PASSAGE - 1

Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 allows an Executive Magistrate to
ask any person who is “likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public
tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace
or disturb the public tranquillity…to show cause why he should not be ordered to
execute a bond…for keeping the peace” for up to a year Section 151 CrPC allows a police
officer who knows of a design to commit a cognizable offence to “arrest, without orders
from a Magistrate and without a warrant, the person so designing”. In legal terms, to be
“bound down” means to be required to appear before the investigating officer or the
court on a given date. The expression is usually used in court orders to indicate that an
accused is “bound” by surety or personal guarantee to appear before authorities. The
law around alleged disrespect to the National Anthem was laid down by the Supreme
Court in its 1986 judgment in Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors vs State Of Kerala & Ors. The court
granted protection to three children belonging to the millenarian Christian sect
Jehovah’s Witnesses, who did not join in the singing of the National Anthem at their
school. The court held that forcing them to sing the Anthem violated their fundamental
right to religion under Article 25 of the Constitution. The children, siblings named Bijoe
Emmanuel, Binu, and Bindu, who were students of Classes 10, 9, and 5 respectively,
were expelled from NSS High School, run by the Hindu organisation Nair Service
Society, on July 26, 1985. Their parents pleaded unsuccessfully before the Kerala High
Court that Jehovah’s Witnesses permitted worship of only Jehovah (a form of the
Hebrew name for God), and since the Anthem was a prayer, the children could stand up
in respect, but could not sing.
In its August 11, 1986 judgment, the Supreme Court said that “Article 25 (“Freedom of
conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion”)…[was]
incorporated in recognition of the principle that the real test of a true democracy is the
ability of even an insignificant minority to find its identity under the country’s
Constitution.” Standing up respectfully when the National Anthem is sung — as the
children had done — but not singing oneself “does not either prevent the singing of the
National Anthem or cause disturbance to an assembly engaged in such singing so as to
constitute the offence…[under] the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act,
[1971],” the court said. Section 3 of the Act prescribes jail up to three years and/ or a
fine for “intentionally prevent[ing] the singing of the National Anthem or caus[ing]
disturbance to any assembly engaged in such singing”. The court held that the children’s
expulsion as a result of their “conscientiously held religious faith…was a violation of
their Fundamental Right to freedom of conscience” and to freely profess, practise and
propagate their religion.
The Supreme Court revisited the matter in Shyam Narayan Chouksey vs Union of
India (2018). While hearing the case, the court had, on November 30, 2016, passed an
interim order that “All the cinema halls in India shall play the National Anthem before
the feature film starts and all present in the hall are obliged to stand up to show respect
to the National Anthem.” The court had also ordered that “entry and exit doors shall
remain closed” when the Anthem is played, and that “when the National Anthem shall
be played…it shall be with the National Flag on the screen”. However, in its final
judgment, the court modified its 2016 interim order. “The order passed on 30th
November, 2016, is modified to the extent that playing of the National Anthem prior to
the screening of feature films in cinema halls is not mandatory, but optional or
directory,” the court said.
Source: Standing up for National Anthem: What the Supreme Court has ruled, The
Indian Express (July 8, 2023).
1. Vikas is an Executive Magistrate in Jaipur. He receives credible information that a
rally is being planned by a local political organization, "Rajasthan Unity Party," which
could potentially lead to a breach of peace in the region. Vikas issues a notice to Vinay,
the organizer, asking him to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a
bond for keeping the peace for up to a year under Section 107 of CrPC. Given the facts,
can Vikas, the Executive Magistrate, lawfully ask Vinay to show cause why he should not
be ordered to execute a bond for keeping the peace for up to one year under Section 107
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

(a) Yes, Vikas can ask Vinay to execute a bond as he has credible information that
the rally may breach peace.
(b) No, Vikas does not have the authority to do so as he is not a police officer.
(c) No, Vikas can only ask Vinay to disband the rally but cannot ask him to execute a
bond.
(d) Yes, Vikas can ask but only if the bond is for a period less than six months.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because the passage states that under Section 107 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an Executive Magistrate is empowered to ask any person
who is "likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity..." to
show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond for up to a year. In the
given factual situation, Vikas has credible information that the rally organized by Vinay
might lead to a breach of peace, which falls under the provision mentioned. Option (b) is
incorrect because the passage clearly mentions that an Executive Magistrate, not just a
police officer, has the authority under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 to issue such a notice. Option (c) is incorrect because the provision under Section
107 allows for more than just disbanding the rally; it allows the Executive Magistrate to
ask for the execution of a bond for keeping the peace. Option (d) is incorrect because the
law specifies that the bond can be for "up to a year," not necessarily less than six
months. Hence (a) is correct.

2. Veena, a school teacher at Sacred Lotus High School, observes that one of her
students, Varsha, refuses to sing the National Anthem during the morning assembly.
Upon asking, Varsha, a follower of a lesser-known spiritual sect, states that her faith
prevents her from singing any anthem or hymn other than hymns devoted to her faith's
deity. Worried about this, Veena consults the school principal, who decides to expel
Varsha. Her parents appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming this expulsion violates their
daughter's rights under Article 25 of the Constitution. Given the factual situation, does
the expulsion of Varsha from Sacred Lotus High School violate her fundamental rights
under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution?

(a) Yes, the expulsion violates Varsha's fundamental rights under Article 25, as
her conscientiously held religious faith prevents her from singing the National
Anthem.
(b) No, the expulsion is justified because Varsha's refusal to sing the National Anthem
could disturb public tranquillity.
(c) No, Article 25 does not cover religious exceptions related to the National Anthem.
(d) Yes, the expulsion violates Varsha's rights but not under Article 25 of the
Constitution.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because the passage refers to the Supreme Court judgment in
Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors vs State Of Kerala & Ors, which held that forcing individuals to
sing the National Anthem violates their fundamental right to religion under Article 25 of
the Constitution. The judgment emphasized the importance of the ability of even an
insignificant minority to find its identity under the country’s Constitution. In Varsha's
case, her conscientiously held religious faith prevented her from singing the National
Anthem, making the expulsion a violation of her fundamental right under Article 25.
Option (b) is incorrect because the passage mentions that not singing the National
Anthem "does not either prevent the singing of the National Anthem or cause
disturbance to an assembly engaged in such singing." Therefore, Varsha's actions do not
disturb public tranquility. Option (c) is incorrect because, according to the mentioned
Supreme Court judgment, Article 25 does indeed cover religious exceptions related to
the National Anthem. The court granted protection to individuals who did not join in the
singing due to their religious beliefs. Option (d) is incorrect because the expulsion
indeed violates Varsha's rights specifically under Article 25 of the Constitution, as per
the mentioned Supreme Court judgment. Hence (a) is correct.

3. Vivek, a police officer, learns through an informant that Vikrant is planning to rob a
local bank in Pune. The information is detailed, indicating the time, place, and methods
that will be employed in the robbery. Based on this information, Vivek arrests Vikrant
without a warrant, invoking Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Based
on the factual situation, did Vivek lawfully arrest Vikrant without a warrant under
Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

(a) Yes, Vivek can arrest Vikrant without a warrant since he has detailed
information about a design to commit a cognizable offence.
(b) No, Vivek needs a court order to arrest Vikrant, even if the information about the
planned robbery is detailed.
(c) No, Vivek can only arrest Vikrant after he has committed the robbery.
(d) Yes, but only if Vikrant is caught in the act of committing the robbery.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because the passage states that Section 151 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, allows a police officer who knows of a design to commit a
cognizable offence to "arrest, without orders from a Magistrate and without a warrant,
the person so designing." In the given factual situation, Vivek has detailed information
about Vikrant's plan to commit a robbery, a cognizable offence, and thus, his arrest
without a warrant falls under the provision mentioned. Option (b) is incorrect because
the passage clearly states that under Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, a police officer can make the arrest without orders from a Magistrate or a
warrant. Option (c) is incorrect because the provision in Section 151 is specifically
designed to allow police officers to prevent the commission of cognizable offences by
making arrests without warrants when they have knowledge of a design to commit such
offences. Option (d) is incorrect because Section 151 allows for preventative action; the
officer does not need to wait for the offence to be committed. Hence (a) is correct.

4. Vinay runs a cinema hall in Chennai. After the Supreme Court's 2018 judgment in
Shyam Narayan Chouksey vs Union of India, he decides to make it optional for the
cinema halls to play the National Anthem before the start of feature films. A group of
patrons, led by a man named Vijay, take offense to this and report Vinay to the police,
claiming he is showing disrespect to the National Anthem. Based on the factual
situation, is Vinay liable for showing disrespect to the National Anthem?

(a) Yes, failing to play the National Anthem before feature films is a direct insult to
national honor.
(b) No, Vinay is merely following the Supreme Court’s 2018 judgment that made
the playing of the National Anthem optional in cinema halls.
(c) Yes, the cinema hall is obliged to play the National Anthem, as per the interim order
of the Supreme Court passed on November 30, 2016.
(d) No, because Section 3 of the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971,
does not prescribe punishment for not playing the National Anthem.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the passage explicitly mentions that in its final
judgment, the Supreme Court modified its 2016 interim order to state that "playing of
the National Anthem prior to the screening of feature films in cinema halls is not
mandatory, but optional or directory." Vinay, by making it optional in his cinema hall, is
in compliance with this judgment. Option (a) is incorrect because the passage clearly
indicates that the Supreme Court's final judgment in 2018 made the playing of the
National Anthem optional. Hence, not playing it before feature films is not necessarily a
direct insult to national honor. Option (c) is incorrect because although the interim
order of 2016 did require cinema halls to play the National Anthem, that order was
modified by the final judgment in 2018, making it optional. Option (d) is incorrect
because, while it correctly notes that Section 3 of the Act does not prescribe punishment
for not playing the National Anthem, it misses the central point that the 2018 Supreme
Court judgment makes it optional to play the Anthem in cinema halls. Hence (b) is
correct.

5. Under what circumstances can an individual be excused from singing the National
Anthem without breaching the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971?

(a) When an individual has a physical disability that makes them unable to sing.
(b) When an individual is not an Indian citizen.
(c) When singing the Anthem interferes with an individual's conscientiously held
religious faith.
(d) When an individual is a public servant and is on duty.

Ans: (c)
Sol: Option (c) is correct because the Supreme Court's judgment in Bijoe Emmanuel &
Ors vs State Of Kerala & Ors established that forcing individuals to sing the National
Anthem in violation of their religious beliefs is unconstitutional under Article 25. Option
(a) is incorrect because the passage specifies that the Supreme Court held that an
individual can be excused due to their "conscientiously held religious faith" but doesn't
mention physical disability. Option (b) is incorrect because citizenship is not a criteria
mentioned in the passage or the judgments. Option (d) is incorrect because being a
public servant and on duty is not a recognized exception in either the law or the
judgments cited in the passage. Hence, (c) is correct.

6. What was the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court regarding the obligation to play
and stand for the National Anthem in cinema halls in 2018?

