In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual

Author(s): Elizabeth M. Zechenter

Source: Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 53, No. 3, Universal Human Rights versus
Cultural Relativity (Autumn, 1997), pp. 319-347
Published by: University of New Mexico
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 IN THE NAME OF CULTURE:CULTURAL
RELATIVISMAND THE ABUSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
M. Zechenter
Elizabeth
at Law,2000OneLoganSquare,
Lewis& Bockius,LLP,Counselors
Morgan,
PA 19103
Philadelphia,
The modernsystemof internationalhumanrightstreatiesis basedon the conceptof
universalismwhichholdsthat thereis an underlyinghumanunity whichentitlesall
individuals,regardless of theirculturalor regionalantecedents,
to certainbasicminimal
rights,knownas humanrights.The influenceof culturalrelativism,multiculturalism,
and postmodernism is slowlyunderminingtheseideals.Manyagreethatuniversalhu-
man rightsnormssimplydo not conformwiththeextremediversityof culturaland reli-
gious practicesfound aroundthe worldand thatuniversalrightsshouldbe modifiedto
conformwithlocalculturaland religiousnorms.Othersquestionthe theoretical validity
and intellectualcoherence of universalism.This is an importantdebate,the outcomeof
whichwill havepracticalconsequences for millionsof peoplearoundthe world.This
articleexaminesthe conceptsof culturalrelativismand universalism,theirtheoretical
strength,theirsocialand ethicalusefulness,and theirintellectualcoherence,especiallyas
theyinfluenceinternational responsestogender-based abusesperpetrated againstwomen
and otherdisenfranchised individualsliving in non-Western societies.
I am humanand nothinghumanis aliento me.
Terence,163 B.C.
My owngroupaside,everything
humanis alien to me.
RenatoRosaldo,1984
THESECOND
UNTIL WORLD the protection of human rights of individualswas
WAR,
seen as a sovereignprerogativeof the state andthereforeas a domesticrather
than an internationalconcern.The atrocitiesof the SecondWorldWarpro-
vided the impetusto changethat statusquo. In the discussionthat ensued,
most scholarsandpoliticiansagreedthat individualsare far too vulnerableif
left at the mercy of domesticlegal systems and that individualsneed more
protectionagainstabuses sufferedat the handof the state. This agreement
was most fullyexpressedin the creationof the UnitedNationsandthe enact-
ment of the complexinternationalregime of universalhumanrights. This
new internationallegal regime was groundedas much in the empiricalevi-
dence of widespreadabuses as in the followingethicalandphilosophicalbe-
liefs: (1) no state can be entrustedwith an absolutepowerover its own citi-
zens because of the tendency of states to abuse absolute power; (2) an
international regimeof humanrightsprotectionis neededto protectindividu-
als againststates and other supralevelorganizations;(3) all individualsare
entitled,by virtue of their commonhumanity,to a basic modicumof human
dignity; (4) certain human rights are universal, fundamental,and inalienable,
and thus they cannot and should not be overridden by cultural and religious

(Journal of AnthropologicalResearch, vol. 53, 1997)

319
320 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
JOURNAL RESEARCH

traditions;and(5) the accidentof birthintoa particularsocialgroupor culture

is not an ethicallyrelevant circumstanceand thus has no bearingon that
individual'sintrinsichumanworthandher or his entitlementto be treatedas
a humanbeing (Buergenthal1988; Donnelly1989). The modernsystem of
international humanrightstreaties-which havebeen ratifiedby all nations-
reflects these universalistnotions.For example,the Charterof the United
Nations reaffirmsa "faithin fundamentalhumanrights, in the dignityand
worthof the humanperson,in the equalrightsof men andwomen"(United
NationsCharter,Preamble,1945)and states that the goal of the UnitedNa-
tions is to promoteuniversalrespectfor andobservanceof humanrightsand
fundamentalfreedomsfor all withoutdistinctionsof race, sex, language,or
religion(UnitedNationsCharter,Articles1(3)and55). BothUN Covenants-
the InternationalCovenanton Economic,Socialand CulturalRightsandthe
InternationalCovenanton Civil and PoliticalRights-state that "equaland
inalienablerights of all membersof the humanfamily[are]the foundationof
freedom,justiceandpeacein the world"andproclaimthathumanrightshave
theiroriginin the "inherentdignityof the humanperson"(CPCovenant,Pre-
amble,1976;ESC Covenant,Preamble,1976).
Universalism,thus, is at the root of modernhumanrights law.Simplyput,
universalismholdsthatthere is an underlyinghumanunitywhichentitles all
individuals,regardlessof theirculturalor regionalantecedents,to certainba-
sic minimalrights, knownas humanrights. Traditionally, universalistshave
basedtheir supportfor universalhumanrightson three majorjurisprudential
theories-the naturallaw theory,the theoryof rationalism,andthe theoryof
positivism(Dworkin1978). More recently, other theories such as, for ex-
ample,the humancapabilitiestheory have been proposedto providephilo-
sophicalfoundationsfor the universalityof humanrights (Nussbaum1993;
Sen 1993;Rawls1971).
Naturallaw has its roots in the ancientStoic philosophybut was morefully
developedby ThomasAquinas.The naturallaw theoryemphasizesethicaldi-
mensionsof the law.It assertsthatindividuals havecertaininalienablerightsof
the highestordergrantedto all individuals by Godor Providenceandthathu-
man-madelaws are just only insofaras they do not conflictwith the eternal
naturallaws governingthe universe(Weinreb1987).The naturallaw philoso-
phyis well illustratedin Antigone,a classicalGreektragedyby Sophocles.When
Antigonewas preventedby the localpolislawfromburyingherbrother,she did
so anyway,claimingthat her actionswere in accordancewith a higher,albeit
unwritten,law andthat this unwrittennaturallaw supersededthe man-made
polislaw.Unfortunately, it is difficultto justifyuniversalhumanrightsbasedon
the naturallawtheoryin a worldwitha profound culturalandreligiousdiversity,
withlittle,if any,agreementamongmajorculturesandreligionsaboutthe very
existence of a higher order law and its mandates, and in a world plagued by
doubts about the existence of any universal moral or ethical norms.
Rationalism, a closely related concept, is a theory of universal laws based
on a belief in the universal human capacity to reason and think rationally
 ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL
RELATIVISM
CULTURAL 321

