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March for Backwardness

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PERSPECTIVES
March for Backwardness
The Marathas’ Transition from
Competition to Concession
Rajagopal Devara
Overviewing the historical
trajectory of the demand for the
reservations for Marathas, the
background conditions for such
demand are sought be explained.
The nature of the agitation for
reservations and the political
response to the agitation
are analysed.
Rajagopal Devara (rgdevara@gmail.com) is
Principal Secretary (Reforms), Department of
Finance, Government of Maharashtra.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 10, 2021
A
ssertion, agitation and protest for
and against reservation policy in
India have a long history which
began in the closing years of colonial
rule1 but continue in a much more inten-
sified form even after the independence
(Bose 1981). In the most recent times,
there have been many interconnected
developments that occurred across the
states in India as well as in Maharashtra.
Across the states, several middle order
social/caste groups like the Jats, Gujjars,
Patel and Kapus have been agitating for
reservation and demanding that they be
included in the quota system that has
been implemented in the country right
from its independence. In such agitational
politics, the Marathas2 from Maharashtra
have been another intermediate, but domi-
nant caste3 group to assert demand for
reservation in public employment and
educational institutions.
However, the recent Maratha asser-
tion for reservation has been significant
in historical sense and quite unique in its
articulation and expression of the de-
mand for reservation. It is unique on ac-
counts of the silent mode that the lead-
ers of the agitation adopted in order to
push their demands. It has historical sig-
nificance since at one point in time Mar-
athas were against the very idea of reser-
vation (Omvedt 1981). Now, in the most
contemporary times, they have shifted
their stance and are agitating for reser-
vation for themselves. This shift in the
Maratha position on reservation compels
us to address the following questions.
First, are the Marathas demanding
reservation for the first time or were they
ever the beneficiary of reservation policy
in its historical evolution? As a corollary
to this question, at one point in time, the
Marathas were against reservation, and
vol lVi no 28
hence suggested recruitment through
open competition rather than reserva-
tion. This would compel us to raise the
question, what are the factors that led the
Marathas to transition from the mode of
competition to concession?
Second, what are the background
conditions that can explain the Maratha
demand for reservation? Why has the
demand become so acute today than
ever before? What are its constitutive
conditions that can explain the acute-
ness that has led to the intensification of
agitation lasting almost for three years
and continuing even today? This would
make it necessary to elaborate on the
socio-economic and educational condi-
tions of the Marathas in Maharashtra.
Third, what has been the nature of the
expression of the agitation for the reser-
vation for the Maratha caste? This ques-
tion becomes important in the contex
where it was observed that the agitation,
by and large, remained silent and rela-
tively peaceful. Thus, it would be quite
interesting to explain the uniqueness of
the expression and assertion for reserva-
tion. Fourth, what has been the response
of the political class to the agitation?
This question becomes crucial once again
in the context where the established
political leadership from the state was
almost totally kept out of the agitation.
Was the agitation, therefore, apolitical
in nature? It would be important to
throw some light on the state govern-
ment’s response to the Maratha demand
for reservation. And finally, how did the
judiciary respond to the concessions
granted by the state in response to the
agitation for reservation? What is the
way forward? These questions become
important in the context of the Supreme
Court’s verdict which has struck down
the Maharashtra State Reservation for
Socially and Educationally Backward
Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018. Let us then see
in brief the historical trajectory of the
Maratha demand for reservation.
Historical Trajectory
Several committees and commissions4
that were instituted from time to time by
the union government and also the state
45
PERSPECTIVES
government to study socio-economic and
educational backwardness of the castes
other than the Scheduled Caste (SC) and
Scheduled Tribe (ST), did not include
Marathas in the policy framework of res-
ervation (Devara 2020). In this regard, it
is interesting to note that in 1902, Shahu
Maharaj, the prince of Kolhapur princely
state, reserved 50% seats in public em-
ployment for the Marathas and other
lower castes.5 Later, in 1919, the South-
borough Commission also reserved few
seats for Marathas in the legislative bodies
that were created in the first half of the
20th century.6
However, after independence, the Mara-
thas along with other non-untouchable
castes like Brahmins, Rajputs and Bhumi-
hars, did not form the part of reservation
policy that was continued only for the
SC/ST and Anglo Indian community.7
Thus, till the recommendation of the
Gaikwad Committee constituted by the
Government of Maharashtra, Marathas
were unsuccessful in their attempt to seek
recommendation from the commissions8
and the committees that were constituted
by the state government to assess the
socio-economic and educational back-
wardness that served the basis for recom-
mendation for reservation. Failure to get
institutional backup led the Marathas to
demand for a separate committee so
that their demand for reservation could
be justified. Though it was a procedural
reason to understand the Maratha agita-
tion for reservation, there were struc-
tural reasons too that led the Marathas
to demand reservation.