(a) It is mandatory for all cinema halls to play the National Anthem and all individuals
must stand.
(b) It is optional for cinema halls to play the National Anthem and individuals are
not obliged to stand.
(c) It is mandatory for cinema halls to play the National Anthem but optional for
individuals to stand.
(d) It is mandatory for all individuals to stand but optional for cinema halls to play the
National Anthem.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct as the court modified its 2016 interim order to specify that
playing the National Anthem in cinema halls is "not mandatory, but optional or
directory." Option (a) is incorrect because the Supreme Court in its 2018 judgment
stated that playing the National Anthem was "not mandatory, but optional or directory."
Option (c) is incorrect because the 2018 judgment stated that playing the National
Anthem is optional, but it didn't make standing optional while the Anthem is played.
Option (d) is incorrect because the 2018 judgment focused on the optional nature of
playing the National Anthem in cinema halls and did not specify that standing is
mandatory. Hence, (b) is correct.
PASSAGE - 2
A notice issued by the Commission said those interested and willing may present their
views within 30 days. This comes eight months after the Centre told the Supreme Court
that the Constitution obligated the State to have a UCC for its citizens, saying that people
of different religions and denominations following different property and matrimonial
laws was an “affront to the nation’s unity”. Responding to petitions before the Supreme
Court for uniformity in laws governing matters of divorce, succession, inheritance,
adoption and guardianship, the Centre, in October 2022, had told the apex court that the
Constitution obligasted the State to have a UCC for its citizens. It had also submitted that
the matter would be placed before the 22nd Law Commission. The Congress has led the
charge against the move, saying the 21st Law Commission had said that it is “neither
necessary nor desirable at this stage” to have a Uniform Civil Code. The Congress told
the 22nd Law Commission that it should remember that the interests of the nation are
distinct from the political ambitions of the BJP. The JD(U), RJD, the Left and the
Trinamool Congress have also slammed the Government over the move. However, the
Sena (UBT) and the AAP, parties who have previously voiced support for a UCC, have
remained silent.
A UCC would provide for one law for the entire country, applicable to all religious
communities, in their personal matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption
etc. Currently, Indian personal law is fairly complex, with each religion adhering to its
own specific laws. Separate laws govern Hindus including Sikhs, Jains and Buddhist,
Muslims, Christians, and followers of other religions. As Faizan Mustafa, expert of
constitutional law, earlier wrote for The Indian Express, “Moreover, there is diversity
even within communities. All Hindus of the country are not governed by one law, nor
are all Muslims or all Christians. For instance, in the Northeast, there are more than 200
tribes with their own varied customary laws. The Constitution itself protects local
customs in Nagaland. Similar protections are enjoyed by Meghalaya and Mizoram. Even
reformed Hindu law, in spite of codification, protects customary practices. The
exception to this rule is the state of Goa, where all religions have a common law
regarding marriages, divorces, and adoption.
Article 44 of the Constitution lays down that the state shall endeavour to secure a UCC
for citizens throughout the territory of India. Article 44 is among the Directive
Principles of State Policy. Directive Principles are not enforceable by court, but are
supposed to inform and guide governance. “However, in some senses, Article 44 is
unique in this manner. While Article 44 uses the words “state shall endeavour”, other
Articles in the ‘Directive Principles’ chapter use words such as “in particular strive”;
“shall in particular direct its policy”; “shall be obligation of the state” etc. Furthermore,
the phrase “by suitable legislation” is absent in Article 44. All this implies that the duty
of the state is greater in other directive principles than in Article 44,” Mustafa wrote.
Article 25 lays down an individual’s fundamental right to religion; Article 26(b) upholds
the right of each religious denomination or any section thereof to “manage its own
affairs in matters of religion”; Article 29 defines the right to conserve distinctive culture.
An individual’s freedom of religion under Article 25 is subject to “public order, health,
morality” and other provisions relating to fundamental rights, but a group’s freedom
under Article 26 has not been subjected to other fundamental rights.
Source: Law Commission seeks views on Uniform Civil Code: What is the UCC and
the debate around it, The Indian Express (June 18, 2023)
1. Vishal, a constitutional law expert, writes an article for a leading daily newspaper
advocating for the Uniform Civil Code (UCC). He argues that the UCC is necessary for
nation's unity and is constitutionally mandated under Article 44. His article sparks a
heated debate, and Vijay, a lawyer and member of a minority religious community, takes
to social media to criticize Vishal's views. Vijay argues that implementing a UCC would
infringe upon the religious and cultural rights of minority communities. Based on the
factual situation, which of the following best reflects the legal position regarding the
Uniform Civil Code as it appears in the passage?

(a) Vijay's criticism is valid because Article 44 of the Constitution is not enforceable by
the court, and therefore the State is not obligated to implement the UCC.
(b) Vishal's argument is incorrect because the 21st Law Commission has stated that it is
“neither necessary nor desirable at this stage” to have a UCC.
(c) Vishal's argument holds merit because the Constitution, under Article 44,
obligated the State to secure a UCC for its citizens and the Centre has affirmed this
view in the Supreme Court.
(d) Vijay's criticism is valid because the Constitution, under Articles 25 and 26, permits
every religious community to have their own set of personal laws.

Ans: (c)

Sol: Option (c) is correct because the passage clearly mentions that the Centre told the
Supreme Court that the Constitution obligated the State to have a UCC for its citizens.
Therefore, Vishal's argument holds merit. Option (a) is incorrect because although
Article 44 is not enforceable by the court, the passage states that the Constitution
obligated the State to have a UCC for its citizens, which supports Vishal's argument.
Option (b) is incorrect because even though the 21st Law Commission had stated that
UCC is “neither necessary nor desirable at this stage,” the Centre had told the Supreme
Court that the Constitution obligated the State to have a UCC, which aligns with Vishal's
argument. Option (d) is incorrect because although the Constitution does allow religious
communities to have their own set of personal laws under Articles 25 and 26, the
Centre's view expressed in the Supreme Court emphasizes the constitutional obligation
for a UCC under Article 44, which supports Vishal's argument. Hence (c) is correct.

2. Vinay, a member of Congress, writes an op-ed in a national newspaper arguing

against the introduction of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC). He relies on the findings of the
21st Law Commission to assert that it is neither necessary nor desirable to introduce
UCC at this stage. Vimal, a prominent legal scholar, disagrees and argues that Vinay's
perspective is politically motivated rather than being based on the true interests of the
nation. In the context of the debate between Vinay and Vimal, which of the following
statements aligns most closely with the passage's information regarding political
opposition to the Uniform Civil Code?

(a) Vimal's argument is valid because the JD(U), RJD, the Left and the Trinamool
Congress have also slammed the Government over the move, indicating that there is
broad-based political opposition to the UCC.
(b) Vinay's argument is valid because the 21st Law Commission stated that it is
“neither necessary nor desirable at this stage” to have a UCC, thus giving legal
credibility to his point of view.
(c) Vimal's argument is misleading because the Congress led the charge against the UCC
solely based on legal principles as presented by the 21st Law Commission, without any
political motives.
(d) Vinay's argument is invalid because Article 44 of the Constitution mandates the
State to introduce UCC, making the 21st Law Commission's views irrelevant.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the passage states that the 21st Law Commission had
found it “neither necessary nor desirable at this stage” to have a UCC, which supports
Vinay's argument and gives it legal credibility. Option (a) is incorrect because although
it mentions the opposition from other political parties, it does not relate directly to
Vinay's argument based on the 21st Law Commission’s findings. Option (c) is incorrect
because while the Congress did cite the 21st Law Commission, the passage also notes
that they warned the 22nd Law Commission that the interests of the nation are distinct
from the political ambitions of the BJP, indicating political motives in the opposition to
UCC. Option (d) is incorrect because the 21st Law Commission's views cannot be
deemed irrelevant, as they were cited by Congress, a significant political party, to argue
against the UCC. Hence (b) is correct.

3. Varun, a law professor, conducts a seminar on the complexities of implementing a

Uniform Civil Code (UCC) in India. He argues that while UCC could bring uniformity, it
also has the potential to clash with various fundamental rights, such as the right to
religion under Article 25 and the right to manage religious affairs under Article 26.
Vidya, a human rights activist, argues that these fundamental rights are not absolute
and can be subjected to certain restrictions. Which of the following statements best
reflects the legal conflict between the right to religion and the Uniform Civil Code as
portrayed in the passage, taking into consideration the views of Varun and Vidya?

(a) Varun's argument is stronger because Article 25 gives an individual the absolute
right to religion, making the implementation of UCC unconstitutional.
(b) Vidya's argument holds weight because Article 25's freedom of religion is
subject to "public order, health, morality," and other provisions relating to
fundamental rights.
(c) Both Varun and Vidya are incorrect because Article 26, unlike Article 25, offers
unassailable protection to religious groups in matters of religion, making UCC
potentially unconstitutional.
(d) Vidya's argument is flawed because Article 29 defines the right to conserve
distinctive culture, which would be violated by a UCC.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the passage explicitly states that Article 25's freedom
of religion is subject to "public order, health, morality," and other provisions relating to
fundamental rights. This supports Vidya's contention that these rights are not absolute.
Option (a) is incorrect because while Article 25 does provide for an individual's
fundamental right to religion, it is not an absolute right and is subject to certain
restrictions like "public order, health, morality," which aligns with Vidya's argument.
Option (c) is incorrect because although Article 26 offers protections to religious
groups, the passage specifically mentions that Article 25's freedom of religion is subject
to restrictions, not mentioning similar restrictions for Article 26. This doesn't make
Varun or Vidya incorrect in their arguments concerning Article 25. Option (d) is
incorrect because while Article 29 does give individuals the right to conserve distinctive
culture, it doesn't specifically preclude the implementation of a UCC, and the passage
doesn't highlight this as a primary point of conflict. Hence (b) is correct.

4. Vishal, a political science student, is intrigued by the directive principles of state

policy, especially Article 44, which deals with the Uniform Civil Code (UCC). He submits
an academic paper arguing that the language used in Article 44 implies that the duty of
the state is weaker compared to other directive principles. Vandana, a constitutional
law expert, criticizes Vishal’s paper, stating that Article 44 has its own unique
significance. Which of the following statements best encapsulates the nuanced
interpretation of Article 44's language compared to other directive principles as
mentioned in the passage, based on the arguments between Vishal and Vandana?

(a) Vandana's argument is more in line with the passage because Article 44 lays down
that the state shall endeavour to secure a UCC for its citizens, thus making it obligatory
for the state.
(b) Vishal's argument is compelling because Article 44's language is less forceful
compared to other directive principles that use terms like "shall in particular
direct its policy" or "shall be obligation of the state."
(c) Both Vishal and Vandana are incorrect because Article 44 is identical in importance
and phrasing to other directive principles.
(d) Vandana's argument is flawed because the phrase "by suitable legislation" is absent
in Article 44, making the directive weaker than other principles.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the passage indicates that the language of Article 44 is
less forceful compared to other directive principles, which use phrases like "shall in
particular direct its policy" or "shall be obligation of the state." This directly supports
Vishal's contention. Option (a) is incorrect because although Article 44 does state that
the state shall endeavor to secure a UCC, it doesn't explicitly make it obligatory for the
state. This doesn't necessarily align with Vandana's argument about the unique
significance of Article 44. Option (c) is incorrect because the passage explicitly states
that Article 44 is unique in its language compared to other directive principles,
contradicting the idea that it is identical in phrasing and importance. Option (d) is
incorrect because while the absence of the phrase "by suitable legislation" may make
Article 44 appear weaker, it doesn't necessarily contradict Vandana's argument about
its unique significance, which the passage doesn't delve into. Hence (b) is correct.
PASSAGE - 3
Recent arrests in Maharashtra and Nashik have once again sparked debates over the
scope of free speech in India. The individuals were detained for their social media posts
on the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, following the renaming of two cities in Maharashtra
from Aurangabad and Osmanabad to “Chhatrapati Sambhaji Nagar” and “Dharashiv.”
These detentions have taken place under India’s contentious “hate speech laws,”
specifically, Sections 298, 295A, 505(2), and 153A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
Section 298 of the IPC awards up to one-year imprisonment, a fine, or both for the
"deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person." This section has
been invoked against individuals like Mohammad Momeen, a 19-year-old jute bag seller,
and Faizan Saudagar, a 23-year-old tempo driver, both from villages in the Kolhapur
district. Another crucial section under which arrests have been made is Section 295A.
This section deals with "deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage the religious
feelings" and has been employed on an array of issues including political satire and
banning books. The section prescribes a penalty of imprisonment up to three years, a
fine, or both. This law was invoked against Faizan Saudagar as well. The arrestees were
also charged under Section 505(2) of the IPC, which addresses statements that promote
"feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different religious, racial, language, or
regional groups." This section was introduced to shift the burden of proving the truth to
the accused and was widely amended in 1969 to prevent communal tensions. A
violation of this section can lead to imprisonment for up to three years, a fine, or both.
Section 153A, which was not part of the original IPC enacted in 1898, focuses on
promoting enmity between different religious and racial groups. A conviction under this
section can result in up to three years of imprisonment, a fine, or both. Although the
section has a low conviction rate according to National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB)
data, its mere invocation often becomes a form of punishment.
Despite their broad wording, there are legal safeguards against the misuse of these
sections. For instance, Sections 153A and 153B require prior governmental sanction
before initiating prosecution, although this is needed before the trial begins and not at
the preliminary investigation stage. The Supreme Court has also issued guidelines, like
those in the 2014 “Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar” case, which restrict the police from
automatically arresting an accused for crimes that carry a sentence of fewer than seven
years. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in its 2021 ruling, “Patricia Mukhim v. The State
Of Meghalaya,” stated that to secure a conviction under Section 153A, the state has to
prove mens rea or "intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence." This ruling
reflects the essential requirement of "intention" across these hate speech laws. The
application of these laws is not limited to any political party or regime; they have been
used across the board to suppress dissent. For instance, Marathi actor Ketaki Chitale
was arrested for allegedly defaming NCP leader Sharad Pawar, while BJP youth leader
Arul Prasad was arrested for spreading “defamatory information” about Chief Minister
MK Stalin. The arrests underline the delicate balance India is trying to maintain between
preventing hate speech and upholding freedom of speech. While the laws in question
aim to curb the incitement of hatred and promote social harmony, they are also subject
to misuse due to their broad wording and the element of “intention,” which is often hard
to prove. Consequently, these developments contribute to ongoing discussions about the
limitations of free speech in India and the possible political exploitation of hate speech
laws.
Source: Arrests in Maharashtra over Aurangzeb posts: What laws have been used,
and why, The Indian Express (June 14, 2023)
1. Vikram Patel, a 35-year-old history lecturer at a university in Pune, publishes a blog
post discussing the historical context behind the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb's
treatment of religious minorities. In the post, he includes satirical cartoons to
emphasize his points. The blog post becomes viral, and some groups claim that Vikram's
post offends their religious sentiments. Consequently, Vikram is arrested under Section
298 of the IPC for "deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any
person." Based on the given factual situation, which of the following legal defenses is
most likely to be effective for Vikram Patel if he seeks to counter the charges under
Section 298 of the IPC?

