Dichotomies in Pakistan’s Approach Towards

Pakistan-occupied Kashmir
For decades, Islamabad has adopted a discriminatory and dichotomous approach towards the occupied territories
of Jammu & Kashmir, or the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The so-called ‘Azad’ Jammu & Kashmir is neither
Azad (independent) nor sovereign. It has been given a false accreditation of independence with a separate
president and prime minister who merely function as agents of Islamabad. Similarly, Pakistan has denied Gilgit
Baltistan of a definite political status given its disputed status. This issue brief analyses Islamabad’s
condescending approach towards PoK and its people and points to the failure of the international community at
large to take into account this reality.

On May 4, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) reacted sharply to the Pakistan Supreme Court ruling that
permitted the government to hold elections in Gilgit Baltistan (GB) in September and install a caretaker set-up to
oversee the process. The MEA spokesperson stated that the Government of Pakistan or its judiciary “has no
locus standi on territories illegally and forcibly occupied by it”.1

The incumbent government in GB headed by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) completed its term on
June 24 and now elections are to be held within 90 days, i.e., by September 24, 2020. As is the practice in
Pakistan, the outgoing government is replaced with a neutral caretaker government to conduct the elections.
However, the existing 2018 government order which lays down the administrative framework for GB does not
have any such provision. The new Supreme Court order that directs the Imran Khan Government to legislate on
GB is in the works. In such circumstances, the government approached the Supreme Court to allow it to amend
the existing order to set up a caretaker government. Quite expectedly, the court allowed the government to amend
the order.2

The way Pakistan’s highest court has extended its writ to GB is quite controversial. It is a territory which Pakistan
has forcibly occupied since 1947 and regards as disputed.3 Pakistan has ruled over the terrain with an iron hand
disregarding the aspirations of the people for a genuinely autonomous and representative administration.
Interestingly, various unilateral orders that Islamabad has so far imposed on GB invariably included a clause
acknowledging the disputed status of GB and a commitment to allow its people to decide their political fate as per
the terms of resolution of the dispute in the future. The fact remains that since GB was part of the erstwhile
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), whose ruler had acceded to India in October 1947, the area is legally
a part of India. The Pakistan Supreme Court has no jurisdiction, whatsoever, over this territory.

Even constitutionally, the authority of Pakistan’s highest court is questionable since its jurisdiction is limited to the
territories that are mentioned in Article 1 of the constitution of Pakistan. GB and the so-called ‘Azad’ J&K (‘AJK’),
are not mentioned in this article that defines the territorial boundary of Pakistan. However, in Article 257, there is a
clause that makes a passing reference to Islamabad’s ties with the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The article
states: “When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship
between Pakistan and the State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.”4
This article assumes that the entire erstwhile princely state will, by default, accede to it. Pakistan makes it
mandatory for holders of all the public offices in GB and the so-called ‘AJK’ to sign a bond of allegiance stating
that they would remain ‘loyal to the cause of’ Kashmir eventually joining Pakistan.5 Submission of such allegiance
is mandatory even to file nomination papers for largely farcical elections held in these areas from time to time. In
this regard, Article 7(3) of the so-called ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution of 1974 (even after the latest revision in 2018)
notes: “No person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against, or take
part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to, [this] ideology”.6

It is apparent that Pakistan has adopted a dichotomous approach towards PoK. For example, the so-called ‘AJK’
is neither ‘Azad’ (independent) nor sovereign. It has been provided with a separate president and prime minister
who function as agents of Islamabad. Similarly, Pakistan regards GB as a disputed territory and takes this as an
excuse to deny the region a definite and respectable political status.7 It has tightened its control over the area
over the years and continues to manipulate it for its geopolitical needs. Besides, GB’s Kashmir link has been
deliberately underplayed and every effort has been made to change its demography. Given Pakistan’s obsession
with the Kashmir issue, one would have expected it to adopt a far more responsive approach towards PoK and its
people. In contrast, however, it has dealt with the region with high-handedness denying the people their basic
rights.

Tales of Usurpation and Fallacies

The PoK, comprising the so-called ‘AJK’ and GB (referred to as the Northern Areas by the Pakistan Government
till 2009), has been under Pakistan’s illegal occupation since 1947. It is well known that in the immediate
aftermath of partition, Pakistan, unable to secure the Maharaja’s consent to accession and unsure of popular
support in the Kashmir Valley, had engineered a tribal invasion, whereby it occupied ‘AJK’ and subsequently
coerced GB to accede by use of force -- a machination in which Pakistan was aided by loyalists in the residual
British Army. Soon the tribal lashkars (militias) backed by the Pakistan Army regulars headed for capital Srinagar
but could only reach after the Maharaja had signed the instrument of accession to India. The Indian Army pushed
the tribal lashkars out of the Kashmir Valley. Subsequently, the Indian Government took the matter to the United
Nations (UN) to report Pakistan’s aggression hoping for international intervention to clear the rest of the territory
that the Pakistan Army had occupied illegally. However, the matter got caught up in the Cold War politics.

Later, Pakistan blatantly disregarded the UN directive to vacate the occupied territories of J&K as per the UN
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 47 of April 1948, which clearly stated that the “Government of Pakistan
should undertake to use its best endeavours” in order “to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and
Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the
purpose of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid
to those fighting in the State.”8

The PoK region has since received scant attention in the overall popular discourse on ‘Kashmir’ (which should
ideally be about the J&K State), which to this day remains valley-centric. It is in view of its inconspicuous
existence that people often refer to it as the ‘other Kashmir’ or ‘forgotten Kashmir’.

A closer look at the history and politics of PoK, including both ‘AJK’ and GB, reveals how Pakistan has neglected
these territories despite its obsession with ‘Kashmir’. For a brief period (about one-and-half years) after 1947,
Pakistan, as well as Pakistan-backed leadership of the ‘AJK’ Muslim Conference (AJKMC), regarded both
Muzaffarabad region and GB as part of the J&K State. However, soon after the issue of Pakistani aggression was
referred to the UN, the GB region was taken out as a separate unit and the rest of the occupied territories of the
J&K State was called ‘AJK’. This was perhaps done to keep GB out of the purview of negotiations with India.
Even though its fate was directly linked to the Kashmir question, GB was not represented either in the
negotiations between the Pakistan state and the leadership of AJKMC or in the signing of the infamous Karachi
Agreement of April 1949, whereby the AJKMC surrendered its claim as well as the right of control over GB.9 The
GB region was later called Northern Areas, perhaps to disregard the historical and ethnic dimension of the
territory and to accord it a geographical expression. It was ruled through a political agent appointed by the federal
government.

It is apparent that both regions have been unlawfully subjugated and are no more than hapless adjuncts of the
Pakistan state without any autonomy. Its people have suffered and their aspirations have been disregarded by the
successive regimes in Pakistan despite their innate obsession with the Kashmir issue. The so-called ‘AJK’ was
allowed some nominal representative government through an interim constitution that was framed by the
Pakistani authorities in 1974, without any participation of the ‘AJK’ leadership, while GB was governed directly
from Islamabad in an unconstitutional manner. The people of GB were stateless for all practical purposes. In fact,
people of both ‘AJK’ and GB do not have their representatives in the National Assembly of Pakistan. For decades,
the people of GB remained disenfranchised and were allowed to vote only after 2009 when the Empowerment
and Self Governance Order was hastily introduced by Islamabad to tide over simmering political unrest in the
region. The order was dismissed by the local people at large and also the Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan(HRCP) which called it a “mere eyewash.”10

Unrelenting state high-handedness and protracted neglect have subdued popular political aspirations for long and
has led to a strong undercurrent of disaffection in the PoK region. Repressed political sentiments find vent
through demonstrations organised by emerging nationalist groups/parties in PoK from time to time. Despite being
on Pakistan’s tight leash, these groups have been challenging Pakistan’s control over PoK, especially the GB
region. While Pakistan champions the so-called human rights violation in the Kashmir Valley, it pays scant
attention to the rights of the people in PoK which is effectively placed under the military ‘jackboot’. Tactically, over
the years, especially since the mid-1980s, Pakistan has settled the Sunni population in GB to undermine its
Shia-majority population. The abolition of State Subject Rule from the region in 1974 (introduced by the Maharaja
of Kashmir in January 1927 to disallow entry of outsiders into his Kingdom), enabled the Pakistan state agencies
to engineer a major demographic change in the region. The memory of the Shia purge in GB during the 1980s still
haunts the people of the region. Gross atrocities were committed under the watch of former military dictator
Zia-ul-Haq who deputed Pervez Musharraf (who later became President), then heading the Special Services
Group, to lead the massacre of Shias in the region.11

Descent into a Terrorist Sanctuary

It is well-known that PoK has emerged as an epicentre of terrorism. Pakistan has been using the region as a
launch pad to perpetrate cross-border terror attacks against India. The way terrorist groups have mushroomed in
PoK all these years could not have been possible without Pakistan exercising tight control over the region. The
people have been denied their rights to self-govern lest they oppose such machinations.

It is not mere coincidence that Masood Azhar, the founder of Jaish-e-Mohammed, took out a huge rally in
Muzaffarabad (capital of the so-called ‘AJK’) immediately after India released him in a swap that took place after
the hijacking of Indian Airlines IC814 in 1999. There were also reports about al Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden
taking refuge in Muzaffarabad soon after the 9/11 attacks as the American forces frantically searched for him.
Similarly, the 26/11 investigations traced the movement of terrorists to Baitul-Mujahideen, the infamous terror
camp run by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Muzaffarabad.12 Post-Uri attack, the surgical strikes launched by India in
September 2016 brought to fore the names of other terrorist training camps operated by Pakistan across the Line
of Control (LoC).13 The Hizbul Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin has also led several anti-India rallies and
demonstrations in PoK.

In Gilgit Baltistan, terrorist activities have witnessed a notable surge. The gruesome killing of foreign
mountaineers in 2013 at the base camp near Nanga Parbat was one such incident that hinted at the widening
web of militant groups in this region.14

Political Deficit and Ambiguities

Pakistan’s relationship with both parts of PoK is replete with inconsistencies and contradictions. Both entities now
have interim structures of governance which help maintain a façade of representative governance, while the
regimes, ‘elected’ by the people, remain puppets of Islamabad. Their only claim to power is loyalty to the Pakistan
state rather than the interests of the people they represent. The so-called ‘AJK’ being given trappings of an
independent country is perhaps Pakistan’s biggest sham, amongst other things. It was ruled under a separate
‘AJK’ Interim Constitution Act of 1974 till June 2018, when another fraud was hoisted on the people (in the name
of conferring more legislative and executive powers to the elected government in the region) through the 13th
Amendment, which was passed in the ‘AJK’ legislature. The word ‘Act’ was omitted from the title of the interim
constitution.15 While much of the administrative structure remains the same, the balance of power has further
tilted in favour of the federal government in Islamabad.

GB, on the other hand, does not even have a constitution of its own and is ruled under ad hoc ordinances/orders
issued by Islamabad from time to time. The long-standing plea of a section of the population in GB to convert it
into Pakistan’s fifth province has gone unheeded. Popular hope around the Sartaj Aziz Committee, which was
trying to address some of these issues, has diminished as its recommendations continue to remain
unimplemented.16 Rather, Pakistan chose to introduce limited political reforms in 2018, which was more of an
eyewash as it did not confer a provincial status on GB. In this regard, the HRCP in its State of Human Rights
2019 notes: “Pakistan’s objection to the abolition of special status for Indian-held Kashmir appears odd, because
Pakistan itself has not granted special status to one of its components (GB).”17

Broadly, both regions are virtually ruled by Islamabad. The political party which rules Islamabad preposterously
wins each time election is held in PoK. Until recently, the councils in both ‘AJK’ and GB were headed by the Prime
Minister of Pakistan. Instead of empowering the local governments, the much-awaited reforms ended up further
reducing the powers of the council and vesting more power in the Prime Minister of Pakistan.18

Over a period, Pakistan has created ambiguities about PoK as a deliberate policy so that facts could be
conveniently misrepresented or left to interpretations. It is clear that Pakistan neither wants to completely absorb
these territories into its political system nor reduce its tight control over their affairs. For all practical purposes,
Islamabad’s hold over the region is complete without any concern for the political rights of the people. By terming
the region as disputed, Islamabad has recused itself of its responsibility to grant the people their basic human
rights. The fact remains that it has not allowed a genuine democratic system of governance to emerge in the
area, as it could interfere with its pursuit of absolute control over the occupied territories. It has tried to sell the
idea to its people that granting either provincial status or complete autonomy would be prejudicial to their
interests, given the non-resolution of the Kashmir issue, mainly because of India’s inflexibility.
Over the years, the local resistance to the Pakistani control has taken shape in various ways. There is an ongoing
tussle between various structures of governance -- for instance, between the judiciary of Pakistan and the
separate judicial structures raised by Pakistan in parts of PoK. In 2010, a bench of the so-called ‘AJK’ Supreme
Court resisted the authority of the Pakistan Supreme Court to appoint judges in the higher court of the region.19
In 2012, a controversy erupted after a non-native was appointed as the Chief Justice of GB Supreme Court.
Admitting a petition that challenged Pakistan’s authority to make such appointments, Pakistan Supreme Court
had even sought a reply from Islamabad on the matter.20 There are also tensions between the GB Government
and the GB Election Commission after the latter suspended its financial and administrative powers much before
the expiry of its term on June 24.21

Contempt despite Geopolitical Salience

Given Pakistan’s high-profile strategic partnership with its all-weather friend China and the criticality of the GB
area of PoK as the only land link between the two countries, the region is of immense strategic value to Pakistan.
It was for geopolitical reasons that Pakistan had ceded the Trans-Karakoram Tract to China as part of an illegal
territorial swap concluded under a provisional border agreement signed in March 1963. Given this and Pakistan’s
continuing obsession with Kashmir, PoK should ideally have been given a high priority. However, the dismal state
of development and infrastructure in PoK, despite its natural wealth in terms of mineral and hydropower
resources, only speaks of Pakistan’s utter neglect of the region.

The power houses of the controversial Diamer Bhasha Dam (to be built on River Indus) in GB were deliberately
moved to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) to deprive the region of its legitimate royalty. According to the constitution of
Pakistan, royalty is awarded to the state where power is generated.22 There is an ensuing battle between KP and
GB over the sharing of royalty ever since. This assumes significance as the constitution of Pakistan does not
apply to GB.

During the Kargil conflict, Pakistan had commissioned the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), manned mostly by the
people from GB, but refused to take back the bodies of their deceased soldiers.23 As part of a malicious design
to deny its army’s involvement, Pakistan disowned them stating they are freedom fighters from the disputed
territory of Kashmir.24

Peripheral to Pakistan’s Kashmir Agenda

Noted scholar Christopher Snedden describes the so-called ‘AJK’ as the “rump” area devoid of attention.25 It is
an unfortunate reality that PoK never received the attention it deserved. As a result, it was never a part of the
international discourse on Kashmir. A cursory look at the Kashmir Day (February 5 every year) speeches makes it
apparent that Pakistan’s politics and strategy are only focussed on J&K, which is an integral part of India.
Pakistan’s revisionist Kashmir strategy is solely directed towards attracting the international attention towards
India’s J&K and it ends there.

It is time that the people of PoK (both the so-called ‘AJK’ and GB) as well as the international community, long
swayed by the Pakistani state propaganda, see through Pakistan’s sinister strategy and take note of the sorry
state of affairs in the Pakistan-occupied parts of J&K and Ladakh. Collectively, they need to bring to bear
pressure on Pakistan to allow genuine autonomy and self-governance to the people in this hapless terrain, rather
than wasting energy on sponsoring mindless terror and subversion in the Indian state of J&K, which only brings
suffering and deprivation to the people of Kashmir.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of
the Government of India.

India’s Changed Approach to

Kashmir Settlement
Recent positive steps in India-Pakistan relations have led to expectations of a resumption of the discussions that
got stalled in 2007. A return to the framework that drove the back-channel negotiations does not, however, appear
to be a tenable proposition any longer. The Manmohan-Musharraf initiative was disowned by the Pakistan
Establishment after Musharraf’s departure. Even if Pakistan were to be keen on reviving that formula, India is
unlikely to favour it because of the Modi government’s commitment to regain Pakistan-occupied Jammu and
Kashmir. While this change in Indian policy may lead to the placement of the Kashmir issue on the back burner in
the short and medium terms, it is likely to aggravate conflict in the long term.

India and Pakistan have taken some preliminary steps towards the easing of tensions and resumption of dialogue
during the last two months. In early February, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa called
for a resolution of the Kashmir issue in “a dignified and peaceful manner as per the people’s aspirations.”1 In
response, the spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs reiterated India’s desire to have “normal
neighbourly relations with Pakistan in an environment free of terror, hostility and violence.”2 In late February, the
Directors General of Military Operations of the two armies agreed to renew the ceasefire along the Line of
Control.3 March 2021 saw Prime Minister Imran Khan and General Bajwa calling for peace and resumption of
dialogue while emphasising the importance of India taking the first step and creating a conducive environment
especially in Jammu and Kashmir.4

Analysts have, however, expressed scepticism about the prospect of meaningful dialogue. Some have
emphasised irreconcilable contradictions such as India’s concerns on cross-border terrorism and Pakistan’s on
Kashmir.5 Others have highlighted the tactical nature of these steps, driven by India’s focus on the challenge
along the China border and Pakistan’s on the unfolding Afghan situation. At the same time, there is an
expectation that, if the two countries were to take further steps towards a full-fledged dialogue, they should ideally
pick up the threads left off in 2007.6

A return to the framework that drove the Manmohan Singh-Pervaiz Musharraf initiative does not, however, appear
to be a tenable proposition any longer. Even if the Pakistan Establishment, which had disowned it after
Musharraf’s departure, were to be keen on reviving that framework, India no longer views that formula with favour.
Whereas successive Indian governments since the late 1940s favoured and pursued a solution to the Kashmir
issue along the existing territorial status quo, the Narendra Modi government has been consistently asserting
India’s sovereign claims over Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK).7

Highlighting this change in Indian policy is the purpose of this brief. After this Introduction, the first section
summarises various efforts made since the late 1940s to forge a Kashmir settlement along the extant territorial
status, albeit with minor adjustments. Section two highlights the Modi government’s articulations and actions with
respect to PoJK and locates them in the long-held positions of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), its predecessor,
Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), and the parent body, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The Brief concludes
that this change in policy is likely to endure and highlights what may ensue therefrom in the short and long terms.

Indian Advocacy of Territorial Status Quo

From 1948, India consistently proposed that the Kashmir issue be settled on the basis of the extant status quo,
albeit with minor territorial adjustments to establish a rational border. Such a settlement has, however, been
unacceptable to Pakistani leaders, who have repeatedly sought, both during negotiations as well as through war
and support for insurgent and terrorist groups, to wrest some or all portions of Jammu and Kashmir from India.

The first Indian effort was made as early as October 1948. On the side-lines of the Commonwealth Prime
Minister’s Conference in London, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposed to his Pakistani counterpart Liaquat
Ali Khan that the issue be settled by both countries accepting the territorial status quo. He added that such a
settlement could also include “certain areas in western Poonch and the north-western part of the State [under
Indian control] being allotted to Pakistan.”8

Nehru’s rationale for advocating such a settlement was as follows: India had referred the Jammu and Kashmir
issue to the United Nations (UN) mainly to prevent the outbreak of “an all-out war” with Pakistan. But the
experience at the UN compelled him to conclude that “nothing substantial could be expected” from the world
body, especially given India’s determination not to concede on “any basic point” as well as Pakistan’s
disinclination to “revert to the status quo ante-war”.

Under these circumstances, India had two options. One was to continue what was likely to prove to be “a long
drawn-out” war for regaining those territories of Jammu and Kashmir that were under the control of Pakistan and
its irregular proxies. But such a step involved the risk of “an all-out war” with Pakistan as well as international
intervention given that the UN Security Council remained seized of the issue. The second option was to reach a
settlement with Pakistan “on the basis of the existing military situation.”9 This line of thought led Nehru to
propose, in his personal capacity, a settlement along the existing status quo, albeit with minor territorial
adjustments in favour of Pakistan. But Liaquat Ali Khan “refused to consider this matter on this basis”.10

Nehru offered a similar proposal in May 1955 during conversations in Delhi with the visiting Prime Minister and
Interior Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Bogra, and General Iskander Mirza, respectively. On this occasion as
well, Nehru indicated his willingness “to consider the transfer of a certain part of the Poonch area” to Pakistan and
pointed to the desirability of the Kishanganga river serving as “a suitable line” in the north.11 During the course of
this conversation, he also referred to the impracticality of the informal proposals that Pakistan’s then Governor
General, Ghulam Mohammed, had conveyed through emissaries: India transferring to Pakistan “a large piece of
territory in Jammu, north of Chenab” and “Kashmir proper” coming under “some kind of a joint control of a joint
army”.12
Bogra and Mirza also expressed their inability to accept Nehru’s proposal of an agreement based largely on the
status quo because of three related reasons: public opinion would oppose it, Pakistan would not get anything out
of it, and India would be able to free itself from UN Security Council and other international “entanglements”.
Instead, they advocated “major adjustments”, which involved India retaining only “some districts” around Jammu
and the rest of the territory going to Pakistan.13

India restated a similar proposal for settling the Jammu and Kashmir issue along the extant status quo, albeit with
minor territorial adjustments, during the Swaran Singh–Zulfiqar Bhutto talks. Six rounds of talks were held in 1962
and 1963 under American urging, pressure and a behind-the-scenes-role. The United States hoped, in the words
of then Secretary of State Dean Rusk, to not only bring about a settlement of the Kashmir issue but also a
reconciliation between India and Pakistan as well as induce India to join America in containing China.14

During the negotiations, the then Minister for Railways Sardar Swaran Singh proposed that, in addition to
retaining all the territory it then controlled in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan would be allotted “small sections
under Indian control to the west and north of the Valley, but nothing in the Valley itself.”15 According to D. K. Palit,
the then Director of Military Operations and a member of the Indian negotiating team, Singh was even prepared to
offer some portions of the Kashmir Valley. Indeed, Palit records that he was informed by the then Commonwealth
Secretary Y. D. Gundevia that the cabinet had “unhesitatingly approved the Prime Minister’s proposal about a
partition of Kashmir.”16 But Bhutto’s counter-proposal demanded that Pakistan be allotted almost the whole of
Jammu and Kashmir – Kashmir Valley, Chenab Valley and Ladakh – with India retaining only “a small part of
Jammu.”17 In the absence of a viable meeting point, these talks were eventually suspended.

