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Post-1949 Chinese Historiography on the 1911 Revolution

Author(s): Edmund S. K. Fung


Source: Modern China , Apr., 1978, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 181-214
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/189085

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Modern China

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REVIEW OF CHINESE AND JAPANESE SCHOLARSHIP

Post-1949 Chinese Historiography


on the 1911 Revolution

EDMUND S.K. FUNG


Griffith University

Unlike the orthodox Guomindang historiography on the


Revolution of 191 1, works published in the People's Republic of
China (PRC) have not focused on the Tongmenghui movement
and the personality of Sun Yat-sen, despite the high esteem in
which Sun has always been held by the communists themselves.
Sun has been reported by Chinese writers of all political colora-
tions as the leader of the revolutionary movement. But while
Guomindang historians have portrayed him as almost flawless,
authors in the PRC tend to be mildly critical of his political
weaknesses which stemmed from his "bourgeois class back-
ground."
The Marxist historians have given relatively little attention to
biographical writings such as the nianpu (biographical chron-
icles) and the xianlie zhuan (biographical writings on the mar-
tyrs). On the other hand, far more research has been done into the
social basis and the consequences of the revolution than is the
case in Taiwanese or Western scholarship. More class analysis is
made and more emphasis placed on the social context of the ideas
of the revolutionary leaders.
This article reports various Chinese Marxist interpretations of
the revolution as developed in the 1950s and 1960s and, to a lesser
extent, in the post-Cultural Revolution period.

MODERN CHINA, Vol. 4 No. 2, April 1978


? 1978 Sage Publications, Inc.

[181]

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[182] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

DOCUMENTAR Y COMPILA TIONS

The most valuable documentary study of the revolution is the


Xinhai geming, compiled and edited by the Chinese Historical
Association (1957). Consisting of eight volumes, this collection
brings together selections from more than 120 works, some of
which had not been hitherto published. Most of these relate to the
revolutionaries and the republican movement; others are docu-
ments of Qing officials and the Manchu government. Divided
chronologically into four parts, it begins by tracing the origins
of the first revolutionary society, Xingzhonghui, and concludes
with the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1912. It is note-
worthy that nearly half of volume 3 is devoted to the "people's
struggles," which took the form of antimissionary and anti-
foreign activities, as well as riots and disturbances in protest
against excessive taxation, corrupt officialdom, rice hoarding
and speculation, bad gentry and merchant exploitation, and lack
of public relief to famine and flood victims. Some of the strug-
gles, backed up by the conservative gentry, were directed against
the new reforms which mainly served the interests of the urban
centers and the upper classes, but which considerably increased
the economic burden of the rural masses. The materials, derived
from the Dongfang zazhi (the Eastern Miscellany) and the
Imperial Palace Archives, offer much insight into the conditions
in the countryside as distinct from the newly emergent urban
centers where the new intellectuals operated with few links with
the rural masses. The gap between city and countryside was a
large and serious one. The city-based revolutionary leaders
tended to ignore it and were indeed incapable of addressing them-
selves to the basic problems facing the peasantry.
In reproducing the selected materials, not only are the editorial
comments kept to a minimum, but also the selections are allowed
to appear in contrast with one another where the authors have
conflicting views. Very little of the wording in the original docu-
ments, irrespective of their political stance and sympathies, has
been altered, except for some glaring "spelling" errors.
This impressive work would have been more thorough had it
included more non-Chinese documents than the incomplete
British Parliamentary Papers (Great Britain, 1912 a, b) which are

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Fung / CHINESE HIS TORIOGRA PHY [183]

rendered into Chinese with some errors in translation. In fairness


to the editors, however, it would have been extremely difficult,
if not impossible, for them to gain access to important foreign
sources in the early 1950s.
Meanwhile, another team of historians was engaged in col-
lecting additional materials to be published in the newly estab-
lished journal, Jindaishi ziliao (Source Materials on Modern
Chinese History). The first few volumes contain, among other
things, a number of Qing documents and reminiscent accounts of
the revolution. In 1961 a special issue (No. 25) was devoted to the
revolution. Prior to this Zhang Guo-gan had published the Xinhai
geming shiliao (1958), which deals with the Wuchang uprising,
the responses of the provinces, the peace negotiations, and the
abdication of the Manchu emperor. A revolutionary participant
from Hubei province, Zhang gives much attention to the Hubei
scene and the revolutionary organizations there. The narrative is
interspersed with lengthy documents, which, although their
origins are not always clear, complement the Xinhai geming and
succeed in arousing much interest in the regional dimensions of
the revolutionary movement.
Indeed, the revolutionary activities extended far beyond the
confines of the Tongmenghui and its branch organizations to the
provinces. Appreciation of the importance and contribution of
the Sichuan railway dispute to the success of the Wuchang up-
rising led to the publication of the Sichuan baoluyundongshiliao
edited by Dai Zhi-li (1959). This collection brings together an
aggregate of 457 items, including memorials, proclamations,
official correspondence, diaries, and the like. Arranged chrono-
logically, it traces in detail the development of the railway issue
from 1903 through the turbulent year of 1911 to the founding of
the Chongqing military government and its dissolution in May
1912. It contains much evidence of the imperial government's
attempts at centralization and the resistance of the province. The
editor disapproves of the government's reliance on foreign loans
to build the trunk railways, and sympathizes with the railway pro-
tection movement which, in his opinion, was a patriotic cause
supported by the peasantry and the working class. This move-
ment might not have been a "mass movement" as Dai suggests,

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[184] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

but he is right in asserting that the railway issue drove a wedge


between the government and the constitutionalists, forcing
the latter to turn against the empire in the end. The Tongmenghui
leaders took advantage of the disturbances in Sichuan, but they
failed to establish close links with the masses and to organize
them into a powerful political force. As soon as the Qing
authority in Sichuan was overthrown, the revolutionary leader-
ship started to disintegrate.
Another interesting provincial documentary study is the Yun-
nan Guizhou xinhai geming ziliao (Institute of Modern History,
1959). A useful reference work filled with materials not in-
cluded in the Xinhaigeming, it is a combination of revolutionary
documents, telegraphic correspondence, diaries, and memoirs. In
addition to these, it includes biographic sketches of "martyrs"
from the two provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou. Owing to the
diverse sources from which the materials are drawn, there are, as
the editors have pointed out, conflicting accounts and incon-
sistencies which the reader must treat with care.
The publication in 1961 of the Xinhai geming Jiangsu diqu
shiliao (Yangzhou Normal College, 1961) added another dimen-
sion to the regional study of the revolution. The editors have
travelled extensively in the province and spoken to a variety of
people who personally experienced the revolution. The materials
are arranged in two parts. The first contains materials dealing
with the province as a whole, and includes the official cor-
respondence of the viceroy, proclamations of the Jiangsu military
government, diaries, excerpts from Zhang Qian's nianpu and
Shang Bing-he's Xinren chunqiu (The Spring and Autumn
Annals, 1911-1912) which originally was published in 1924. There
is also a biographic note on Zhao Sheng, a notable Jiangsu
revolutionary, and a patriotic song composed by him. The second
part, which forms the bulk of the collection, consists of miscel-
laneous materials on the revolutionary outbreak in various pre-
fectures in response to the Wuchang uprising. While this is a fine
work on the revolution in Jiangsu, it provides no information on
the pre-1911 situation. The peasant riots and disturbances in
Jiangsu, documented in volume 3 of the Xinhai geming, are