(a) Vikram Patel can argue that his blog post was purely academic and the satirical
cartoons were a form of creative expression, therefore not intentionally wounding
anyone's religious feelings.
(b) Vikram Patel can claim that he was quoting historical facts, and as they are facts,
they cannot be subjected to religious sentiment.
(c) Vikram Patel can assert that he never meant to wound anyone's religious feelings;
therefore, the burden of proof should shift to the prosecution to prove the deliberate
intention behind his act.
(d) Vikram Patel can argue that his arrest is unlawful as the police did not have prior
governmental sanction under Section 153A to arrest him for this offense.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because Section 298 of the IPC specifically deals with the
"deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person." The defense can
argue that Vikram's blog post was an academic endeavor coupled with creative
expression and did not have the deliberate intention to wound anyone's religious
feelings. Option (b) is incorrect because even if Vikram Patel was quoting historical
facts, the law under Section 298 focuses on the "deliberate intention" to wound religious
feelings, not on the factual basis of the statements. Option (c) is incorrect because the
issue here is not about shifting the burden of proof to the prosecution but rather about
the "deliberate intention" involved in the act. Merely stating that he did not intend to
wound anyone's religious feelings may not suffice as a defense under this specific
section. Option (d) is incorrect because Section 153A, requiring prior governmental
sanction, is irrelevant to Section 298 under which Vikram was arrested. Thus, this
argument would not serve as an effective defense against charges under Section 298.
Hence, (a) is correct.

2. Vishal Mehta, a 40-year-old author, releases a new book that includes a chapter
criticizing certain religious practices. The book is well-received by some but attracts
strong opposition from various religious groups. Eventually, Vishal is arrested under
Section 295A of the IPC, which deals with "deliberate and malicious acts intended to
outrage the religious feelings." In light of the given factual situation, which of the
following legal defenses could be most compelling for Vishal Mehta if he intends to
counter the charges under Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code?

(a) Vishal Mehta can argue that his book aims to prompt intellectual debate about
religious practices, and therefore, cannot be categorized as an act done with
malice to outrage religious feelings.
(b) Vishal Mehta can state that the book should be treated as a work of fiction and
should not be taken literally, thereby excluding him from the charges under Section
295A.
(c) Vishal Mehta can claim that since the book covers a range of religious practices, it
does not specifically target one religious group to outrage its feelings and thus cannot be
held liable under Section 295A.
(d) Vishal Mehta can contend that he has the right to freedom of speech and expression,
and any restrictions on this right should be reasonable and in accordance with the law.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because Section 295A of the IPC requires that the act must be
"deliberate and malicious" and intended to "outrage the religious feelings" of a
community. Vishal can argue that the purpose of his book is to initiate intellectual
debate, not to outrage religious feelings, thereby negating the element of malice
required under this section. Option (b) is incorrect because labeling the book as fiction
does not exempt it from the scope of Section 295A if the content can still be interpreted
as having the deliberate intention to outrage religious feelings. Option (c) is incorrect
because Section 295A does not require that the act targets a specific religious group.
Even if the book discusses multiple religious practices, it could still be considered as
intended to outrage religious feelings. Option (d) is incorrect because, although freedom
of speech and expression is a constitutional right, Section 295A serves as a limitation on
this right when the act is committed with the deliberate and malicious intent to outrage
religious feelings. Hence, (a) is correct.

3. Vaibhav Kumar, a 27-year-old activist, tweets a series of statements criticizing a newly

proposed government policy that affects multiple religious communities. His tweets
gain traction and spark heated debates online. Soon, he is arrested under Section 505(2)
of the IPC for promoting "feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different
religious, racial, language, or regional groups." Based on the given factual situation,
which of the following legal defenses would be most advantageous for Vaibhav Kumar if
he aims to counter the charges under Section 505(2) of the IPC?

(a) Vaibhav Kumar can argue that he is not responsible for how people interpret his
tweets, and thus, he didn't intend to promote enmity or ill-will.
(b) Vaibhav Kumar can assert that his tweets focus solely on a governmental
policy and do not explicitly promote enmity or ill-will between religious groups,
thereby making the arrest unwarranted under Section 505(2).
(c) Vaibhav Kumar can claim that the burden of proving the truth of his statements
should not be on him as the section was amended in 1969, removing this obligation.
(d) Vaibhav Kumar can contend that his arrest is illegal because the police did not
secure prior governmental sanction, which is a requirement for initiating prosecution
under such sections.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because Section 505(2) of the IPC is concerned with
statements that promote "feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different
religious, racial, language, or regional groups." Vaibhav can assert that his tweets were
directed at critiquing a government policy and did not have the intent to incite enmity or
ill-will between religious groups, thus not fulfilling the criteria for Section 505(2).
Option (a) is incorrect because Section 505(2) places the burden on the accused to
prove that he did not intend to promote enmity, and simply denying responsibility for
how people interpret his tweets may not suffice as a defense. Option (c) is incorrect
because the 1969 amendment to Section 505(2) actually introduced the burden on the
accused to prove their statements were true. Vaibhav's assertion that the burden should
not be on him is contrary to the provisions of the law. Option (d) is incorrect because
Section 505(2) does not require prior governmental sanction for initiating prosecution.
The requirement for prior governmental sanction applies to other sections like 153A
and 153B, not Section 505(2). Hence, (b) is correct.

4. Vinay Patel, a 32-year-old journalist, writes an op-ed piece discussing how the arrests
in Maharashtra and Nashik over social media posts point to the misuse of Sections 298
and 295A of the IPC. The article suggests that these laws are being exploited to curb
freedom of speech. Vinay is subsequently arrested under Section 153A of the IPC for
promoting enmity between different religious and racial groups. Considering the factual
situation above, which of the following defenses would best serve Vinay Patel in
challenging the charges under Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code?

(a) Vinay Patel can assert that he had no mens rea or "intention to cause disorder
or incite people to violence," as required by the Supreme Court ruling in the
"Patricia Mukhim v. The State Of Meghalaya" case to secure a conviction under
Section 153A.
(b) Vinay Patel can argue that since his article is an op-ed piece, it falls under the
domain of personal opinion and thus cannot be charged under Section 153A.
(c) Vinay Patel can claim that Section 153A is not applicable to him as the article
discusses the misuse of laws and does not actively promote enmity between religious or
racial groups.
(d) Vinay Patel can assert that since the arrests he discussed in his article were based on
different sections of the IPC, his piece cannot be taken as promoting enmity under
Section 153A.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because the Supreme Court ruling in the "Patricia Mukhim v.
The State Of Meghalaya" case established that to secure a conviction under Section
153A, the state has to prove mens rea or "intention to cause disorder or incite people to
violence." Vinay can use this ruling as a basis to assert that he had no such intention,
making this the most compelling defense. Option (b) is incorrect because the
classification of the article as an op-ed doesn’t automatically exempt it from the scope of
Section 153A, especially if the content is considered as promoting enmity between
different groups. Option (c) is incorrect because Section 153A doesn’t make exceptions
based on the topic of the article; it focuses on the outcome—whether it promotes
enmity or not. Discussing misuse of laws does not automatically shield one from being
charged under Section 153A if the content promotes enmity. Option (d) is incorrect
because Section 153A is concerned with the promotion of enmity between different
groups and not necessarily with the sections of the IPC discussed in the article. As such,
discussing arrests based on different sections is irrelevant to the charges under Section
153A. Hence, (a) is correct.

5. Based on the principle that India is attempting to balance between preventing hate
speech and upholding freedom of speech, which of the following statements is most
likely to be true?

(a) There is a consensus that Sections 298, 295A, 505(2), and 153A of the IPC are
effective and fair in curbing hate speech without limiting freedom of speech.
(b) The broad wording of hate speech laws allows room for misuse, potentially
jeopardizing freedom of speech.
(c) The Supreme Court has ruled that no one can be arrested for spreading hate speech
online, given that it falls under freedom of speech.
(d) Hate speech laws are only applicable to specific religious or racial groups in India.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the passage states that while the laws in question aim
to curb the incitement of hatred and promote social harmony, they are also subject to
misuse due to their broad wording. This highlights the challenge India faces in balancing
hate speech prevention with freedom of speech. Option (a) is incorrect because the
passage does not mention any consensus regarding the effectiveness and fairness of
these laws. Option (c) is incorrect because it contradicts the premise that hate speech
laws are enforced, as exemplified by the arrests made. Option (d) is incorrect because
the passage states that the application of these laws is not limited to any specific
religious or racial groups. Hence, (b) is correct.

6. In the context of hate speech laws in India, what would be a major legal implication if
a person is arrested but not convicted?

(a) A mere invocation of Section 153A can be viewed as a form of punishment even
without conviction.
(b) The arrested individual will be subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence of one
year.
(c) The accused must prove the truthfulness of their statement to avoid conviction,
according to Section 505(2).
(d) Section 153A and 153B of the IPC can be invoked only after prior governmental
sanction, making arrests without conviction impossible.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because the passage mentions that although Section 153A has
a low conviction rate according to National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data, its mere
invocation often becomes a form of punishment. Option (b) is incorrect because the
passage does not state that there is a mandatory minimum sentence of one year for
those arrested. Option (c) is incorrect because while Section 505(2) does shift the
burden of proving the truth to the accused, it does not mention that the accused must
prove their statement's truthfulness to avoid conviction. Option (d) is incorrect because
although Sections 153A and 153B require prior governmental sanction, the sanction is
needed before the trial begins and not at the preliminary investigation stage, thus
arrests without conviction are possible. Hence, (a) is correct.
PASSAGE - 4
In June 2020, a Kerala-based women’s rights activist became the center of controversy
when she posted a video on social media. The video displayed her children, aged 14 and
8, painting on her semi-nude torso, accompanied by the hashtag “Body Art and Politics.”
Public outrage followed, leading the police to file charges against her under the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act 2012, Information Technology
(IT) Act 2000, and the Juvenile Justice (JJ) Act 2015. The Ernakulam court decided not to
discharge her, stating there were grounds to believe she had committed offenses. Under
the POCSO Act, she was charged with offenses under Sections 10 read with 9(n), 14 read
with 13(b), and Section 15. These sections pertain to sexual assault by a child's relative,
using children for pornographic purposes, and storing child pornographic material,
respectively.
The police also charged the activist under Section 67B (a), (b), and (c) of the
Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (JJ) Act,
2015. Section 67B (a) (b) and (c) of the IT Act lays down the punishment for publishing
or electronically transmitting obscene material, which depicts children in sexually
explicit acts. Section 67B (a) is attracted when the material depicts children engaged in
sexually explicit acts, and Section 67(B) (b) is attracted when children are depicted in an
obscene, indecent, or sexually explicit manner. Section 67B (c) is about the cultivation,
enticement, or induction of children into online relationships for sexually explicit acts.
Section 75 of the JJ Act prescribes punishment for cruelty to children, which includes
assaulting, abandoning, abusing, exposing, and wilfully neglecting them to cause
unnecessary mental or physical suffering. After viewing the video, the court said that
although it showed the activist’s son painting her chest, the crucial question was
whether there was any sexual intent on the mother’s part. Dismissing the POCSO
charges against her, the court said that Sections 9 (n) and 10 are attracted when a child’s
relative commits “sexual assault”. However, “sexual assault” under Section 7 of the Act
requires “sexual intent” while touching the child’s private parts or making the child
touch one’s own or another person’s private parts.
On the use of Section 15 (punishment for storing pornographic material involving
children), the court said the children in the video were clothed, and participating in a
harmless and creative activity. “Hence, the offence under Section 15 also would not lie,”
the court said.Observing that the lower court had “completely overlooked the context”
in which the video was published, the High Court discharged the activist of the
remaining charges under the IT and JJ Act(s). “There is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the petitioner,” the court said. In its order dated June 5, the court
said that a mother-child relationship is one of the “most solemn and pious
relationships”. Clearing the accused of charges under Sections 67B (a), (b), and (c) of the
IT Act, the court said that Section 67B (b) is attracted only when the material “depicts
children in an obscene or indecent, or sexually explicit manner”. In its judgment, the
court delved into the evolving definition of ‘obscenity.’ Initially, the Indian judiciary
adopted the 1868 UK-based ‘Hicklin test’ for obscenity. However, in 2014, the Supreme
Court applied 'contemporary community standards,' stating that a material could only
be considered obscene if it incites sexual arousal or explicit thoughts. The Kerala High
Court concluded that nudity and obscenity were not necessarily synonymous and
criticized societal double standards that allow the overt sexualization of women’s
bodies. The court recognized that the activist’s primary intention was not to exploit her
children but to challenge these double standards. The case was groundbreaking in its
nuanced understanding of laws concerning child protection, obscenity, and women’s
autonomy. By setting this precedent, the court not only clarified the scope and
limitations of the POCSO Act, IT Act, and JJ Act but also advanced the discourse on bodily
autonomy and gender equality.
Source: ‘Sexual intent’ in POCSO, definition of obscenity: Why Kerala HC threw out
case against activist, The Indian Express (June 9, 2023)

1. Vinay, an art teacher in Mumbai, records a video of his 10-year-old daughter, Veena,
drawing a nature scene on a large canvas. The video is meant to showcase Veena's
extraordinary art skills. During the video, Veena dips her fingers into non-toxic paint
and applies it directly onto the canvas, as she finds it easier than using a brush for
certain textures. The video is posted on social media platforms with the hashtag
"#ArtFromTheHeart." After it goes viral, Vinay is charged under Sections 9(n) and 10 of
the POCSO Act for allegedly exploiting his child for pornographic purposes. Which of the
following options most accurately reflects the likely outcome of Vinay's case under the
POCSO Act, considering Sections 9(n) and 10, as they relate to sexual intent?