(Donnelly1989). Rationalismreplacesthe divineoriginsof universalhuman

rightsfoundin the naturallawtheorywith the ideathathumanrightsare held
by each humanbeing,in an individualcapacity,due to the universalcapacity
of all humansto thinkrationally.Both rationalismandnaturallaw theoryare
often combinedin the modem humanrights discourseand take the formof
claimsthat universalhumanrights exist independentof culture,ideology,or
value systems. In this view, universalhumanrightsare a class of rightseach
individualpossesses by virtue of being a human.They are the rights of final
resort, typicallyinvokedwhen all else has been tried andhas failed,andare
therefore moral and ethical rights of the highest order. They are also
extracultural andare meantto challengeandchangethe existingnorms,prac-
tices, andinstitutionsandto subvertoppressivecustoms(Donnelly1989,1990).
Bothrationalismandnaturallaw idealsare expressedin the AmericanDecla-
rationof Independence,whichproclaims:"[w]e hold these truthsto be self-
evident,that all men are createdequal,that they are endowedby their Cre-
ator with certainunalienableRights,amongthese are Life, Libertyand the
Pursuitof Happiness"(Declarationof Independence,para.1 U.S. 1776).Vari-
ous schools of thought, includingculturalrelativism, deconstructionism,
interpretivism,andpostmodernism,disputethe validityof the rationalistap-
proachby arguingthat rationalismis merely a reflectionof Westernculture
andit thereforefailsto reflectthe diversityof humanexperience.
Positivism,on the other hand,justifies the existence of universalhuman
rights by noting the worldwideacceptanceand ratificationof humanrights
instruments.Accordingto positivists,universalhumanrightsnormshavebeen
createdby andare embodiedin the international treatiesandcustomaryinter-
nationallaw (Higgins1994).Positivistsobservethat culturaldifferencesnot-
withstanding,all Westernand non-Westernnationshave signed and ratified
the vast majorityof humanrights treaties and agreements,a fact which at-
tests to the worldwideacceptanceof the humanrightsprinciplesset forthin
these treatiesandagreements.This uniformworldwideacceptanceprovides,
therefore,a legitimatebasisforadherenceto suchuniversalhumanrightsand
other standardsunderlyingthese treaties and agreements.Positivists also
observe that the source of humanrights lies not in individualculturesbut
ratherin internationallaw which gave rise to the idea of universalrights.
Consequently,positivists claimthat humanrights cannotbe withdrawnby
any domesticlegal system andmust take priorityover the conflictingnorms
of differentdomestic systems. Althoughpositivismprovidesa sound legal
justificationfor universalityof humanrights,it does so primarilyfor individu-
als living in modernnation-states.Unfortunately,positivismfails to justify
universalrights for indigenouspeoples, many of whom were forcefullyan-
nexed into modernstates andmanyof whomdenythatmodernstates have a
moral or legal authority to represent them in the internationalarena.
The capabilities theory and related approaches look at the quality of life of
various groups and individualsand ask whether individualsin a given culture
live as decent a life as they are capable of living (Sen 1993). This approach
322 RESEARCH
OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
JOURNAL
focuses on the questionof what it means to be human.It evaluatesvarious
subgroupswithinthe society andcomparesthem againsteach other in order
to detect structuralinequalities.The capabilitiestheoristslook for common-
alitiesamongcultures,religions,andphilosophicaltraditions,as well as com-
monalitiesamongmen and women, and use those commonalitiesto argue
that all individualsmust have at least some minimumrights necessary for
humanfunctioning(Nussbaum1993).Althoughthe capabilitiestheoryrepre-
sents a very thoughtfulattemptat justifyinguniversalhumanrights, its pri-
maryweaknesslies in its failureto adequatelyaccountforthe factthatcertain
significantdifferencesamongculturesjust cannotbe reconciledby lookingfor
commonalitiesor pointsof agreementsamongthese cultures.
Since most attemptsto providesolidphilosophical foundationsfor the uni-
versality of humanrights have not been entirely successful, the universal
foundationsof internationalhumanrights are subjectto numerousempirical
andtheoreticalattacks,primarilyfromthe variousproponentsof culturalrela-
tivism. Until recently,the internationallegal communityhas uniformlysub-
scribedto the view that humanrightsshouldbe universalandthatthe inter-
nationalhumanrights regime createdby the UnitedNations,as well as by
otherregionalhumanrights systems, shouldbe enforcedevenhandedly,irre-
spectiveof differencesin culturalcustomsandreligions.If humanrightswere
to have differentmeaningto Westernandnon-Westerncountries,the whole
system of humanrights law wouldbe renderedmeaningless.Consequently,
the internationalcommunityhas shown reluctanceto defer to "culture"in
cases of conflictbetween internationalhumanrights and culturalvalues. In
fact, internationalhumanrights law mandatesthat the states must combat
culture-basedviolence,especiallyif such violenceis beingdisguisedas a reli-
giousor a culturalpractice(UnitedNationsHumanRightsCommission1989).
The currentinternational law embodies,therefore,a collectiveaffirmation by
the worldcommunityof the fundamental unityof the humanrace.
Althoughthe universalityof humanrightsis still widelyacceptedby many
nations, the influence of cultural relativism and multiculturalist and
postmodernistideas is slowlyundermining the entire system of international
humanrightstreaties(Sullivan1994).This growingdebateaboutthe validity
of the universalistassumptionsunderlyingthe humanrights regime is, to
some degree, inevitablein a worldwith ever-increasinginterconnectedness
andglobalization.Humanrightsinstitutionsareincreasinglyexposedto a grow-
ing varietyof norms,values, and beliefs, and to competingclaims of legiti-
macyfromvariousculturesandsubcultures.To humanrightsrelativists,uni-
versal humanrightsnormsare impossibleto defendin such a richlydiverse
worldand are no more than a "Westernconceptwith limitedapplicability"
(PollisandSchwab1979:1).Armedwithrelativistarguments,numerousgroups
have mountedformidablechallengesto the ideal of universalhumanrights,
including such constituencies as (1) Asian and Islamic governments which,
despite their ratificationof all major internationalhuman rights instruments,
outrightly reject human rights universalism, particularlyas it pertains to hu-
 CULTURAL ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL
RELATIVISM 323
manrights of women livingin theirjurisdictions;(2) numerousThirdWorld
regimeswhichwishto avoidintenseinternational scrutinyofthe domestictreat-
ment of their citizens;(3) representativesof the newly organizedindigenous
groupswho cravelegitimacyforthemselvesandtheircultures;(4) manysocial
scientistsandphilosophersengagedin a searchfor soundertheoreticaljustifi-
cationof humanrightsuniversalismandits principles;(5) personswho value
human"diversity" andwho view humanrightsas an extensionof the Western
sphere influence;and(6) those who fearthathumanrightsuniversalismen-
of
couragesuncalled-for interferencewithothercultures.Mostof the above-men-
tionedgroupsor individualsarguethat the promulgation of universalhuman
rightslaws simplydoes not conformwiththe extremediversityof culturaland
religiouspracticesfoundaroundthe worldandthat universalrightsshouldbe
subsidiaryto localculturalandreligiousnorms.Othersquestionthe theoretical
validityandintellectualcoherenceof varioustheoriesunderlyinginternational
humanrightslaw. Clearly,this is an importantdebate,the outcomeof which
will havepracticalconsequencesfor millionsof peoplearoundthe world.
This articleexaminesthe applicability of culturalrelativismto the interna-
tionalhumanrightsregime,especiallyas it shapesthe international responses
to gender-basedabusesperpetratedagainstwomenandotherdisenfranchised
individualslivingin non-Westernsocieties.The firstpartbrieflyoutlinesvari-
ous formulations of culturalrelativism.The secondpartfocuseson majortheo-
reticalandpracticalweaknessesof culturalrelativismas appliedto the human
rights arena.It argues that the culture-relativistcritiqueof the modernhu-
manrightslawis largelyinvalidandhas corruptingeffectson the humanrights
regime,andit concludesthathumanrightsuniversalism,despiteall its flaws,
is still the better approach.

CULTURALRELATIVISMAS A SOCIALSCIENCETHEORY

Variantsof CulturalRelativism
Cultural relativismgainedprominence in the secondpartof the twentiethcen-
turyandis consideredby manyto be a hallmarkof modernanthropological and
relativismis a theory
socialscientificthought(Bidney1968).Statedbriefly,cultural
whichassertsthatthereis no absolutetruth,be it ethical,moral,or cultural,and
thatthereis no meaningful wayto judgedifferentculturesbecausealljudgments
are ethnocentric(Gellner1985).In practice,it is rathermeaninglessto speakof
thetheoryof culturalrelativismtoday,sincethereareseveraldifferentvariantsof
the theory,rangingfromdescriptive relativism(alsoknownas weakrelativism;
amounting to a commonsense observation thatculturesvary),throughnormative
relativism(orstrongrelativism;positingthatsinceallstandards areculture-bound,
therecanbe no transcultural moralor ethicalstandards), upto the mostextreme
formof relativism,knownas epistemological (orextreme
relativism relativism),ex-
emplifiedby Geertz and his followers (claimingthat humans are shaped exclu-
sively by their cultureand thereforethere exist no unifyingcross-culturalhuman
characteristics)(Jarvie1983; Spiro 1984, 1986).
324 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
JOURNAL RESEARCH
The early form of culturalrelativismwas a reactionto the ethnocentric
assumptionsof nineteenth-century science whichglorifiedWesternsocieties
and diminishedthe achievementsof non-Westerncultures.Nineteenth-cen-
tury scientistssaw humanevolutionas a processof progressivechangefrom
theprimitiveto the advanced(Spencer1904).Althoughthey understood,more
or less correctly,the basicschemeof socioeconomicevolutionof humansoci-
eties (whichis, in fact,characterizedby the gradualchangefromforagingto
adoptionof agricultureandthe emergenceof chiefdomsandstates), they er-
roneouslyincorporatedextraneousvalue judgmentsinto that scheme. De-
scriptiverelativistsbecame skepticalof broadgeneralizationsabouthuman
beingsandchallengedthe notionof the naturalsuperiorityof Westerncivili-
zation(Boas 1894, 1901;Benedict1934;Mead1928, 1963).Insteadthey em-
phasizedthe seemingly endless humandiversityand were able to demon-
stratethat even culturesplacedat the bottomof the evolutionaryscale were
advancedandsophisticatedat least in some aspectsof theirculturaldevelop-
ment. In fact,descriptiverelativistsfocusedso muchon exposingseemingly
vast culturaldifferences,they tendedto disregarddatashowinga significant
degree of patternedsimilaritiesamonghumancultures(Edgerton1992).
Normativerelativistswere convincedthat in additionto being highlyvari-
able,culturesinculcatedtheir memberswith moralandethicalrules through
involuntarysocializationand enculturationand that few, if any, individuals
were consciouslyawareof the arbitrary characterofbeliefsthatwere ingrained
into them (Herskovits1958, 1973; Fernandez1990). Consequently,norma-
tive relativistsfelt that there couldbe no extraculturalstandardsby which
other culturescanbe judged,thus forcingrelativiststo acceptandtolerateall
practicesengagedby others. Benedictobserved,for example,that morality
"differsin every society,andis a convenienttermof sociallyapprovedrights";
consequentlyshe viewedallculturesas "equallyvalidpatternsoflife"(Benedict
1934:278).
This formulationof relativismhas been characterized by some scholarsas
"intellectuallyirresponsible."Kluckhohn,for example,observedthat ethical
relativismis flawedbecause"ifone followsout literallyor logicallythe implica-
tions of Benedict'swords,one is compelledto acceptany culturalpatternas
vindicatedpreciselyby its culturalstatus:slavery,cannibalism,Nazism,or Com-
munismmaynotbe congenialto Christiansor to contemporary Westernsociet-
ies, but moralcriticismof the culturalpatternsof otherpeopleis precluded"
(Kluckhohn 1955:266).Despitethe criticism,relativistsarguethatas a practical
matterrelativismmustbe coupledwithabsolutetoleranceof otherculturesor
it wouldlose its teeth. Consequently,they believe that any attemptto make
cross-culturaljudgmentsor to create universalstandardsrendersrelativism
ineffectiveor trivial(Hatch1973, 1983). Furthermore,manyanthropologists
preferto avoidjudgmentsaltogetherbecausethey fearthat criticismof other
cultures and practices could become a theoretical and politicalminefieldfor the
discipline (Downing and Kushner 1988). Some believe that anthropologymust
be objective and ethically neutral in order to be scientific and conclude that true
 CULTURAL ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL
RELATIVISM 325

