Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 32, No.

1
March 1994

Europeanization of Domestic Politics and

Institutions: The Case of France

ROBERT LADRECH
Saint Mary’s College, Notre Dame

I. Introduction
During the spring and summer of 1992, the referendum campaign over ratifica-
tion of the EC Treaties on Economic and Political Union finally engaged in
public the ramifications of EC integration for France. At the core of the debate,
for both proponents and opponents of the Treaty alike, was the nature of French
national identity in a post- 1992 Europe. Hoffmann has suggested that current
fears about French national identity include a focus on the European Commu-
nity, which ‘often decides against French interest, which moves toward a
concept of European citizenship that goes against the Jacobin strain ... and
whose institutional system is far closer to the German Federal model than to the
French unitary one’ (Hoffman, 1992, p. 33).
This article analyses the process of Europeanization in France, especially as
it impacts domestic politics and institutions. Hoffman’s mention of citizenship
is one such issue. These trends not only impact the institutional realm of politics,
for example constitutional revision, but other areas as well, such as the
relationship between national and subnational policy-making, with the suprana-
tional (the EC) increasingly woven into the matrix. Europeanization is an
incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree
that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational
logic of national politics and policy-making. In the case of France, two areas are

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70 ROBERT LADRECH

considered: ( 1 ) recent constitutional and parliamentary developments and (2)

the territorial bases of policy-making, focusing on relations between national
and subnational levels.
Due to the limitations imposed by an article length essay, the following
presentation can only skim selected areas. Many issues not treated here are done
so elsewhere (French Politics & Society, 1990). The intent is therefore not to
provide an exhaustive account of all areas of French political life touched by the
EC, nor an in-depth account of any one. Rather, I have selected areas which most
directly convey the effect of Europeanization.
My choice of these two areas, constitutional revision and changes in
temtorial relations affecting authority and legitimacy, are country-specific in
detail, but indicative of trends found in other EC Member States. My definition
of Europeanization stresses a reorientation of the organizational logic of
national politics and policy-making. Bearing in mind the variety of structural
determinants in all EC Member States, homogenization or harmonization
across boundaries is not a realistic expectation when considering national
adaptation to EC-generated inputs (e.g. in administrative practices). Yet an
approach is required allowing one to understand the redefinition of political
activity as it has been unfolding (and accelerating) over the past 10years among
EC Member States. By focusing on the reorientation of national politics by way
of organizational change through internalization of new environmental inputs,
alternate resources, costs and competitive calculations, I hope to bring a better
appreciation of the changes wrought by EC integration.
This moves analysis away from the debate between intergovernmentalists
*
and institutionalists. The difference between the approach employed in this
article and neo-functionalism and federalism on the one hand, and neo-realism
on the other, is a recognition of the continuing validity of national politics, yet
of a transformed nature. Neo-functionalism and federalism tend to privilege the
supranational (EC) level of decision-making, whether as part of an incremental
process redirecting activities and allegiances or in a qualitative leap to the ‘EC
as federal state’. Europeanization preserves the legitimacy and authority of
national government, but suggests that it will become progressively permeated
by environmental inputs which become, over time, internalized in politics and
policy-making. This is at odds with neo-realism in that national or state interests
are traditionally defined to the exclusion of other dimensions of political
activity external to the national state. Rather, the implications of Europeaniza-
tion would suggest inclusion of multiple actors, external as well as internal.
Consequently, Europeanization as defined in this article strikes a mid-point
in terms of extremes in conceptualizing institutional and political change in EC
Member States. Intergovernmentalism, as the predominant style of EC integra-
I For a presentation of the main issues in this debate, see Moravcsik (1991) and Cameron (1992).
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 EUROPEANIZATION OF POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS IN FRANCE 71

tion to date, while probably not ceding place completely to transnational actors
and EC institutions, may become altered in practice to the extent that recogni-
tion of mutual and reciprocal benefits and burdens may develop further. The
implications for the study of politics in the EC are profound in the sense that
national politics should be viewed as a dimension of an increasingly integrated,
yet multidimensional environment. Sandholtz voices a similar view:
Each Member State tries to ensure that EC outcomes are as close as possible
to its national interests, but the crucial point is that those national interests are
defined in the context of the EC. Membership in the EC has become part of the
interest calculation for governments and societal groups. In other words, the
national interests of EC states do not have independent existence; they are not
formed in a vacuum and then brought to Brussels. Those interests are defined
and redefined in an international and institutional context that includes the EC.
States define their interests in a different way as members of the EC than they
would without it. (Sandholtz, 1993, p. 3)
What makes Europeanization different from terms such as internationaliza-
tion or globalization is first of all the geographic delimitation and, secondly the
distinct nature of the pre-existing national framework which mediates this
process of adjustment in both formal and informal ways. In other words, there
exist exogenous factors originating from EC sources and processes, although it
is understood that there are also extra-EC causes (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989),
and endogenous factors which have their own impetus, such as the decentrali-
zation reforms of the 1980s. Machin’s definition strikes a similar note. Europe-
anization of French politics implies
that France is an integral part of a supranational EC. Its economy is interde-
pendent with those of the other eleven members, its monetary policy is tied in
the EMS with ... the Bundesbank, and its economic policies in most areas
(agriculture, industry, taxation, transport, public procurement and interna-
tional economic relations) are now made jointly through the European
mechanisms based in Brussels. ... French politics and policymaking are
intrinsically and increasingly part of a greater European whole (Machin,
1990).
By ‘the organizational logic of politics and policymaking’ I am proposing a
definition broad enough to include governmental and non-governmental actors.
Changes in organizational logic refer in this sense to the adaptive processes of
organizations to a changed or changing environment. If we equate the EC with
an international regime (understanding that it is uniquely more developed as
such), and generalize French political parties, organized interest groups, and
certain administrative agencies and governmental units as organizational ac-
tors, we then assume that organizations respond to changes in the perceptions