(a) Vinay is likely to be convicted under Sections 9(n) and 10 of the POCSO Act because
his daughter touched paint, which is suggestive of sexual content.
(b) Vinay is unlikely to be convicted under Sections 9(n) and 10 of the POCSO Act
as the element of "sexual intent" seems to be missing in the act of recording the
video.
(c) Vinay will likely face charges only under Section 9(n) of the POCSO Act because it
explicitly deals with a child's relative.
(d) Vinay is likely to be convicted under Sections 9(n) and 10 because the video went
viral, indicating mass distribution of inappropriate content.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the passage states that "sexual assault" under Section
7 of the POCSO Act requires "sexual intent" while touching the child’s private parts or
making the child touch one's own or another person's private parts. In Vinay's case,
Veena is seen painting a canvas and not involved in any act that has sexual intent,
making it unlikely for him to be convicted under Sections 9(n) and 10. Option (a) is
incorrect because there is no indication in the factual situation that touching paint is
suggestive of sexual content or that there was any sexual intent involved in the act. The
POCSO Act requires "sexual intent" as one of its elements, and the passage explains this
clearly. Option (c) is incorrect because even though Section 9(n) deals with a child's
relative, there is no evidence of sexual intent, a necessary element for conviction under
POCSO Act. The passage clarifies that both Sections 9(n) and 10 require a sexual intent
for conviction. Option (d) is incorrect because going viral does not, in itself, indicate that
the content is sexually explicit or inappropriate. The passage explains that the key
element is whether there was "sexual intent" on the part of the parent, which seems to
be lacking in Vinay's case. Hence, (b) is correct.

2. Vikas, a YouTuber from Delhi, decides to launch a public awareness campaign

focusing on teaching children about online safety. To make his message more relatable
to children, he creates a fictional story using animated characters in which one of the
characters is tricked into giving out personal information online. However, Vikas makes
a controversial choice by using children's nursery rhymes as background music. The
video gains popularity but also garners criticism. Soon, Vikas is charged under Section
67B(a), (b), and (c) of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, for allegedly
publishing obscene material depicting children in explicit acts. What is the most likely
outcome for Vikas under Section 67B(a), (b), and (c) of the Information Technology (IT)
Act, 2000, concerning the depiction of children in explicit acts?

(a) Vikas is likely to be acquitted under Section 67B(a), (b), and (c) because the
primary focus of his content is to educate children about online safety, and there
are no explicit or sexually suggestive scenes involving children.
(b) Vikas is likely to be convicted under Section 67B(a), (b), and (c) since he used
children's nursery rhymes, making the content targeted at children and potentially
harmful.
(c) Vikas will be convicted under Section 67B(c) because the act of tricking a character
into sharing personal information can be considered as cultivation or enticement for
explicit acts.
(d) Vikas will only face charges under Section 67B(a) since the video aims to depict
children in an explicit manner due to the controversial choice of nursery rhymes.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct as the passage outlines that Section 67B(a), (b), and (c) of the
IT Act are related to obscene and sexually explicit material involving children. Vikas'
video does not include explicit or sexually suggestive scenes, and its primary intent is
educational. Option (b) is incorrect because the passage specifies that Section 67B(a),
(b), and (c) pertain to the depiction of children in sexually explicit acts or in an obscene,
indecent manner. Using nursery rhymes does not meet these criteria. Option (c) is
incorrect because, according to the passage, Section 67B(c) is about the "cultivation,
enticement, or induction of children into online relationships for sexually explicit acts."
There is no indication that Vikas' video serves such a purpose. Option (d) is incorrect
because the mere use of nursery rhymes does not depict children in a sexually explicit
manner as specified under Section 67B(a). The passage clarifies that this section is
attracted when the material depicts children in sexually explicit acts, which is not the
case for Vikas' video. Hence, (b) is correct.

3. Vaishali, an art teacher in Mumbai, has her students participate in a project to create a
mural on a public wall. The project involves the students painting various family scenes,
but Vaishali decides to include a section that depicts a mother breastfeeding her child.
The mural sparks a debate, and soon Vaishali finds herself facing charges under the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act 2012, specifically under
Sections 10 read with 9(n), 14 read with 13(b), and Section 15 for using children for
pornographic purposes and storing child pornographic material. Under the POCSO Act,
is Vaishali likely to be convicted for the charges against her considering the content of
the mural?

(a) Vaishali will be convicted under Sections 10, 14, and 15 because she involved minors
in creating a mural that depicts a sensitive family scene, thereby using them for
pornographic purposes.
(b) Vaishali will not be convicted under any of the charged Sections as the mural
represents a natural family scene without any sexual intent, and the children were
participating in an educational project.
(c) Vaishali will be convicted only under Section 15 because the mural, being a public
artwork, can be considered as storing child pornographic material.
(d) Vaishali will be convicted under Section 14 as she has used children to create
artwork that may be interpreted as pornographic by some viewers, thereby making it
harmful for them.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because, according to the passage, the court would likely
consider the intent behind the creation of the mural. In Vaishali's case, the mural is
educational and represents a natural family scene without any sexual intent. Hence, the
charged Sections under POCSO would not apply. Option (a) is incorrect because the
passage states that under the POCSO Act, Sections pertaining to sexual assault by a
child's relative and using children for pornographic purposes require "sexual intent" for
conviction. Vaishali's mural, which depicts a natural family scene, lacks any sexual
intent. Option (c) is incorrect as the passage specifies that Section 15 pertains to storing
child pornographic material. Vaishali's mural, which shows a natural family scene, does
not qualify as child pornographic material. Option (d) is incorrect because the passage
highlights that sexual intent is required for a conviction under Sections like 14 read with
13(b). There is no evidence to suggest that Vaishali's mural has a sexual intent or is
harmful to children. Hence, (b) is correct.

4. Vinay, an independent filmmaker in Bengaluru, creates a documentary highlighting

the double standards in society concerning women’s bodily autonomy. To emphasize his
point, he includes interviews with mothers who openly discuss their experiences with
breastfeeding and features clips of mothers nursing their infants. Following its release,
Vinay is charged under Section 67B (a), (b), and (c) of the Information Technology (IT)
Act, 2000 for publishing material that depicts children in an explicit manner. Would
Vinay be held liable under Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, for
including clips of mothers nursing their infants in his documentary?

(a) Yes, Vinay would be liable under Section 67B (a) and (b) as he has published
material that depicts children in sexually explicit and indecent acts, even if the intention
was educational.
(b) No, Vinay would not be liable under Section 67B (a), (b), or (c) as the
documentary serves an educational purpose and does not depict children in an
obscene, indecent, or sexually explicit manner.
(c) Yes, Vinay would be liable under Section 67B (c) as the clips could be seen as an
enticement or induction of children into online relationships for sexually explicit acts.
(d) No, Vinay would only be liable under Section 67B (b) as the clips, although not
sexually explicit, could be considered indecent or obscene material.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct based on the information in the passage, which emphasizes the
evolving definition of ‘obscenity.’ The court concluded that nudity and obscenity were
not necessarily synonymous. Vinay’s documentary serves an educational purpose and
does not depict children in an obscene, indecent, or sexually explicit manner. Option (a)
is incorrect because the passage states that Section 67B (a) and (b) of the IT Act are
attracted only when material depicts children engaged in sexually explicit acts or in an
obscene, indecent, or sexually explicit manner. Vinay’s documentary is educational and
does not meet these criteria. Option (c) is incorrect as the passage specifies that Section
67B (c) pertains to the cultivation, enticement, or induction of children into online
relationships for sexually explicit acts. There is no evidence to suggest that Vinay’s
documentary serves this purpose. Option (d) is incorrect because, according to the
passage, Section 67B (b) is attracted only when material "depicts children in an obscene
or indecent, or sexually explicit manner." Vinay's documentary aims to educate and does
not depict children in an obscene, indecent, or sexually explicit manner. Hence, (b) is
correct.

5. Considering the judgment of the Kerala High Court, which of the following statements
is an accurate inference regarding "sexual intent" as required under the POCSO Act?

(a) The POCSO Act requires that any touch between a child and an adult qualifies as
sexual assault.
(b) A child painting a semi-nude parent amounts to sexual assault regardless of intent.
(c) Under the POCSO Act, sexual intent is required for a charge of sexual assault by
a relative.
(d) Semi-nudity automatically implies sexual intent under the POCSO Act.

Ans: (c)

Sol: Option (c) is correct because the court stated that Sections 9(n) and 10 of the
POCSO Act would be attracted when a child’s relative commits “sexual assault,” and
sexual assault under Section 7 of the Act requires “sexual intent.” Option (a) is incorrect
because the court clarified that sexual intent is required for charges under the POCSO
Act to be applicable, thus not all touch would qualify. Option (b) is incorrect because the
court said that sexual intent was crucial to establish a charge under Sections 9(n) and 10
of the POCSO Act. The act of a child painting a semi-nude parent did not necessarily
imply sexual intent. Option (d) is incorrect because the court dismissed the charges
based on the absence of sexual intent, not the semi-nude condition of the parent. Hence,
(c) is correct.

6. In light of the court's judgment, which statement best captures the court's view on the
evolving definition of "obscenity" in the IT Act?

(a) The Hicklin test remains the cornerstone for determining obscenity in India.
(b) Material is considered obscene only if it incites sexual arousal or explicit
thoughts.
(c) The court adheres strictly to the "community standards" for defining obscenity.
(d) Nudity and obscenity are synonymous according to the Indian judiciary.