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Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [ 185]

barely sufficient for a full understanding of the social conditions


in the province or of the social context of the revolutionary move-
ment there. The present collection does little to improve it.
A number of journals and books concerned with affairs in
China were published in the 1900s which represented different
views of the Chinese intellectuals on China's future. An effort to
bring together the leading articles (pro- and antirevolution alike)
and selections from some of the major revolutionary works re-
sulted in the publication in 1960 and 1963 of the Xinhai geming
qianshinianjian shilun xuanji, edited by Zhang Nan and Wan
Ren-shi (1960, 1963). Two parts, each consisting of two volumes,
have been published, covering the years 1901-1907. The aim of the
selection is to demonstrate the split within the newly emergent
Chinese bourgeoisie into the revolutionary and the reformist
(later constitutionalist) camps. The editors believe that from the
very beginning the Chinese bourgeoisie was divided on an economic
level. The upper bourgeoisie consisted of the compradores, the
"feudal bureaucrats," big landlords, big merchants, and usurers,
all of whom had close connections with "feudalism" (the dynasty)
and "imperialism" (the foreign powers). The middle bourgeoisie
was made up of handicraft factory owners and middle and small
merchants whose lower social status and small capital subjected
them to feudal and imperialist exploitation. At the lowest reaches
of the hierarchy were the city-based petty bourgeoisie who were
small traders. The social and economic differences among the
various segments of the bourgeoisie were an important determinant
in the division of the bourgeois class on a political level. With the
growth of "national capitalism" after 1900, the middle bour-
geoisie had increased in numbers and influence and was in tune
with the petty bourgeoisie; together they formed the revolu-
tionary camp under the leadership of the "national bourgeoisie,"
a term which denotes indigenous capitalists as distinct from com-
pradores and bureaucratic capitalists.
The editors have attempted with mixed success to elucidate the
social ideology of the bourgeois revolutionary leaders as well as
their political strengths and weaknesses. They have portrayed
the revolutionaries and the reformists as two diametrically op-
posed camps, but the selected writings show not only their dif-

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[186] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

ferences but also their similarities, namely, a common experience


of the onslaught of foreign imperialism, a common concern about
China's national survival, and a common realization of the need
for change for the country.
Other documentary works produced in the late 1950s include
the Min Bao (The People's Journal) reproduced by photo-
offset, Zou Rong's Gemingiun (1958), originally published in
1903, and the selected works of Sun Yat-sen (Sun Wen, 1959). Be-
sides these, there are a number of bibliographical guides.

ORAL HISTORY

In conjunction with documentary compilation Chinese scho-


lars have undertaken "oral history" projects, the object of
which is to gather information from a variety of private, indivi-
dual sources other than official documents already available.
Nonofficial materials such as diaries, memoirs, reminiscences, and
the like occupy an important place in historical research, par-
ticularly in the study of revolution where many official and semi-
official documents were destroyed as a result of the political
turmoil. These projects involve interviewing, or bringing together
in colloquia, people who had personal experiences of the
revolution. Most were revolutionary participants, others were
not; a few who were associated with the Qing government had
witnessed some of the catacylsmic events of 191 1. All were en-
couraged to exchange views and write memoirs and recollections
of the revolution in articles or book form. Those who could not
write because of old age or literary incompetency had their
accounts recorded by others on their behalf.
Many of the articles published in the journal, Jindaishi ziliao,
result from these projects. The first booklet (40 pages) of "oral
history" is probably the Huiyi Sun Zhong-shan he Liao Zhong-
kai, written by the wife of Liao Zhong-kai, He Xiang-ning (1957).
A superior work published about the same time is the Xinhai
shouyi huiyilu (Hubei Committee, 1957). This is an extremely
useful work for the study of the Wuchang uprising and the Hubei

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Fung / CHINESE HIS TORIOGRA PH Y [ 187]

revolutionary movement. It consists of three volumes, with


thirty-odd contributors. Many of these writers were common
soldiers in the New Army which led the uprising with little as-
sistance from the Tongmenghui. The articles vary considerably in
length and style, and explanatory notes have been added by the
editors wherever necessary. Each article is preceded by a bio-
graphic note on the contributor. These biographic sketches fur-
nish useful information on the social backgrounds of the revo-
lutionary participants. Many of them were educated in varying
degrees before enlisting in the army, and this points to a hitherto
neglected aspect of the revolution: the revolutionary impact of
army reorganization through the introduction into the ranks of
men of education and radical nationalist sentiment. Indeed, this
work sheds light on the role of the Hubei New Army in the mili-
tary genesis of the revolution.
An equally important and probably more exhaustive piece of
"oral history" is the Xinhai geming huiyilu (Committee on
Written Historical Materials, 1961). With six substantial vol-
umes, this collection has a wide coverage of the revolutionary
movement and the revolution itself in different provinces, under
which the materials are arranged. The contributors came from
different social and geographical backgrounds and thus were able
to deal with different social groups and revolutionary bodies
in different regions. The scope is so wide and the information
so ample that all students of the revolution will find it a valuable
complement to the Xinhai geming. It is a pity, however, that
there are no biographic notes on the authors, hence it is some-
times difficult to discern the authors' relationships with the
personalities and organizations they describe. Second, the editors
have made no effort to point out, let alone explain, contra-
dictory accounts which appear occasionally in the text. This
shows, on the other hand, that all the articles were faithfully
recorded and reproduced. The contributors simply reported what
they recollected, and it is only natural that there should have
been errors and biases. Yet it must be appreciated that much of
their information is not available in official documents, Chinese
and Western alike.

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[188] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

"Oral history" is intended to encourage more study of the


revolution and to bring the events of 1911 to life. The editors
of the several collections may have been obliged to pay lip service
to the official interpretations in the preface, but the ideological
content is at a minimum.

MONOGRAPHIC STUDIES

The monographs reviewed here were published in the 1950s


and the early 1960s. Some authors attempted to analyse events
from a Marxist class viewpoint; others did not. The fact that very
few historians were adequately trained on Marxist lines resulted
in some works reflecting an imperfect combination of Marxist
and traditional methodologies. Nevertheless, class analysis, albeit
sometimes superficial, represents a basic departure from the
earlier Guomindang writings.
The earliest works published after the founding of the PRC
were written by a young historian, Li Shu (formerly known as Li
Nai-han). His first book, Xinhai geming yu Yuan Shi-kai (1949),
appears to have been inspired by Chen Bo-da's earlier work,
Qieguo dadao Yuan Shi-kai (1945). In a polemic fashion, Chen
satirized Jiang Jie-shi [Chiang Kai-shek] for mimicking some of
Yuan's "anti-revolutionary techniques." Li holds a similarly low
opinion of Yuan. For Li, the main impetus to revolution in China
was imperialism. The anti-imperialist struggle of the Chinese
people became widespread with the mounting threat of foreign
partition of China and the increasing corruption and impotence
of the Manchu government, which, in Li's view, was subservient
to the foreigners while it oppressed the Chinese masses and
opposed reform at home (pp. 1-2). Li sees the Tongmenghui as an
anti-Manchu united front organization (tongyi zhenxian). How-
ever, it displayed three ideological weaknesses: (a) lack of effort
to mobilize the peasant masses; (b) lack of an antifeudal thrust in
the sense of radically attacking landlord and local gentry power;
and (c) lack of an anti-imperialist program, which resulted in a
compromise with foreign enemies. The revolutionary leaders'
conception of democracy was vague, hence there was a discre-

