the

National Assembly.
Zia-ul-Haq favored the non-Party elections because he know very well that
non-political and non-committed people would be easily managed as compare to the
political or affiliated people. So, he wanted that the people who become the members
of the assembly would not be the member of any party nor affiliated with political
leaders. The Waderaas and several members of the feudal families contested the
elections, and the majority of them were unknown in the politics. People did not
response to the MRD’s appeal of the boycott, as they responded in the referendum.
The turnout in the elections was about 44.7 per cent in Sindh and 59.4 per cent people
of the Punjab were participated in the elections. In general, 52 per cent people casted
their votes in these elections. The elections turn-out was really surprising for all the
political groups, the military, the candidates and the opposition. No doubt that people
195
casted the votes in the elections but they rejected Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime.1The
majority of the ministers of his cabinet and the members of the Majlis-e-Shoora
(Parliament) were lost their seats. Benazeer commented:
The voting was a resounding rejection of Martial Law and General Zia-ul-
Haq’s policy of Islamization. Six out of his nine Cabinet Ministers who ran
for the National Assembly were overpowered, as were many of his other
associates. The candidates backed by the fundamentalist religious parties,
only six out of sixty-one candidate of the Jamat-e-Islami won their seats. In
contrast, candidates who had claimed connection with PPP in spite of our
boycott did remarkably well, called winning fifty out of fifty two seats. 2
The elections were free and fair and government did not hamper. The main
proof for it that majority of the ministers were defeated in the elections. Zia-ul-Haq
Regime did not rigging in the elections because they already successful his policy that
his main opposite party PPP and their allies were boycotted the elections. So there
was no need Zia-ul-Haq to interfere in the elections. 3 The second reason was believe
in regime of bullet and not ballot. Zia-ul-Haq regime only wanted a democratic cover,
not democracy.4 Zia-ul-Haq and his friends were very happy about the result and
turnout of the elections. Even major parties boycotted the elections and appealed to
the people for boycott. People discouraged the appeal of the boycott and participated
in the elections. Over twelve hundred candidates contested for 207 National Assembly
Muslim seats5.The promise of lifting of the Martial Law after the elections was one of
the main reasons of the participation of the people in the elections. People participated
in the elections because they were against Martial Law and in favor of democracy.
Elections were first step for democratic government, even on Non-Party basis. The
1
Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Greenwood Publishing, Westport, 2012, p.159.
2
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), Pakistab
3
Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq, p.160.
4
Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, The University of Michigan,
5
Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq, p.161.
196
convincing to voters by Candidates also played vital role in the participation. They
used their personal, brotherly, religious and ethnic relations to convince the people to
cast their vote. Some Waderaas bought the votes from the local chiefs of clans and the
small landowners. It was one cause of turn-out in Sindh province. Haji Amir Bux
Junaijo won the provincial seat from District Dadu by purchasing votes from the local
influenced persons. An economist, Shahid Kardar also described that the major factor
was the price in the rural Sindh for 20 or more votes Rs. 10,000, considering the
extent of poverty, households which could deliver 20 votes, facing no real substitute
choice, were prepared to sale their vote. It also eased the burden of the poverty. So the
money also played a vital role in the turnout of 1985”6.The purchasing of votes was
unenthusiastic mark of the non-party elections, which increased corruption in the
country. The members who won the elections by purchasing the votes, they would use
all means for their personal interests7. It proved when Junaijo government decided
that development fund would be given to the elected members, and it was first time in
the history of the country that development fund directly goes in the accounts of the
assembly members. It was on the will and honesty of the members that they utilized
the funds in proper way or not8. The landlords of Punjab participated in the elections
themselves or put up the candidates on their own choice. The same position was in
KPK, but it was changed in Sindh and Baluchistan. The tribal chiefs of Baluchistan
were not more interested in the elections, and the landlord class of Sindh was divided
into two groups. A large camp supported the line of the MRD, and other camp was
trying to accommodate the proposed structure9. As the general elections of 1985 were
on non-party basis, therefore, the political issues were not in the program of the
elections. It left negative impact on the society, such as the election campaign was
based on Baradrism as well as on local issue. So it created the ethnic as well as
sectarian issues in the politics of the country10. Omar Nouman narrated that, “Tribe,
6
Shahid Kardar, The Gathering Economic Crisis And The Dwindling Options, Group 83, Islamabad,
1986, p.11.
7
Ibid., pp.11-12.
8
Ibid., p.12.
9
Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq,pp.161-162.
10
Ibid., p.162.
197
race, cult and ethnicity were the factor that appeared to be serving or framers of
reference for the voters in today’s electoral contest”11. The same remarks have been
quoted by Dr. Tahir Amin about 1985 elections. He stated:
The most important consequence of the party less election has been that the
political campaign predictable revolved around sectarian, ethnic and tribal
sectarian problems in the absence of any program. Regime claimed the
elections had one recommend taking forward the process of Islamization with
the participation of the people. But it was not seen during the elections,
majority of the candidate were talk about the local issues and convinced to the
people on personal and ethnic and tribal relations.12
Rai Shakil Akhtar comments on the elections of 1985 as under:
Elections mainly concerned with local and common issues and rarely took
up any bigger national issue. Islam, economy, Martial law, foreign affairs,
etc. we’re not part of electoral campaigns. These elections became a reason
of reducing national politics to municipal level13.
Mostly, all the scholars and social scientist are agreed with this point that the
non-party elections left the harmful impact on the politics of country, particularly on
the politics of Sindh province14.It was the impact of the party-less elections that ethnic
politics increased and many ethnic groups became more powerful. MQM, PPI and
Pushtoon Federation were the result of the elections. Benazeer Bhutto, a federalist
politician, who believed in strong center comments: “The non-party elections held by
the regime had furthered the country’s fragmentation”15. By banning political parties,
the regime forced candidates to campaign not on a platform of political ideals, which
11
Omar Noman, The Political Economy of Pakistan, 1947-85, KPI, Islamabad, 1988, p.192.
12
Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic And International Factors,Institute of
Poliy Studies, Islamabad, 1988, pp.218-219.
13
Rai Shakil Akhtar, Media, Religion And Politics In Pakistan, Oxford University Press, London, 2000,
p.164.
14
Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead,p.187.
15
Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... p.429.
198
transcended ethnic and regional boundaries, but on the basis of individual
identification like:
 Vote for me because I am a Shia like you
 Vote for me because I am a Punjabi like you, and
 Vote for me because I am Sindhi like you16
Dr. Tahir Amin wrote about it as under:
Opportunist local holders principally the land owning rural class emerged
victorious in the elections and the regime was more than happy to make them a
junior partner in the power game both at the center and in the provinces.17
As a result of non-party elections, the ethnic, regional as well as religious

issues were increased in the country. It went in the interest of separatists, as well as in
the interest of religious fundamentalists. The people of the country divided into clan,
caste and sects. The political issues such as foreign policy, economic policy and the
question of the integrity of the country went into wave. Members came into
assemblies without political plan and agenda. Political inducement and dishonesty
was increased as a result of non-party elections18.
Participation of Other Political Parties
As the General Elections of 1985 were non-party based, almost 1300

candidates contested these elections. Turnout was approximately 52.92 per cent. All
the members of parliament cannot show their political affiliation therefore, all the 207
members were declared as independent candidates. There were 21 seats reserved for
women from which 9 seats were reserved for minorities and total seats were 237.19
16
Ibid., p.430.
17
Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic And International Factors, p.220.
18
Ibid., p.219.
19
Rana Zia-ul-Haq, Jamhooriat: Tallwar Se Tez Tar...... (Urdu Edition),Usman Publishers, Bahawalpur,
1990, p.161.
199
Before holding these elections, Zia-ul-Haq holds a referendum all over the country to
legitimize his presidency. There was a question on which people had to vote either
they like presidency of Zia-ul-Haq or not20. The question for referendum was:
Do you agree with the act of President General Zia-ul-Haq which he initiated
for the implementation of Islamic laws according to Quran and Sunnah in
Pakistan? Do you agree to continue this procedure and want to deliver
political power to the real representatives of the people.21
This was a common question and no one can deny the need of Islamic laws.
Therefore, if military government claimed that Zia got 96 per cent of votes from total
registered votes, then it can be possible. After getting this so-called legitimization, Zia
announced non-party elections in Pakistan for the basic purpose to remove the
political influence of PPP and its allies. On the other hand, MRD decided not to
participate in these elections. As this news spread, military administration started
arresting the leadership of MRD22. As the mainstream political parties had boycotted
these elections, Pakistan Muslim League, Jamat-e-islami and other members of
Majlis-e-Shoora became happy to see an open ground. Candidates, affiliated with
right wing political parties, participated in these elections as independent candidates.
There was almost 50 per cent turnout23.Nine ministers of Zia’s cabinet also contested
these elections but only three were succeeded to win. Jamat-e-Islami participated with
full intenstion but it succeeded to win only six seats of the parliament. Most of the
elected members of parliament were the previous members of Majlis-e-Shoora and
some were belonged to Pakistan Muslim League and Jamat-e-islami24.
20
Ibid., p.162.
21
Ibid., p.162.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid., p.163.
24
Ibid.
200
Differences Between Zia-ul-Haq And Junaijo
Zia-ul-Haq was greedy of power so he was against the popular government.

He was against the parliamentary and federal form of government. Therefore, he
wanted to implement the presidential and unitary form of government. But he could
not do it due to the pressure of the masses. When Junaijo tried to restore the status of
the parliamentary government, Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the Assemblies and dismissed
the Junaijo government25. In this regard Shahid Javed Burki quoted the words of Zia-
ul-Haq as under:
It was mistake on my part to have accepted the advice of some of my

colleagues that a parliamentary system of some kind is the only political
system that would work in Pakistan. I should have gone for a presidential
form of government. After all, it is working in other countries. I am also not
so sure whether a federation based on a four provinces is suitable for
Pakistan. We should perhaps divide the country into twenty or so
administrative units but have a unitary form of government at the center26.
It was clear from the above statement of Zia-ul-Haq that he was neither in
favor of Parliamentary form of Government nor supported the Federal system of state.
The dissolution of the assemblies and dismissal of the government was the result of
the differences between the handpicked civilian Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan
Junaijo and the Army President, Zia-ul-Haq. Though Junaijo was his own choice and
selection, he did not want to work as a puppet Prime Minister and was much
interested in the ceremonial splendor of his appointment, as he was in the public
manifestation of the exercise of power. He tried to show that he is a powerful and
independent in his rule27. It is shown from the statement of Muhammad Ali Durrani,
which was quoted by K.M. Arif as under:
25
Ibid., p.163.
26
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq, West View Press,
27
Rana Zia-ul-Haq, Jamhooriat; Tallwar se Tez Tar...... (Urdu Edition),p.163.
201
In October 1986, Brigadier Muhammad Ali Durrani, Military Secretary to the
President, was posted back to the army. When he made his farewell call to the
Prime Minister Junaijo, he surprised him by saying I am trying to run the
country in accordance with the constitution. If the president did not like this
constitution, he could have promulgated one similar to that of Sri Lanka.28
The seeds of the differences grew even before taking the oath by Muhammad
Khan Junaijo as Prime Minister. When Zia-ul-Haq called Junaijo and congratulated
him on winning the elections of National Assembly seat and also declared that he
selected him as next Prime Minister of the country. Zia-ul-Haq expected that when he
would declare the name of Junaijo before him he would say thanks for it. But Junaijo
did not say words of thanks to Zia-ul-Haq. After that he became conscious and felt
uneasy on his selection29. K.M. Arif narrated:
The President met Mr. Muhammad Khan Junaijo in his office in the
President’s House at 8:00 PM on the same evening. The Chief of Army Staff
was also present. Warmly greeting Mr.Junaijo, General Zia-ul-Haq
congratulated him on his election to the National Assembly and said, I have
decided to nominate you as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The revelation
caused no surprise to Mr. Junaijo. The Peer Pagaaro and the MNAs had
already spilled the beans to him. Without the silhouette of emotion appearing
on his face, Junaijo heard General Mhammad Zia-ul-Haq in an unconcerned
manner. Without expressing a word of thanks, he said unexpectedly, Mr.
President, when do you plan to lift the Martial Law? This was a shocked
question for General Zia-ul-Haq. He kept himself cool and said casually,
Martial Law is now in your support. It will help you to settle down in your
high appointment. I will lift it whenever you are in control of the situation. The
relationship between the President and his nominated Prime Minister started
on an icy note.30
28
Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), Dost Publishing, Lahore, 1996,
p.418.
29
30
Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition),p.420.
202
It was the earliest meeting of Junaijo and President but it left not good
impression on President. The question about the lifting of Martial Law by Junaijo in
his first meeting with Zia-ul-Haq created many questions in the mind of the President.
Then during the session of the senate on July 6, 1985, Junaijo addressed the house
and said that “In the presence of the Martial Law, civilian government could not work
properly, and we would not be the party to extend the Martial Law”31.
Although, the Martial Law was lifted on December 30, 1985, even then the
President was powerful than the Prime Minister due to 8th Amendment in the
constitution of 1973. Muhammad Khan Junaijo as a civilian elected Prime Minister
wanted to hold power on the government but it could not be tolerated by a dictatorial
President, Zia-ul-Haq. After it he started watching the activities of Junaijo very
eagerly32.According to K.M. Arif:
The General Zia-ul-Haq-Junaijo honeymoon was shot lived. General Zia-ul-

