Is Punishment Effective?

Coercive Strategies in Social Exchange

Author(s): Linda D. Molm
Source: Social Psychology Quarterly , Jun., 1994, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 75-94
Published by: American Sociological Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2786703

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 Social Psychology Quarterly
1994, Vol. 57, No. 2, 75-94

Is Punishment Effective?
Coercive Strategies in Social Exchange

LINDA D. MOLM
University of Arizona

This research tests competing predictions about the effectiveness of coercive strategies in
social exchange. Both the classical exchange theories and most bargaining theories argue
that the actual use of punishment in exchange relations provokes hostility and retaliation,
and leads to a decrease rather than an increase in mutually rewarding exchange. I argue
instead that more frequent use of contingent punishment would increase the effectiveness of
punishment power. Although the motivation to minimize loss constrains the use of
punishment, that motivation should make it highly effective when used. An experiment tested
these predictions, using computer-simulated actors who were programmed to employ
varying levels of contingent punishment, under different structures of punishment power,
against a partner with a reward power advantage. In support of my predictions, more
frequent punishment for nonexchange increased the partner's reward exchange without
increasing retaliation or negative affect. Punishment that was both strong and consistent
produced the highest frequency of reward exchange and the least negative affect toward the
partner.

Thirty years ago social exchange theorists
excluded punishment from the scope of social
exchange relations, arguing that punishment
was ineffective and incompatible with con-
tinuing, voluntary social relations (Blau 1964;
Homans [1961] 1974). Since that time, these
views have been echoed by numerous philos-
ophers and social scientists. Theories that
deal exclusively with punishment power and
punitive tactics in social interaction argue
either that coercive power is effective only if
it is not used (e.g., deterrence theories; see
Morgan 1977) or that both the potential and
the actual use of coercion inhibit cooperative
behavior (e.g., social psychological theories
of conflict spiral; see Deutsch 1973).
The results of a recent series of experi-
ments comparing reward-based power with
punishment-based power in nonnegotiated
exchange relations appear to confirm these
views: in exchange networks in which all
actors have some capacity to reward and
punish their exchange partners, the effects of
punishment power are consistently weak
(e.g., Molm 1988, 1990). The distribution of
exchange is almost entirely a function of
reward power; actors with greater power to
punish do not receive increased benefits from
their exchange partners.
In contrast to the classical exchange
theorists, I argue that the weak effects of
punishment power are due to its low use, not
its ineffectiveness. Deterrence theorists con-
tend that the actual use of punishment
destroys the positive effects of the capacity to
punish; I propose that punishment power will
be more effective if it is used frequently and
consistently to punish a partner's failure to
provide rewards in exchange.
This paper reports the results of experimen-
tal research testing these competing predic-
tions, using computer-simulated actors who
are programmed to employ the kinds of
coercive strategies that real actors have failed
to use. The experiments address a basic
question: Does the effectiveness of punish-
ment power in social exchange increase with
the frequency and contingency of its use? If
so, at what cost to the coercer? I examine this
question in relations in which actors who are
disadvantaged on reward power try to in-
crease the reward exchange of their less
dependent partner by using coercive strategies
of varying contingency and strength.

* This work was supported by a grant from the THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

National Science Foundation (SES-9210399). I thank
Phillip Wiseley, David Richmond, Satoshi Kanazawa,
Angelina Quesada, and Anne Lane for their assistance,
and the editor and anonymous reviewers of SPQ for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Social Exchange and Power
Social exchange theories propose that
power derives from actors' dependence on