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Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [189]

pancy between their political platfrom (zhenggang), which was


revolutionary and democratic, and their strategy (fanglue), which
was nonrevolutionary and revolved around a narrow racial
nationalism. Organizationally, the Tongmenghui also had
serious shortcomings, chief among which was its inability to pro-
vide central leadership to the provinces where revolutionary
groups acted with little coordination (pp. 7-15). Li cites the
choice of Li Yuan-hong as military governor and Tang Hua-long
as chief of civil administration of Hubei as evidence of the revo-
lutionaries' tendency to compromise with the old force. Such
compromise enabled the feudal forces and the bureaucrats to take
over control of the new government, an outcome which was re-
peated in other provinces which declared for the republican cause
(pp. 23-40).
Li expands Chen Bo-da's theory that Yuan Shi-kai cal-
culated to thwart the Manchu dynasty with one stroke and the
revolution with another. After manipulating the revolutionary
south and the loyalist north into peace nogotiations, Yuan left
the revolutionaries no alternative to offering him the presidency
(pp. 57-74). The new president proved to be a "big dictator," Li
asserts. The Guomindang's attempts to establish a responsible
cabinet system ended in a fiasco after some "hopeless opposition"
(pp. 80-99). Consequently, Yuan virtually enjoyed the powers
of an emperor. But still not satisfied, he orchestrated the "ugly"
monarchical movement in 1915. In Li's view, the revolution was a
failure because of the political weaknesses of its leadership and
Yuan's manipulation and treachery. Fortunately, the people were
opposed to Yuan and that was why he also failed in the end. Un-
fortunately, there did not yet exist in China a progressive and
strong political party capable of leading the Chinese people,
hence China's eclipse into warlordism after 1916 (pp. 107-140).
The Powers' "neutrality" in the Chinese civil war was in
effect favorable to Yuan because of their sympathies and high
regard for him. Li points out that the Powers, especially Britain,
were keen to see Yuan return to public life. They refused to ad-
vance an international loan to the financially hard-pressed
Nanjing [Nanking] government, but extended to Yuan several
crucial loans when he became president. Early in February 1912

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[190] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

Yuan had begun negotiations with the foreign banking consor-


tium for a loan. Shortly after his inauguration as president, he
obtained an advance of cash from the consortium and a promise
of more. The ensuing negotiations for the Reorganization Loan,
1912-1913, confirms Li's impression that under the veneer of
"neutrality" the Powers entertained much animosity toward the
revolutionaires (pp. 51-55).
Li's second book, Xinhaigeming di Zhongguo zhengzhi (1954),
is a revision of his earlier book. A new part is added, covering
the period between Yuan's death and the May Fourth Movement.
Interpretations of Yuan and of the revolution have remained un-
changed.
Subsequent studies (e.g., Chen Xu-lu, 1955; Hu Sheng, 1952;
and Tao Ju-yin, 1957) have invariably depicted Yuan as the arch
villain, and have ignored (or rejected) the view, popularly held
in the diplomatic corps in Beijing at that time, that Yuan was the
foremost progressive statesman in the Empire, the best and most
capable administrator Qing China had produced, and the only
man in China able to maintain stability in the country. Chinese
historians also take no notice of the fact that, not long after
Yuan's dismissal by the Prince Regent, a wave of popular feeling
arose in his favor and that the Grand Council in vain had made
overtures to him to return to office. It is not good enough to
explain the revolutionaries' gestures to Yuan before and during
the peace negotiations as compromises. Ernest Young's study of
Yuan's rise to the presidency provides a more realistic assess-
ment of the political and military situation in which the revo-
lutionaries themselves, as well as the constitutionalists,turned to
Yuan in the belief that he would make the best national leader
after the demise of the dynasty (Young, 1968). In a recently pub-
lished book, Young (1977: 52) asserts convincingly that "Yuan's
pre-eminence as the Chi'ing [Qing] fell was founded not on a
reputation for moral excellence or widespread popularity but on
his administrative and political achievements as an official-and
on the power accruing from these achievements." Chinese
historians are right in describing President Yuan as a dictator,
but they have neglected, as Young points out, "the problem of

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Fung / CHINESE HIS TORIOGRA PH Y [ 19 1 ]

understanding the intended and unintended import of his


policies" (1977: 50).
Marxist historians are concerned with the history of social
change. Wu Yu-zhang, a Chinese Communist Party official, be-
gins his book, Xinhai geming (1961), which has an English
language edition, with an introduction that provides a brief but
interesting analysis of the socioeconomic conditions in the late
Qing. Wu sees the emergence of a new bourgeoisie at the turn of
the century. This new class, dissatisfied with the tardy growth of
Chinese industry and capital, "became increasingly sensitive
to the menace of foreign capital, and was more concerned about
political reforms" (p. 6). The deteriorating socioeconomic con-
ditions in China were attributed to foreign imperialism. The
importation of cotton cloth and other commodities was detri-
mental to the native handicraft industry, affecting, for instance,
the local manufacturing of silk fabrics and porcelain-ware.
Added to the hardships of the peasantry and the handicraft in-
dustry were the heavy taxes levied by the Qing government and
the intensifying landlord exploitation. Imperialism and feudalism
combined to cause riots throughout the Empire, the most serious
being the Changsha rice riots of 1910 (pp. 9-10).
Wu points also to the growth of a Chinese working class which
'gradually became stronger" as capitalism developed. As well as
organizing strikes in an effort to improve their working con-
ditions, the workers took part in the uprisings planned by the
Tongmenghui in Hunan and in the Sichuan railway protection
movement. China was in the throes of "great upheavals," and
this was evidence of a rapidly collapsing feudal society. Many
landlords were aware of this change. The more enlightened ones
felt obliged to ally themselves with the bourgeoisie in the hope
of finding a solution to China's problems to their advantage. They
then sided either with the reformists or with the revolutionaries,
the two camps into which the bourgeoisie was split (pp. 10-1 1).
Wu shares Li Shu's criticism of the Tongmenghui's political
program: that it focused on racial nationalism, that it failed to
oppose landlord feudalism, and that it failed to realize that the
real enemy of the Chinese people was imperialism. The revo-
lutionary leaders were not creative in the theoretic realm. "The

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[192] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

serious weakness of the Revolution of 1911 was that it lacked an


ideological revolution to pave the way" (p. 19). The reasons
for the failure of the revolution were "the lack of preparation and
errors in leadership with regard to the fundamental problems of
revolutionary theory, revolutionary organization, the revo-
lutionary armed forces and revolutionary government" (p. 28).
Wu views the provincial assemblies as forums where political
reforms were demanded, but inasmuch as they were made up of the
upper and middle bourgeoisie and the landed gentry, they had no
desire for social reform. Paradoxically, however, they con-
tributed to the revolutionary movement through demands for
political change and through their attacks on the corruption and
incompetence of the government. When the revolution broke out,
they quickly declared for a republic, but owing to their alliance
with the feudal forces, they actually constituted an obstacle to
the revolution (pp. 14-16).
Wu's class analysis reflects the official interpretations of
the revolution. In pointing out the lack of an ideological revo-
lution before 1911, Wu seems to have in mind the intellectual
ferment of the May Fourth period which prepared the way for the
founding of the Chinese Communist Party. As a party official, he
is under obligation to clarify the party interpretation before
recounting his personal experiences of the revolution.
The constitutional movement is generally interpreted by
Chinese historians as antirevolutionary. Hu Sheng-wu and Jin
Chong-ji (1957) analyze the class backgrounds of the consti-
tutionalists and show how substantial numbers of landlords had
been transformed into members of the newly emergent bourgeo-
isie. This new type of landlord was a result of the Qing govern-
ment's policy after 1903 of encouraging industrial development,
increasing economic imperialism, and an expanding national
industry. These landlords, investing successively in commercial
and industrial enterprises, railways, and mining, played over-
lapping roles, being landlord-officials and landlord-merchants
at the same time. Wealthy merchants, too, bought their way into
officialdom and quickly accumulated land on a large scale.
However, there were conflicts of interests between the land-