From Competition to Concession
As mentioned above, the demand for
reservation for Marathas suggests that
they are making a move from competition
to concession or more protective entry
into the employment market and higher
education avenues. This would make it
necessary for us to examine the factors
other than the institutional rejection that
the Marathas have had to face at many
committees and commissions. These fac-
tors are socio-economic and educational
backwardness among the Marathas.
Interestingly, one has to keep in mind
that while there is economic criterion
that is considered as the basis to justify
46
the reservation for the Marathas, reser-
vation is based not only on the economic
and education criterion but on caste
criteria, meaning thereby, that within
the quota, there is no distinction between
the lower- and the upper-class Marathas;
everyone within the caste are placed on
an equal footing and are thus identical.
The policy presupposes the Marathas as
a socially homogeneous group. Although,
one cannot deny the fact that in social
terms the caste is divided into 96 clans
and 92 clans where the former are con-
sidered as pure. One has to accept that
Maratha caste is not a homogeneous
social entity. Like other communities in
India, apart from the stratification based
on the social structure and inherent hier-
archy, there is an economic stratifica-
tion, which is visible within the Maratha
community.
For instance, one does not require
statistics to prove the economic division
among the Marathas of Marathwada and
western Maharashtra. The landholdings
of the Marathas of western Maharashtra,
are endowed with perennial irrigation
and resultant cash crops and agri-pro-
cessing industry and dairy produce.
Poor irrigation resources in Marathwada
do have an adverse impact on the agri-
cultural productivity and related agro-
industrial products. According to a rough
estimate, an average Maratha farmer
with a landholding of 2 acre cultivating
sugar cane from rich western Maharashtra
earns a minimum of `2.40 lakh per annum
besides supplemental income of `60,000
from dairy/allied activities.9,10 Whereas
their counterpart from Marathwada earn
an average income of around `70,000 to
`75,000 per hectare from cotton and
soya bean together under kharif and
rabi season.11,12 Besides assured irrigation,
sugar cane cultivation gives steady in-
come to Maratha farmers from western
Maharashtra, as the Marathwada farmers
are exposed to market price fluctuations,
monsoon failures with no/little supple-
mental income from dairy and allied
agricultural activities. Thus, the landed
assets, cropping pattern, nature of crop,
irrigational facilities, market prices and
its fluctuations determine the difference
in economic condition of farmers in dif-
ferent regions of Maharashtra. Marathas
july 10, 2021
from economically underdeveloped region
of Marathwada are more disadvantaged
as compared to the Marathas from western
and southern Maharashtra (Devara 2020).
These Marathas are disadvantaged in
terms of retaining control over the land
as a source of income. Due to adverse
climatic conditions and the lack of sus-
tainable sources of income, Marathas
from the villages studied by the author
are more prone to sell their piece of
land. The internal economic disparities
within Marathas can further be deline-
ated from the following account of the
economic status of Marathas.
Capitalist development mediated thro-
ugh the process of urbanisation, com-
bined with the rise of new Maratha lead-
ership through the green revolution and
the cooperative sugar factories in the
state, has thrown up new patterns of in-
ternal stratification among the Maratha–
Kunbi cluster. According to a study con-
ducted by Dehspande and Palshikar in
2008, “Around 20 per cent of sampled
Maratha respondents were landless la-
bourers and 15 per cent had less than
three acres each.” The survey found only
3% of rich Marathas among the sampled
families in 2014. The same scholars con-
ducted another survey in 2013 among
800 households in two villages, one in
western Maharashtra and the other in
Marathwada, and concluded that “land
ownership patterns suggest nearly 65
per cent of Marathas are poor, whereas
hardly four per cent own more than 20
acres of land and thus may be classified as
rich farmers” (Kushal and Mishra 2015).