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of interest and value that occur in the principles, norms and institutional design
of the regime in which they are embedded. I am borrowing from Haas (1990) a
concept of organizational and institutional change that I believe contributes to
conceptualizing national adaptation to EC environmental inputs. Haas adds that
success in adaptation is certainly not preordained. Borrowing from a body of
theories labelled ‘rational adaptation theory,’ he states that
[olrganizational change is a matter of deliberate human design. The determi-
nants of successful design changes are seen as contingent on understanding the
social technologies involved, or on an appreciation of the resources base
available for organizational action, or on the conformity of organizational
structures with the surrounding social norms (or embeddedness in a larger
regime), or on the fit of the organization into some functional scheme (e.g. the
needs of capitalist accumulation or of socialist construction). (Haas, 1990, p.
238fn 10)
For our purposes, therefore, changes in French organizational logic in terms
of politics and policy-making refers to those new or developing behaviours or
practices inspired by the new rules and procedures emanating from the EC,
together with pre-existing or unfolding national trends or tensions. These
include increased EC decision-making into more policy areas, as well as new
and expanded opportunities for national and subnational actors to exploit EC
resources, e.g. in the development of EC structural or ‘cohesion’ funds. This
definition contributes to our understanding of how various French actors
conceptualize their situation and thus react to EC-related changes, such as the
speed of certain multinational firms to exploit the Single Market, and the
uncertainty of the mainstream parties vis-ci-vis their role between Paris and
Brussels.

11. Maastricht and the Fifth Republic Constitution

Of the two treaties signed in December 1991 at Maastricht (final version signed
in February 1992),one on economic and monetary union, the other on political
union, French consternation was directed toward the implications of the latter.
The lack of significant opposition against the conditions of economic and
monetary union is attributable to the consensus over its goals, and this involves
factors of economic growth and policy toward Germany. As for economic
growth, the drive towards the Single Market and the potential benefits of co-
ordinated monetary policy and a single currency help to explain its acceptance.
Monetary union, in a sense, dilutes the predominance of the Germany Bundes-
bank in monetary policy-making as it affects France and other EC Member
States. French policy toward Germany has been to enmesh it within the
interdependencies created by European integration. This has been evident right
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up to recent announcements of joint defence forces and French reactions in
general to German unification.
It is the treaty on political union, with its interpretation by some of French
surrender of sovereignty, that has generated debate and division in France and
within political parties. In short, the Constitutional Council ruled that in order
to ratify the Treaties, revision of the 1958 Fifth Republic constitution was
required, especially the section dealing with citizenship. The Maastricht Treaty
calls for European citizenship:
Art. 8.1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding
the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.

Art. 8.b. 1. Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he
is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at
municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same
conditions as nationals of that State.
The creation of European citizenship can be interpreted as contributing
toward the detachment of citizenship from nationality (especially if we assume
that a European nation-state is not the vocation of the EC). The consequences
to the French nation-state naturally aroused the most intransigent among those
favouring a Jacobin, centralized notion of state and citizenship, in this case the
Communist Party (PCF), a minority in the Socialist Party (PS), most of the
Gaullists (RPR), and the National Front (FN). These groups campaigned against
legislative approval of the treaty, with the RPR suffering most in terms of intra-
party dissensions. In the end, at a special congrts held at Versailles on 23 June,
the necessary revisions were adopted, 592 to 73, with 14 abstentions. With a few
exceptions, the senators and deputies of the RPR did not take part in the
proceedings or the vote. The following are pertinent sections of the new text
adopted:
TITLE XIV On the European Communities and European Union

Art.88- 1 A The Republic participates in the European Communities and in the

European Union, constituted of States which have chosen freely, by virtue of
treaties which they have instituted, to exercise in common certain of their
jurisdictions (competences).
...
Art.88-2 On condition of reciprocity and according to the terms informed by
the treaty on European Union signed on 7 February 1992, the right to vote and
of eligibility in municipal elections can be accorded to only those citizens of
the Union residing in France. These citizens can neither exercise the functions
of mayor or of assistant nor participate in the designation of senatorial electors
and the election of senators ...