It was only in the immediate aftermath of the 1971 War that a Pakistani leader was even willing, albeit tactically as
it later proved, to consider a settlement along the territorial status quo. Convinced by P. N. Haksar’s argument
about the possible adverse consequences of imposing a harsh peace on Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
emphasised to President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto the merits of such a settlement and the transformation of the
renamed Line of Control into a de jure border at the 1972 Simla Conference.18 Bhutto conceded that it was “the
only feasible” solution but expressed his inability to formalise such an agreement at that juncture.19 Subsequent
Pakistani leaders disowned Bhutto’s admission however, with one former official crowing that Bhutto “fooled”
Gandhi at Simla.20

The most recent effort, undertaken in the mid-2000s, to find a mutually acceptable solution on a ‘status quo plus’
basis did not also bear fruit, although the top leadership on both sides did make a sincere effort in subtly altering
established national positions to bridge the gulf.21 In essence, what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
President Pervaiz Musharraf sought was to make the Line of Control “irrelevant … just lines on a map” so that
people and goods could move freely between the two sides.22

According to the Indian interlocutor in these talks, “the essential prerequisite” for achieving the goal was “an end
to hostility, violence and terrorism.”23 Only that would pave the way for establishing an open border especially
between the Kashmir Valley and so-called 'Azad Jammu and Kashmir', considerably thinning down the number of
troops deployed on both sides, and evolving a joint mechanism to “look into socio-economic issues like Tourism,
Travel, Pilgrimages to Shrines, Trade, Health, Education, and Culture” so that “self-governance” could be ensured
“for internal management in all areas on the same basis on both sides of the LoC”.24
That an agreement along these lines was largely worked out to mutual satisfaction was revealed by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh in May 2009 when he reportedly observed: “General Musharraf and I had nearly
reached an agreement, a non-territorial solution to all problems, but then General Musharraf got into many
difficulties with the Chief Justice and other forces and therefore the whole process came to a halt.”25 According to
Sanjaya Baru, a former Media Adviser to the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh was keen on renewing the
process with Musharraf’s successors – President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani –
even in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008.26

Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, who, as then Foreign Minister, was part of the small group that monitored and guided
the progress of the back channel negotiations on the Pakistan side, has revealed that the group comprised of top
military leaders and diplomats including the Vice Chief of Army Staff, Director General of the Inter-Services
Intelligence, Corps Commanders, and the Foreign Secretary.27 Yet, President Musharraf’s successors, both
civilian and military, distanced themselves from the framework that had been evolved. Prime Minister Gilani
dismissed the framework proposals as “half-baked things that didn’t have the mandate of Parliament.”28 General
Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who as Director General Inter-Services Intelligence was part of the core group that
monitored the back channel negotiations, “distanced himself from the negotiations” after becoming Army Chief
and even informed US officials that “Musharraf had operated independently, that he was unaware of the
agreement’s details, and that it was, at any rate, untenable because it did not enjoy the support of the army’s
corps commanders.”29 Kayani’s term as Pakistan Army Chief coincided with the November 2008 terrorist attack
on Mumbai, which effectively put paid to any immediate prospects of the back channel process being revived. His
successor, General Raheel Sharif, reverted to ‘Kashmir is the jugular vein’ rhetoric and to Pakistan’s long-held
position of seeking a solution in line with United Nations Security Council resolutions.30

Modi Government’s Position

Even as India sought to forge a settlement of the Kashmir issue along the territorial status quo, it did sporadically
assert sovereign claims over PoJK during the 1990s and noughties. The most significant assertion in this regard
was the resolution unanimously adopted by both Houses of Parliament in February 1994 demanding that
Pakistan vacate the portions of Jammu and Kashmir territory which it has “occupied through aggression”.31
Parliament, however, passed the resolution more as an expression of defiant determination in the wake of
Pakistan’s diplomatic campaign and Kashmir consequently becoming a global talking point.

In his 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, US President Bill Clinton referred to the conflict in
Kashmir as a serious global threat.32 A month later, Robin Raphel, Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of State for
South Asia, asserted that the United States does not recognise Maharaja Hari Singh’s signature on the instrument
of accession “as meaning that Kashmir is forevermore an integral part of India.”33 About this time, Pakistan’s
diplomatic campaign was reaching a crescendo with the introduction of a resolution in the United Nations Human
Rights Council condemning India for grave human rights violations, which, if adopted, had the potential to reopen
the Kashmir file in the United Nations.34

This backdrop explains why India ignored the issue of PoJK after it managed to weather the diplomatic storm over
Kashmir. Moreover, once the back channel became active during the Vajpayee prime ministership, the issue of
territory under Pakistan’s occupation was ignored. It was revisited only in the aftermath of the intense emotions
generated by the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack. In 2009 and 2010, the Ministry of External Affairs asserted Indian
sovereignty over PoJK on two occasions, first in the context of Pakistan holding elections in Gilgit-Baltistan, and
the second in the wake of statements that the region has become Pakistan’s fifth province.35

Since the coming to power of the Modi government in 2014, the tone of Indian assertions of sovereignty over
PoJK has become sharper and their frequency has also increased. In June 2015, responding to media questions
about the proposed elections in Gilgit-Baltistan, the spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs not only
asserted Indian sovereignty but also dismissed the elections as a camouflage for Pakistan’s “forcible and illegal
occupation of the regions.”36 A few months later, exercising its right of reply during the UN General Assembly
debate, an Indian representative called out Pakistan as a foreign occupier of the territory of Jammu and
Kashmir.37

Further, after a gap of some ten years, the ministry appears to have renewed engagement with the diaspora from
Gilgit-Baltistan and even explored the possibility of inviting them for the 2017 edition of the Pravasi Bharatiya
Divas.38 There is, however, no confirmation as to whether any member of the PoJK diaspora participated in that
or subsequent editions of the Divas. When asked in the run-up to the 2017 event, the Secretary in charge of
Overseas Indian Affairs provided the ambiguous answer that the event is open to all non-resident Indians and
persons of Indian origin.39 Nor is it clear whether there was any member of the PoJK diaspora among the 3121
delegates from 91 countries including four listed under ‘Others’ who participated in the 2019 edition of the
Divas.40

The change in India’s approach to the issue of PoJK has evidently come at the express direction of the political
leadership. Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself has publicly referred to the region on at least three occasions.
First, at the All-Party Meeting he convened in August 2016 to discuss the unrest in Kashmir following the killing of
Burhan Wani, Modi not only emphasised the importance of winning the people’s confidence while ensuring
national security but also highlighted the fact that PoJK is a part of Jammu and Kashmir.41 Four days later, in his
Independence Day address, he thanked the people of Gilgit and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) for honouring
the Indian nation by honouring him and showing goodwill towards him.42 Subsequently, while speaking in the Lok
Sabha in February 2018, Modi observed that “[h]ad Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel been the first Prime Minister, a part
of Kashmir would not have been under control of Pakistan”.43

Senior cabinet ministers have followed Modi’s lead. Following the abrogation of Article 370 and the establishment
of the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, Home Minister Amit Shah averred in Parliament that
all his references to the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be understood as including Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir. More significantly, he added that PoJK is worthy of the ultimate sacrifice.44 Here, it is also worth noting
the informed speculation about Shah’s criticism of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee for foreclosing the option
of regaining PoJK by precipitately conducting the 1998 nuclear tests and thus providing Pakistan an opportunity
to demonstrate its own nuclear weapons capability.45

Shah’s statements in Parliament were followed up by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Foreign Minister S.
Jaishankar. Speaking at an election rally in Haryana in August 2019, Singh stated that, if talks are held with
Pakistan, India will not discuss any issue other than Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.46 A few weeks later, addressing
the press on the occasion of 100 days of the second Modi government, Jaishankar affirmed that PoJK is a part of
India and expressed the hope that the country will someday obtain “physical jurisdiction” over the region.47
These statements from members of the Modi government reflect the long-standing position advocated by the BJP,
its predecessor BJS, and the parent body RSS that PoJK should be regained. While the BJP’s election
manifestos for the 2019 and 2014 elections did not refer to PoJK, the 2009 manifesto specified that the
parliamentary resolution of 1994 “shall remain the cornerstone of future decisions and actions of our Government”
when it came to “dealing with issues related to Jammu & Kashmir.”48

Likewise, the party’s manifestos issued in 1991, 1996 and 1998 referred to territory under Pakistan’s occupation
and affirmed Indian sovereignty over the whole of Jammu and Kashmir including PoJK. Given that the 1999
manifesto was issued in the name of the National Democratic Alliance, there was understandably no reference to
PoJK. It is not clear why the party did not refer to Indian claims to the region in the manifestos issued for the 1984
and 1989 elections.49

Notwithstanding these and the more recent lapses in 2014 and 2019, the fact remains that the BJP’s predecessor
– Bharatiya Jana Sangh – had, since its inception in 1951, highlighted Pakistan’s occupation of Jammu and
Kashmir territory and advocated efforts to regain it. At its very first annual conclave in December 1952, the Jana
Sangh critiqued the Nehru government for pursuing policies that have resulted in Pakistan’s continued occupation
of one-third of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. At subsequent conclaves, the party called upon the
government to undertake efforts to regain that territory. The party also promised in its election manifestos that, if
elected, it would make the necessary effort to regain PoJK. The Jana Sangh also criticised the Indira Gandhi
government for concluding the Simla Agreement of 1972 as well as for not liberating “the areas of Kashmir
occupied by Pakistan since 1947” during the course of the 1971 War.50

Over the decades, the RSS has also repeatedly flagged the issue of vacating Pakistan’s occupation of Jammu
and Kashmir territory. As far back as 1963, the Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha of the RSS asserted that the
main issue in India-Pakistan talks should be vacating Pakistan’s aggression from the portion of Jammu and
Kashmir it has been occupying. After Parliament passed the 1994 resolution, the Sabha expressed hope that the
Rao government would abandon its ambivalent attitude on the Kashmir issue. Eleven years later, another RSS
body, the Akhil Bharatiya Karyakari Mandal, reminded the Manmohan Singh government of the 1994
parliamentary resolution and called upon it to “stand firmly against any international pressure” to compromise on
the issue.51

Conclusion
India’s position on the contours of a settlement of the Kashmir issue has changed during the course of the last
few years. Driven by the long-held convictions of the BJP, the change appears set to endure for two reasons. The
first is the pole position in the Indian political firmament that the BJP appears set to enjoy for some years to come.
Second, future governments are likely to find it difficult to overturn a policy on national territory that is laden with
emotional and sacral overtones.

This change in Indian policy on a Kashmir settlement may not have adverse consequences in the next few years
because of India and Pakistan’s need to concentrate upon other compulsions, both internal and external. These
include managing the adverse economic impact of the COVID pandemic, India’s need to prevent the precipitate
emergence of a two-front threat, and Pakistan’s imperatives relating to the management of the Afghan transition
and gaining relief from the strictures imposed by the Financial Action Task Force.
These circumstances may prove propitious for placing the complicated issue of Kashmir on the back burner and
foster bilateral cooperation in order to better concentrate on meeting the above challenges. According to an
informed Indian commentator, placing the issue on the back burner was also Modi’s own preferred approach
when he first assumed the prime ministership.52

In the long run, however, if both India and Pakistan were to competitively seek to alter the territorial status quo,
the result would be a further aggravation of conflict.

The Other South Asia

South Asia generally evokes the image of a region that is afflicted by violent religious extremism where groups
like the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are active. It is also noted for being a place where
clandestine nuclear proliferation has taken place allegedly in connivance with the A. Q. Khan network active from
Pakistan. Then there is the enduring India-Pakistan hostility and rivalry, despite occasional peace initiatives. The
various terror attacks launched within India allegedly with the support or incitement of Pakistan are a
manifestation of this rivalry. However, while this South Asia remains a reality, what is encouraging is that not all of
South Asia is in a state of dreariness. There is a part of South Asia which is trying to overcome similar problems
and create a new situation that is conducive for progress.

India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives constitute the changing face of South Asia. Nepal too is not a
part of this group because it is still struggling with writing a constitution and establishing democracy.

Sri Lanka has made rapid progress after the end of the Tamil insurgency, which was led by the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It has signed a free trade agreement with India and the Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral trade is
booming. Indian investment firms and multi-nationals have played a crucial role in the Sri Lankan economic
growth. While the ‘ethnic war’ is over and though the Tamil political demands have not yet been resolved, yet the
country is doing well economically.

In South Asia the most encouraging development, however, seems to be taking place between India and
Bangladesh. Bangladesh was also threatening to emerge as a major trouble spot during the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP)-led four-party regime, which included some Islamist parties bent upon giving a fillip to
religious extremism in the country. The sudden upsurge in religious extremism even led to predictions that
Bangladesh could become the next Afghanistan.

However, sincere efforts have been made to rein in extremism. This happened, to some extent, under the
caretaker government led by Fakharuddin Ahmed. But, a decisive move against extremism was made under the
government of Sheikh Hasina. Hasina’s party, after coming to power with an overwhelming majority, went against
these forces with full vigour. It launched a war crimes trial against parties like Jamaat-e-Islami which had
committed atrocities on the local population during the Liberation War of Bangladesh. It also busted several
modules of Pakistani terror groups in Bangladesh. Action was taken against the local Islamist group
Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) as well. India-Bangladesh relations improved significantly with
 Bangladesh’s clampdown on anti-India groups active on its soil. Bangladesh handed over several leaders of
insurgent groups to India who were hiding in Bangladesh and waging insurgency in north-east India.

India has noticed this cooperative effort on the part of Bangladesh and bilateral relations reached a new level
when Sheikh Hasina visited New Delhi in January 2010. During the last one and a half years, after Sheikh
Hasina’s state visit to India, both sides have taken many steps forward. They plan to resolve several outstanding
issues such as disputes over the land boundary, sharing of common river waters and addressing the trade deficit
which is unfavourable to Bangladesh.

Some understanding has been reached on the issue of transit as well. India has been demanding transit through
Bangladesh to its landlocked north-eastern states for long. But this was denied by the earlier regimes in
Bangladesh, though India had the facility till 1965. Currently, Bangladesh plans to involve Bhutan and Nepal in the
transit issue. It has allowed both Nepal and Bhutan, which are landlocked, to use Chittagong and Mongla Port.
Bhutanese vehicles would be using Indian territory to reach Bangladesh. An agreement to this effect was signed
when Indian Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna visited Bangladesh recently. He also signed an agreement on
protection of Indian investments in Bangladesh. Indian multi-nationals plan to invest $3.5 billion in Bangladesh in
the near future. This is likely to further boost Bangladesh’s economic growth which is already growing at a fast
pace. Further, unilateral trade concessions are likely when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits
Bangladesh later this year.

This is a new beginning for a major part of South Asia. Though Pakistan and Afghanistan still continue to be
embroiled in religious and ethnic conflict, the rest of South Asia appears keen to check and go beyond such
tendencies. They also appear dedicated to giving priority to economic growth and regional integration. The hope
is that this characteristic of regional cooperation would soon become a model for even that part of South Asia
where peace and stability has been elusive.

Mosque and Quran, Faith and

Multiculturalism: An Indian
Perspective
In the week in which the United States will observe the 9th anniversary of 9/11, ridiculously unacceptable
behaviour guided by the unreasonable attitude of a pastor is threatening to undo the progress achieved in
promoting inter-community relations and in dealing with stereotyping and prejudice. It is promising to take the
world several steps back and not towards any imagined post materialist utopia that was generated by the idea of
end of history.

A lot of research has been conducted on religious extremism since the end of the Cold War when extremist
Islamic forces were identified as the principal threats to world peace. 9/11 gave new direction to this field of
research. However, in a social setup where insider-outsider compartmentalisation is rigid, religious intolerance
has become widespread. That is why the proposed act of Terry Jones of Gainesville, Florida could cause
disproportionate strife.

Terry Jones wants to burn copies of the Quran on the anniversary of 9/11 by which he believes that a strong
message would be sent out to the elements supporting ultra radical Islam. Even if his intentions are noble, Terry
Jones’ actions are counterproductive as burning a religious text to give a message to radicalism is an oxymoron.
It does not prove the pastor any different from the perpetrators of 9/11. In fact, they are mirror images of each
other and the act provides justification for equally radical elements elsewhere.

The ultra radical imams have spoken against this proposed act. There have been protest marches to US
embassies around the world. In addition, inter- religious violence is bound to take place if copies of the Quran are
burnt on 9/11. Already, radical supporters of Terry Jones have vowed to ensure the act of burning, even carrying
guns to support the act. Jones himself is reportedly carrying his licensed weapon around. Therefore, contempt
and prejudice will again feed on these intransigent positions. Stereotypes about US society, already aplenty, will
certainlyget fresh lease.

Jones is the extreme manifestation of the radical voices that keep surfacing periodically. However, state structures
have been weak in responding to them. The question that could be posed is why has the Government not
contemplated arresting Jones on preventive grounds? Does the US need to introspect regarding reformulating its
arguments on the balance between constitutional freedom and its limits? In the US, similar debates came to the
forefront earlier on the subject of building a mosque on ground zero. However, in the absence of serious
brainstorming to guide policy, radicalism seems to be monopolising the limelight and in turn undermining the
leadership position of the US.

Fareed Zakaria has argued elsewhere that the US can retain its global leadership only if it is able to come up with
ideas that are guiding principles for the world. Due to the inability to find quick as well as sustainable solutions on
issues like this, the US is unable to strengthen and defend the principles of its core idea, democracy, and thus its
ability to come up with new and path breaking ideas appears to be seriouslyimpaired. Even in Europe, democratic
states are taking steps that are challenging the multicultural character of their societies. Therefore, even
democracies are dragging their feat when it comes to the question of religion, multiculturalism and democratic
space. Regulations regarding minarets, veils and turbans are all examples of this form of uneasy relationship
between the variables mentioned above.

Does India have a role?

Burning a religious text should never be a part of democratic right and should be restricted under the rules of a
functioning democracy. However this point is largely absent from the US debate. India’s democratic practice has
evolved around the uniquely developed principle of secularism that stipulates equidistance from religion and also
allows certain religious rights as long as they do not harm other people’s religious rights. This is the core principle
of Indian democracy. Principles like this have strengthened democracy within the framework of unity in diversity.
This provides a safety valve and a cushion for debates on rights and religion. India has witnessed many instances
of radical extremism but has come out stronger from each of those experiences.

However, the Indian leadership is usually not vocal enough when it comes to promoting the utility of the Indian
democratic model. It is in times like these that India must propose solutions that are peaceful and also extend
 democratic principles for global engagement. This could also help in democratisation of international relations and
create a niche for an Indian perspective on contemporary international relations.

Towards an Epistemic
Understanding of Radicalism,
Extremism and Terrorism
Without an international consensus on the definition of terrorism and associated terms, how effective could
campaigns to fight the global scourge be? This question has dogged many counter-terrorism experts and
academicians worldwide who have been steadily working towards building unanimity of views in defining terms
such as fundamentalism, radicalism, violent extremism, hate attacks and terrorism. Properly identifying of people
as fundamentalists and potential radicals is critical for preventing them from becoming violent extremists and
terrorists.

The once-vaunted Global War on Terror (GWOT) and even the ongoing Global Programme on Preventing and
Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) have often been criticised for being misnomers,1 as some commentators
aver that it is untenable to wage campaigns against abstract nouns like terrorism and extremism, particularly in
the absence of any internationally recognised definition of such terms.2

The lack of international consensus over some of these fundamental terms of references severely impairs
well-intentioned global counter-terrorism (CT) operations and sometimes even puts the effectiveness, if not
legitimacy of several Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism (CVET) campaigns to question. Terms associated
with terrorism such as violent extremism, radicalism, or fundamentalism, are often used indiscriminately and at
times interchangeably, not just in the popular media but even in academic literature. Often fundamentalists and
non-violent radicals are equated with terrorists, which leads to legal complications. The persistence of such
conceptual confusion impedes the development of effective CVET operations and programmes that need precise
matrices to determine the threat and achieve quantifiable outcomes.

Various security experts and academicians globally have been working to build unanimity of views over
universally accepted terms of reference in the intractable cognitive realm of violent extremism and terrorism.3
Although much confusion still exists, this Brief seeks to provide information regarding the growing acceptance of
definitions and understanding of important concepts.

Fundamentalism
The firm adherence to any belief system or religion by its followers is fraught with the danger of engendering
fanaticism, bigotry and xenophobia in that community. In the modern age, religious zealotry has reacted mainly to
the rise of modern science and secular philosophy and a technology-driven lifestyle.
The liberal and humanist ideals of equality, scientific reason and material progress have undermined religion’s
erstwhile pre-eminence in social and political spheres and gradually marginalised institutions of traditional
religious laws and learning. In reaction, religious revivalist forces emerged early in the 20th century as social and
political movements to overcome the collapse of traditional religious authority. This new wave of religious reaction
to the rise of a secular mode of living has been named fundamentalism.4

Fundamentalism can be defined as a strict and literal interpretation of religious scriptures, dogmas, or practices
and a staunch adherence to irreducible beliefs or ‘fundamentals’.5 In addition, there is great emphasis on
distinguishing one’s in-group and out-group. According to Michael Bernstein,

In-groups are the groups to which individuals both belong and psychologically identify, while out-groups are those
to which individuals do not belong or identify. Categorizations based on ingroup–outgroup distinctions have a
profound impact on social interactions, including aspects of prejudice, reward allocation, stereotyping, and group
conflict.6

The term fundamentalism was first used in the 1920s by a group of Evangelical Protestants who opposed
attempts by some Christian theologists of their time, who sought to explain traditional Christian beliefs in light of
modern science and histography. Opposed to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and the high level of liquor
consumption in society, the early fundamentalists published a series of 12 pamphlets under the title “The
Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth” (1915–20), which emphasised that the Bible was the ‘inerrant’ word of
God.

However, the anti-modern and literalist adherence to religious texts and dogma was not limited to Christianity but
was present in other religious communities around the same time. For instance, much of the Islamic world
struggled to throw off the colonial yoke at that time, and radical movements like Muslim Brotherhood emerged in
the 1920s. Since then, many religious communities have witnessed the rise of fundamentalist movements within
them.

Many violent extremist and terrorist organisations of our times may show fundamentalist traits, ranging from
Salafi-jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, Shia militant forces like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Kataib Hezbollah
in Iraq, Christian terrorist groups like Orange Volunteers in Northern Ireland and Lord’s Resistance Army in
Uganda, Buddhist extremist Groups like Ma Ba Tha and 969 Movement in Myanmar and Sikh terrorist groups like
Babbar Khalsa.

However, it would be wrong to conclude that all fundamentalist groups are violent extremists or terrorists. For
instance, Christian fundamentalists of Evangelical Protestants were mainly linked to pre-millennial eschatology
and were strictly apolitical and non-violent. Similarly, Madkhalism is associated with Quietist thought within the
broader Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia. Although highly punctilious in religious practices, its followers who
follow the writings of Sheikh Rabaee Al Madkhalee insist on loyalty to both monarchical rule, such as in Saudi
Arabia, and secular authoritarian governments in the Arab world. The fundamentalist Deobandi movement in
India supported the Indian freedom struggle against the British Raj and India’s adoption of a secular Constitution
post-independence while opposing the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Thus, fundamentalist adherence to one’s religious beliefs cannot always be linked to adopting violent extremist or
terrorist actions, even though the tendency towards resorting to religion-inspired violence remains high.

In countries like India, where the number of terrorists is far less than people harbouring passionate religious
ardour, government machinery and security forces need to be actively vigilant in monitoring the trajectory of
fundamentalist movements in various communities and groups. They should also seek to build effective social,
political and ideological firewalls to keep the large pool of fundamentalists from adopting violent extremist and
terrorist tendencies.

Radicalism and Radicalisation

Additionally, religious fundamentalism, racial supremacism, as found in the ideologies of Fascism and Nazism;
national and sub-national insurgencies, and revolutionary political ideologies such as Anarchism and
Communism, serve as ideological drivers for violent extremism and terrorism.

In the domain of counter-terrorism, the terms radicalism and radicalisation are commonly used and often
misunderstood. The Oxford Dictionary succinctly defines radicalism as “in favour of extreme and complete
political or social change”.7 The etymological origin of the word ‘radical’ lies in the Latin word ‘radix’, which means
‘the root’. In the domain of politics and international relations, radicals refer to those groups of people who seem
to bring about deep-rooted and fundamental changes to the existing socio-political ideology and institutions. Thus,
radicals wish to bring about a new socio-political order by uprooting the existing one.8

For instance, Islamists call for throwing off Western governance systems in Muslim countries and introducing a
highly purist form of Shariah rule as they claim was implemented by the Prophet and subsequently by the Four
Pious Caliphs (the Rashidun).

Radicalism did not historically have a negative connotation as many revolutionaries of republican and liberal
political philosophies in the 18th and 19th centuries proudly called themselves ‘radicals’. In the words of Astrid
Bötticher, “Radicalism became a political doctrine inspiring republican and national movements committed to
individual and collective freedom and emancipation, directed against the monarchic and aristocratic post-1815
status quo. At that time, radicalism was mostly anti-clerical, anti-monarchist, and definitely pro-democracy.”9

The word ‘radicalisation’ has been derived from the word radicalism and is said to have first gained currency in
the 1930s to refer to the indoctrination and recruitment techniques of left-wing extremists. The usage became
more dubiously popular as left-wing extremism spread across the globe by the 1960s. However, in the 2000s, the
term was used for jihadist ensnarement of impressionable minds into the terrorist ranks. 10

In simple terms, radicalisation is the transformative process that a law-abiding citizen of a state or a member of
society undergoes to become a person who starts accepting principles and actions of violent extremism and
terrorism.11

According to a report from the United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism,12

The notion of 'radicalization' is generally used [by some States] to convey the idea of a process through which an
individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations. This may include, but is not defined by,
the willingness to condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further political, ideological, religious or other
goals.

Radicalism vis-à-vis Extremism

As the above definition may suggest, radicalisation is today linked to extremism, which might suggest that
radicalism and extremism are synonymous and interchangeable. While in most cases this might be true, it is also
a fact that many academicians and experts fail to make any differentiation which is, in reality, quite subtle.