The disadvantage and the resultant
sense of deprivation emanated on the
one hand from declining income from
agriculture, and on the other, their inabil-
ity to find alternative opportunities and
employment in the techno-innovation
driven new job market (Kumar 2009).
In post-independence India, Marathas
have enjoyed uninterrupted political
hegemony in Maharashtra. Being numeri-
cally preponderant community, electoral
democracy based on the principle of
simple majority and working of vote bank
politics, helped them to capture political
power in the state. The Maratha domi-
nance in the state politics can also be
understood in terms of their hold over
vol lVi no 28 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

the land, agro-processing industries like,
sugar, milk and other by-products of sugar
and milk. In this regard, it has also to be
kept in mind that with the process of
land transfer and subsequent govern-
ment policies that promoted green revo-
lution impacting agricultural growth,
they emerged as an economically domi-
nant community too, which helped them
to consolidate power, particularly in
western Maharashtra (Kumar 2009).
However, turbulent 1990s witnessed
major setback, both economically and
politically, to the Maratha community.
The setback and erosion of economic and
political power can be attributed to three
most important events in the history of
the state. These events are the structural
adjustment programmes, the Other Back-
ward Classes (OBC) reservation and the
implementation of 73rd and 74th Constitu-
tional Amendment Acts, which opened
the domains of political representation
to women and backward communities.
These interventions have disrupted the
dominant position of the Maratha com-
munity as well as increased the social/
economic visibility of other communi-
ties. Thus, having sensed the trend the
Marathas have attempted to usurp the
demographic imagination through “Mook
Morchas,” clearly articulating the de-
mand for reservation in education and
public employment.
Agrarian distress and unemployment
are the two important factors that can
explain the large-scale participation of the
Marathas in the agitation. As Marathas
are primarily an agrarian community,
they are directly affected by the three
main factors that are constitutive of
agrarian distress. These are, unpredict-
able natural conditions, such as uneven
rain pattern, faulty implementation of
minimum support price and market-
determined agricultural inputs. Most im-
portantly, the growing fragmentation of
land and the inability of agriculture to
provide adequate work opportunity to
Maratha youth propels them to seek
alternative work options outside agri-
culture. Since, the private sector does not
offer much scope for employment that
seeks to be based on reservation criteri-
on, the Marathas, like other castes such
as the OBCs and the Dalits, are putting
Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 10, 2021
their bet on the government employment.
These are, probably, some of the basic
factors that can explain the Maratha
demand for reservation in education
and employment in government sector.
Nature and Scope of the Morcha
The agitation is now known as the
“Maratha Mook Morcha”13 (the Silent
Maratha Agitation). The agitation that
looked overtly silent, in consequences,
was inwardly vocal, if not volcanic. The
silent mode can be explained in terms of
the leaders who led the agitation used
both the rhetorical as well as constitu-
tional language more powerfully and
effectively. The Maratha Morcha followed
such a mode almost throughout the agi-
tation period that, in the first phase,
lasted for the longer duration of three
years from 2018 to 2020.
The Maratha demand for reservation
was primarily and rightly aimed at the
central government as well as the judici-
ary. It, however, was mediated through
the state government. The agitation was
unique for its silent mode that it chose to
put the demands across the relevant insti-
tutions of redressal, such as government
and most importantly the judiciary. Look-
ing at the actual mobilisation of Marathas,
one could also add here that the asser-
tion was rather dynamic if not dramatic.
It was dynamic in terms of the energy
that was demonstrated in mobilising the
agitators who were mostly young.
The morchas were unique in another
important sense that they managed to
maintain self-restraint in the street
demonstration that by its very logic of
physical density tends to acquire violent
expression. But Maratha morchas, where
several lakhs of people demonstrated on
the streets, managed to stay peaceful in
pressing for reservation. This arguably
was different from the history of violence
that is associated with the agitation for
reservation that took place both in Maha-
rashtra and other parts of India.14 Final-
ly, the morchas were also unique for two
added reasons. First, women were in the
forefront of the agitation. Second, the
agitation was led without the formal and
open support of established political
parties from the state (Devara 2020).