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Art.88-3 The government submits to the National Assembly and the Senate,
by way of their transmission to the Council of the Communities, proposals of
Community acts incorporating provisions of a legislative nature. During
sessions, or outside of them, resolutions can be voted in the framework of the
present article, according to the terms determined by the rules of each
assembly.
The first point to be made is the obvious, the EC is now part of the French
constitution. Two potential consequences can be ascribed to the new constitu-
tional revisions: the weakening of the Jacobin link between citizenship and
nationality, which is part of the larger debate on French identity, and in this
context, sovereignty; and the revival of parliamentary democracy, again in the
context of sovereignty, but now linked to the the EC in a more explicit manner.

Citizenship and Nationality

The question of French national identity has been a topic generating debate for
some time now, with the immigration issue as raised by LePen only adding fuel
to the fire. The decline of Jacobin ideology has been noted by many, and indeed
those most alarmed by the diminution of the French centralized state, both right
and left, rallied against the Maastricht Treaty. Safran makes the point that the
Jacobin notion of the French nation-state includes a fusion of ‘nationality (i.e.
membership in a social community) and citizenship (a status entitling the holder
to the rights and duties conferred by the state)’ (Safran, 1991, p. 222). The
disaggregation of citizenship and nationality is rejected by both right-wing
Gaullists and left-wing Jacobins, although for different reasons. Gaullists
‘argue that it would weaken the state and lead to separatism on the part of ethnic
minorities; the latter argue that the disjunction ... would be a disincentive to the
social and economic integration of ethnic minorities and contribute to their
ghettoization and then permanent impoverishment’ (p. 226). No wonder that
such a national, ‘which implies a total congruence of legal citizenship and
nationality, must create discomfort for those who contemplate the evolution of
the European Community’ (p. 236).
The discomfort, as it turns out, was noticeable in the arguments put forth by
the anti-Maastricht forces. Their weakened support was reflected not only in the
vote at Versailles (even if the RPR had voted), but in numerous public opinion
polls demonstrating continuing support for European integration (NB: not all
opposition came from these quarters. Green and certain alternative left figures
wanted more progressive issues addressed. In addition, much of the drop in
support in the weeks leading up to the referendum on the Treaty was due to a
desire to censure the Mitterrand government, not a sudden shift in attitudes
toward Europe).

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It was not total victory for the Europeanists either, as Article 88-2 makes
clear. Other EC nationals residing in France cannot run for mayor nor elect
senators. The reason for this amendment is the fact that representatives or
localities make up more than 95 per cent of the Senate electors, thus indirectly
influencing national politics. Mitterrand at first resisted this clause, then later
backed down when UDF insistence and strength seemed to jeopardize his
careful manoeuvring. Still, a breach has been made in the Gaullist, Jacobin,
Fifth Republic constitution.
Does this represent the ‘logic of abdication’ (1’HumanitC-PCF)or ‘a crime
against the nation’ (LePen)? Or is the essential question concerning identity the
issue of control of national destiny as related to the role of the state?This appears
to be the basis for the fear expressed it the statement that ‘the accords of
Maastricht will have as a consequence the paring back of essential attributes of
sovereignty’ (LeMonde,3 March 1992).The question of sovereignty was raised
because it goes to the heart of the question concerning the future architecture of
Europe (or EC in the present circumstances). The debate in France is, and has
been, between Gaullist support for ‘1’Europe des patries’ versus some form of
‘supranationalitk’; otherwise stated, a confederation versus a federalist-like
formula.
Pro-Maastricht forces in France readily admit to the limits of national
sovereignty in a complex and interdependent world. The role of the state,
whether they have theorized its new vocation much,2 is to secure the best deal
in terms of national self-determination over those competences better suited to
decision-making by national and even subnational territorial units.3 This is the
argument for subsidiarity. In support of the Maastricht Treaty, Prime Minister
BCrigovoy stated: ‘The most enterprising go as far as recommending a confed-
era1Europe to which they contrast a federal Europe. False debate: we are not part
of a federal Europe. But we are going further than a Europe of nations, because
we accept the sharing of competences in those areas where one can do better
with twelve than going alone and failing. ... What is necessary for us to refuse,
in all cases, is a return backwards’ (Le Monde, 7 March 1992).
Again, because of the very tangible reality of monetary interdependence,
‘Financial nationalism no longer operates. ... [AJt least since the 1970s, no
nation any longer mints a single currency, even if appearances allow one to think
so’ (Dumas, Le Monde), monetary union did not generate as much passion as
political union. Even so, the role of the state, even in this traditional domain

The new Parti Socialiste projet affirms a ‘finalitt fkdtrale’.

