Australian Journal of Asian Law, 2023, Vol 24 No 1, Article 03: 19-34

Analysing the Success of Death Penalty Campaigns in

the Philippines: Strategies, Tactics and Framing
Neri Javier Colmenares∗

Asia remains a rich field of study for death penalty scholars because a comparatively large number of Asian countries continue
to statutorily impose capital punishment, despite a worldwide trend to abolish it. Asian countries (excluding China) handed
down at least one-third of the 28,670 death sentences worldwide in 2021. The Philippines, the first Asian country to abolish the
death penalty ( in 1987), is also of interest because it continues to be the arena for one of the most ferocious battles between the
retentionists, who advocate for the retention or reinstatement of capital punishment, and the abolitionists. While the 1987
Philippine Constitution abolished the death penalty, it also granted Congress the power to reimpose capital punishment through
legislation. This shifted the arena of contention to Congress, rather than the judiciary, as retentionists and abolitionists battled
it out through legislative skirmishes (Kim, 2016: 606) that often spilled out to street rallies and raucous public debates. Barely
a few months after the 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty, the heated campaign for its reinstatement ensued and
culminated in the reimposition of capital punishment in 1993. Immediately thereafter, a strong abolitionist campaign
commenced, and successfully occasioned the second abolition of capital punishment in 2006, a clear sign not only of the
contentious nature of the debate but, also, of the vacillating tendency or ‘mixed feelings’ of Philippine policy-makers. Since then,
the abolitionists managed to successfully stave off the reinstatement of capital punishment. This article examines the specific
strategies, tactics and framing narrative that may have contributed to the abolitionists’ successful campaigns resisting the strong
retentionist efforts to reimpose the death penalty after its second abolition in 2006, up to the period of 2016-22, when President
Rodrigo Duterte attempted to reinstate it. The paper will compare the Philippine campaign strategy with those employed by
transnational activists who successfully campaigned for the passage of various United Nations Resolutions, calling for a
moratorium on the imposition of death penalty in 2007 and succeeding years.

There have been few studies the role of international non-governmental organisations, transnational
campaigns and the framing elements deployed in campaigns against the death penalty (Marchetti,
2016: 356; Kim, 2016: 596). In his study of the United Nations (UN) transnational campaigns for a
death penalty moratorium, Raffaele Marchetti (2016) identified the horizontal (coalition building),
vertical (multi-layered political lobbying in institutions), and communicative (rational framing and
emotional storytelling) strategies and tactics that contributed to the success of the UN campaign
(Marchetti, 2016: 369-70). He pointed out that the communicative strategy of transnational
abolitionists, consisting of reason-based framing anchored on human rights (the inalienable right to
life), as well as emotion-based storytelling based on the micro-experiences of death row inmates and
their families, played a crucial role in this success (Marchetti, 2016: 369, 372).
Marchetti asserts that the success of the transnational moratorium movement was underpinned
by the coalition’s horizontal expansion to accommodate organisationally and ideologically varied
advocates, and its vertical interaction with multi-layered institutions to persuade policy-makers to
support moratorium endeavours. He particularly examines the interplay of reason-based human
rights macro-framing with emotion-based storytelling, and posits that the previously neglected frame
of empathy storytelling contributed largely to persuading targeted gatekeepers in government
institutions to support the moratorium resolutions (Marchetti, 2016: 358, 369, 372-73).
Snow and Bedford (1988: 199), in their seminal work on social movement framing and resonance,
identified the three core framing tasks as diagnostic (problem analysis), prognostic (the proposed
solution), and call to action (consensus mobilisation), arguing that campaign successes depend on
how these framing tasks were executed. Framing, defined by Snow and Bedford (1988: 198) as
assigning meaning to, and interpreting, ‘relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to

∗
Neri Colmenares is a human rights lawyer and lectures for the Continuing Legal Education program of the Institute for
the Administration of Justice, University of the Philippines Law Center. He served as a member of the Philippines House
of Representatives from 2007 to 2016.

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Australian Journal of Asian Law Vol 24 No 1

mobilise potential adherents and constituents to garner bystander support and demobilise
antagonists’, has increased in significance since they tackled the concept of social movement framing
and resonance in 1988. Assessing the factors of recruitment and mobilisation in the peace movement
and religious groups, they advanced the notion (Snow and Bedford, 1988: 214) 1 that:
... consensus mobilization is multidimensional and that the ways in which dimensions are framed may
inadvertently impede, as well as facilitate, action mobilization.

This paper attempts to analyse whether the same transnational strategy and tactical decisions
in the UN campaigns, including the framing process that may have facilitated or impeded
mobilisation, were similarly employed successful abolitionist campaigns in the Philippines against
reimposition since 2006. It is hoped that the identification of the fields of similarity and divergence
can inform future national and transnational death penalty campaigns. Study of the Philippines is
particularly important, because a large number of Asian countries retain the death penalty. Even
excluding China, Asian countries handed down at least one-third of the 28,670 death sentences
worldwide in 2021. 2 Even in the Philippines, the first Asian country to abolish the death penalty (in
1987), 3 battles between retentionists and abolitionists continue. The transnational campaign relied
heavily on human rights framing, coupled with the empathy narrative on the dire plight of death
row convicts. This dual framing was supplemented by the ‘religious’ framing that life is a gift from
God, and the ‘fallibility’ framing, which points out erroneous death sentences in an imperfect justice
system (Marchetti, 2016: 369-70).
In the case of the Philippines, the communicative framing deployed indeed delivered a strong
blow to the retentionist position and mobilisation. However, this paper posits that it was not mainly
the human rights framing nor the empathy-based storytelling that generally demobilised the
retentionist narrative, but rather the reason-based ‘fallibility’ exposition of a corrupt, ineffective,
discriminatory, and therefore failed, justice system in the Philippines that derailed retentionist
arguments for restoring the death penalty.
This framing, which I call the ‘failed justice’ framing, also amplified the assertion of the need for
justice system reform in responding to heinous crimes, instead of the retentionists’ hasty resort to
capital punishment. The ‘failed justice’ framing is not limited to ‘judicial fallibility’ or ‘erroneous’
decisions of courts, but rather, systemic flaws in the justice system and the impact of the injustice it
breeds on the imposition of capital punishment.
This research finds that while strategic and tactical decisions similar to the UN campaigns were
arrived at in the Philippine campaigns, they were nuanced by the specific conditions pertaining to
the country as domestic framings are, at times, at ‘odds with global human rights framing’ (Neumeier
and Sandholtz, 2019: 126). The adjustment or transformation of the Philippine abolitionist frame to
that of the failed justice system framing served as the main fulcrum of its arguments, and when
supplemented by human rights and religious messaging, effectively countered the retentionists’
deterrence and retribution narrative. This ‘frame transformation’ (Snow et al, 2014) not only
resonated with the target audience but also helped demobilise vacillating retentionists.
This paper’s research methodology largely employed qualitative analysis of data from official
government institutions, documents from the protagonists themselves, the media, and death
penalty-related scholarly research. Public documents were mainly sourced from the Commission on
Human Rights, transcripts of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, various death penalty bills filed
in Congress since 1987, Supreme Court decisions, and data from the Philippine National Police.
Documents from the UN, the European Union, and statements by the Vatican and various
abolitionist countries also formed part of this paper’s international sources. Documents containing