Haq soon found power slipping from his grasp. Mr. Junaijo found himself
politically hamstrung by the label of being the handpicked nominee of an
autocratic ruler.33
During those days, the foreign office of the government was very significant
because of Afghan crisis and American aid. President wanted to control the foreign
office and foreign policy. Prime Minister as head of the government was trying to
control all the government folios. So in that seesaw Prime Minister replaced foreign
Minister, Sahabzada Yaqoub Khan. President felt excluded from foreign policy
matters because Yakub Khan was known as a man of President. So, on this issue, the
difference between President and Prime Minister became sharp. After this, President
issued a statement to Washington Post, “he effectively took charge of foreign policy,
particularly the Afghan issue and became its principal spokesman, if not its
architect”34.
31
32
Ibid.
33
34
203
Just after lifting the Martial Law in 1985, relations between the President and
Prime Minister turned into mistrust on each issue. Both tried to undermine each other.
So the clash of personality started between the staff of the President and Prime
Minster. Mushahid Husain Sayyed described this situation as: “After the end of
Martial Law in December 1985, battle over protocol and personnel started in earnest
between the Prime Minister and President”35.The replacement of Information
Secretary, Lieutenant General Mujeeb Rahman by Junaijo grew more differences
between them. At that time, federal secretariat was in trouble. There were two
authorities at a time. The employees of the secretariat were so confused, when two
instructions reached to their table in different shapes and authorities. Due to that
confusion they could not work in proper ways. K.M. Arif narrated it as “many federal
secretaries complained that at a time they receive divergent orders directly from the
President and the Prime Minister, which create problems for them”36.It was also noted
by Zia-ul-Haq that Benazeer was criticizing him not to Junaijo. “Round Table
Conference” on Afghan crisis was convened by Junaijo in 1987, which increased the
differences between both of them. In this conference all the parties including PPP
were invited. Benazeer Bhutto agreed to attend the conference on the wording that
“Zia-ul-Haq would not participate in the conference”. Prime Minister accepted it and
Zia-ul-Haq was not invited. It was a big shock for Zia-ul-Haq37. Shahid Javed Burki
narrated it as:
The first major conflict between the two centered on the question of
Pakistan’s Afghan policy. General Zia-ul-Haq and the Inter Services
Intelligence favored a military solution. They believed that only a military
victory over Kabul would put power in the hands of the Mujahideen leaders
supported by Pakistan. Junaijo was in favour of a negotiated settlement,
arguing that the soviet willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan and had
presented Pakistan with an opportunity that would be imprudent to ignore.38
35
Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's politics: The Zia years, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1990, p.390.
36
37
Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead,pp.173-174.
38
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq,pp.263-264.
204
The differences became sharp on Round Table Conference, which was held to
solve the Afghan crisis39. Muhammad Waseem described it in these lines:
It is in this perspective that the growing tension between the President and the
Prime Minister can be under stood. Ever since the latter’s initiative in holding
the Round Table Conference with all political parties largely by passing the
President and the signing of the ‘Geneva Accord, the President felt
increasingly insecure about his future.40.
So, the disagreement increased day by day between the Army General and the
civilian Prime Minister41. On the other hand, during that cold tussle, an American
delegate came to audit the weapons, which were sent by American government for the
Afghan Militant Organizations. Before audit an incident took place at Ojharri Camp
on April 10, 1988 in which thousands of missiles and projectiles flew all around in a
radius of approximately 10 miles, affecting the twin cities of Rawalpindi and
Islamabad and causing deaths and serious injuries to hundreds of people42.
As a result, almost one hundred people were killed and about 1100 were injured. The
people of Rawalpindi and Islamabad were in trouble in the explosion of the Ojharri
Camp. Regarding these measures against the responsible persons of the Ojhari camp
incident, Zia-ul-Haq had kept a gulf of differences with Muhammad Khan Junaijo43.
Zia-ul-Haq showed his harsh behavior against the demands of inquiry by the
Muhammad Khan Junaijo and expressed his opinion during a private dinner and said
that Junaijo is acting as Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto44.So, on May 29, 1988, he dissolved the
National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. After dismissal of Junaijo
government, Zia-ul-Haq addressed to the nation on May 30, 1988, and stated that
Junaio had been failed in implementation of Islamic laws as well as to maintain the
39
40
Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985, Vanguard, London, 1987, p.186.
41
Rana Zia-ul-Haq, Jamhooriat; Tallwar Se Tez Tar....., p.166.
42
Ibid., pp.166-167.
43
Ibid., p.167.
44
Ibid., p.168.
205
situation of law and order. Muhammad Khan Junaijo did not challenge the
dissolution of the Assemblies in the court nor went to the people. The politicians were
divided on dissolution of the Assemblies. Some supported and some criticized the
decision. Benazeer Bhutto and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi supported the decision of Zia-
ul-Haq and demanded for the fresh elections in due time on party basis45. Feudal lords
were, once again, supporting the decision of Zia-ul-haq because they want to become
the part of power structure. Caretaker chief ministers, appointed by Zia-ul-Haq were
also following his policy and working as his right hand. But, his discriminative
attitude towards Sindhess had been exposed to them and they started agitation against
Zia-ul-haq46.
End of Zia-ul-Haq Regime And The Elections of 1988
Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the National Assembly on May 29, 1988, and argued
that Junaijo Government had been failed to maintain law and order situation,
implementation of Islamic laws and involved in corruption. Zia-ul-Haq promised for
new elections within 90 days. Moreover, Zia once again declared that up-coming
elections will be on non-party bases. But, sudden death of Zia-ul-Haq in plane crash
near Bahawalpur, turned the political scenario of Pakistan. Elections were held on
November 16, 1988, but these were on party bases47. There were now two mainstream
parties after the end of Zia regime. At one end, there was Pakistan People’s Party
which was led by Benazeer Bhutto while on the other hand; there was an alliance of
rightist political parties which was led by Nawaz Shareef. This alliance had adopted a
name of “Islami Jamhoori Itehad” or Islamic Democratic Alliance. Nawaz Shareef
contested this election from Lahore while Benazeer contested this election from
Larkana. Pakistan People’s Party won 94 seats of National Assembly while Islamic
Democratic Alliance got 55 seats. Overall, Pakistan People’s Party got 7,488,934
votes while Islamic Democratic Alliance got 5,883,298 votes. Turnout was 37.6 per
cent in favor of Pakistan People’s Party while 29.6 per cent in favor of Islamic
45
Ibid., p.168.
46
Ibid., pp.168-169.
47
Ibid., p.170.
206
Democratic Alliance48.Although Nawaz Shareef tried a lot for putting pressure on
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to nominate him as prime minister. He claimed that he
had a simple majority while acquiring support of independent candidates and
members of MQM. But, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan observed carefully and finally,
he nominated Benazeer Bhutto as a Prime Minister of Pakistan on December 4, 1988.
She was a first female Prime Minister of a Muslim country49.Other political parties
also participated in these elections from which Pakistan Awami Itehad got 3 seats,
Awami National Party 2 seats, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (Fazlur Rahman Group) 7 seats,
National People’s Party (Khar) one seat, Pakistan Democratic Party one seat,
Balochistan National Alliance two seats, Jamiat ulama-e-Islam (Darkhasti Group) got
one seat and independent candidates got 40 seats in the National Assembly. With this
electoral process, Parliament has been designed according to party based political
system. Even, constitution existed still on the basis of Zia’s amendments and political
system of Pakistan was still semi-presidential but now, Martial Law had been ended
and elected government has been installed. Scholars say that this was a sacrificed
travelling of Pakistan People’s Party from its 2nd democratic period to 3rd democratic
period which faces blood sheds and crucial circumstances50.With the death of Zia-ul-
haq, his dictatorial rule had officially been ended but his amendments in the
constitution were remained present and system was remained semi-presidential.
People of Pakistan were happy to see their own representatives in the National and
Provincial Assemblies. Zia had been failed to satisfy people of Pakistan through his
own so-called Islamization and non-party system. So, he was struggling for satisfying
Pakistani people with announcing new elections but his life did not permit him to rule
more on Pakistan and he had been died in plane crash. The basic objective of MRD
had been fulfilled with the announcement of party based elections after Zia’s death.
Pakistan People’s party won these elections and Benazeer became the female prime
minister of Pakistan and it was a first instance all over the Muslim world.
48
Report on the General Elections, 1988, Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1990.
49
Nafisa Hoodbhoy, Aboard The Democracy Train: A Journey Through Pakistan's Last Decade of
Military Rule, Anthem Press, London, 2011, p.38.
50
Ibid., p.39.
207
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Pakistan, since its emergence, was facing administrative problems in its both
wings. Although, Quiad-e-Azam and his close allies had qualitative abilities but after
them, it was exposed that Muslim League has become a self interest group. This had
been divided in almost 14 sub-groups and each group was trying to defeat others.
Even, in the life of Jinnah, he faced criticism in both the wings, after the making of
Pakistan. A problem of declaring Urdu as an official language was a big challenge for
Muslim league in East Bengal (later East Pakistan). Similarly, the affiliation with
other states like Hyderabad Deccan, Junagarh, Kashmir and Manawadar was also a
problem because the colonial military of Pakistan had been refused to obey Jinnah’s
order regarding attacking on Kashmir. Army chief of that time argued that Jinnah is
governor general and, therefore, he is an appointee of British Queen. So, he is an
obedient for direct order of British Queen regarding attack on Kashmir.
After the death of Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan faced bravely several
administrative problems as well as politicization from bureaucracy of that time. At the
time of presenting Objectives Resolution in the First Constituent Assembly on March
12, 1949, he faced a huge criticism from all those people who were claiming that
Jinnah was a supporter of secular state but this effort is making Pakistan a theocratic
state. After the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan in Rawalpindi, KhawajaNazim-ud-
Din became Prime Minister of Pakistan. This was the phase when conflict for getting
strong political power started in Pakistan. Newly appointed Governor General,
Ghulam Muhammad was a bureaucrat and at several occasions he tried to counter the
policies of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din. Firstly, he dismissed the government of Khawaja
Nazim-ud-Din and then during the government of Muhammad Ali Bogra, to observe
the Bogra Formula, he dissolved first constituent assembly as well. At that time,
politicization of judiciary had been opposed in favoring the act of dissolving first
constituent assembly by governor general, Ghulam Muhammad through doctrine of
necessity.
208
At last second constituent assembly succeeded to make new constitution for
the country, implemented on March 23, 1956. This constitution was remained
implemented up till October 7, 19958. It was abrogated by Ayub Khan with the orders
of Iskandar Mirza, president of the country at that time. The role of Ayub Khan was
started since 1954, when he became Defense minister along with chief of army staff.
This position facilitated him to strengthen his status in the politics of Pakistan. After
imposing Martial Law in the country, firstly, he established a judicial committee
which has a work of observing public opinion for making new constitution. But at
last, without considering public opinion, he designed a new constitution under the
supervision of his shadow cabinet and with the consultation of his subordinate
governors of East and West Pakistan; he implemented this new constitution through a
presidential order. On June 2, 1962, this newly constitution had been enforced.
Another reforming act of Ayub Khan was to introduced his system of Basic
Democracy on May 1, 1959 but soon during the election of president, this secret was
exposed that the BD members were in fact elected as an electoral college for
president. Even Fatima Jinnah participated in the presidential election against Ayub
Khan but due to politicization of BD members, he became president.
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was a foreign minister in the cabinet of Ayub Khan.
Durng his ministry, Pakistan resolved his border disputes with China as well as
Pakistan’s relations with Soviet Union were under consideration. But on Tashkent
declaration, after the war of 1965, he resigned from the cabinet of Ayub Khan and
formed his own political party, named Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).
This was a starting of PPP when it initiated its policies against the policies of Ayub
Khan. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was prisoned for this move. On the other hand, Sheikh
Mujeeb-ur-Rehman who was a leader of Awami League and supported Fatima Jinnah
in East Pakistan during the elections of presidency in 1965, presented his six points
which got popularity in East Pakistan. Due to massive protest against Ayub Khan, he
resigned from presidency and invited Chief of Army Staff, Yahya Khan for
controlling the government. In fact, Ayub Khan buried in his own constitution, with
his hands and did not shift the political power to the speaker of National Assembly.
Yahya Khan firstly, announced Legal Framework Order through which he restored
209
the provinces of Pakistan as well as announced first general elections all over the
country.
Election campaign had been started in all the five provinces of Pakistan.
Awami League had acquired popularity in East Pakistan, while PPP was famous in
Punjab and Sindh provinces. On the other hand, KPK and Balochistan were under the
political influence of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (Hazarvi group) and National Awami
Party. Results were the same as the popularity of these poltical parties. Although,
Awami League got majority in National Assembly but PPP got seats from Punjab and
Sindh. Now, the conflict had been generated among these political parties regarding
shifting of power. Even, once Yahya Khan announced that the Mujeeb-ur-Rehman
will be the new prime minister of Pakistan, but PPP opposed this announcement and
started protest all over the Sindh province. PPP started agitation against this decision
and initiated civil disobedience in Sindh. As a result, Yahya Khan did not call the
session of National Assembly on the demand of Awami League. This decision was
perceived as exploitation of rights by Awami League and on March 23, 1971,
Mujeeb-ur-Rehman waved the flag of Begladesh. This action was considered mutiny
against the soverignity of Pakistan. Military started operation against Awami League
on March 25, 1971, and Mujeeb-ur-Rehman arrested and prisoned in Faisalabad
central jail. Civil war had been started in entire East Pakistan. Thousands of Bengali
people were migerating towards West Bengal where India provided training against
Pakistan Army and sending them back to East Pakistan for fighting against it. This
war was continued and in November, India directly attacked on East Pakistan. A
regular war among Pakistan and India had been started due to lack of air link and civil
disobedience, Pakistan Army with 93,000 soldiers forced to surrender, at Paltan
ground in front of Indian Army on December 16, 1971, and East Pakistan became
Bangladesh.
Yahya Khan lost its control over the government and resigned on December 20,
1971, and transferred all the political powers to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Now, Bhutto had
become first Civilian Martial Law Administrator as well as President of Pakistan.
This was a starting of Bhutto rule which was on three phases:
 As a Civilian Martial Law Administrator and President (1970-73).
210
 As a Prime Minister of Pakistan (1973-76).
 As a Prime Minister of Pakistan (1976-77), which ended with the
implementation of third Marial Law, imposed by Zia-ul-Haq on July 5, 1977.
During this period, he performed several magnificent acts as well as