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Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [ 193]

lord-bourgeoisie and the Qing government. The former, having


risen to prominence, made new demands on the government, thus
forcing the latter to introduce political reforms. The heavy taxes
levied by the government aroused resentment. The deepening
national crisis menaced the lives and property of the privileged
as well as the poor. Above all, the mounting pressure of revolu-
tion was seriously undermining imperial authority and the
established social order. Fearing revolution and hoping to thwart
it, the landlord-bourgeoisie resorted to a constitutional move-
ment, which they expected would expand their political participa-
tion, rights, and power. Hu and Jin refute the view that the
constitutionalists, after failing in their demands for the early
opening of Parliament, were prepared to lend active and substan-
tial support to the revolutionary cause. They argue that the
constitutionalists, then seeing revolution as inevitable, turned
against the dynasty in order to "reap the fruits of revolution."
These hostile interpretations of the constitutionalists have
prompted scholars outside China to reassess their contributions
to the demise of the dynasty. Recent scholarship in Taiwan and
the United States has elucidated the ways in which they positively
contributed to the revolution. There were, of course, divisions
and differences within the constitutional group. While many
gentry members of the provincial assemblies were undoubtedly
progressive, others were still conservative and were motivated by
private interests when they supported the revolution in 1911.
Western or Western-educated scholars have found much that was
liberal and modern about the gentry constitutionalists. Histor-
ians in the PRC, on the other hand, tend to be skeptical about
their motives and adopt a view closer to Lu Xun's The True Story
of Ah Q.
Apart from the general works so far discussed, there are a few
provincial studies. Zhang Yu-kun's book on the Wenxueshe and
the Wuchang uprising, first published in 1944, reappeared in a
revised edition in 1955. It traces the origins of the Wenxueshe and
its development through the revolution to its ill-fated "persecu-
tion" by the military regime of Li Yuan-hong. In the preface
the author criticizes the "Jiang Jie-shi clique" which has given
little credit to the relatively unknown figures who led the

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[194] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

Wuchang uprising. Yet the book is entirely a narrative with little


ideological overtone. Based on information supplied by former
members of the Wenxueshe, this reasonably reliable account
opens a new perspective on the resourcefulness of the Hubei
revolutionaries and their tenuous links with the Tongmenghui,
as well as the contributions of the Wuhan New Army. Not only
does it show the way in which the local revolutionaries organized
themselves, but it sheds light on the Hubei New Army, which had
attracted a large number of educated men who enlisted for a
variety of reasons. It was these men who provided leadership for
the local revolutionary movement.
This theme is developed in two subsequent works. The first one
is Yang Yu-ru, Xinhai geming xianzhuji (1958), which explains
the success of the revolution in achieving its most immediate aim
in terms of the intense racial hatred for the Manchus, the corrup-
tion of the Qing administration, the foreign threat, and the
changes in Chinese thought. The first act of the revolution was
also the first sign of the failure of the revolution. The case of
Li Yuan-hong is a lesson: revolution must not be entrusted to the
hands of a nonrevolutionary. The rule of Yuan Shi-kai in the
early years of the republic, in Yang's view, bears this out (pp. 4-5).
Yang's study centers on the Hubei revolutionary movement.
The immediate events leading to the revolutionary outbreak
demonstrate the strength of the local organizations which,in the
most trying circumstances, acted independently of the Tong-
menghui Central China Bureau. The Tongmenghui, through lack
of understanding of the highly explosive situation in Wuhan,
missed the opportunity of providing the local revolutionary
movement with the leadership which the men of Hubei had
sought. This has led some historians outside China to reappraise
the role of the Central China Bureau in the Wuchang uprising
(Fung, 1974).
Another Hubei-centered work is Cai Ji-ou's Ezhou xueshi
(1958). rhe author, a journalist at the time of the revolution, was
an eyewitness of the Wuchang uprising. His work is very infor-
mative, but unfortunately, as some reviewers have criticized, his
fictional style all too often interferes with historical facts, despite

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Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [ 195]

his claim to the contrary. Furthermore, Cai tends to make as-


sumptions based on controversial evidence (Feuerwerker, 1961:
133-134). Nevertheless, this posthumous publication has some
remarkable features. The author gives a good deal of attention
to the social backgrounds of the revolutionaries, their living
conditions, and financial difficulties. Some of them had been
journalists and teachers before joining the army. They had to
finance the local revolutionary organizations and lived on meager
incomes, displaying the endurance and faithfulness which were
the highest characteristics of revolutionary leadership. However,
as Cai points out, once the Qing authority was overthrown,
political intrigues developed among them. The internal dis-
sension in Wuchang was not an isolated incident, but a wide-
spread phenomenon which threatened the unity of the Nanjing
provisional government. Finally, Cai refrains from placing any
particular revolutionary leader or revolutionary organization at
the center of his narrative. Although he criticizes the Tong-
menghui on various occasions, he does not exaggerate the role of
the local revolutionary groups.
No study of the Hubei revolutionary movement can be complete
without some investigation into Hunan. Indeed, there was no lack
of cooperation between the revolutionary groups in the Lianghu
region. In the Wenxueshe the Hunanese predominated, while in
the Gongjinhui, another local society, men of Hubei were in
large proportions. A merger was achieved shortly before the
revolution, and it was planned, too, that Changsha was to rise in
revolt simultaneously with the outbreak in Wuhan. The revo-
lutionary movement in these two provinces forms the subject of
Li Shi-yue's book, Xinhai geming shiqi Lianghu diqu di geming
yundong (1957). This study includes a discussion of the dis-
content of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, as well as
of the struggles of the peasants and workers against their class
enemies. The chapter on Hubei concentrates on the revolutionary
soldiers in the Wuhun area, while the part dealing with Hunan
revolves around the struggles between the revolutionaries and
the constitutionalists. The author reaches the conclusion that
"the fruits of revolution" were usurped by the constitutionalists
and their bureaucrat allies who supported Li Yuan-hong and

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[196] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

Yuan Shi-kai. This led to the suppression of the peasant move-


ment and "a reign of darkness." The "1913 revolution" unfor-
tunately ended in a fiasco. In the case of Hubei, Li argues, the
revolutionaries acted "too properly" when they, in the belief
that they lacked the status and expertise necessary to run a
new government, allowed the nonrevolutionaries to predominate
in it. In Hunan, the revolutionaries, because of their "mag-
nanimous character," were ill-fated in dealing with the con-
stitutionalists who tried to usurp power. In both Hunan and
Hubei their tendency to compromise reflected their basic political
weaknesses (p. 129).
In 1958 an informative account of Hunan appeared: Yang
Shi-ji's Xinhai geming qianhou Hunan shishi (1958). Covering
the years 1900-1919, this work deals with two main themes, anti-
imperialism and the usurpation of power by the constitutionalists.
The first part surveys the state of affairs in China and the history
of Hunan since the Opium War, with special reference to the
socioeconomic changes in Hunan as a result of imperialist en-
croachments. The opening of the treaty ports, Yang states, gave
rise to national capitalism and the emergence of the national
bourgeoisie. In the meantime, the Hunanese people waged spon-
taneous struggles against foreigners and feudalism. A revo-
lutionary movement developed, led by returned students and sup-
ported by local secret societies, the rural masses, and some sec-
tions of the New Army. Radical students, notably Chen Tian-hua
and Yu Zhi-mo, were primarily anti-imperialist; it was this
sentiment, accentuated by the government's weakness in dealing
with the foreign powers, that caused them to be anti-Manchu.
Yang subscribes to the view that the constitutionalists repre-
sented the interests of the upper bourgeoisie which included those
who had been transformed from the landlord class. They sup-
ported revolution in 1911 merely to protect and advance their
private interests. Only when the dynastic rule was overthrown
could they rise to a position of power. Yang concedes, however,
that regardless of their motives, they did contribute to deepening
the revolutionary crisis (p. 3). Yet, they must still be seen as
political opportunists, who, like Tan Yen-kai, desired a sort of