1 See also Snow et al, 2014.

2 At the end of 2021, at least 28,670 people were known to be under sentence of death. Nine countries held 82 per cent of
the known totals: Iraq (8,000+), Pakistan (3,800+), Nigeria (3,036+), USA (2,382), Bangladesh (1,800+), Malaysia (1,359),
Viet Nam (1,200+), Algeria (1,000+) and Sri Lanka (1,000+). These figures do not include China. See Amnesty
International, 2021 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/>.
3 Nepal, which abolished capital punishment in 1946, was the first Asian country to abolish the death penalty. However,
it reinstated it in 1985, making the Philippines the only Asian country without death penalty once it abolished capital
punishment in 1987.

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Australian Journal of Asian Law Vol 24 No 1

research findings and public declarations of abolitionist civil society organisations and groups such
as the MTB-RJM (Mamamayan Tutol sa Bitay 4 - Restorative Justice Movement), CADP-Philippines
(Coalition against Death Penalty-Philippines), AI (Amnesty International), HRW (Human Rights
Watch), and FLAG (Free Legal Aid Group), as well as position statements from religious groups
including the Catholic church, protestant and evangelical groups, were also valuable sources.
The personal experience of the author, as an observer-participant in death penalty issues also
informed this paper’s analysis. Then an 18-year-old activist, he was arrested in 1979 during martial
law under President Ferdinand Marcos, tortured and imprisoned for four years on charges of
subversion and rebellion, which could then merit capital punishment. Additionally, the author
drafted an appeal before the Supreme Court 5 for a death row inmate in 1997 that succeeded in his
exoneration and eventual release. He was also a three-term member of the Philippine Congress
(2007-16) during the period when death penalty bills were filed and deliberated in the legislature.

The Swinging Pendulum of the Death Penalty Debate

After centuries of relatively unchallenged imposition of capital punishment, the Philippines has
become the site of one of the most relentless battles between abolitionists and the retentionists, after
it was ‘abolished’ by the 1987 Constitution (Serak, 2018: 32).
Capital punishment had been statutorily entrenched in the Philippine legal system since the
colonial rule under Spain (1521-1896) and the United States (1898-1946) (Amnesty International,
1997: 3), and the Philippine Revised Penal Code of 1930 retained capital punishment. While the
philosophy of retributive justice, and, subsequently, deterrence, dominated Philippine penology since
the Spanish colonial rule, there was some assertion of the need for a rehabilitative penology in the
1960s, and the pendulum has been swinging back and forth between the two contending schools of
thought since then. In 1979, Rep. Salacnib Baterina who advocated for rehabilitation, filed
Parliamentary Bill 543, contending that ‘The Philippine Penal system’s method of retributive justice
is vengeful and barbaric...’ (Amnesty International, 1997: 7). House Bill 295 (HB 295), filed in 1987
to reimpose the death penalty, used both retribution and deterrence as basis for reimposition
(Amnesty International, 1997: 9). 6 It was during martial law (1972-86) under President Ferdinand
Marcos, however, that capital crimes were expanded to include sedition, rebellion and insurrection,
to deter opposition to his regime, by Presidential Decrees No 9 (PD 9), 7 PD 1834 8 and PD 1866. 9
Opposition leader Senator Benigno Aquino was sentenced to death for subversion, illegal possession
of firearms, and murder during martial law, although it was not carried out. 10
As mentioned, the post-martial law 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty, mainly to
dissociate the new government from Marcos’ repressive martial law regime and signal Philippine
democratisation (Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 134). 11 The provision was, however, tucked in a proviso
under art III s 19(1) that allows Congress to reinstate capital punishment ‘for compelling reasons’. 12
This was a concession to the strong contention of some drafters of the Constitution that the issue
should be left to the discretion of Congress rather than enshrined in the Constitution. 13
Immediately thereafter, the military, including then Armed Forces Chief General Fidel Ramos,
launched a vigorous campaign for the reimposition of capital punishment, citing its need to quell

4 People Against Death Penalty (translation).

5 The pleading (in People vs Del Rosario, GR No 127755) was signed by Atty. Leo Agustin, the head of the law firm
employing the author, who was then a non-lawyer intern waiting for the bar examination results.
6 See also People of the Philippines vs Leo Echegaray, GR No 117472, 7 February 1997.
7 Official Gazette, 2 October 1972 <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/>.
8 Official Gazette, 16 January 1981 <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/>.
9 Official Gazette, 29 June 1983 <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/>.
10 He was allowed to go on exile to the United States but was assassinated on 21 August 1983, when he returned to the
Philippines. His assassination triggered a massive people protest that led to the ouster of Pres. Ferdinand Marcos in
1986.
11 See also discussion by Neumayer (2008: 28, 30) on democratisation as a factor in death penalty abolition.
12 Official Gazette <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/>.
13 See Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission [Volume I, Volume II and Volume V).