scholarshipis incompatible withanyformof evaluation(Steward1948;Hastrup

andElsass 1990).Othersfeel thatcriticismof any culturalpractice,no matter
how inhumane,wouldjeopardizetheirfieldworkandacademiccareers(Down-
ing 1988).To be sure, anthropologists doingfieldworkare oftenfacedwith an
ethicalconflictwhen they observeculture-sanctioned abusesof individuals. If
anthropologists chooseto supportan indigenoussocietyin its struggleagainst
humanrights abuses propagatedby an oppressivestate or some other large
multinationalentity, state officialsmay retaliateagainstthe whistle-blowers
anddenypermissionto conductfieldwork.If anthropologists chooseto support
a statepolicyaimedat eradicating humanrightsabusesperpetrated byanindige-
nous society againstits own members,that society may refuse to cooperate
with anthropologists, thus makingfieldworkdifficultor impossible.Finally,if
anthropologistsdecide to help a dissentingindividualor groupwhichrebels
againstdehumanizing customsof its own culture,lackof cooperation fromthat
societymay make the fieldworkequallyimpossible. Given the highcost of field-
work and the large empirical,theoretical,and financialinvestmentthat goes
into fieldprojects,few anthropologists havebeen eagerto get involvedin hu-
manrightsissues. Manyanthropologists .willingly,if somewhatunconsciously,
embracethe self-servingillusionof neutralityand objectivityto resolve the
moraldissonancecausedby observinginjusticeandtake solacein leavingthe
balanceof powerunalteredby theirpresencein the societiesthey study.How-
ever, as JohnStuartMillobserved,"apersonmaycauseevil to othersnot only
by his actionsbutby his inaction,andin eithercase he is justlyaccountable to
themforthe injury"(Mill1952[1859]:272).
In the 1970s the most radicalversionof culturalrelativism,knownas epis-
temologicalrelativism,emerged.Epistemologicalrelativistsarguedthat not
onlydo there exist no extracultural standardsagainstwhichculturalpractices
may be judgedas acceptableor unacceptablebecauseall culturesare mutu-
ally incomprehensible-asRosaldoput it, "myown groupaside, everything
humanis aliento me" (Rosaldo1984:188)-they also arguedthatthere is no
such thing as objectivereality,truth,or reason (Geertz1973, 1984; Clifford
andMarcus1986;MarcusandFisher1986).Accordingto epistemological rela-
tivists, all knowledgeandmoralityare exclusivelyculture-bound, andrational
thinkingandthe scientificmethodare no morethana culturallyboundformof
Westernethnoscience.In that view, science is not a logicallycoherentsys-
tem of verificationandfalsification, butrathera culturallybiasedway of think-
ing that is no differentfrom magic witchcraft(Geertz1973, 1984).The rise
or
of epistemologicalrelativismcoincidedwith the emergence of many new
schoolsof thoughtthatrose to prominenceat thattime suchas deconstruction-
ism, postmodernism, andMarxism,all of whichhaveattackedthe very ideaof
scientific,rational, ethical reasoning.Marxism,for example,emphasizes
or
the inevitability of class consciousness in shaping individuals' viewpoints
(Kolakowski 1978). Deconstructionism and postmodernism profess that there
is no way of knowing anything beyond one's direct experience and reject the
very concept of reality (Jameson 1991). All these schools repudiate the con-
326 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
JOURNAL RESEARCH

cept of objectivityand consequentlythe universalityof basic humanrights.

To many anthropologistssteeped in those theories, any attemptto define
even the mostbasicschemeof universalhumanrightsis meaninglessab initio.
As a result of the confluenceof the theoreticalandpragmaticconcernsde-
scribedabove,manyof which are indeedvalid,anthropologyas a discipline
has largelyfailedto examineculture-and group-sanctionedabuses of indi-
vidualhumanbeings (AmericanAnthropological AssociationExecutiveBoard
1947;Messer,this issue). Moreover,by adoptingculturalrelativism,proclaim-
ing unqualifiedtoleranceof all cultures,andby takinga group-centeredper-
spective, anthropologyhas left little room for rationaldiscussionaboutthe
rights of individuals,particularly
in non-Westernsocieties.

ReactionsagainstCulturalRelativism
Obviously not all anthropologists accept cultural relativism and the
antiexplanatory and antiscientificparticularismof its variants.Manyreject
relativismin favorof an evolutionaryanalysisby observingthat societies do
indeedchangetheir customsby developingmore humanehabitsin conjunc-
tion with the growthof their economic,technological,and scientificcapabili-
ties. They emphasizethe commondenominatorsamongcultures,suggesting
that it is properto speakof the commonhumanityof peopleas the basis for
cross-culturalmoralityandethics that are not completelyculturallyrelative.
Redfield(1953,1957)andKroeber(1935,1948,1952),for example,havetried
to developan objectiveschemeby whichone couldjudgeothercultures'cus-
toms. Kroeber(1948, 1952) suggestedthat there is an observableprogress
from nonstratifiedto stratifiedcultures.He saw culturalevolutionas an in-
crease in technologicaltraitsaccompanied by increasedrationalismanda cor-
respondingdeclinein magic,superstition,torture,mutilations,andotherreli-
giously motivatedbrutalities.
In the 1960s, Sahlins(1960) demonstratedthat culturalevolutionis more
usefullyviewed as a combinationof two simultaneousprocesses of specific
and generalevolution.Specificevolutioninvolvesadaptationto variouseco-
logicalconditions,whereasgeneralevolutionis progressiveinsofaras more
complexformsreplacesimplerones. Sahlinsobservedthat specificandgen-
eral evolutionare not differentrealities,but ratheraspects of the same pro-
cess. Specificevolutionaccountsfor localvariationsin ecologyandaccidents
of history;thus it lendsitselfto the relativistpointof view. Generalevolution,
however,is a progressivechangethatallowsus to makecomparisons,to rank
variouscultures,andactuallyto demonstrateculturalprogress.Accordingto
Sahlins,generalevolutionis characterized by the increasedabilityof cultures
to harnessenergy;increasedcomplexityin social organizationsfromsimple
foragingbands,throughtribes,chiefdoms,andfinallyto states;andthe greater
year-roundadaptabilityto physical environment. There is a wealth of archaeo-
logical and ethnographicdata that confirms beyond doubt the basic evolution-
ary characterof human culture (Flannery 1972; Sanders, Parsons, and Santley
1979; A. Johnson and Earle 1987; Service 1975; Steward 1955). Reflecting a
 CULTURAL ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL
RELATIVISM 327

majordeparturefromSpencerianevolutionism,modem anthropologyviews
evolutionas changecaused by a combinationof mountingpopulationpres-
sure, greaterintercultural contact,andincreasingtechnologicaldevelopment,
ratherthansimplyas progress.In fact,evolutionarychangeis costly, andits
benefits, such as increasedfood security,increasedprotectionfrompreda-
tors, andgrowthin scientificandmedicinalknowledge,are often counterbal-
anced,althoughnot entirelyoffset, by the costs of evolution,whichinclude
increasedlaborcosts, increasedwork time, decliningmarginalproductivity,
increasedwarfare,and the decline of individuallibertyfor all, especiallyfor
women,thataccompanythe emergenceof socialstratification (Boserup1965;
Cohen1977;A. JohnsonandEarle1987).
Feministscholarsare also deeplytroubledby the factthat relativism,post-
modernism,or deconstructionism marginalize gender-based violenceandavoid
the realityof systemic power imbalancesbetween the sexes (Gordon1993;
Moore1988).Moreover,theyareconcernedthatlargenumbersof nondominant
groupsandindividuals fromvarioussocietiesare routinelydisregarded andex-
cludedfromculturalrelativists'analysesas if they meritedno attention.
Others,like Gellner(1985),questionthe culturalrelativistassertionabout
the inherentincomparability of differentculturesby observingthat although
numeroussocial scientists have conductedfieldworkin seeminglyalien cul-
tures, andnumerousindividualshave traveledandlived in alien cultures,no
one has ever encountereda culturethatwas so vastlydifferentas to be wholly
incomprehensible or uninterpretable to outsiders.Similarly,no languagehas
ever been foundthat was not capableof beingunderstood,translated,andac-
quiredby outsiders.In fact,modernresearchindicatesthat languageacquisi-
tion is largelygeneticallycontrolled(Pinker1994).Moreover,the factthatnu-
merousindividuals havebeen ablesuccessfullyto switchcultures,migrateinto
othercultures,or adoptor modifytheirowncustomsandbeliefsbeliesthe idea
thathumansareso exclusivelyshapedby theirnativecultureas to be incapable
of comprehending or adoptingother culturesor that culturesvary so signifi-
cantlyas to be entirelyunintelligibleto outsiders.Gellner'sinsightshavebeen
strengthenedby modernresearchin evolutionarypsychology,sociobiology,
primatology, psychiatry,moderncognitivesciences,andneurosciences,which
showsratherconvincingly thatthereis sucha thingas universalhumannature,
lendingcredenceto the universalistbeliefthat there is an underlyinghuman
unitywhichallowsus to devise minimumuniversalstandardsapplicableto all
humanbeingsregardlessof theirculture(Barkow,Cosmides,andTooby1992;
ToobyandCosmides1990;DalyandWilson1983,1988).

