Burden of proof

Case: Woolmington v DPP [1935] A.C. 462

Brief Facts of the Case:

In the case of Woolmington v DPP [1935] A.C. 462, the defendant, Woolmington, was a
21-year-old farm labourer who had been married to Kathleen Woolmington for three
months. After his wife left him and went to live with her mother, Woolmington became
distraught. On December 10th, 1934, he stole a double-barrelled shotgun and
cartridges from his employer, modified the firearm by sawing off the barrel, and cycled
to his mother-in-law's house. There, he shot and killed his wife. He was arrested on
January 23rd, 1935, and charged with wilful murder. Woolmington claimed that he did
not intend to kill his wife and that the shooting was accidental.

Issues:

The main issue in the case was whether the burden of proof was correctly placed on
Woolmington to show that the shooting was accidental, or if it was the duty of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Laws Applicable:

The case relied on various legal principles, including:

The presumption of innocence:

The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the burden of proof rests on
the prosecution.

The principle that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt:

The standard of proof required in criminal cases is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Resolution of the Case:

At the trial, the judge ruled that the case was so strong against Woolmington that the
burden of proof was on him to show that the shooting was accidental. Woolmington
was convicted and sentenced to death. However, on appeal, the House of Lords
reviewed the case.

Lord Sankey delivered the "Golden thread" speech, stating that it is the duty of the
prosecution to prove that the accused is guilty and that the defendant is presumed
innocent. The House of Lords concluded that the trial judge had misdirected the jury by
placing the burden of proof on Woolmington. The conviction was quashed, and
Woolmington was acquitted.

The case of Woolmington v DPP established a precedent for the burden of proof in
criminal cases. It affirmed that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the accused is not required to prove
their innocence. The case reaffirmed the fundamental principle of the presumption of
innocence in criminal law.
Standard of Proof:

Case: Uganda v Monday,

The standard of proof in the case of Uganda v Monday, as discussed in the judgment, is
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is required to prove its case to a high
degree of probability, excluding any reasonable doubt.

Brief Facts of the Case:

In this case, the accused, Monday Wilson, was charged with the offense of murder. It
was alleged that on the 25th day of January 2016, in Kamata Village, Kyenjojo District,
Uganda, the accused murdered three individuals named Kanyunyuzi Scola, Monday
Israel, and Kabarokole Eunice. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.

Issues:

1. Whether the prosecution has proven the offense of murder beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Whether the accused directly or indirectly participated in the commission of the
alleged offense.
3. Whether the elements of death, unlawful causation, and malice aforethought
have been established by the prosecution.

Laws Applicable:

The Penal Code Act of Uganda, specifically Sections 188 and 189, are relevant to the
offense of murder. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, Article 28,
establishes the burden of proof on the prosecution and the principle that an accused
person is innocent until proven guilty.

Resolution of the Case:

In the judgment, the court found the accused guilty as indicted for the offense of
murder. The court concluded that the prosecution had proven its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution presented four witnesses, and their testimonies
confirmed the deaths of the three individuals. The bodies were found cut into pieces
and buried in a mass grave, indicating the unlawfulness of the killings and the presence
of malice aforethought. The accused's conduct, including misleading witnesses about
the victims' whereabouts and introducing another woman after their disappearance,
further supported the inference of guilt.

Based on the circumstantial evidence presented, the court determined that there were
no other co-existing circumstances that would weaken or destroy the inference of the
accused's guilt. Therefore, the court agreed with the opinion of the assessors and
convicted the accused of the offense of murder under Sections 188 and 189 of the
Penal Code Act.

In summary, the court applied the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt and
found the accused guilty of murder based on the circumstantial evidence and the
absence of any reasonable doubt regarding the accused's involvement in the killings.

STRICT LIABILITY

Case: R v Prince [1874-80]

Brief Facts of the Case:

Henry Prince was charged with abducting a 14-year-old girl, Annie Phillips, under the
belief that she was 18 years old. Abducting a minor was a violation of the relevant
statute law regarding minors at that time. Prince argued that he had made a reasonable
mistake regarding Phillips' age. However, he was convicted despite his defense.

Issues:

1. Did the accused, Henry Prince, commit the offense of abduction by taking a
minor under the age of 16 out of the possession of her father?
 2. Did Prince's reasonable belief about Phillips' age serve as a defense to the
charge?
3. Should strict liability be applicable to offenses involving the age of the victim?
4. Is the offense of abduction a strict liability offense in its entirety, or only with
respect to the age element?
5. Does the defense of reasonable mistake of age apply to offenses involving
minors?
6. Should there be a distinction between offenses involving minors based on
different age brackets?

Laws Applicable:

The relevant statute law in this case was Section 55 of the Offences Against the Person
Act 1861, which prohibited taking an unmarried girl under the age of 16 out of the
possession of her father.

Resolution of the Case:

The court held that Prince's conviction was valid. The offense of abduction, as specified
in Section 55 of the Offences Against the Person Act, was considered an offense of
strict liability regarding age. Therefore, Prince's reasonable belief about Phillips' age was
not considered a valid defense. The court established that the mens rea (criminal
intent) was necessary for criminal liability, but strict liability applied to the age element
of the offense. As a result, Prince's reasonable mistake regarding Phillips' age did not
absolve him of the offense.

In summary, the court upheld Prince's conviction, emphasizing that strict liability
applied to the age element of the offense of abduction. This meant that Prince's
reasonable belief about the girl's age did not serve as a defense in this case.