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insurgency and enhance national security. Retentionists have always found strong support from
state security forces who want the death penalty imposed for political offences, members of Congress
who wish to portray strong stance against crime to their electorates, and some evangelical churches,
who argue that the death penalty has biblical basis.
Ramos subsequently became President (1992-98), and marshalled the passage of Republic Act
7659 (RA 7659), which came into effect in 1994, reimposing capital punishment for what were
considered ‘heinous’ crimes (Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 137), covering at least thirteen capital
offenses (Tagayuna, 2004: 2). 14 However, this law abandoned the original national security purposes
(Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 139) and mainly focused on curbing lawlessness and certain economic
crimes.
In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected president (1998-January 2001) on a platform that included
a tough response to crime. He immediately set into action the implementation of the death sentences
for hundreds of death row inmates. A total of seven convicts were executed from 1999 to 2000. This
ignited strong protests from the abolitionists who immediately launched a campaign for a second
abolition. In December 2000, President Estrada, in a surprising turnaround, suddenly announced
that he would commute all death sentences to life imprisonment in recognition of the Catholic
church’s ‘International Jubilee Year’ (Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 124). This announcement, at a
time when Estrada was besieged by corruption issues (Tagayuna, 2004: 19), was seen as his futile
attempt to win the support of the Catholic church. In any case, President Estrada was ousted by
‘people power’ in January 2001 and replaced by then Vice-President Gloria Arroyo (2001-10), who
immediately declared a moratorium on the execution of death row convicts.
Amid intense pressure from anti-crime groups and the business sector over the surge in
kidnappings and violence, President Arroyo lifted the moratorium in December 2003 (Villanueva,
2003), although she never approved an execution during her term (Punay, 2006). In Easter of 2006,
President Arroyo, citing religious reasons (Philippines. Official Gazette, 2006), announced that she
was commuting all death sentences meted to around 1200 convicts to life imprisonment, one of the
largest mass commutations in the world (Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 125). On 24 June 2006, Arroyo
finally signed RA 9346, repealing the death penalty law and ending years of flip-flopping on the issue
(Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 125). In the week following the law’s signing, Arroyo met with Pope
Benedict XVI (Ramzy, 2006) during her visit to Rome (Calica, 2006). At that time, Arroyo was also
reeling from surging street protests demanding her resignation for corruption, and electoral fraud in
the 2004 presidential elections.
The battle between the retentionists and the abolitionists continued after 2006 as bills for the
reimposition of capital punishment were immediately filed in Congress. However, the campaigns
mounted by retentionist anti-crime groups failed. President Benigno Aquino III (2010-16), in the
midst of strong abolitionist campaign, declared that he would not support capital punishment
because the death penalty cannot co-exist with an ‘imperfect’ legal system (Tan, 2014), arguing that
there must be justice system reform first (Corrales, 2014).
It was not until the term of the next president, Rodrigo Duterte (2016-22), that the retentionists
gained headway with the support of a strong retentionist president and his ‘super majority’ in both
Houses of Congress.

President Rodrigo Duterte: Continuing the Retentionist and Abolitionist Battle

President Duterte, in his first major policy statement on 16 May 2016, declared his intention to
reinstate the death penalty saying that ‘After the first hanging, there will be another ceremony for
the second time until the head is completely severed from the body’ (Romero, 2016). Seven bills were
immediately filed in the House of Representatives during the 17th Congress (2016-19). These were
approved on 8 March 2017, by an overwhelming vote of 217-54. 15
So strong was President Duterte’s push for the death penalty that many of those who voted
against the bill, including former President Arroyo, who was by then elected to Congress, were

14 See also Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 140.

15 House Bills 1, 16, 513, 3237, 3239, 3240 and 3418, filed during the 17th Congress, see <https://www.congress.gov.ph/>.

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consequently ousted from their legislative committee positions (Cayabyab, 2017). Charges of
railroading the bill’s speedy approval were also expressed by opposition legislators (Cepeda, 2017). 16
To prod the Senate to approve a similar bill, President Duterte reiterated his call for the passage of
a death penalty law in his State of the Nation Address in July 2017 declaring that ‘Capital
punishment is not only about deterrence. It is also about retribution’. 17 The bills, however, did not
get past the Senate (CNN-Philippines, 2019; Amnesty International, 2021), which succumbed to the
effective and focused campaigning of both domestic and international abolitionists. It is worth noting
that Senators, elected at large nationally, are often concerned with wider national and international
issues that may affect their electoral fortunes and are, therefore, susceptible to lobbying by civil
society organisations.
Another set of death penalty bills was filed in the 18th Congress (2019-22). 18 On 2 March 2021,
the House of Representatives, voting 188-11, approved House Bill (HB) 7814, imposing the death
penalty but this time, only for drug-related crimes (Jose and de Ungria, 2021: 2). Again, due to the
Senate’s lack of support it failed to pass into law. 19
Despite the strong push from a powerful and intimidating president, the attempt at reimposition
failed (Johnson and Zimring, 2019: 321). It is unclear whether the current President, Ferdinand
Marcos Jr, will support its reimposition (Lalu, 2012). What is certain is that the battle between the
protagonists on the death penalty issue will just be as contentious in the coming years, as death
penalty bills were immediately refiled in the 19th Congress (2022-25).

Framing Transformation: Arguments and Counter-Arguments in search of

Resonance
The main retentionist argument in 1987 echoed the deterrence argument 20 of the 1970s (Radelet and
Borg, 2000: 44). President Duterte, however, gives scant credibility to the deterrence argument,
claiming that the death penalty is essentially retribution:
They say the death penalty is a deterrence to discourage people from committing crimes. But it has no
effect. People don’t learn anyway. You know that is a very fractured statement. The other school of thought
is, the death penalty is not to instil fear, not to deter. Whether you like to commit a crime or not, that’s not
my business. Death penalty to me is retribution. (Ranada, 2016)

While some retentionists admit that, so far, there is no conclusive proof that death penalty is more
effective as a deterrent than long term imprisonment (Pulta, 2019), they argue that this is caused by
the difficulty in gathering data, because the capital punishment is rarely implemented. Retribution
has been one of the main arguments of evangelical churches supporting capital punishment. The
Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches (PCEC), comprising 78 churches from 200 faith-based
organisations, 21 cited Genesis 9:6 – ‘Because life is sacred, to wilfully extinguish the life of another
person entails forfeiting one’s own’ – to explain its support for capital punishment (PCEC, 2018).
On the other hand, the abolitionists mainly point to corruption, the glacial pace of the judicial
process, the overall ineffectiveness of the justice system, its discriminatory nature against the poor
and the marginalised (Deinla et al, 2021: 7-8), and the fallibility of the entire process that can send

16 Rep Carlos Zarate of Bayan Muna Party List and the Makabayan Coalition said, ‘This is to be expected and we stand by
our principled decision to vote no against the anti-poor death penalty bill. But it does not speak well for the House
leadership to have resorted to arm-twisting and railroading just to ensure the passage of an anti-poor death penalty bill’
(Cepeda, 2017).
17 Philippines Official Gazette ‘President Rodrigo Duterte’s Second State of the Nation Address (2017).
18 Thirteen death penalty bills were filed in the House of Representatives in the 18th Congress (House Bills 741, 1380, 1588,
1800, 1806, 1807, 368, 2026, 2092, 4743, 3128, 3256, 3261) see <https://www.congress.gov.ph/>.
19 Sen. Manny Pacquiao filed Senate Bill 185 to reimpose death penalty in 2016 during the 17th Congress but his bill did
not pass in the Senate. He refiled it in the 18th Congress as Senate Bill 189. A total of 13 death penalty bills were also
filed in the House of Representatives in the 18th Congress as a renewed push for the passage of the law. All these bills
failed to pass into law.
20 See House Bill 395 filed in 1987 ‘…in light of rising and mounting tide of criminality and lawlessness [...] particularly the
pestering insurgency and the alarming incidents of violent crimes…’.
21 See PCEC webpage at <https://pcec.org.ph/join-us/>.