Most importantly, this did not lend the
vol lVi no 28
PERSPECTIVES
agitators to the misuse and manipula-
tion that normally happens when the
agitation is taken over by politicians. In
the context of the unique nature of the
morchas, it is necessary to explain the
nature of uniqueness of the agitation.
Maratha Mook Morchas or silent
agitation involved a series of agitations
witnessed over three years, on different
dates and different parts of Maharashtra
between 2016 and 2018. Altogether 52
demonstrations, equal in size, were or-
ganised in a span of three years across
Maharashtra. These have come to be
recognised with the expressive manifes-
tation of the Maratha dissent in many
ways. These demonstrations for reserva-
tion for the Marathas were unique in
more than one way. First, in the history of
Maratha mobilisation on various issues,
the agitation for reservation has been
spectacular both in terms of intensity
and magnitude. Several lakhs of Marathas
from all over the state participated in such
demonstration. Second, the Maratha
mobilisation over the issue of reservation
took place independent of the formal
association with political parties in the
state. The character of the morchas was
autonomous in the sense that it was led
by a new young leadership that came
from outside the formal political parties.
Political parties and their leaders were
visibly absent or given a back seat, thus
making the agitation apolitical (Malik
2017; Hindu 2016). Undeniably, collec-
tive community leadership of multiple
organisations led the movement till the
end (India Today 2017).
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47
PERSPECTIVES
Third, the planning of the morchas
was quite meticulous and systematically
organised in total silence, carried out
without any violence and/or forceful dis-
ruption of public activities. Their slogans
were not explosive in nature as it did
not connate any violent meaning and
message. The slogans were liberal and
inclusive of socially diverse symbols
like Shivaji Maharaj, B R Ambedkar and
Jotirao Phule. Finally, the demographic
character of the morchas suggested that,
by and large, they were composed of
youth and led by both male and female
youth, who were in the forefront of these
morchas. Finally, the language that was
used to communicate their demand was
seemingly moderate, constitutional and
devoid of any violent expression. Although
there was an occasional emotional
outburst that could be heard during
the morachs, these overtures could be
explained in the background of the
Kopardi case.15
Moreover, one could also notice the
symbolic expression of valour that is
associated with the heroic history of
the great Maratha king, Shivaji Maharaj.
Although brandishing “bhagva” (saffron)
flag, a typical headgear connoting the
cultural power of the Marathas, and the
sword with a trumpet (tutari in Marathi)
reinforced the emotionally charged cul-
tural identity underlying the historical
pride, brought in cohesion as an ethnic
unit of the Marathas. Interestingly, new
age communication tools were extensively
used during the agitation by the Maratha
youth to connect, organise and mobilise
the community. The leaders used, rather
efficiently, the electronic media in order
to mobilise the Maratha youth. Electronic
and social media did help the agitation
to acquire an extensive coverage of the
morchas throughout the duration of the
demonstration. The morcha was effec-
tively aided by an extensive use of digital
media and technology to establish its sig-
nificance without being formally associ-
ated with political parties.
There was a kind of politics of project-
ing apolitical character so as to appeal
to all sections within as well as outside
the large Maratha–Kunbi cluster. A large
section of Maratha youth exists outside the
party framework and hence maintaining
48
apolitical character was thought to be an
effective strategy to enlist their support.
Non-Maratha communities too supported
and participated in the Maratha agita-
tion as the reports around the time sug-
gested (Times of India 2016). The support
of other castes was not voluntary but out
of intuition. In fact, there is structural
logic that can explain the other castes’
support to Maratha protest for reserva-
tion. The asymmetry in land–labour
relations can explain this visible sup-
port. The study undertaken by the author
in Marathwada region corroborated that
the backward castes and Dalits who
labour on the Maratha land also volun-
tarily supported the agitation. As our
study shows (Devara 2020), even the
agricultural labourers also extended
their support to Maratha agitation. This
support could be understood in terms the
labour’s dependence on the landowners
from the villages that were studied. The
subordination of labourers working for
wages on the farm/at home tending to
land and household work of the master
morally obliges them to participate in
the master-promoted agitation.