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Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [ 197]

"civilized revolution" (wenming geming), which demanded


the speedy restoration of law and order following the overthrow
of the existing authority. For them, Yang asserts, revolution
was merely "a change in the [national] flag and the [government]
seal" (p. 186).
The masses of the population supported the anti-imperialist
and antifeudal revolutionary cause, but for all this, they gained
little from it. Rather, it was the constitutionalists who made them-
selves the chief beneficiaries of the revolution, thus preparing
the way for the restoration of reactionary forces. The revolution
in Hunan failed for precisely this reason. The obvious lesson to
be learned is: "China's future does not lie in the direction of
capitalism" (p. 256).
The considerable scholarly attention given to the Hubei-
Hunan region is due not only to the fact that the revolution
erupted there, but also to the belief that the course of revolution
in the region best illustrates the weaknesses of the revolutionary
leadership and the ways in which political power passed into the
hands of the constitutionalists. Hubei was atypical because of
the extent to which members of the New Army had been con-
verted to revolutionary supporters or sympathizers. On the other
hand, Hunan was typical of many provinces which, once they had
declared for the republican cause, were controlled by members of
the provincial assemblies.
Other provincial studies include Zhou Shan-pei's work on
Sichuan, Xinhai Sichuan zhenglu qinliji (1957) and a compre-
hensive account of the revolutionary movement in northeast
China during the period 1840-1919, Jindai dongbei renmin
geming yundongshi (Institute of Historical Research, 1960). The
former is actually a memoir of Zhou, an "industrial daotai" in
charge of railway construction in the disputed province in 1911. It
is, however, more than a memoir in that it contains some of his
correspondence with other Qing officials. Zhou was sympathetic
with the Railway League and attacked the government's policy.
His account also shows the involvement of other local officials
and members of the gentry in the dispute which led to serious
rioting in the province.

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[198] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

The work on the three eastern provinces of Manchuria is the


only book-length study of the revolutionary movement to date.
The authors, who are members of the Jilin branch of the Institute
of Historical Research, Chinese Academy of Science, and of the
History Department of Jilin Normal University (1960), claim to
have seriously studied Marxism-Leninism and the works of
Chairman Mao. This evidently has an important bearing on their
approach and conclusions. In the Marxist theoretic framework
which they use, every part of China during the period 1840-1919
was an object of foreign imperialism, and Manchuria was no ex-
ception. Yet, it was in the process of China's transformation into
a semicolony that the Chinese people were engaged in opposing
imperialism and the domestic rulers who served its interests
("running dog"). The year 1905 marked a dividing line in the anti-
imperialist and antifeudal class struggle, and on this basis the
book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with the rising tide
of peasant uprisings, and Part 2 with the development and ulti-
mate failure of the bourgeois-democratic revolutionary move-
ment. The Taiping movement had encouraged the masses to
oppose Qing officialdom, landlords, and usurers. The Boxer
movement provided good cause for fighting imperialism and
traitorous officials who capitulated to it. Since 1905 Tong-
menghui agents had infiltrated the region and attempted some
uprisings with peasant support. However, since they were bour-
geois elements, they failed to mobilize and organize the broad
masses.
The conclusion emerging from the study is that while the
spontaneous mass struggles in the northeast were broader and
more widespread than in the rest of the country, the weaknesses
of the bourgeois revolutionaries were also more pronounced.
Manchuria was the scene of three wars: the first Sino-Japanese
War, the Boxer War, and the Russo-Japanese War. The extent of
imperialism there was great and the reaction against it was strong.
Yet, for various reasons, the revolutionary leadership there was
particularly weak. The secret societies, the New Army, and the
modern schools in the three eastern provinces were comparatively
few in number. The Honghuzi, a complex local antidynastic

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Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [ 199]

group, was difficult to organize. The revolutionary leaders were


from other parts of the country and therefore encountered more
difficulties than were expected. The situation was further compli-
cated by the more effective imperial control over Manchuria and
by the rapacious encroachments of the Powers, particularly
Russia and Japan. The fears of the bourgeois revolutionaries to
oppose imperialism specifically caused them to opt for a "civi-
lized revolution" or "orderly revolution' (diezui geming) so as
to avert foreign intervention. The Tongmenghui program of "the
equalization of land rights" was to all intents and purposes
ignored. The class enemies were not dealt with harshly enough
and the reactionary forces were still deeply entrenched. It took
a long time before Manchuria responded to the revolutionary
outbreak in Hubei, and the uprising there was crushed as soon as
it occurred (pp. 296-298).
These historians who believe in violent struggle naturally heap
scorn on the idea of "orderly revolution," which involves
sharing political power with, even handing it to, the bureaucrats
and surviving forces of the old society. Some of the old elements
in 1911 might have already developed a modern and progresssive
outlook, but they were still class enemies who became counter-
revolutionary once they were returned to power. The weaknesses
of the revolutionary leaders in Manchuria were, in the authors'
opinion, characteristics of the "old democratic revolution."
As far as provincial studies are concerned, no monographs on
the Liangguang region have appeared, in spite of the important
part Guangdong played in the revolutionary movement. The
reason for this is not clear, as there is no lack of historical
materials on Guangdong and Guangxi. Nevertheless, what had
been published before the Cultural Revolution was sufficient in
anticipating a new research trend in Western scholarship in the
1960s-provincial studies of the revolution. The works of Rankin
(1971), Rhoads (1972) and Esherick (1977), not to include a few
unpublished doctoral dissertations, are good testimony to this
influence.

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[200] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

SCHOLA RL Y DISCOURSE
IN THE EARLY 1960s

The fiftieth anniversary of the 1911 Revolution generated


further interest in the subject. In the early 1960s a good number
of academic papers were delivered at symposia and colloquia.
These papers, which were subsequently published in various
journals, reflect certain problems and differences of interpre-
tation. The most important book that grew out of one such sym-
posium is the Xinhai geming wushi zhounian jinian lunwenji
(Joint Hubei Association, 1962), which has been reviewed by
Winston Hsieh (1975: 54-63). It will not be necessary to repeat
an exercise that has already been ably done. However, a couple
of areas neglected in Hsieh's essay deserve attention.
Hsieh points out that with a bulk of new source materials
now available to them, Chinese historians were having difficulties
reconciling the differences between the Marxist-Leninist neo-
orthodox framework and the tradition of Chinese historiography
which emphasizes the cultural uniqueness of things Chinese. This
reflects the "incompatibility of the particularistic sentiment for
Chinese history and the universalistic faith in the Marxist-
Leninist model," as evidenced by the controversy over "historic
viewpoints" (lishi zhuyi guandian) versus "class analysis" (lieji
fenxi) during the years 1963-1966 (Hsieh, 1975: 55).
The ideological dispute with the Soviet Union after 1960 con-
tributed to a revivial of interest in China's differences from other
socialist societies. It was now necessary to adapt the Marxist-
Leninist model to Chinese conditions in order to explain what
appear to be distinctively Chinese phenomena. The question is
how to strike a balance between the historicist viewpoint and
class analysis. That this is a difficult task is indicated by the
debates on a range of issues concerned with the revolution.
In accordance with the analytical method set forth in Mao's
"On Contradiction," Chinese historians have sought to identify
the "principal contradiction" governing developments in any
one period. There has been much disagreement over precisely
what this principal contradiction was during the period of the
1911 Revolution. Proceeding from the premise that the revo-