Ans: (b)
Sol: Option (b) is correct because the court, in its judgment, referred to the Supreme
Court's 2014 adaptation of 'contemporary community standards,' stating that material
could only be considered obscene if it incites sexual arousal or explicit thoughts. Option
(a) is incorrect because the passage indicates that initially, the Indian judiciary adopted
the 1868 UK-based ‘Hicklin test’ for obscenity, but this is no longer the standard used.
Option (c) is incorrect because while the court did refer to "community standards," it did
so to explain the evolution from the Hicklin test and emphasized that material is
considered obscene only if it incites sexual arousal or explicit thoughts. Option (d) is
incorrect because the court concluded that nudity and obscenity were not necessarily
synonymous. Hence, (b) is correct.
PASSAGE - 5
The Kerala High Court Wednesday (June 7) stayed an order passed by single-judge PV
Kunhikrishnan which said that a student’s credit score cannot be a factor in rejecting an
education loan application. Acting on an appeal filed by the State Bank of India (SBI), a
Bench of Acting Chief Justice SVN Bhatti and Justice Basant Balaji temporarily stayed an
order dated May 30, directing the banks to sanction educational loans to students
without rejecting them on the basis of a low CIBIL or credit score. The bank had
challenged the order on grounds that the credit sanctioning has to be carried out
according to the applicable rules and guidelines such as the Credit Information
Companies Act, 2005, which deals with the regulation of credit information companies
and facilitates efficient credit distribution. On May 30, the High Court had held that a
student’s credit score cannot be a factor in rejecting an education loan application.
Calling students the “nation builders of tomorrow”, a Bench of Justice PV Kunhikrishnan
added that the student’s education loan application should not have been rejected
simply because he had a low CIBIL or credit score.
In Noel Paul Fredy vs State Bank of India, the Kerala High Court was dealing with a
petition filed by a student seeking sanction and consequently the disbursal of an
education loan worth Rs 4,07,200 within the stipulated time. On finding that the balance
of convenience was in favour of the student, who completed his course on May 31 and
had also secured a job in Oman, the court directed the bank to sanction and disburse the
loan to the petitioner student’s college. “While considering Education Loan application,
a humanitarian approach is necessary from the Banks. Students are the nation builders
of tomorrow. They have to lead this country in future. Simply because, there is low
CIBIL score to a student, who is an applicant for Education loan, I am of the considered
opinion that Education loan application ought not have been rejected by Bank,” the
court said. Also, “Banks may be hypertechnical, but a court of law cannot ignore the
ground realities.”
In KM George vs The Branch Manager, the court said that the rejection of the student’s
loan application for a deficiency in his father’s credit score was arbitrary and violative
of the spirit of the circular issued by the Reserve Bank of India on April 28, 2001. In this
case, while the student was given a scholarship by his university for the fee of the first
two semesters on account of his merit, the court found that the bank had failed to assess
the student’s repaying possibilities based on his course’s potential and his future
earning capabilities, consequently depriving him of an opportunity to pursue his
studies. The court determined that the aim of educational loan schemes is to ensure that
no deserving student misses out on higher education due to lack of funds.
On April 28, 2001, the RBI issued a circular in which it mentioned a comprehensive
“model educational loan scheme” prepared by the Indian Banks Association (IBA) “for
adoption by all banks”. The scheme aimed to provide financial support from the banking
system to deserving or meritorious students pursuing higher education in India and
abroad. Additionally, it was announced in the Union Budget for 2001–2002. While this
scheme provided broad guidelines for banks to operationalise education loans, its
implementation by banks varied. Following this, on June 24, 2019, the RBI advised all
scheduled commercial banks to adopt the educational loan scheme formulated by IBA in
2001.
Source: ‘Bank can’t refuse education loan over student’s CIBIL score’: What the
Kerala HC held, The Indian Express, (June 4, 2023)
1. Vinod, a resident of Kerala, has been accepted to the prestigious IIT Madras for his
engineering course. His family has faced financial hardships, leading to a low credit
score. Vinod applies for an educational loan of Rs 5,00,000 from the State Bank of India
(SBI). The bank declines his application citing his poor credit score. In the background,
the Kerala High Court recently stayed an order that stated a student's credit score could
not be a factor in rejecting an educational loan. Which of the following best describes
the legal status of SBI's rejection of Vinod's educational loan application, based on the
Kerala High Court's recent stay on the previous ruling?

(a) SBI is fully justified in rejecting Vinod's educational loan application based on
his low credit score, as the Kerala High Court's stay supports the bank's discretion
in this matter.
(b) SBI should sanction the loan regardless of Vinod's credit score because students are
the "nation builders of tomorrow," as per the previously overruled judgment by Justice
PV Kunhikrishnan.
(c) The court has to consider the balance of convenience in favor of Vinod, and direct SBI
to sanction the loan, as seen in the case of Noel Paul Fredy vs State Bank of India.
(d) SBI's rejection is arbitrary as it did not consider Vinod's potential for repaying the
loan based on the course's potential and future earning capabilities.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because the Kerala High Court recently stayed an order that
previously directed the banks to sanction educational loans without considering a low
CIBIL or credit score. This stay temporarily supports SBI's authority to reject Vinod's
educational loan application based on his low credit score. Option (b) is incorrect
because the Kerala High Court's recent stay effectively nullifies the statement about
students being "nation builders of tomorrow" in the context of educational loans and
credit scores. Option (c) is incorrect because the 'balance of convenience' was a specific
factor considered in Noel Paul Fredy's case and cannot be generalized to apply in
Vinod's situation, particularly after the High Court's stay on the earlier order. Option (d)
is incorrect because while the rejection might seem unfair from a humanitarian
perspective, the Kerala High Court's stay currently supports the bank's decision to reject
loan applications based on low credit scores. Hence, (a) is correct.

2. Vivek, a talented young musician, has been offered a seat in the Berklee College of
Music in the United States. Vivek applies for an educational loan from the State Bank of
India (SBI). SBI denies the loan on the grounds that his course does not have a
"guaranteed job outcome." However, Vivek has recently won an international music
competition and has a job offer lined up in a renowned music company. The Kerala High
Court had previously mentioned in Noel Paul Fredy vs State Bank of India that the
balance of convenience was in favor of the student, who had completed his course and
secured a job. In the context of the legal principle relating to the balance of convenience,
what should be the court's decision regarding Vivek's loan application with SBI?

(a) The court should direct SBI to sanction the loan because the balance of
convenience is in favor of Vivek, as he has a job offer and significant achievements
in music.
(b) The court should uphold SBI's decision to deny the loan, as the "balance of
convenience" principle is not applicable to international educational institutions.
(c) SBI's denial is justified because the course in question does not have a "guaranteed
job outcome," and this is sufficient to tip the balance of convenience in favor of the bank.
(d) The court should disregard Vivek's job offer and achievements as they are not
related to the balance of convenience, which is primarily concerned with the bank's
financial interests.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because in the case of Noel Paul Fredy vs State Bank of India,
the Kerala High Court considered that the balance of convenience was in favor of the
student who had secured a job. Given that Vivek has significant achievements and a job
offer, it could be argued that the balance of convenience is also in his favor, which might
compel the court to direct SBI to sanction the loan. Option (b) is incorrect because the
principle of the "balance of convenience" was discussed in a specific case and was not
restricted to domestic or international educational institutions. Therefore, it could be
applicable in Vivek's case as well. Option (c) is incorrect because although SBI claims the
course doesn't have a "guaranteed job outcome," the fact that Vivek has a job offer and
significant achievements in the field could tip the balance of convenience in his favor,
similar to the Noel Paul Fredy case. Option (d) is incorrect because the balance of
convenience is not solely about the bank's financial interests; it also considers the
student's prospects, as seen in the case of Noel Paul Fredy vs State Bank of India. Hence,
(a) is correct.

3. Vaibhav is a meritorious student who has been admitted to an esteemed university

for an MBA program. His father, Viren, has a poor credit score due to a previous business
failure. Vaibhav applies for an educational loan from the State Bank of India (SBI). The
bank denies the loan citing a deficiency in his father's credit score. The Kerala High
Court in the case of KM George vs The Branch Manager had held that the rejection of the
student's loan application due to a deficiency in his father's credit score was arbitrary. Is
the denial of an educational loan to Vaibhav by SBI on the grounds of his father's poor
credit score legally justified based on the ruling in KM George vs The Branch Manager?

(a) Yes, the bank is justified in denying the loan as it is based on the father's poor credit
score, which is a relevant factor according to banking guidelines.
(b) No, the denial is arbitrary because it violates the spirit of the Kerala High
Court's ruling in the KM George case that rejecting a loan based on a parent's poor
credit score is arbitrary.
(c) Yes, Vaibhav's case cannot be compared to KM George's case because Vaibhav is
pursuing an MBA, which is a professional course and thus a different category.
(d) No, the bank should not consider the father's credit score but only focus on
Vaibhav's academic merits as he is the actual loan applicant.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because according to the Kerala High Court's ruling in KM
George vs The Branch Manager, the rejection of a student's loan application based on a
deficiency in his father's credit score is considered arbitrary. Therefore, the denial of
Vaibhav's educational loan based on his father's poor credit score is not legally justified.
Option (a) is incorrect because even though poor credit scores might generally be a
relevant factor according to banking guidelines, the Kerala High Court in KM George's
case considered such rejections arbitrary. Option (c) is incorrect because the type of
course (MBA or otherwise) was not a distinguishing factor in the legal principle
established by the Kerala High Court in the KM George case. Option (d) is incorrect
because while focusing solely on Vaibhav's merits might seem fair, this option does not
specifically address the legal issue established in the KM George case, which made it
arbitrary to reject loans based on a parent's poor credit score. Hence, (b) is correct.

4. Vinay, an engineering student, has applied for an educational loan from State Bank of
India (SBI). He has already received a scholarship from his university for the fees of the
first two semesters. However, SBI rejects his loan application stating that his course
does not align with the "model educational loan scheme" prepared by the Indian Banks
Association (IBA) and advised by RBI in 2019 for adoption by all scheduled commercial
banks. The Kerala High Court had previously stated in KM George vs The Branch
Manager that the bank had failed to assess the student's repaying possibilities based on
his course's potential and future earning capabilities. In light of the legal issue regarding
the bank's failure to assess the student's repaying possibilities based on course potential
and future earnings, what is the likely legal outcome for Vinay?

(a) SBI's rejection is valid because the "model educational loan scheme" advised by RBI
takes precedence over individual case factors like scholarships.
(b) The court should direct SBI to reassess Vinay's loan application by considering
his scholarship and potential future earnings, as indicated by the KM George case.
(c) The court has no authority to direct the bank on operationalizing education loans, as
it is guided by the model educational loan scheme prepared by the IBA.
(d) SBI's rejection is valid since scholarships for the first two semesters do not
guarantee Vinay's financial stability for the entire course.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because, in the KM George vs The Branch Manager case, the
Kerala High Court emphasized that the bank had failed to assess the student's repaying
possibilities based on his course's potential and future earning capabilities. Given that
Vinay has received a scholarship for the first two semesters, these factors may point to
his ability to repay the loan in the future. Option (a) is incorrect because while the
"model educational loan scheme" prepared by the IBA and advised by RBI sets broad
guidelines, the KM George case indicates that banks should also consider individual
factors like the course's potential and future earning capabilities. Option (c) is incorrect
because, as established in the KM George case, courts can indeed provide directions to
banks if they fail to adequately assess a student’s repaying capabilities based on the
potential of the course and future earnings. Option (d) is incorrect as the scholarships
for the first two semesters could be indicative of Vinay's academic potential, which in
turn could be indicative of his future earning capabilities. The bank's failure to consider
this could be seen as arbitrary, according to the principles laid out in the KM George
case. Hence, (b) is correct.
5. Based on the judgments in the cases of Noel Paul Fredy vs State Bank of India and KM
George vs The Branch Manager, what can be inferred about the court's perspective on
the role of CIBIL or credit scores in determining eligibility for an educational loan?

(a) The court strictly believes that CIBIL scores should be the sole determining factor for
educational loan approval.
(b) The court is of the view that the bank's internal policies should be the only criteria
for determining loan eligibility.
(c) The court insists that a student's merit in academics should solely decide the loan
approval process.
(d) The court suggests that CIBIL scores should not be the sole factor in rejecting
an education loan and emphasizes a humanitarian approach.

Ans: (d)

Sol: Option (d) is correct because the Kerala High Court, in the cases of Noel Paul Fredy
vs State Bank of India and KM George vs The Branch Manager, specifically stated that a
student's credit score should not be the sole factor in rejecting an educational loan
application. The court also highlighted the need for a humanitarian approach in loan
sanctioning. Option (a) is incorrect because the court specifically disapproves of using
CIBIL scores as the sole determining factor. Option (b) is incorrect because the court has
questioned the bank's adherence to only internal policies and pushed for a broader,
more humanitarian approach. Option (c) is incorrect because while the court does
consider a student's future prospects, it does not state that academic merit should be
the only determining factor for loan approval. Hence (d) is correct.

6. Considering the Reserve Bank of India's circular and its impact on the cases
mentioned, what can be concluded about the responsibilities of banks in assessing a
student's potential for repayment?