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an innocent person to the gallows, to explain the failure of capital punishment to achieve retributive
justice (APHR, 2017). 22 This ‘failed justice system’ framing managed to effectively counter the
retentionist ‘sliding frame’ from deterrence to retribution. The retentionist counter-argument in
House Bill 4121 23 that the possibility of sentencing error is ‘minimal’, served only to weaken the
retentionist position.
The abolitionist campaign also hammered the retentionists’ failure to satisfactorily prove their
deterrence argument, showing that crime rates in Metro Manila increased from 18.14 per cent to
24.93 per cent in 1994, when the death penalty was reinstated (Commission on Human Rights, 1997).
There were years that crime rates decreased or increased (Senate Economic Planning Office, 2013)
despite the second abolition of the death penalty. This simply means that the direct correlation
between capital punishment and crime rates, which tend to go up or down depending on other factors
such as the economy, crime reporting system or natural calamities, has not been sufficiently
established. Deterrence has no sufficient and conclusive basis in relation to death penalty in the
Philippines. The author, together with other human rights lawyers, asserted this, as well as the
failed justice argument, during the 2020 congressional hearing on death penalty of the House of
Representatives (Patag, 2020) but the House passed the bill, despite failure of the retentionists to
provide sufficient basis for their deterrence argument.
The fact that the police in the Philippines are notorious for corruption, incompetence, and
torture made it easier for the abolitionists to argue that the poor will be at a serious disadvantage
for lack of resources and competent counsel to ensure a fair trial (Deinla et al, 2021). A study revealed
that 51 per cent of those in death row earn less than the minimum wage and 45 per cent of these
inmates reported torture by the police. 24 Moreover, the Supreme Court in the case of People of the
Philippines vs Mateo 25 admitted that of the 1493 death sentences imposed from 1993 to 2004, the
Court was only able to review 907. Of the cases reviewed, only 230 or 25 per cent of death sentences
were affirmed, while 651 death row convicts were saved from lethal injection. In fact, 65 of the
convicts were acquitted by the Court, leading many to believe that some of those previously executed
may have been innocent or at least, did not deserve the death penalty. The author, then a legal intern,
drafted the appeal of a death row convict in 1997 that led to his acquittal by the Supreme Court 26 in
a case that was patently erroneous.

The Philippine Campaign: Organising, Lobbying and Framing

This paper posits that the Philippine campaigns employed strategies and tactics similar to the
transnational moratorium campaigns, although these were nuanced with the interplay of local
factors and specific realities affecting the framing of the social movements’ narrative.
First, the coalition building strategy of the UN moratorium campaigns found its way into the
Philippine campaigns, which made a conscious strategic decision to build a broad coalition
emphasising the imperative of broad-based campaigning through a unified network of autonomous
members. The coalition set aside substantial or residual differences in ideological, managerial, and
resource mobilisation issues in order to strengthen the unity of the abolitionist camp in the face of a
strong retentionist campaign. While international campaigns are at times beset by differences
between those advocating for abolition and moratorium, such substantial division was not found in
the Philippine campaign.
Arrayed against the retentionists as early as the 1987 campaigns were the Catholic church
through the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), some progressive protestant
churches such as the National Council of Churches of the Philippines, anti-death penalty advocates

22 See also De Ungria and Jose (2019) for other abolitionist arguments.
23 HB 4121, filed in 2022 under the current 19th Congress seeks to reinstate capital punishment.
24 See PCIJ, 2006, citing survey conducted by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG).
25 People of the Philippines vs Mateo E, GR No 147678-87, 7 July 2004, Supreme Court E-Library,
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/45535.
26 People of the Philippines vs Del Rosario, GR No 127755, 14 April 1999, Supreme Court
<https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/apr1999/gr_127755_1999.html>.

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such as CADP and MTB-MRJ, human rights advocates such as the Commission on Human Rights,
Amnesty International and FLAG (Serak, 2018: 33), and some opposition groups in Congress. Many
of these groups continued the abolitionist advocacy through the years, establishing an institutional
continuity that reinforced campaigns every time reimposition bills were filed in Congress.
The Philippine population is approximately 81 per cent Catholic (Philippine Statistics Authority,
2003). This explains the organisational and communicative reach of the Catholic church, centrally
organised through the CBCP. Under the CBCP’s Episcopal Commission on the Laity is the
Sangguniang Laiko ng Pilipinas (Philippine Council of the Laity), a grassroots organisation with
members in almost all cities and municipalities throughout the country. The decision to involve the
laity 27 since the 2006 campaigns was a major element of abolitionist norm diffusion, that at the very
least, neutralised the pervasive public perception favouring capital punishment.
The civil society component of the abolition movement was mainly fuelled by human rights
groups adept in organising, campaigning, and coalition building. This is akin to the transnational
configuration of the UN campaigns where groups have acquired organising and campaign skills
through campaigns for diverse international human rights, fair trade, environment and gender
issues.
When President Ramos reinstated capital punishment in 1993, 28the Catholic church together
with Amnesty International and FLAG immediately helped establish CADP-Philippines. When the
debate was at its height in 2003, the broad-based MTB-MRJ was organised and later expanded to
about 150 member organisations nationwide (Pabico, 2006). More importantly, MTB-MRJ
incorporated in its framing the vision of restorative justice providing abolitionists as well as the
public, with an alternative that will replace the dominant retribution philosophy of Philippine
penology.
With the support of international groups, as well as abolitionist member countries of the
European Union, the abolitionists managed to launch a well-oiled machinery for the campaign.
Human rights groups, veterans in new rights campaigns (Dorsey and Nelson, 2008: 89-91) on
multiple human rights issues, have campaign and organising experience, unlike the retentionists,
whose campaign lacked the institutional continuity of the abolitionists.
During the Duterte retentionist push, abolitionist organisations, together with MTB-MRJ such
as Artikulo Tres Human Rights Alliance, MABINI, Philrights, SENTRO, Alcohol and Drug
Foundation (Australia), Penington Institute, the Philippine Alliance for Human Rights, and many
international groups, issued a strong joint statement opposing death penalty (Tupaz, 2016). Youth
organisations, notably the Student Alliance for the Advancement of Democratic Rights in UP (Stand
UP) and the League of Filipino Students, held mass actions against the Duterte retentionist move.
While new organisations may sprout at different junctures of the abolitionist campaign, the strategy,
tactics and framing deployed in the previous campaigns continue to reinforce abolitionist
engagements. On the other hand, retentionists such as the military are generally inexperienced in
advocacy campaigns on social issues, while politicians in Congress were mainly individual legislators,
rather than a homogenous group, who lacked the platform for a unified campaign. The evangelical
churches supportive of the death penalty, though well organised, are small in a country which is
predominantly Catholic (Cornelio and Aldama, 2021).
Other than the Movement for Restoration of Peace and Order and the Citizens Action Against
Crime, the most recognised retentionist group was the VACC (Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption), established in 1998 29 with the vision of establishing a ‘relatively crime and corruption-
free Philippines’. However, VACC’s orientation is not solely focused on death penalty advocacy, as it
staunchly battles corruption as well. This, at times, feeds into the abolition narrative against
imposing capital punishment within the context of a corrupt police organisation and judiciary. Other
retentionist groups, consisting of the Federation of Anti-illegal Drugs Campaign, The Anti-Crime
Council of the Philippines, and Fight the Drug Trade Movement, used the proliferation of illegal