It could be argued that the agitation in
a way reinforced the classical feudal
landlord–labour relationship. The unity
and solidarity of the Marathas was sus-
tained till the final culmination of the
morchas in August 2018. Also, slogans
such as “Shivaji Maharaj ki jai” “Jai
Bhavani, jai Shivaji” which reverberated
through the agitation for reservation for
three long years, ended in generating a
new slogan “Ek Maratha, lakh Maratha”
(one Maratha person is equal to a lakh
Marathas) that was made popular during
the course of the agitation.
State Response
While the agitations did continue in the
state, it was but natural that the state
would react to the street agitations and
respond to the claims and assertions of
the protesting community.
First and foremost, the ruling political
class and opposition openly welcomed
the agitation and sympathised with its
demand for reservation. In fact, all politi-
cal parties strived in competition to sup-
port the cause of the Marathas. Obviously,
Maratha being majority community, with
july 10, 2021
more than 32% of the state population,
ignoring their demand would mean politi-
cal sidelining. Even though political class
was not allowed public participation in
demonstrations by agitators, their subtle
involvement was obviously seen, felt
and discussed throughout the state. Each
state has a capacity to absorb the demands
and aspirations generated due to chang-
ing socio-economic developments. The
state responded politically in terms of dis-
cussion and negotiation on the demands
through positive engagements with the
community and its leadership. In order
to appease such agitations, the state
agencies, especially the police, under the
pretext of security, law and order, engaged
in collection of local intelligence for the
purpose of further negotiation and fore-
cast the extent to which the agitation
may go. The community representatives
in the law and order machinery partici-
pated “positively” in the agitation. The
friendly approach of the state towards the
agitators and the series of demonstra-
tions ensured its peaceful conduct, with
no or mild cases filed against agitators,
which were later withdrawn.
Second, the agitation also demands
administrative response in terms of
(i) initiation of reservation policy, and
(ii) various other policy interventions to
strengthen the claims made during the
agitation. These affirmative interventions
may benefit the community, even if the
implementation of the Maharashtra State
Reservation for Socially and Educationally
Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 is
delayed on the grounds of constitution-
ality of the reservation. It also acts as an
immediate response to satisfy the demand
of agitation. For instance, the state re-
sponded by setting up SARTHI (Chhatrapati
Shahu Maharaj Research, Training and
Human Development Institute) in 2018.
The main objectives being educational
attainment, skill development, training
and employment enhancement, including
self-employment among the Marathas.
However, the debate on reservation
centres around the internal inequalities
amongst Marathas, although the gov-
ernment and Gaikwad committee have
taken Marathas as one unit for the con-
sideration of reservation. One could also
argue that, since agriculture has become
vol lVi no 28 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 PERSPECTIVES

less promising, in terms of providing sus-
tained source of survival, the Marathas
have taken to higher education. But they
find a mismatch between the degree
obtained and the corresponding job op-
portunity available. Few Marathas were
well-educated but showed discontent
with the state and other competing
communities as they could not afford
providing higher education to their
community members. On the contrary,
the SC community, though moderately
educated, on account of reservation, could
capture jobs mostly of schoolteachers,
bus drivers/conductors, linemen and
other Class III positions in public sector,
which ensured a fixed monthly income
for them. The other communities were
found to be less educated than the Mar-
athas due to their “social status.” The
communities still carry out traditional
occupation to a great extent and attain
maximum high school education. There
is reluctance to study more due to less
availability of schools and colleges
within the nearby area. Moreover, the
landholdings along with the cattle and
livestock rearing are economically satis-
fying to these communities.
Conclusions
In the Maratha collective consciousness,
there seems to be a cognitive element
that was at work during the agitation for
reservation. It is this element that had
bearing on the silent nature of the agita-
tion. The protesters were aware that the
question of reservation is not political but
legal and constitutional but needed to be
pursued through the state government.