However, it would be necessary first to understand the meaning of the term ‘political extremism’. According to
several security experts, political extremists refer to people who are quite dogmatic, intolerant, and hostile
towards not only all competing political ideologies and philosophies but even towards their proponents. While
radical actors might be fundamentally antithetical towards the existing socio-political order, they may or may not
view politics as a zero-sum game. Furthermore, they may not be vehemently opposed to the existence of their
rivals—be they, people of foreign origin, belonging to a different religion or supporters of a different political
ideology, etc.

Thus, Gandhi was a radical leader in that he opposed the Western imperial rule of his time and practised his
version of rural socialism as opposed to capitalist colonialism. Still, he was not an extremist as he never hated or
despised the British personally and used non-violence even as his means of resisting colonial excesses. Thus,
radicals may not be as harsh in their actions as extremists are.

In the words of R. Koselleck and G. Sartori:

Extremists, viewing politics as a zero-sum game, tend – circumstance permitting – to engage in aggressive
militancy, including criminal acts and mass violence in the fanatical will for gaining and holding political power.
Where extremists gain state power, they tend to destroy social diversity and seek to bring comprehensive
homogenization of society based on an often faith-based ideology with apocalyptic traits. At the societal level,
extremist movements are authoritarian, and if in power, extremist rulers tend to become totalitarian. Extremists
glorify violence as a conflict resolution mechanism and are opposed to the constitutional state, majority-based
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights for all.13

Whereas non-extremist radicals like Gandhi, Martin Luther, and Nelson Mandela can exist, who bring about a
more democratic and egalitarian order, extremist radicals tend to favour a more intolerant, militant, and
authoritarian dispensation. Experts like Peter Neumann make the distinction between cognitive radicalisation
(people who hold extremist beliefs) as against behavioural radicalisation (people who take non-violent and
violent action in support of radical socio-political change).

Although the meaning of radicalism and extremism remains vague in the absence of legal definitions, many
strategic experts like Astrid Bötticher have sought to build academic consensus over these terminologies to bring
clarity to many government-run Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (CVET) programmes and
De-radicalisation across the globe that struggle with different kinds of subjects that require more specialised
attention.14

Violent Extremism and Terrorism

There are also two other terms—violent extremism and terrorism—that are the subject of confusion and debate
among security experts. Thus, violent extremism is a broader term that covers terrorism, along with hate crimes
and fomenting communal clashes.

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the United States, violent extremism refers to the
"encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological,
religious, social, or economic goals".15 This is the broadest description of socially and politically disruptive
activities, including terrorist attacks.

Similarly, US Agency for International Development (USAID) defines violent extremist activities as the
“advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further
social, economic or political objectives”.16

Violent extremism also covers hate crimes ranging from hate speeches, direct physical assault, vandalising and
desecrating sacred and revered sites, property damage, lynching, verbal and physical abuse, social and/or online
stalking, sticking of offensive posters and graffiti, use of weapons. Hate can be directed against members of a
particular section of society based on race, ethnicity, language, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, gender,
disability, wealth, etc.17 Violent extremism also covers sectarian and ethnic clashes that may rise to the level of
genocide and ethnic cleansing in some instances.

Terrorism is just one of the manifestations of violent extremism. Unfortunately, as is well-known, there is also a
lack of international consensus on the definition of terrorism. According to Alec Schmid,18 terrorism can be
viewed as a tactic and a doctrine. As a tactic, terrorism involves indiscriminately using direct violent action against
non-combatants and civilians. As a doctrine, terrorism involves the strategic belief that political goals can be
achieved by coercing a government or even the international community through terrorist actions.

According to the 2011 revised academic consensus definition,

Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of
fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated,
demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and
non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict
parties.19

Counter-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation

Ironically, there has not just been confusion over definitions of terrorism, radicalisation, and violent extremism but
even counter-radicalisation programmes launched by security agencies worldwide. The methodologies and
terminologies used in counter-radicalisation programmes were developed separately in different countries and
were subject to constant revision. This, in turn, caused confusion as the matter was not just an issue of
syntactical nuance but had practical implications. As each set of counter-radicalisation initiatives or steps
addressed a particular concern, used a unique approach, and had different standards of measurement that are
applicable in different stages of the lactic cycle of radicalisation—with characteristic behaviour, tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs)—they could not be lumped under one overarching category.
 Thus, there was no agreement over terms like ‘anti-radicalisation’, ‘counter-radicalisation’, and ‘de-radicalisation’,
as these three terms were also being used interchangeably. Gradually, unanimity emerged. Now, the term
‘anti-radicalisation’ is rarely used and is mainly associated with programmes aimed to protect segments of the
population that have only recently come under the influence of radicalisation and also covers measures related to
detection and developing deterrence.

On the other hand, ‘counter-radicalisation programmes’ target those radicalised elements that may have not yet
joined forces of violent extremism or terrorism and can be rescued before they attempt the dangerous transition.
The measures suited to counter-terrorism operations include disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration
programmes.20 The third category pertains to ‘de-radicalisation programmes’, devised for those individuals who
may have already aided, abetted, or committed acts of violent extremism. Thus, these measures cover
post-surrender and post-detention programmes.

However, all these three programmes still generically fall under ‘counter-radicalisation’. Many of these behaviour
modification programmes under the categories mentioned above cover ideological or religious counselling,
vocational education, recreational and psychological rehabilitation, inter-religious or inter-communal discourse
programmes, post-release surveillance, and care, as well as the involvement of family members and civil society
to foster rehabilitation.

Thus, we find greater clarity emerging over previously contentious issues related to violent extremism and
terrorism. With more academic consensus and unanimity of views at the international levels, it is hoped that
various counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation programmes would become more effective in fighting a
significant threat to global security and the socio-political order.

Khalistan Movement: Recent

Activities and Indian Response
It is essential for the government to convey to the countries hosting separatist Khalistani elements that they
cannot simultaneously have good relations with India while allowing anti-India separatist movements on their soil.
India will also have to build a constructive and sustained engagement with the Sikh diaspora, dispel the
misinformation propagated by the Khalistani separatists and showcase the sense of contentment prevailing in
Punjab.

Introduction
Khalistani separatist activities in Western countries have been on the rise. On 2 July 2023, the Indian Consulate
in San Francisco was set on fire (causing minor damage) by a group of pro-Khalistani separatists. In another
incident, ‘Sikhs for Justice’, a separatist organisation, put out posters instigating the radical elements to kill Indian
top diplomats in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. The advertising poster of the rally
featured a tagline ‘Kill India’. These posters were in response to the death of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in June 2023 in
British Columbia, Canada, with separatists charging Indian agencies as responsible for the killing. In addition to
these two incidents, Khalistani supporters in Brampton, Canada carried out a 5-km long parade which displayed a
float depicting the assassination of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Khalistani militants.

Intensification of Khalistani Activities Overseas

Although such incidents have taken place intermittently in the last two decades, the Khalistani activities overseas
have intensified in last couple of years. Besides the attacks on state symbols, the separatists’ activities across
major Western countries broadly include attacks on temples and consulates, and coordinating referendums for a
separate State of Khalistan in multiple countries.

Attacks on Religious Symbols

In October 2022, Khalistan separatists and Indian supporters, approx. 400–500 in numbers clashed in
Mississauga, Ontario, on the eve of Diwali. While one group waved the Indian flag, the other carried the Khalistan
flag and shouted anti-India slogans. In January 2023, in a series of incidents, three Hindu temples (ISKCON,
BAPS Swaminarayan Mandir and Shri Shiva Vishnu Temple) in Australia were defaced and anti-India slogans
were sprayed on the walls. Similar incidents have been reported intermittently in Australia, with the most recent
incident happening just before Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited that country in May 2023. Similarly, Canada
has witnessed several incidents related to the defacement of Hindu temples, often with the slogan ‘Khalistan
Zindabad, Hindustan Murdabad’ sprayed on the walls.

Referendum for separate State of Khalistan

Besides these events, the ‘Sikhs for Justice’ conducted its ‘Referendum 2022’ for separate State of Khalistan in
the UK, Canada, the US and Australia, where a sizable Sikh population reside. Canada witnessed participation of
1 lakh people out of total population of 5 lakh. This does reflect the failure of separatists to garner full support for
their agenda. The Indian diaspora have been vehemently opposing the activities of the Khalistanis. During the
referendum in late January 2023 in Australia, a scuffle broke out between Khalistanis and pro-India supporters at
the voting site, Federation Square, Melbourne.1

Attack on Indian High Commission and Consulates

The Khalistanis have also targeted Indian consulates in a coordinated manner. In February 2023, the separatists
in Australia targeted the Honorary Consulate in Brisbane and installed the Khalistani Flag inside the premises. In
a similar incident in March, pro-Khalistani protesters stormed the Indian consulate in San Francisco, raised
Khalistani slogans and installed two pro-Khalistan Flags inside the consulate premises. On 19 March, a group of
Khalistan separatists vandalized the Indian High Commission in London, taking out the Indian flag and tried to
replace it with the Khalistan flag.

Activities inside India

The Khalistani separatists have been trying hard to reignite the Khalistani separatist movement in India as well.
Two major incidents which saw active involvement of Khalistan elements were the farmers’ agitation in 2020 and
the emergence of Amritpal Singh as an advocate of a separate state of Khalistan. As intelligence reports have
suggested, the farmer’s protest did witness the involvement of declared terrorist organisations operating from
abroad.2 The incident of 26 January 2021, when protesting farmers entered the vicinity of the Red Fort and
hoisted Nishan Sahib Flag, gives more credence to such reports. The US-based banned pro-khalistani group,
Sikh for Justice, announced the reward of USD 350,000 (INR 25 million) for unfurling ‘Khalistani Flag’ at the
Indian parliament.3
In case of framers protest, it was later established that Amritpal Singh visited the protesting sites to lay the
grounds for his separatist activities a year later. In February 2023, at an incident in Ajnala, thousands of Amritpal’s
supporters broke through the police barricades and secured the release of Lovepreet Singh Toofan, an aide of
Amritpal Singh. In an attempt to appeal to the separatists sentiments in the state and revive the issue of
Khalistan, Amritpal also imitated Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. He was finally arrested on 23 April. His arrest
provided another rallying point for the overseas Khalistan separatists to intensify their propaganda. On 19 March
2023, Indian High Commissioner to Canada had to cancel an event in British Columbia as nearly 200 protestors
gathered in front of the venue entrance (some wielding swords) to protest against the arrest.

West’s reluctance and refusal to act

That multiple Khalistan separatist organisations and individuals could spearhead such an anti-India campaigns as
discussed above, indicates the unwillingness of the Western countries, especially Canada, to act against these
separatist elements.

During the period of the Punjab militancy in the 1980s, the behaviour of the Western camp led by the US was
guided by the then prevailing international systemic order reflected in the Cold War dynamics. India at the time
was perceived as a Soviet-leaning state, and therefore belonging to the enemy bloc. The end of the Cold War and
the opening up of the Indian economy for outside investors altered the perception of the Western countries about
India’s ideological leanings.

Further, the attack on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the subsequent war on terror led these
countries to crack down on terrorist organisations. However, two decades since, vote bank politics appears to
have influenced these Western countries, explaining their tolerance towards anti-India activities by the Khalistani
separatists on their soil. When confronted by India, the Western countries hide behind the veil of their so-called
democratic credentials, and highlight the principles of ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘peaceful protests’. Hence,
Khalistanis are allowed to protest peacefully.

However, lately, the inaction of Western countries and their unwillingness to rein in the Khalistani separatists in
their respective countries have been straining their relations with India, especially for countries like Canada.

Khalistan factor in Canadian politics

Canada is home to the second-largest Sikh population in the world, after India. In terms of their population, they
form more than 2 per cent of the total population of Canada, with nearly 8,00,000 people. They are also the
fastest-growing and fourth-largest religious community in Canada. Over the years, Canada has seen several
phases of Sikh migration. They have now developed into a robust and economically flourishing community. Earlier
in the 1980s, Canada had provided sanctuary to several dreaded terrorists, including Jagjit Singh Chauhan and
Talwinder Singh Parmar, among others. Presently also, several ‘designated terrorists’ like Arshdeep Singh Gill
alias Arsh Dalla of Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF) are residing in Canada. As stated earlier, while Canada’s actions
during the 1980s were guided by Cold War dynamics, its present actions are influenced purely by vote bank
politics.

In the 2019 Canadian federal election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party got 157 votes, 13 short of a
majority. Hence, they had to form a coalition government with the ‘New Democratic Party’ led by Jagmeet Singh
Dhaliwal, a pro-Khalistan leader. Jagmeet has, in the past, made provocative statements in favour of Khalistan
and the human rights situation in Kashmir. Out of 338 seats in the Canadian parliament, Sikhs are elected on 18
seats which speak of their political influence. The Trudeau-led government is under political compulsion to not
antagonize their coalition partners.

Trudeau has been restrained in confronting the Khalistan separatists’ anti-Indian activities. His soft peddling on
the Khalistan issue was quite evident when, in the aftermath of the 'Kill India' posters incident, he stated that “We
have an extremely diverse country, and freedom of expression is something that we have. But, we will also make
sure that we are pushing back against violence and extremism in all its forms.”4

Khalistani Activities in Other Countries

The Khalistan activities are not only limited to Canada. The influence of terrorist organisations like Sikh for Justice
extends to the section of Sikhs residing predominantly in the UK, the US and Australia.

Khalistan separatists’ foothold has been prominent in the UK. The Sikh community got established in the UK
almost immediately after India’s independence. It was in the UK that the first overseas Sikh organisation, ‘Sikh
Home Rule Movement’, was formed under the leadership of Sardar Charan Singh Panchi. The movement was
organised to take up the grievances of the Sikh community with the authorities in the UK. Later on, the Sikh Home
Rule Movement was taken over by separatist leader and self-proclaimed President of Khalistan, Jagjit Singh
Chauhan, who moved to the UK in 1970.

Presently, more than 520,000 Sikhs reside in the UK, comprising nearly 0.88 per cent of the total population. They
are the fourth largest religious community in the UK. The Canadian Sikh separatists and organisations like Sikhs
for Justice have a presence among the Sikhs in the UK, as well. Recently, a report released by the UK
Government reflects the increasing influence and subversive actions of some pro-Khalistan elements.5
Unfortunately, the UK government appears to react slowly to the activities of the Sikh separatists as was evident
from the March 2023 incident in which the Khalistan separatists stormed the Indian High Commission in London
and removed Indian National Flag. The Sikh separatists continued to protest with impunity days after this incident.

Khalistan activities have also intensified in the US, home to some of the designated terrorist organisations and
individuals in India. During the 1980s, Khalistan activities thrived under successive US Administrations. As per
reports, in 1971, The New York Times carried an advertisement of the declaration of a separate state of Khalistan
by Jagjit Singh Chauhan. This advertisement was reportedly funded by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
The driving force behind US behaviour was the Cold War dynamics and the US-Pakistan strategic alliance
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Over 500,000 Sikhs reside in the US, amounting to 0.2 per cent of the total population. Although the Sikh
population is not substantive numerically, it does have a connection with the Sikh separatists of Canada as can be
evidenced by the fact that within four month, the Indian Consulate in San Francisco witnessed two incidents of
arson by the Khalistani separatists. The so-called Khalistani flag was also installed inside the Consulate
premises. In recent years, Australia has also witnessed several anti-India activities by Khalistani separatists as
discussed in pervious sections.
All the above incidents reveal that the Khalistan sympathisers and anti-India elements operate from these
Western countries with impunity.

Indian Government’s Response

The Indian Government is consistently taking up the matter with respective governments, highlighting concerns
about the adverse impact their inaction will have on bilateral relationships. For example, in July 2023, External
Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said, “We have requested our partner countries like Canada, the US, the UK and
Australia, where sometimes Khalistani activities happen, not to give space to Khalistanis. Because their radical,
extremist thinking is neither good for us nor them nor for our relations.”6

The Indian Government is taking these concerns seriously and trying to convey them in high-level bilateral
discussions as well. For instance, after the Brampton incident, Jaishankar expressed his long-standing concern
regarding pro-Khalistan activities in Canada and blamed the Canadian government for playing vote bank politics.
On 6 July 2023, he denounced Canada for propagating violence in the name of freedom of expression. In a
statement, Jaishankar said,

“It is a matter of concern that freedom of expression and speech is once again being misused by anti-India
elements based in Canada and elsewhere… Let me make the larger point that the issue is not about freedom of
expression but its misuse for advocating violence, for propagating separatism and for legitimizing terrorism.”7

India strongly urged Canadian Government to take appropriate action against the anti-India ‘Khalistan Freedom
Rally’, which was to be conducted on 8 July 2023. In a media interaction, the External Affairs Ministry termed the
posters inciting violence against diplomats as “unacceptable” and condemned them in the strongest terms.8

National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met his British counterpart on 7 July 2023 and took up the matter of
intensified activities by Khalistan separatists. At the 5th India-UK Home Affairs Dialogue,9 the Indian Government
reiterated their concern regarding the Khalistan issue and the misuse of UK’s asylum status by the pro-Khalistani
elements to aid and abet terrorist activities in India. The security breach at the Indian High Commission in London
was also discussed.

It is important to note that in response to the inaction of the UK Government against Khalistani separatists in the
London incident, New Delhi removed the outer security cover of the British High Commission and High
Commissioner’s residence. India was compelled to take such an action to strongly communicate to the British
Government the need to take the security of the Indian High Commission in London seriously.

The Indian Government has issued similar statements to express its displeasure about the arson incident at
Indian consulate in San Francisco. India also firmly denounced the vandalism of temples in Australia. While
rejecting the so-called Khalistan referendum as a politically motivated exercise by extremist elements, the
government requested the Australian authorities to “ensure the safety and security of the members of the Indian
community and their properties.”10

Conclusion
The Government of India has vigorously communicated its concerns regarding Khalistani activities to the highest
political authority in these countries. India’s constructive engagement with the Western governments did bear
 some positive results. However, more needs to be done. The Khalistanis are intensifying their activities abroad,
and given that the host countries seem to be looking the other way, India needs to redouble its effort to prevent
the reoccurrence of such incidents. It is essential for the Government to effectively convey to the host countries
that they cannot simultaneously have good relations with India while allowing anti-India separatist movements on
their soil. At the same time, India will also have to build a constructive and sustained engagement with the Sikh
diaspora, dispel the misinformation propagated by the Khalistani separatists and showcase the sense of
contentment prevailing in Punjab.

Combating Left Wing Extremism: Is

Police Training Lacking?
The menace of Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly termed as Naxalism and Maoist insurgency, has been
categorised as the single biggest challenge to India’s internal security by the Prime Minister. He urged the Centre
as well as States, to urgently employ all available resources to cripple the virus of Naxalism.

The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs has adopted a multi-prong strategy to deal with the Naxal
menace, including an effective security response to curb rebel’s violence. Due to socio-economic roots of the
problem, emphasis is being laid on employing the State Police Forces to tackle the Naxal violence. However, the
Government’s security response, have been ineffective in most of the States except a few. Inadequate combat
capability of police forces in Naxalism-affected States is considered a prime factor for failing security response.
Lack of proper training to police forces, due to poor infrastructure, resources and environment, is often attributed
to inadequate combat capability of police forces.

This occasional paper attempts to briefly assess the ineffective security response and importance of police
training, in Naxalism-affected States in general, and examines Chhattisgarh as a case study; in particular. The
paper also discusses the role of the Centre in police training, and briefly assesses the overall police training
environment and culture. At the end, the paper identifies some corrective measures and makes relevant policy
recommendations.

Partisanship can hurt India’s

Internal Security Management
It is perhaps a truism that issues concerning India’s internal security like terrorism, Naxalism and insurgencies in
the North East require a dynamic multi-pronged approach spread across states to manage and resolve them.
Such a management and resolution package would possibly require crafting a national strategy capable of
bypassing local political divisions and enabling India’s multiple political parties to work towards a consensus on
issues concerning the nation. In the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks, the need for such a “centrist”
approach capable of reconciling different political postures and ideologies and rising above party lines has
become all the more important to effectively safeguard the country from future internal and externally supported
violence. Sadly, in 2008 alone, the country lost more than 1000 civilians to terror attacks, Naxal violence and
militant violence in Jammu & Kashmir and the North East.

There are two identifiable obstacles to cooperation between the Centre and the states and among states
themselves in India. The first is structural and the second is political. The “Union and State Lists” enshrined in the
Constitution and the issue of a state’s sphere of jurisdiction under India’s federal structure inhibit co-ordination
amongst the various arms of the Central and state governments. At the political level the obstacle is in the form of
a lack of consensus amongst the major political parties on issues of common concern to the nation. To strengthen
co-operation at these two levels between the Centre and the states in fighting terror, two Chief Ministers’
Conclaves were held in New Delhi on January 6 and 7, 2009. In the first conclave on January 6, the focus was on
“internal security” issues. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his address stated that “Terrorism, Left Wing
Extremism and insurgency in the North East” are three of the gravest threats to India’s national security. He
emphasized the need for a co-ordinated approach across states noting that Naxalism was mostly “indigenous and
homegrown”, terrorism has been largely sponsored from Pakistan, and insurgency in the North-East is due to
economic disparities as well as sanctuaries provided to the leaders of these armed movements in neighbouring
countries.

The issues taken up in the Conclave included issuance of identity cards in Border States, registration of
fishermen, up-gradation of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and the establishment of a permanent
“Crisis Management Group”. The states were also requested to set up a dedicated intelligence wing in their own
police forces to ensure better law enforcement. Home Minister P. Chidambaram identified two key issues:
intelligence gathering and sharing. Although the mood in the conclave was positive for greater Centre-State
co-ordination in fighting terrorism, several Chief Ministers expressed reservations about the functioning of the
newly constituted National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the amendments brought in the Unlawful Activities
Prevention (Amendment) Act and the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). This could be due to lack of clear
communication between the Centre and the States on the NIA and the amended laws. The Gujarat and Bihar
Chief Ministers argued that setting up the NIA was “contrary to our federal spirit” and an attempt by the Centre to
relegate the states to the backstage in the fight against terror. Significantly, the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister
stayed away from the Conclave despite the fact that most Indian Mujahideen (IM) cadres involved in terror blasts
in Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Delhi in 2008 belonged to districts in UP like Azamgarh. Such a state of political affairs
is not a very welcome sign at a time when India needs to stand united against terrorists and their sponsors.

The Conclave of Chief Ministers of Naxal affected states held on January 7 took stock of the security situation in
33 Naxal affected districts across 13 states. It was observed in the Conclave that killings in Bihar and Jharkhand
were high in 2008, with nearly 39 police personnel killed in Jharkhand in 2008 as compared to 11 in 2007 along
with 148 civilians and 99 Naxalites. Bihar suffered the death of 76 policemen as compared to 66 rebels, while
Chhattisgarh again witnessed the highest number of casualties with 77 police personnel, 131 civilians and 53
rebels killed. Though the Home Minister again identified intelligence gathering and sharing as important for
fighting both terrorism and Naxalism, missing in both conclaves was stress upon the need for real-time
intelligence. Instead of offering detailed plans for intelligence co-ordination and co-operation amongst states,
there was an unnecessary fear amongst the Chief Ministers that the Centre was perhaps being heavy handed in
its issuance of diktats to the states to follow certain measures for handling terror and armed violence. However,
this situation is not just limited to the two conclaves.
 In general there is little substantive co-operation between states in fighting internal cross border security
challenges like Naxalism and insurgency in the North East. For instance, security personnel and politicians in
Orissa accuse Andhra Pradesh politicians and its elite police force - the Grey Hounds - of weeding out Naxalism
in Andhra Pradesh and planting them in Orissa. Andhra Pradesh meanwhile accuses the Orissa police of lack of
professionalism in fighting Naxalism. Instead of engaging in such “blame game”, both states should perhaps work
out a joint action plan in countering an armed organized group that threatens them both in equal measure.
Though “law and order” is a state subject, the Constitution does not limit co-operation amongst states in
addressing issues that threaten the solidarity of the nation. The problem is similar in the North East. There is little
real co-operation politically between Assam, Manipur, Tripura or Nagaland in jointly tackling cross-border
insurgencies like the NSCN (IM), ULFA or the DHD. Consequently, these groups operate on the NH-39 and
across all seven states with impunity facing little joint counter measures from state forces.