27 See Sangguniang Laiko ng Pilipinas statements in <https://www.cbcplaiko.org/>.

28 See Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 124; see also: Parliamentarians for Global Action Philippines and the Death Penalty
<https://www.pgaction.orgl>.
29 See VACC web page <https://vaccphilippines.com/>.

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drugs as the lynchpin of their retentionist campaign. A review of literature, however, does not
sufficiently describe their organising and campaign activities. Unlike the abolitionists, the
retentionists have not formulated a strategy for broad coalition building among like-minded groups
animated by experienced campaigners.
In sum, the abolitionists were the better-organised and experienced campaigners. More
importantly, they arrived at a strategic decision, long before Duterte, on the need for a broad yet
unified coalition that will pursue a single objective—to organise and campaign to derail the incessant
attempts at reimposition.
Second, again akin to the transnational campaign, inherent in the abolitionist strategy was the
recognition of the need to locate vertically and institutionally in the national, regional and
international arenas. Philippine abolitionists were active not only among members states of the UN,
but also in activities of international non-government organisations such as the World Coalition
against Death Penalty. 30 This strengthened their campaign’s resource support and systematised its
lobby efforts to sway pro-capital punishment policy-makers. The creation of strong multi-layered
linkages for not just the public component of the campaign, but also persuasion efforts to sway policy-
makers and legislators, assured its comprehensive and deep institutional reach.
The recognition of the need for institutional and governmental lobbying was born out of the
experience in the Estrada and Arroyo campaigns, when abolitionist calls from international bodies,
such as UN treaty bodies, the European Union and the Vatican, played a crucial role in the eventual
repeal of capital punishment in 2006 (Kim, 2016: 11). The importance of institutional support was
acknowledged by the abolitionists early on in view of the vacillating tendency of policy-makers
(Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 125) in the face of what were, at times, contradictory presidential
directives on death penalty policies (Serak, 2018).
The vibrancy of the international campaign against capital punishment long before 2016
provided the external context that assured international support for the abolitionists (Kim, 2016).
Amnesty International played an active role in the Philippine campaign, as did as the World
Coalition Against Death Penalty, Human Rights Watch, Capital Punishment Justice Project
(Reprieve Australia), Focus on Global South, Parliamentarians for Global Action, IBAHRI
(International Bar Association Human Rights Institute), and other human rights organisations in
various countries played a key role in these campaigns. This included pressure on Cabinet members
and senators who are generally vulnerable to the sentiments of the international community. In
particular, support from the Vatican greatly enhanced the abolitionist campaign in the Philippines. 31
In fact, former President Arroyo’s meeting with Pope Benedict in the Vatican in 2006 was seen to
have precipitated her urgent push for a law abolishing death penalty (Serak, 2018: 10).
On the other hand, there was no similar strong international support for the retentionists. In an
age where abolition is sweeping the world (Hood and Hoyle, 2009), it is challenging for supporters of
capital punishment to gather such support from the international community.
Third, the abolitionists’ communicative strategy to generate a cohesive and coherent human
rights and religious framing (Bromberg, 2007) under an overarching framework of a failed justice
system narrative found resonance with the public, and made it difficult for the retentionists, who
mainly focused on punishment theory (Flanders, 2013), to exploit public support for capital
punishment. Imelda Deinla et al, in ‘Death Penalty in the Philippines: Evidence on Economics and
Efficacy’ (2021: 17), discussed at length the reason why the death penalty is ‘ill-timed’ in the current
poverty and justice system conditions in the Philippines.
It must be noted that many retentionists and abolitionists, as well as the public (Deinla et al,
2021: 8), agree that the Philippine justice system is corrupt and ineffective (Amnesty International,
1997). This is where the nuanced framing of the Philippine campaign came into play. Like the UN

30 See examples of Philippine participation in World Coalition Against the Death Penalty (WCADP) activities in WCADP,
2022. Since the early 2000s, Philippine abolitionists have been active in international forums. For example, the MTB-
MRJ attended the 2nd World Congress against the Death Penalty and the Asia-Pacific Regional Consultative Meeting on
the Death Penalty: see Pabico, 2006.
31 The support for the abolitionist campaign was strengthened when Pope Francis categorically declared that death penalty
is ‘unacceptable’, a departure from the initial position in Evangelium Vitae, promulgated in 1997: see Bordoni, 2018.