75

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 76 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
each other for valued outcomes (Blau 1964;
Emerson 1962, 1972a, 1972b; Homans 1974;
Thibaut and Kelley 1959). In any exchange
relation, each actor exerts some degree of
power over the other. In most relations,
however, actors' dependencies are unequal,
and the more powerful actor in the relation is
the one who is less dependent on the other.
Power and dependence are determined by
how greatly actors value the benefits they can
obtain from the relation, and by the probabil-
ity that they can obtain those benefits from
alternative sources (Emerson 1972a). Those
alternatives typically are other exchange
relations that are potential sources of the same
or equivalent resources (e.g., alternative
dating partners, alternative sources of expert
advice). Relations that provide alternative
sources of the same resource for an actor A
are said to be negatively connected at A
because A's exchange in one relation reduces
his or her exchange in the other (Emerson
1972b). Because resources are relation-
specific-a resource for actor A, in A's
relation with B, is any possession or behav-
ioral capability of A that is valued by
B-power is also relation-specific. Power
resides not in an individual actor, but in the
relation between actors.
The power-dependence relation between
any two actors can be described on two
theoretically orthogonal dimensions: average
power and power imbalance (Lawler 1986;
Molm 1987).1 The average power of a
relation, defined as the average of the actors'
dependencies on each other, is a measure of
the absolute strength of their power over each
other. Power imbalance, defined by the
difference between two actors' dependencies
on each other, is a measure of the relative
power in their relation. In balanced relations,
actors are equally dependent on one another.
In imbalanced relations, their dependencies
are unequal, and the less dependent actor has
a power advantage.
The insight that power derives from
another's dependence allowed exchange theo-
rists to create a conception of power that
differed in important respects from the more
common conception of power as coercive
(e.g., Bierstedt 1950; Weber 1947). Emerson
argued that when power derives from an-
other's dependence, its use is inherent in a
1 Lawler (1986) refers to average power as total
power, and to power imbalance as relative power.
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structure of imbalanced power, regardless of
intent to use power or desire to, influence
another's behavior. As predicted by Emerson
(1972b) and supported by numerous studies
(e.g., Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook et al.
1983; Molm 1981), unequal dependencies
produce unequal exchange; the less dependent
actor receives more of the other's potential
resources than he or she gives in return. The
mechanism behind that distribution is not
coercion, but simply the same laws that
govern economic transactions: when demand
is high (high value) and supply is scarce (few
alternatives), one pays more for the things
one values.
Incorporating Coercive Power Into
Exchange Theory
Either explicitly or implicitly, most social
exchange theorists restricted the theory and its
analysis of power to the exchange of rewards
or positively valued resources. Discussions of
cost were limited to the costs of the actor's
own behaviors-that is, the "opportunity
costs" of rewards forgone from alternatives
not chosen, or the cost involved in enacting
particular behaviors.
According to Heath (1976) and others
(e.g., Blalock 1987; Molm 1987), there is no
compelling theoretical reason why social
exchange theory should be restricted to
rewarding exchanges, or why it should
exclude coercive power. If a reward is
defined as a sanction that either adds positive
value or removes negative value, and a
punishment as a sanction that either adds
negative value or removes positive value,
then conceptually it should be possible to
array reward power and punishment power
along a single bipolar continuum. Both
reward and punishment power offer actors
potential ways to increase their benefits from
the exchange. Similarly, it should be possible
to analyze both forms of power in terms of
dependency. If A's behavior affects B's
outcomes in either a positive or a negative
direction, then B is dependent on A for the
quality of outcomes that B experiences, and A
has power over B.
One of the most important reasons for
incorporating both reward and punishment
power within the framework of exchange
theory is the recognition that virtually all
exchange relations involve both forms of
power as well as some mix of positive and
 COERCION IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 77
negative actions. This point has been ob-
scured by many writers' tendency to speak of
exchange relations and coercive relations as if
they were separate, mutually exclusive types,