The silent nature succeeded because there
was a positive response from the state
government and the entire political class
of the state. The agitation did emanate
from the agricultural distress, which
was intensified due to the loss of employ-
ment opportunities in the agricultural
sector and on the other hand reduced
agricultural incomes and inability to
support higher education. The Maratha
youth neither find job opportunities in
the agriculture, nor are they equipped with
skill sets to compete for jobs in the new
digital economy driven by neo-liberalism.
Thus the anxieties manifested in un-
precedented three-year protest move-
ment for reservation. The significance of
the first phase of the Maratha agitation
for reservation, which ended in August
2018, by and large remained silent. This
was evident in the methods of agitation
that was driven along the constitutional
and legal routes to press for their de-
mands. The collective mind of Marathas
is reflected in the Maratha Mook Morchas
although it looked silent in terms of the
absence of the ruling elites who were
kept outside the purview of agitation.
Notes
1 Initial opposition to the political reservation
of untouchables is a prime example, which
subsequently culminated in the Poona Pact
of 1932.
2 Marathas are demographically dominant peas-
ant caste and are located in the middle of the
caste hierarchy in Maharashtra.
3 Srinivas (1987) first defined the term “dominant
caste” to refer to the caste in the villages which
is numerically strong and also wields the greatest
economic and social power.

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Economic & Political Weekly EPW july 10, 2021 vol lVi no 28 49
PERSPECTIVES
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8 Union government-appointed Backward Classes Hindu (2016): “Sharad Pawar Denies Role in Agita- New Indian Express (2017): “Marathas Take Out
commissions headed by Kaka Kalelkar and tion as Marathas Stage Another Rally in Hingoli,” Massive March in Mumbai to Press for Quota,”
B N Mandal did not include Maratha caste in 19 September, viewed on 2 May 2021, https:// 9 August, viewed on 2 May 2021, https://www.
the list of “Backwards.” Maharashtra govern- www.thehindu.com/news/cities/mumbai/ newindianexpress.com/cities/mumbai/2017/
ment had appointed commissions headed by Sharad-Pawar-denies-role-in-agitation-as- aug/09/marathas-take-out-massive-march-in-
S N Khatri, R M Bapat and B P Saraf to study Marathas-stage-another-rally-in-Hingoli/arti- mumbai-to-press-for-quota-1640612.html.
and recommend socially and educationally cle14987792.ece. Omvedt, G (1976): “Cultural Revolt in Colonial
backward classes as defined under Article India Today (2017): “Maratha Kranti Morcha Shows Society: The Non-brahmin Movement in
15(4) of the Indian Constitution. However, Its Might in Mumbai March, Government Gives Western India, 1873-1930,” Bombay Scientific
Marathas failed to meet the assessment criteria In,” 9 August, viewed on 2 May 2021, https:// Socialist Education Trust, Bombay.
and thus were not recommended to be included www.indiatoday.in/india/story/maratha- — (1981): “Maratha Melava,” Economic & Political
in “Other Backward Classes” by all the three kranti-morcha-protest-mumbai-devendra-fad- Weekly, Vol 17, No 6, pp 185–86.
commissions. navis-1028788-2017-08-09. Mint (2018): “OBCs, Dalits Consolidate in the Face
9 Western Maharashtra is one of the most pros- Iqbal, Mohammed (2020): “Gujjar Agitation Hits of Maratha Movement,” 12 October, viewed on
perous regions and being predominantly irri- Rail, Road Traffic in Rajasthan,” Hindu, 20 No- 2 May 2021, https://www.livemint.com/Politics/
gated area, contributes on an average about vember, viewed on 2 May 2021, https://www. IgaXJjRvWFaoCEWMgUFUxI/OBCs-Dalits-
50% of sugar cane produced in the state. For thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/gu- consolidate-in-face-of-Maratha-movement.html.
the purpose of calculating average income, one jjar-agitation-hits-rail-road-traffic-in-ra- Palshikar, S and R Deshpande (1999): “Electoral
hectare of land is used as a base landholding. jasthan/article33004772.ece. Competition and Structures of Domination in
As per the state agriculture department, it is Jaisinghani, Bella (2018): “Vegetable Markets, Maharashtra,” Economic & Political Weekly,
estimated that 80 tonnes of sugar cane is Dabbawallah Services Down to a Trickle as Vol 34, Nos 34 and 35, pp 2409–22.