(a) Banks are mandated to strictly follow RBI guidelines without any deviation.
(b) Banks are advised to consider a student’s future earning capabilities and
course’s potential for assessing repayment.
(c) Banks are at liberty to solely use a parent's credit score for determining loan
eligibility.
(d) Banks are encouraged to use arbitrary measures to assess repayment capabilities of
students.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because in the case of KM George vs The Branch Manager, the
court found that the bank had failed to assess the student’s repaying possibilities based
on his course’s potential and his future earning capabilities. This indicates that the bank
should have considered these factors, aligning with the RBI guidelines that advise such a
comprehensive approach. Option (a) is incorrect because the RBI has issued broad
guidelines that banks should adopt, but the implementation varies from bank to bank.
Option (c) is incorrect because the court found that the rejection based solely on the
father's credit score was arbitrary and violative of the spirit of RBI's guidelines. Option
(d) is incorrect because the court criticized the bank for their arbitrary assessment and
stressed the need to consider a student’s future prospects for repayment. Hence (b) is
correct.
PASSAGE - 6
The Karnataka High Court on May 30 held that having sexual intercourse with a
woman’s dead body will not attract the offence of rape, punishable under Section 376 of
the Indian Penal Code, as there is no provision in the IPC for it. Partially allowing the
convict’s appeal in a rape and murder case, a bench of Justices B. Veerappa and
Venkatesh Naik recommended that the Centre should amend the IPC to protect the
dignity of the dead. “It is high time for the Central government to amend the provisions
of Section 377 of IPC” to include dead bodies of men, women, and animals, the court
said.
On June 25, 2015, a 21-year-old woman was returning home after her computer class
when the accused Rangaraju attacked her. He murdered her, an offence under Section
302 IPC, and subsequently "raped" her corpse. Charges were filed against him for
offences of murder and rape under Sections 302 and 376 IPC. The session's judge
sentenced Rangaraju to rigorous life imprisonment for murder and an additional 10
years for raping the victim’s dead body. An appeal was filed before the Karnataka High
Court. While the trial court’s decision to convict and sentence him to life imprisonment
for murder under Section 302 of the IPC was upheld, the high court acquitted him under
Section 376 for “raping” the victim’s dead body, reasoning that there is no provision in
the IPC to punish him for the same. “Admittedly, the accused had sexual intercourse on
the dead body,” the court observed. However, whether it would amount to an offence
under Sections 375 (rape) and 377 (unnatural offences) remained to be seen.
“A careful reading of the provisions of Sections 375 and 377 of the Indian Penal Code
makes it clear that the dead body cannot be called as human or person. Thereby, the
provisions of Section 375 or 377 of the Indian Penal Code would not attract,” the court
said. Adding that no offence punishable under Section 376 (punishment for rape) had
taken place, the court clarified that “sexual intercourse on a dead body is nothing but
necrophilia” Under Section 46 of the IPC, the court said that “death” denotes the “death
of a human being”. Therefore, the court opined that rape must be “accomplished with a
person, not a dead body”. “A dead body cannot consent to or protest a rape, nor can it be
in fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury,” the court said while adding that it also
doesn’t have any feelings of outrage. Additionally, the court relied on the 1989 SC ruling
in “Pt Parmanand Katara, Advocate vs Union of India,” which said that the dignity of a
dead body must be maintained and respected while establishing a corresponding duty
on the state to ensure decent cremation is served to the person. The “right to dignity
and fair treatment under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is not only available to a
living man but also to his body after his death,” the ruling said. Besides this, the court
invoked the 2021 National Human Rights Commission’s advisory, on “Upholding the
Dignity and Protecting the Rights of the Dead,” which states that there cannot be any
physical exploitation or discrimination in the treatment of the body and also mentions
the right to a decent and timely burial. The Karnataka High Court in “Rangaraju
@Vajapeyi vs State of Karnataka” observed that “necrophilia” is a morbid fascination
with death and the dead and more particularly, an erotic attraction to corpses. A
psychosexual disorder, classified under the DSM-IV, among a group of disorders, called
“paraphilias,” including paedophilia, exhibitionism, and sexual masochism, necrophilia
“could be the result of rage, experimentation, or lust rather than sexual necessity or
habit,” the court noted.
Source: What is necrophilia and is it an offence in India?, The Indian Express (June
5, 2023)
1. Varun, a 28-year-old man, is charged with the murder of Vani, a 32-year-old woman,
and the rape of her corpse. The police arrested him after he was caught on a CCTV
camera near the crime scene. He was sentenced by the session's court to life
imprisonment for murder under Section 302 of the IPC and 10 years for rape under
Section 376 of the IPC. Varun appealed the decision, challenging the rape conviction on
the ground that the IPC lacks provisions for considering intercourse with a dead body as
rape. Based on the given facts, should Varun be acquitted of the rape charge under
Section 376 of the IPC because of sexual intercourse with Vani's dead body?

(a) No, because Section 376 of the IPC clearly states that sexual intercourse with a
woman, whether alive or dead, is considered rape.
(b) Yes, because the Karnataka High Court has previously held that there is no
provision in Section 376 of the IPC that makes sexual intercourse with a dead
body an offense.
(c) No, because Section 377 of the IPC which deals with unnatural offenses, will apply to
Varun’s act.
(d) Yes, because Varun did not have the intent to commit rape as defined under Section
376 of the IPC.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the Karnataka High Court explicitly mentioned that
Section 376 of the IPC lacks the provision to consider sexual intercourse with a dead
body as rape. The factual situation is directly related to this principle. Option (a) is
incorrect because the passage states that the Karnataka High Court held that there is no
provision in Section 376 of the IPC that makes sexual intercourse with a dead body an
offense. Therefore, Section 376 does not clearly include sexual intercourse with a dead
body. Option (c) is incorrect because the passage states that Sections 375 and 377 of the
IPC would not attract the provisions when a dead body is involved, according to the
High Court's interpretation. Thus, Section 377 of the IPC is not applicable in this
scenario. Option (d) is incorrect because the passage does not focus on the intent of the
accused but rather on the absence of a provision in Section 376 to consider sexual
intercourse with a dead body as rape. Hence (b) is correct.

2. Vikas is accused of murdering Vidya, a 25-year-old woman, near her home. Post-
mortem reports confirm that Vidya was killed due to strangulation. While the lower
court convicted Vikas under Section 302 IPC for murder and sentenced him to rigorous
life imprisonment, his lawyer has filed an appeal before the Karnataka High Court
challenging the ruling. No sexual offense was involved in the case, only the act of
murder. Given that Vikas has been convicted for the murder of Vidya, should his
sentence of rigorous life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC be upheld by the
Karnataka High Court?

(a) No, because the Karnataka High Court generally overrules the lower court's decision
regarding Section 302 IPC.
(b) No, because the Karnataka High Court can modify the conviction to a lesser sentence
for Vikas, given that he did not commit any sexual offense.
(c) Yes, because according to the passage, the Karnataka High Court upheld the
lower court’s decision to convict and sentence Rangaraju to life imprisonment for
murder under Section 302 IPC.
(d) Yes, because the passage suggests that the lower courts are not competent enough
to deal with murder cases, and their decisions are always to be reconsidered.

Ans: (c)
Sol: Option (c) is correct because the passage explicitly states that the Karnataka High
Court upheld the lower court’s decision to convict Rangaraju to life imprisonment for
murder under Section 302 IPC. Given that the factual situation is similar, it would be
consistent for the High Court to uphold Vikas's life imprisonment sentence. Option (a) is
incorrect because the passage does not suggest that the Karnataka High Court generally
overrules lower court's decisions regarding Section 302 IPC. In fact, the High Court
upheld the lower court's decision in the case of Rangaraju. Option (b) is incorrect
because the passage does not indicate that the absence of a sexual offense would
warrant a lesser sentence. The Karnataka High Court upheld the conviction for murder
under Section 302 IPC regardless of whether a sexual offense was committed. Option
(d) is incorrect because the passage does not comment on the competence of lower
courts in dealing with murder cases or suggest that their decisions should be
reconsidered. Hence (c) is correct.

3. Vishnu is a medical examiner who is accused of sexually molesting a male corpse

during autopsy. The charges filed against him include an offense under Sections 375 and
377 of the IPC for rape and unnatural offenses. An appeal has been filed in the
Karnataka High Court, asking for clarification on whether a dead body can be classified
as a "human or person" under the relevant sections of the IPC. Does Vishnu's act of
molesting a male corpse during an autopsy amount to offenses under Sections 375 and
377 of the IPC?

(a) Yes, because Sections 375 and 377 of the IPC should be interpreted broadly to
include sexual offenses against dead bodies as it involves human dignity.
(b) No, because Sections 375 and 377 of the IPC do not attract the provisions when
a dead body is involved, according to the Karnataka High Court's interpretation.
(c) Yes, because Section 46 of the IPC states that "death" denotes the "death of a human
being," therefore, a corpse should still be considered a human being under Sections 375
and 377.
(d) No, because Vishnu did not commit the act against a living person, and thus his
actions cannot be classified as rape or unnatural offenses under the IPC.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the passage explicitly mentions that the Karnataka
High Court clarified that a dead body cannot be classified as a "human or person" for the
purposes of Sections 375 and 377. Therefore, the provisions would not attract in the
case of a dead body. Option (a) is incorrect because the passage states that the
Karnataka High Court has made it clear that the provisions of Sections 375 and 377 do
not apply to dead bodies. It did not mention any need for a broad interpretation of these
sections to include dead bodies. Option (c) is incorrect because although Section 46 of
the IPC states that "death" denotes the "death of a human being," the High Court
specified that rape must be "accomplished with a person, not a dead body." Thus, a
corpse is not considered a human being under Sections 375 and 377. Option (d) is
incorrect even though it aligns partially with the High Court's view that a dead body is
not a person under Sections 375 and 377. However, it doesn't directly address the High
Court's specific interpretation of these sections, which is what the question asks for.
Hence (b) is correct.

4. Varun is an activist advocating for human rights. He petitions the Karnataka High
Court to clarify its position on maintaining the dignity of the dead. His concern stems
from a case where a woman's body was desecrated after death, and the perpetrator was
acquitted of sexual offense charges under the IPC. Varun refers to the 2021 National
Human Rights Commission's advisory on "Upholding the Dignity and Protecting the
Rights of the Dead" in his petition. Does Varun's reference to the 2021 National Human
Rights Commission's advisory strengthen his petition in the eyes of the Karnataka High
Court?

(a) No, because the Karnataka High Court has explicitly stated that only the Central
government has the power to amend the provisions of the IPC to protect the dignity of
the dead.
(b) Yes, because the Karnataka High Court itself invoked the 2021 National
Human Rights Commission’s advisory, which emphasizes the need to uphold the
dignity and protect the rights of the dead.
(c) No, because the Karnataka High Court follows only precedents and does not consider
advisories from human rights organizations.
(d) Yes, because the advisory sets international standards that the Karnataka High Court
is bound to follow.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (a) is incorrect because although the Karnataka High Court recommended
the Central government amend the IPC, it also invoked the 2021 National Human Rights
Commission's advisory. This implies a willingness to consider such advisories in its
reasoning. Option (b) is correct because the passage specifically mentions that the
Karnataka High Court invoked the 2021 National Human Rights Commission's advisory
on "Upholding the Dignity and Protecting the Rights of the Dead." This shows the court's
regard for the advisory, which would likely strengthen Varun's petition. Option (c) is
incorrect because the passage states that the Karnataka High Court did, in fact, invoke
an advisory from a human rights organization (the 2021 National Human Rights
Commission’s advisory). Option (d) is incorrect because there's no indication in the
passage that the Karnataka High Court is bound to follow international standards; it
invoked the advisory for its own purposes, not because it was bound to. Hence (b) is
correct.

5. Based on the reasoning of the Karnataka High Court, which of the following
statements could be a logical extension regarding the legal classification of a dead body?

(a) A dead body is considered a person, but incapable of giving consent.

(b) A dead body is not considered a person, but Section 377 IPC should be applicable to
it.
(c) A dead body is not considered a human being or a person for the purposes of
Sections 375 and 377 IPC.
(d) A dead body should be protected under Section 376 IPC, because it has the right to
dignity after death.

Ans: (c)

Sol: Option (c) is correct because the court explicitly mentioned that a "dead body
cannot be called as human or person," and thus the provisions of Sections 375 or 377
would not apply. Option (a) is incorrect because the court stated that a dead body is
neither a human being nor a person under Sections 375 and 377 IPC. Option (b) is
incorrect because, although the court recommended an amendment, it did not imply
that Section 377 should currently be applicable to a dead body. Option (d) is incorrect
because the court specifically stated that the act doesn't attract the offence of rape
under Section 376 IPC. Hence, (c) is correct.

6. If the legislature amends Section 377 IPC, as suggested by the court, to include dead
bodies, what could be the implications for similar cases?