and to associate coercion with legal punish-
ment by the state or the threat of extreme
forms of punishment by oppressors against
captive victims (e.g., mugger and victim,
master and slave, torturer and prisoner).2
Even in voluntary relations, which are
motivated primarily by the exchange of
rewarding outcomes, the use of aversive
influence techniques is common. The senator
who refuses to support a colleague's bill
without concessions, the employer who ad-
monishes a worker for arriving late, and the
child who throws a temper tantrum when told
that it is bedtime are all using punitive tactics
in an effort to change the behavior of an
exchange partner.
Scope Conditions of the Research
This study is part of a larger project that
was begun with two main aims: 1) theoreti-
cally, to determine whether the scope of
exchange theory can be extended to incorpo-
rate coercive power, and, if so, what
modifications of the theory might be neces-
sary; and 2) empirically, to investigate the
similarities and differences between the ef-
fects of the two bases of power on behavior.
The project has been conducted under
particular setting conditions and assumptions.
In addition to the usual scope conditions of
social exchange theory-structures of mutual
dependence, actors who are motivated to
increase rewards and to decrease costs,
relatively enduring exchange relations be-
tween the same actors or sets of actors (Molm
and Cook forthcoming)-several other condi-
tions define the focus of this research.
First, actors are engaged in voluntary
exchange relations for the primary purpose of
exchanging benefits. Coercive power is stud-
ied in the context of relations in which all
2 Some authors include the requirement of severe harm
in their definitions of coercion. According to Dahl,
"Coercion implies illegitimate power involving only the ability of the research to other types, especially physical
prospect of great loss" (1970:33-34; his emphasis).
Hoekema states, "It is essential that the victim of
coercion be brought to act by the threat of serious harm call or
loss" (1986:23). On the other hand, some philosophers
(e.g., Cook 1972) define coercion so broadly as to
include any form of influence, including reward-based
power.
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actors have some capacity to both reward and
punish their exchange partners. To avoid the
problems of comparing qualitatively different
forms of power, I operationalize power by
varying actors' capacities to produce gains
(reward power) or losses (punishment power)
of a single resource-money-for their ex-
change partners.3
Second, exchange transactions are recipro-
cal, not negotiated (Emerson 1981). Actors
do not bargain explicitly over the terms of
exchange. Instead they initiate exchanges
individually without knowing whether, when,
or to what degree the other will reciprocate.
Their relations develop over numerous ex-
change opportunities, as actors respond con-
tingently to one another and gradually estab-
lish a stable frequency and ratio of exchange.
Although negotiated transactions have been
the subject of extensive research by exchange
theorists (e.g., Cook et al. 1983; Lawler
1992; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988),
reciprocal transactions are probably more
typical of the social exchanges in which
people engage during their everyday lives,
with friends, family, and coworkers.
Third, the unit of analysis is the dyadic
exchange relation. I study dyadic relations
that are connected negatively to each other in
larger exchange networks, whose structure
determines the absolute and the relative
power within dyadic relations, but I am
interested in the power relations and exchange
processes within the dyad, not in the
distribution of power in the network as a
whole.
Fourth, actors can choose between alterna-
tive exchange partners, but they cannot avoid
a partner's attempts to influence or initiate
exchange; that is, they cannot "leave the
field." Actors can continue to reward or
punish others who no longer exchange with
them.
Fifth, actors' resources in an exchange
relation are behavioral capabilities that pro-
duce outcomes of value for exchange part-
3 The study of this particular type of punishment (the
loss of positive value) necessarily restricts the generaliz-
punishment. Research, however, shows that this form of
punishment, which psychologists (e.g., Weiner 1962)
response cost, follows the same principles as other
punishment techniques (e.g., Pazulinec, Meyerrose, and
Sajwo, 1983). For theoretical purposes, it has the
advantage of providing a way to create objectively
equivalent levels of power on the two bases.
 78 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
ners. These might represent, for example, an
hour of advice to a coworker, cooking dinner
for a friend, or-on the negative side-the
refusal to support a colleague's proposal. The
value of any single act is fixed (e.g., A's