harvested in one hectare of land. Fair and Maratha Morcha Gets Violent,” Times of India, Srinivas, M N (1979): “Future of Indian Caste,”
Remunerative Price (FRP) are declared by 25 July, viewed on 21 May 2021, http://timesofin- Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 14, Nos 7 and
the union government every year before the dia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/65137050. 8, pp 237–42.
harvesting season begins. FRP is calculated cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_ — (1987): The Dominant Caste and Other Essays,
as per the sugar recovery rate, which is taken medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. Oxford University Press.
as basis. To calculate current years FRP, pervi-
Kumar, M (2009): “Reservations for Marathas in Times of India (2016): “Ambedkarites Call for
ous years sugar recovery rate is considered.
Maharashtra,” Economic & Political Weekly, Supporting Maratha Morcha,” 23 September,
Maharashtra state average sugar recovery rate
Vol 44, No 14, pp 10–12. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/
is in the range of 11.50%. However, western
Maharashtra sugar mills average is more than Kushal, Akshat and Mayank Mishra (2015): “Why 54472026.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&
Dominant Caste Want OBC Status,” Business utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
12.25%, but for income calculation state aver-
age recovery of 11.50% is considered. Similarly,
annual income from dairy is calculated based Appendix
on average milk yield per cattle (cow/buffalo) Table A1: Major Crops, Area and Productivity in Marathwada Area (2015 to 2019)
and the average selling price and presumed Sr District Cotton Soyabean Tur Dal Corn Total
two animals per farmer. No Area Avg Area Avg Area Avg Area Avg Area in
10 This has been the general impression of those (Hectare) Productivity (Hectare) Productivity (Hectare) Productivity (Hectare) Productivity Hectare
Maratha farmers who produce cash crop. in Kg in Kg in Kg in Kg
11 See the Appendix. 1 Aurangabad 4,01,311 685 11,323 999 29,422 839 1,90,883 1,122 6,32,939
12 This general impression of the farmers emerged 2 Jalna 2,58,014 1,373 1,38,064 1,723 50,697 1,478 52,146 2,578 3,74,721
in the group discussion with the latter.
3 Beed 3,72,169 493 2,50,327 745 53,172 749 9,815 267 6,85,483
13 Mandal agitation, or the agitation for reserva-
tion in Gujarat or Rajasthan are few examples 4 Osmanabad 16,800 178 2,87,700 860 84,800 594 18,300 726 4,07,600
that can prove this point. See Bose (1981). 5 Hingoli 68,173 294 1,92,495 1,211 59,583 698 1,264 464 3,21,515
14 The Rape of Minor in Kopardi, Ahmednagar 6 Parabhani 1,86,528 281 2,24,288 859 38,814 896 0 0 4,49,630
was considered as an immediate trigger to the
Maratha Morchas. 7 Nanded 2,60,505 218 3,09,375 902 60,788 838 0 0 6,30,668
15 The Maharashtra State Reservation for Socially 8 Latur 5,37,215 253 14,03,465 948 3,55,184 877 26,143 335 23,22,007
and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC)
Act, 2018 provided for 16% reservation of seats
Table A2: Average Market Rate (per quintal)
for admission in educational institutions and
posts in public services to Marathas who Crop 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21
have been declared as SEBC of citizens in Corn 1,489 1,550 1,112
Maharashtra. Amended in 2019 following
Tur dal 4,495 4,250 5,150
Bombay High Court verdict stipulating 12%
and 13% quota respectively instead of 16%. Soya bean 3,083 3,250 3,950 to 6,500
However, it was struck down by the highest Cotton – – 5,000
court in May 2021 saying that “Maratha com- • The data has been collected from various government sources and compiled by the author of this article.
munity does not make out exceptional circum- For calculating the annual income of a farmer in Marathwada, average yield per hectares for the entire region (eight districts)
stances to exceed the ceiling limit of 50% was arrived by/and multiplied with 2020–21 average prevailing prices as shown in Table A2. The average annual income is
reservation.” calculated based on the harvesting of two seasons of kharif (soya) and rabi (cotton) crops.

50 july 10, 2021 vol lVi no 28 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

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