introduced reforms in socio-political sectors of Pakistan. He sought to consolidate and
strengthen PPP among the people of Pakistan, including rural and urban areas of the
country. F. Rehman has written that Pakistan people party supported the poor by land
and labour reforms and with the nationalization of industries, financial institutions and
schools. Such reforms were condemned by the leftist groups associated with PPP who
were already dissatisfied by the opportunist entry of landlords into its rank. At the
same time the reforms created powerful enemies among the propertied classes. The
economics of the country has already suffered serious setback at the hand of
worldwide inflationary pressure generated by the 1973 Arab-Israel war. The
devaluation of the rupee on May 11, 1972, stoked infiantiary pressures. Dependence
on foreign aid and from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
to ride over the deteriorating balance of payments situations from 1974 to onwards,
was a mixed blessing as aid, also found its way into the pockets of the regime’s
Islamic opponents. For a common man the rhetoric of egalitarianism sounded mere
singly hollow when confronted with annual price rises twenty per cent.
Bhutto, during 1970 elections campaign, had called for the removal of the
remaining of vestiges of feudalism. The land reforms which he introduced two years
later were certainly radical than Ayub’s Land Reforms. Craig Baxter added that
maximum land ceilings were reduced to 150 acres of irrigated land and 300 acres of
un-irrigated land, orchards and stud, livestock and forms were brought under the tax
system and it was gigantic step indeed. On the other hand, Bhutto’s law reforms
efforts were not well articulated and by and large they were ill conceived though they
were well intentioned. As in 1959, only a limited amount of land was ultimately made
available for redistribution. This consisted of even poor quality land than before as the
absence of compensation predictably encouraged and reinforced owners to retain their
most fertile holding.
211
The Bhutto Reforms suffered from irregularities in their implementation as the
Land Reforms of 1959. In numerous instances the landless were made owners if the
rescued areas in name only or fictitious transfers were entered. Ironically, the reforms,
rather than signaling a suit in the balance of power in favor of talents, encouraged
Punjabi land lords to enter the PPP’s ranks in order to safeguard their position. The
success with which large number of land lords concealed their lands as much to
official patronage as administrative inefficiency. Craig Baxter had pointed out that the
remarkable ability of the leading land lords families to accommodate themselves to
successive regimes. Despite his popular slogan Bhutto liberally dispensed PPP
election tickets to the land lords in 1977. Those people who suffered a great deal at
the hands of Bhutto under the Land Reform Legislation almost invariably came from
politically opposing families. To compensate the earlier failure Bhutto announced
most severe and string out land reforms on the eve of the 1977 elections, ceilings were
lowered to 100 acres of irrigated land and 200 acres of an un-irrigated land. The
loopholes of defining land owner ship in the form of ten years interest leaving bonds.
The PPP also announced in January 1973, that land revenue would be replaced by
agricultural income tax revenues and reduce tax envision by individual whose wealth
in reality urban rather than rural based. These measures were suspended with the
introduction of Martial Law on July 5, 1977.
Similarly, in January 1972, Bhutto government introduced the nationalization

of over thirty large firms in the basic industries. These measures which kept the
promise of PPP manifesto undertaking was intended to eliminate once for all poverty
and discrimination in Pakistan. In reality it was more important in clipping the wings
of the twenty two families than in achieving the later goal, as the heavy industrial
sector did not possess a dominating economic influence. The subsequent
mismanagement of these newly nationalized industries by the board of management
chaired by Dr. Mubashir Hassan, not only depressed production but also weakened
the standing of leftist groups in the PPP. Two months later nationalization was
extended to the financial sector with the takeover of the life insurance companies.
During the following November the government setup a state life insurance
corporation of Pakistan. The next burst of nationalization took place which involved
ghee industry quite contrary to previous measures, this affected the small industry
212
owner who had supported the PPP in 1970. It was justified by the profiteering which
had occurred in the wake of sever monsoon flooding. The confidence of small
businessman in the regime was further undermined by the subsequent nationalization
in July 1976, of the rice husking and cotton trading industries. Significantly, small
traders and merchants were at the forefront of the 1977, anti-Bhutto movement. After
beginning of 1974, for the people of Pakistan, Bhutto had announced the
nationalization of all privately waned banks at the beginning of 1974. Indra Ghandi
motivated by similar popular ideas and had adopted this policy. The nationalization of
the colleges was introduced in September 1972. No provision for compensation was
provided for the owners of colleges and schools. There was opposition to the policy
owner of the institutions opposed this forcefully. This policy was also opposed from
missionary run institutions which traditionally maintained high academic standard and
they were afraid that standard would fall in the absence of sufficient support
deteriorating educational standard was indeed important factor which encouraged
urban middle class opposition to the government in 1977. Similarly, labor reforms,
support from the poor groups did not outweigh the opposition from the personal and
vested interests which government trader policies generated. However, nationalization
policy was accompanied by the provision of free education for children up to the age
of 13, it was a significant achievement but the goal of universal education still was not
realized while poor parents no longer had to afford fees, there was still need of their
children labour. Added to this there was cultural resistance to sending girls to the
schools in more consecrated rural areas. Enrolment rates consequently did not
improve dramatically but the government stress on educational development
continued to win support even from its opponents. By and large nationalization policy
was not supported by the majority of trade owner of the schools and colleges and they
develop deep hate and feelings of revenge against Bhutto. They were waiting for the
time opportunity to seek revenge from Bhutto, and anti-Bhutto movement provide
chance to over through Bhutto, as these people were on the forefront against him.
Zia-ul-Haq had designed long planning to inflict the Martial Law as he

became Chief of the Army Staff in 1976. On numerous occasions, he purposely
covered intelligence information and tried to misguide Bhutto on various political
affairs. As a result, all the opposition parties were demanding overthrow of Bhutto’s
213
government. When political and civil disorder was intensified, it had been converted
into massive unrest. Bhutto on the advice of General Zia-ul-Haq imposed Martial Law
in the major cities of country including Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad. Though, a
negotiation agreement among Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and opposition was eventually
reported. The negotiating theory was generated next day after the showing off armed
rally by the workers of PPP but Zia-ul-Haq had been planned the Martial Law
carefully, because he knew that Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had huge links in the intelligence
services of Pakistan armed forces and have links with several military high ranking
officers. Chief of Air Staff, General Muhammad Zulfaqar Ali Khan and Major
General Tajamul Husain Malik who was GOC of 23rd Mountain Division, Major
General Nasirullah Baber, DGMO (Directorate General for the Military Intelligence)
and Vice-Admiral Syed Muhammad Ahsan, were considered to be loyal with Bhutto.
In the meantime, one intelligence unit and the army formations were stationed in the
Prime minister secretariat whose purpose was to keep an eye on Bhutto's activities
and movements, tapping phone calls and also keeping a record of invitees in the
Prime Minister's secretariat. General K.M. Arif who was the closest ally of Zia-ul-
Haq, had tried to get together with Bhutto in different attempts, but such efforts were
disillusioned by Zia-ul-Haq. Finally, on April 5, 1977, General Arif succeeded in
having meeting with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto behind closed doors, enlightening the
scheme against him. But, Bhutto remained not to persuade this and still unimpressed,
reportedly asking that how his protégé, Zia-ul-Haq could do such unconstitutional acts
against him. Therefore, Bhutto dismissed General K.M. Arif later due to conveying
him such “wrong” information.
Due to showing off this intelligence information, Zia-ul-Haq clandestinely

contracted with the British active duty SAS armed officers to continue a staff course
for the Army human resources, while at the same time Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral
Muhammad Shareef silently removed naval personnel loyal to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto
and his government since the starting of his ranked post. Zia-ul-Haq ordered Bhutto's
trustworthy officers to go to a staff and command course and none was allowed to
depart the course until midnight. In the meantime, Zia-ul-Haq with his close military
officers as well as Muhammad Shareef (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee at that time) arranged the coup in the evening of July 5, 1977. So, before
214
the declaration of any accord or agreement, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and other members of
his cabinet were under arrest by the troops of Military Police on the order of Zia-ul-
Haq in the evening. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto tried to call Zia-ul-Haq but all telephone lines
had been disconnected. One army officer came in the Prime minister secretariat and
arrested Bhutto. After realizing that warnings of General K.M. Arif were not hoax, he
was listen from that military officer that he was sorry but has been forced to perform
this unpleasant task of arresting him.
Zia-ul-Haq and his military administration portrayed the Martial Law as an

"impulsive reply to difficult circumstances" but his reaction was entirely
contradictory. Though, during the rule of Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff at that
time, Khalid Mahmood Arif contradicted Zia-ul-Haq's this statement when K.M. Arif
noted that the Martial Law had already been structured, and the senior ranked
leadership of Pakistan Army had solid information. Therefore, he met with Zulfaqar
Ali Bhutto on urgent situation, stressing and trying to urging Bhutto to rush
discussions with the opposition. According to K.M. Arif and several other
independent experts, accounts, the discussion had not been broken down even though
the Martial Law was designed. Zia-ul-Haq further argued that Operation Fair Play
against Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had been demanded by the outlook of a civil disobedience
and Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was making a plan to distribute weapons among his
supporters. But, K.M. Arif strongly rejected Zia-ul-Haq's explanations on Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto, and said that there was no proof that weapons were recovered or found at any
of the political party's election office, the military administration in fact, did not put
on trial Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on the accuse of preparing planning of civil war.
Immediately, Muhammad Shareef, the Chief of Naval Staff at that time,

announced his support with other navy strong officers for Zia-ul-Haq and his military
administration. But Muhammad Zulfakar Ali Khan, the Chief of Air Staff at that time,
remains unsupported, whereas, Muhammad Shareef, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee, remains neutral and he noiselessly expressed his mental support
to the Prime minister, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Zia-ul-Haq, in 1978, pressured President
Fazal Elahi Chaudhary to hire General Anwar Shamim as Chief of Air Staff and in
1979, Admiral Karamat Niazi hired as Chief of Naval Staff. On Zia-ul-Haq's advice,
President Fazal Ellahi Chaudhary appointed Admiral Muhammad Shareef as the
215
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and principal military adviser for overlooking all the
affairs of inter-services including Chiefs of the Staff of respected forces. The Chiefs
of Army, Navy, and the Air Force, in 1979, including the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff legalized the Martial Law as constitutional and lawful under the war-
torn conditions, promised their support in the favor of Zia-ul-Haq as well.
After arrogant power as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Zia-ul-Haq

soon appeared on national television and promised to hold new free and fair
parliamentary elections within next 90 days and to shift the political powers to the
civilian representatives. He also said that the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan had not
been abrogated but for the time being, it has been suspended. Zia-ul-Haq did not
reliance on the civilian organizations and institutions, and legislators ensured him that
his stay is necessary for the country's integrity and sovereignty. Therefore, in October
1977, he declared the delay of electoral program and decided to initiate an
accountability procedure for the politicians. On national television, Zia-ul-Haq
strongly defended his policy for delaying the elections and insisted that "inspection of
political leaders who had involved in misconduct in their past ruling eras". As a result,
the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) adopted its strategy of "retribution first,
elections later". Zia-ul-Haq's strategy severely spoiled his trustworthiness
domestically and internationally. He several times broke promises. Another cause was
that Zia-ul-Haq extensively assumed that once out of power the mass of PPP protests
and rallies puff up and an improved performance in up-coming elections was
achievable. This fear led to demand for deferment of elections by the right-wing
Islamist parties and groups as well as left-wing socialist minded people and parties,
who were previously allied with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto but displaced by him in the first
place. Zia-ul-Haq transmitted one of the intelligence unit, known as Political Wing of
ISI and sending Brigadier General Tafazzul Husain Siddiqi, to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's
native Province of Sindh, to evaluate whether people would agree to Martial Law.
The Political Wing of ISI also contacted with several right-wing Islamist political
parties and groups, and also several conservatives regarding promising an election,
and offering power sharing formula with PNA the government with Zia-ul-Haq. He
successfully divided and alienated the secular political parties and groups from right-
216
wing Islamist groups, parties and several conservatives, and afterward washed out
each member of secular parties.
Disqualification Tribunal was established and several politicians who had

been members of parliament were alleged with misconduct and banned from
participating in political activities at any stage for the next seven years. A white paper
manuscript was published the military administration which was highlighting the
reasons of dismissing Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto’s government. It is reported by senior
military officers that when Zia-ul-Haq met with federal secretaries for the 1st time as
leader of the country after military coup, he stated that: "He does not acquire the
legitimacy of Liaqat Ali Khan, personality of Ayub Khan or charisma of Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto. It can be analyzed who have its market.1"
Nussrat Bhutto who was the wife of the dismissed Prime Minister, filed a suit
against Zia-ul-Haq's arrival into politics, challenging the soundness of the July 1977
military rule. The Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled, which later declared as the
Doctrine of Necessity (not like the 1954 Doctrine of necessity but politicization of
judiciary as happened previous in 1954), that the seriously unstable political
circumstances of the time, Zia-ul-Haq's overthrowing of the Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto
government was lawful on the grounds of requirement. The ruling tightened the
general's hold of the military rule. When Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto appeared face-to-face to
argue his petition in the Supreme Court, he almost affirmed his agreement with the
judges, presented his views about unconstitutionally imposed military government
and its legitimization from the judiciary.
Despite the discharging of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto government, President Fazal