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Fung / CHINESE HIS TORIOGRA PH Y [201 ]

lution was directed against imperialism, Hu Sheng-wu and Jin


Zhong-ji argue that the principal contradiction was a national
one between imperialism and the Chinese nation, and that this
was inextricably interwoven with the internal contradiction
between feudalism and the Chinese people. Imperialism was the
mainstay of the Chinese feudal landlord class, which in turn
provided the social foundation for imperialist control in China.
The Qing government had become a tool of imperialism; hence
opposition to imperialism was predicated on the overthrow of
the traitorous dynasty. This interpretation immediately poses
a question: why did the revolutionary leadeship lack a clear,
specific anti-imperialist slogan but rather concentrated on racial
anti-Manchuism? Hu's and Jin's answer is that although the
period of the 1911 Revolution on the whole saw an accentuation
of the principal contradiction, imperialism in China in the post-
Boxer decade had temporarily changed its policy from one of
"oppression through war" to one of propping up a puppet regime
through "moderate oppression" by political, economic, and
cultural means. As a result of this change, the real national
issue was obscured and the internal contradiction became more
pronounced. The bourgeois revolutionaries failed to realize the
potential of the people's anti-imperialist and antifeudal strug-
gle. Furthermore, they dreaded the specter of foreign inter-
vention. Subjectively, they failed to comprehend the aggressive
character of imperialism because of the Europo-American origins
of their revolutionary ideas. Nor did they have a clear under-
standing of the relationships between imperialism and the feudal
ruling class. Hu and Jin warn that the events of 1911 must not
be analyzed in terms of contradictions between Chinese and
Maflchus. The revolution was not a racial revolution. Anti-Man-
chuism was whipped up only because the dynasty had become a
running dog of imperialism (Joint Hubei Association, 1962:
645-658).
This interpretation is critized by Li Shi-yue, who believes
that the principal contradiction in Chinese society in the post-
Boxer decade was an internal one. While acknowledging that
imperialism was the primary cause of revolution in China, Li
points out that the revolution was not directed against im-

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[202] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

perialism as such. He distinguishes between the nature (xingzi)


and the form (xingshi) of imperialism. While the nature is
constant, the form is subject to change. After 1900 the form of
imperialism in China had become "relatively moderate" through
adoption of peaceful means rather than war, a change which
affected the tactics of the Chinese people who were now directing
their struggle at the "traitorous and despotic" government. Li
adds, however, that to overthrow the dynasty was of course not
all end in itself, but a first essential step toward defeating im-
perialism (Joint Hubei Association, 1962: 659-675).
Anti-Manchuism, Li is convinced, ought to be related to the
question of national salvation. The view that anti-Manchuism
was merely a reflection of Chinese-Manchu contradictions is a
narrow one. To drive out the Manchus was a way of achieving
national salvation. To be more specific, the principal contra-
diction in Chinese society was between the Tongmenghui revo-
lutionary force and the Qing regime. The revolution was different
from the War of Resistance in the later decades in that the former
was an internal armed struggle aimed at the running dog of
imperialism. Why, then, can we not simply say that the contra-
diction between feudalism and the Chinese people was the prin-
ciapl contradiction? There are two reasons, according to Li.
First, such an assertion is too broad, and second, it is not
sufficiently clear to show the "dual character" of the Qing dy-
nasty, which was both a feudal regime and a dynasty controlled
by foreigners.
Li also finds difficulty in the view that the revolution was
directed against a coalition of imperialism and feudalism. This
view is put forward by Wu Yan-nan, who sees the principal con-
tradiction as being between the Chinese people on the one hand
and imperialism and feudalism on the other. Wu disagrees that
the more peaceful policy adopted by the imperialists in the post-
Boxer era meant a relaxation in the contradiction between
imperialism and the Chinese people. To say that feudalism
was the chief target of the revolution is to believe that the Chinese
revolution was cast in the same mold as the English and French
Revolutions-a mistaken proposition, Li argues. In the coalition
he describes, imperialism was the leading partner. Yet, the revo-

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Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [203]

lution was focused on Manchu rule because the dynasty had be-
come the embodiment (shiti) of imperialism and feudalism.
Seemingly anxious to reconcile the Hu-Jin interpretation with the
Li Shi-yue theory, Wu concludes that to emphasize the national
contradiction would be an oversimplification of a complex situ-
ation, while to stress the internal contradiction would tend to
ignore the basic issue of imperialism versus the Chinese nation
(pp. 676-696).
Another issue which generates much debate is the character
and composition of the secret societies (huidang). Some writers
find that secret society members were in the main peasants and
small artisans. This is particularly true of those in Zhejiang, where
it was not uncommon for thousands of members to be mustered
at the call of their leaders. Migration from the hinterland had
also brought large numbers of poor peasants into the secret
societies in towns and cities. These societies were a product of
a class society, hence their distinct class features. Although their
members were far from homogeneous, and although their leaders
were not always of peasant origin, the societies as a group had to
reflect the consciousness and demands of the peasantry. The part
they played in the Taiping uprising, the Boxer movement, and the
1911 Revolution, is testimony to the anti-imperialist and anti-
feudal sentiments of the masses. However, to say that they were
peasant organizations is not to suggest that their activities re-
flected the will and demands of the peasantry alone. It must be
emphasized, the writers add, that they were not a peasant political
party; nor did they wholly represent the peasantry (pp. 172-173,
519, 699-700).
A second theory describes the secret societies as comprising
ex-soldiers, vagrants, unemployed industrial workers, craftsmen,
coolies, poor city dwellers, and a small proportion of peasants,
merchants, ex-army officers, and members of the gentry class.
The Gelaohui in Hunan, the Hongjianghui in Jiangxi, and the
Qinghongbang in Jiangsu are cases in point. It is thus more ac-
curate to describe them as organizations of the property-less
vagrant class. Their members might have come from the country-
side, but once away from home, they had lost their peasant
identity. The Gongjinhui, for example, relied heavily on secret

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[204] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

society support, and advocated "the equalization of human


rights" rather than "the equalization of land rights." The
property-less vagrant class was in fact the lumpenproletariat of
the urban centers.
A third opinion concedes that a definitive conclusion on the
class study of the secret societies is yet to be reached. Secret
society memberships were complex, and as a class instrument of
armed struggle, secret societies sometimes served the revo-
lutionaries well, while at other times they allowed themselves
to be used by counterrevolutionary elements. Their character and
composition lend themselves to further inquiry (pp. 700.701).
A controversy also arises over the character and functions of
the New Army. While it is generally agreed that the New Army
consisted of a good percentage of educated men susceptible to
revolutionary ideas, opinions are divided as to how they actually
became "revolutionized" (politicized). Chen Xu-lu and Lao
Shao-hua have argued that this was largely the outcome of the
basic contradiction of a feudal regime seeking to defend itself
with a bourgeois-type army (p. 158). To other writers, this
explanation lacks precision. They believe that the politicization
of the New Army had little to do with its organization, equip-
ment, and training. The real causes were the impact of a general
revolutionary situation in the country and the efforts of the revo-
lutionaries operating within the army units (pp. 456-463).
The New Army and the secret societies were two principal
sources of military power to which the revolutionaries endea-
vored to gain access. In some places, like Hubei, the army was the
main target of subversion. In others like Hunan, the secret
societies received far more attention. To some writers, this
indicates a difference in revolutionary lines. In their view, the
ultimate policy shift from the secret societies to the armies in most
provinces reflected a heightened awareness of the needs of
the revolutionary situation. Most other scholars, however,
argue that the difference was one of tactics, not of revolutionary
lines. In neither case did the revolutionaries evince enough
nerve to mobilize the masses, and that was why they had to use
the societies and the army which were more readily available
instruments of force (pp. 702-703).