)Surveyevidencesuggests thedevelopment ofattitudes which combine apro-ECor Europeanoutlook with
support for further decentralization in France. Conversely, anti-EC attitudes are paired with suspicion of
the weakening of the national state. These attitudes appear to cut across the left-right spectrum. See Dolez
( 1 991).
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symbolizing sovereignty did not escape the political debate over European
federalism. For Industry Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn,
whether one deplores it or applauds it, our states hardly constitute any longer,
and will constitute less and less in the future, the central site in which economic
policies will be conducted. This expansion of useful space (I’espace utile) is
not in itself a new phenomenon and, from this point of view, European
construction is only a stage in a long historical process. ... The single currency
will be as useful to France as the franc was to Provence, the lira to Venice and
the mark to Bavaria; it will allow Europe to create itself in the same manner
as the franc, lira and mark allowed the development of France, Italy and
Germany. (Le Monde, I5 March 1992)
Beyond the pro-Maastricht reasoning that the treaty simply ratifies what is
already occurring, a constitutional argument supporting a transfer of sovereign-
ty has also been developed.
In the report issued from the National Assembly commission charged with
developing the project of constitutional revision, the claim was made that the
concept of sovereignty itself has been evolving in France. According to
Commission rapporteur, GCrard Gouzes (PS), the Constitutional Council deci-
sion of 9 April 1992 concerning the need for revision relative to the Maastricht
Treaty ‘confirms and amplifies the jurisdictional evolution’ of the concept of
sovereignty. ... ‘It is not illegitimate to give to the notion of sovereignty a new
meaning’ [in which France] ‘by a sovereign consented act, the signing of a
treaty, accepts the limitation of its sovereignty in view of realizing an objective
of higher interest,’ such a limitation entailing ‘ a transfer of competences’ (Le
Monde, 6 May 1992). In prior decisions during the 1970s and 1980s affecting
national sovereignty, the Constitutional Council had concluded in each that
‘essential conditions in the exercise of sovereignty’ were not endangered.

Parliamentary Democracy and Maastricht

Although not enough to satisfy proponents of a return to a parliamentary system,
constitutional revision may lead to a modest enhancement of Parliament in
France, after its eclipse by the Fifth Republic executive. Following Article 88-
3, both deputies and senators now ensure that the government will no longer be
able to negotiate European laws ‘incorporating provisions of a legislative
nature’ as its pleases. This has been interpreted as ‘a complete break with the
French tradition of the executive being the sole player in international negoti-
ations. ...By indicating that the two houses of parliament will henceforth be able
to vote on resolutions and not just express opinions ... the revised constitution
places a weapon in the hands of deputies and senators’ (Le Monde, 25 June
1992).

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If this enhancement of parliament in EC affairs enshrines ‘in a basically

Jacobinist constitution France’s acceptance of the institutional consequences of
European construction’, it also reflects an enhancement of democratic account-
ability. It may serve to strengthen both national and supranational democracy
by diminishing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ of the EC. The ‘democratic
deficit’ is usually regarded as the lack of substantial power for the European
Parliament (EP) vis-&vis the EC Council of Ministers. But the relative lack of
EP influence in EC decision-making is mirrored at the national level as well by
the growth of executive and bureaucratic power over parliament in the develop-
ment of regulations and policy. Furthermore, national executives act unencum-
bered by parliamentary oversight in their dealings with Brussels, whether with
the Commission or the Council. Only the Danish Folketing has retained
significant leverage over the Council by virtue of a parliamentary committee on
EC legislation ‘that is in near-permanent session’ (Williams, 1991, p. 159).
Article 88-3 may promote national parliamentary input into the accountable
deliberations of its national representatives. It will not, though, reorient the
dynamics of executive-legislative relations in France.4 More likely, at least in
terms of accountability, is the full engagement of French administrative proce-
dures as part of the process of turning EC Directives and Regulations into
French law (Guillaume, 1992).
At the same time, the Maastricht Treaty provides, at least partially, for more
control, or co-decision, on the part of the EP vis-d-vis the Council of Ministers.
The Maastricht Treaty would seem to advance European construction in a triple
democratic effort: ( 1 ) emphasizing local democracy by way of the principle of
subsidiarity; (2) a closer relationship between the EP and national parliaments
in the elaboration of EC rules; and (3) an improvement in the role of the EP.
National parliamentary input also adds to the legitimacy of the EC. By
‘reinforcing the legitimacy of [French] negotiators in Brussels’, by virtue of the
support from and clearer accountability to the national parliament, EC legitima-
cy, which derives from ‘the governments of its Member States’, is also
strengthened (Barrot, Le Monde, 22 April 1992).
Finally, an additional view of democratic legitimacy is promoted. The
French international legal scholar Cohen-Tanugi has suggested that two con-
ceptions of democracy currently co-exist in Western Europe. The Jacobin
tradition, which is still prevalent in France (although no longer exclusive), ‘is
that of elective democracy, founded solely on universal suffrage. Now, since the
war, the European definition of democracy has been enriched little by little by
another dimension, that of the state of constitutional law, founded on higher