Elahi Chaudhary was persuaded to carry on in office as a nominal head of the state.
After completing his tenure, Zia-ul-Haq insisted to acquire the office of Presidency.
So, Fazal Elahi Chaudhary resigned and Zia-ul-Haq took the office of President of
Pakistan on September 16, 1978. Thus, his place was covered as the undisputed
monarch of the country. Till the next six years, Zia-ul-Haq issued numerous
agreements which amended the constitution and significantly expanded his political
1
Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, The University of Michigan,
217
powers. Most considerably, the Revival of Constitution of 1973 Order settled Zia-ul-
Haq the authority to dissolve the National Assembly at will. According to Aftab Qazi
and Roedaad Khan:
General Zia-ul-Haq reviled Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and had used unsuitable
language and verbal abuse to describe Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and his other
colleagues. On the 4th of April 1979, the ex-elected Prime Minister Zulfaqar
Ali Bhutto was hanged, after the Supreme Court sustained the death
punishment as had been passed by the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court
ruled with four to three judges in favor of death punishment. The Lahore High
Court had given him the death punishment on accuses of the assassination of
the father of Ahmad Raza Kasuri, a nonconformist politician of Pakistan
People’s Party. Despite a lot of appeals of mercy from international leaders
requesting General Zia-ul-Haq to convert Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's death
punishment, but Zia-ul-Haq dismissed all the appeals and upheld the death
punishment. The hanging of democratically an elected Prime Minister by a
military ruler was condemned worldwide and by the lawyers and jurists across
the Pakistan. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's trial was decidedly controversial as well2.
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's final personal manifestation and utterances in the

Supreme Court were not the long defense of his behavior; he also made a number of
matters clear in front of judiciary. He also mentioned the word "heir" for his son Meer
Murtaza Bhutto. He said some observations which indicated that he has views
according to the Sunni sect of Islam, though he was considered Shia. He also
efficiently directed doubt on the dependability of key witnesses against him, for
example Masud Mehmood who was the trained lawyer from U.K. and was not a
police officer or Federal Security Force (FSF) chief. He talked about repeatedly
Lahori and Ahmedi connection of Masud Mehmood in his witness. He frequently
brought the question of his mistreatment in the death cell. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto made it
plentifully clear even ultimately he wanted either freedom from prison or death, not
something in between of it, and appreciated Ghulam Mustafa Khar and thanks to his
lawyer Yahya Bakhtiar.
2
Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.193.
218
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's another lawyer Abdul Hafeez Peerzada filed an appeal
for the releasing of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's associate Mubashir Hassan and Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto himself. The Supreme Court fulfilled that Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's execution can
be valued by the President and Mubashir Hassan's case is being covenanted by the
Military Justice Court led by General Zia-ul-Haq; therefore, the civilian courts have
no authority over hearing this petition. Abdul Hafeez Peerzada submitted the appeal
to Chief of Army Staff Directorate but Zia-ul-Haq claimed that the request application
had been missed. Therefore, Zia-ul-Haq upheld the punishment and Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto was executed on April 4, 1979. Horrified and disturbed Peerzada left Pakistan
for United Kingdom and did not return to Pakistan until the restoration of democracy
in 1988. Before 2000, Pakistani media did not published this news that the application
had been found in the record section called Directorate General for the Military
History, at the Generals Combatant Headquarter or shortly called GHQ. The
application was published after declaring public sphere of influence when General
Pervez Musharraf declassified several secret documents during the decade of 1970s.
After imposing Martial Law, Zia-ul-haq fristly appointed several judges on

adhoc bases in Supreme Court of Pakistan. In fact, still he has fear that Pakistan
People’s Party has a power to collect people domestically as well as he knew that
Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto has strong relationship with several heads of states and heads of
governments all over the world specially with Soviet Union and China. Therefore, he
wanted to remove his support on grass root level in such a pattern that he must not be
blamed but this act should be considered as a judicial proceeding.
Soon after declaring Martial Law, Zia-ul-Haq advised President Fazal Elahi
Chaudhary to appoint Justice Anwar-ul-Haq as a new chief justice of Pakistan.
Immediately, military administration removed chief justice Yaqoob Ali from the
office of chief justice of Pakistan by force and issued orders of appointment of Justice
Anwar-ul-Haq as a new chief justice of Pakistan on September 23, 1977. It was just
because of filed petition by Nussrat Bhutto in the Supreme Court against the arrival of
Zia-ul-Haq into the politics. Zulfqar Ali Bhutto objected the appointment of new chief
justice and highlighted his critical character before and after dismissing his
government but Anwar-ul-Haq was made the head of that bench who was hearing the
petition against military government of Zia-ul-Haq.
219
The objection of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was overruled by the new politicized,
Anwar-ul-Haq and now the petition of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was yet again heard by
him as the leading judge of the bench. He presided overall petition of Zulfaqar Ali
Bhutto while the Martial Law has been imposed throughout the country. He played
his part in declaring Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as guilty in an ambiguity murder case and
announcing death sentence even accuse did not prove. When Zia-ul-Haq visited Saudi
Arabia in 1979, Anwar-ul-Haq became acting president of Pakistan till his comeback.
Same as earlier military governments, Zia-ul-Haq did not like the idea of
Parliamentary democracy and he banned all political parties across the Pakistan. The
political structure which was built by Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was destroyed, disturbed,
hampered, and not existed in the 1980s. On the other hand, a new political system was
still needed to manage the country where several issues were demanding the fast
solutions. Similarly, Zia-ul-Haq decided to establish Majlis-e-Shoora in the absence
of parliament in 1980. This was the theme that the members of Shoora will be
intellectuals, economist, journalists, scholars, and religious experts called Ulama and
professionalists from different fields. In fact, Zia-ul-Haq decided to replace the
system of parliamentary democracy from the system of like-minded people same as in
Soviet Union. Therefore, all the 284 members of Majlis-e-Shoora were nominated by
president. So, scholars called it the government of technocrats.
Benazeer Bhutto who was facing a hard situation after the death of her father,
became Co-Chairperson of Pakistan People’s Party while her mother became
Chairperson of respective party. To see crucial rule of Zia-ul-Haq, she started her
great efforts in the shape of Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan.
During this struggle consequently, including 10 months in custody, she remained
about 5 years in the lockup, not easy time for her because during this she also faced
her father’s bereavement. After some time she was unconfined for a short period and
during that period an alliance was shaped for the restoration of democracy. “The first
official meeting of the leaders for the arrangement of Alliance was held at 70 Clifton
Karachi on February 6, 1981.The leaders were agreed and the alliance was formed
and named Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD).
220
Alliance sponsored a four end program: Ending of Martial Law; Restoration of
the 1973 Constitution, Parliamentary elections, and Transfer of power to the public
representatives. Soon after the establishment of MRD, Benazeer was another time
under capture and sent to jail but under international stress she was released in 1984,
after that she left Pakistan and went to UK and worked for MRD from there. She lived
there for hardly two years, when her younger brother Shahnawaz Bhutto was
assassinated in France, she revisited to Pakistan for burial of her brother and again she
had to leave the country.
During these days she decided to continue the mission of her father, so for this
purpose she once again planned to comeback to Pakistan, to pressurize Zia-ul-Haq for
restoration of Democracy in the country. She landed in Lahore on April 11, 1986, to
fulfill her promises, “The carefree girl who first left home in 1969 to study at Harvard
had now twisted into a woman with an iron will, to fight the battle left incomplete by
her father3”.
Basically, her aspiration was to join Pakistan foreign services, not to become a
politician, she was of the opinion that her predisposition was not towards politics, it
was her father to whom she wanted to please by joining oxford union. Benazeer
Bhutto was warmly greeted by millions of peoples at Lahore airport, Zia-ul-Haq had
panic from it and due to this fear he played a card of Islamization (Policy of
Implementing Islamic Laws) and announced for referendum, Benazeer Bhutto hoped
a change for democracy, but Zia-ul-Haq also made his clear intention that authority
would be transferred to only those persons who are religious brainpower, General Zia-
ul-Haq’s so called democracy shunned down when on August 14, 1986, Benazeer
Bhutto was detained at her home in Karachi, when she was just preparing to attend
peaceful assembly on Pakistan’s Independence day. She was given thirty days
detention order and once again she was send to jail. On the other hand, except Jamaat-
e-Islami all the other political parties had already joined MRD. They once again arose
against the wicked killing of innocent people in lump sum and the capture of
thousands of people by their own military. During movement Zia-ul-Haq was
bothered because he was thinking, if Benazeer Bhutto came in authority then what
3
221
will be his position? So he every time avoided the elections in Pakistan, while giving
an interview Zia-ul-Haq replied, “It is Miss Bhutto’s superfluous impractical ambition
and her attitude towards acquiring power which is objectionable4”.
Unwillingly under International stress and the pressure of MRD, Zia-ul-Haq

had to release Benazeer on September 10, 1986, but many people stayed behind in
jail. This struggle was strengthen against Zia-ul-Haq by PPP along with other political
parties under Benazeer’s supervision. Lubna Rafique wrote: While PPP gained its full
potency as single political institution in Pakistan, on the other hand Zia-ul-Haq denied
these facts, “Bhutto strike back against this by saying that her party was speaking not
out of vengeance, but for nation building5”.
After a long struggle Zia-ul-Haq announced the elections, the superior step
taken by him through which he made Junaijo the Prime Minister, this step once again
gone into the darkness when Zia-ul-Haq eliminated the assemblies on May 29, 1988,
after that he announced that the new election will be held on November 16, 1988. It
had the hope of democracy for Benazeer and other political leaders but Zia-ul-Haq
publicized on July 21, 1988, that the elections would be held purely on nonparty
basis; the reason was that the PPP has popular support, there was a reason behind the
elections on non-party. Chandio Ameer Ali writes: “Zia-ul-Haq preferred the non-
party elections because he was well-aware of the reality that nonpolitical and non-
committed people are easy to control as compare to political and affiliated people. So
he wanted that elected members of the assemblies had no political connection as well
as membership of any political party or faithfulness to any political leader”, now
Benazeer went to the courts and she confronted Zia-ul-Haq’s nonparty based election,
because she was of the opinion that in this way the military law of Zia-ul-Haq will
come to an end and the democracy will be restored. She wrote, “Just as inferior
cannot blossom in a desert, so political parties cannot prosper in dictatorship6”. In this
way the democracy is vital for the political parties, where they can work freely
without any hindrance and perform their political activities in a good manner, on the
4
5
Ibid., p.198.
6
222
other hand, in dictatorship there is no way for the political parties because history
witnessed that the dictators tried their most excellent just to extend their rule instead
of giving opportunity to the democratic environment. It was Benazeer Bhutto, who
from about thirty months continued to assemble world opinion for the restoration of
democracy and violation of human rights by Zia-ul-Haq. He wanted to keep Benazeer
away from the elections, and the election date was suggested by keeping in view the
pregnancy of Benazeer Bhutto, so that she may not be capable for election campaign.
Although, Zia-ul-Haq designed non-party electoral system just to strengthen

his rule but soon, he realized that this system has been failed to strengthen his powers.
Junaijo Government was demanding autonomy for justifying its character as a
representative of the public but Zia did not like it. As a result, Zia-ul-Haq dissolved
the National Assembly on May 29, 1988, and argued that Junaijo Government had
been failed to maintain law and order situation, implementation of Islamic laws and
involved in corruption. Zia-ul-Haq promissed for new elections within 90 days.
Moreover, Zia once again declared that up-coming elections will be on non-party
bases. But, sudden death of President Zia-ul-Haq in plane crash near Bahawalpur,
turned the political scenario of Pakistan. Elections were held on November 16, 1988,
but on party bases.
Now there were two mainstream parties, at one end there was Pakistan
People’s Party led by Benazeer Bhutto while on the other side, there was an alliance
of rightist political parties led by Nawaz Shareef. This alliance had adopted the name
of “Islami Jamhoori Itehad” or Islamic Democratic Alliance. Nawaz Shareef
contested this election from Lahore while Benazeer from Larkana. Pakistan People’s
Party won 94 seats of National Assembly while Islamic Democratic Alliance got 55
seats. Overall, Pakistan People’s Party got 7,488,934 votes while Islamic Democratic
Alliance got 5,883,298 votes. Turnout was 37.6 per cent in favor of Pakistan People’s
Party while 29.6 per cent in favor of Islamic Democratic Alliance.
Although, Nawaz Shareef tried a lot and pressurized President Ghulam Ishaq
Khan to nominate him as prime minister. He claimed that he had a simple majority
with acquiring support of independent candidates and the members of MQM. But,
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan observed carefully and finally, nominated Benazeer
223
Bhutto as Prime Minister of Pakistan on December 4, 1988. Now, She was a first
female Prime Minister of a Muslim country.
Other political parties also participated in these elections in which, Pakistan

Awami Itehad got 3 seats, Awami National Party 2, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (Fazlur
Rahman Group) 7, National People’s Party (Khar) one, Pakistan Democratic Party
one, Balochistan National Alliance two, Jamiat ulama-e-Islam (Darkhasti Group) one
and independent candidates got 40 seats in the National Assembly. With this electoral
process, Parliament has been designed according to party based political system.
Even, constitution was existing still on the bases of Zia’s amendments and political
system of Pakistan was still semi-presidential but now, Martial Law had been ended
and pure democratic government had been installed. Scholars says that this was a
sacrificed travelling of PPP from its 2nd to 3rd democratic period which faced blood
sheds and crucial circumstances.
With the death of Zia-ul-haq, his dictatorial rule had officially been ended but
his amendments in the constitution were remain present and system was semi-
presidential. But the people of Pakistan were happy to see their representatives in the
National Assemblies. Although, Zia had been failed to satisfy the people of Pakistan
through its own so-called Islamization and non-party system. He was struggling to
satisfy the Pakistani people by announcing new elections but his life did not permit
him to rule more on Pakistan and he had been died in plane crash. The basic objective
of MRD had been fulfilled with the announcement of party based elections after Zia’s
death. PPP won these elections and Benazeer had become the first female prime
minister of Pakistan and in all over the Muslim world.
Keeping in view the major questions of research after critically analyzing the
facts, following findings has been traced:
1) All the political parties in Pakistan formed by the politicians just for the sake
of their personal interest, not for the nation.
2) Military direct involvement into politics was started when Prime Minister
Muhammad Ali Bogra appointed Chief of Army Staff, Ayub Khan as Defence
Minister.
224
3) Due to the weak process of constitutionalization, politicians were being
considered as fail to run the political affairs.
4) PNA politicized religion against the “Islamic Socialism” of Zulfaqar Ali