WHAT IS WRONGWITH RELATIVISMIN THE AREA

OF HUMAN RIGHTS?

Cultural relativism has many flaws. Most formulations of it are contradic-

tory; others are tautological. As a whole, relativism is based on a static con-
ception of culture. It shows a bias toward functionalism and tends to justify
328 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
JOURNAL RESEARCH
the dysfunctional beliefs and customs of non-Western cultures while
marginalizing nondominantvoices withinthose societies. It overemphasizes
the rightsof a groupover the rightsof individuals.It forcesus to abandonany
meaningfuldiscussionaboutothercultures.However,the most troublingas-
pect of culturalrelativismis its applicationto the internationalhumanrights
legal regimebecauseof its potentialconsequences.At a minimum,if relativ-
ism were to underminethe universalistfoundationsof moderninternational
humanrightslaw, all meaningfuldialogueabouthumanrights abuseswould
end. Instead,all sorts of culturallysanctionedviolationsof individualswould
be legitimized,andindividualswouldbe left unprotectedagainstrulers,gov-
ernments,and others in power. Before takingup the argumentin favorof
humanrightsuniversalism,let us considertwo real-lifecases anduse themas
a springboard for our analysis.

CaseI: IndianSati

In 1987,RoopKanwar,aneighteen-year-old Rajputgirl,wasburnedalive
on her husband'sfuneralpyre.She was marriedby her parentsthrough
an arrangedmarriageat the age of sixteen andwas a universitystudent
whenher husbanddiedof cancer.It is not clearwhethershe committed
sati voluntarilyor underpressurefromher in-laws.It is said that she
appearedto be heavily druggedon the day of her burning.The case
causedquitea stir in India.Women'sgroupsorganizedmarchesin pro-
test of the practice.Manyof the Rajputs,however,bothmenandwomen,
defendedthe practiceon the basisof culturalrelativismstatingthatsati
is an ancientRajputtradition.They claimedthe rightto commitsati as
partof theirethniccultureanderecteda shrinein honorof RoopKanwar,
who becamea symbolfor a groupof Rajputextremists.Indianhuman
rightsactivistswere brandedby them as Westernimperialistsimposing
their views on ancientIndianculture.The Indianfeministmovement
was discreditedfor denigratingtheir nationalculture,for its lackof na-
tionalpride,andfor tarnishingthe imageof Indiaabroad.Althoughthe
Indiangovernmenthas repeatedlypassed laws prohibitingsati, these
laws are difficultto enforcebecause federalprosecutorsare often un-
able to gather evidence againstthe offendersfrom a communitythat
protectsthem. (extractedfromCoomaraswamy 1994:39-57)

Considera few hypotheticalquestions:

Wouldit matterandshouldit matterwhetherRoopKanwarcommittedsati
willingly?Wouldit be justifiableculturalpracticeif she committedsati volun-
tarily?
Wouldit matterif she objectedto her death?Does she have the rightto
reject the cultural practices of her culture or her ethnic subgroup, or is she
bound, through the accident of her birth, by these practices no matter how
unfair they are?
 CULTURAL ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL
RELATIVISM 329
Wouldsati be justifiableif it were supportedby a majorityof a group?Would
justifications ofsati holdthe samelegitimacyif the vastmajorityof sati support-
ers were menwhile100percentof the victimswere women?Is it relevantthat
thereneverwas a sati burningin whichthe victimwas a widowedmanandthat
most supportersof sati findthe ideaof malesati totallyridiculous?
Whatif sati supporterswere politicalopportunistsusing sati as a way to
rallypoliticalsupportandto dividethe Indiansocietyalongethnicsubgroups?
Whatif womenwho supportsati were mothers-in-law of sati victims?Does
it matterthat given the landinheritancesystem in India,a widowedwoman
has a legal rightto inherither deceasedhusband'sland?Does it matterthat
the in-lawsof a widowedwomanhavea significanteconomicincentiveto dis-
pose of her in orderto retainownershipof the land,whichis theirprimary,if
not only, asset? Is an invocationof an ancientcustomsufficientto legitimize
the practice?
Does the age of a sati victimmatter?Whatif she is fullycontrolledby the
familyof her in-laws?Whatif she is a child?Whatif she is an olderwoman
who has alreadylived most of her life andis consideredan economicburden
on her children?Does it matterwhetherthe womanis pregnantor not?How
faralongdoes she haveto be in her pregnancybeforeher deathby sati would
be unjustified?And if a pregnantwomanis to be spared,does she become
eligiblefor sati afterthe childbirth?
Is sati legitimateif the womanconsentsto her ownburning?Canherconsent
ever be legitimate?Canher consentever be informed?If she livedher whole
life in a smallvillageandknewof no otherrolemodelsforwomen,wouldshe be
consideredcapableof renderingan informedandvoluntaryconsent?
Is it relevantwhetherthe sati victimis a childbride,throughan arranged
marriage,livingsince her earlypubertyin her in-laws'house with no income
or decision-makingpower of her own? Is it relevantwhether she has any
practicaloptionsother than "voluntary" deathby sati? Does it matterthat if
she were to refuse to die, she wouldbe ostracizedby the village,her in-laws
wouldthrowher out of the house, andshe wouldhave no placeto go?
Is it wrongfor Indianfeministsand humanrights activists to invoke the
universalhumanrightsidealsin theirfightagainstsati andotherpracticesof
tortureor violenceagainstIndianwomen?Are these Indianfeministsbetray-
ing theirnationalheritageby doingso? Are these IndianfeministsandIndian
humanrights activistsmindlessvictims of Westernculturalimperialism?Is
theirjudgmentof Indianculturalheritageless legitimatethanthatof the sup-
portersof sati?
Whatof the long-standing,pluralistic,and rationalistictraditionsof India
whichare similarto those espousedby Westernuniversalism(Nussbaumand
Sen 1989)?Do these traditions,considerablyolderthanthe adventof sati in
Rajasthan, provide the needed cultural legitimacy to the position of Indian
feminists and human rights activists?
To most rational people familiar with the facts of Roop Kanwar's case,
whether they live in India or abroad, no doctrine or philosophical theory, in-
330 RESEARCH
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cludingculturalrelativism,is sufficientto justifyher death.Culturalrelativ-
ism, no matterhow nuanced,inevitablyprovidesthe logicaljustificationfor
such inhumanepractices.Ironically,the cultural-relativistdefenseof sati has
of
the detrimentaleffect disregarding thewell-demonstrated
pluralityand diver-
in
sity of Indiantraditions favorof adoptingone viewas representativeof In-
dianculture,in this case the view of sati supporters.Sucha cultural-relativist
constructionof Indiancustomsand traditionsmerely serves those who pick
andchoose ancientcustomsat will andthose who resurrectcustomsto serve
their own politicalagenda(in this case, Rajputextremists)or their own eco-
nomicneeds (in this case, RoopKanwar'sin-laws).

CaseII:AlgerianHolyWarriors

In 1996,two teenageAlgeriangirls were firstrapedandthen murdered

in frontof the entire villageby the followersof fundamentalistIslamic
leaderSherifKosami,who issued an edict that all women who attend
schools, in violationof the traditionof Islam,shall be rapedand mur-
dered.In addition,the motherof the two girlswas slaughteredwhen she
attemptedto shieldher daughters.The murderedgirls were fifteenand
sixteen years old andattendedhigh schoolin the hope of becomingei-
ther nurses or doctors.Both were religious,bothwore veils, andboth
studiedthe Korandaily.Accordingto the girls'father,the girls wanted
to practicemedicinein smallvillageswhere there are no women doc-
tors and where village women are deprivedof basic medicalhelp be-
cause Islamprohibitswomenfromundressingin frontof male doctors.
Sherif Kosami,religious leader of the fundamentalistArmedIslamic
Group,does not approveof women's educationbecause, in his view,
educationcorruptsMuslimgirls.Kosamihas issuedan edictin whichhe
proclaimsthat women attendingschools shouldbe punishedby death.
Moreover,Kosamibelieves that the "holywarriors"of Allah,i.e., his
followers,have a moraland religiousrightto rape their victims,or as
Kosamiputs it, they have a license "forenjoymentof marriage."The
newspapersreportthatat least 112 schoolgirlsor womenteacherswere
rapedandmurderedin Algeriain the firstfew monthsof 1996.(extracted
fromBhatia1996:C11)

Again,considera few questionin this case:

Does it matterthat both parentsof the slain girls believedthat education
was appropriateandnecessaryfortheirMuslimdaughters?Are theirviews as
legitimateas those of Kosami?Andif yes, why is it thatmanyculturalrelativ-
ists wouldarguethatKosami'sactionsare culturallysanctioned?Correspond-
ingly, why are the less popularviews in a culture not considered to be worthy
of protection?
What if Kosami and his policies were overwhelmingly supported by Alge-
rian women? What if many Muslim women have so deeply internalized the
 RELATIVISM
CULTURAL ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL 331
inferiorstatus affordedto them by Muslimclerics that they frequentlyen-
dorsetheirsecond-classstatusas naturalanda partof the God-givenorderof
things?How shouldthe internationalcommunitydeal with this situation?
Can an individualespouse ideas that are outside the mainstreamof her
cultureor embracenovel ideas in orderto changethe nativeculture?If not,
how couldany cultureever change?Does the job of decidingwhetheran idea
or practiceis typicalof a culture (and, therefore,blessed as legitimateby
culturalrelativists)alwaysrest withthe group?Giventhatvariousgroupsand
individualswithinAlgeriaholddifferentviews as to whatconstitutesIslamic
or Algerianculture,whatare the criteriafordecidingwhichsubgroupactually
representsthe true Algerianculture?Whoseviewpointshallthe international
communityacceptas legitimateandwhy?
Whyshouldn'tthe international communityinsist thatall cultures,no mat-
ter what their beliefs, be boundby universalhumanrightsthat prohibittor-
tureandmurder?Is it not, in fact,betterthatinsteadof engaginginjudgments
as to whichsubgrouprepresentsthe true culture,we guaranteeinsteadcer-
tain minimumrights,such as the rightto life, to all individualsin every cul-
ture, as the internationalhumanrightslaw currentlydoes, so thatindividuals
candecideforthemselvesto whichsubgroupthey wish to belongandto which
beliefs they wish to subscribe?
In thinkingaboutthese issues, let us keep the followingfacts in mind.A
typicalratioof males to femalesat birthrangesbetween 106:100to 104:100
(Sen 1990).In contrast,Islamiccountrieshavethe lowest ratiosof femalesto
males in the world,dippingas low as 48:100 in the UnitedArabEmirates,
60:100 in Qatar,and 84:100 in SaudiArabia(Nussbaum1995:90).Sen has
calculatedthat as manyas one hundredmillionwomen worldwideare cur-
rently "missing"andthata "greatmanymorethana hundredmillionwomen
are simplynot there because women are neglected comparedto men" and
thereforeare not given medicalcare or nutritioncomparableto their male
counterparts(Sen 1990:66).In manytraditionalcultures,disproportionately
fewerfemalechildrensurvivechildhood,andthe survivorsdisproportionately
suffer from malnutrition,diseases, and beatings and are routinelyrefused
medicalcare and educationresultingin women havinga significantlylower
life expectancythanwomenin othercultures.Giventhese facts,whichdem-
onstratea long history of abysmaltreatmentof women living in traditional
societies, anyinvocationof traditionto justifybrutalitiesagainstwomenmust
be treatedwitha greatdealof skepticismandbe subjectedto the highestlevel
of internationalscrutiny.The cases of RoopKanwarand the Algeriangirls
are, in manyways, "easy"because in both situations,the victims lost their
lives in the name of "culture."Whataboutcustoms that "merely"restrict
womento home,or veil them,or mutilatethem,or preventthemfromobtain-
ing education, or deny them salaried jobs, etc.? Most cultural practices that
restrict women are not benign, and many have grave if not outright morbid
consequences. Which cultural practices are internationallysanctioned and al-
lowed to exist is therefore a matter of enormous consequence. In the follow-
332 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
JOURNAL RESEARCH

ing section, I will try to point out why it is imperativethat we retain and
upholdthe universalnatureof humanrights law.

Contradictions of CulturalRelativism
Logicalscrutinyrevealsthat most applicationsof culturalrelativismto hu-
manrights are self-contradictory. On the one hand,relativistssubscribeto
the propositionthatthere are no universallaws or principles,yet on the other
handthey also insist that one must be tolerantof the culturalpracticesof
others,thus makingtolerancea defacto universalprinciple.If it is true that
there are no universalrules,be they ethicalor moral,then culturalrelativists
commitan errorby demandingthat,as a matteror principle,no culturalprac-
tice shouldever be judgedby other culturesor by outsiders.So long as we
recognizeat least one universalprinciple,we shouldcarefullyconsiderwhich
principlesdeserveto be applieduniversallyandwhichdo not.A goodcase can
be madethat other values, such as justice and fundamentalfairness,are far
moreworthyof beingpromotedas universalratherthanthe principleof toler-
ancewheretoleranceis definednotas avoidanceof hastyjudgmentsbutrather
as an avoidanceof any extracultural judgmentirrespectiveof circumstances.
Culturalrelativiststend to employthe conceptof cultureas a ready-made,
all-purposeexplanationof humanbehavior.Whydidthe practiceof sati evolve
amongstRajputs?Whydidthe Rajputsabandonthe practiceof sati at a certain
pointin time?Whyare some peopletryingto resurrectit? Culturalrelativism
offersno meaningfulexplanationsto any of the abovequestionsandprevents
us froma rationaldiscussionof any opportunisticuses andmisuses of tradi-
tion. Appealsto selectively chosen ancientcustoms or religions shouldbe
moreproperlyanalyzedas attemptsto legitimizethe politicalorreligiousagen-
das of variousfactionswithina society.Correspondingly, it is questionableto
assume that the views of the individualsopposingtraditionalpracticesare
somehowinauthenticor not reflectiveof their culture.These individualsare
no less membersof their society thanvariousfundamentalists who claimto
uphold "the tradition." The father of the slain girls voiced that concern
poignantlywhen he told the reporters,"mydaughtersdied as martyrs....
These madmenwho took the lives of my wife anddaughtersare the enemies
of Islam"(Bhatia1996:C11).

StaticConception of Culture
Culturalrelativismis basedon a staticconceptionof culture.By emphasiz-
ing stabilityandculturalcontinuityof customsor traditions,relativismdisre-
gards or minimizesthe importanceof social change.In fact, it ignores the
inevitabilityof change in every society and dismisses the thornyfact that
some traditionspersistwhile othersare selectivelydiscontinued.All formsof
cultural relativism fundamentallyfail to recognize culture as an ongoing his-
toric and institutional process where the existence of a given custom does not
mean that the custom is either adaptive, optimal, or consented to by a major-
ity of its adherents. Culture is far more effectively characterized as an ongo-
 CULTURAL ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL
RELATIVISM 333

ing adaptationto a changingenvironmentratherthanas a staticsupraorganic

entity. In a changingenvironment,culturalpracticesroutinelyoutlive their
usefulness,andculturalvalueschangeeitherthroughinternaldialoguewithin
the culturalgroupor throughcross-culturalinfluences.Any contactbetween
culturesis likely to cause at least some modificationin the customs of the
contactingculturesor at least to inducea reinterpretationof these customs.It
is this constantreinterpretation,reinvention,andmodification of customsthat
allowsculturesto surviveandbe viableover time.
Culturecan also be viewed as an uneasycompromisebetween conflicting
needs andwants of variousgroupsandclasses withinthe society,where the
dominantgrouptends to maintainperceptionsandinterpretationsof cultural
values andnormsthat are supportiveof its own interests,proclaimingthem
to be the onlyvalidview of thatculture.For example,ethnographic examples
indicatethatmen,whoas a groupdominatethe powerstructureof most strati-
fied societies, have discardedancientcustomsthat are inconvenientto them
but have selectivelyretainedthose customsthattend to subordinateanddis-
advantagewomen(Butegwa1993).Althoughviolenceagainstwomenhasbeen
documentedin practicallyall types of societies, the distributionof such vio-
lence andgender-baseddominancevaries significantly.For example,women
living in foraginggroups enjoy a high degree of freedomand equality(Lee
1979, 1984;Lee andDeVore1968;Leacock1978;Kaplan,Hill, and Hurtado
1990). Similarly,women living in simple horticulturalmatriarchalsocieties
have a higherdegree of participation in their cultureand are far better pro-
tected againstgroup-basedviolencethanwomenlivingin patriarchal groups
(0. Johnson1978). In contrast,women borninto stratifiedsocieties endure
high levels of physicalviolence,rape, spousalabuse,unequalaccess to diet,
restrictionson movement,andfemaleinfanticide(Edgerton1992).The divi-
sion of laboris also not equitablein most societies (A. Johnsonand Earle
1987).Time allocationstudiesrevealthatwomenworktypicallylongerhours
thanmen andthatthis differenceis most pronouncedin nonegalitarian societ-
ies (A.Johnson1975,1987).Inmoststratifiedsocieties,womenserve as beasts
of burden,carryloadsof waterandfirewood,engagein dailysubsistenceand
child-caringactivities,andeven have been documentedto engagein hunting,
warfare,anddivingfor food.Furthermore,nutritionalstudies show that even
if some societies can ensure an adequatediet for all their members,they
selectivelyfail to do so in the case of women andfemalechildren,depriving
even pregnantor lactatingwomen(P.Johnson1981).Suchfailureis maladap-
tive and has detrimentaleffects on the longevityand qualityof life of such
societies(Edgerton1992).Atthe sametime,in moststratifiedsocietieswomen
are excludedfrompublicaffairs,and men dominatethe social,religious,and
politicalagendas(Edgerton1992;Sahlins1968, 1972;Boulware-Miller 1985;
Dwyer 1991). In many regions, the low status of women was further reduced
at the time of colonization with the imposition of new political, social, and
cultural orders (Etienne and Leacock 1980; Leacock 1978). In recent years,
this process of marginalizationof women was again reinforced by well-mean-
334 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
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ing economicprogramsinstitutedby multilateral institutions,such as, for ex-