‘ On 17 December 1992. the Constitutional Council ruled that although legislative resolutions on EC
matters were not inconsistent with the Constitution, it did stress that Parliament was not fo usurp the
prerogatives and responsibilities of the government (Le Monde, 13 January 1993, p. 10).
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principles of law, equity, and procedure, of which legitimacy is of a different

kind. ... Like other organizations of a federal type, the Community is building
itself by law, and Community law will be the cement of the future European
citizenship’ (Cohen-Tanugi, Le Monde, 5 May 1992). In addition to the process
of Europeanization in the form of adopting, adapting and enforcing EC Direc-
tives, Cohen-Tanugi advances an effect grounded in international legal norms.
The EC
above all, is a factor in political modernization: in France, European integra-
tion has promoted the ‘return of law’ and the promotion of a democratic ideal
which does not draw its legitimacy solely from the law of the majority, but also
from fundamental principles -those of the European Convention of the rights
of man, for example - and from a system of judicial recourse largely open to
citizens against national states, in the quality of rights. This cultural revolution
in the primacy of law accounts for much of which we [French] owe to Europe.
An increase of power for national parliaments in EC affairs may bolster not
only the first kind of democracy, the elective, but also the second. This is
because they now become part of the negotiations of constituent treaties. This
last point is significant ‘because the norms derived from Community law hold
their legitimacy from the democratic sanction given by States to treaties from
which they proceed’ (Cohen-Tanugi, 1992).
The Maastricht Treaty remains, undoubtedly, modest in terms of rebalancing
parliamentary with executive power. Yet the constitutional revisions in France
and the modest enhancement of the EP may signal the direction in which more
explicitly political development takes place. This double legitimacy is needed
in order to assuage the doubts and apprehensions of those who feel that at
present,
the architects of Europe think that they can make progress towards European
Union solely through fashioning a structure of laws. ... [for them] Europe is
conceived of as essentially a legal space. ... The Community i s in the process
of becoming a sort of closed regulatory area isolated from political forces. ...
It is then urgent that the Community rebalance the judicial with the political.
(Rosanvallon, 1992, p. 27)
The Maastricht Treaties add to the trends noted above - the weakening of the
Jacobin tradition in terms of both citizenship and executive - legislative
relations, and the promotion of Community norms in constitutional law. These
are the types of dynamics that proceed at a slower, incremental pace than the
high-profile decisions taken at intergovernmental summits and, therefore, are
more difficult to measure in impact when analysed in isolation from other
ongoing processes. The fact that for many in France the meaning of subsidiarity
-transferring to the EC only those matters that cannot be effectively taken care
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of at the lowest level - implies the need for more control at the subnational
(regional) rather than national level probably cannot be examined apart from the
effects of the decentralization reforms of the 1980s (Gremion, 199 I ), In another
area, the integration of EC Directives into French laws, and therefore enforce-
ment, has been strengthened by recent decisions of the Conseil d’Etat, which
state that French laws must be in conformity with EC Directives and internation-
al law. Yet the compliance rate in enforcement had already begun to rise since
the SEA was promulgated in 1987, due to the introduction of new administrative
techniques and the greater weight given to the policies themselves (Carnelutti,
1988).

111. Changes in the Territorial Bases of Policy-Making

In an analysis of the EC’s Structural Policy on the institutional relationship
between Member States and Brussels, Marks stresses that most discussions
about the political configuration of the EC in the short to medium term miss the
crucial role developing on the part of subnational governments: ‘Instead of a
two-sided process, a far more complex, open-textured, and fluid situation is
emerging in which subnational governments interact with the EC and cross-
nationally. Policy-makers are confronted not simply with the issue of how much
decision-making to centralize in Brussels but with how disparate levels of
government both within and beyond the national state fit together’ (Marks,
1992, p. 222). Recognizing that convergence or homogenization of sub- and
national structures across boundaries is not expected, Marks notes that ‘national
differentiation ... reflects varying strengths and types of regional government
and varying state strategies and capacities’ (p. 2 15).
How is this process of differentiation manifesting itself in the case of France?
Again, we have a complex process at work in the French case -exogenous inputs
or environmental conditions generated by the EC and wider global economic
trends, intermingling with those emanating from endogenous national factors,
in this case the intended and unintended consequences of decentralization
reforms.
In this brief look at Europeanization as it affects French policy-making, we
see a process of detachment occurring, this time in the temtorial exclusiveness
of the national state in framing the structure and networks of policy actors.
Increased latitude on the part of subnational actors injects into the EC-national
-subnational relationship a greater degree of complexity in terms of responsi-
bility for rule-making and resource opportunities. Despite the considerable
influence of national governments to maintain their primacy, one can nonethe-
less observe a change in the logic of French policy-making. The French case
shares some similarities with other nations which have experimented with ways
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to ‘deconcentrate and decentralize decision-making to mollify ethno-linguistic

minorities, bring policy provisions nearer policy receivers, cushion demands on
the state, and reduce the central tax burden’ (Marks, p. 213), primarily by the
formation of a regional tier of government. Europeanization thus proceeds from
the consequences of decentralization - increased responsibility of regions and
departments - and the traditional policy networks’ exposure to EC-mandated
procedures (Leonardi, 1990).