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Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [205]

The issue of land, too, is central to Chinese scholarship. Sun


Yat-sen's idea of "the equalization of land rights" (ping/un
diquan), which underpinned the principle of the people's liveli-
hood (minsheng zhuyi), attracts scholarly attention. Xia Dong-
yuan, in an article on the land issue, deals at length with the
origins and social context of Sun's idea (pp. 299-322). Sun,
sympathetic with the rural masses, sought to solve their problem
through adoption of John Stuart Mill's and Henry George's
theory of single tax: all rent on site values should go to the state,
which should then abolish all other forms of taxation. The
"unearned increment," i.e., the increase in land values resulting
from social progress rather than from the improvements made by
the owner, would be used for the welfare of the people. Xia
points out that Sun's pingjun diquan, while accepted as one of the
four planks of the Tongmenghui platform, was subject to inter-
pretations by his party colleagues coming from different socio-
economic backgrounds. Zhang Bing-lin, Tao Cheng-zhang,
Feng Zi-you, Liu Shi-pei, for instance, all had their own inter-
pretations, while some others never liked it at all, a fact which
partly accounted for the revolutionaries' inability to formulate a
land policy clearly. Whatever the interpretations, Xia stresses,
pingjun diquan represented the interests of the bourgeoisie, not
the peasantry. It was intended to promote bourgeois capitalism
with the revenues coming from land rent. When capitalism was
accelerated, the differences between the rich and the poor would
increase, thereby sharpening class antagonisms. Drawing on
Lenin's essay, "Democracy and Narodism in China,"" Xia argues
that Sun's "economic revolution"" amounted to nothing more
than the transfer of rent to the states; i.e., land nationalization,
and that there was absolutely nothing else that was realistic
in what Sun proposed and advocated. As Lenin writes (1963:
XVIII, 168):

According to Marx's theory, land nationalization means a maxi-


mum elimination of medieval monopolies and medieval relations
in agriculture, maximum freedom in buying and selling land, and
maximum facilities for agriculture to adapt itself to the market.

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[2061 MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

While the class identity of some revolutionary leaders, notably


Zhang Bing-lin, is open to debate, there is no dispute that the
bourgeois revolutionaries were not building socialism as some of
them thought they were doing. In advocating pingjun diquan, it
was their intention to establish bourgeois rule with peasant
support, thereby to prevent a second revolution. The rural masses
would not be the chief beneficiaries, Xia concludes, since the
idea of "land to the tiller," of which Sun talked in generalities,
never received serious attention. It was not until the early 1920s
that, with the assistance of the Chinese Communist Party, "land
to the tiller" became central to Sun's pingjun diquan.
There are other interesting issues discussed in the book. A few
articles published separately in the journal Lishi yanjiu and other
journals join the debates. But, for reasons of space we cannot
include them here.

SCHOLARSHIP SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Since the Cultural Revolution the issue of "historical view-


points" versus "class analysis" seems to have lost much of its
significance. Chinese historiography has become more directly
related to the political needs of the Chinese Commuinist Party.
Politics in command applies to art and literature as well. It is
considered to be unrealistic to argue what is uniquely Chinese
and what is universally Marxist-Leninist. The two are not neces-
sarily incompatible. What is important is for the Party to define
the demands of Chinese society; historical events are then inter-
preted in a way that would help to meet them. In other words,
history is to be written or rewritten in broad terms to fulfil its
social and political functions.
The Revolution of 191 1 has received merely general treatment
since the Cultural Revolution. In late 1972, Wu Yu-zhang's Lun
xinhai geming (1972) was published, which is a reproduction of
the introduction to his earlier work (1961). The appearance of
this treatise iiidicates that generally no new interpretations had
been put forward. In the same year, a booklet, Xinhai geming,
was put out as part of the History of Modern China series (1972)

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Fung / CHINESE HIS TORIOGRA PH Y [207]

intended for the general public (later with an English language


edition published in 1976). It reaffirms the anti-imperialist and
antifeudal interpretation in general terms and repeats the argu-
ment that the revolution failed because of the weak leadership of
the bourgeoisie (pp. 93-94). In 1974 a similar book, entitled Xin-
hai geming (Lin, 1974), appeared. Both of them have title pages
preceded by quotations from Chairman Mao, which serve as the
theoretical framework. Both emphasize the incomplete nature of
the revolution and the importance of the working class in revo-
lution. Chairman Mao's message is clear:

The entire history of revolution proves that without the leader-


ship of the working class revolution fails and that with it revo-
lution triumphs. In the epoch of imperialism, in no country can
any other class lead any genuine revolution to victory. This is
clearly proved by the fact that the many revolutions led by China's
petty bourgeoisie all failed [Mao, 1961: IV, 421].

In 1975 when the anti-Confucian campaign was in full swing,


some aspects of the 191 1 Revolution were reappraised in an effort
to exalt the Legalists. An article published in the March issue of
Wen Wu (Cultural Relics) describes Zang Bing-lin's view of
history as being anti-Confucian and pro-Legalist (Tang, 1975).
The author, Tang Zhi-jun, examines a hitherto unpublished
handwritten letter of Zhang's to Wu Jun-sui, which is now on
deposit in the Shanghai Library, and points out that Zhang once
supported Confucianism and the Qing dynasty. But after 1901
Zhang had broken with Liang Qi-chao and Kang You-wei and
taken a revolutionary stand. Tang asserts that Zhang, once he
was converted to revolution, realized the need to criticize Con-
fucius and Confucianism, and to look upon the progressive
Legalists as a source of inspiration, for he now favored revo-
lutionary change in the Legalist fashion. In 1902 Zhang met Sun
Yat-sen in Tokyo, an encounter which had a profound influence
on the former, Tang maintains. The issue of land attracted
Zhang's attention, and he was said to have had many useful dis-
cussions with Sun on a number of subjects.