Bhutto.
5) Sardars and several tribal chiefs became rivals of Bhutto due to 4th and 5th
amendment in the Constitution of 1973, against Sardari system in Balochistan.
6) Bhutto could not judge the dual character of Zia-ul-Haq.
7) Even negotiations had been finalized between government and opposition but
Zia took over the government according to plan and justified his arrival in the
politics, arguing failure of Bhutto government.
8) Zia used religion and religious parties, like Jamat-e-Islami, to strengthen his
rule.
9) Judges self-created doctrine of necessity supported undemocratic and

dictatorial norms during Zia regime.
10) Zia forced Sindhi supporters of Pakistan People’s Party for initiating civil war
against the federation of Pakistan open fire through army helicopters on
protesters in Qasba Aligarh.
11) The process of Islamization was actually a framework for strengthening Zia’s
rule.
12) Majlis-e-Shura was an undemocratic gathering of like-minded religious people

who were supporting Zia regime.
13) Non-Party based elections were an effort to sustain Zia’s supremacy over
political system.
14) Eighth amendments in the constitution of 1973, made Prime Minister and his
cabinet a puppet in the hands of president.
225
15) Military generals were considered superior than the representatives of the
people during Zia regime.
16) Basic purpose of dissolving Junejo Government was a conflict of politics

among Muhammad Khan Junaijo and General Zia-ul-Haq and initiating
inquiry on Ojhari Camp issue.
17) Although MRD got popularity all over the country but Zia did not want to
show any pressure on him through his gestures. So, he once again announced
non-party based elections after dissolving Junejo Government.
18) Ghulam Ishaq Khan as a successor of Zia did not follow his hated policy and
announced party based elections which was in fact a success of MRD.
In the end, after Critical Study following recommendations have been

suggested for healthy political activism in an ideological state like Pakistan.
 The basic aim of establishing any political party should be to serve the nation.
Similarly, people should vote for that political party which clearly manifested
its policy over national issues.
 Military should be far from politics. Similarly, politicians must solve their
problems by negotiations, and not try to get help from military.
 In flexible democracies, process of constitutionalization is being continued

according to the needs of time. So, political interest must not be involved in
this process.
 There should be proper legislation against declaring “Kafir” or “Non-Muslim”

to the opponents by any political or religious party.
 Parochial Sardari System must be eliminated from Balochistan. So that, native

Baloch people would get opportunities of education and other basic necessities
of life without any socio-political and cultural barriers.
 Merit must always be considered during appointments, even for the

appointment of the army chief.
226
 Religion must not be used for gaining political benefits.
 Judiciary must be accountable if it uses the doctrine of necessity.
 Government must not oppress any community by force and must try to resolve
their problems in democratic way. Otherwise, seeds of separation can be
grown once again like East Pakistan.
 Each policy or rule must be imposed in a democratic way according to the will
of people.
 Parliament or Majlis-e-Shura must be a gathering of peoples’ representatives

which elect through general elections. There should not be any spoiled system.
 Party-based elections which provide pure manifestation of politicians and

people easily realize that policies of political party are based on national
interest.
 Prime minister is in fact a leader of the whole nation. So, he must be

constitutionally powerful according to parliamentary norms.
 There should be accountability of all the public representatives or officials

even that of the military generals. No one must be above the law.
 Democracy must never be derailed, and it should be strengthen with the

passage of time for its continuity.
 Although, there are always several differences among political parties in any
of the political system but these must be resolve through negotiations,
according to the constitution. Unconstitutional efforts of any political party
regarding its political interest can derail the democratic process.
227
Appendix 1
Manifesto of Pakistan People’s Party
General aims:
The ultimate objective of the party’s policy is the attainment of a classless society,
which is possible only through socialism in our time. This means true equality of the
citizens, fraternity under the rue of democracy in an order based on economic and
social justice. The aims follow from the political and social ethics of Islam. The Party
thus strives to put in practice the noble ideal of the Muslim Faith.
The party accepts the possibility of a mixed economy, the existence of a private
alongside a nationalized sector. However, it is within the public sector that all the
major sources of the production of wealth will be placed. The private sector will offer
opportunities for individual initiative in the areas of production, where small
enterprises can be efficient. Monopoly conditions will be abolished, so that private
enterprise will function according to the rules of competition.
Nationalization of Industries in the public sector will be all basic and key industries.
The principal ones are:-
1. Iron and steel

2. Non-ferrous metals
3. Heavy engineering
4. Machine tools
5. Chemicals
6. Ship building
7. Motor car assembly and manufacture
8. Equipment for electrical power production, distribution and use.
9. Electronics
10. Production of arms, ammunition and armaments for defence.
11. Cement
12. Paper
To these will be added the new industries which must be established to enable the
autonomous growth of the national economy. For example, it will be necessary to
manufacture agricultural machinery and equipment in Pakistan, and the commonly
used hand tools.
All major industries will be nationalized. This will mean taking over into the public
sector, textile and jute mills over a certain production capacity. In private ownership
these have been sources of excessive profits, inefficient productions, wastage of
resources and unhindered exploitation of workers.
228
In the public sector will be not only the large scale production of electrical power, but
also all other sources of energy supply, namely, nuclear material, gas, oil and coal.
All exploitation of mineral wealth, both mining and ore-processing will be in the
public sector.
The public sector will completely contain the following and major means of public
transport, namely railways, shipping and airways. It will also take over public road
transport.
Large scale export trading, such as of Jute and Cotton will be conducted by state
corporation.
Rights of workers:
As a necessary part of their employment in factories, the worker must be provided

with housing and adequate means of transportation to their place of work. They will
be entitle to paid holidays, and recreation camps will be opened where they can spend
their holidays in healthy surroundings. They will have the right to training facilities
for improving their skills. Hospitals and free medical attention will be incorporated in
the system of works’ welfare.
A system of minimum wages, reckoned according to the cost of living, will be

enforced both in the public and the private sector.
Princely states:
No region of Pakistan will be permitted to be governed in the manner of a princely

state. All political agencies will be brought in line with the general legal
administration of the rest of Pakistan.
Financial measures:
The possession of money institutions in the hands of private parties is the source of
exploitation, which uses national wealth and private deposit to create money for the
financing of monopoly capitalists. All big industries have been set up entirely on bank
loans, which means, on the money of the depositors. Such loans can be said to have
been the misappropriation of public money by the bankers. To this sort of abuse,
which is inherent in any system where banks are in private hands, there has been
added the control of banks in cartels belonging to industrialist families.
Unless the State taken hold of all the banks by making them national property, it will
not able to check inflation. The state’s financial policy is at present a prisoner of the
bankers.
All banks and insurance companies will be forth-with nationalized.
229
Reform of Taxation System. The establishment of a socialist order will, naturally,
change the present form of taxation, which wealth with the privileged classes.
Agrarian Reform:
The Party stands for elimination of feudalism and will take concrete steps in
accordance with the established principles of socialism to protect and advance the
interests of the peasantry.
The promotion of self-help groups and co-operatives is the best way to help the
cultivators to improve their lot.
Patterns of Proprietorship: The breaking up of the large estates destroy the power of
the feudal landowners is a national necessity that will have to be carried through by
practical measures, of which a ceiling is only a part, the size of the agricultural estate
will be limited by the ceiling, the norm being the ownership of a minimum of 50 to
150 acres of irrigated land, the maximum varying from tract to the tract and being
determined on the basis of quality of soil, present productivity and the availability of
irrigation facilities.
Education:
Primary and secondary Education will be free up to matriculation and primary

education will be compulsory and free. A 5-year programme will be formulated by the
end of the which all the necessary schools must be built and the primary school
teachers trained. Free housing will be provided for such teachers, and their children
will be exempted from secondary school boarding fees if they opt for the profession
of teaching.
More secondary schools must also be established, with the aim that in due course
education will become compulsory upto a prescribed age and level of secondary
school education.
Among the compulsory subjects in schools, mathematics will be accorded the place of
honor and taught by the most scientific modern methods.
230
Appendix 2
THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS OF 1970
National Assembly Seats From All Pakistan
Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N)
AL 37.2 160
PPP 16.6 81
CML 7 7
QML 4.5 9
JI 6 4
Others 21.7 23
Independent 7 16
Total 100 300
National Assembly Seats From Punjab Province And Its

Regions
PPP 41.7 62
CML 12.7 7
CVML 5.1 2
QML 5.4 1
JUI-WP 5.2 0
JUP 10.0 4
JI 4.7 1
NAP-W 0 0
PDP 2.3 0
Others 1.2 0
Independent 11.7 5
Total 100 82
231
National Assembly Seats From Sindh Province And Its
Regions
PPP 44.9 18
CML 6.8 0
CVML 1.8 0
QML 10.7 1
JUI-WP 4.9 0
JUP 6.9 3
JI 10.5 2
NAP-W 0.1 0
PDP 0.4 0
Others 1.7 0
Independent 11.3 3
Total 100 27
National Assembly Seats From NWFP Province And Its

Regions
PPP 14.3 1
CML 4 0
CVML 0.6 0
QML 22.6 7
JUI-WP 25.5 6
JUP 0 0
JI 7.2 1
NAP-W 0.3 0
PDP 18.5 3
Others 0.7 0
Independent 6.3 7
Total 100 25
232
National Assembly Seats From Baluchistan Province And Its
Regions
PPP 2.4 0
CML 11 0
CVML 0 0
QML 10 0
JUI-WP 20 1
JUP 0 0
JI 1.2 0
NAP-W 2.4 0
PDP 45.2 3
Others 1.0 0
Independent 6.8 0
Total 100 4
233
Appendix 3
THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS OF 1977
National Assembly Seats From All Pakistan
PPP 58.6 155
PNA 35.8 36
Others 0 1
Independent 0 8
Total 94.4 200
National Assembly Seats From Punjab Province And Its

Regions
PPP 61 107
PNA 35.5 8
Others 0 0
Independent 0 0
Total 96.5 115
National Assembly Seats From Sindh Province And Its

Regions
PPP 61.6 32
PNA 32.2 11
Others 0 0
Independent 0 0
Total 93.8 43
234
National Assembly Seats From NWFP Province And Its
Regions
PPP 39.6 8
PNA 48 17
Others 0 0
Independent 0 0
Total 87.6 26
National Assembly Seats From Baluchistan Province And Its

Regions
PPP 49.2 7
PNA 0 0
Others 42.4 0
Independent 0 0
Total 91.6 7
235
Appendix 4
NOTIFICATION
Islamabad, The 21st, March 1977