EC and Decentralization
The 22 French regions (collectivitis territoriales) endowed after 1982 with
elected mandates and augmented responsibility in planning have begun to
accrue importance in policy-making for reasons beyond the initial domestic
considerations. Although regions are more constrained in their legal freedom of
action within and beyond the boundaries of France as compared to Spanish
provinces or German Lander, they have in the past few years multiplied the
number and range of their activities at the European level. Before turning in
some detail to such examples, let us first understand the general dynamics
promoting regional aims.
EC dynamics are our primary external input into changing organizational
logic, yet the most significant recent EC development, the Single European Act,
is itself the response to multiple causes. The enhancement of subnational
governments was not an explicit goal, although the boost in aid to poor and
declining regions has been considered by some as a ‘side payment’ in order to
acquire assent by the poorer Member States for the 1992 package of economic
liberalization. Yet the nature of the EC response to global economic conditions,
deregulation by way of the Single Market, does in fact contribute to demands for
subnational or regional economic planning, over and above that created by
national institutional reform in proceeding years.
To the extent that one of the predicted benefits of the Single Market is added
foreign direct investment, then a direct impact upon local development strate-
gies can be ascertained. According to King, flexible specialization ‘promotes
the importance of regions ...since under this craft-based specialized organiza-
tion of production firms and local government operate as parts of an integrated
system. ... Indeed within the European Community competition between
national, regional and local governments to influence the location decisions of
industrial financial investors is intense’ (King, 1990, pp. 277, 284). Budd
suggests a similar process of regional promotion due to global and European
economic trends. The context and conjuncture of Europe’s regional transforma-
tion stems from the

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evacuation of national economic regulation to supranational and regional
levels, deindustrialization, decentralization, reagglomeration and reindustri-
alization and a growing hegemony of global finance. The transformation of
Europe’s regions is a function of these forces which have led to mobile capital
locating in them.

Regional responsibility for economic development has given the regions the
appearance of a relative autonomy from central state control. This relative
autonomy stems from the degree to which regions are able to locate them-
selves within the hitherto different forms of circuits of commercial and
banking capital. (Budd, 1992, pp. I , 19)
Are variants of these trends visible in France? Although French regions may
not exercise the same degree of ‘relative autonomy’ over their affairs as other
regions in EC Member States, nevertheless similar activities and national
responses to them are occurring. Delcamp states that national misgivings about
more authority and autonomy for the regions as actors on a European level are
fading due to three pressures impinging on state control: (1)financiaf difiicul-
ties which necessitate the state to seek additional funding for regional develop-
ment; (2) international economic interdependency emphasizing market I i beral-
ization; and ( 3 ) the growth of local powers ‘wishing to affirm their youthful
personality in a multipolar Europe’ (Delcamp, 1992, p. 149). As the regions
become more and more the objects of European law, the EC appears increasing-
ly as one of their basic fields of operation. Especially since 1988 - market
liberalization and the increase in EC Structural and Development Funds -
French regions have ‘suddenly found themselves plunged into a milieu where
economic realities, taking on multiple networks of exchange, count for more
than the simple management of local services’ (p. 159).
Emphasizing multiple pressures resulting in regional autonomy in European
matters, Mullerargues that during the 1980s the French public policy model was
challenged by two basic developments (Muller, 1992). The model, according to
Muller, had three characteristics: ( I ) the centrality of the state in mediation
procedures; (2) specific forms of interest representation; and (3) a privileged
place for the national state in the implementation of public policies at the local
level. Challenging this model are ( I ) the emergence on the European level of the
market as a dominant norm, affecting the state’s main operational modes, and
(2) decentralization.
The ‘crisis’ of the French public policy model following from these devel-
opments leads to two principal conclusions. The first concerns the ‘loss of the
centrality of the State, and in particular that of the upper administration, in the
processes of social mediation ... and ... in the expression of social interests’ (p.
295). The second conclusion, linked to the first, is the establishment of a new