(a) The accused would still not be convicted under Section 376 IPC, but could face
charges under Section 377 IPC.
(b) The dignity of the dead body would no longer be a consideration in such cases.
(c) The amendments would automatically overturn past convictions related to
necrophilia.
(d) Section 302 IPC, which deals with murder, would also need to be amended.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because the court recommended that the Central government
should amend the provisions of Section 377 IPC to include dead bodies, implying future
cases could potentially result in charges under Section 377. Option (b) is incorrect
because the recommendation aims to enhance the protection of the dignity of the dead,
not eliminate it. Option (c) is incorrect because amendments to criminal law are
generally not retroactive, meaning they would not automatically affect past convictions.
Option (d) is incorrect because the court's recommendation was specific to Section 377
and did not mention a need to amend Section 302 IPC. Hence, (a) is correct.
PASSAGE - 7
The complex relationship between education and maternity leave came under judicial
scrutiny in the case of "Renuka v. University Grants Commission and Anr." A student
from Chaudhary Charan Singh University in Meerut petitioned the Delhi High Court for a
59-day maternity leave so she could maintain the required 80% attendance for her
Master of Education (MEd) program. The court’s response was highly nuanced. While
acknowledging the challenge of reconciling educational commitments with the
biological demands of pregnancy, it stated that it could not relax attendance
requirements under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. The court did, however,
encourage the university to reconsider the student’s application. The case raises
questions about the constitutional framework concerning maternity benefits. Article 42,
part of the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs), expressly provides that the "State
shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity
relief." Yet, this doesn't specifically address student maternity leave in educational
institutions, leaving it an open field for judicial interpretation. The Indian Supreme
Court's rulings in various cases further underscore the constitutionality of reproductive
rights. In 2009, the case of "Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn" held that a woman's
reproductive choices are an extension of her personal liberty under Article 21. This
means that restrictions on maternity leave could be viewed as infringing on a woman's
constitutional rights.
Similarly, the landmark 2017 judgment in "KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India" reiterated
the need for the state to safeguard a citizen’s ability to make decisions, including those
related to reproductive health. The judgment expanded the definition of life under
Article 21, stating it is "not confined to the integrity of the physical body" but also
includes one’s "fullest sense of being," thereby opening doors for broader interpretation
regarding maternity benefits. Regulatory frameworks also exist at the academic level.
The University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulations of 2016, updated in a 2021
circular, provides for maternity or childcare leave for women enrolled in MPhil or PhD
courses for up to 240 days. It further requests Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) to
establish guidelines for providing maternity leave and other facilities to women
students. However, the court clarified that the case in question—pertaining to an MEd
course—is governed by the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, and the
2014 Regulations made under it. These regulations don't contain any provision for
student maternity leave, creating a legislative void. This gap becomes especially glaring
when considered against the backdrop of India's constitutional commitments. The
court's observations suggest that educational institutions, as well as legislative bodies,
may need to reconsider and possibly expand existing policies to include maternity leave
provisions for students, thereby aligning them with the broader constitutional
guarantees of education and maternity benefits. The dialogue between reproductive
rights and educational commitments is far from over. This case serves as an essential
touchpoint for further discussion and possible legislative action. Therefore, it remains to
be seen how educational institutions and the judiciary will reconcile these crucial
aspects of a woman’s life in the future.
Source: What are provisions for university students to take maternity leave?, The
Indian Express (May 31, 2023)

1. Vidya, a student enrolled in a Master of Science program at Panjab University, is

pregnant. She requests 45-day maternity leave to meet the 80% attendance requirement
mandated by her program. Her request is declined on the grounds that the National
Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, and the regulations of 2014, which govern her
course, don't provide for student maternity leave. Vidya decides to take legal action,
invoking Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. What would be the most probable
outcome of Vidya's?

(a) The court would decline her request because Article 226 of the Indian
Constitution does not permit relaxation in attendance.
(b) The court would grant Vidya maternity leave since she falls under the educational
commitment category, thus fulfilling the required attendance.
(c) The court would allow Vidya's request based on her fundamental right under Article
21 to make reproductive choices.
(d) The court would direct the university to create new guidelines that offer maternity
leave to all women students, irrespective of the course they are enrolled in.

Ans: (a)

Sol: Option (a) is correct because, in "Renuka v. University Grants Commission and Anr,"
the Delhi High Court clarified that it could not relax attendance requirements under
Article 226. This directly aligns with Vidya's situation, who is also petitioning under
Article 226 for maternity leave. Option (b) is incorrect because the Delhi High Court, in
the case of "Renuka v. University Grants Commission and Anr," stated that it could not
relax attendance requirements under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. Therefore,
granting Vidya leave based on educational commitments would contradict this ruling.
Option (c) is incorrect because even though Article 21 includes a woman's right to make
reproductive choices, the Delhi High Court did not consider this right as a basis for
relaxing attendance requirements under Article 226 in the case of "Renuka v. University
Grants Commission and Anr." Option (d) is incorrect because the court did not issue
such a directive in "Renuka v. University Grants Commission and Anr." Instead, it
encouraged the university to reconsider the student’s application. It did not mandate
the creation of new guidelines for student maternity leave. Hence (b) is correct.

2. Vikram, a legal scholar and advocate, has taken an interest in the case of "Renuka v.
University Grants Commission and Anr." He decides to write a research paper focusing
on the constitutional implications of the ruling, particularly concerning Article 42 of the
Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs). Vikram argues that the ruling leaves room
for broader judicial interpretation to fill the legislative void regarding student maternity
leave in educational institutions. How plausible is Vikram's argument that Article 42
could serve as a foundation for broader judicial interpretation to include student
maternity leave in educational institutions?

(a) Vikram's argument is not plausible because the Directive Principles of State Policy
are not enforceable by courts, making them irrelevant to judicial interpretation.
(b) Vikram's argument is plausible because the court left the matter open for
reconsideration by the university and made no comment on Article 42, thereby
leaving it an open field for interpretation.
(c) Vikram's argument is implausible as the court specifically declined to provide
maternity leave under Article 42 in the case of "Renuka v. University Grants Commission
and Anr."
(d) Vikram's argument is plausible due to the Indian Supreme Court's rulings, which
have expanded the scope of reproductive rights, thus making Article 42 a probable legal
anchor for the provision of student maternity leave.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the Delhi High Court, in "Renuka v. University Grants
Commission and Anr," encouraged the university to reconsider the student’s application
and did not rule out the possibility of judicial interpretation under Article 42. This
leaves room for broader interpretation regarding maternity benefits in educational
settings. Option (a) is incorrect because while it is true that the Directive Principles of
State Policy are generally not enforceable, they often serve as guidelines for judicial
interpretation and policy-making. They cannot be completely disregarded as irrelevant
to judicial interpretation. Option (c) is incorrect because the court did not specifically
decline to provide maternity leave under Article 42. It rather focused on Article 226 for
not relaxing attendance requirements but left the field open for further interpretation.
Option (d) is incorrect because the Indian Supreme Court's rulings on reproductive
rights under Article 21 are distinct from Article 42, and the Delhi High Court in the
Renuka case did not comment on the scope of Article 42 in the context of student
maternity leave. Hence (b) is correct.

3. Varsha, a law student at Bangalore University, decides to write her thesis on

reproductive rights and constitutional provisions. She finds the "Renuka v. University
Grants Commission and Anr" case intriguing, especially when considering the Indian
Supreme Court's view on reproductive choices as an extension of personal liberty under
Article 21. In her thesis, Varsha argues that denial of maternity leave could be an
infringement on a woman's constitutional rights under Article 21. How strong is
Varsha's argument that denial of maternity leave could be seen as an infringement on a
woman's constitutional rights under Article 21?

(a) Varsha's argument is strong because the Indian Supreme Court's ruling in "Suchita
Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn" directly correlates with her stance.
(b) Varsha's argument is weak as the Delhi High Court clearly stated that Article 226
does not allow for the relaxation of attendance, making Article 21 irrelevant in this
context.
(c) Varsha's argument is moderate because while the Indian Supreme Court
extended the scope of Article 21 to include reproductive choices, the Delhi High
Court did not relax attendance requirements in the educational setting.
(d) Varsha's argument is invalid because Article 21 only protects personal liberty
against state action, and universities are not considered a part of the state machinery.

Ans: (c)

Sol: Option (c) is correct because Varsha's argument stands on moderate ground. While
the Indian Supreme Court has extended the scope of Article 21 to include reproductive
choices, the Delhi High Court, in this specific case, did not provide maternity leave based
on these grounds. Therefore, the strength of her argument is tempered by the court's
focus on Article 226. Option (a) is incorrect because, although the Indian Supreme
Court's ruling in "Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn" does extend the scope of
Article 21 to include reproductive choices, it was not considered by the Delhi High Court
in the Renuka case to relax attendance requirements. Option (b) is incorrect because
while the Delhi High Court did focus on Article 226 in its decision, it did not necessarily
rule out the relevance of Article 21 entirely. Article 21 could still be considered in
different or broader legal arguments regarding maternity benefits in educational
institutions. Option (d) is incorrect because universities, especially public ones, could be
considered state institutions and thus, their actions could be subject to judicial review
under Article 21. Hence (c) is correct.

4. Vijay, a student at Panjab University, files a petition before the Punjab and Haryana
High Court seeking maternity leave for his wife, Vandana, who is also a student at the
same university. Both are enrolled in a Master of Commerce (MCom) program. Vijay
argues that the University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulations of 2016, updated in a
2021 circular, provide for maternity or childcare leave for women enrolled in MPhil or
PhD courses. He believes that these regulations should be extended to include other
postgraduate courses like MCom. The case draws attention as it explores the legislative
gaps related to maternity leave in the context of different postgraduate courses, which
do not fall under the UGC Regulations of 2016. What is the most likely outcome of Vijay's
petition for extending the maternity leave provision to MCom courses?

(a) The court will grant the maternity leave based on the UGC Regulations of 2016, as
they provide a guideline for higher education.
(b) The court will deny the maternity leave petition, stating that the UGC
Regulations of 2016 specifically pertain to MPhil and PhD courses and do not
extend to MCom courses.
(c) The court will grant the maternity leave petition based on the broader constitutional
guarantees of education and maternity benefits under Article 42 and Article 21.
(d) The court will deny the petition on the ground that the MCom program falls under
the domain of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, which does not
contain any provision for student maternity leave.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because, in the "Renuka v. University Grants Commission and
Anr" case, the court clarified that different courses are governed by different
regulations. Given that the UGC Regulations of 2016 pertain specifically to MPhil and
PhD courses, it is highly likely that the court will deny the petition for extending these
provisions to MCom courses. Option (a) is incorrect because the UGC Regulations of
2016, updated in a 2021 circular, specifically provide for maternity or childcare leave for
women enrolled in MPhil or PhD courses. Since the MCom course is not included in
these regulations, the court is unlikely to extend these provisions to the MCom course
based on this argument alone. Option (c) is incorrect because, in the "Renuka v.
University Grants Commission and Anr" case, the court was cautious not to extend the
maternity leave provisions based on broad constitutional principles. Rather, it relied on
specific legal frameworks governing the course in question. Option (d) is incorrect
because the MCom program does not fall under the National Council for Teacher
Education Act, 1993. The mention of this Act in the Renuka case was specific to the
Master of Education (MEd) course, not the MCom course. Hence (b) is correct.
5. Considering the ruling in "KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India," which concept does the
Indian Supreme Court link to the right to make decisions about reproductive health?

(a) The integrity of the physical body

(b) Financial independence
(c) The fullest sense of being
(d) The freedom of speech and expression

Ans: (c)

Sol: Option (c) is correct because the 2017 judgment in "KS Puttaswamy v. Union of
India" expanded the definition of life under Article 21 to include one's "fullest sense of
being," thereby opening doors for broader interpretation regarding maternity benefits.
Option (a) is incorrect because the court expanded the definition beyond just the
"integrity of the physical body." Option (b) is incorrect as financial independence was
not mentioned in relation to reproductive rights in the case. Option (d) is incorrect
because freedom of speech and expression is not what was linked to reproductive rights
in this case. Hence, (c) is correct.

6. Imagine that a legislative body is considering the introduction of a new law that
mandates all educational institutions to provide maternity leave for students. Which
element from the case of "Renuka v. University Grants Commission and Anr." would be
most relevant for the legislative body to consider in their deliberations?