No. F.13(1) 77-Elsx (I). - In pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section
20 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (LXXXV of 1976), the Election
Commission of Pakistan hereby publishes the names of the candidates returned to the
National Assembly of Pakistan as a result of un-contested election from the
constituencies mentioned below against the name of each candidate:-
Sr. No and Name of
Name Father's Name
# Constituency
1 2 3 4
Mr. Mohammad Haji Muhammad
1 NA-1 Peshawar-I
Yousaf Khattak Kulli Khan
Arbab Mohammad Arbab Sher Ali
2 NA-2 Peshawar-II
Jehangir Khan Khan
Mr. Aftab Ahmad Ghulam Haider
3 NA-3 Peshawar-III
Khan Khan
Begum Naseem W/o Abdul Wali
4 NA-4 Peshawar-IV
Wali Khan Khan
Maulana Abdul Al-Haj Maruf
5 NA-5 Peshawar-V
Haq Gul
Khan Mir Afzal K.B. Sarfaraz
6 NA-6 Mardan-I
Khan Khan
Mr. Mohammad
7 NA-7 Mardan-II Allahdad Khan
Yousaf Khan
Begum Naseem W/o Abdul Wali
8 NA-8 Mardan-III
Wali Khan Khan
Mr. Ali Gohar Khan Zaman
9 NA-9 Mardan-IV
Khan Khan
Maulana Habib
10 NA-10 Kohat-I Saida Gul
Gul
11 NA-11 Kohat-II Molvi Naimatullah Azizullah
Mr. Mohammad Gohar-ur-
12 NA-12 Abbottabad-I
Iqbal Khan Jadoon. Rehman Jadoon
Air Marshal (Retd) Rehmatullah
13 NA-13 Abbottabad-II
Asghar Khan Khan
F.M.
Mr. Goher Ayub
14 NA-14 Abbottabad-III Mohammad
Khan
Ayub Khan
Mr. Mohammad Haji Mohammad
15 NA-15 Mansehra-I
Haneef Khan Akbar Khan
236
Mr. Fakhruz Badi-uz-Zaman
16 NA-16 Mansehra-II
Zaman Khan Khan
Mansehra- Haji Faqir Niamatullah
17 NA-17
cum-Kohistan Mohammad Khan Khan
Khalifa
Maulana Mufti
18 NA-18 D.I.Khan Mohammad
Mahmood
Siddique
Maulana Maulvi Abdur
19 NA-19 Bannu-I
Sadrushaheed Rahim
20 NA-20 Bannu-II Mr. Ahmad Jan Shah Wali Khan
Miangul
21 NA-21 Swat-I Miangul Amirzeb
Jehanzeb
22 NA-22 Swat-II Haji Fazl-e-Raziq Abdul Mustaan
Mr. Fateh Khan Bahadur
23 NA-23 Swat-III
Mohammad Khan Sultanat Khan
Moulvi Khosh
Chitral-cum-
24 NA-24 Mohammad Wali Mohammad
Swat-cum-Dir
Khan Khan
Malakand
Mr. Gauhar
25 NA-25 Protected Sharifullah
Rehman
Area-cum-Dir
Sahibzada
26 NA-26 Dir Shahzada
Safiullah
27 NA-27 Tribal Area-I Mr. Baroz Niamat
28 NA-28 Tribal Area-II Mr. Baz Gul Mohammad
29 NA-29 Tribal Area-III Mr. Shamsul Haq Ahmed Shah
Sardar Habibullah
30 NA-30 Tribal Area-IV Gulain
Khan
Major Mir Bad
31 NA-31 Tribal Area-V Mr. Said Khan
Shah
Mr. Abdus Subhan Mohammad Jan
32 NA-32 Tribal Area-VI
Khan Khan
Tribal Area-
33 NA-33 Haji Gul Sher Haji Jammal
VII
Tribal Area- Haji Mohammad
34 NA-34 Mr. Nur Sher Khan
VIII Shah
Raja
35 NA-35 Federal Capital Mr. Zahur Ahmad Mohammad Ali
Khan
Col. (Retd) Habib
36 NA-36 Rawalpindi-I Capt. Allah Dad
Khan
37 NA-37 Rawalpindi-II Mr. Abdul Aziz Allah Ditta
237
Bhatti Bhatti
Syed Ali Asghar Syed Balawal
38 NA-38 Rawalpindi-III
Shah Shah
Mohammad
Mr. Nazar Hussain
39 NA-39 Rawalpindi-IV Feroz Khan
Kiani
Kiani
Mr. Abdul Qayyum Mohammad
40 NA-40 Rawalpindi-V
Butt Sharif
Mr. Ahmed Fazal Karim
41 NA-41 Campbellpur-I
Waheed Akhtar Akhtar
Campbellpur- Sardar Shaukat Late Sardar
42 NA-42
II Hayat Sikandar Hayat
Ghulam Mohy-
Campbellpur- (Pir) Syed Safi-ud-
43 NA-43 ud-Din Lal
III din
Badshah
Dr. Ghulam Haji Mohammad
44 NA-44 Jhelum-I
Hussain Akbar Khan
Sardar
Sardar Khizar
45 NA-45 Jhelum-II Mohammad
Hayat Khan
Khan
Mr. Masood-ul-
46 NA-46 Jhelum-III Abdul Qayyum
Hassan Bhatti
47 NA-47 Gujrat-I Mr. Zafar Mehdi Ch. Mehdi Ali
Mian Mushtaq
Mian Noor
48 NA-48 Gujrat-II Hussain
Ellahi
Pagganwala
Mr. Ata Elahi Fazal Elahi
49 NA-49 Gujrat-III
Chaudhry Chaudhry
Mr. Mohammad
50 NA-50 Gujrat-IV Noor Ahmad
Sardar Khan
51 NA-51 Gujrat-V Ch. Ghulam Rasul Ch. Khuda Dad
Mr. Mohammad Mohammad
52 NA-52 Gujrat-VI
Gulzar Siddique
Malik Nazim Mohammad
53 NA-53 Sargodha-I
Ahmad Aheer Malik Khan
54 NA-54 Sargodha-II Mr. Karam Bakhsh Maula Bakhsh
Nawab
Mr. Mohammad
55 NA-55 Sargodha-III Mohammad
Zakir Qureshi
Hayat Qureshi
Khan Bahadur
Mehr Khuda Dad Mehr
56 NA-56 Sargodha-IV
Khan Mohammad Yar
Khan
238
Mohammad
57 NA-57 Sargodha-V Mr. Hafeez Ullah
Abdullah
Malik Noor Hayat Malik Feroz
58 NA-58 Sargodha-VI
Khan Noon Khan Noon
Malik Anwar Ali
59 NA-59 Sargodha-VII Sultan Ali
Noon
Malik Amir
Nawabzada Malik
60 NA-60 Mianwali-I Mohammad
Muzaffar Khan
Khan
Mr. Amir Abdullah Mohammad
61 NA-61 Mianwali-II
Khan Hayat Khan
Mr. Ghulam Ali Mohammad
62 NA-62 Mianwali-III
Hussan Khan Khan
Sardarzada Sardar Ghulam
63 NA-63 Jhang-I Muhammad Ali Mohammad
Shah Shah
Mehr Ghulam Mehr Shamsul
64 NA-64 Jhang-II
Haider Haq
Mr. Faisal Saleh
65 NA-65 Jhang-III Mahmood Hayat
Hayat
Syed Zulfiqar Ali Syed Mubarik
66 NA-66 Jhang-IV
Bokhari Shah
Sahibzada Hazrat Hazrat Sultan
67 NA-67 Jhang-V Mohammad Nazir Noor-ul-Hassan
Sultan Sahib Sahib
Mian Hafiz
Mian Mohammad
68 NA-68 Lyallpur-I Mohammad
Atta Ullah
Abdullah
Mian Abdul
69 NA-69 Lyallpur-II Mian Zahid Sarfraz
Qayyum
70 NA-70 Lyallpur-III Ch. Nisar Akbar Ch. Ali Akbar
Rana Sakhawat Ali Rana Riasat Ali
71 NA-71 Lyallpur-IV
Khan Khan
Ch. Mohammad Ch. Asghar Ali
72 NA-72 Lyallpur-V
Anwar Ali Khan Khan
Major (Retd) Mian Abdul
73 NA-73 Lyallpur-VI
Moeen-ud-Din Bari
Ch. Imtiaz Ahmad Ch. Sardar
74 NA-74 Lyallpur-VII
Gill Mohammad Gill
Khan Shahadat Ali
75 NA-75 Lyallpur-VIII Haji Nizam Din
Khan
Mr. Ghulam Nabi
76 NA-76 Lyallpur-IX Khuda Bakhsh
Chaudhry
239
Mian
77 NA-77 Lyallpur-X Mr. Asad Masood Mohammad
Hussain
Rai Hafeezullah Rai Saadullah
78 NA-78 Lyallpur-XI
Khan Tariq Khan
Mr. Mohammad Mian Abdul
79 NA-79 Lyallpur-XII
Bashir Ahmad Haleem
80 NA-80 Lyallpur-XIII Ch. Bashir Ahmad Ch. Allah Bux
Syed Inayat Ali
81 NA-81 Lahore-I Mr. S.M. Masood
Shah
Mian
Mr. Khalid Latif
82 NA-82 Lahore-II Mohammad
Kardar
Latif Kardar
83 NA-83 Lahore-III Mian Ehsan-ul-Haq Ch. Abdul Haq
S. Abdul
84 NA-84 Lahore-IV Dr. S.M. Yaqub
Rahman
Mian Amir-ud-
85 NA-85 Lahore-V Mian Salah-ud-Din
Din
Malik Mohammad
86 NA-86 Lahore-VI Khuda Bakhsh
Akhtar
Mr. Muhammad
87 NA-87 Lahore-VII Mehar Din
Rashid
Malik Mehraj
88 NA-88 Lahore-VIII Mahi
Khalid
Sardar
89 NA-89 Kasur-I Sardar Ahmad Ali
Mohammad Ali
Major Rehmat Ch. Dilawar
90 NA-90 Kasur-II
Khan Khan
91 NA-91 Kasur-III Mr. Shafaat Khan Dhundal Khan
Sardar Asghar
92 NA-92 Kasur-IV Mr. Amjad Masood
Ali
Mr. Manzoor
93 NA-93 Sheikhupura-I Khuda Bakhsh
Hussain
Malik Mushtaq
94 NA-94 Sheikhupura-II Ghulam Qadir
Ahmad
Sheikhupura- Mr. Mohammad Noor
95 NA-95
III Arif Mohammad
Sheikhupura- Mr. Shamim Ch. Mohammad
96 NA-96
IV Haider Ali
Rai Rashid Ahmad Rai Hussain
97 NA-97 Sheikhupura-V
Khan Khan
98 NA-98 Gujranwala-I Ch. Ghulam Haider Ch. Hayat
240
Cheema Mohammad
99 NA-99 Gujranwala-II Mian Saif Ullah Attaullah Khan
Khan Ghulam
100 NA-100 Gujranwala-III Ghulam Hussain
Dastgir
Mian
Mian Azhar
101 NA-101 Gujranwala-IV Mohammad
Hassan
Shaffi
Malik Mahdi Muhammad
102 NA-102 Gujranwala-V
Hassan Asghar Khan
Mian Shahadat Muhammad
103 NA-103 Gujranwala-VI
Khan Nawaz
104 NA-104 Sialkot-I Qazi Zaka-ud-Din Qazi Saraj Din
Mian
Mian Masud
105 NA-105 Sialkot-II Mohammad
Ahmad
Hussain
Ch. Khan
106 NA-106 Sialkot-III Ch. Sultan Ahmad
Bahadur
Fateh
107 NA-107 Sialkot-IV Mr. Kausar Niazi Muhammad
Khan Niazi
Mr. Hamid Nawaz Shahnawaz
108 NA-108 Sialkot-V
Khan Khan
Mr. Ghulam
109 NA-109 Sialkot-VI Sarwar Khan, Muhammad Din
Advocate
Mr. Anwar Aziz
110 NA-110 Sialkot-VII Dr. Abdul Aziz
Chaudhry
Syed Abbas
111 NA-111 Multan-I S. Altaf Hussain
Hussain Shah
Mr. Rifat Hayat Gul Mohammad
112 NA-112 Multan-II
Khan Khan
Ch. Nawazish
113 NA-113 Multan-III Ch. Barkat Ullah
Ali
Makhdum Makhdoom
114 NA-114 Multan-IV Muhammad Sajjad Murid Hussain
Hussain Qureshi Qureshi
Syed
Syed Hamid Raza
115 NA-115 Multan-V Muhammad
Gilani
Raza Gillani
Sh. Khuda
116 NA-116 Multan-VI Sh. Khizar Hayat
Bakhsh
Maulana Hamid
117 NA-117 Multan-VII Shaida Ali Khan
Ali Khan
241
Ch. Allah Dad
118 NA-118 Multan-VIII Ch. Abdul Rehman
Khan
Brig. Syed Said
119 NA-119 Multan-IX Mr. Nasir Ali Rizvi
Ali Shah Rizvi
120 NA-120 Multan-X Mr. Taj Ahmed Sultan Ahmed
Mr. Mohammad
Mohammad Yar
121 NA-121 Vehari-I Nawaz Khan Alias
Khan Khichi
Dilawar Khan
Alhaj Mian Riaz Nawab Allah
122 NA-122 Vehari-II
Ahmad Khan Yar Khan
Agha Saleem Khursheed
123 NA-123 Vehari-III
Khurshid Ahmed
Khalifa
Maulana Mufti
124 NA-124 D.G. Khan-I Mohammad
Mahmood
Siddique
Nawabzada
Sardar Farooq Sardar
125 NA-125 D.G. Khan-II
Ahmad Khan Mohammad
Khan
Mir Murad
Mir Balakh Sher
126 NA-126 D.G. Khan-III Bakhsh Khan
Khan Mazari
Mazari
Mr. Mohammad
127 NA-127 Muzaffargarh-I Ghaus Bakhsh
Ibrahim
Muzaffargarh- Nawabzada Nawab Saifullah
128 NA-128
II Nasrullah Khan Khan
Dr. Dost
Muzaffargarh-
129 NA-129 Mohammad Mithan Khan
III
Buzdar
Muzaffargarh- Malik Qadir
130 NA-130 Malik Allah Yar
IV Bakhsh
Muzaffargarh- Sardar Mohammad Sardar Bashir
131 NA-131
V Behram Khan Ahmad Khan
Mr. Abdul Aleem Mohammad
132 NA-132 Sahiwal-I
Sardar Shafi
Sardar Mohammad Sardar Fazal
133 NA-133 Sahiwal-II
Naseem Haq
Ch. Muhammad Ch. Nawab
134 NA-134 Sahiwal-III
Hanif Khan Khan
135 NA-135 Sahiwal-IV Rao Khurshid Ali Rao Niaz Ali
Mr. Mohammad
136 NA-136 Sahiwal-V Abdul Haq
Saeed
137 NA-137 Sahiwal-VI Mian Mohammad Hafiz Fateh
242
Yasin Khan Mohammad
Mr. M. Hashim Ch. Mohammad
138 NA-138 Sahiwal-VII
Khan Ali Khan
Mr. Ahmad Saeed
139 NA-139 Sahiwal-VIII Ahmad Khan
Khan
Sir Sadiq
Shahzada Saeed-
140 NA-140 Bahawalpur-I Mohammad
ur-Rashid Abbasi
Khan Abbasi
Mr. Shuja Ullah Major Hafiz
141 NA-141 Bahawalpur-II
Shaikh Ullah Shaikh
Brigadier Alhaj
Prince Salahuddin
142 NA-142 Bahawalpur-III Mohammad
Ahmad Abbasi
Abbas Abbasi
Bahawalpur-
Sahibzada Noor Hazrat Mian
143 NA-143 cum-
Hassan Abdul Ghaffar
Bahawalnagar
Fateh
Bahawalnagar- Mr. Rafique
144 NA-144 Muhammad
I Muhammad Shah
Shah
Bahawalnagar- Mr. Mohammad
145 NA-145 Haji Abdul Haq
II Afzal Wattoo
Bahawalnagar- Mr. Mohammad
146 NA-146 Ali Ahmad
III Afzal Wattoo
Rahim Yar Khawaja Jamal
147 NA-147 Ghulam Rasul
Khan-I Muhammad
Makhdoom
Rahim Yar Makhdoom
148 NA-148 Mohammad
Khan-II Hameed-ud-Din
Karam Shah
Makhdoom
Rahim Yar Makhdoom Noor Mohammad
149 NA-149
Khan-III Muhammad Shah Akhtar Hussain
Shah
Rahim Yar Sardar Ghulam
150 NA-150 Bilal Khan Sardar
Khan-IV Asghar Khan
Mr. Ali Hassan Muhammad
151 NA-151 Sukkur-I
Mangi Ibrahim Mangi
152 NA-152 Sukkur-II Agha Ghulam Nabi Dur Mohammad
Sardar Ali
Sardar Ghulam
153 NA-153 Sukkur-III Mohammad
Mohammad Khan
Khan
Haji Noor
Sardar Dadan
154 NA-154 Sukkur-IV Mohammad Khan
Khan Lund
Lund
243
Mir Mehraa Khan Mir Behram
155 NA-155 Jacobabad-I
Bijarani Khan Bijarani
Haji Khair
156 NA-156 Jacobabad-II Adam Khan
Mohammad Khan
Ali Nawaz
157 NA-157 Nawabshah-I Mr. Abdul Fatah
Memon
Haji Ghulam
Mr. Ghulam
158 NA-158 Nawabshah-III Rasool Khan
Mujtaba
Jatoi
Sayed Shabbir Sayed Hassan
159 NA-159 Nawabshah-III
Ahmed Shah Bux Shah
Haji Qabool
160 NA-160 Nawabshah-IV Noor Ahmad Shah Mohammad
Shah
Syed Qaim Ali Syed Ramzan
161 NA-161 Khairpur-I
Shah Ali
Pir Syed Abdul Pir Syed Ahmad
162 NA-162 Khairpur-II
Qadir Shah Shah
Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Sir Shah Nawaz
163 NA-163 Larkana-I
Bhutto Khan Bhutto
Sardar Ahmed Mir Muhammad
164 NA-164 Larkana-II
Sultan Khan
Mr. Mumtaz Ali Nabi Bux Khan
165 NA-165 Larkana-III
Bhutto Bhutto
Makhdoom
Makhdoom
166 NA-166 Hyderabad-I Ghulam
Mohammad Zaman
Mohammad
Maulana Shah Maulana Abdul
167 NA-167 Hyderabad-II
Ahmed Noorani Aleem Siddiqui
Mr. Mohammad
168 NA-168 Hyderabad-III Khuda Bux
Shaukat
Mir Ghulam Ali
169 NA-169 Hyderabad-IV Mir Aijaz Ali Khan
Khan Talpur
Syed
Syed Umed Ali
170 NA-170 Hyderabad-V Muhammad
Shah
Hassan Shah
Haji Fateh
Haji Najmuddin
171 NA-171 Badin-I Mohammad
Khan
Khan
Haji Abdullah Haji Ahmad
172 NA-172 Badin-II
Halepota Halepota
Pir Ghulam Rasool
173 NA-173 Tharparkar-I Pir Jehan Shah
Shah Jillani
244
Mr. Khadim Ali Syed Allahdino
174 NA-174 Tharparkar-II
Shah Shah
Mr. Niaz Allah Bux Khan
175 NA-175 Tharparkar-III
Muhammad Khan Wassan
Malik Sikandar Malik Sardar
176 NA-176 Dadu-I
Khan Khan
177 NA-177 Dadu-II Rais Allan Khan Gaji Khan
Mr. Liaquat Ali Abdul Hamid
178 NA-178 dadu-III
Khan Khan Jatoi
Haji Fatehuddin
179 NA-179 Sanghar-I Ghulam Shah
Shah
Rais Ali
Rais Atta
180 NA-180 Sanghar-II Mohammad
Mohammad Maree
Khan Maree
Mr. Muhammad Haji Mohammad
181 NA-181 Thatta-I
Khan Soomro Usman Soomro
Khan Bahadur
Mr. Muhammad
Khair
182 NA-182 Thatta-II Yousif Khan
Muhammad
Chandio
Khan Chandio
Sardar Sher Baz Mir Murad Bux
183 NA-183 Karachi-I
Khan Mazari Khan Mazari
Mr. Mahmood Muhammad
184 NA-184 Karachi-II
Azam Farooqi Rashid (Late)
Mr. Mohammad Abdul Hafeez
185 NA-185 Karachi-III
Hassan Haqqqani Haqani
Mr. Ghafoor Shaikh Khuda
186 NA-186 Karachi-IV
Ahmad Bakhsh
Mr. Musheer Pesh
187 NA-187 Karachi-V Imam
Imam
Mr. Abdul Sattar Sardar Allah
188 NA-188 Karachi-VI
Gabol Bux Gabol
Mr. Mohammad
189 NA-189 Karachi-VII Haji Tayyab
Hanif
Air Marshal (Retd) Rehmatullah
190 NA-190 Karachi-VIII
Asghar Khan Khan
Syed Munawar Syed Akhlaq
191 NA-191 Karachi-IX
Hassan Ahmad
Shah Faridul Shah Bashirul
192 NA-192 Karachi-X
Haque Haque
Mr. Abdul Hafeez Abdul Sattar
193 NA-193 Karachi-XI
Pirzada Pirzada
245
Mr. Tahir Mirza Abdullah
194 NA-194 Quetta-I
Mohammad Khan Khan
Mr. Yahya Haji Abdul
195 NA-195 Quetta-II
Bakhtiar Krim Bakhtiar
Sardar
196 NA-196 Quetta-III Mr. Wazir Ahmad Mohammad
Usman
Mir. Taj Mir Jafar Khan
197 NA-197 Sibi-I
Mohammad Khan Jamali
Mir Abdul Nabi Haji Faqir Ali
198 NA-198 Sibi-II
Jamali Jamali
Mir Ahmad Yar
199 NA-199 Kalat-I Mr. Mohyuddin
Khan
Mir Mehrab
200 NA-200 kalat-II Mir Amanullah
Khan
246
Appendix 5
THE RESULTS OF THE NON-PARTY BASIS
ELECTIONS OF 1985
Distribution of Seats in National Assembly

