Socorro D.

Ramirez, the complainant, filed a civil case for damages in the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, claiming that Ester S. Garcia, the private respondent, had confronted her in the
other party's office and had verbally and physically abused her, calling it a "aggressive and
furious mood" and "contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy."1

The petitioner presented a precise recording of the incident to support her claim, and she asked
for P610,000.00 in moral damages, legal fees, and other litigation costs in addition to costs,
interests, and other relief that the trial court could decide to grant. The text used as the
foundation for the civil lawsuit was taken from a cassette recording of the exchange that the
complainant had made.2 It says what follows:

As a project manager do I need to use those words? Napaka chismosa mo

In response to the petitioner's recording of the event and his claim that the recording of the
confrontation was unlawful, the private respondent filed a criminal case for a violation of
Republic Act 4200, which is titled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes." The following is an
information that accuses the petitioner of violating the said Act and was dated October 6, 1988.

DESCRIPTION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Charges Socorro D. Ramirez with the Following Violations
of Republic Act No. 4200:
On or about February 22, 1988, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the ones mentioned above. accused, Socorro D. Ramirez,
did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, use a tape recorder to secretly record
the said conversation and eventually communicate in writing the contents of the said recording
to another person. This was done without Ester S. Garcia's authorization. against the law.
Metro Manila's Pasay City, September 16, 1988.
Instead of entering an agreement at trial, the petitioner used the opportunity to file a Motion
to dismiss the Information, arguing that the facts stated weren't the basis for an offense—
specifically, a violation of R.A. 4020. The trial court agreed with the petitioner that 1) the facts
stated do not constitute an offense under R.A. and granted the Motion to dismiss in an order
dated May 3, 1989. 4200; and that 2) the offense for which R.A. The term 4200 describes the
recording of a conversation by someone who is not a party to the conversation.
The private respondent acquired a copy of the trial court's order and filed a Petition for Review
on Certification with this court. This Court immediately referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a First Division resolution dated June 19, 1989.

Respondent Court of Appeals issued its argued decision on February 9, 1990, deciding that the
trial court's May 3, 1989 order was unlawful and declaring that:
The accusations are sufficient to establish a crime covered by Section 1 of the R.A. 4020. This
constitutes an enormous abuse of discretion by the respondent judge, which can be corrected
by certification, in dismissal the information on the grounds that the stated facts do not
constitute an offense.
As a result, the respondent Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
on February 21, 1990, in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Thus, the current request.
In her "main and principal issue"7, the petitioner strongly argues that recording a private
conversation by one of the participants is not covered by the applicable Republic Act 4200
clause. She argues that the rule only refers to someone not directly involved in the
communication recording a private conversation without permission.8 In this regard, the
petitioner claims that the information must include the conversation's content in order for the
facts charged to be considered a violation of R.A. At last, the petitioner argues that R.A. Since
4200 prohibits recording "private communications," not "private conversations," her act of
secretly recording her chat with a private response was lawful.
We disagree
First, a statute's language is the primary source for determining the legislative purpose. When a
statute has plain and straightforward language, the law is applied according to with its stated
requirements; interpretation is only used when an exact translation would be useless, irrational
or cause injustice.
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Part I. It is illegal for anyone to tap a wire or cable, or to use any other device or arrangement to
covertly overhear, intercept, or record a private communication or spoken word using a device
that is commonly referred to as a dictaphone, dictagraph, detectaphone, walkie-talkie, tape
recorder, or however else described, unless authorized by all parties involved.
This section definitely and clearly states that it is unlawful for anybody who is not granted
permission by all persons involved in a private discussion to covertly record that
communication using a tape recorder. The question of whether the party seeking to be
punished by the laws should be separate from or different from those involved in the private
communication is not differentiated by the law. The adjective "any" in the statute emphasizes
its desire to bring charges against anyone not allowed to create such a recording. For this
reason, respondent Court of Appeals properly decided that under this article of the Act, "even a
(person) accessible to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the latter's knowledge (will) qualify as a violator" 13.

Furthermore, a review of the Senate Congressional Records confirms the respondent court's
finding that in passing R.A. In fact, 4200 of our lawmakers considered making illegal,
unapproved audio recordings of private discussions or correspondence that were either
recorded by the participants themselves or by outsiders. Hence:

Senator Tañada: Only "overhear" was qualified.

Senator Padilla: In order for an element of secrecy to not seem material in the event that it is
captured or recorded. Now, let's say, Your Honor, that some parties, rather than all of the
parties, made the recording. This would apply to legal matters or special legal action, rather
than criminal cases, which would fall under section 3. In these situations, the parties may have
recorded something in an effort to show their intentions, as evidenced by their actions prior to,
during, or after the contract or act. If such a tape existed, what would you say? Is it meant to be
included within this bill's extent, Your Honor, or outside of it?

Senator Tañada: Your Honor, that is included in the scope of this bill.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record is to be used as evidence in civil lawsuits or special
proceedings rather than in the prosecution of an offense?

Senator Tañada: You're correct. Tape recordings of talks that are made without the consent of
all parties are strictly prohibited.

Senator Padilla: Now, your Honor, is that reasonable?

Senator Tañada: I think it makes sense since it isn't sporting to secretly record someone's
observation and use it against them. It's not sportsmanlike, and it's not fair. Your honor, if the
goal is to document the parties' intentions. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This could make recorders less useful.

Yes, Senator Tañada said. For instance, I was to state that if everyone involved is aware, there is
no objection to documenting board of directors meetings on tape. It is only fitting that those
making the comments and observations be aware that they are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: For this reason, we ask for fairness when we take comments from people,
saying things like, "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you."
He can't really complain anymore because, despite that warning, he continues to make
statements that are detrimental to his own interests. Nonetheless, I believe it is unfair to record
someone else's observations and statements without their knowledge or consent, especially if
they could be used against them later on.

The respondent court's opinion that the provision aims to punish even individuals who have
access to private communications is thus amply supported by the clarity of the provision's
express language as well as the Congressional Record's discussions that were previously cited.
One does not distinguish where there is no legal distinction.

Secondly, the type of conversation has no bearing on whether the statute was broken. It is not
necessary for the information to explicitly allege the same. As for R.A. The acts of
surreptitiously listening in on, intercepting, or recording private communications using the
instruments listed in 4200 are punishable. Section 1 of the R.A. would apply to a crime if it were
only claimed that someone had secretly recorded a private conversation using a tape recorder.
4020. In his COMMENT before the respondent court, the Solicitor General made clear that:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person, be met before one can be considered a violator.
Communication must be secure, use proper appropriate account, not public. Highly confidential
Communication and conversation