ample,the structuraladjustment programsinstitutedby the WorldBankor the
lendingpracticesof the International MonetaryFund(JointConsultative Group
on Policy 1991). By emphasizingstability,culturalrelativismdisregardsand
minimizesthe systemicaspectsofwomen'ssubordination, muchofwhichseems
to be correlatedwiththe socioeconomic level of developmentof a givensociety,
ratherthanbeingsome immutablecharacteristic of humanlife.
It is alsosignificantthatwomenfrommanystratifiedsocietiesseek to change
the restrictiveandoutdatedsocialcustomsin orderto survive.For example,
manyAlgeriansdeploreKosamiandhis extremistviews. Newspapersreport
that more than a hundredthousandAlgerianwomen demonstratedin 1996
againstvariousreligiousfundamentalists who wantto resort to the most re-
strictiveof traditional Muslimcustomsin orderto gaineven greatercontrolof
women.As one Algerianwomanputit, "Womenhere arethe leadersof change
in society. ... Algerianwomenhavea longtraditionof fightingso thatfunda-
mentalistsconsiderthem enemy"(Bhatia1996:C11).Such actionsare often
describedby theiropponentsas foreign-motivated implants.A more accurate
view wouldbe to recognizethat Muslimwomenare engagedin a socioeco-
nomic and politicalstrugglewith religiousfundamentalists, who manipulate
religiousandculturalideologyto theirownadvantageandwhodisregardother,
more liberalstrandsof Muslimideology.Discreditingof indigenousaspira-
tions for socialchangeas nothingmorethanWesterncontamination or as an
aberrantforeignimport,merelybecausethese aspirationsruncounterto some
entrenchedculturalpracticesof the majorityin power,seems to show singu-
larlybadjudgment.
Insteadof using cultureas the so-calledexplanationandjustificationfor all
behaviors,it is farmorefruitfulto analyze(1) whoseinterestsarebeingserved
by the "traditional" customsandwhose are infringedby them, (2) why some
customsareabandoned whileothersaremaintained orresurrectedandbywhom,
(3) who benefits from change in cultural
practices versus whogainsfrommain-
taining the status quo,(4) who is influencingthe direction andthe internaldy-
namicsof culturalchangeandwhethersuchculturalchangesmightleadto genu-
ine equalityand improvementof life to currentlymarginalizedsubgroupsor
individuals or to a furtherdisenfranchisement of the voiceless,and(5) whatis
the best way in whichthe universalidealsof humanrightscouldbe used to
effectchangein the natureanddynamicsof nativepowerrelationsin orderto
producemore equitableresults. It wouldseem only appropriate that the cul-
turalrelativistswhoderidehumanrightsuniversalism as superficial
shouldbear
the burdenof enumerating some sortof criteriaby whichthe international com-
munitymayjudgewhichgroupsor individuals withina givencultureshouldbe
classifiedas legitimaterepresentativesof thatculture.Withoutsuchcriteria,it
is impossible to decide what is and what is not part of a given culture and why.
The modern internationalhuman rights regime, in contrast to the relativistic
proposals, represents a thoughtfulattempt to balance competing claims for the
legitimacy of various groups and societies, while protecting those most at risk.
 CULTURAL ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL
RELATIVISM 335
Functionalism
Manyrelativistsprovidetacit or even explicitjustificationsof cannibalism,
infanticide,genitalmutilation,torture,violence,brutalityagainstwomenand
children,tortureof animals,andotherpracticesthatare repugnantof the ide-
als of international
humanrights (Benedict1934;Edgerton1992).Harris,the
leadingproponentof culturalmaterialism,has long arguedthat virtuallyall
culturalpracticesare adaptive,even if the peoplewho engagein them haveno
consciousunderstanding of these customs andpractices(Harris1971, 1977,
1985). Anthropological show, however, that many societies engage in
data
customsandpracticesthat are either inefficientor inhumaneor are actually
maladaptivein that they endangerhumanhealth, happiness,biological,and
even culturalsurvival(Edgerton1992).In fact,persistenceof a given custom
does not meanthatit is adaptive,optimal,or consentedto by a majorityof its
adherents(Cavalli-Sforza andFeldman1981;BoydandRicherson1985).Boyd
and Richerson(1985)have shownthat maladaptivepracticescan spreadin a
populationdue to indirectbias even undernaturalselectionandin the pres-
ence of better-adapted variants.Consequently,beliefs andpracticesthat are
harmful,inefficient,or neutralfromthe evolutionarypointof view cananddo
persist over long periodsof time.
Relativistsandfunctionalistspresumethat culturesshouldnot be tinkered
with,lest they shouldbe irreparably damagedor destroyed.Theyareconcerned
thatchange,whethereffectedby internalor externalfactors-such as the uni-
versalhumanrightslaws-could leadto destructionof cultures,forif a partof a
cultureis modifiedor takenaway,then the wholeculturemightcollapse.Con-
sequently,functionalistsfocus on justificationsof traditionalcustoms,forget-
ting that cultureshave been continuouslychangingandremakingthemselves
throughoutthe historyof humanevolution.It is highlyunlikely,for example,
that the millennia-oldIndianculturewill suddenlydisappearor be damagedif
we were to eliminatebrutalpracticessuchas the burningof widowsandif we
were to insiston the protectionof the rightto life of womenlike RoopKanwar.
In fact, Indiahas demonstrated,ratherconclusively,that fundamental beliefs
canbe changedin a relativelyrapidmannerwithouta corresponding collapseof
society.Forexample,Indiahas madeenormousstridesin mitigatingthe impor-
tanceof the caste system, a system of beliefsthat appearsto be farmore in-
grainedin the Indianpsychethanthe customof sati ever was. In practice,cul-
turalchangeis inevitableif culturesare to surviveandthrivein the changing
world.Blindadherenceto oldcustomsthathavelongoutlivedtheirusefulness
is nothingbut counterproductive. In addition,not all culturalpracticesare of
equalimportancein the overallcultureof the group,andsome canbe modified
moreeasilythanothers.It is erroneousto assumethata reductionin culturally
sanctifiedviolence,suchas sati,wouldsomehowundermineIndianculture.And
yet numerousanthropologists, beholdento culturalrelativism,justifythe cul-
tural and religious beliefs of other societies, even if those justificationsare far-
fetched and franklyquite unconvincing,rather than examine their rational,ethi-
cal, and adaptive qualities (Edgerton 1992).
336 RESEARCH
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TheMisconception abouttheExistenceof TraditionalCulture
Culturalrelativismadmonishesus to respecttraditionalculturesbut tends
to gloss over the fact that even in the most egalitarianand nonstratifiedof
societies, there is no such thing as one culture.Instead,all culturesalways
have consistedof groupsand individualswith conflictingagendas,and their
customshave reflectedthe interestsof the dominantclasses.
It is exceedinglyhardto determinehowone shouldgo aboutdecidingwhich
customsare representativeof a given culture.Shallwe, for example,assume
that if 100 percentof the individualswithinthe culturepracticea given cus-
tom,then suchcustomis legitimate?Orcanwe just accepta simplemajority's
view as to whattheirtypicalculturalbeliefsandpracticesare?Andwhatif this
majoritybenefitsfromthe given practiceat the expense of the minority?Is
such a practicestill legitimateandrepresentativeof that culture?Judgments
as to whatare the boundariesof a given cultureandwhatare its representa-
tive customsandtraditionsare inevitableandcannotbe avoidedjust by em-
bracingculturalrelativism,althoughsuch an avoidanceof judgmentappears
to be one of manyreasonsthatculturalrelativismremainsso attractive.Given
the long-standinghistoryof Westernimperialism,manyscholarsand politi-
ciansare appropriately hesitantto judgeforeigncultures,lest they standac-
cusedof ethnocentrismandlackof sensibilityto others.Consideringthe enor-
mousdifficultyinvolvedin makinganyjudgments,especiallywise andbalanced
judgments,it is easy to understandthe reluctanceto makethem.Althoughno
one can deny that even the best judgmentsand soundreasoningcan be and
havebeen used in an ethnocentricmanner,makingjudgmentsis not synony-
mous with ethnocentrismper se. Culturalrelativistsare correctin pointing
out thatby endorsingor rejectinga foreigncustom,one risks an impositionof
one's own culturalprejudiceson others.They are also correctin emphasizing
thatupbringingandeducationbringwith them inherentbiases.But the belief
that judgmentsof other culturesmust be avoidedaltogether,because they
may be ethnocentric,is illusory.One simplycannotavoidmakingjudgments
when facedwith oppressionand brutalitymasqueradingunderthe guise of
culturaltradition.Such a nonjudgmental toleranceof brutalityis actuallyan
ultimateformof ethnocentrism,if not an outrightethicalsurrender.The fates
of RoopKanwarandthe Algeriangirlscallformoralandethicaldecisionmak-
ing. By withholdingjudgmentin either situation,we are perpetratingfunda-
mental injusticesagainstthose who lack the voice and abilityto speak for
themselves.Culturalrelativism,despiteits pretensesto the contrary,involves
makingjudgmentsand,in the process,ends up condoningabusesperpetrated
againstthe voiceless and disenfranchised.