Politics by definition requires forging a “vital centre” easing ideological tensions and class and caste divisions for
the common good. The Centre must therefore craft a policy that avoids a “centralizing” approach in fighting armed
violence in the states. This necessitates involving legitimate political voices from the states in building much
needed co-operation. With the multiple internal security threats that India faces, only a multi-pronged politically
inspiring approach can help it overcome terrorism, left wing violence, and insurgency in border states. Finally,
without doubt, political polarization will weaken India’s internal security management apparatus while a
multi-pronged approach will strengthen it.

Keywords: Northeast IndiaNaxalIndian Mujahideen (IM)National Investigation Agency (NIA)

Impact of Modernisation of Police

Forces Scheme on Combat
Capability of the Police Forces in
Naxal-Affected States: A Critical
Evaluation
The menace of Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly termed as Naxalism and Maoist insurgency, has been
categorised as the single biggest challenge to India’s internal security by the Prime Minister. He urged the Centre
as well as States, to urgently employ all available resources to cripple the virus of Naxalism.

The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs has adopted a multi-prong strategy to deal with the Naxal
menace, including an effective security response to curb rebel violence. Due to socio-economic roots of the
problem, emphasis is being laid on employing the State Police Forces to tackle the Naxal violence. However, the
 Government’s security response, have been ineffective in most of the States except a few. Inadequate combat
capability of police forces in Naxalism-affected States is considered a prime factor for failing security response.
The police forces in most of the States are tremendously capacity-deficient in terms of manpower, resources,
training and infrastructure.

This occasional paper attempts to assess and analyse the impact of the MPF scheme on building police combat
capability in affected States. In order to realistically assess the impact of the MPF scheme, the paper focuses on
the ongoing MPF scheme in various affected States in general, and the States of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand
and Orissa in particular, which are worst hit and generally considered to be having the least developed police
capability.

Naxalism in Chhattisgarh: Down,

not wiped out
Despite the Chhattisgarh government's two-pronged strategy of police operation combined with socio economic
programmes against the Naxalites, there appears to be deterioration in the law and order situation in the state
due to the escalation of Naxal violence. Frequent use of police forces against tribals in the name of anti-Naxal
operations, forceful eviction due to mining and the establishment of industries by the state machinery have left the
Bastar region of Chhattisgarh a virtual battle zone. Of late, the Naxalites' new tactics of deception against the
security forces personnel engaged in anti-Naxal operations has further worsened the situation. In general, people
in the State are feeling insecure in the face of frequent attacks on the security forces.

Seven security forces personnel, including an Assistant Commandant of the Central Reserve Police Force and an
Assistant Sub-Inspector of Chhattisgarh Police, were killed on January 16, 2007, when Naxalites triggered
landmines on a joint operation team in Jharghati jungle near Narayanpur town in Bastar district. At least five
policemen were injured in the blasts, after which the Naxalites carted away three AK-47 rifles, two SLRs, two
Insas rifles and two walkie-talkies from the slain security personnel. Over 100 armed Naxalites, divided in groups,
took positions on both sides of the road to ambush the 38-member police party. This ambush had been preceded
on December 21, 2006 by another set of two landmine blasts at Polampalli in Dantewade district, which resulted
in the death of five people two of whom were security forces personnel and injury to four others.

The January 16 blasts were reportedly caused by at least three landmines. They were systematically co-ordinated
and executed, and the Naxals followed it up by opening fire from all directions on the police party. The police
believe that it was in fact a booby trap, for they had embarked upon that particular operation upon learning from
informers that the some top Naxal leaders could possibly visit the area to pay tribute to four cadres who had
recently been killed by the security forces in an encounter. The Naxals thus seem to have used disinformation to
deceive the police and its intelligence system.

The attack seems to have been deliberately planned to demoralize the security forces personnel and to ensure
that in future they do not carry out immediate actions upon receiving intelligence inputs. If such a situation were to
come to pass, it will help the Naxalites in political mobilization. Further, the attack indicated that the Naxalites'
intention was to walk off with arms from the security forces personnel, given that they are running short of arms
and ammunition due to frequent police raids on suspected Naxalite arms factories and dumps. On January 11,
2007, for example, the police unearthed a Naxalite arms factory in Satnami Nagar area in Bhopal and recovered
a huge consignment of arms. Subsequently, the police also unearthed Naxalite arms factories in Jamshedpur and
Rourkela.

Another explanation has been given for the recent Naxal attacks given by Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman
Singh. He said that the Naxalites carried out the attack out of frustration and warned that stringent action would
continue against the rebels. In fact, the State has been taking stringent actions against the Naxalites after
imposing a ban on the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and its front organisations under an
ordinance issued on September 5, 2005. Despite this, the state government has failed to check violence in
Bastar. A Union Home Ministry report indicated that the Naxalites could capture nearly 60 per cent of the land
area of Chhattisgarh by 2010, if decisive operations are not carried out to dismantle their bases. Moreover, an
Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) report suggested that in the year 2006, 48 per cent of the
Naxalite-related killings were reported from Chhattisgarh. The report also said that a total of 749 people, including
285 civilians, were killed in Naxalite violence in India during the year 2006 and that about 80 per cent of these
were victims of landmine attacks.

Although various reports suggest that Naxalite violence in Chhattisgarh had gone down in 2006, in comparison to
2005, the recent attacks indicate that the movement is down but not wiped out. It is still capable enough to hit at
will. The attack raises questions on the counter-insurgency strategy adopted by the state as well as about the
nature of the Naxalite movement there. Instead of treating the conflict as a law and order problem, state
authorities should understand the true nature of the problem. What the Naxalites are engaged in is an agrarian
and livelihood based revolutionary war, in which man, not weapon, is the decisive factor. The Chhattisgarh
government has consistently failed to provide basic infrastructure - schools, hospitals, roads, and gainful
employment to the tribal groups. At the same time, the tribal groups' access to natural resources is being
increasingly curbed due to stringent forest and mining Acts formulated by the State from time to time. These
policies have consistently deprived them of their fundamental rights. As a result they have become easy recruits
to the Naxalite cause. Moreover, although the State adopted a pro-business Mining policy in 2001, it is yet to
formulate a Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) policy.

Instead of addressing the root cause of Naxalism in Chhattisgarh, the State police have been blaming other state
governments for the rise of the Naxal threat. According to Chhattisgarh police chief, his state is suffering mainly
because of Andhra Pradesh's incoherent policies on Naxalism. Similarly, the chief of police in Jharkand, another
Naxal-affected state, has accused the neighbouring Bihar and West Bengal governments of being non-committal
when it comes to launching a joint offensive against Naxals.

While bureaucrats accuse other states, the matter is more serious at the political level. Chhattisgarh is ruled by
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its neighbouring states - Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Jharkhand - are
governed by the Congress, Biju Janata Dal and an independent alliance backed by the United Progressive
Alliance (UPA), respectively. Hence, it is observed that there is lack of political will to arrive at a common agenda
to address Naxalism in the region. Apart from unaddressed socio-economic issues that provide it with a sustained
motive, the Naxal movement has also been able to sustain itself for more than 40 years because different political
 parties ruling the affected states create hurdles for joint operations. As a result, Naxalites take shelter at state
tri-junctions during police action in these states.

Considering the gravity of the situation, the affected states need to overcome their political and ideological
differences. Dr. Manmohan Singh had, at a day-long meeting of six Naxalite affected states' chief ministers in
New Delhi on April 13, 2006, in fact said that Naxalism has emerged as the single biggest internal security
challenge to the country and advised the states to co-ordinate with each other to manage the problem. There thus
needs to be simultaneous combing operations in all bordering districts. The Naxalite movements in all 14 affected
states are controlled by separate state committees and five regional bureaus, and each has its own set of
demands. There is strong co-ordination between these state committees and regional bureaus and that is why
individual states should not try and negotiate only with those within their borders. Naxalites also have the habit of
relocating their cadres to neighbouring states during peace talks. This is all the more reason why there needs to
be greater co-ordination among the various states affected by Naxal violence. Moreover, to bring the alienated
masses to the mainstream of governance, ecological regeneration programmes should be introduced in rural
areas. In fact, considering the different approaches and recurring failure of the Naxalite affected states in
managing the conflict, the Union government should take the initiative to declare a people friendly Resettlement
and Rehabilitation policy at the national level and generally assume a more proactive role in co-ordinating efforts
to tackle this single biggest internal security challenge facing the country.

Arming the Unarmed

On April 25, 2011, the Supreme Court of India pulled up the centre and the Chhattisgarh government for
appointing Special Police Officers (SPOs) and arming them with weapons in the trouble-torn areas of
Chhattisgarh under Section 17 of the Police Act, 1861 and Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Police Act, 2000.1 This
has once again raised questions on the counter-naxalite operations being undertaken in the heartland of India.

SPOs were first deployed in 1990 in Kashmir during the height of militancy to assist the security forces in
conducting combat operations in limited areas. These are generally recruited from among the locals on a
temporary basis because they are familiar with the terrain of specific locations. Their training period is limited to
one or two months and they are paid a monthly honorarium that ranges from 1500 to 3000 rupees. This is not
deemed to be a regular employment. The SPOs are different from the Salwa Judum though they are generally
considered to be synonymous. On record, they function under the supervision of the state police, but in reality
they are an unorganised village force. Some times known as Village Defence Forces, they do not have the
capability to combat militants who are much better trained and equipped. Despite being an unorganised force,
SPOs are deployed in Chhattisgarh, in the insurgency active areas of Manipur and in left wing extremist affected
areas of Jharkhand, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. But while Manipur and other
states have recently begun to recruit SPOs, Jammu and Kashmir has discontinued the practice since 2008. After
18 years, the Jammu and Kashmir government found the SPOs to be more of a liability since they were found to
be harming innocent civilians, extracting protection money and involved in human rights violations.2

According to the apex court bench consisting of Justices B. Sudarshan Reddy and S.S. Nijjar, the 1861 Act on the
basis of which SPOs are recruited was a legacy of colonial policing whose validity after the framing of the Indian
constitution is suspect. The court expressed serious reservations on whether the appointment of SPOs without
 any accountability was sustainable in the eyes of the law and questioned the central government for providing
finances to the state government for arming them.

The state government has, however, justified the deployment of SPOs in naxal-affected areas on the grounds that
they are locals and hence familiar with the terrain, language and the weapons being used by the adversary.3
However, this strategy of pitting civilians against anti-state actors has been counter-productive. There are risks
attached to arming youths who are educated up to class V only. When an anti-national mindset group has taken
up arms against the state, the government is arming the unarmed. By doing so, the state is encouraging the
people in naxal-affected areas to fight against each other. Viewed from another perspective, the basic reason why
naxalism has flourished in these areas is the inability of the state governments concerned to provide good
governance. Instead of facing the ground realities and framing an implementable strategy to address them, the
state government is resorting to short-term defensive plans of securing the naxal-affected areas by arming the
people, whom the state instead should be protecting. In due course of time, the Kashmir experience with SPOs is
bound to be repeated in Chhattisgarh and other states.

The deployment of paramilitary forces serves the purpose of engaging the anti-national militants in an organised
manner and they can be pulled out once the situation improves. But in the case of SPOs once the security
environment improves the government will have to disarm and rehabilitate them or consider absorbing them in the
state police constabulary. Besides, most of the armed naxals are better organised for conducting guerrilla
operations like ambushes, sabotage and tactical assault and these can be handled only by experienced and
trained troops. Moreover, in the emerging security environment where even committing the army to anti-naxal
operations is being reviewed after the Dantewada incident of April 2010, when 75 CRPF personnel (COBRA) and
a policeman were gunned down in an ambush by left-wing extremists in the Mukrana forest during operation
‘Green Hunt,’ the SPO experiment could prove to be disastrous. Given their lack of training, combat exposure and
expertise in use of weapons, the SPOs are unlikely to be effective even in the defensive line of action. Therefore,
the state and the central governments need to reconsider the policy of arming unarmed civilians as SPOs and
look for other options to enhance security. Raising a new armed constabulary like Indian Reserve Battalion (IRB)
composed of local recruits could be an option, as it would serve the twin purposes of generating employment and
restoring security.

Examining the Maoist Resurgence

in Andhra
If two recent events are compared, then they would ostensibly appear to be disconnected. Nevertheless, they
ought to evoke considerable interest because of the actual linkage between them. The first is Swaranjit Sen,
former Director General of Police (DGP) of Andhra Pradesh, is to be anointed as the vice-chancellor of the
troubled Osmania University, which of late has been a hotbed of Telangana agitation. His appointment would be a
historic occasion since for the first time an Indian Police Service (IPS) officer will be a vice-chancellor in the
state.1 Second, the Maoists called for a bandh in the Andhra-Orissa border area on December 22. Their agenda
was to protest against the killing of five of their comrades in an encounter by the elite Andhra Greyhounds
personnel at Cheruvuru near Korukonda in Chintapalli mandal.2 These two events represent different facets of
the Maoist movement in Andhra. And the connection is manifested when it is remembered that Sen is known in
the state for his ‘hard line’ image against the Maoists.

On one hand, Sen’s appointment shows that the police force in Andhra commands significant confidence among
the political leadership. That is why an IPS officer has been entrusted with task of sorting out a trouble-torn
university. For instance, media reports say that the Andhra government has, in principle, approved a suggestion
by Governor Narasimhan to nominate senior Indian Administrative Service (IAS) or IPS officers to head the three
strife-torn universities of Osmania, Kakatiya and Andhra.3

On the other hand, these events also portray the fact that the Maoists are trying their best to reclaim lost
territories. Hence, a more severe skirmish is in the offing in Andhra Pradesh. In fact, the Maoists have a
grandiose plan to create ‘liberated zones’ in the state.4 Moreover, it is not at all unlikely that the left-wing ultras
are not aiding and abetting the Telangana movement and would continue to do so in future through their frontal
student and other mass organisations.

To corroborate, quite recently, the Telangana Praja Front (TFP) was floated by Maoist sympathiser and balladeer
Gaddar. Reportedly, he has demanded that the central government honour its commitment by immediately tabling
a bill in parliament for the formation of Telangana.5 Gaddar’s actions, though in the garb of democracy, needs to
be conceived as a covert move of the insurgents. Moreover, when some Telangana groups have already warned
of a 'bloodbath' if the Sri Krishna Commission makes no recommendation for the formation of Telangana state by
December 31 2010, the inherent liaison between these militant pro-Telangana groups and the Maoists simply
cannot be rejected outright.

Against this backdrop, Gaddar’s TFP, acting as an open party to subvert the democratic processes of the state, is
basically what the outlawed outfit wants or rather badly needs. It is a natural tactical belief of the Maoists that
overt military acts in the Andhra-Orissa border region can be effectively compounded with mass agitations around
Hyderabad to weaken the existing political structures of Andhra Pradesh. Moreover, when the issue is as emotive
as Telangana, the rebels do have a solid ground from which to launch their tactics.

There is another reason to believe that the ongoing agitation for a separate Telangana state may have a Maoist
‘hand’. There are allegations of extortion against Telangana activists which seem to follow the ‘extortion regime’ of
the Naxalite movement in Andhra.6 Pro-Telangana activists believe that taking donations to propel the movement
forward is a reasonable step. However, Lok Satta Party president Jayaprakash Narayan asserted in the state
assembly that there is heavy extortion involved in the Telangana movement. Furthermore, there have been
allegations that local leaders were collecting huge amounts to the tune of Rs. 10,000 to 20,000 from
businessmen, government employees, contractors and others to conduct even cultural programmes.7 This is
quite interesting considering the fact that this is a standard modus-operandi of the Maoists to garner finances.

Operating from their headquarters at Abujhmar in Chattisgarh, the Maoists are essaying into other states. Most
importantly, along with the historically rebel-dominated district of Srikakulam, the districts of Vizianagram,
Vishakhapatnam, East Godavari and Khammam are the disturbed areas of Andhra Pradesh. Khammam shares a
long border with Chhattisgarh whereas the other districts are contiguous with Orissa.
 The Maoists are now celebrating the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army
(PLGA) and hence have taken up a month-long recruitment drive in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Chattishgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal. Their party spokesperson
Gudsa Usendi and Dandakaranya special zone military commission in-charge Sudhakar said that the 10th
anniversary of the PLGA, which began on December 2, will continue till January 2, 2011. They proclaimed that
during the period, revolutionary propaganda, processions, meetings and rallies would be conducted in every
village.8

The Maoists had been physically driven out from Andhra from a law and order point of view almost five to six
years back. But in June 2008 at Balimela reservoir in Malkangiri district of Andhra-Orissa boarder, the elite
greyhounds suffered casualties at the hands of the Maoists.9 That could be interpreted as the ‘come back’ event
for the latter in Andhra. And the present surge in militancy is in sync with that. Additionally, since the Maoists are
losing ground in other states, they need to regain their lost forte in their old backyard so as to have an edge in the
psychological war with the Indian state.

In addition, it is quite disturbing for the Maoists not to have a mass base in Andhra since most of their top
leadership hail from the very region. Hence, they are trying to cash in on major issues to extract maximum
dissatisfaction of the masses towards the political system. Telangana is one such. Along with it, it seems natural
that the Maoists may focus on the issue of suicide of farmers too in the foreseeable future through their frontal
organisations.

In this regard, the porous border with Orissa is a major cause of concern for the Andhra authorities. The ultras
have bases in the Malkangiri, Koraput and Rayagada districts of Orissa that adjoin the Andhra border. There are
no border check posts except on the highway and main roads. Furthermore, on both sides of the border the same
Kondh tribals live who provide the mass base for the ultras.

The Andhra government might have won the first phase of the civil war with the Maoists. But the renewed
violence in the area portends ominous signals for the future. A far more dangerous future situation was reflected
by an opinion poll published by the Times of India on September 28 201010. According to it, a clear 58 per cent of
the populace (who were polled) in the Maoist-dominant areas of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra and Orissa said that Naxalism had actually been good for their area. In Andhra, Khammam was one
of the districts where the poll was conducted. Four districts of the Telangana region – Adilabad, Nizamabad,
Karimnagar, Warangal – were also chosen.

Probably the vital aspect of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the people in counterinsurgency is yet to be
accomplished by the Andhra authorities. And the continued failure to do so would have serious ramifications in
the long run.

Hemant Kumar asked: What can be

done to minimise casualties among
the CRPF personnel engaged in
anti-Naxal operations and how
Naxalism can be eradicated from
Chhattisgarh?
The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and all other Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) deployed in
Anti-Naxal Operations (ANO) would need to adhere to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in order to
minimise casualties.

Calibrated security response together with vigorous development measures would help to meet the Naxalite
challenge in Chhattisgarh. These would include health, education and connectivity.

For more on the subject, please refer to the following IDSA publications:

Om Shankar Jha, “Combating Left Wing Extremism: Is Police Training Lacking? Case Study of Chhattisgarh”,
IDSA Occasional Paper No. 3, June 2009.

P.V. Ramana, “Measures to Deal with Left-Wing Extremism/Naxalism”, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 20, October
2011

DR. MANMOHAN SINGH: CHECK VIRUS OF COMMUNAL

VIOLENCE
PM Dr. Singh, addressing the annual conference of Directors and Inspectors General of Police in New Delhi on
November 23, voiced concern over the “new danger” posed by the spread of fundamentalist and extremist
ideas. Dr. Singh suggested the setting up of a task force to initiate a 100-day plan to address “emerging
challenges” in the areas of terrorism, naxalism and insurgency. Describing communal violence as a virus that
threatens the secular fabric of the country, he called for measures to check its influence in time so that the
multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-caste society will not unravel1.

The Arrest of Abu Jundal: An

Assessment and Recommendation
The arrest of Abu Jundal is being seen as a coup for Indian intelligence agencies. While the arrest is not only
likely to provide a link to as yet unknown and critical details of the 26/11 terrorist attack, it reinforces both state
and non-state actor linkages with corresponding evidence. These could well have far reaching implications for
investigators and the government for a number of reasons. First, the sequence of events leading to the arrest
indicates a subtle realignment of bilateral relations with countries like Saudi Arabia. Second, while it is known
that Pakistani state agencies were directly involved in the planning and execution of the attack, however,
details likely to be made available as a result of Abu Jundal’s interrogation could provide irrefutable evidence in
this regard, thus helping to make strategic and tactical gains. While the former will help force legal action and
shed greater light on Pakistan’s strategy of state sponsored terrorism, the latter will provide details of the
planning process, modus operandi and identity of key players in the 26/11 terrorist attack. Third, it will also
highlight the weaknesses and loopholes in India’s counter terrorism strategy that needs to be plugged.

It can well be argued as to why there is a need for a sharper focus on the 26/11 terrorist attack, given a large
number of attacks that India has faced in the last couple of decades. The 1993 Mumbai attacks resulted in a
larger number of deaths.1 Akshardham in Gujarat witnessed similar killings by a group of fanatically motivated
terrorists.2 The attack on Parliament House3 targeted a more sensational objective. However, certain key
factors differentiate 26/11 from previous attacks. First, there is clear evidence of direct Pakistani involvement in
the attack right through the planning, preparation and execution stages. Second, the logistical arrangements
and the professional execution of a multiple target operation by a small group of terrorists were unique in its
application in the Indian context. Third, the sheer intensity of attacks exposed weaknesses within all parts of
the Indian security apparatus. And fourth, it led to a serious rethink within India of all aspects of the existing
counter terrorism strategy.

A number of details highlighting these issues had earlier come through the interrogation of Ajmal Kasab,
investigations involving David Headley and Tahawwur Rana as well as communications that were intercepted4
during the attack. Abu Jundal’s arrest not only reinforced some of these aspects, but also provided insights into
the preparatory stages and subsequent events in the control room, thereby adding some missing pieces to the
26/11 puzzle.5 This Issue Brief focuses on these very facets linked with the arrest of Abu Jundal, with the aim
of deriving recommendations for India’s counter terrorism strategy.

Pakistan, the Epicentre of Terrorism

Abu Jundal aka Zabiuddin Ansari was arrested in Saudi Arabia and sent to India in an operation that saw close
coordination between the Indian and Saudi intelligence agencies.6 This seemingly innocuous statement of fact
is significant for a number of reasons. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have close diplomatic ties.7 Pakistan has
been receiving support and aid from Saudi Arabia despite being increasingly isolated in the Western world.
Saudi Arabia has also been accused of being soft on extremist ideology and a number of Saudi charitable
organisations have been involved in financing terror activities around the world.8 Given all this, Saudi
cooperation in the arrest and deportation of Abu Jundal could have been influenced by its changed perceptions
of terror threat from exposed coastal areas, the importance of improving bilateral security and economic ties
with India and the residual threat of domestic terrorism in Saudi Arabia itself. While counter terrorism support
from Saudi Arabia is welcome, its limitations also need to be understood. Help was forthcoming only after
confirmation of the identity of the terrorist as an Indian national. Similar cooperation with respect to Pakistani
terrorists wanted in India is unlikely to fructify.
The recognition of terrorist safe havens in Pakistan was earlier recognised by the United States as well.
Admiral Mike Mullen, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called Pakistan the “epicentre of
terrorism”.9 More recently, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, during an interaction with the Indian strategic
community at IDSA, openly indicated US exasperation with Pakistan, when he said, “We are reaching the limits
of our patience, and for that reason it is extremely important that Pakistan take action to prevent this kind of
safe haven.”10

In a recent article, Bruce Riedel of Brookings named the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) as more dangerous than the al
Qaeda.11 However, the reality of the current circumstances indicates that it is not merely the LeT, but the
Pakistan sponsored terror machine as a whole that is the most lethal terror conglomerate in the world today. A
brief assessment of the 26/11 attack and details revealed thereafter reinforce this reality.