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European public space where images of references and articulation of social

interests take place.
This developing EC is structured around two fundamental norms defining
the role of national states. The first is the social economy of the market, which
Muller takes to be characteristic of the German model. ‘Certainly, this combi-
nation of liberalism and the welfare state does not reign supreme in Europe, but
it is tending to become the dominant norm’ (p. 296). The second is the norm of
subsidiarity, which defines a relationship between ‘the State and regions
(collectivitCs territoriales) founded on both the priority given to the decentral-
ized echelon and on a global regulatory role given to the State. ... The same
observation applies elsewhere to nationalized industries which, despite the
forceful return of “colbertisme industriel”, see their growing autonomy of
decision beginning at the moment when the necessity to win market share
becomes their sole purpose’ (pp. 296-7).
Hall considers these developments as enhancing the pluralism of French
politics, especially the variety of organized interests or associational life. The
gradual internationalization of French business and the growing influence of the
EC ‘has moved the axes of influence over social and economic policy away from
Paris while the recent surge of interest in market solutions to socio-economic
problems has enhanced the role of private sector actors in many economic and
cultural spheres’ (Hall, 1990, p. 92).
Delcamp observes new ‘networks of exchange’, or ‘policy communities’. As
many have observed, the formal-informal relations between the French state
and organized interests and subnational units has been changing in the direction
of, if not less state presence, then more penetration of the state apparatus by
formerly weak or excluded groups and echelons. MCny suggests a certain
‘fragility of these policy communities’, resulting from external as well as
internal factors. In numerous sectors, the nature of relations between groups and
the state has been loosened or modified by European integration again comple-
mented by decentralization. EC enlargement and deepening has had many
consequences, and according to MCny, French administrations have stated more
and more often that ‘it was no longer possible to impose their views and have
been obliged to accept the idea that they were becoming, in Community matters,
instruments of execution as much as that of decision’ (MCny, 1989, p. 363). As
for the groups concerned, they realize that government support is indispensable
and so ‘act in concert with their opposite numbers within the EC and organize
on a European scale’ (p. 363). Opportunities to penetrate EC structures include
lobbying the European Parliament as well as EC civil servants in Brussels, who
in fact seek to complement the information and data supplied to them on various
issues by national administrations (Andersen and Eliassen, 1991).The result of
EC influences doubly affects policy communities:
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 EUROPEANIZATION OF POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS IN FRANCE 83
The State is no longer in a position to ‘guarantee’ policy output nor to assure
selected intermediaries a monopoly of access to effective centres of decision;
as for the groups, they can, if they wish, utilize a range of interventions larger
and more open than has been the case or even, when they are marginalized,
short-circuit the State. (MCny. 1989, p. 363)

French Regions in the EC

French regions are increasingly involved in activities aimed at Brussels and in
transfrontier relations. The nature of their activities varies with the internal
complexion of each region. What makes a region more than simply an admin-
istrative jurisdiction? Here the economic trends discussed above add to the
definition, for certain regions may evolve as dynamic economic and financial
centres relatively autonomous from central inputs. The Ile-de-France and Paris
constitute a region within France and at a European-level due, among other
factors, to the presence and continued development of transnational transport
networks.
In a similar fashion, some regions are also developing a certain clout beyond
the tutelage of Paris, structured at times around a dynamic city (Brunte, 1989).
Kresl suggests, for instance, that Lyon has been ‘liberated from a constraining
national economic space by EC 1992. ... Most recently described ... as the key
city in the ‘North of the Souths, ... [pllanners in Lyon have made much of this
locational advantage and have begun to perceive the city as one of the crossroads
of Europe, rather than as a peripheral city in France’ (Kresl, 1992, p. 161 ).
This development of new spatial hierarchies, a consequence of the compet-
itive environment created by Single Market dynamics, is likely to continue to
the point where we begin to speak of multinational regions (Camagni et al.,
1991). Multinational, or transfrontier, regions are already a fact incorporating
various French regions. For Charles Millon, president of the regional council of
Rh8ne-Alpes, ‘each French frontier region is closer to a regional capital of our
neighbours than to Paris’ (Le Monde, 8 January 1992). Arguing for the
strengthening of French regions in order to avoid a sort of national dismember-
ment, Millon paints a picture of behaviour and activity clearly more transnation-
al than national. A ‘Montpellierais prefers to fly from Barcelona, a Lillois from
Brussels, a Strasbourgeois from Frankfurt, rather than go to Roissy. And it’s not
much different for banks: already in Savoie, the Savings Bank of Turin now
attracts those French businessmen who have lost interest in our national banks,
too centred as they are on the capital. The Languedoc-Rossillon region already
submits to the economic influence of Barcelona.’ French regions have sought
to project their concerns towards the EC (Robin, 1991). They have signed a
number of co-operation accords with their neighbours in the Community and