reward exchange might produce five reward
units for B), and is determined by the actor's
structural position in the network. Conse-
quently the total value given in exchange can
be varied only by varying its frequency over
time. I manipulate structural power by
varying the relative value of the resources
controlled by alternative partners, while
holding constant the number of each actor's
alternative exchange partners.
Sixth, actors have full information about
the values governing relative dependencies in
their immediate exchange relations. Although
Cook and Emerson's (1978) work shows that
information is not a necessary condition for
the effects of reward power, it is unlikely that
we can make that assumption for punishment
power. Determining how information influ-
ences the use and effects of punishment
power is an important issue for future
research; for now, I restrict my analysis to
conditions in which actors know the relative
dependencies of both self and partner in each
of their potential exchange relations.
THE USE OF PUNISHMENT POWER:
EFFECTS ON EXCHANGE
If actors are dependent on each other for
the range of outcomes they experience, both
positive and negative, and if their interests
include both seeking gains and avoiding
losses, then a generalization of power-
dependence theory to punishment-based
power would predict that the effects of such
power on the frequency and distribution of
exchange should be comparable to those of
reward power.
They are not comparable, however. Ac-
cording to a series of experiments comparing
exchange networks that create equivalent
magnitudes and imbalances of reward power
and of punishment power, the effects of
punishment power on exchange consistently
are surprisingly weak (Molm 1988, 1989a,
1989b, 1990). Actors rarely use punishment,
and variations in the structure of punishment
power have little effect on exchange. In
particular, the distribution of exchange-the
relative frequency with which actors provide
benefits to each other-is almost entirely a
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function of reward power imbalance. Even
actors with a punishment power advantage
equal to and opposing another's reward
power advantage are ultimately disadvantaged
on the exchange.
This study tests the argument that the weak
effects of punishment power result mainly
from its low use rather than from the
ineffectiveness of punishment per se. I
investigate the effects of coercive strategies of
varying probabilities and contingencies in
relations of imbalanced reward power, in
which the disadvantaged actor tries to coerce
the advantaged (and less dependent) partner
to reward more. A reward-disadvantaged
actor has a stronger incentive to use coercion,
but the advantaged partner has a stronger
incentive to resist it. Therefore, if coercive
strategies are effective in these relations, they
should be even more effective in relations in
which the targets of coercion depend more
strongly on the coercer for rewards. In
support of this assumption, an earlier study in
this program found that the use of coercion by
a reward-disadvantaged actor, against an
advantaged partner, provoked more retalia-
tion and stronger perceptions of injustice than
the use of coercion by an advantaged actor
against a disadvantaged partner, or by an
actor in an equal-power relation (Molm,
Quist, and Wisely 1994).4
My predictions derive from the learning
model that underlies exchange theory and
from research on decision making under
uncertainty. Emerson (1972a) adopted the
behavioral assumption that actors respond to
the actual positive and negative consequences
of their behaviors. Structural power provides
actors with the capacity to impose gains or
losses on another, but the effect of that
capacity depends on its use. If actors with
reward power rarely withhold rewards, and if
actors with punishment power rarely punish,
then structural power will have little effect.
Emerson assumed that reward power imbal-
ance would lead inevitably to power use, but
the same is clearly not true of punishment
power imbalance. Yet if punishment power is
used contingently and consistently to punish a
partner's failure to reward, its effectiveness
should increase.
4 In that study we examined only one coercive
strategy, similar in probability and contingency of
punishment to the intermediate-level used in this
experiment.
 COERCION IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 79
Underlying this argument is the assumption
that punishment and reinforcement are
equally effective forms of influence. Early
behavioral studies by Estes (1944), Thomdike
(1932), and Skinner (1938) suggested that
they were not. They concluded that punish-
ment did not alter behavior, in a process
parallel to reinforcement, but only suppressed
it temporarily by inducing emotional re-
sponses in the organism. Skinner also argued
that punishment produced negative side ef-
fects such as hostility and withdrawal. Recent