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moratorium campaign framing, the Philippine campaign initially employed a human rights frame
coupled with the religious framing emphasising the right to life of death row convicts (Marchetti,
2016: 369-70, 374; Kim, 2016: 596-97, 605-06). The retentionist counter-frame, however, also gave
emphasis to the ‘human rights’ of the victims of crime (Tagayuna, 2004: 9-10). Their empathy-
directed storytelling showing the horrible conditions of victims of heinous crimes stymied the
abolitionist human rights narrative. President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), under whose term
capital punishment was abolished, was quoted to have 'vowed to work hard for the reimposition of
the death penalty for heinous crimes', after visiting the ‘parents of two young girls who had been
raped, murdered and mutilated’ in 1990 (Amnesty International, 1997). The abolitionists’ religion-
based argument, 32 when countered with similarly Bible-based justification for capital punishment
frequently employed by retentionist evangelical churches, only resulted in muddled debates that left
the public confused.
This framing interplay among the protagonists led to a reconstituted narrative (akin to what
Snow called ‘framing transformation’) among abolitionists as they adjusted their communicative
strategy to give more emphasis to the corrupt, ineffective and inefficient Philippine justice system
(Deinla et al, 2021) and sidestep the retentionist counter-frame. According to Attorney Jose Diokno,
Chairman of FLAG, 33 the Supreme Court decision in People vs Mateo was cited as among the main
reasons that fuelled this shift. In this decision, the Court admitted that 71 per cent of the 907 convicts
sentenced to death did not deserve the death penalty.
Frame transformation consists of four alignment processes (Snow et al, 2014), namely frame
bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation. The narrative shift may not fall exactly
within the ambit of framing transformation in that the existing beliefs and standpoint of the
abolitionists themselves (such as the violative nature of capital punishment to human rights tenets)
may not have been fundamentally reconstituted. It pertains, rather, to their application of the
movement’s framing of its social messaging. In any case, the shift in terms of thrust of the
communicative content by amplifying the failed justice narrative led to changes in the handling of
the discourse. In a sense, the widespread pre-existing distrust of the justice system (Deinla et al,
2021: 8) became a major element in the reframing of the abolitionist stance.
Public support for the death penalty is usually fuelled by increasing crime rates. However, the
public also knows that the police are not only corrupt and incompetent but also plant evidence on, or
torture, suspects to get a confession (Cabico, 2019). The possibility of sending a poor but innocent
man to death while guilty criminals with resources will most likely not suffer the death penalty
(Deinla et al, 2021: 7), made it problematic for the retentionists to argue deterrence and retribution.
The Supreme Court’s admission in People of the Philippines vs Mateo 34 only bolstered the
abolitionists’ contentions.
This framing adjustment affected retentionist support and created dissonance even among some
retentionist evangelical churches. The PCEC declared ‘that the poor would be victims of the death
penalty because of an imperfect justice system that could bring about terrible miscarriages of
justice’. 35 Brother Eddie Villanueva, head of the Jesus is Lord Movement (JIL), supports the death
penalty but only ‘for heinous crimes committed by rich people and politicians’ (Teves, 2010). He
further declared that capital punishment will not work without ‘a sweeping change’ in the country’s
justice system. Dante Jimenez, head of the VACC and Chairman of President Duterte’s Presidential
Anti-Corruption Commission and one of the most vocal proponents of capital punishment, admits as
much when he declared during his testimony before a congressional hearing of the Committee on
Justice in 2016 that ‘Almost 10 years had passed, more than enough time has been given. Has there
been any improvement in our criminal justice system? It has actually deteriorated beyond
redemption’ (Meruenas, 2016). This lack of coherent and unified messaging in the face of the

32 In Evangelium Vitae, promulgated in 1997, the Vatican vaguely acknowledges the legitimacy of the application of the
death penalty ‘in cases of absolute necessity’.
33 Author’s interview with Jose Dokno, Manila, 22 February 2023.
34 People of the Philippines vs Mateo E, GR No 147678-87, 7 July 2004, Supreme Court E-Library,
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/45535.
35 PCEC Official Statements (2018), https://pcec.org.ph/2018/01/12/pcec-statement-on-death-penalty/.

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abolitionist ‘failed justice’ frame, supplemented by the human rights argument, defanged the
retentionists campaign. On the other hand, the argument that the solution to crimes is not the death
penalty but the swift and sure imprisonment of the guilty, whether rich or poor, began to take hold
in the national discourse.
Moreover, while the surveys alleged public support for the death penalty (Valente, 2018; Calleja,
2022), the retentionists failed to exploit this to their advantage, as a result of their failure to present
a coherent and unified messaging. A Social Weather Station (SWS) survey of 22-27 March 2018
showed that 59 per cent of respondents favoured the death penalty for those ‘proven in court to have
committed heinous crimes’. This means that judicial proof of guilt is a qualification in public support
for capital punishment. Furthermore, a careful look at the individual responses in the same SWS
survey shows that only drug related cases merited the death penalty, with the crime of rape under
the influence of illegal drugs garnering the highest favourable rate of 47 per cent, less than the clear
‘majority’ trumpeted by the retentionists (see also the Labucay study, in CHR, 2020). This was the
reason why legislators narrowed the death penalty bills to cover only drug related offenses in the 18th
Congress. 36
The fact that offenses not related to drugs did not merit a similar response, splintered
retentionist support. In fact, the SWS survey, as SWS head Mangar Mangahas has explained,
showed that the public will not resort to capital punishment if given an alternative (ABS-CBN News,
2018). Some media outlets headlined this survey as majority support for death penalty, but a deeper
study of the context of such public positions does not necessarily lead to such overwhelming numbers
(Gomez-Dumpit, 2018). While the extent of the role of Philippine media in the death penalty debate
remains to be rigorously studied, that it is a factor in shaping public opinion cannot be denied. Studies
in the United States show that public positions on capital punishment can be susceptible to media-
perpetuated fears (Bandes, 2004: 227), mainly because the media is among the main sources of
information. Based on the Marshall hypothesis in the case of Furman v Georgia 37 that support for
the death penalty is dependent upon the ‘whether people were fully informed as to the purposes of
the penalty and its liabilities’, then a dearth of media information, or a particular interpretation of
information by the media, can sway public positioning on capital punishment.
In the case of the Philippines, the majority of the people, especially the poor, rely on media for
information (Tagayuna, 2004: 9). This renders them susceptible to the coverage or emphasis that
media gives to a particular issue. The persuasive power of the media on death penalty issues was
quite apparent in the case of Leo Echegaray, 38 who was sentenced to death in 1997 and executed for
the rape of his stepdaughter. Five years before his execution, there was an increase in the reporting
of rape cases and incest. The emphasis of certain media groups on sensational cases, particularly
through heavy coverage of heinous crimes, means that the public was more informed about the
immensity of the dismal crime conditions of the country rather than the equally appalling conditions
that permeate the issue of capital punishment (Tagayuna, 2004: 10). Due in part to the media frenzy
that beset the Echegaray case, television polls showed that seven in ten Filipinos favoured death
penalty. Studies in the United States found that many Americans would not choose death penalty if
given a choice of punishments, a finding similar to those of the 2018 SWS survey in the Philippines
(Gomez-Dumpit, 2018). However, television polls are usually limited to collating general views and
are not equipped to provide detailed options to the respondents. This can give an impression of
unqualified support to capital punishment that is incomplete and misleading, as the 2018 SWS
survey shows, but it can, nonetheless, influence legislators and policy makers, as well as the public.
A shift in media reporting was noticed in the middle of the 1990s (Hayes, 2013), when media
coverage, instead of mainly focusing on crime and punishment, began to largely report on wrongful
executions and the exoneration of some death row convicts. The dawning of the ‘innocence framing’
(Baumgartner et al, 2006) began to highlight the probability of mistaken conviction in the justice
system, which, in turn, gradually shifted public’s perception from the need to impose capital