Mumbai witnessed 10 armed LeT terrorists commence their attack at 8 PM on 26 November 2008. They were
to be finally neutralised only at 8 AM on the 29th, almost 60 hours later and after they had succeeded in killing
166, wounding 304 and destroying property worth 41 crore and 72 lacs.12 Eleven areas were targeted in a well
planned attack. The city of Mumbai was held hostage by the ruthless action of the 10 perpetrators and their
masters in Pakistan who were directing them. The intimate control over the massacre in Mumbai can be
gauged by the fact that 41 calls lasting over 8834 seconds from Taj Mahal Hotel, 62 calls from the
Oberoi/Trident lasting over 15,705 seconds and 181 calls for 35,172 seconds from Nariman House were made
by the terrorists to their controllers in Pakistan.13 This clearly establishes the elaborate planning of the
operation by the terrorist masterminds sitting thousands of kilometres away in Pakistan, immune from the
exchange of fire at the scene of attack and busy with the clinical execution of their diabolical plan. The
unambiguous orders and their remorseless execution leading to the cold blooded killings of innocents
reinforced the ruthlessness of the perpetrators of the incident.

Evidence collected in the immediate aftermath of the 26/11 attack indicated that the LeT, operating from
Pakistani soil, could not have achieved this dubious distinction, unless it had received state backing. Ajmal
Kasab, one of the terrorists sent in to target the innocent people of Mumbai, was fortuitously captured alive. His
confession gave a detailed account of the recruitment, training, induction and attack in Mumbai.14 This was
followed by evidence provided by David Headley and Tahawwur Rana, which was produced by the US
Attorney, Patrick J. Fitzgerald:

“In or about July 2008, Headley returned to Mumbai for the fifth time to carry out instructions and surveillance
activities. Headley carried out surveillance of a number of locations, including the Taj Mahal Hotel, Oberoi
hotel, Leopold Cafe, Chabad House, the train stations, various potential landing sites, and a Hindu temple,
where Headley purchased approximately 15 red bracelets commonly worn by the followers of the Hindu
faith...Once his surveillance was completed, Headley returned to Pakistan and gave Sajid the GPS device so
that its contents could be downloaded...Headley also met with Major Iqbal, and again debriefed not only on
what he had done, but also his discussions with Lashkar leaders.”15

Major Iqbal alias Chaudhery Khan, was identified by Headley as the ISI handler who coordinated the attack.16

However, these two sets of inputs neither provide details of events inside Pakistan during the attack nor of
behind the scene activities during the preparation for the same. This gap is now being filled through the
interrogation of Abu Jundal. Abu Jundal has revealed that 12 LeT terrorists were trained at camps in Muridke
and Thakot in Pakistan, of whom finally 10 were selected for the attack. He has also said that the terrorists
“were in constant touch with LeT figurehead Hafiz Saeed and Lakhvi, both of whom used to meet them along
with the Pakistan’s spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence.”17

Abu Jundal has also given details of the control room set up “between the Malir Cantonment, a densely
populated locality called Quaidabad and Jinnah International Airport.”18 It is also revealing to note that these
locations are connected by the Jinnah Avenue and a national highway in the heart of the town! Interestingly,
the control room was located in the close vicinity of an army cantonment, as also a PAF airbase, adjacent to
the Abbottabad Lines complex at Chota Malir. These disclosures indicate a pattern of sorts, given that Osama
Bin Laden’s safe house was located near the Pakistan Military Academy. Both cases thus indicate the
availability of security for terrorists and proximity for the coordinating and controlling elements of the Pakistani
establishment.

Pakistani complicity is also borne by the fact that Abu Jundal had been provided a National Identity Card for
Overseas Pakistanis (Number 354050-3970947) and free Visa entry into Pakistan (Passport Number QL
1790941).19

According to Abu Jundal, amongst the occupants of the control room were two Pakistani ISI agents, Sajid Mir
and Sameer Ali. This corroborates David Headley’s confession that these same individuals were his handlers,
thus reinforcing the suspicions of direct Pakistani control of the operation.20 As noted by India’s Home Minister
P. Chidambaram, “[i]t is no longer possible to deny that though the incident happened in Mumbai, there was a
control room in Pakistan before and during the incident. Without state support, the control room could not have
been established.”21

The Domestic Angle

While Pakistan is undoubtedly the epicentre of terror activities directed against India and hence India’s counter
terrorism strategy has to take into account this critical external aspect, it is equally important to ensure that
both real and perceived causes of alienation among people within the country are addressed.22 Abu Jundal’s
arrest has once again reinforced the importance of this aspect in India’s counter terrorism strategy. In this
regard, a key aspect that must be borne in mind that it is more important to root out the causes of terrorism
rather than merely neutralising individual terrorists who will continue to feed on perceived injustice and radical
propaganda. At the same time structural and enforcement weaknesses23 within the country will have to be
addressed to ensure that the ability of terrorists to function is constrained and finally neutralised. For instance,
the ability of terrorists to exploit existing channels of funding, communication, liaison and manpower available
to criminals has to be curtailed by severing the unholy nexus between profit seeking criminals and ideologically
extremist terrorists. Some of these structural weaknesses have also been exploited by Non Governmental
Organisations (NGOs), given the advantage they enjoy of inherent social respectability. While some steps have
been initiated by placing 100 organisations under the governmental scanner,24 a vast majority continues to
take advantage of the lack of structured audit, thereby allowing them to act as fronts for terror groups.25

Recommendations
Given the external and internal angles to the threat of terrorism, India needs to adopt a comprehensive counter
terrorism approach that includes both domestic and foreign policy measures.

International

India needs to continue its diplomatic efforts to strengthen the global counter terrorism architecture. This
should include simplification of the procedure for extradition of terrorists and those supporting terrorism
activities. India’s cooperation with the United States and Saudi Arabia, amongst other countries, is a test case
of successful joint action against terrorism, and these need to be deepened.
The ongoing effort to expose Pakistan’s use of terrorism as an instrument of policy must continue in order to
bring to bear sustained diplomatic pressure upon Islamabad and Rawalpindi to take proactive measures
against terror groups operating from Pakistani soil.
Intelligence sharing is one of the most important instruments in the fight against terrorism. While a number of
bilateral memorandums of understanding have been signed in the past, this effort needs to be enlarged to
block existing loopholes and gaps being exploited by terrorist organisations.
The financing of terrorism remains the basis for groups like the LeT to function with impunity. India should work
in close cooperation with multinational groups like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Financial
Intelligence Units (FIUs) and Asia Pacific Group (APG) to fight the flow of funds to terror organisations. This
will help provide a fillip to efforts aimed at making countries compliant with the recommendations of world
bodies fighting terrorism.
India, along with like-minded countries, should introduce specific measures in the UN aimed at assessing State
support for terrorism by a UN-mandated body. The findings from this body should thereafter become the basis
for aid from World Bank and IMF.
Dealing with Pakistan

Pakistan’s growing international isolation clearly indicates the increasing pressure upon it to act against
terrorist groups which it considers as ‘strategic assets’. At the same time, Pakistan’s internal political, economic
and security situation has also become weakened. India must exploit Pakistan’s current position to coax it into
taking verifiable action against the terrorist infrastructure within its territory.
But at the same time, sustained efforts need to be made to reach out to and strengthen moderate sections
within Pakistan aimed at increasingly marginalising the radical voices within its society.
Domestic

Domestic laws need to be adjusted to ensure that the sensitivities of countries regarding human rights and
treatment of prisoners are addressed suitably. This will facilitate extradition and follow-up trial proceedings.
Some action has already been initiated through the formalisation of Do’s and Don’ts as part of AFSPA,
revocation of laws like TADA and POTA. Improvements in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act
2008, (UAPA) have also been incorporated to address some of the issues raised by human rights groups. As
an exception, India had also agreed to the conditional release of Abu Salem by Portugal on the assurance that
it will not seek the death penalty for his crimes.
Steps need to be taken to ensure that alienation within society is not allowed to fester. This can only be
achieved if there is an all party consensus to avoid fuelling divisions that provide an opportunity for neighbours
like Pakistan to exploit. Empowerment, inclusive growth and a rights based approach to democracy are some
of the pointers in this direction.
Hitherto, domestic terrorist actors have been able to successfully shield themselves from state scanners. While
there are a number of reasons for this, the two most important ones are inadequate regulation of NGOs and a
weak intelligence apparatus. Consequently, registration, audit and transparency in the functioning of NGOs
through regulatory bodies, especially those with religious affiliations, need to be institutionalised. At the same
time, the intelligence apparatus needs to be strengthened, in terms of numbers, capability and capacity of
existing networks.
Close coordination between law enforcement agencies, the intelligence apparatus and the government
bureaucracy needs to be fostered at both the central and state levels in order to sever the linkages between
crime, corruption and terrorism.
Conclusion

The arrest of Abu Jundal yet again proves to the world community that it is not merely groups like LeT that
need to be dealt with expeditiously, but also Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorist groups which it regards as
‘strategic assets’ and the terror infrastructure that has taken roots in its territory. India’s approach to dealing
with the challenge posed by terrorism has to become multi-dimensional, including diplomatic efforts to isolate
state sponsorship of terrorism, dealing with Pakistan pragmatically instead of being driven by sentiment, and
strengthened domestic structures.

The Petya Cyber-Attack

On 27 June 2017, the computer servers of many companies and organisations in Europe and the United
States of America (USA) were paralysed by a ransomware cyber-attack dubbed as “Petya”. The Danish
shipping giant A.P. Moller-Maersk, Britain’s advertising agency WPP, Ukraine’s banks, power grid and
international airport, the US pharmaceutical company Merck and co., Russia’s banks and its major oil
producing company ROSFNET were all hampered by the mass scale cyber-attack.1

All the affected computers displayed a ransom note in which the attackers demanded US$ 300 in bitcoin
currency as a ransom.2 Most of the damage caused by the Petya ransomware was on Ukrainian systems,
which led to the crippling of operations of its metros, and even the Chernobyl power plant was forced to switch
the radiation-sensing systems to manual mode.3 The attack on the systems at Maersk also affected operations
at one of the three terminals of India’s largest container port, the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, where Maersk
operates the Gateway Terminals India (GTI).4

This attack came a month after two other major ransomware attacks. One of these was the “Wannacry”
ransomware cyber-attack, which crippled more than 10,000 organisations and 200,000 individuals in over 100
countries.5 The other was the “Erebus” ransomware attack in South Korea, which forced the webhosting
organization “Nayana” to pay around $1.5 million (397.6 bitcoin) as ransom to retrieve the data of its
customers.6

Ransomware is a malware that prevents the user from accessing the system. It does so either by encrypting
the files (Crypto-ransomware) or by locking the system’s screen and thus denying access to the device itself
(Locker-ransomware). Ransomware was deployed as a tool for cyber-attack for the first time in 1989 when the
AIDS trojan was released through snail mail using 5¼” floppy disks. AIDS, also called PC Cyborg, replaced the
“AutoExec.bat” file used in Windows. Once an infected machine booted 90 times, the malware would begin
hiding directories and encrypt filenames on the “C:” drive. Once completed, the target would be asked to renew
their license by contacting a random “PC Cyborg Corporation”. Upon contacting, they would then be instructed
to send the payment to a post office box located in Panama.7 Although the clear motive for the attack has
remained vague thus far, a disk labelled “AIDSOUT” that contained the tools for system restoration was
released. 8 The type of cryptography used by the attacker was symmetric cryptography,9 hence computer
experts who analysed the malware were able to easily reverse it.

In 2005, a new ransomware called “Gpcode” was developed but its weak cryptographic algorithm meant it also
could be decrypted easily.10 From 2009 until early 2013, locker ransomware was the most commonly deployed
tool to extort money. In 2012, the Reveton ransomware or the FBI Moneypak scam was used to impersonate
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to scare victims into paying money.11 Victims were
psychologically manipulated into giving up confidential information like bank account numbers or passwords
through social engineering. But these attacks became less successful as people started becoming aware of
malwares and security solution companies started strengthening systems using tools that could shunt the
effects of locker ransomware.

This forced cyber criminals into developing more sophisticated malware, which eventually resulted in the crypto
ransomware. Unlike locker ransomware attackers, crypto ransomware attackers are generally upfront with their
demands and intentions. An extortion message stating that the data would be given back upon payment of a
ransom amount is displayed on the screen.

Of late, the target computer systems for crypto ransomware attacks have been those of Microsoft and Linux,
where a vulnerability in the software is exploited using an infection vector. In the May 2017 Wannacry
ransomware attack, the attackers used “Eternalblue”12 (a cyber weapon developed by USA’s National Security
Agency [NSA] to break into any network of computers) as the infection vector to spread the virus.13 Although
Microsoft Windows issued an emergency patch to protect devices using the Windows operating system, the
attack was halted after the accidental discovery of a kill switch in the ransomware’s code. 14

Like Microsoft Windows, Linux too has points of vulnerabilities as evident in the case of South Korean
ransomware attacks. Nayana’s Linux servers were targeted by the “Erebus ransomware”. However, unlike in
the case of Microsoft, the difficulty in finding a kill switch to neutralise Erebus and normalise the Linux servers
forced the company to pay ransom to the attackers.

Petya used the same exploits as Wannacry, but the difference between the two is that Petya does not have an
in-built kill switch. However, a “vaccine” has been found for Petya by Cyberreason’s security researcher Amit
Serper. 15 Windows users can create a read-only file called ‘perfc’ in the “Windows” folder inside “C:” drive,
which will stop Petya from even infecting the computer.

Most attacks prior to Petya were carried out by criminals for financial gain, but some characteristics of the
Petya malware have led to doubts as to whether the culprits are criminals or state actors. Firstly, despite
creating mayhem throughout the globe, the attackers who deployed Petya could amass less than $10,000 in
bitcoin (roughly 3.7 bitcoin).16 These numbers are meagre for a ransomware attack carried out on such a large
scale given that, last year alone, ransomware attackers pocketed $100 billion. Also, the email that was given to
the victims to provide proof of payment was taken down on the first day of the attack itself, which made it
impossible to transfer bitcoins or any type of cryptocurrency as ransom.17 Secondly, the Petya attacks
happened a day before Ukraine’s constitution day. According to the antivirus company Kaspersky, 60 per cent
of the impact was on Ukraine.18 This has led to Ukraine blaming the Russian security services for the attack.
Kiev has based its accusation on the fact that Russia-based hackers have been carrying out sustained attacks
on Ukraine’s infrastructure, cutting off the electricity supply to most parts of Ukraine, first in December 2015,
and again in 2016, by hacking into the country’s power gird.19 This might just be circumstantial evidence
because Russia’s largest oil conglomerate ROSNEFT was also hit by Petya. This only serves to highlight the
difficulties with attribution and thus the difficulties involved in tracing the attackers.

Whoever might have been behind the attacks, the shift in motives has become evident. Ransomware attacks
have started targeting both governmental and non-governmental critical infrastructure agencies such as banks,
airports, power grids, telecom networks, etc. This calls not just for more user awareness on the micro level but
for collective cyber security mechanisms at a global level. Ransomware has the ability to sabotage operations
at multiple targets at the same time. Therefore, state intelligence agencies and Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) related security companies around the world must come together to aid
each other in information sharing and joint analysis of threats. This would eventually strengthen coordination
and shared situational awareness, paving the way for proactive cyber security policies around the world.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of
India.

Preparing civil defence against

chemical and biological weapon
attacks: The imperative role of
media
In the new world of advanced science and technology, the nature of terrorism has assumed its worst
manifestation. The 2008 Mumbai attack proved that terrorists aim at creating havoc and panic using
unconventional means. Under such circumstances,probability of chemical or biological attack against innocent
civilians can not be ignored by defence planners.

It needs to be understood in this context that the usage of chemical or biological weapons in warfare is not
new. However, what makes its possibly an attractive weapon of mass destruction against masses are the
astounding advancements in technology that have made them more lethal, easier to produce, store and deliver
than ever before. Secondly, in the world of internet, it is easy to get or exchange technical information related
to chemical and biological weapons. Most of all, the shock such kind of attacks create is what the terrorist
organizations probably intent to. Although it is believed generally that these weapons would not be used on
ethical grounds, usage of chemical and biological weapons in recent times point towards an increasing interest
of terrorist organizations using unconventional weapons against civilians.

Soon after 9/11 attacks in the United States, Anthrax laced letters were found in the mailboxes of several
media offices and two US senators. Five Americans were killed and 17 were infected in the worst biological
attacks in U.S. history. 1 Earlier, on 20 March 1995, members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult released Sarin, a lethal
nerve agent in the Tokyo subway system. By the end of that day, 15 subway stations in the world’s busiest
subway system had been affected. The number of people infected in the attacks was nearly 3,800. This attack
was a wake-up call regarding the prospects of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Chemical weapons
were not, however, the only option explored by this cult group. AumShinrikyo also developed a laboratory for
toxin production by 1990 and was subsequently replaced with two new laboratories, one at Kamakuishki and
the other in Tokyo. The cult experimented with different biological agents like botulin toxin, anthrax, cholera,
and Q fever and also attempted several apparently unsuccessful acts of biological terrorism in Japan between
1990 and 1995.2

Recently in Syria, alleged usage of chemical agent Sarin by the Syrian government killed more than 1400
civilians including nearly 425 children. The U.S. intelligence analysts explained that the preparations continued
during 18-21 August 2013, when the projectiles were loaded into rocket launchers behind the government’s
defensive lines. And then half-dozen densely populated neighborhoods were jolted awake by a series of
explosions, followed by an oozing blanket of suffocating gas. 3 Usage of chemical weapons in Syrian conflict
indicates that these weapons can also be used by state or state sponsored groups.

All these incidents clearly point towards an increasing threat of use of chemical and biological weapons against
innocent civilians. Hence, developing a comprehensive civil defence system against chemical and biological
weapons is the need of the hour. It involves strengthening existing norms against chemical and biological
weapons, usage of latest technology, enhanced immunization, efficient public and community health facilities
from local to global level and most of all, creating general awareness about these weapons across common
man. Media plays a critical role in connecting with people to create general awarenessabout the basics of such
weapons. Also, the way it responds to such attacks contributes to a holistic civil defence against usage of
chemical and biological weapons.

How media can significantly impact the extent and outcome of a terrorist attack can be understood by the role
Indian media played during Mumbai terror attack. On November 26 2008, the financial capital of India, Mumbai
faced the most shocking terror attacks. However, the role that media played during the entire incident needs
further scrutiny. Critics describe it as ‘TV terror’ for showing gory scenes, being too aggressive, and often
reporting incorrect information as fact. “They don’t need to apologize as much as they need to introspect, figure
out how to operate in a time of crisis,” said Dipankar Gupta, sociology professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University
in New Delhi. 4

While confirming the death sentence to the only captured Pakistani terrorist Ajmal Kasab, the Supreme Court
pulled the media for its role and called for self regulation in covering such incidents. From the transcripts,
especially those from Taj Hotel and Nariman House, it was evident that the terrorists and their collaborators
across the border were watching the full show on TV. The court further went on to say that it is not possible to
find out whether the security forces actually suffered any casualty or injuries on account of the way their
operations were being displayed on the TV screen. However,it is beyond doubt that the way their operations
were freely shown made the task of the security forces not only exceedingly difficult but also dangerous and
risky. 5 In an overexcitement to show the live coverage, various reporters from electronic media not only
created a security challenge and disturbance for the security forces combating against the terrorists, but also
shared the information that was used by the terrorists. Also, the news soon took over the social media and this
all created nothing but a state of panic. The way in which the terrorist attack on Mumbai was covered, the
Indian TV channels did not serve any national interest or social cause. On the contrary they acted in their own
commercial interests putting the national security in jeopardy. 6

Contrary to the uncontrolled media that complicated the situation in case of Mumbai terror attack, in another
terror attack at Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi on 21 September, 2013, completely controlled media
complicated the situation. During the attack, except the initial stage, the media was kept out of direct visual
contact of the mall. However, this was not followed up with official updates and social media played a major
role in the dissemination of news originating from various government agencies, NGOs, journalists, citizens
and even the terrorists, both inside and outside the mall. It created unverified information from unreliable
sources which further spread through social media network. The Al-Shabaab terrorists used social media to
infuse their version of the events and to enhance the shock effect by circulation of morphed photographs of the
attack and the victims inside the mall. It also affected the credibility of the media. 7

Media has a capability of evading the situation of panic by positively informing people. However in both
situations, totally controlled and uncontrolled, media added to the state of fear and terror, which further
complicated the situation. Although both examples are related to terrorist attacks in which no chemical and
biological weapons were used, it is clear that the role of media during such incidents is crucial. It is not difficult
to imagine the media response in case India was to face a chemical or biological weapon attack.

Thus, it is very important to pay attention to media’s contribution in combating chemical and biological weapon
use. First of all, a self regulatory in media is required as wrong or uncontrolled information can not only create
a panic, it can also help the terrorists in accomplishing their goals. Second, to combat possible chemical and
biological attacks, media and government have to go hand in hand. Government can take media’s help in
running various general awareness programmes in educating people.Creating general awareness is significant
to establish a potential civil defence against chemical and biological threats. Various forms of media can be
used in sharing basic knowledge about these unconventional weapons. They can also help in establishing a
potential civil defence by educating people about how to identify an attack, understanding delivery models of
such weapons, response mechanisms and emergency contacts in case of an attack. Media’s role in creating
civic awareness and eduction is critical to minimize loss of human life. Creating a comprehensive civil defence
against chemical and biological threats is one of the most significant challenges and media can play an
important role in this respect.
Mumbai Bombing: Men Behind the
Massacre
The July 11 bombing in Mumbai, which left 200 dead and 700 injured, is the deadliest terrorist attack in India
this year. It was a systematic and well planned attack engineered between 6.24 pm and 6.35 pm on the
Western Railway line during peak-hour when office-goers were returning home.

The last few months had shown enough signs that Maharashtra was likely to experience a terrorist attack.
Terrorist plans to target the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) Headquarters on June 1 in Nagpur and the
biggest ever seizure of explosives and arms (30 kg of RDX, 10 AK-47 rifles, 2,000 bullets and 40 magazines)
from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives in Aurangabad on May 9 gave adequate warnings that something big
might happen. In addition, cases of arms and RDX (two boxes containing RDX and an AK-47 rifle) were seized
from Ankai fort of Manmad area of Nashik district on May 13. And subsequently, on May 14, the Anti-Terrorist
Squad (ATS) seized five boxes containing 13 kgs of RDX, five AK-47 rifles, 1,000 live cartridges, 20 magazines
and 50 hand grenades from an electronic shop at Azad Nagar in Malegaon. It is believed that these weapons
and explosives were meant for distribution in Mumbai and other parts of Maharashtra to be used in carrying out
various acts of terrorism.

Mumbai has so far witnessed several terrorist attacks since 1993. A series of bomb blasts ripped through 13
different places in the city on March 12, 1993, killing 257 people and injuring 713. These were the first blasts in
which RDX was used and the explosions are understood to have been carried out by Dawood Ibrahim. After
nearly a decade, on December 2, 2002, two persons were killed and 31 injured when a powerful bomb
exploded in a municipal bus outside Ghatkopar suburban railway station. A few days later, 25 people were
injured when a bomb, planted in an air-conditioning duct, exploded in a food plaza at Bombay Central railway
station. In 2003, terrorists triggered three bomb blasts in Mumbai. The first was at a shopping complex outside
Vile Parle railway station on January 27, 2003, in which 33 people were injured when a crude bomb planted in
a bicycle exploded. The second attack occurred on March 13, in which 11 people were killed and 65 injured, in
a 'ladies special' train when it was entering Mulund railway station during peak hours. The third was on August
25, when two successive blasts occurred at the Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazaar, killing 46 people and
injuring more than 160. RDX was planted in taxis parked at both these places.

The security and intelligence community are still clueless and have failed to identify the miscreants responsible
for last Tuesday's terror. Three days after the attacks, the media reported that a man claiming to represent Al
Qaeda, and identifying himself as Abu al-Hadeed, stated that "whoever has carried out the attacks in Bombay,
we express our gratitude and happiness". But it is not as yet clear whether Al Qaeda was indeed responsible
for the attack. The next day saw another claim being made via email by a new group with links to the LeT
called Lashkar-e-Qahar, which claimed that the attack was in retaliation to the situation in Kashmir and the
Gujarat communal riots of 2002.

The Maharashtra state police, Railway Police and Mumbai's Anti-Terrorist Squad are handling the
investigations. So far no authentic group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, but suspicions and
speculation have centred on the LeT and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). SIMI, a banned
organisation since 2001, has a strong network across India and is a principal ally of almost all major Islamist
terrorist groups. In fact, it played a key role in several major terror strikes like the July 28, 2005 bombing of the
Shramjeevi Express at Jaunpur, and the Varanasi serial bombings of March 7, 2006. In addition, several of the
11 LeT operatives arrested from the Aurangabad area in May 2006, while attempting to move a shipment of
explosives, assault rifles, and grenades into Gujarat, had worked for SIMI before it was proscribed.