Party Votes Seats
Independents 207
Seats reserved for women - 21
Seats reserved for non-Muslim minorities - 9
Invalid/blank votes -
Total 52% 237
Provincial Assemblies
Provinces Muslim Minorities Women Total
Balochistan 40 3 2 45
NWFP 80 3 4 87
Punjab 240 8 12 260
Sindh 100 9 5 114
Total 460 23 23 506
247
Members of The Various Political Parties Taking
Part In The Elections of 1985
Parties NWFP Punjab Sindh Balochistan
PPP 10 31 32 6
PML 13 55 22 66
JI 7 34 18 2
TI 1 12 0 1
JUP 1 8 4 0
JUI 4 2 2 0
Progressive PP 0 4 1 0
MKP 1 0 0 0
NAP 0 2 0 0
PDP 0 1 0 0
NDP 1 0 0 0
Inqilabi Mahaz 0 1 0 1
PML (ZS) 0 1 2 0
Himayat-e-Zia 0 2 0 0
TKN 0 1 2 0
Masawat Party 0 1 0 0
Pakhtoon Itehad 0 0 1 2
Sawad-e-Azam 0 0 3 2
NAP (PK) 0 0 0 0
ICP 0 0 3 1
248
Bibliography
Primary Source
Official Documents
Constitution of 1973. 8th Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Islamabad:

Government of Pakistan, 1985.
Report on the General Elections, 1985: Detailed Result of Elections. Election Results,
Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan, 1987.
Report on the General Elections, 1988. Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan, 1990.
Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad. President of Pakistan; General Zia-ul-Haq's Interviews to Foriegn

Media. Official documents, Islamabad: Directorate of Films & Publications, Ministry of
Information & Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1988.
Journals
Afroz, Kareem. "Islamic Socialism." Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, 1978.
Bakhtiar, Nelofar. "Islamization And Women Empowerment During Zia Regime."

Interdisciplanry Journal of Social And Humanitarian Studies, 1993.
Chilang, Lelli. "China and Pakistan; During Bhutto Regime." Beijing University Journal of
Marxist Studies, 1997.
Contemporary Forms of Slavery in Pakistan. New York: Human Rights Watch, July 1995.
Corren, Pale De. "Exploring Pakistan; From The Eye of Socialism." Afro-Asian Journal of
Political Studies, 2001.
Sehgal, Ikram ul-Majeed. Ojhri Camp Blast Near Rawalpindi. Rawalpindi: Defence Journal,
Volume 9, Issues 1-3, 2005.
Tariq, Ashraf. "Panic in Karachi: Altaf Hussain, MQM And underground Mafia." Daily Hot
News International, 1999: 245.
249
Tarres, Christofer. "Bhutto Family in Pakistan." Journal of Public Opinion, 2001.
Wolden, Richard E. "Radicalization in Afghanistan And Pakistan During Zia Regime."

Journal of Public Opinion, 2000.
Woltes, Erring. "Pakistan-USSR Relations During Bhutto Regime." Siberian Federal

University Journal, 1995.
Newspapers
Aaj, Karachi: July 14, 1985.
Awaz-e-Sindh, Karachi: March 02, 1982.
Karachi Today, Karachi: August 19, 1988.
Nawa-e-Waqt, Islamabad: Islamabad, January 1, 1985.
Nawa-i-Seher, Karachi: December 12, 1986.
New Morning, Karachi: Novemeber 28, 1975.
Pakistan Times, islamabad: Pakistan Publishers, March 3, 1985.
Sada-e-Sindh, Hyderabad: March 03, 1982.
Takbeer, Hyderabad: June 20, 1979.
Secondary Source
Published Books
Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War on
Terror. Islamanad: M.E. Sharpe, 2006.
Ahmad, Irfan. Islamism And Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami.

New Jersy: Princeton University Press, 2009.
250
Ahmad, Nazeer. Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead. Michigan: The University
of Michigan, 2004.
Akhtar, Rai Shakil. Media, Religion And Politics In Pakistan. London: Oxford University
Press, 2000.
Alagappa, Muthiah. Civil Society And Political Change in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2004.
Ali, Shoukat. Pakistan: A Religio-Politcal Study. Islamabad: The National Institute of

Historical and Cultural Research, 1997.
Al-Razi, Aleem. Constitutional Glimpses of Martial Law: in India, Pakistan And Bangladesh.
Michigan: The University of Michigan, 1988.
Amin, Tahir. Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic And International Factors.

Islamabad: Insitute of Policy Studies, 1988.
Anwar, Raja. The Terrorist Prince: The Life And Death of Murtaza Bhutto. New York: Verso,
1997.
Arif, Khalid Mehmood. Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition). Lahore: Dost Publishing,
1996.
Aziz, Mazhar. Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State. New York: Routledge, 2008.
Baahadur, Kalim. Democracy in Pakistan: Crisis And Conflicts. London: Oxford univesity
Press, 1998.
Baxter, Craig. Pakistan on The Brink: Politics, Economics, And Society. London: Lexington
Books, 2004.
Bhurgri, Abdul Ghafoor. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Falcon of Pakistan. Karachi: SZABIST,
2002.
Bhutti, Zaiḍ A. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; Shahid-i-Azam. Karachi: Dost Publishers, 1990.
Binder, Leonard. Religion And Politics in Pakistan. California: The University of California,
1961.
251
Bindra, Sukhawant Singh. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement. New Delhi:
Deep & Deep Publishers, 1981.
Blood, Peter R. Pakistan:A Country Study. London: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Brecher, Irving. Foreign Aid And Industrial Development in Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
Burki, Shahid javed. Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77. London: Oxford University Press,
1988.
Burki, Shahid Javed. Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq. The
University of Michigan: Westview Press, 1991.
But, Usama. Pakistan's Quagmire: Security, Strategy, And The Future of The Islamic-Nuclear
Nation. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010.
Candland, Christopher. Labor, Democratization And Development in India And Pakistan.

New York: Routledge, 2007.
Chari, P. R. The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers
& Distributors, 2001.
Chengappa, Bidanda M. Pakistan, Islamisation, Army And Foreign Policy. London: APH
Publishing, 2004.
Chitkara, M. G. Benazir, A Profile. New Delhi: APH Publishing, 1996.
Cohen, Stephen P. The Idea of Pakistan, London: Brookings Institute Press, 2004.
Das, Suranjan. Kashmir And Sindh: Nation-Building, Ethnicity, And Regional Politics in
South Asia. New Dehli: K.P. Bagchi & Co., 2001.
Dawood, Janmohammed. The Role of Superior Judiciary in The Politics of Pakistan. Karachi:
Royal Book Co., 1994.
Dharamdasani, M. D. Pakistan Under Democratic Regime. New Delhi: Shalimar Pub. House,
1994.
Dressel, Bjorn. The Judicialization of Politics in Asia. New York: Routledge, 2012.
252
Englar, Mary. Benazir Bhutto: Pakistani Prime Minister And Activist. Minneapolis: Compass
Point Books, 2006.
Esposito, John L. Islam And Democracy. New York: Center of Muslims-Christians

Understanding, The Georgetown University, 1996.
Eulau, Heinz. Behavioralism in Political Science. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2011.
Farazmand, Ali. Administrative Reform in Developing Nations. Westport: Praeger Publishers,

2002.
Faruqee, Rashid. Strategic Reforms For Agricultural Growth in Pakistan. Washington D.C.:
The World Bank, 1999.
Farwell, James P. The Pakistan Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability. London:
Oxford University Press, 2011.
Gerdezi, H. Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship. London: Zed Press, 1983.
Grover, Verinder. Pakistan: Government And politics. New Delhi: Deep & Deep
Publications, 2000.
Gualtieri, Antonio R. Conscience And Coercion:Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan.