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84 ROBERT LADRECH

expanded their activities in Brussels, especially during the past three years.
Although formal EC structures for regional representation remain consultative,
encouragement from Brussels (including Jacques Delors) is apparent.5 The
following are some recent initiatives undertaken by French regions, some in
conjunction with other EC regions, compiled by a Le M o d e (8-9 March 1992)
survey of the European policies of French regions.
1. transfrontier regions have created the Association of European Fron-
tier Regions;
2. mountain regions have founded a working group, the Community of
the Western Alpes;
3. peripheral regions launched a Conference of Peripheral Maritime Re-
gions, headquartered at Rennes;
4. capital city regions have formed a Union of Capital Regions of the EC;
5. numerous bilateral accords between Corsica and Sardinia.
More ambitious projects have included:
1. beginning in 1986, the Rh6ne-Alpes region entered into accords on
scientific, technical and cultural co-operation with Baden Wiirttem-
burg, Catalonia, and Lombardy;
2. in July 1991, the Euro-region was formed, grouping the five regions
of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Kent, Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels-
capital region together so as to prepare for the Single Market, the
ChannelTun nel, and the north-western segment of the TGV.
These initiatives are important because they are motivated by the search to
exploit changed and changing conditions, which present more responsibility for
economic development, less tutelage from Paris, and potential opportunities at
the EC and trans-regional and -national levels. This represents that altered
‘organizational logic’ which, though perhaps not accounting for a revolutionary
restructuring of French national - subnational relations, is certainly adding
another dimension modifying, sometimes in subtle ways, those relations.

IV. Conclusion
Europeanization posits a complex interdependency which will vary from nation
to nation depending on pre-existing national structures and internal develop-
ment (Lindberg, 1971). Even so, although this article has reflected a single-
’The Maastricht Treatyon Political Union creates anew Committee of the Regions, a body whose members
are to be appointed by national governments.
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 EUROPEANIZATION OF POLITICS AND 1NSTlTUTlONS IN FRANCE 85
country focus, one can perceive a wider significance of these developments for
other EC Member States. As Hoffmann noted in the opening quote, the EC
‘institutional system is far closer to the German Federal model than to the
French unitary one’. Yet constitutional issues and territorial relations in federal
and regionalist polities are also affected by EC integration, though in a different
manner. In unitary systems, as in the French case, EC inputs may provide
additional conduits of resources and political legitimacy for subnational actors
through consciously designed EC programmes aimed at regional economic
development. This would apply to the UK as well as France. These develop-
ments may then feed into debates about administrative decentralization in such
countries.
In federal systems such as Germany, or ones with pronounced regional
territorial arrangements such as Spain, EC development may actually upset the
national/subnational balance, thus stimulating constitutional or other design
reforms (Hrbek, 1992; Lopez Aguilar, 1992). Consequently, the pattern of
changes unfolding in France may be classified as one affecting unitary states in
regards to the territorial bases of policy-making. Europeanization does, there-
fore, seem to call into question prevailing relationships between different
territorial actors, some fearing a loss of autonomy, others perceiving an
opportunity.
It is into this dimension of Europeanization that questions of federal union
and subsidiarity in the EC are brought into relief. The deficiency of both neo-
functionalist and federalist models has been the implication or presumption of
a certain uniformity in structural arrangements, whether in conceiving EC
institutions as becoming at some later date a ‘government’ which enjoys
national-type allegiances (Haas, 1958) or else a federal relationship clearly
favouring the supranational level.6 By the time of the Edinburgh EC Summit in
December 1992, the consternation voiced by many over the appropriate alloca-
tion of responsibilities between actors, national and EC, led to a more public
debate about subsidiarity. Yet, as Scharpf (1992) notes, subsidiarity without
constitutional provisions demarcating and allocating responsibilities between
the EC and Member States is not a hedge against centralization and bureauc-
ratism, and the political issue of national identities cannot be overlooked in any
qualitative leap to support the principle of subsidiarity.
The point here is that the debate in France over national identity in the EC,
constitutional revision, role of Parliament, and subnational prerogatives, are
echoed in the other national systems, mediated by their own traditions and
structures. The approach adopted in this article, to define and then analyse

In this context, Taylor (1991)introduces some new thoughts in his discussion of consociationalism and
EC integration.
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86 ROBERT LADRECH

Europeanization as a change in organizational logic induced by and intertwin-

ing with EC integration dynamics, avoids the bias of a preordained outcome
inherent in both neo-functionalism and federalism by paying attention to
national-specific adaptation to cross-national inputs, a bottom-up approach. .4t
the same time, the question of subsidiarity and growing regionalization can be
framed in their specific contexts, allowing for diverging rates of development,
different political and institutional responses, etc.
In the case of France, my focus on the prevalence and degree to which
organizational change is driven by the ‘understanding ... appreciation ...
conformity ... or ... fit ...’ of French actors into the emerging European polity
suggests that the EC has indeed affected the pace and direction of Fifth Republic
institutional change in the 1980s. The implications for EC institutional and
political development is a growing mosaic of national responses and practices
which should feed into the debates and design plans being considered for the
1996 Intergovernmental Conference on matters of EC institutions (Streek and
Schmitter, 1991). In this context, a better understanding of exactly how national
systems compose the wider EC environment will be necessary if one wants to
truly ‘deepen’ the EC in an efficacious manner.

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