LeT, an Islamist militant group, formed in 1990 in Afghanistan, and banned by India, Pakistan and the United
States, is one of the most active groups waging jihad against India. It has denied involvement in the latest
Mumbai attacks and its spokesman Abdullah Ghaznavi has condemned it as an inhumane and barbaric act.
Ghaznavi also said that Islam does not permit the killing of innocent persons and that his outfit does not
believe in killing innocent civilians. He further added that blaming the LeT for such an inhumane act is an
attempt by the Indian security agencies to defame the freedom struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. However, the
fact remains that the outfit has in the past justified many of its violent terrorist attacks as part of its political
struggle.

Whether it is the LeT or some other group that has carried out the latest Mumbai massacre, the fact remains
that a new trend in terrorist activities in India has emerged. This pertains to groups either denying their
involvement or alternately creating fake outfits to hide their real identity. For example, the very next day after
the October 29, 2005 terrorist attacks in Delhi, a hitherto unknown outfit, Inquilabi (Revolutionary) Group,
claimed responsibility and said that more such attacks would occur in future unless India stopped its
"oppressive and hideous measures" in J&K. But when Delhi Police arrested the actual attackers, it turned out
that they were LeT members. This pattern was repeated again in early January 2006, when the
Jaish-e-Mohammad attempted to throw sleuths off its trail by arranging for a fictitious group,
Lashkar-e-Qaharby, to claim responsibility for the January 7 terrorist attack in Varanasi. Delhi Police and
intelligence agencies subsequently disproved this claim by tracing calls made by Jaish members.

Another pattern that is becoming evident now is the help being offered by locals to terrorists operating in
metropolises. Last Tuesday's bombings in Mumbai might also involve Maharashtra-based SIMI activists. Indian
intelligence agencies believe that the LeT has drawn many of its operatives from the large pool of SIMI
activists who were radicalised by anti-Muslim riots in Bombay in the 1990s and in Gujarat in 2002. For
instance, two months after the Delhi serial blasts on October 29, 2005, Delhi police arrested two terrorists
named Saidul and Sohed in the capital who were in regular touch with Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI). They were being sheltered by a Bangladeshi national, Mohammad Saidul, who is a scrap dealer based
near Ghaddewali masjid in Usmanpur. Similarly, after the Jama Masjid blasts on July 14, 2006, Delhi Police
Commissioner said that there was 'strong local support' in the Walled City for the suspects.

Most of the attacks in Indian metropolises, like the terrorist attack on the IISc campus in Bangalore on
December 28, 2005, have been carried out by the LeT. Recently, on February 1, 2006, a LeT module was
busted in Kolkata. It was planning a possible strike in the city. An analysis of the available facts leads one to
the conclusion that the LeT has a wide network in Indian metropolises and big cities, including in Maharashtra.
And it is highly likely that one of its terror modules perpetrated the Mumbai massacre on July 11.
Uri, Surgical Strikes and
International Reactions
On September 18, 2016, four terrorists belonging to the Pakistani jihadi group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
struck at an Indian Army camp in Uri. The camp housed more than the usual number of troops, given the
changeover between two infantry battalions. This had resulted in the creation of additional temporary
accommodation in the form of tents. Unlike in the past, this was seen as an obvious vulnerability by the
Pakistani terrorist handlers who decided to exploit this fleeting opportunity.

It can be argued that the terrorists were lucky and came across troops housed in tents when they struck the
camp at Uri. This is, however, unlikely for three main reasons. First, terrorists are not known to carry incendiary
ammunition as part of their regular arsenal, as is evident from terror strikes in the past. Further, the use of such
specialised incendiary ammunition requires terrorists to carry under barrel grenade launchers. In the Uri attack,
these launchers were carried by each of the four terrorists, which further reinforces the fact that it was indeed a
carefully orchestrated attack. Second, terrorist groups do not have the intelligence and logistics wherewithal to
detect, monitor and plan such a carefully calibrated strike, with a definitive focus on exploiting a fleeting
opportunity. The terrorists who struck at the Uri camp did just that. Third, beyond the specific details related to
the incident, it has been established over a period of time that the JeM has been funded, guided, trained and
controlled by the Pakistan Army. Therefore, the circumstantial evidence presented by the attack only reinforces
this premise.

Backdrop to the Surgical Strikes

The resultant impact of the Uri incident, which led to the death of 19 army soldiers, was not the only
provocation that hardened the government’s resolve to move beyond standard reactions. The Army’s action
against terrorist launch pads was also linked to the cumulative build-up of terrorist attacks that had been
emanating from across the Line of Control (LoC). This was reinforced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who
indicated that those responsible for the Uri attack would not go unpunished. Therefore, a robust and
determined response was expected sooner rather than later. It was a matter of time before a strong message
was delivered, through surgical, yet demonstrative, means.

The military options available for counter terror strikes has been analysed threadbare over the years. When
viewed along the escalatory ladder, these included shallow strikes across the LoC against terrorist launch
pads, precision long range missile strikes against terror camps, deep Special Forces strikes against terrorist
camps, surgical strikes to eliminate terrorist leaders, and neutralisation of Pakistan Army positions along the
LoC directly involved in the launch of terrorists into India. The innovation in executing the counter punch was,
therefore, more likely to come in terms of the time and place of its delivery.

India’s reaction to the Uri terrorist attack is a distinct departure from the strategic and tactical approaches it had
adopted in the past. The government decided to undertake a shallow surgical strike along the LoC. This clearly
implied that the Army intended to target terrorist launch pads, which are typically located between 500 metres
and a couple of kilometres along the LoC inside Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). The decision reinforced the
government’s restraint and mature response, which had characterised past Indian responses as well. Second,
by limiting the strike to terrorist launch pads, India maintained the requisite balance between resolve to punish
the perpetrators of terrorism and keeping a low military threshold as would be expected from a reasonable
state. Third, on completion of the strike, the Director General Military Operations of the Indian Army informed
his counterpart in Pakistan of the same and simultaneously indicated termination of the mission, thereby,
ensuring that no ambiguity existed regarding the scope and scale of the operation. Fourth, a large number of
friendly foreign countries as well as the media were informed about the operation. This saw the government
and the army take ownership of the operation and its intended consequences. Fifth, the government called for
cooperation from the Pakistan to fulfil its international obligations to fight terrorism, as has been promised by
Islamabad on more than one occasion.

The Special Forces Operation

These decisions formed the strategic backdrop to the tactical strike that was undertaken by the Army. On
receipt of a go ahead from the highest level within the government, a large number of central resources were
made available to the Army and were seamlessly integrated to achieve cohesion in orchestration. From
receiving satellite imagery to corroboration of inputs through human intelligence and a drone feed of events,
the sequence of events followed clockwork precision in execution. Despite such support, the operation was a
challenge given the decision to strike simultaneously at multiple targets spread across different divisional and
corps boundaries. This implied that the loss of surprise or a premature launch at one location could well have
led to serious life threatening consequences at the others. However, the plan went ahead as envisaged and
unfolded over the early hours of darkness of September 28, 2016.

The Special Forces contingent involved in the operation was sub-divided into smaller sub-groups and brought
to the vicinity of the LoC where the holding units of the Indian Army are positioned. They were launched after
last light through gaps in own minefields, which dot the area ahead of Indian defences. Having crossed the
minefields, which remain a constant threat to life given their being washed laterally due to heavy rains and
slides over a period of time, the sub-groups continued to close in on the targets along the LoC. The target
areas were being monitored for any dramatic build up in contrast to intelligence that had earlier been fed. At
the designated hour, the strikes were launched on the unsuspecting terrorists who were preparing to infiltrate
across the LoC for the next strike, supported by fire to pin them down. The strike succeeded completely in
eliminating the terrorists, achieving the intended impact within a short timeframe as planned. Having
succeeded in their mission, the sub-groups extricated as swiftly as they had closed in with the target area and
returned to their base locations just before day break.

The operation left in its wake a trail of terrorists and their support elements who had clinically been eliminated.
This was announced the same day during a joint press conference of the spokespersons of the Ministry of
External Affairs and the Indian Army. The element of surprise that the operation witnessed was also seen in the
follow up sequence of events. The strategic plan executed through a tactical strike achieved many firsts and
substantial gains that need to be reinforced.

Impact and Implications of the Surgical Strikes

This was the first operation conducted by the Army across a wide frontage of well over 100 kilometres at
multiple terrorist targets along the LoC. Second, by taking ownership of the strike, India snatched the initiative
from Pakistan, which had continued its provocations through terrorist attacks at regular intervals. Third, the
Army raised the cost of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy by a couple of notches. Fourth, the
Pakistani narrative about the absence of India-targeting terrorists on its soil stood exposed for the world to see.
Fifth, the strikes proved to be an important element for maintaining the morale of the people of India and the
armed forces. Sixth, the strike reinforced the credibility of the government and displayed its resolve, even as
justified restraint and maturity was on display. Finally, India called into question the Pakistani belief that it would
not react to terrorist provocations because of the fear of escalation. Along with this, the army also crossed the
laxman rekha that had for long constrained its ability to hit terrorists in their own backyard.

Pakistan’s Response to the Surgical Strikes

Following the surgical strikes carried out by the Indian Army across the Line of Control (LoC) on the night of
28/29 September 2016, the Pakistan establishment was in denial mode once again. It has accused India of
“fabrication of truth” and explained the death of two soldiers and injury to nine others as resulting from
cross-border firing between troops deployed on either side of the LoC. However, in a move unusual for
cross-border firing, which is fairly routine, the Indian High Commissioner was summoned to the Pakistan
Foreign Office and issued a demarche. In the initial statement carried by The Nation on behalf of Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif, it was stated that the PM “condemned the military action undertaken by the Indian Army
along the Line of Control.” However, the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) categorically stated that no
surgical strikes were carried out across the LoC.

When looking at the clear articulation of the event by the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) of the
Indian Army, the political leadership, and briefing of envoys of 25 countries by Foreign Secretary in New Delhi
on 29 September, it becomes clear that an operation was indeed carried out. Subsequent press reports also
suggested that two members of the strike force from the Special Forces units of the Indian Army have also
received injuries during the operation. The question that arises is the reason for Pakistan’s denial of the
operation ever having taken place. The benign explanation is that Pakistan does not wish to escalate tensions
at this particular moment when regional and global opinion is against the promotion of terrorism by states
anywhere in the world. The other explanations could be:

Pakistan wants to deny the existence of terrorist launch pads in the territory presently under its control and
wants to avoid accountability on this account.
Pakistan wants to avoid a linkage between India’s targeting of terrorists and the casualties its troops suffered in
the vicinity of the terrorist launch pads.
The Pakistan Army does not want to be seen in a poor light vis-à-vis India, particularly after its loss of face in
not being able to detect the US strike at Abbottabad (Operation Neptune Spear) in which Osama bin Laden
was killed.
Denial also becomes necessary to prevent questions about the Pakistan Army’s level of alertness and
preparedness and consequently greater public pressure to undertake retaliatory action at the earliest even if
that turns out to be a misadventure.
World opinion has definitely turned against Pakistan and there is more than enough evidence to link the
Pakistan Army with terrorist groups. The Pakistan Army, therefore, has a difficult choice of either denying the
presence of terrorist launch pads in the portion of Jammu and Kashmir under its occupation close to the LoC or
having to undertake a retaliatory action for which it may not be prepared presently.

All told the Pakistan government and Army obviously know the facts. Therefore, two main reasons to downplay
the operations are: (a) avoid admitting association with terrorists, and (b) avoid public pressure to retaliate.
But soon enough the Pakistan public would know the facts when jihadi tanzeems start holding functions to
honour the jihadis who have been killed in the Indian surgical strike. It is then that Pakistani public will hold the
Army responsible for such incidents.

International Responses to Uri and India’s Surgical Strikes

India’s diplomatic offensive launched post the Uri-attacks provided the broader context in which its decision to
carry out the surgical strike needs to be seen. The thrust to ‘name and shame’ Pakistan as a sponsor of
terrorism emanating from its soil was carried out systematically, at the national, regional and global level across
all fora. Indian diplomatic representations in the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly in
response to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue called out
Pakistan on its “long-standing policy of sponsoring terrorism, the consequences of which have spread well
beyond our region.”1 In a statement intended to provoke, the Indian response also stated that “The land of
Taxila, one of the greatest learning centres of ancient times is now host to the Ivy League of terrorism. It
attracts aspirants and apprentices from all over the world.”2 This was followed up by External Affairs Minister
Sushma Swaraj who, in an evocative speech at the UN General Assembly, called for the isolation of Pakistan
and added that “in our midst, there are nations that still speak the language of terrorism, that nurture it, peddle
it, and export it. To shelter terrorists has become their calling card. We must identify these nations and hold
them to account. These nations, in which UN declared terrorists roam freely, lead processions and deliver their
poisonous sermons of hate with impunity, are as culpable as the very terrorists they harbour. Such countries
should have no place in the comity of nations.”3

India was then quick to rally international support from the US, UK, and France, which condemned the Uri
attack, and also highlighted Pakistan’s atrocities in Balochistan, which led the European Union to respond with
a threat of punitive economic sanctions if Islamabad did not come clean on human rights violations.4 In
conversations with her Indian counterpart Ajit Doval after the ‘cross-border attacks’, US National Security
Advisor Susan Rice reportedly said that, “the US expects that Pakistan take effective action to combat and
delegitimise United Nations-designated terrorist individuals and entities, including Lashkar-e-Taiba,
Jaish-e-Muhammad, and their affiliates”.5 Media reports suggested that the US and UK even tried to prod
Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif to condemn the Uri attack during his meeting with US Secretary of State John
Kerry and British Prime Minister Theresa May at the side-lines of the UN General Assembly. 6

Countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea also issued statements condemning the incident and
expressed support for India’s stand on countering terrorism globally.7 Japan, in a statement condoning the
incident, said: “The government of Japan strongly condemns the terrorist attack on the Indian base in Uri,
Jammu and Kashmir, and extends its sincere condolences…Japan condemns terrorism in all forms regardless
of its purposes and strongly reiterates that no act of terrorism can be justified.”8 Germany also stands “firmly
on the side of India in the fight against terrorism,” according to an official statement. 9

Key West Asian countries and members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also issued
statements condemning the Uri terrorist attack. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain and Qatar all issued statements on the attack. Post Uri, the Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry stated:
“The foreign ministry expressed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's strong condemnation and denunciation of the
terrorist attack that targeted an Indian military base in the Uri area of north Kashmir, killing and wounding
dozens.” 10 The UAE’s “Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation renewed the country’s firm
stand against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and expressed… solidarity with the Republic of India
and support to all actions it may take to confront and eradicate terrorism.” 11 News media also reported that
the “UAE and Bahrain have, in their statements, even supported any action by India to confront, eradicate and
fight terrorism — at a time when Delhi is discussing a range of military, diplomatic, political and economic
options to retaliate against Pakistan.” 12 Statements from these OIC members are significant since they have
traditionally supported Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir and the OIC itself was doing so with respect to the recent
unrest in the Valley. The “OIC Secretary General Iyad Ameen Madani [had] expressed concern over the
situation in Kashmir and called for an immediate cessation of atrocities by India, urging the Indian government
for peaceful settlement of the dispute ‘in accordance with wishes of Kashmiri people and the UNSC
resolutions’.” 13

In the immediate aftermath of the surgical strike, the US reiterated its support for India’s fight in combating
terrorism and sought to clarify the need for de-escalation of hostilities by both sides. 14 Meanwhile, media
reports suggested that China’s reaction to the strikes came two days after Pakistan dispatched two special
envoys on Kashmir to Beijing to drum up support for its position. “As shared neighbour and friend to both India
and Pakistan, we are concerned about continuous confrontation and tensions between India and Pakistan,”
foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang was quoted as saying. He added, “we call on all relevant parties
to exercise restraint and refrain from actions that would escalate tension.” 15 However, on the side-lines, the
news of China blocking a tributary of the Brahmaputra river in Tibet at a time when India's reported decision to
suspend talks with Pakistan under the Indus Water Treaty in response to the Uri attacks did not go
unnoticed.16 Co-incidentally, China also continued with its decision to extend its technical "hold" on a UN
resolution to ban the Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Masood Azhar. The resolution to ban him was co-sponsored
by the US, UK, France and India, with 14 other countries acquiescing. China was the only one to block it with a
technical hold.17

Russia came out strongly in support of Indian action saying Moscow stood for “decisive struggle against
terrorism in all its manifestations.” The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson added, in a statement, that “we
expect that the Government of Pakistan should take effective steps in order to stop the activities of terrorist
groups in the territory of the country.”18 In another explicit statement of support, given to a news network, the
Russian Ambassador in New Delhi, Alexander Kadakin, said, “the greatest human rights violations take place
when terrorists attack military installations and attack peaceful civilians in India. We welcome the surgical
strike. Every country has right to defend itself.”19,” Russian Ambassador Alexander M Kadakin’s interview to
CNN-News18, 03 October 2016, accessed on October 4, 2016.

Within South Asia, India found support from all its other neighbours. After its decision to boycott the SAARC
summit which was due to be held in Pakistan in November, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Maldives and Sri Lanka all
pulled out citing “concerns on terrorism” and the lack of a “conducive atmosphere” for the forum.20 In fact,
Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government came out in explicit support of India’s operations
saying in a statement that “India has got all legal, internationally accepted right to make a response to any
attack on her sovereignty and her soil.”21 The Afghan Ambassador to India, Shaida Mohammed Abdali,
supported India’s response, saying that “it is time to take bold action.”22 While official statements from the
Maldives government condemned international terrorism in generic terms, the Maldivian Democratic Party
(MDP) led by former President Mohamed Nasheed lauded India’s mature response and demanded that
“Pakistan (must) combat and delegitimise terror groups in the region.” 23

Keeping up the momentum on the diplomatic offensive, India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Syed
Akbaruddin, said that while Pakistan had reached out to the UN Chief and the 15-nation Council over the
issues of the surgical strike and Kashmir, its call for intervention by the world body has not found any
resonance as there was no further discussion on the matter. 24 India had seized the initiative first, by briefing
top envoys of 25 countries including the US, China, Russia, the UK and France on the ‘context of the strike’
after the Indian Army had concluded its operations.25

Successful Strategic Communication and Unity of Response

The operation stood out particularly for the clarity with which information about the surgical strike was
presented in the public domain. The narrative was precise, had clarity of purpose, and showed the unity of
response in the military, political and diplomatic wings of the government. The messaging was clear: this was a
limited strike to pre-empt terrorists from entering India, the target were terrorists and not the Pakistan Army,
India had acted within its rights and the Indian Army was in constant touch with its Pakistani counterpart to
ensure that there was no ratcheting up of tensions. The combined press briefing conducted by the Director
General of Military Operations and the Spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs left no ambiguity about
the limited scope of the operation and its demonstrative nature, and built upon the official narrative that had
shored in international diplomatic capital post the Uri attacks. The Indian establishment had clearly taken
lessons post the Myanmar operation and projected a unity of response across the various wings of the
government.

The ‘Cold Start and Stop’ strategy

Gurmeet Kanwal has it that the Cold Start doctrine is a ‘good’ doctrine for India since ‘it is perceived to be
destabilising by Pakistanis.’1 As a strategy for a proactive offensive, it evidently has merits that have been
registered by Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan has taken preparatory steps to counter the strategy and
practiced them in its recent Exercise Azm-e-Nau. That it commands a constituency in India is also evident from
India’s acquisition plans and impetus to jointness, with the release this summer of a land-air joint doctrine.

Yet there are sceptics of the utility of the doctrine. This owes to a problem alluded to by Kanwal: ‘that (the
doctrine) could adversely impact strategic stability since Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is premised on countering
India’s conventional military superiority with a nuclear shield.’ This suggests that the strategy would require to
be sold to political masters wary of the nuclear dimension. This would be possible along the lines of limitation
that Kanwal mentions:

‘The doctrine has been carefully designed to avoid crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines through large-scale
offensive operations with Strike Corps deep into Pakistan. By limiting the application of force to divisional-sized
thrusts across the international boundary, it carefully avoids risking escalation of any future conflict to the
nuclear level.’
The political head would have two options, the third of ‘large scale operations’ having been ruled out. The two
options are of restricting the offensive to the division sized Integrated Battle Groups; and, second, to follow this
up with those of ‘one or two strike corps’, albeit up to limited depth. The first option can be termed, ‘Cold Start
and Stop’, and the second, ‘Cold Start and Continue’. Reflecting on the pros and cons of these is therefore
warranted.

The Cold Start and Stop idea is for the offensives to be restricted to those of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs).
This has the clear merit of being well below possible nuclear redlines. It serves the purpose of demonstrating
resolve to Pakistan. The headway made by the IBGs along a wide front would enable threatening the launch of
strike corps, by then having formed up in the wake. This way military pressure – with strike corps actually
poised for launch - can be orchestrated along with other instruments of national power on the Pakistani
decision makers. The conflict would be cheaper, of shorter duration and easier to terminate. The area of
operations being shallow would not involve a robust asymmetric counter by Pakistan.

The underside of the idea is that the Pakistanis would be able to face off with the IBGs using only their
defensive forces. Their strategic reserves would not require to be committed. This way they would be able to
preserve the strategic reserves from attrition by land based firepower and air action. Thus, with its ‘centre of
gravity’ in the form of the strategic reserves intact, Pakistan would not require to concede anything, making war
termination at this stage difficult. This may then entail launch of strike corps, morphing the option from ‘Cold
Start and Stop’ to the next higher one of ‘Cold Start and Continue’.

The second option has the advantage of prising out the strategic reserves by ensuring their reaction to the
threat posed by the strike corps. The movement would expose them to attrition by the Air Force in particular
enabling their degradation in the time available. The political dividend of such punishment is in the resulting
loss of prestige for the Pakistan Army. This is expected to displace them from the centre stage of the Pakistani
system, enabling a change of strategic posture in Pakistan. The flip side is, however, that it would involve
launch of strike corps, even if to a limited depth. This takes the conflict deeper into the nuclear shadow. It
would also face a firmer asymmetric counter.

The political decision maker would require convincing on the merits of the second option in face of escalatory
possibilities on both the subconventional and nuclear levels. The first option also has limitations in the form of
not delivering a suitably chastened Pakistan to the negotiation table and the possibility, as seen, of it expanding
into the second option. There is therefore a need to tweak the ‘Cold Start and Stop’ strategy for greater
acceptability.

The end game of the Cold Start and Stop strategy can be visualised along two directions. The first is to stay on
till a negotiated end is reached, using the captured territory as a bargaining chip. This may not be possible
since captured territory does not make sense in today’s world order. Pakistan may simply ‘wait out’ India.

The second is to inflict the punishment possible in the short time and de-escalate with a unilateral ceasefire
and early de-induction. This suggests itself as viable in light of the precedence in the Israeli withdrawal after its
two recent operations. The difference with the Israeli model is that expectations of a greater political dividend
from the higher order resort to force would need to be met.
The questions are: What political objective would be achieved? How? Answering these is necessary to making
Cold Start strategy saleable.

The strategy helps sensitise Pakistan to India’s tolerance threshold and reinforces deterrence by bringing
home unambiguously to Pakistan that things could get out of hand. This would bring about self-restraint in
Pakistan’s employment of proxy war. However, reinforcing deterrence is also possible to undertake by lower
order resort to military force without the risks, such as surgical strikes and, at the next level, border skirmishes
and activation of LoC etc. Therefore, a wider purpose needs to be served by going to war in this manner, even
if it is in the most limited manner of Limited War.

India would be justified in looking beyond war termination to the ensuing peace deal, making for a better
peace. Punishing Pakistan only helps end its impunity. In case a long term aim of getting it to change its
strategic posture remains unmet, then repetition may have to be done periodically. This has been starkly put as
‘mowing the lawn’. This means continuing ‘ugly instability’, beyond the current ‘ugly stability’.