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[208] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

In Tang's opinion, Zhang's main weakness was his inability to


analyze the Confucian-Legalist conflict from a class viewpoint.
By this Tang means that Zhang, as a "political representative of
the weak Chinese bourgeoisie," was divorced from the masses and
ideologically behind the revolutionary age. That was why he
moved into the orbit of Yuan Shi-kai once the dynasty was over-
thrown, and fell into disgrace when he reversed his stand and
supported Confucianism after 191 1.
The article by Tang is obviously intended to be part of the
political movement to criticize Confucianism rather than a
scholarly study of Zhang's view of history. The author fails
to substantiate the claim that Zhang was a Legalist or pro-Lega-
list before 1911. Nor does he make any mention of Zhang's dif-
ferences with Sun Yat-sen over the land issue and the question
of revolutionary leadership.
In May 1975 the Wen Wu published an article which sought
to "expose the criminal record" of foreign imperialism in late
Qing China (Zhong, 1975). The author, Zhong Jin-shi of the
Beijing Normal College, alleges that foreign imperialists in China
had formed a political and cultural alliance with the Chinese
semifeudal ruling class in order to carry out the policy of "using
the Chinese to play off against the Chinese themselves." Foreign
missionaries, notably Richard Timothy and Young John Allen
(the latter was publisher of the Globe Magazine in Shanghai),
are accused of promoting an admixture of Confucianism and
Christianity as an ideological instrument of imperialism. The
foreign powers supported the dynasty and the Confucian ideo-
logy because, the author maintains, they wanted China to remain
as backward as ever so that she would permanently be under
imperialist control. When Yuan Shi-kai attempted to restore the
monarchy in 1915, the imperialists in China are alleged to have
quickly supported him, openly advocating Confucianism and the
suppression of revolution. This article, like the one by Tang
Zhi-yun, is a political piece of work which lacks depth in its
analysis.
In September 1976 Tang Zhi-yun in collaboration with Zhuang
Yuan-he published another article on Zhang Bing-lin (Tang,
1976). It is based on an examination of fourteen published

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Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [209]

letters of Zhang that are now held by the Chongqing Museum.


These letters were written between April and August 1913, fol-
lowing the assassination of Song Jiao-ren, a leading member of the
newly constituted Guomindang. According to Tang and Zhuang,
Song's death brought Zhang to the realization of Yuan's ambition
and treachery, but he had no confidence in Sun Yat-sen's ability
to challenge Yuan militarily. So he turned to Li Yuan-hong, then
vice-president of the Republic, but to no avail. He also failed
to see that Yuan intended to restore the monarchy when, as
president, Yuan sought to restore Confucianism to the respected
position which it had traditionally held. In 1913 Zhang found
himself unable to trust either Yuan or Sun, for they were "badgers
of the same mold."
Tang adds what he omitted in his previous article, namely,
Zhang's differences with Sun, which can be traced back to 1907
when the former was editor of the Min Bao. While Tang and
Zhuang are critical (very mildly) of Zhang's failure to distin-
guish between friend (Sun) and enemy (Yuan) and to carry out
thoroughly the anti-Yuan campaign, they advance the view that
Zhang was one of the most important revolutionary standard-
bearers (qishou) who had had a profound influence on the
bourgeois democratic revolution before 191 1. But unfortunately,
he still had a tendency to compromise with the feudal forces
owing to the fact that he himself was a product of the traditional
feudal culture. In the final analysis of the authors, Zhang went
down in history as a "half-hero" who epitomized the inherent
weaknesses of the bourgeois revolutionaries.
Following the political demise of the "Gang of Four," there
is obviously a new trend to review the historiography of the
previous years when the "radicals" were in the ascendent. In
February 1977 an interesting article, ("Was the 191 1 Revolution
a struggle between Legalism and Confucianism?") entitled "Xin-
hai geming shi rufa douzheng ma?" appeared in Lishiyanjiu (Fan,
1977). The author, Fan Bai-chuan, accuses the "Gang of Four" of
having opposed Mao Ze-dong's interpretation and betrayed the
fundamental Marxist theory in their study of the revolution.
During the anti-Confucian and anti-Lin Biao campaign of 1973-

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[210] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

1974, the "Gang of Four" is alleged to have distorted history


through interpreting the revolution as primarily a struggle be-
tween Legalism and Confucianism. Fan does not name the his-
torians who belonged to the "Gang of Four," nor does he refer to
any specific article. But obviously his criticism is directed at
Tang Zhi-yun's earlier writings on Zhang Bing-lin.' Fan chal-
lenges the claim that Zhang, not Sun, was the true revolutionary
standard-bearer before 1911. Actually Tang never made such a
claim; what he said was that Zhang was one of the most important
revolutionary standard-bearers. Nor did Tang ever reject the role
and leadership of Sun.
In any case, Fan finds it necessary to reassert Mao's anti-
imperialist and anti-feudal theme which seems to have been
somewhat neglected during the anti-Confucian campaign. He
argues convincingly that Zhang was neither a true Legalist nor
a true bourgeois democratic revolutionary. Although Zhang once
lauded Legalism and attacked Confucianism, he still had high
regard for Confucius and never positively denied the role of
Confucianism; in Chinese society. His .ideological stand was
ambivalent; the only obvious thing about him was his frantic anti-
Manchu sentiment which overrode all considerations of political
and economic changes. He did not understand that Sun Yat-
sen's "equalization of land rights" was intended to promote
Chinese capitalism, and this, among other things, explained his
disagreements with Sun. In short, Fan tells us that the "Gang of
Four" pretended to be modern Legalists in order to attack
Premier Zhou En-lai and other loyal members of the Chinese
Communist Party.
Dissussion of the Confucian-Legalist controversy which char-
acterized the anti-Confucian and anti-Lin Biao campaign is be-
yond the scope of this paper.2 Suffice it to say that Fan is correct
in rejecting the view that the 1911 Revolution was a Confucian-
Legalist struggle. It is also of interest to note that while following
the neo-orthodox anti-imperialist and antifeudal interpretation,
Fan asserts that ideologically the struggle during the period of
the 1911 Revolution was between "new learning" and "old

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Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [21 1]

learning," i.e., between the newly acquired Western bourgeois


democratic ideas and the Chinese feudal culture. Sun Yat-sen is
seen as the representative of those bourgeois intellectuals who
sought to find "the truth" in the West. This last point is most
interesting and somewhat intriguing. None of the earlier works I
have reviewed in this paper deals with the new learning-old
learning theme.

CONCLUSION

In Chinese historiography, the 1911 Revolution was anti-


imperialist and antifeudal and cannot be put in the same cate-
gory with the English and French Revolutions. Unlike its English
and French counterparts, the Chinese bourgeoisie was weak
numerically, economically, and politically, and never grew in-
dependent and confident because it was tied to and dependent on
the feudal state bureaucracy and the imperialist foreign interests.
It was their political, organizational, and ideological weak-
nesses that prevented the Chinese bourgeois democratic revo-
lutionaries from completing the anti-imperialist and antifeudal
task.
Chinese scholarship on the revolution is of interest to anyone
who takes social revolution seriously. Much of it is inspired by
Marxist or Leninist ideas. The class analysis and Marxist ap-
proach afford an insight into the socioeconomic backgrounds of
the revolutionaries and their movement, as well as into the
limitations of their achievements and the consequences of the
revolution. At the same time, there are useful narratives which
follow more traditional methodologies.
There are areas in the Chinese writings which deserve further
research: for example, the role of the New Army in provinces
other than Hubei, the intellectual metamorphosis of some impor-
tant sections of the gentry class, the self-government movement
in the provinces, the administrative reforms at both the central
and provincial levels, to mention but a few. We look forward to
additional scholarly treatment of these subjects.

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[212] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978

NOTES

1. I have checked all the 1974-1976 issues of Wen Wu and Lishiyanyiu, and could not
find any articles dealing with Zhang Bing-lin or the 1911 Revolution other than those
already reviewed here.
2. For an account of the anti-Confucian campaign, see Merle Goldman (1975)
"China's Anti-Confucian Campaign 1973-1974" The China Quarterly, 63: 435-462.

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Edmund S. K. Fung is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Modern Asian Studies,


Griffith University, Brisbane. His research interest is in the history of the late
Qing and early Republican periods. He has published articles on some aspects of
the 1911 Revolution.

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