Emphasison theGroupat theExpenseof theIndividualand the

Misunderstanding of Self-Determination
Unlike anthropologists,who often tend to emphasizethe importanceof
groups,most universaliststake the positionthat the locus of humanrightsis
most properlysituatedin an individual.Universalistsrecognizean individual
 CULTURAL ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL
RELATIVISM 337
as the unitof culturalevolutionandselection.They also recognizethatrights
of groupsare best protectedby attendingfirst to individualrights. For ex-
ample,the best wayto protectthe rightsof anyculturalgroupto practicetheir
customsandreligionis to guaranteefreedomof religionandexpressionto all
theirmembers.Thatway,anybodywishingto practicemaydo so, whilethose
wishingto abstain,forwhateverreason,havetheirrightsprotectedas well. In
contrast,if one were to grantsuch a rightto the group,the individualswho
disagreewith the views of the majoritywouldhave no recourse.Historyhas
shown over and over that groupsand culturesshow a proclivitytowardthe
exploitationof individualsor entire classes of individuals,such as womenor
children,andthatwithoutthe properlegalconstraints,groupswill abusetheir
powersin a mannerthatguts the very ideaof humanrights.
In contrast,proponentsof culturalrelativismadopta group-centeredview
of the worldanddisregardthe fact that manysocieties place severalrestric-
tions on manyof theirmembersandespeciallytheirwomen.Manyproposals
callingfor the establishmentof grouprightsare based on researchthat does
not adequatelyreflectsuchintracultural diversity.Whatmaybe advantageous
for the group,or for religiousor politicalelites withinthatgroup,mayor may
not be in the interests of individualsbelongingto that groupor even in the
interests of the entiregroup.Fartoo manyethnographiesprovidelittle or no
information aboutintracultural diversityandtreatwomenandotherdisadvan-
taged groups essentiallymarginalandirrelevantby failingto reflecttheir
as
opinions,beliefs, and the degree of their acquiescenceto the dominantcul-
turalpractices(Geertz1968).
The degreeof individual freedomtendsto varywiththe degreeof socioeco-
nomicorganization of a culture(A.JohnsonandEarle1987).Individuals livingin
nonstratified communitarian societieshavea relativelyhighdegreeof indepen-
dencefromthe group.Althoughthe rightsof individuals in these societiesmay
be contingenton gender,age, or kinshipstatusof the individual, the informal
structureof these societiesallowsindividuals to negotiatea reasonabledegree
of independenceandthus to escapemost of the group-sanctioned abuses(Lee
1979, 1984; Lee and DeVore 1968; Flanagan1989). The more complexand
more stratifiedthe society,the morepronouncedare differencesbetweenthe
interestsof the groupandthe individuals(A.JohnsonandEarle1987).For ex-
ample,the morestratifiedthe society,the less freedomis affordedto women.
Manystratifiedsocietiespracticehypergyny,i.e., the familiestryto ensurethat
their daughtersmarryup into familieswith a higherstandingthantheir own
(Edgerton1992). To make their daughtersmarketable,familieswatchthem
vigilantlyto ensuretheirvirginity,throughphysicalseclusionof girls,whether
by veilingor purdah,throughthe practiceof footbinding,femalegenitalmutila-
tion,andotherphysicalconstraintsthataredesignedto decreasewomen'serotic
desiresandinsuretheirfidelityto a futurehusband(Kerr1993;Mathieu1989,
1990; Patel 1986). Such gender-based exploitationserves the purpose of fami-
lies, but it does so at a heavycost to girls andwomen,who lose theirfreedom
and whose qualityof life is diminished drastically.
338 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
JOURNAL RESEARCH
Yet most relativistssubscribeto the view that all groupsof peoplehave a
rightto createtheir own formof governmentandculture,no matterhow re-
pressive or reprehensibleit maybe either to outsidersor to the minorityof
individualsliving within that culture.Accordingto this interpretation,self-
determinationmeans somethingquite differentfromthe legal definitionof
self-determination (whichbasicallystates thatno state mayimposea cultural
or politicalsystem on peoplelivingbeyondits borders)(Higgins1994).Fur-
thermore,this interpretation of self-determinationleadsto the conclusionthat
individualsliving in oppressiveand inhumaneregimes shouldbe left at the
mercy of these regimes and cultures.In this vein, manyrelativistshave ar-
gued that even the most brutalcustoms which are groundedin culturalor
religiousprescriptionsshouldbe exempt fromthe prohibitionof tortureor
otherhumanrightsstandards.But historyshows that ethicalandmoralstan-
dardscanbe andhavebeen raisedthroughoutthe worlddue to the adoptionof
a universalapproachto humanrights.Abolitionof slaveryis one exampleof
suchglobalelevationof humandignity(Donnelly1989).Althoughslaverywas
acceptedby virtuallyall traditionalreligionsandnumerouscultures,it is now
generallyagreedthat slaveryis not compatiblewith the inherentdignityof
the humanbeing, regardlessof religiousand other culturaljustificationsof
the practice.Therefore,it is not unreasonable to arguethatin orderto ensure
basic dignityfor all individuals,cultural-relativistic
claimsshouldat least be
subjectto the minimumstandardsof universalhumanrightslaw.

TheAbdicationof EthicalResponsibility; Self-ServingUsesof Cultural

Relativism;Unsustainability
The self-imposedstraitjacketof absoluterespect for all forms of cultural
behaviorprecludesrelativistsfrommakingcross-cultural judgmentsandfrom
in
engaging meaningfulcomparisons.Manygovernments,especiallythose of
the ThirdWorldcountries,haverealizedthe politicalusefulnessof relativism
andhave erected uponit the positionthat governmentsare free to suppress
andsuspendthe humanrightsof their citizensin the nameof culturalsover-
eignty. In recent years, several ThirdWorldcountrieshave challengedthe
very principleof the universalityof internationallaw (Cook 1990; Hannum
1990).The problemwith theirchallengeis thatthey are mostly,if not exclu-
sively, self-serving.Those who defendculturallysanctionedviolenceagainst
women do so, not in orderto upholdabstractancientculturalprinciples,but
typicallyto advancetheirown self-interest,be thateconomic,social,or politi-
cal. Their claimsthat universalhumanrightsare nothingmore thana West-
ern importationdesignedto perpetuateWesternimperialismand to impair
the economicand culturaldevelopmentof ThirdWorldculturesare thinly
veiled attemptsto strengthentheir own powerbase. Religiousfundamental-
ists such as Kosami routinely denounce the excessive individualism of uni-
versal human rights and object to the imposition of Western values, which
they claim are embedded in universal human rights law. Such self-serving
rhetoric was also embraced by most of the former governments of the Soviet
 CULTURAL ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL
RELATIVISM 339
bloc countries,andit was only abandonedafterthe fallof Communism.Even
thoughthe Sovietblocgovernmentsratifiedthe vast majorityof international
humanrightsinstruments,they continuedto denouncethe so-calledcapitalist
natureof humanrights law and insisted that the treatmentof their own na-
tionalswas a purelydomesticmatter.Theyalsoarguedthatanygrantof rights
must be contingentuponan individual'sperformanceof his or her duties to
the society andthat the needs of a communitymust alwayscome beforethe
rights of individuals.In spite of this rhetoric,the citizens of the Soviet bloc
embracedthe idealsof the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRightsandother
humanrightsinstrumentsin their struggleagainstCommunism.It was only
afterthe fallof Communismthatthe cynicalnatureof the Communistrhetoric
was fullyexposed.Unfortunately, such rhetoricis still prevalentamongmany
regimes particularly in Asia andAfrica.
Historyhas shownthatit is unwiseto acceptat facevalueanyofficialclaims
that the systematicdiscrimination or presenceof cruelcustomsis partof the
culturalheritageof a society. The only meaningfuldefense of abusivecus-
toms that wouldbe consistentwith the principlesof humandignityand au-
tonomywouldbe a bonafide showingthat each subjugatedand abusedindi-
vidualconsentedto such a practiceandthat such consent was knowingand
informed.In practice,most individualslivingin traditionalandindigenousso-
cieties havefew, if any,economicor otheroptionsandare incapableof giving
an informedconsentto harmfulor brutalizingcustoms.
The growingconflictsbetween rights of individualsand group-sanctioned
violenceare onlylikelyto intensifyin the nearfuture.In particular, the impact
of cultureand traditionon the treatmentof womenmust be carefullyevalu-
atedby analyzingwhobenefitsfromthe traditionversus whobearsthe cost of
the traditionandby lookingat class andpowerdistributionin the society,as
well as the politicsof the so-calledtraditions.Internationalhumanrightsnorms
offera usefulframeworkfor resolvingconflictsbetweenwomen'srights and
traditionalcustomsthatharmanddehumanizewomen.Universalhumanrights
standardsact as limits on the excesses of culture-and religion-basedvio-
lence. They ensure that cultureis not used as an excuse to limitand impair
women'sdejure anddefacto rights. Ultimately,the rights of individualsand
groupsmust be balancedby evaluatingthe natureandsignificanceof cultural
practices,their effects on the weakestmembersof the society,the degreeto
whichthe conflictingrights interferewith each other,the cumulativeeffects
of potentialrestrictionson either's rights,and the proportionality of the re-
striction(Sullivan1992).The extent to whichwomenwill be ableto exercise
their rights withinvariousculturesand succeed in minimizingviolence and
gender-basedinequalitieswill be ultimatelylinkedto these women'sabilities
to sharein the interpretationof their culturaltraditions.
The assertion, often made by relativists, that indigenous women are indif-
ferent to, or offended by, Western notions of human rights is factuallyerrone-
ous. The criticism of feminism as nothing more than a Western imperialist
ideology fails to explain the ever-growing women's movements across the
340 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
JOURNAL RESEARCH