Militarily all that can be done is to bring Pakistan to the table. India requires clinching the effort made
diplomatically through a ‘carrot’ to supplement the military ‘stick’. Getting Pakistan to end proxy war counter
intuitively requires ‘sweetening’ of the punishment. A consensus on the exit policy needs arriving at: on how far
India can go and what Pakistan might find acceptable.

This recommendation is in keeping with an insight of the late General Sundarji, that war between nuclear
powers requires having an exit policy permissive of a ‘face saving’ exit for the other side and an ‘honourable’
end to the war.2 A Cold Start and Stop strategy, informed by politico-diplomatic exit policy, may prove a
saleable option.

Is Kerala Emerging as India's New

Terror Hub?
Not many in the security establishment would like to believe so. A state known for its religious diversity and
secular fibre, Kerala also has a sensitive communal melange with conflicting interests holding stake over its
political and social institutions. To an average security analyst in Delhi, the ominous trends of subversive
activities in this farthest nook would not be as apparent as similar events in Aurangabad or Meerut. In the past
half-a-decade, central intelligence agencies and the Kerala police have been on their feet to check the growing
influx of pan-Indian and South Asian terror groups across the state. A chain of sporadic events in the past
decade and more has disturbed many secular structures and the law and order situation in Kerala, with serious
ramifications for national security. While many such events were directly or indirectly connected with national
and global terror trends, Kerala's vast coastline and its proximity to international waters have made it a suitable
landing point for extremist elements, after the intensified vigil across the Western coast from Goa to Gujarat.
This has forced the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy to step up patrol in this region, especially off the Malabar
Coast, where groups involved in smuggling and other nefarious operations are traditionally based. Like similar
points off the Western coast, the Malabar coastal belt is reportedly used as a corridor for transiting resources
and equipment for extremist groups operating in Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

While the western coastline has always been an active subversive corridor, the recent shift of such traffic
through the Kerala coast has vitiated the communal atmosphere in the state, especially after the recent terror
attacks in Mumbai and elsewhere. Though Kerala itself has not witnessed any major terror attacks, there are
indications that many Pakistan-based terror groups have active modules or linkages with some fundamentalist
groups in the state. Inspired by pan-Islamic reactionary movements across the country after the 1992 events,
fundamentalist elements in this region have gained a firm footing with more groups emerging in different roles
in the past few years. After earlier groups like the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Islamic
Sevak Sangh (ISS) were banned in the 1990s, they re-emerged in new incarnations and have reportedly
established linkages with other pan-Indian extremist groups. With the focus shifting back to SIMI after its
alleged role in the recent Mumbai blasts, the Kerala Police have in the past few weeks rounded up suspected
SIMI activists, especially from Binanipuram in Malabar, and impounded inflammatory literature, including
seditious graffiti, showing linkages with Pakistan-based terrorist groups. Besides, fervent investigations are on
to trace the possible linkages of many other organizations in Malappuram and Kozhikode with pan-Islamic
extremist elements.

The emergence of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Malabar acquired a serious dimension from the mid-1990s
after a series of insidious events. The abduction and murder of reformist scholar Maulavi Abul Hassan
Chekannur in July 1993 was the first indication of the strong fundamentalist trend gaining ground in this region.
Even after years of investigations involving even the Central Bureau of Investigation, the actual culprits could
not be nabbed, causing a severe setback to the reformist movement. The seizure of pipe bombs (nitroglycerine
charges in iron tubes) concealed in plastic bags under the Kadalundi Bridge in Malappuram in 1996 gave
credence to fears of terror groups gaining roots and possible infiltration by Pakistan's ISI among extremist
groups in this region. Also, two Tamil Nadu bomb blast suspects, Imam Ali and Hyder Ali, had reportedly
revealed during interrogation about their visits to Malappuram and training people in handling explosives during
this period. The recent spurt in fundamentalist violence - including intermittent small-scale explosions in
Kozhikode early this year, periodic arms seizures across the state, and the burning of Tamil Nadu transport
buses by suspected ISS/PDP activists in retribution to the incarceration of Abdul Nasser Madhani in Salem Jail
- are all ominous trends pointing to Kerala turning into an extremist flash point.

The Coimbatore bomb blasts in February 1998, allegedly stage-managed by Tamil Nadu-based Al-Umma, was
the first instance of a Kerala terror link being established after investigators arrested Abdul Nasser Madhani for
conniving with Al Umma. Madhani, incarcerated since then in Salem Jail, floated the Islamic Sevak Sangh
(ISS) in the early 1990s and quickly rose as a fire-brand leader inspiring Muslim youth to resist the Hindutva
forces. Though ISS was banned after the post-1992 upheaval, he floated a political party called the Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP), which aligned with the ruling Left Democratic Front in the recent assembly elections.
Despite its political identity and limited activism after his arrest, police and intelligence agencies suspect PDP
to be maintaining links with other pan-Islamic extremist groups. The occasional violence by PDP activists in
recent months has only compounded the vigil over their activities.

On the other hand, newly-formed groups like the National Democratic Front (NDF) have emerged as stronger
alternatives to ISS and SIMI and have allegedly masterminded communal violence in recent years. The Kerala
Police believes that this outfit, which masquerades as a human rights movement, is another re-incarnation of
the ISS. Though the NDF leadership denies any extremist links, it is reportedly operating under different names
to save itself from being banned or tracked down. Many of its activists were arrested or detained in connection
with recent country-bomb blasts, like in Meppayyur, and other acts of violence in different parts of the state.
SIMI, on the other hand, had been working in the shadows ever since the ban in the 1990s. However, a splinter
group of SIMI activists, led by C A M Basheer who hails from Ernakulam, is suspected to be involved in the
Mumbai blasts. Basheer, a trained aeronautical engineer, is known to have received training in Pakistan, and
was already booked for his alleged role in the 2003 Mumbai blasts. The investigation team is also probing the
likely role of three Keralite suspects of the Coimbatore blasts - K P Noohu, Ooma Babu and Shamsudheen.
The Mumbai Police believes that Noohu was in touch with Dr. Tanvir Ansari, who was recently arrested in
connection with the 7/7 blasts. According to reports, while Babu is lodged in Coimbatore jail, Shamsudheen
was recently arrested by Coimbatore police for conspiring to undertake explosions in the town.

Despite incriminating evidence of co-operation between Kerala based groups and major pan-Islamic terrorist
organisations, there is general lethargy in the state police machinery and intelligence agencies to crack down
on such groups owing to the political patronage they enjoy in Kerala. Many of these groups have openly allied
with major political Fronts in recent years, thus stymieing a concrete response to their anti-national activities.
Government inaction after the communal violence in Marad and Nadapuram, with culprits involved in these
incidents still roaming free, demonstrates their leverage with political dispensations in the state. Despite reports
by the Union home ministry of ISI-aided groups operating from Kerala, there is great inaction among
concerned agencies to curb this dangerous trend. In recent years, central agencies had unearthed
Kerala-based Hawala rackets facilitating the passage of funds from Middle East-based groups to the rest of the
country through expatriate networks. However, such events have failed to move either the police machinery or
the political establishment, which are seemingly wary of disturbing communal equations through proactive
action. While bomb-hauls, seditious graffiti, and the murder of moderates have become common occurrences,
the day may not be far when such sporadic eruptions coalesce into a major terrorist event.

Beyond Cartographic Assertion: A

Roadmap on Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir
Most of India’s geopolitical vexations stem from a contested northern periphery, entailing disputes born either
in the aftermath of independence or inherited from British rule. Principal among these is the region of Pakistan
occupied Kashmir (PoK), part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Soon after
independence, a huge portion of J&K’s territory was bifurcated from the rest of the princely state as a result of
the Pakistan-aided assault conducted in these regions during 1947-48. Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)
refers to those parts of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) that continue to be under
Pakistan’s control. It comprises the so-called ‘Azad’ Jammu and Kashmir (‘AJK’), and Gilgit Baltistan, which
latter was referred to as the Northern Areas by the government of Pakistan until 2009. India stakes a claim on
these territories by virtue of the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh on 26 October 1947.

In consonance with India’s official position on J&K, the Survey of India map, considered the official and by far
the most authentic source of determining India’s geographical extent, shows PoK (as it existed during British
rule) as part of the Indian state of J&K and thus as an integral part of India. Apart from PoK, the Survey of India
map also shows as Indian territory the Trans-Karakoram Tract (previously part of PoK) and Aksai Chin, both of
which are currently under China’s control.

The Geospatial Information Regulation Bill 2016

In May 2016, the Government of India unveiled the ‘The Geospatial Information Regulation Bill 2016’ in order
to “regulate the acquisition, dissemination, publication and distribution of geospatial information of India which
is likely to affect the security, sovereignty and integrity of India.”1 According to the bill: “Whoever disseminates,
publishes or distributes any geospatial information of India in contravention of section 4, shall be punished with
a fine ranging from Rs. 10 lakhs to Rs. 100 crore and/or imprisonment for a period up to seven years.”2
Further, for such dissemination or publication or distribution of geospatial information of India outside India
were to occur, a hefty fine “ranging from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 100 crore and/or imprisonment for a period up to
seven years” is proposed.3 Once enacted as law, the proposed bill will make it mandatory to obtain permission
from a government authority before acquiring, disseminating, publishing or distributing any geospatial
information of India including the cartographic depiction of J&K.

The proposed legislation caused considerable domestic opposition, which threw into question its feasibility and
future prospects. Even as the domestic debate was shaping up, India-Pakistan bilateral atmospherics were
fuelled by this new “stress-point”.4 Pakistan raised the ante against the proposed Indian legislation by invoking
the issue at the United Nations. It alleged that “the official map of India has been depicting the disputed territory
of Jammu and Kashmir as part of India which is factually incorrect and legally untenable.”5 Terming the
legislation as a violation of international law, Pakistan’s note to the UN General Secretary urged the holding of
a plebiscite to determine the future of J&K. India’s response was one of downright rejection and questioning of
Pakistan’s locus standi for challenging a domestic legislation within India.

Interestingly, about two years ago in May 2014, Pakistan’s National Assembly had passed a similar bill “The
Surveying and Mapping Act”, to regulate geospatial data and designated the Survey of Pakistan as the nodal
agency in this regard. The Survey of Pakistan map shows J&K (within India) as part of Pakistan, captioned
“disputed” however. But it does not include the Aksai Chin area.6 India is not known to have objected to either
Pakistan’s geospatial legislation or its official map.7 In February 2015, exercising the powers conferred by the
above act, Pakistan’s federal government came out with Surveying and Mapping Rules 2015, which was
published in the Gazette of Pakistan in March 2015.

In the light of the Indian geospatial legislation, the amount of political capital attached to it domestically and,
more significantly, Pakistan’s objections to it, this policy brief avers that India needs to extend the ambit of its
official claim on PoK beyond mere cartographic assertion. In the emerging geopolitical environment, the
cartographic inclusion of areas that legitimately form part of India, i.e., the entire erstwhile princely state of
J&K, needs to be taken up in a forthright manner as a policy measure to seriously establish India’s claims on
PoK. Calculated pro-activism on PoK could bolster India’s position on Kashmir both in formal negotiations as
well as backchannels talks.

Interpolating PoK is essential

Key developments in India’s close proximity augur compounding geopolitical challenges. The strategic bonding
between Beijing and Islamabad is expanding into the economic realm through the extensive connectivity
corridor to be built across PoK, which throws into starker relief China’s growing commitment to and presence in
Pakistan. Concurrently, the recent spurt in violence in J&K has amplified the gravity of the situation. It is well
known that the problem of J&K has reached this level because of unstinted and unabated Pakistani support to
the separatist constituency over the years. Pakistan’s support has catalysed the situation and kept the issue on
the boil. The internal politics within J&K has not been too encouraging all these years to ward off such
persisting Pakistani machinations. This does not bode well for both India and the Kashmiris. India has dealt
with Pakistan’s obsession with Kashmir for decades. However, despite Pakistan’s weak claims on Kashmir, it
has managed to whip up popular sentiment against the Indian state, on the one hand, and the popular political
leadership in Kashmir, on the other. The energy and verve with which Pakistan has successfully sustained its
propaganda on Kashmir for decades has been complemented by lack of foresight and adaptation to changing
circumstances on the part of policy makers in India.

While India continues to weather Pakistan’s asymmetric assaults rather tamely, it needs to be bold and
innovative in its approach, and reassert its genuine claim on PoK rather than adopt a defensive stand.
Claiming PoK can potentially be an antidote to Pakistan’s unfounded but aggressive claim on Kashmir.
Additionally, rebooting the claim on PoK can reinforce India’s position against the China-Pakistan strategic and
economic partnership (involving PoK) in the near and long terms. A rethink involving the raising of the PoK
issue can be effective when India sets out recalibrating its political and strategic measures to safeguard its core
geopolitical interests vis a vis Pakistan and China.

The Roadmap
Ever since the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir State signed the Instrument of Accession, India’s position on
J&K, and on PoK in particular, has remained largely unaltered. The Indian position on PoK has been
articulated intermittently, but in a rather mild way. India’s claims on PoK have not been as strident as it ought to
have been. True, the Parliamentary Resolution of 1994 was an emphatic re-statement of India’s position on
PoK, urging Pakistan to vacate areas under its illegal control. But such assertions have not been backed by
astute and assertive repositioning at the diplomatic and policy-making levels, leading to the general impression
that India is resigned to the idea of losing the territory to Pakistan and settling for the Line of Control as the
border.

Re-calibrating the Indian approach towards PoK will require shedding policy hesitation on PoK, minimizing
contradictions and addressing gaps in policy pronouncements. This may require an overhaul involving a
multi-stage strategy to shift the discourse on PoK from the cartographic domain to the policy domain. To begin
with, the following measures could be considered for implementation in the domestic, external and ancillary
levels.

Domestic Level
A purposeful strategy on PoK will require a certain basic course correction — one that situates the region in the
popular imagination in India and bridges the knowledge gap in the country about a region which legally belongs
to it. In the absence of a concerted course correction, no breakthrough on formulating an ambitious and
focussed strategy on PoK will be possible. The primary goal here should be to alter domestic perceptions and
political complacency on PoK.

A white paper on PoK: In a vibrant democracy like India, where minute issues are open to intense debate and
public scrutiny, the twin issues of J&K and territorial integrity enjoy multi-partisan support across the entire
political spectrum. The Government of India needs to capitalise on this consensus by bringing out a white
paper that delineates India’s position on PoK in the light of developments that have occurred in the last few
decades or more. It has been nearly 22 years since the Parliamentary Resolution of 1994 was passed and
there has been no detailed point of reference to ascertain India’s official claim on the PoK region since then.
Meanwhile, statements from the concerned ministries in the government or default allusions to PoK have been
rather sketchy, tepid, and at best, reactive. To enhance the vigour and substance of its claim, India needs to
cogently argue out its position on PoK by putting out a comprehensive official document/proclamation in the
form of a white paper that is mindful of contemporary challenges and geopolitical fundamentals.
Constitutional measures: Part VI Section 48 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir carries a provision of
24 seats in the state’s legislative assembly for representatives from PoK. This section notes that such seats
shall lay vacant “until the area of the State under the occupation of Pakistan ceases to be so occupied and the
people residing in that area elect their representatives.”8 While no concrete effort could be made to fill these
seats in the assembly, provisions to constitutionally supplement a similar quota of representation in the Union
Parliament have not been accorded much significance. In December 2014, a private bill to this effect was
rejected by the Parliamentary Committee.9 Before this, in October 2013, the government spurned media
reports conjecturing a serious rethink on allocating seats for PoK in the Lok Sabha.10 It may be worthwhile to
re-consider this option for effective policy posturing. Besides, an amendment to this effect would also address
the element of incongruence between the constitution of J&K state and the constitution of India.
Deft dispersal and administration of information: The government needs to disseminate information regarding
PoK through the right channels. Compared to the level of public awareness in Pakistan on Kashmir, that of
PoK within India is dismally low. Comprehensive information on the political status of PoK should be infused in
the popular discourse in the Kashmir Valley as well. As acknowledged in a Home Ministry-aided study
conducted in 2010, Kashmiri youth appear largely unaware of the politics and nature of governance in PoK.11
Systematic efforts to curb misperceptions regarding the notion of azadi on the other side, especially in the
so-called AJK, would be much useful. Similarly, it is vital to initiate steps that could factually highlight Gilgit
Baltistan’s sustained political exclusion by Pakistan. Concerted attempts should be made to fill the existing
vacuum concerning PoK’s political ground realities. It is also intriguing that people in India know relatively more
about the excesses committed by Pakistani forces in Balochistan than what Islamabad is actually doing in PoK.
India’s inert policy behaviour is partially responsible for creating a situation where PoK invokes an uncertain
ambiguous reaction amongst people at large despite the fact that they grow up used to the perpetual
illustration of this region in the official map of India. Moreover, there is a large section of Indians that believes
that India has virtually lost its claims on PoK. Besides, confusion still prevails on the geographical expanse of
PoK. Several writings within India have more often than not referred to the so-called ‘AJK’ and PoK
interchangeably, thus keeping Gilgit Baltistan away from the purview of India’s claim. Apart from maps, it is vital
to undertake necessary measures to curtail the misrepresentation of facts related to PoK in the domestic public
discourse.
Media feeds: Indian media’s coverage of PoK has been rather scant, and lacks depth and understanding.
Sporadic coverage of PoK in the Indian media — both electronic and print, as well as English language and
vernacular — is reflective of the scale of importance that has been accorded to the region in the public
discourse. The media tends to focus on issues that stir public sentiments. Unfortunately, because of decades
of neglect and disinterestedness, PoK has lost its appeal as an Indian territory illegally occupied by Pakistan—
a historical wrong that could not be set aright by the United Nations because the issue got enmeshed in Cold
War politics. In an interesting departure from the past, in September-October 2015, a number of private news
channels in India broadcast footage of gross human rights violations in PoK showing Pakistan’s
highhandedness against those challenging its authority and control in these areas. Ensuing discussions were,
however, rather poor and ill-researched. Media coverage on PoK has a tendency to quickly dissipate as they
fail to generate the necessary traction in India. Apart from Asian News International (ANI), which regularly
features short videos on PoK, especially Gilgit Baltistan, PoK remains one of those domains that has been
grossly neglected by the Indian media. It is distressing to note the stark contrast between the Pakistani media’s
obsession with Kashmir and the near complete apathy of the Indian media with respect to developments in
PoK. It is hard to recall the last time a full-fledged op-ed focussing on PoK was published in any of the
mainstream national dailies.
Along with promoting comprehensive coverage in state-owned broadcasting channels, developments and
issues related to PoK need to figure frequently in the media especially on the prime time slot of private news
channels. Augmenting references to PoK in official statements and focussed discussions on the issues
concerning the region will incentivise media coverage, providing the much-needed stimulus for enhanced
popular awareness regarding PoK.

The External Tier

Pakistan’s reaction to the recent spate of violence over the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan
Wani on July 8 has been along expected lines. The statement from Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif,
the observation of a Black Day and a joint session of Parliament were all aimed at indicting the government of
India for committing gross atrocities in J&K. There were instant rebuttals from India, urging Pakistan to set its
own house in order with stray allusions to violations taking place in PoK and Balochistan. In such
circumstances, it is important that India innovates and shifts the policy gear from being merely reactive to being
decisively proactive. It is of no avail if statements on PoK are invariably issued in a reactive mode, more so to
balance out Pakistan’s rhetoric. Pakistan is quick to capitalise on crisis situations in the Kashmir Valley and
does not fail to seize the opportunity, in clear contrast to the indifference displayed on the Indian side which is
reminded of PoK only upon some provocation from the other side. India needs to replace this approach with a
more consistent, pre-emptive one so as to outmanoeuvre Pakistan’s relentless rhetoric-driven agenda on
Kashmir.

At a certain level, India’s geopolitical challenges vis-a-vis PoK involves China as well. While China may aver its
neutrality on the Kashmir issue, it will continue to be a factor for India to reckon with. China is in possession of
2000 square miles of J&K territory in the Shaksgam Valley and has played a pivotal role in consolidating
Pakistan’s hold over Gilgit-Baltistan. The Karakoram Highway was built through the disputed territory, despite
India’s protests. China has unfailingly reminded India of the disputed status of Jammu & Kashmir by denying
visas to Indian military officials deployed in that state and it has now officially registered its concern on the
recent incidents. China’s statement noted that it was “concerned about the casualties in the clash, and hope
that relevant incident will be handled properly. The Kashmir issue is left over from history. China holds a
consistent stance and hopes relevant parties will address the issue peacefully through dialogue.”12 Alongside
facts regarding China developing extensive stakes across PoK (including the massive China Pakistan
Economic Corridor), the aforementioned official statement signals a perceptible change in China’s positon. So
far, it had avoided reacting to India’s actions to counter Pakistan-backed subversion in the state. The
China-Pakistan axis working together on the Kashmir issue has to be deftly handled.

Bilateral assertion with Pakistan and China: For the reasons mentioned above, India needs to place PoK on
the bilateral agenda with both Pakistan and China. While Pakistan is in illegitimate control of PoK, China’s
unhindered involvement in the region despite India’s protests is a constant source of strategic concern. India
needs to highlight how terrorist sanctuaries have proliferated in the entire PoK. Collective inputs from the
intelligence agencies could be used to prepare a dossier on the militant training camps in PoK and disseminate
them through relevant platforms, apart from handing it over bilaterally to Pakistan, the United States, China
and other key countries at the most appropriate occasion.
Hedge against Pakistan: The simmering political unrest in PoK has been understated and much less reported.
For several years, a phenomenal growth in the number of nationalist or advocacy groups in the PoK region
(especially in Gilgit Baltistan and also in the so-called AJK) has been witnessed. India needs to explore options
to constructively engage with such political groups in PoK. Inputs from such groups would enable India to
develop a better understanding of issues and concerns of the people and the land in this region.
India also needs to chart out a well-thought-out policy framework designed to diminish the malicious
propaganda and subversive activities unleashed by Pakistan. While India has ably handled Pakistan’s
propaganda at the UN, it may be useful to consider citing PoK in rejoinders and pre-emptive remarks as well.
So far, Pakistan has selectively quoted from the UNSC resolutions to corner India on the question of Kashmir.
Pakistan’s stratagem could be deflated to a great extent by invoking the ‘demilitarization clause’ from the same
UNSC resolutions, which required Pakistan to withdraw its forces completely from what is now being referred
to as PoK.

Additional routes on the Line of Control: In addition to the existing routes, India needs to consciously insist on
opening up more points across the LoC for movement of people and goods, especially the Kargil- Skardu
route. The proposed route has been on the anvil for long and involves the sentiments of people on both sides
in the Ladakh-Gilgit Baltistan sector. With an initiative such as this, India is likely to generate goodwill on the
other side of the LoC and in the process also bring forth Pakistan’s hesitations on such measures that seek to
facilitate communication among the people on both sides of the LoC.
Ancillary Measures
In a democracy, the onus of changing the policy discourse lies as much on the people and institutions as on
the government and media. Therefore, apart from engaging and harnessing the existing expertise and
scholarship on various government policies, think tanks, educational institutions and the civil society at large
need to think in terms of putting in place a robust discourse on J&K (including PoK) through some of the
following initiatives:

Academic deliberations: In the wake of the ongoing turmoil in J&K, there emerged a critique regarding the stark
gap in the holding of quality discussions on issues concerning J&K. Correspondingly, there is an utter lack of
interest in developments in PoK— the election in the so-called AJK, for example, went literally unnoticed.
Interestingly, the ‘AJK’ electorate voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Nawaz Sharif led PML-N (Pakistan
Muslin League-Nawaz), which was at the receiving end of criticism for its openness to the idea of reconciliation
with India. Regular discussions identifying the nuances in the local politics of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan in
academic research institutions could be a good beginning. Similarly, proceedings from conferences and
seminars on PoK could be effectively channelled into informing/educating policy circles. Open public
discussions are quintessential for advancing the scale of domain awareness on PoK. It has to be borne in mind
that optimal benefits from such discussions can be reaped only by engaging people from PoK. Nationalist
constituencies in PoK need to be provided an appropriate forum for venting their views, thereby exposing
Pakistan’s highhanded approach towards the region. While it may be difficult to process the visit of residents of
PoK to India for conferences, hosting people from the PoK diaspora based in Europe and the United States for
the purpose offers an easier option.
Ideas exchange and research collaboration: Over the past few years, several PoK-centric think tanks have
sprung up in the United States and Canada. Encouraging constructive engagement between PoK driven
think-tanks, academics and communities with those in India will lead to cross-fertilization of ideas and forge
partnership on significant issues of mutual interest. Institutions in India can also think in terms of incentivising
young people from PoK (diaspora included) through educational and skill building exercises.
Way Forward
India is passing through a critical phase of growth and development. However, the country still needs to
overcome intractable domestic challenges to sustain the momentum in economic growth and prosperity. In this
regard, the protracted problem of Kashmir as a principal challenge involving India’s all-weather adversary,
Pakistan, is a perennial strategic distraction. India has no option but to conceive a well-thought out strategy to
overcome this distraction. While measures to deal with discontent within are necessary, it is also important to
chart innovative measures to undercut Pakistan’s gross indulgence in fanning the problem. Blueprinting a
refined and robust approach on PoK is one of the key components in mapping India’s strategic
adaptability/transition and preparedness for future contingencies. India must avoid policy incoherence and
inconsistency on PoK that has spanned decades, and navigate a course that helps reshape the domestic as
well as external discourses on PoK and pursue Indian claims in a firm, consistent manner.