(a) The judgement in "KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India"

(b) The Article 21 concerning personal liberty
(c) The absence of a provision for student maternity leave in the National Council
for Teacher Education Act, 1993
(d) The UGC Regulations of 2016 regarding maternity or childcare leave for women
enrolled in MPhil or PhD courses

Ans: (c)

Sol: Option (c) is correct because the case highlighted the legislative void concerning
student maternity leave in the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993. This
absence of provision would be a critical point for a legislative body to consider when
contemplating new laws. Option (a) is incorrect because the judgement in "KS
Puttaswamy v. Union of India" talks about the general right to make decisions about
reproductive health but does not specifically deal with maternity leave for students.
Option (b) is incorrect as it concerns personal liberty under Article 21 but does not
specifically target the issue of maternity leave for students in educational institutions.
Option (d) is incorrect because the UGC Regulations of 2016 are specific to MPhil or PhD
courses and would not fill the legislative void for other types of educational programs
like MEd. Hence, (c) is correct.
PASSAGE - 8
Article 298 grants the Centre and state governments the power to carry on trade or
business, acquire, hold, and dispose of property, and make contracts for any purpose.
Article 299 delineates the manner in which these contracts will be concluded. Article
299 of the Constitution stipulates that “all contracts made in the exercise of the
executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the
President or by the Governor of the State.” It further mandates that these contracts and
“assurances of property shall be executed” on behalf of the President or the Governor by
persons duly authorized by them. The phrase 'expressed to be made and executed'
under Article 299 (1) indicates that there must be a written deed or contract, executed
by a person authorized by the President or the Governor. According to the 1954
Supreme Court ruling in ‘Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram & Ors’,
the objective behind Article 299(1) is to establish a definite procedure for contracts
made by agents acting on the government’s behalf. This is to prevent the depletion of
public funds by unauthorized or illegitimate contracts. Contracts not adhering to the
manner given in Article 299(1) cannot be enforced. Article 299 (2) specifies that neither
the President nor the Governor can be personally held liable for such contracts. A recent
ruling dealt with an application filed by Glock Asia-Pacific Limited against the Centre
concerning the appointment of an arbitrator in a dispute. Glock Asia Pacific entered into
a contract with the Ministry of Home Affairs for the supply of 31,756 Glock pistols. A
dispute arose due to the Centre invoking a performance bank guarantee.
Glock issued a notice invoking arbitration and nominated a retired Delhi High Court
judge as the sole arbitrator. The government contested this, saying the arbitrator’s
nomination violated tender conditions that stipulated an officer in the Law Ministry
should be the arbitrator. The court observed that the arbitration clause allowed a
serving employee of the Union of India to nominate another serving employee as the
Sole Arbitrator. This was found to be in conflict with Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. Thus, the court ruled in Glock’s favour. The court also appointed
former SC judge Justice Indu Malhotra “as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the
disputes” in the case. Referring to the 246th Law Commission Report, the court
emphasized that when the party appointing an arbitrator is the State, the duty to
appoint an impartial and independent adjudicator is even more crucial. The court
rejected the Centre’s reliance on Article 299, clarifying that it only lays down the
formality for binding the government with contractual liability and not the substantive
law, which is found in general laws of the land. In its judgment, the court cited its 1966
ruling in ‘K.P. Chowdhry v. State of Madhya Pradesh’, which laid down three conditions
for a binding government contract under Article 299: “(1) the contract must be
expressed to be made by the Governor or the President; (ii) it must be executed in
writing, and (iii) the execution should be by persons and in a manner as directed or
authorized by the Governor or the President.
Source: Can the govt claim immunity when entering contracts under the
President’s name? Here’s what SC has ruled, The Indian Express (May 30, 2023)

1. Varun Dhawan, a proprietor of Dhawan Constructions, enters into a contract with the
Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs for the construction of 500 affordable houses
under a government scheme. The contract is signed by a junior-level officer in the
ministry, not authorized by the President or the Governor. A dispute arises over the
quality of the construction material used, and Varun Dhawan seeks to enforce the
contract through legal means. Can Varun Dhawan enforce the contract against the
Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs for the construction of 500 affordable houses?

(a) Yes, Varun Dhawan can enforce the contract because the Ministry is obligated to
fulfill its terms irrespective of who signed it.
(b) No, Varun Dhawan cannot enforce the contract as it does not adhere to Article
299(1) because it wasn't executed by a person authorized by the President or the
Governor.
(c) Yes, Varun Dhawan can enforce the contract because the 1954 Supreme Court ruling
grants such flexibility in exceptional cases.
(d) No, Varun Dhawan cannot enforce the contract as the ministry had a right to
question the quality of material and thus the contract becomes voidable.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the passage clearly states that contracts not adhering
to the manner given in Article 299(1) cannot be enforced. The contract in question was
not signed by someone authorized by the President or the Governor, which is a violation
of Article 299(1). Option (a) is incorrect because although Varun Dhawan entered into a
contract with the ministry, the enforceability of such a contract is subject to compliance
with Article 299(1), which mandates authorization by the President or the Governor.
Option (c) is incorrect because the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in ‘Chatturbhuj Vithaldas
Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram & Ors’ emphasizes the importance of adhering to Article
299(1) for preventing the depletion of public funds by unauthorized or illegitimate
contracts. It does not grant flexibility in exceptional cases. Option (d) is incorrect
because even though there is a dispute over the quality of the construction material, the
core issue is the enforceability of the contract, which falls under Article 299(1). The
question of material quality is a separate issue. Hence, (b) is correct.

2. Vikas Sharma, the owner of SharmaTech, signs a contract with the Ministry of
Electronics and Information Technology for the supply of custom software solutions.
The contract specifies that in the event of any dispute, the President or the Governor
would not be personally liable. A year later, the software delivered by SharmaTech has
multiple security vulnerabilities, and the ministry seeks to cancel the contract. Vikas
Sharma files a lawsuit, arguing that the liability must be fixed on some individual in the
government. Is Vikas Sharma correct in arguing that some individual in the government
must be held personally liable for the contract?

(a) Yes, Vikas Sharma can argue that the liability must be fixed on the President or the
Governor, as they are the ones representing the government in such contracts.
(b) No, Vikas Sharma cannot argue for individual liability in the government
because Article 299(2) states that neither the President nor the Governor can be
personally held liable for such contracts.
(c) Yes, Vikas Sharma can argue that an individual must be personally liable, as Article
299(2) is subject to judicial interpretation and is not definitive.
(d) No, Vikas Sharma cannot argue for individual liability as the contract was under the
Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, which acts as a separate legal entity.

Ans: (b)
Sol: Option (b) is correct because the passage specifies under Article 299(2) that neither
the President nor the Governor can be personally held liable for such contracts. This
clause is in agreement with the terms stipulated in the contract, negating Vikas
Sharma's argument. Option (a) is incorrect because, although the President or the
Governor are representatives in government contracts, Article 299(2) makes it clear
that they cannot be personally held liable. Option (c) is incorrect because, while laws
can be subject to judicial interpretation, the passage makes it clear that Article 299(2)
protects the President and the Governor from personal liability. There is no mention in
the passage about this Article being subject to interpretation in this context. Option (d)
is incorrect because even if the ministry acts as a separate legal entity, Article 299(2)
clarifies that no individual, including the President or the Governor, can be personally
liable for government contracts. Hence, (b) is correct.

3. Vaishali Gupta enters into a contract with the Ministry of Defense for providing
consultancy services in cybersecurity. The contract contains an arbitration clause
stating that in the case of a dispute, the arbitrator would be a high-ranking officer in the
Ministry of Defense. A dispute arises, and Vaishali wants to nominate a retired Supreme
Court judge as the sole arbitrator. The Ministry of Defense objects, insisting that their
officer should be the arbitrator according to the clause. Can Vaishali Gupta nominate a
retired Supreme Court judge as the sole arbitrator despite the arbitration clause stating
otherwise?

(a) Yes, Vaishali Gupta can nominate a retired Supreme Court judge, as the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, allows parties to choose an arbitrator mutually.
(b) No, Vaishali Gupta cannot nominate a retired Supreme Court judge, as the arbitration
clause explicitly mentions that the arbitrator should be a high-ranking officer from the
Ministry of Defense.
(c) Yes, Vaishali Gupta can nominate a retired Supreme Court judge, as the clause
allowing a Ministry officer to be the arbitrator is in conflict with Section 12(5) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
(d) No, Vaishali Gupta cannot nominate a retired Supreme Court judge, as the case
involves matters of national defense and requires specialized knowledge from within
the ministry.

Ans: (c)

Sol: Option (c) is correct because the passage highlights a court ruling that found such
an arbitration clause to be in conflict with Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. The law emphasizes the need for an impartial and independent
adjudicator, especially when the State is a party. Option (a) is incorrect because, even
though the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, generally allows for mutual choice in
the selection of an arbitrator, the passage specifically mentions a ruling that negates
such a clause when the State is a party. Option (b) is incorrect because, although the
arbitration clause in the contract specifies the conditions for selecting an arbitrator, the
clause itself was found to be in conflict with existing law, per the passage. Option (d) is
incorrect because the passage emphasizes the importance of impartiality and
independence in the arbitrator, irrespective of the specialized knowledge that might be
required. Hence, (c) is correct.
4. Vinay Kumar, a contractor, signs an agreement with the State of Maharashtra for the
construction of a public school. The contract specifies that "all dealings and contracts
will be expressed to be made by the Governor." Later, it is discovered that the contract
was actually signed by the Secretary of the Education Department, without any explicit
authorization from the Governor. Vinay completes the school, but the state refuses to
pay, claiming that the contract is unenforceable as it wasn't properly executed according
to Article 299(1). Is the State of Maharashtra correct in asserting that the contract with
Vinay Kumar is unenforceable?

(a) Yes, the contract is unenforceable because it was not explicitly made by the Governor
as stipulated in Article 299(1).
(b) No, the contract is enforceable because it was executed by a government official,
which implies consent from the Governor.
(c) Yes, the contract is unenforceable because Article 299(1) requires the
execution to be done by persons and in a manner as directed or authorized by the
Governor.
(d) No, the contract is enforceable because the Secretary of the Education Department
should be considered as implicitly authorized to execute such contracts.

Ans: (c)

Sol: Option (c) is correct because the passage clearly states that Article 299(1) lays
down three conditions for a binding government contract: "(1) the contract must be
expressed to be made by the Governor or the President; (ii) it must be executed in
writing, and (iii) the execution should be by persons and in a manner as directed or
authorized by the Governor or the President." In this case, the contract was not executed
by a person authorized by the Governor, making it unenforceable. Option (a) is incorrect
because while it highlights the need for the Governor's explicit involvement, it doesn't
capture the full spectrum of conditions mentioned in Article 299(1) for a contract to be
enforceable. Option (b) is incorrect because Article 299(1) stipulates that mere
execution by a government official does not automatically imply consent from the
Governor or make the contract enforceable. Option (d) is incorrect because the passage
underlines the need for explicit authorization by the Governor for executing such
contracts. There is no mention of implicit authorization being sufficient. Hence, (c) is
correct.

5. Based on the principles stated in the passage, which of the following hypothetical
contracts would be considered binding according to Article 299?

(a) A contract for a road construction project signed by the Deputy Secretary of the
Ministry of Infrastructure, who has no formal authorization from the President or
Governor.
(b) A contract for the procurement of medical equipment verbally agreed upon by the
Governor during a meeting.
(c) A written contract for purchasing educational software for schools, expressed
to be made by the Governor and executed by a person authorized by him.
(d) A written contract for supplying agricultural equipment to a state, expressed to be
made by the President but executed by the Minister of Agriculture.
Ans: (c)

Sol: Option (c) is correct because it meets all the conditions laid down by Article 299,
including that the contract must be expressed to be made by the Governor or President,
be in writing, and executed by persons authorized by them. This aligns with the 1966
ruling in ‘K.P. Chowdhry v. State of Madhya Pradesh’. Option (a) is incorrect because the
Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Infrastructure has not been formally authorized by
the President or Governor to execute the contract, which violates the conditions under
Article 299. Option (b) is incorrect because the contract is verbally agreed upon and not
in writing, which is contrary to the requirement of Article 299 that the contract should
be executed in writing. Option (d) is incorrect because although the contract is
expressed to be made by the President, it is executed by the Minister of Agriculture, who
is not specified as being duly authorized by the President to execute contracts under
Article 299. Hence, (c) is correct.

6. Based on the court's ruling in Glock Asia-Pacific Limited's case, how does Article 299
affect the appointment of an arbitrator in a dispute involving the government?

(a) Article 299 mandates that only a serving employee of the Union of India can be an
arbitrator.
(b) Article 299 does not lay down substantive law for appointing arbitrators;
general laws of the land apply.
(c) Article 299 prohibits the appointment of retired judges as arbitrators.
(d) Article 299 specifies that the President or Governor must personally appoint the
arbitrator.

Ans: (b)

Sol: Option (b) is correct because the court clarified that Article 299 only lays down the
formality for binding the government with contractual liability and does not constitute
substantive law for the appointment of arbitrators. This is governed by general laws like
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Option (a) is incorrect because the court
ruled that the condition of having a serving employee of the Union of India as an
arbitrator was in conflict with Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, not Article 299. Option (c) is incorrect because Article 299 does not specifically
address the appointment of arbitrators, let alone retired judges. The general laws of the
land apply for the appointment of arbitrators. Option (d) is incorrect because Article
299 only delineates the manner in which contracts involving the government should be
executed; it does not specify who must appoint the arbitrator. Hence, (b) is correct.