globe(Cobbah1987;Dwyer1991;Kerr1993;Legesse 1980;PetersandWolper
1995).For example,Africanwomenhave organizededucationalcampaignsto
combatthe brutalsexual surgeryof clitoridectomy.ManyMuslimfeminists
are fightingagainstconservativeMuslimclerics, such as Kosami,by recog-
nizingthat religiousfundamentalism is nothingmore than "patriarchal atti-
tudes andculturaltraditionsdisguisedas religiousnorms"(Mernissi1991:ix;
see also Patel 1986;Dwyer1991;Weaver1994).As one prominentMoroccan
feminist,FatimaMernissi,sees it, true Islamallowsfor "dignity,democracy,
andhumanrights."Accordingto Mernissi,"ifwomen'srightsare a problem
for some modernMuslimmen, it is neither because of the Korannor the
Prophet,nor the Islamictradition,but simplybecause those rights conflict
with the interestof a male elite" (Mernissi1991:ix).Peasantwomenin India
haveorganizedthemselvesto preventdowry-related burningof youngwomen
(Jayawardena 1986). The FourthWorldConferenceof Women,which took
placein Septemberof 1995in Beijing,wasattendedbylargenumbersofwomen
fromtraditionalsocieties. All those developmentsbelie the relativists'view
thatuniversalhumanrightsare excessivelyWesternandnot desiredby non-
Western individuals.Many such non-Westernindividualsnot only support
andembracethe universalstandards;they use them as a tool in the internal
culturaldialoguethat is ongoingin manysocieties today.
Froma practicalperspective,relativismis unsustainableinthe modemworld.
Even the most remoteindigenousgroupshave been substantiallyintegrated
into the globaleconomyandare subjectto ever-growingexternalinfluences
(CulturalSurvival1993).It is preciselythese peopleswho desperatelyneed
the protectionof their humanrights, and ironically,it is often the dictators,
the fundamentalists, and the multinational companieswho chantthe mantra
of culturalrelativismfortheirownbenefit.By refusingto engagein the evalu-
ation of other culturesand their practices,culturalrelativistsare unableto
analyzethe true natureof such politicallymotivatedclaims and are unwit-
tingly lendinga helpinghandto those who benefitfromresurrecting,appro-
priating,or inventingwhatevercustomsthey see fit.

CONCLUSION

Culturalrelativism,in its variousforms,has enteredthe debateabouthuman

rightsandhas been steadilygainingpopularityamongmanygroupsandindi-
viduals.Perhapsthis is so becausesome scholarsbelievethatculturalrelativ-
ism is the onlyalternativeto the dangersof ethnocentrismandmoralabsolut-
ism (Hatch1983;Jarvie1983).Or maybethis is due to its intuitiveappealto
manypoliticiansandactivistswho use it to advancetheirownagendas.Orper-
hapsbecauseof the politicalexpediencythatculturalrelativismoffersto gov-
ernments and those in power, the ideas of cultural relativism continue to ex-
pand well beyond academe. Whatever the reason, cultural relativism has the
potential of underminingthe modern human rights law developed during the
last fifty years. In fact, some majorinternationalhuman rights treaties, such as
 RELATIVISM
CULTURAL ANDTHEABUSEOFTHEINDIVIDUAL 341
the Convention ontheElimination ofAllFormsofDiscrimination againstWomen,
arebeingrewrittenandamendedto accommodate variousculturalandreligious
differencesin the nameof culturalrelativism,guttingin the processthe whole
ideathatwomendeservebasichumanrightsprotections(Cook1990).
Contraryto the assertionsandfearsof relativists,humanrightsuniversalism
does not take awaydecision-making powersfromindividual cultures,nor does
it have demoralizingand homogenizingeffects.Nor is there any evidenceto
showthatuniversalism is merelya formof uncriticalethnocentricWesterncon-
spiracydesigned to undermine non-Westerncultures.It maywell be thatuni-
versalhumanrightsidealswere firstrecognizedanddevelopedin the West,but
that does not mean such ideals are alien to non-Westerncultures.Similarly,
while the developmentof international humanrightslaw duringthe last forty
yearswas primarilyspearheaded by Westernnations,it does not meanthatthe
resultinginternational humanrightsregimeis ethnocentricandunjust.
The mainobjectiveof the existinguniversalhumanrightsregimeis not to
imposea jacketof arbitraryandhomogenizinguniformityamongdiversecul-
turaltraditions.Instead,the goal of universalismis to create a floor below
whichno society can stoop in the treatmentof its citizens. Conversely,uni-
versalismhas never aspiredto establishan upperceilingof whatthe idealor
maximumlevel of humanrights shouldbe, leavingsuch improvementsand
enhancementsto each individualculturein accordancewith its resourcesand
abilities.All majorinternationalinstrumentsandtreaties,such as the United
NationsCharter,the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights,togetherwith
its two bindingCovenants,andall majorinternational conventionssuchas the
conventionagainsttorture,slavery,andgenocide,are attemptsat universal-
izing only the minimumstandardsof treatmentof all individuals.
Due to a minimalistapproachto standardsetting,modeminternational hu-
manrightslaw is fullycompatiblewith culturaldiversityandmoraldiversity
foundaroundthe world.Underuniversalism,each state and cultureretains
sovereignpower over its own culturaldevelopmentalbeit withinthe limits
delineatedby internationallaw.Althoughthe limitationsimposedby interna-
tionalhumanlaw are minimal,they provideimportantprotectionsfor indi-
vidualswhowouldotherwisebe entirelyat the mercyof the state or the group
in power.These protectionsincludesuch basic rights as the right to bodily
integrity;the rightto be freefromtortureandphysicalandpsychological abuse;
the rightto be free fromarbitrarycourts,imprisonment,andpolicecoercion;
the right to be free fromslaveryandgenocide;the rightto free speech;and
the rightto choose to be associatedwith, or be free of, any religion,culture,
ethnicity,and language.
Althoughhumanrights universalismhas its flaws,universalismoften pro-
vides the onlyavenueavailableto individualsin theirintracultural strugglefor
fairness, justice, and equality. Consequently, the abandonment of universal-
ism in favor of cultural relativism would have profoundimplications for those
brutalized in the name of culture or religion. Even the critics of human rights
universalism admit that the internationalsanction provided by universalism is
342 OFANTHROPOLOGICAL
JOURNAL RESEARCH
conduciveto the preservationof internaldialoguewithin manytotalitarian
societies andthus providesthe neededleverageto improvethe humanrights
situationwithinthose countries(An-Na'im1992).
The tensionbetweenthe rightsof groupsto maintaintheir traditionalcul-
ture andthe rights of individualsto rejectthat culture,eitherin whole or in
part,is only likely to increasein the future.We must strive thereforeto de-
velop criteriafor balancingthe needs of both by findingnew ways in which
universalidealscanbe internalizedandlegitimizedin variouscultures.There
aremanyas yet unansweredquestions,suchas howto determinewhichrights
are more fundamentalthan others, which rights should be considered
nonderogable,andwhichrightscan be recognizedas more culturallydepen-
dent. Is it possible to developan internationalconsensus as to the criteria
whichcouldbe used to criticallyevaluateculturalcustomsandto judgethem?
How shallwe engage in a comparisonof cultures?How can we most effec-
tively legitimizethe claimthat certainethicaland moralconsiderationsare
absolutein a sense that they shouldnot be violatedor deferredunderany
circumstances?Such answers have yet to be completelyarticulated,but in
orderto achievefurtherprogressin this area,it is necessaryto abandonthe
uncriticalpluralismpostulatedby culturalrelativism.Indeed,anthropologists
are in the uniquepositionto promotethe observanceof humanrightsamong
the societiesthey workin by researchingthe congruencebetweenlocaltradi-
tionsandthe universalnorms.Inalllikelihood,the observanceof humanrights
in all societies will be significantlyimprovedif those rightsare perceivedas
legitimateandfittinginto the localtradition(An-Na'im1992).
There exist genuine differencesamongcultures,and not all such differ-
ences caneasilybe reconciled.The universalhumanrightslawrepresentsan
attemptto strike a properbalancebetween the rights of each individualcul-
ture to createits own moralandethicalnormsandthe needs of individualsto
be protectedagainstarbitraryand brutalcustoms and culturalpractices.As
such, humanrightsuniversalismis worthyof protectionagainstthe cultural
relativisticassault.Despiteall its flaws,humanrightsuniversalismstill offers
the best hope of dignifiedlife to the world'spopulation.

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