Why disclaiming Pakistan occupied

Kashmir is not prudent
Former Jammu & Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah recently raised a furore by stating: “I tell them in
plain terms-- not only the people of India, but also to the world – that the part (of Jammu and Kashmir) which is
with Pakistan (PoK), belongs to Pakistan and this side to India. This won't change.”1 This statement on Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) in general, and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) in particular, was made even as
Dineshwar Sharma, the newly appointed interlocutor on J&K mandated to engage with a broad spectrum of
stakeholders, made his maiden visit to the Valley. Within days, Farooq Abdullah supplemented his statement
by noting: “How long shall we keep saying that (PoK) is our part? It (PoK) is not their father's share.”2 He
further cautioned that “they (Pakistan) are not weak and are not wearing bangles. They too have atom bomb”,
which, in his view, must prevent India from thinking of retaking PoK.3

Abdullah’s views elicited sharp criticism from certain quarters and endorsement from others. Some even
resorted to legal action against Abdullah as the issue stirred heated debate in television channels. While a PIL
(Public Interest Litigation) was filed in Delhi High Court against Abdullah,4 a court in Bihar ordered the
registering of an FIR (First Information Report) against him.5 National Conference leader and former chief
minister Omar Abdullah questioned the intent of past Congress-led governments on “taking back” PoK and
challenged the present government to do so and prove his father wrong.6 Omar Abdullah also evoked former
prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s resolve to preserve the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) during the
Kargil conflict in 1999.7

This is not the first time that such an unrestrained reference undermining India’s position on PoK has been
made by senior political leaders. Nor have the reactions and responses to such assertions taken into account
the fundamental link between PoK and J&K. Repeatedly, these back and forth statements have translated into
high-decibel and divisive for and against debates without being sensitive to the potential fallout. Further,
instead of harmonising the domestic discourse on PoK, these polarising debates lead to disjointed analyses
and understanding on an issue so critical to India.

Umbilical link
Its low-key standing claim on PoK notwithstanding, the territory does embody India’s broader position on J&K;
namely, the entire territory of the erstwhile princely state is an integral part of India. A part of the state’s
territory, PoK, comprising the so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit Baltistan (G-B), has
remained under Pakistan’s control since the tribal raid and India-Pakistan war of 1947-48. Although the territory
is largely forgotten by the people of India, and some have even forgone the claim, its salience to India’s overall
claim on J&K is undeniable. This is because there is an umbilical link between India’s control over J&K and its
standing claim on PoK. Via the Instrument of Accession, the entire territory of what then comprised the princely
state of J&K, including what is since being referred to as PoK, acceded to India. The accession was signed in
India’s favour by the then ruler of the princely state, Maharaja Hari Singh, on October 26, 1947. It is this
Instrument of Accession that warrants India’s territorial control over the entire J&K. India’s extant claim on PoK
and its control on J&K are, therefore, inextricably linked. Besides, the Constitution of J&K contains a provision
of 24 seats for the representatives of PoK “until the area of the State under the occupation of Pakistan ceases
to be so.”8 Therefore, unless India’s official stand on PoK is duly revised at some point, hopefully blueprinting a
definitive settlement on J&K, it is premature and self-defeating to subtract PoK from its overall claim.

Determinants of Domestic Complacency

The sustained neglect of India’s claim on PoK in the domestic discourse on Kashmir and the indifference
shown by successive political dispensations are responsible for building a cynical perception of the territory’s
insignificance in the broader scheme of things. Rash public statements smacking of political opportunism that
contradict the official position on PoK have done considerable damage over time.

Uninformed public discourse

Public conversation on PoK within India is uninformed and pessimistic. It is a stark reality that there is
inadequate academic focus on PoK in India. This is probably because PoK is considered academically
irrelevant and less rewarding in comparison to a purely Valley-centric discourse. Consequently, PoK has
remained under-represented in the conventional discourse on Kashmir. Instead, the near exclusive focus
during the last nearly three decades has been on alleged human rights violations perpetrated by the security
forces. In this view, only criticisms of India’s ‘hard’ approach towards the people of the Valley are considered
genuine. Even as Valley-centric issues elicit concern and spawn serious discussions at elite platforms, the
issues of political apathy and disenchantment prevalent in PoK are grossly neglected and even avoided. What
exists, as a result, is a blinkered view of Kashmir – one that also fails to acknowledge that such a premature
signalling on PoK would tantamount to disclaiming PoK with grave repercussions during future negotiations if
and when they take place. While is it valid to argue that PoK's inclusion in the domestic debate may not
necessarily resolve the Kashmir issue in India’s favour, it is at the same time self-defeating to project the view
that the Kashmir issue can be solved only by insulating it from India’s standing claim on PoK.

India’s subdued stance, a virtual abandonment of its claim on PoK, has ensured that the focus of Pakistan, of
the international community and of the people of India remains confined to developments on the Indian side of
the LoC. As a result, India’s PoK policy has been deprived of suitable periodic adjustments to match evolving
strategic objectives. Successive governments are responsible for engendering a trend that hugely disserves
India’s position. That the cartographic representation of PoK as part of India has not translated into mass
perceptions of PoK as an integral part of India and the overall failure to mainstream PoK in the public discourse
could partly be attributed to inept handling of the issue by the policy-makers.

An agenda of the Right?

Even though India’s position on PoK has never been categorically contested by any mainstream political group,
ratcheting up the territorial claim is more than often discredited as mere rants by right-leaning constituencies
within the country. Indeed, in the wider vacuum that exists, the right- leaning groups have frequently raked up
the issue calling for integration of PoK with India.9 Therefore, on most occasions, discussions on PoK elicit
responses to the effect that it is unnecessary raking up a claim that has already been more or less dispensed
with. 10 Added to this is the recent tendency to ascribe the raising of the PoK issue as a political agenda of
particular constituencies. Together, such responses prevent a meaningful and coherent policy-oriented
discussion on PoK.

Cues from the past

In contrast to the situation obtaining at present, PoK was vital to India’s defence of its position on Kashmir in
the initial years after independence. Former Defence Minister V K Krishna Menon’s elaborate defence during
his marathon UN speech in 1957 made repeated references to Pakistan’s deceitful occupation of this portion of
territory.11 It is generally perceived that following this impassioned plea, India’s approach on PoK revolved
around accepting the ceasefire line and later, LoC as a de facto border and perpetuating the territorial status
quo. From “practical” considerations of ceding more territory to Pakistan during the 1960s engagement
(Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks),12 to an alleged informal understanding on maintaining the territorial
status quo during the Simla Talks, there was a virtual shift in the debate on Kashmir within India. The territorial
aspects of the issue gradually assumed less significance in discussions as terror and violence abetted by
Pakistan during late 1980s assumed centre-stage.

Though never pronounced officially, it is believed that successive governments have veered towards the
position of retaining the status quo as the permanent solution to the festering issue of Kashmir by simply
converting the present LoC into a permanent border. As indicated above, this particular trend in India’s policy
posture began around the Simla Conference in 1972, which also laid out the roadmap to bilateralism on
Kashmir and the conversion of the cease fire line into LoC. The Simla agreement is widely considered part of
India’s quest to formalise the LoC as a permanent border. Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s
oft-quoted articulation on making borders irrelevant rather than changing them, and heightened anticipation
around Musharraf’s four-point formula (constructed around the status quo), were construed as India’s best
options while seeking a permanent solution to the Kashmir issue.

Rethink Soft Pedalling

Prudent as it may have appeared to reconcile to the territorial status quo in the past, policy makers must ask
themselves whether such an approach has really worked in India’s favour. While India may have been pursuing
the option of formalising the LoC into a border, internal security indicators in J&K, dismal bilateral equations
with Pakistan, and the persisting tug of war on Kashmir negate the previous approach. Pakistan’s unrelenting
perpetration of violence and instability in J&K persists and its hand is more visible than ever in the events that
have unfolded after the killing of Burhan Wani. Pakistan’s diplomats have not spared a single opportunity to
raise the Kashmir issue internationally. It is abundantly clear that India has not gained anything by seeking to
perpetuate the status quo. It is time to look at alternate options. Ceding territory as part of a “LoC plus” solution
is not an option anymore.13

India cannot afford to appear to be disowning its extant claim on PoK unless a steadfast guarantee, this time
on paper, is extracted on retaining the territorial status quo. Until such a formulation appears on the horizon, it
makes no difference to Pakistan whether India abandons its claim on PoK or not. On the contrary, even
peripheral overtures indicating India’s disinterestedness in PoK will potentially weaken its position on the
broader issue of Kashmir. It is wishful thinking to assume that Pakistan would welcome the territorial status quo
as propounded by some sections in India. The Kashmir issue substantially governs the undercurrents of
Pakistan’s domestic polity. It is important to understand that Pakistan has long refused to accept the status quo
by proclaiming support for secessionist groups in J&K. Its revisionist designs are even more obvious from the
way Pakistan commissions militancy in the Valley and continues to house militant camps in PoK.

Due care is required to ensure that stray references by India’s previous leaders suggesting maintenance of the
status quo are not interpreted as a climb down/divergence from the stated official position. Instead they must
be understood as individual quests to explore pragmatic ways to resolve a protracted issue. It is equally
important to articulate that India will not cede territory it controls and see whether Pakistan is willing to conduct
a dialogue within this framework. Till the time India approaches a conclusive negotiation stage, it is important
that loose references contradicting India’s claim on PoK are avoided at all cost.

Way Forward: Shed Rhetoric, Shore up Claim

Of late, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has given India’s claim on PoK a new lease of life. India
has skilfully spun its reservations on the CPEC around the principle of territorial sovereignty and integrity.
Therefore, apart from the bilateral imperatives vis-a-vis Pakistan as discussed above, presently, there are
pressing geopolitical imperatives that must be heeded while formulating India’s policy position on PoK. In this
regard, disregarding the territorial claim on PoK will only weaken India’s position on CPEC.

With CPEC placed under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), asserting claims to PoK has become a
strategic necessity rather than an afterthought. It was perhaps owing to such compulsions that India’s inert and
understated position on PoK was rescinded by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s reference to the territory during
his Independence Day address in August 2016. There will always be those who argue that there is nothing
substantial that India would lose by dis-claiming PoK. In the present geopolitical scene, however, India is likely
to lose more than it gains by ignoring its claim on PoK. There is an urgent need to build a broad consensus on
PoK in order to fix the credibility deficit caused by sustained neglect across generations. Unless India sheds its
nonchalant approach towards its claim on PoK, it cannot expect the rest of the world to take its position on J&K
seriously. For the time being, India has few options other than continue to be relentless in pursuing its claim on
PoK.

Who is the Indian Mujahideen?

In 2008, India faced multiple terror attacks on its cities across several states. These attacks resulted mostly in
civilian deaths. The May 13, 2008 Jaipur bombings killed 80 civilians and injured more than 200, the
Ahmedabad terrorist bombings of July 26, 2008, killed nearly 45 civilians and wounded 160, while the
Bangalore bombs the previous day killed one person and wounded six. The Delhi bombings of September 13,
2008 killed 30 civilians and injured nearly 90 while the Guwahati blasts of October 30 the same year killed 83
civilians and injured nearly 300. In the Guwahati attacks, a group, identifying itself as Islamic Security Force
(Indian Mujahideen), originally claimed responsibility via an email. Significantly, in all the other attacks, a
hitherto unknown group calling itself the Indian Mujahideen (IM) claimed responsibility, thereby shifting the
blame from more established terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). In
an email sent five minutes before the Ahmedabad bombings, the IM requested the LeT not to claim
responsibility for the bombings. A deeper scrutiny into such behaviour by terrorist outfits reveal that newly
established terror groups carry out attacks at short intervals not only to establish their deadly credibility in the
world of terror networks but also to attract sponsors at home and abroad for their activities.

The IM’s frequent bomb blasts in Indian cities except perhaps Mumbai where the direct involvement of the LeT
is established, begs answers to the question: who is the IM, what are their motives and where do they actually
come from?

The Indian Mujahideen: Tracing the Roots and the Causes

According to Indian intelligence, the IM is not a well knit organization with a hierarchical structure like other
more established groups like the LeT. Rather, it is a loose network of Islamic organizations which includes the
Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), certain individuals from the state of Uttar Pradesh with alleged
links with the Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI), and the terror cartel of Aftab Ansari. Key SIMI members like
Qayamuddin Kapadia, Usman Agarbattiwala and Sajid Mansuri started supporting the idea of the formation of
the IM as early as December 2007 with 50 SIMI cadres participating in a jihadi training camp in Aluva, Kerala1.
The plausible reason for men forming the IM could be many. First could be their personal experiences during
the Gujarat riot of 2002. Other reasons could be the availability of funds for such activities in abundance in an
underground network of terror financiers. Young men especially from UP also join these activities because of
the availability of money in it vis-à-vis the absence of alternate employment opportunities. Terror activities also
do not require too much of education or knowledge of the English language and yet the monetary benefit could
be tremendous. Most of the arrested IM cadres were ill versed in English yet fluent in Hindi or Urdu.

Radical Ideology
Another important reason for young men taking up such subversive activities is the teaching of radical Islam
which is easily available these days in the internet in any language. It is also a fact that the ideological roots of
Islamic fundamentalism started in South Asia. History reveals that the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami in
Pakistan was Maulana Maududi (1903-1979), who in turn inspired men like Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) of Egypt
to further spread it. Maududi’s Islamic liberation theology was an anti-thesis to the West attracting several
young alienated Muslims to take up arms. Maududi in fact called for a universal jihad by all Muslims to fight
Western barbarism providing an ideological framework for many Sunni Islamic fundamentalist groups.2 The
SIMI narratives also reveal the influence of Maududi’s teachings and can be very influential on younger people.

Anger at mainstream media biased reporting is also cited as one of the causes by most IM arrested cadres. It
is argued that the mainstream media turns a blind eye to Hindu fundamentalist groups while mostly depicting
the fundamental nature of Islam.

Politics is seen as another cause of the radicalization of communities along religious lines. Political parties
deliberately play on the religious nerve of communities in order to garner votes. This results in social
fragmentation and a polarized politics which in turn leads to young men and women from the minority
community viewing the Indian state as been non-representative of all its communities. Experts like B. Raman
also argue that “Over the last few years, [Indian Islamist terrorists] have expanded the ambit of their grievances
from purely domestic issues to global issues like the U.S.-led war in Iraq”.

Leadership and Cadres

The leadership of the IM is mainly traced to a man from Mumbai named Abdul Subhan Usman Qureshi, code
name “Kasim” or “al-arbi” who signed the email manifestos sent by the IM before and after the multiple blasts
last year. Qureshi’s background however refutes the theory that most IM cadres come from a deprived
background or was schooled in a radical Madrassa. Qureshi studied at the Antonio DeSouza High School ran
by a Christian missionary in Byculla, Mumbai and came from an economically privileged background. Qureshi
was studying at Bharatiya Vidyapeeth in Navi Mumbai in 1992 when the Mumbai riots took place followed by
the demolition of the Babri Masjid. In 1995, he obtained a diploma in industrial electronics and in 1996, a
specialised software maintenance qualification from the CMS Institute in Marol. After obtaining these degrees,
he joined Radical Solutions, an independent computer firm operating out of the Fort area in south Mumbai in
November, 1996. In 1999, he changed jobs and joined Datamatics, a major computer firm in Mumbai.
However, somewhere in these years, Qureshi was also harbouring more radical ideologies and in 2001, he left
his job at the firm stating in his resignation letter that “I have decided to devote one complete year to pursue
religious and spiritual matters.”3

According to Mumbai police intelligence, by 1998, Qureshi was one of the most committed SIMI activists going
on to edit one of SIMI’s house-magazines, Islamic Voice, from New Delhi. By then, SIMI’s growing links with
global Islamic movements like the Egyptian Brotherhood and Hamas were clear. Links with Bangladesh based
HuJI and Pakistan based LeT were also coming to the fore. The radicalization process of SIMI became clearer
by its 1999 Aurangabad convention when SIMI activists Mohammad Amir Shakeel Ahmad stated that “Islam is
our nation, not India”. Qureshi was one of the principal organisers of SIMI’s last public conference in 2001 in
which 25, 000 young people participated. He also succeeded in training hundreds of SIMI-IM cadres since
2007 and was the mastermind of the Delhi blasts undertaken by Mohammad Bashir, Mohammad Fakruddin
and Saif Ahmad in September 2008.4 The main assault members of the IM include Atif Amin, who belongs to
UP, and responsible for the Ahmedabad bombings, and Aftab Ansari’s lieutenant, Riaz Bhatkal, who is mainly
responsible for the IM’s finance coming mostly from West Asia.5 Recently, an arrest in Pune of Anwar Ali
Bagwaan, a MBBS graduate who was practicing in Hyderabad, revealed that he trained IM members on how to
administer sedatives on persons they were planning to kidnap. According to another UP based IM cadre, Sadiq
Shaikh, hailing from Azamgarh district and who was arrested on September 23, 2008, IM modules exist in
Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Pune and Mumbai. Shaikh is a software professional who lived in Central Mumbai.
Most arrested IM cadres are computer professionals and bomb makers. Among those arrested are
Pune-based Mohammed Mansoor Asgar Peerbhoy and Mubin Kadar Shaikh, who jointly designed the IM logo
and hacked into unsecured Wi-fi connections.

Another significant intelligence input from the UP police indicates that UP based IM cadre Fahim Arshad Ansari
who was arrested in UP in February 2008 was in direct contact with the LeT in masterminding the Mumbai
attacks of November 2008. Ansari studied at the Malad Municipal Secondary School in Mumbai, from where he
graduated in 1989 but later on went onto Dubai. In 2005, another Hyderabadi, Sami Ahmad who was arrested
by the police in 2006 revealed that he agreed to put Ansari in touch with the LeT then. The narrative of Ansari
is equally revealing. He got in touch with LeT in Dubai and reached Pakistan in 2005 itself. In the LeT’s
Muzzafarabad base, Ansari was put under Muzammil, the LeT commander in charge of operations in India.
Ansari revealed during interrogation that he went through a 21-day Daura Aam (basic combat course), followed
by a rigorous three-month advanced Daura Khaas (specialized guerrilla tactics) as a precursor to the Fidayeen
attack on Mumbai6. He also learnt the use of maps, compasses and Global Positioning Systems (GPS).
Mumbai was traced in the Google Earth maps and chillingly, Mumbai stock exchange, the Taj Mahal Hotel,
railway station and airport were identified as target areas. Ansari arrived in India in 2007 and from November
28 to December 10, 2007, he stayed at the Sunlight Guest House in Mumbai, photographing and mapping the
targets he had been shown prominent amongst them being the Chattrapati Shivaji Terminus and the Taj Mahal
Hotel.7

Game Plan
The game plan of the IM is rather obvious. Despite its obvious LeT connections and training in Pakistan in
sophisticated weaponry and guerrilla warfare, the IM wants to establish itself as an Indian based terror outfit.
This is done for three reasons.

First, when the blame for terror attacks in India is pinned on the IM, then Indian security forces will have to
concentrate their resources within India instead. This is done deliberately as Indian intelligence on the IM
cellular networks is rather weak at present and most of the intelligence inputs are gathered from arrested IM
cadres who might mislead the police.

Second, the LeT then can go blameless despite its obvious hand in training and providing weaponry. That will
also offset any diplomatic pressure from India and the international community on Pakistan to act against the
LeT in its territory.8

Third, once its credibility is established, the IM can also easily target vulnerable minority youth base within
India for direct recruitment into terror outfits in India and abroad.

Linkages
Though the IM cadres mostly come from India, their linkages with a global jihad are worrisome. Links to the
LeT and the HuJi also portends the fact that cross border movement of cadres and arms appears rather easy
with the help of false names and passports mostly of Pakistani origin. Ansari entered India in 2007 from Nepal
with a false Pakistani passport no. BM 6809341, issued on November 1, 2007 in Pakistan with the pseudonym
Hammad Hasan. The connection to HuJI is also alarming given the porous nature of India’s international
border with Bangladesh. Hence, despite India increasing surveillance and border security at the Line of Control
(LoC) with Pakistan in its Western border, motivated IM-LeT cadres like Qureshi or Ansari can easily enter
India via Nepal and Bangladesh with the help of HuJI who is active in these areas. Insurgent groups from
Assam like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) also run camps in Bangladesh with covert connections
with HuJI and could end up transporting terror cells into India. This calls for very strict fencing of India’s eastern
borders and steep increase in border patrolling.

Countering the IM
A review of India’s ground forces for law enforcement and intelligence gathering last year reveal that India's
police strength comes to 126 officers per 100,000 people while the standard United Nations norm is 222.9 The
Intelligence Bureau (IB) has only 3,500 field operatives to monitor a country of 1.1 billion. Thereby, a boost in
India’s security forces is a must along with modernization of the police forces and speedy undertaking of vital
security sector reforms. Terror activities can be deterred if specific intelligence can zero in on different actors
within a terror network. According to two distinguished terror experts, Paul Davies and Brian Jenkins, terror
groups comprise of “leaders, lieutenants, financiers, logisticians, and other facilitators, foot soldiers, supporting
population segments, and religious and otherwise ideological figures”10. Hence, it’s a long drawn process of
planning and coordination before the final act of terror is unleashed. Terror activity is a process rather than the
single final act that we see in terms of violence. The 9/11 terror process started in 1996 when Muhammad Atta
began planning for the attack in Hamburg.11 Keeping this insight in mind, the IM terror process can be easily
deterred if the state forces concentrate on finding the financiers, usually the least motivated amongst the other
actors.

A counter against the IM ideology can also be undertaken at the social level. In February, 2008, theologians
from 6,000 religious schools met at the Darul-Uloom Deoband, an influential, 150-year-old Islamic school in
UP, to denounce terrorism as an activity against Islam. Deoband’s cooperation in fighting terror is a very
positive way of handling the spread of radical ideologies within India. Also, vulnerable areas like Azamgarh in
UP must be closely monitored and the local civil society encouraged to talk against terror activities. India has to
construct a counter-narrative against terror which should have cooperation from all the nation’s stakeholders if
the fight against terror is to be a unified and successful effort.

Neeraj Kapoor asked: Keeping in

mind that the naxals are Indians
with guns and naxalism is a result
of government apathy, what should
be the right strategy against
Naxalism?
Naxalism, to begin with is not only the result of government apathy; that is just one approach to understanding
Naxalism. Naxalism or Left Wing Extremism in India is an ideological war as much as an armed insurgency.
Therefore it is imperative to counter the ideology that helps mobilise their support. The apathy feeds into this
extremism. Therefore it is essential to address the apathy as well. But most importantly the authorities must be
seized of the gravity of the Maoist problem. Maoists haven't struck in the cities yet and that could be one
reason for the Government to have not responded to it immediately. Development must be all round and not
concentrated only in Maoist dominated areas. Police reforms must be implemented immediately. The state and
the centre must agree on the threat perception and follow a clear policy which is currently absent. The
Government must choke funding of these organisations. Tactical negotiations must follow arrests of leaders to
allow them to participate in the democratic process as proof that change is possible. Crucially, there has to be
a genuine will to address the grievances of the people which in turn feed into these movements.