36 See Senate Bill 226 and House Bill 7814 in 2019.

37 Concurring Opinion of Justice Thurgood Marshall in the US Supreme Court decision in Furman v Georgia (408 US 238).
38 People of the Philippines vs Leo Echegaray, GR No 117472, 7 February 1997.

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punishment or its morality, to the fairness and the fallibility of the justice system (Hayes, 2013). This
may have been a factor in the acceptability of the frame transformation to a failed justice system
narrative deployed by the Philippine abolitionists later. In any case, this shows the influence of
shifting media frames in the public’s support for abolition or retention.
The role of social media in death penalty issues requires more scholarly scrutiny but, judging
from studies of its impact on the 2022 Philippine elections, it definitely plays a large role because of
its deep penetration in the Philippines. According to surveys there were 73.9 million internet users
in the Philippines, with a penetration rate of 67 per cent in January 2021 (Macaraeg, 2021).
Strangely, there was a total of 89 million social media users during the same period, equivalent to
80.7 per cent of the population, implying multiple accounts for many Filipinos (Arugay, 2022). In any
case, 51 per cent of Filipino social media users admitted that influencers were their major source of
information, considerably more than the international average of 22 per cent (Arugay, 2022). As of
January 2023, the Philippines has a total of 84.45 million social media users, with a usage rate of
three hours and forty-three minutes per day (Howe, 2023). The Philippine Commission on Human
Rights recognised the power of social media when it launched an awareness and media campaign in
2017 that placed emphasis on social media in its campaign for the abolition of capital punishment
(Gerzso, 2017). Abolitionist and retentionists cannot, therefore, disregard these relatively new arenas
for mobilising support for their respective positions.
In sum, while the issue of death penalty was largely driven by the political decisions of the
executive and the legislative bodies, public support for the abolitionist or retentionist side is, to a
certain extent, influenced by the media. Any campaign on the death penalty should, therefore,
recognise this in crafting and framing their respective narratives. A thorough study of media impact
would be crucial in the continuing battle for the abolition or retention of the death penalty.
Did other factors contribute to effectively stymieing and eventually stopping the Duterte push
for the reimposition of capital punishment? While this will also require further study, it is worth
noting that the context within which the battle was fought did interplay with the various actors and
agents and may have affected the outcome. The legislature is, ostensibly, the main arena of
engagement, but the executive plays a crucial role in congressional decisions in the Philippines. This
explains the perception of some scholars of the policy ambivalence of Philippine legislators (Johnson
and Zimring, 2009: 160-61), who generally follow the policy direction of the incumbent president out
of political expediency (Burgos, 2013). The existence of ‘’pork barrel’ funds called the Priority
Development Assistance Fund 39 and the Development Assistance Fund (Burgos, 2013), largesse
handed down by the president to legislators (Colmenares, 2017), 40 pretty much explains the
propensity of many legislators to follow the varied, and, at times, conflicting, positions of the different
presidents. This was exemplified by the congressional vote supporting capital punishment under
President Ramos in 1993, and the reverse vote against the death penalty under President Arroyo in
2006 (Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 159-161).
Except for a few members, legislators have no strong ideological affinity with capital
punishment—they support or oppose death penalty based on its perceived impact on their electoral
fortunes. The possibility of losing votes and the support of the Catholic church 41 on an issue that is
not fundamentally critical to a legislator may have swayed many senators to at least portray
neutrality during congressional debates. On the other hand, retentionist legislators are easily swayed
by the reported popularity of death penalty during a particular period. The demand by some
legislators for the death penalty, despite the dearth of data proving its effectiveness, is therefore
mere penal populism (Deinla et al, 2021: 4), defined by Johnson and Fernquest (2018: 373) as the
‘pursuit of punishment policies based primarily on their anticipated popularity rather than
effectiveness. It implies little faith in the government to solve crimes, making vigilantism an
attractive option’ (Johnson and Fernquest 2018: 374). Penal populism not only results in vacillating
policy directions but renders policy-makers inconsistent and unreliable, providing a critical entry

39 Supreme Court decision in Belgica vs Executive Secretary (GR 208566).

40 See Colmenares, 2018; see also Ibon Foundation, 2013.
41 Pope Francis challenged Catholic politicians to abolish death penalty. See Povoledo and Goodstein, 2018.

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point for abolitionist lobbying. This ambivalence served as a fertile ground for abolitionist lobbying,
especially during times when the executive branch was itself divided on an issue as a result of
domestic or international pressure.
Another factor that may have affected legislators’ enthusiasm, as well as public sentiment on
the death penalty as a deterrent, was the continuing proliferation of illegal drugs (Official Gazette,
2019), despite President Duterte’s brutal ‘war on drugs’ that led to the killing of at least 6,201 drug
suspects. These were the numbers admitted by the police, although they are estimated to be
thousands more by human rights groups (ACLED, 2021). The fact that this de facto death penalty
for drug suspects failed to solve the drug problem in the country may have influenced the public to
mistrust the effectiveness of a de jure death penalty (Deinla, 2021: 16-17). It is completely possible
that the fervour with which retentionists previously pushed for the death penalty may have been
dampened by the fact that such a penalty already exists without needing congressional imprimatur.
It needs emphasising that illegal drugs and their insidious effects constitute the main retentionist
communicative narrative. Accordingly, the foundation of the retentionist call for capital punishment
was undermined by the fact that the killing of thousands of drug suspects, far beyond the number of
executions implemented under various Philippine death penalty laws, did not succeed in
substantially deterring the drug trade or crimes. The death of thousands in the war on drugs resulted
in waning support for the retentionists, best captured by the position change of the retentionist PCEC
in 2018:
PCEC upholds firmly its previous Statement on death penalty. We maintain that the death penalty and
the sanctity of human life are not contradictory. …God has appointed the civil government as an ‘agent of
wrath’ (Romans 13:3- 4; 1 Peter 2:13-14) that may exercise capital punishment for the good of the
community...
However, the recent arrests of police officers and even killings of political figures involved in criminal
activities expose the glaring fallibility and weaknesses of our country’s criminal justice system. If such an
imperfect system would be armed with the power to impose death on alleged and actual offenders, it would
likely bring about terrible miscarriages of justice in which the poor would often be the victims. The present
state of the justice system then makes it difficult to guarantee that the government’s duty to wield the
sword would be upheld with full integrity. Thus, PCEC cannot support the present call to reimpose capital
punishment in our country. (PCEC, 2018)