Montreal: Guernica Editions Inc., 1989.
Hasnat, Syed F. Global Security Watch - Pakistan. New York: ABC-CLIO, 2011.
Hoodbhoy, Nafisa. Aboard The Democracy Train: A Journey Through Pakistan's Last
Decade of Military Rule. London: Anthem Press, 2011.
Husain, Ishrat. Pakistan: The Economy of An Elitist State. London: Oxford University Press,
1999.
Hussain, Asaaf. Elite Politics in An Ideological State. Folkestone: Dawson, 1979.
Hussain, Mushahid. Pakistan's politics: The Zia years. Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1990 .
Hussain, Rizwan. Pakistan And The Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan.

Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005.
Hyman, Anthony. Pakistan: Zia And After, New Delhi: Abhinav Publishers, 1989.
253
Islam, Tariq. Democracy The Only Way For Pakistan: Interviews of Benazir Bhutto. Karachi:
Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Archives, SZABIST, 2008.
Jaffrelot, Christophe. The History of Pakistan And Its Origins. London: Wimbledon
Publishing, 2004.
Jalal, Ayesha. Democracy And Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative And

Historical Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, The Muslim League And The Deman For
Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press, 1994.
Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khan. Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Politician And Parliamentarian:
Selected Speeches, 1962-1990. Lahore: Alvi Publishers, 1997.
Jillani, Anees. Advance Towards Democracy: The Pakistani Experience. Islamabad:

Progressive Publishers, 1991.
John, Wison. Pakistan: The Struggle Within. London: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Junejo Rajputs: Muhammad Khan Junejo, Jan Muhammad Junejo, Jam Sadiq Ali, Chakar Ali
Khan Junejo. Historical Description, Karachi, Books Group Staff, 2010.
Junejo, Chakar Ali. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Memoir. Karachi: Pakistan Publishing, 1996.
Kalia, Ravi. Pakistan: From The Rhetoric of Democracy To The Rise of Militancy. New
York: Routledge, 2012.
Kamal, K. L. Pakistan: Democracy At The Cross Roads. The University of Michigan: Yuvraj
Publishers & Distributors, 1990.
Kapur, Ashok. Pakistan in Crisis. New York: Routledge, 1991.
Kardar, Shahid. The Gathering Economic Crisis And The Dwindling Options. Islamabad:
Group 83, 1986.
Korsan, Henry J. Contemporary Problems of Pakistan, E. J. Brill, London, 1974
254
Khan, Hamid. Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan. London: Oxford University
Press, 2005.
Khan, Mohammad Asghar. My Political Struggle. London: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Khan, Mohammad Habib. Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan. The University of

Michigan: Directory Bureau, 1989.
Khan, Shafique Ali. The Demand For India And The Communist Party of India. Islamabad:
Pakistan Historical Society, 1986.
Khan, Shahrukh Rafi. Initiating Devolution For Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring The
Power Structure. London: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Korejo, Muhammad Soaleh. A Testament of Sindh: Ethnic And Religious Extremism A

Perspective. London: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Krueger, Anne O. Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries. New York:
The Ohlin Lectures, 1993.
Kukreja, Veena. Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan. New Delhi: NBO
Publishers Distributors, 1985.
Lau, Martin. The Role of Islam in The Legal System of Pakistan. New York: BRILL, 2006.
Lodhi, Maleeha. Bhutto, The Pakistan Peoples Party And Political Devemopment in
Pakistan: 1967-1977. London: The University of London, 1980.
Mahmood, Sohail. Good Governance Reform Agenda in Pakistan: Current Challenges. New
York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006.
Maḥmud, Ṣafdar. Pakistan: Political Roots And Development, 1947-1999. London: Oxford
University Press, 2000.
Malik, Iftikhar Haider. Culture And Customs of Pakistan. Westport: Greenwood Publishing
Group, 2006.
Masoom, Abdul Latif. Dilemmas of A Military Ruler: A Political Study of The Zia Regime.
Islamabad: Afsar Brothers, 2000.
255
Maswani, A. M. K. Subversion in East Pakistan. Dhakka: Amir Publications, 1979.
McGrath, Allen. The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy. London: Oxford University Press,
1996.
Mehdi, Rubya. The Islamization of The Law in Pakistan. Oxon: Routledge, 1994.
Mehmood, Safdar. Pakistan: Role of Muslim League And Inception of Democracy 1947-54.
Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1997.
Mishra, Ghulab. Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To The Simla
Agreement. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1987.
Mitra, Subarta Kumar. Political Parties of South Asia. Westport: Greenwood Publishing,
2004.
Mukerjee, Dilip. Yahya Khan's Final War: India Meets Pakistan's Threat. New York:
Coleman, 1972.
Mukherjee, Dilip. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Quest For Power. New Delhi: NBO Publishers
Distributors, 1972.
Mumtaz, Soofia. Pakistan: The Contours of State And Society. London: Oxford University
Press, 2002.
Murphy, Eamon. The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical And Social Roots of
Extremism. London: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Naden, Corinne J. Benazir Bhutto. London: Marshall Cavendish, 2010.
Nair, P. Sukumaran. Indo-Bngladesh Relations. New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishers Corporation,

2008.
Narain, Ravi Shekhar. The Military Factor in Pakistan. London: Lancer Publishers, 2008.
Noman, Omar. The Political Economy of Pakistan, 1947-85. Islamabad: KPI, 1988.
Osella, Filippo. Islamic Reform in South Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Darling, Malcolm, L. Pakistan Muslim League. London: Oxford university Press, 2012.
256
Palmer, Monte. Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity, And Challenges. New York: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2008.
Parent, Michelle. Benazir Bhutto: She Once Had A Dream. New York: Publish America,
2009.
Qayyum, Abdul. Zia-ul-Haq And I. The University of Michigan: International Consortium of

Consultants and Technical Services, 1997.
Qudoos, Syed Abdul. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Politics of Chrisma. Lahore: Lahore Publishing,
1994.
Rais, Rasul Bux. Ethnic Politics in Sindh. Karachi: H.N Publishers, 1997.
Rajaratnam, T. W. A judiciary in Crisis: The Trial of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. New Delhi:
Kaanthalakam, 1988.
Raza, Rafi. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto And Pakistan: 1967-1977. London: Oxford University Press,
1997.
Rizvi, Hassan Askari. The Military And Politics in Pakistan. Michigun: Progressive
Publishers, 1976.
Rizvi, Syed Shabbar Raza. Constitutional Law of Pakistan: Text, Case Law And Analytical
Commentary. Constitutional law, Michigun: Vanguard, 2002.
Russell, Jesse. Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq. Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2012.
Sadiqui, Farah Hanif. The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: . Oxon: Routledge, 2012.
Saha, Santosh C. Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries. Westport: Greenwood

Publishing Group. Copyright. , 2001.
Sahgal, Neha. Divided We Stand, But United We Oppose? Opposition Alliances in Egypt And
Pakistan. New York: UMI, 2009.
Saeed, Khalid Bin. Pakistan: The Formative Phase. Karachi: The Pakistan Publishing House,
1960.
257
Sayyid, Riyāz̤ Aḥmad. Pakistan on Road to Islamic Democracy: Referendum 1984.
Islamabad: Historical Research Institute, 1985.
Schmitt, Carl. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. New York: MIT Press, 1988.
Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto To Benazir
Bhutto. London: Westview Press, 1997.
Shah, Mehtab Ali. The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1971-1994.
London: I.B Tauris & Co, 1997.
Shah, Nasim Hassan. Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in
Pakistan. London: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Shehab, Rafiullah. The Politcal History of Pakistan. Michigan: The University of Michigan,
1995.
Siddiqi, Javed A. Operation Fair Play-5 July-1977. Islamabad: Pakistan Publishing, 1985.
Singh, Surendra. Politics of Regionalism in Pakistan: A Study of Sind Province. New Delhi:
Kalinga Publications, 2003.
Syed, Anwar Hussain. The Discourse And Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. New York:
Macmillan, 1992.
Syed, Anwar. Islam, Politics And National Solidarity. Lahore: Vanguard, 1984.
Talbot, Ian. Pakistan: A Modern History. London: C.Hurst & Company Publishers Limited,
2009.
Taseer, Salman. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition).
Lahore: Pakistan Book Dipute, 1988.
Sims, Holly, The Discourse And Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Michigun: The University of
Michigun, 1992.
Tummala, Krishna K. Comparative Bureaucratic Systems. Maryland: Rowman And Little

Field Publishing Group, 2005.
Waseem, Mohammad. Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985. London: Vanguard, 1987.
258
Weiss, Anita M. Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in A
Modern Society. London: Syracuse University Press, 1986.
Wolpert, Stanley A. Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life And Times. London: Oxford University
Press, 1993.
Zaheer, Hassan. The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise And Realization of Bengli Muslim
Nationalism. London: Oxford university Press, 1996.
Zahoor, Muhammad Abrar. Economic Reforms Under The Government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
New York: VDM Publishing, 2011.
Zia-ul-Haq, Rana. Jamhooriat; Tallwar Se Tez Tar...... (Urdu Edition). Bahawalpur: Usman
Publishers, 1990.
Ziring, lawrence. Pakistan in The Twenieth Century. London: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Ziring, Lawrence. The Ayub Kahn Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-69. Michigan: The
University of Michigan, 1971.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Journey of Renaissance; A pictorial Record of President Bhutto's

Whirlwind Tours of Africa And Middle East. Research Report, Department of Films And
Publications, 1972.
Interviews
Ehsan, Aitazaz, Interview by Imteaz Abbasi. Role of Pakistan Peoples Party During Zia
Regime (January 03, 2012).
Meer, Rasheed, Interview by Imteaz Abbasi. Role of Political Parties During Zia Regime,
with Special Reference to Pakistan Peoples Party (January 12, 2012).
Websites
Aqil, Tariq. Judicial Murder of Bhutto. http://sixhour.com/judicial_murder.htm (accessed

March 13, 2013).
259
Beardsley, Philip L. A Critique of Post-Behavioralism.
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/191149?uid=3738832&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&ui
d=4&sid=21102903577701 (accessed March 16, 2013).
Murtaza Bhutto. http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=2fqeMAEACAAJ&dq =murtaza+

bhutto&hl=en&sa=X&ei=8mF_UsL2KenJ4ATZsYCIAw&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAg (accessed
March 20, 2013).
Pakistan Peoples Party. www.ppp.org.pk (accessed March 7, 2013).
Raban, Ofer. The Supreme Court Endorsement of A Politicized Judiciary: A Philosophical

Criticque. http://adr.uoregon.edu/assets/facultydocs/ofer/scendorsementofpoliticized
judiciary.pdf (accessed March 14, 2013).
Saeed, Khalid Bin. Islam And The Paths of Pakistan’s Political Development.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/17754810/Islam-and-the-Paths-of-Pakistans-Political-
Development (accessed March 12, 2013).
The Education Watch Pakistan. http://www.theeducationwatchpakistan.org/

index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1942:scholar-khalid-bin-sayeed-
remembered&catid=340:misalliance-&Itemid=569 (accessed March 12, 2013).
260

PH.D History Imtiaz Abbasi

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

PH.D History Imtiaz Abbasi

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

PH.D History Imtiaz Abbasi

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF POLITICAL PARTIES

DURING ZIA ERA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

PAKISTAN PEOPLE PARTY (1977-1988)

Imtiaz Ahmed Abbasi Professor Dr. Muhammad

The Islamia University of Bahawalpur

Imtiaz Ahmad Abbasi

Prof. Dr. Muhammad Akbar Malik

This thesis entitled “ An Analytical Study of Political Parties During Zia

Era with Special Reference to Pakistan People’s Party (1977-88)” which

External Examiner: ___________________________________

enlightened our mind to recognize ourselves. It is pleasure for me to express my feelings of

to express my sincere feelings towards my family for their affections. I am thankful to my

continue higher studies.

Rehman Abbasi, Saffir Ahmad Abbasi whose cooperation facilitate me to complete my

Imtiaz Ahmed Abbasi

CPC Communist Party of Pakistan

HRM Human Resource Management

ICJ Intentional Court of Justice

JUI Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

JUP Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan

NAP National Awami Party

PDP Pakistan Democratic Party

PML Pakistan Muslim League

PPP Pakistan Peoples Party

SCP Supreme Court of Pakistan

UNESCO United Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural

UNICEF United Nations International Children Emergency Fund

USA United States of America

USSR United Soviet Socialist Republic

Z.A.B Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto

Contents Page Numbers

The Role of Political Parties From 1947-77 11

Pakistan Muslim League 13

Pakistan Democratic Party 16

National Awami Party 18

Jeay Sindh Qoumi Mahaaz 24

Communist Party of Pakistan 25

Republican Party of Pakistan 26

Tashkand Agreement And Its Impacts 28

Failure of Democracy And Imposition of Martial Law 1969 31

Martial Law of 1969 And Its Political Consequences 35

Political Activism And The Rise of Pakistan People’s Party 39

Bhutto’s Rising of Power: 39

Bhutto And The Bureaucracy 46

Constitutional Engineering During Bhutto Regime 69

Economic And Social Change During Bhutto Regime 71

Labor Reforms During Bhutto Regime 72

Nationalization Policy of Bhutto 74

Foreign Policy of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto And His Fall 75

Major Steps of Zia-ul-Haq And Pakistan People’s Party 93

Zia’s Attitude Towards Political Forces 93

PPP’s Leadership And Zia Regime 98

Zia-ul-Haq As President 104

Politicization of Supreme Court 106

Five Year Plan (1978-83) 109

Constitutional Engineering And The Elections of 1985 112

Nussrat Bhutto Case And Its Political Effects 115