The impact of extrajudicial killings on death penalty campaigns in abolitionists countries, such
as the Philippines and Nepal certainly deserves more rigorous study. Extra-judicial killings have not
yet been given substantial attention (Johnson and Fernquest 2018: 360) by abolitionist campaigners,
who focus on the legislative and judicial imposition of capital punishment. Whether the escalation of
extrajudicial killings in the Philippines contributed to the defeat of the retentionists requires further
scholarly scrutiny but it cannot be discounted as a factor in the depletion of retentionist messaging
and narrative.
Further, President Duterte had to contend with various issues that came in quick succession
during his term that may have distracted his administration from its death penalty push. The
domestic and international condemnation of the extra-judicial killings in President Duterte’s ‘war on
drugs’ (Johnson and Fernquest, 2018: 379, Serak, 2018: 44), his support for China in the South China
Sea dispute, the ‘communication’ (complaint) filed by families of extrajudicial killings victims against
him in the International Criminal Court (Mogato, 2018), and the eruption of Covid-19 and the
economic meltdown that ensued may have derailed the retentionist campaign as it diverted organised
attention from the death penalty bills. These, inter alia, are perceived as possible contributing factors
that helped stop the death penalty juggernaut unleashed by President Duterte. In fact, Duterte
seemed to have lost control of his death penalty push when the Philippines surprisingly voted in
favour of the UN moratorium in 2020 (Philippine Commission on Human Rights, 2020).
In summary, the transnational campaign’s horizontal and vertical strategy found a place in the
Philippines campaign, even though that campaign was nuanced with organisational adjustments to
set aside possible organisational and ideological differences in order to create a broad horizontal
movement to maintain unity in the campaign. Further, its vertical lobbying of government

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institutions tactically devised ways to exploit the vulnerability of Philippine policymakers,

considering their vacillating tendency in the face of vigorous persuasion efforts (Kim, 2016: 606-08).
The role of the Catholic church in swaying vacillators to the side of abolition also played a crucial
role in the success of the abolitionist resistance.
As Philippine abolitionist actors actively joined previous transnational UN moratorium battles,
it is natural that the communicative strategy employed by transnational activists flowed into the
Philippine framing of the abolitionist narrative. However, the Philippine campaign’s communicative
strategy had to adjust its human rights and religion-based framing to a more comprehensive critique
of the failed justice system, emphasising the need for justice system reform, so that the abolitionist
narrative could find resonance with the public, policy-makers and even retentionist supporters. This
‘framing transformation’ managed to effectively counter the retentionists’ human rights and religious
counter-framing under an overarching deterrence and retribution argument.
While the strategy, tactics and lessons culled from both transnational and domestic campaigns
have symbiotic relations and inform the campaigns in both arenas, it is necessary to identify the
specific conditions and factors that could impact on the search for resonance among stakeholders and
actors. These findings on the strategy and tactics employed and the adjustments to particular
conditions, should merit consideration in the expected new round of retentionist efforts under
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr (2022-28) to reinstate capital punishment.
As this suggests, the battle for reinstatement is certainly not over. 42 There are currently three
bills in the House of Representatives and one in the Senate under the 19th Congress (2022-25)
penalising a whole range of crimes with death. Senator Ronald Dela Rosa, former head of the
Philippine National Police during Duterte’s drug campaign, and author of Senate Bill 198 reimposing
the death penalty, has confidently declared that the bill will pass this time (Ager, 2022). The fact
that President Marcos Jr’s father espoused a strong death penalty stance during martial law may be
an omen here. The Joint Statement issued on 22 June 2022 by the Federation of Anti-Illegal Drugs
Campaign, the Anti-Crime Council, and the Fight the Drug Trade Movement expressing support for
efforts to push President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, to reinstate the death penalty (Calleja, 2022)
therefore merits serious consideration.
If the abolitionists wish to engage in the expected retentionist push, it is imperative that they
prepare for the next round of reimposition moves by consolidating their organisations and
reinvigorating their coalitions, flexing their campaign machinery, and reigniting vertical
coordination with like-minded international groups and institutions, including governments. They
should also carefully consider the framing of their abolitionist narrative that balances human rights,
and religious framing with the continuing failure of the justice system to effectively respond to crime
and fairly dispense justice. This should go hand in hand with a vigorous campaign for justice system
reforms to check the raging impunity in the Philippines today and render irrelevant the retentionists’
call to revive state-sanctioned murder.

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Tan, Kimberly Jane (2014) ‘PNoy: Fixing Justice System More Important than Death Penalty’, GMA News Online, 29 January
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Cases
People of the Philippines vs Del Rosario, GR No 127755, 14 April 999
People of the Philippines vs Mateo E, GR No 147678-87, 7 July 2004
Belgica vs Executive Secretary et al, GR 208566, 19 November 2013.
Araullo vs President Aquino et al, GR 209287, 1 July 2014.
Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238, 29 June 1972.

Legislation
Act No 3815 An Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws, 8 December 1930, Official Gazette
<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1930/12/08/act-no-3815-s-1930/>
House Bills 501, 1543, 2459, and 4121 - 19th Congress <www.congress.gov.ph>
Presidential Decree No 1834 (1981) Increasing the Penalties for the Crime of Rebellion, Sedition, and Related Crimes, and
Amending for this purpose Articles 135, 136, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146 and 147 of the Revised Penal Code and Additing
Section 142-B thereto (16 January 1981 Official Gazette).
Presidential Decree No 9 (1972) Declaring Violations of General Orders No. 6 and No. 7 dated September 22, 1972 and
September 23, 1972, respectively, to be Unlawful and Providing Penalties therefor (2 October 1972) (Official Gazette).
Republic Act No 7659 (1993) An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that purpose the
Revised Penal Laws, as amended, other Special Laws, and for other special purposes (Official Gazette).
Republic Act No 9346 (2006) An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines (Official Gazette).
The 1987 Philippine Constitution (Official Gazette)

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