research strongly refutes these early findings.
Most contemporary psychologists conclude
that punishment is highly effective, parallel to
reinforcement, and produces positive side
effects as often as negative (e.g., Axelrod and
Apsche 1983; Walters and Grusec 1977).
These conclusions are based on both labora-
tory experiments on animals and applied
studies in schools, families, and mental
hospitals, using a variety of forms of
punishment (e.g., physical punishment, time
out, and response costs such as loss of tokens
or fines).5 Punishment is most effective when
combined with rewards-that is, when unde-
sirable behaviors are punished and desirable
behaviors are rewarded (S. Axelrod 1983). In
the context of reciprocal exchange, that
implies punishing the partner's failure to
exchange and rewarding the partner's ex-
change. The strategies I study take this form.
Research on decision making and choice
behavior not only supports the argument that
punishment is effective, but suggests that its
impact is stronger than that of comparable
rewards. Numerous studies show that under
conditions of uncertainty, decision making is
dominated by concerns about minimizing
losses rather than maximizing gains (Gray
and Tallman 1987; Kahneman and Tversky
1979, 1984; Machina 1987; Molm 1991).
Although fear of loss can constrain the use of
punishment power (Molm 1993), it should
heighten the effects of that power on the
targets. In other words, if actors use punish-
ment power consistently and contingently to
sanction their partners' nonexchange, their
partners' reward exchange should increase.
5 Observational studies of punitive actions in nonex-
perimental settings (families and marital relations)
reported mixed findings: coercion is effective, or it leads
to escalating cycles of aggression (e.g., Burgess et al.
1981; Gottman 1979; Patterson 1982). As Patterson
suggests, these different effects probably depend on the
strategies of coercion that actors employ.
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The target of punishment should comply to
avoid the losses inflicted, even if compliance
entails settling for lower rewards.
Research by Tedeschi and his colleagues
(e.g., Horai and Tedeschi 1969; Tedeschi,
Schlenker, and Bonoma 1973) adopts a
similar logic, derived from expected utility
and decision theories. Their experiments on
threat and punishment in the Prisoners'
Dilemma show that compliance with threats
(to punish noncooperation) increases with the
credibility of threats-that is, with the
contingency of punishment on noncompli-
ance. Tedeschi's research, however-like
most of the behavioral and decision-making
studies-examines only situations in which
punishment power is unilateral. Unlike actors
in the exchange relations in this study, the
target has little or no capacity to retaliate.
Alternative Perspectives
The prediction that coercive strategies will
produce more frequent reward exchange is at
odds with predictions of other theories,
particularly theories of punishment in bilateral
power relations. The classical exchange
theories of Homans (1974) and Blau (1964),
as well as theories of bargaining based on
processes of either bilateral deterrence or
conflict spiral, propose that the actual use of
punishment provokes hostility and retaliation,
not compliance, and eliminates any positive
effects of punishment power as a potential.
In part on the basis of the early findings of
Estes, Thomdike, and Skinner, Blau and
Homans proposed that the use of punishment
in exchange relations would be ineffective
and harmful. Blau argued that punishment
"arouses emotional reactions that have unde-
sirable consequences for behavior other than
the one it is intended to affect" (1964:224).
Retaliation can become an end in itself,
leading individuals to act contrary to their
other interests. Similarly, Homans claimed,
"The use of punishment is an inefficient
means of getting another person to change his
behavior: it may work but it seldom works
well. . . . Punishment, moreover, is apt to
produce hostile emotional behavior in the
person punished (1974:26). Homans and Blau
also believed that the use of punishment
power, unlike reward power, eventually
would lead to the termination of the exchange
relation. Field theorists (e.g., French and
Raven 1959) expressed similar views.
 80 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
Concerns that punishment will provoke
retaliation and hostile emotional responses are
also evident in theories of bilateral deterrence
(e.g., Morgan 1977; Schelling 1960) and of
conflict spiral processes (Deutsch 1973). As
shown by Lawler's (1986) explication of
these two approaches, bilateral deterrence and
conflict spiral theories make opposite predic-
tions about the effect of punitive capacity
(punishment power) on the use of punitive
tactics, but they agree that the actual use of
punishment leads to retaliation, reduces
concessions in bargaining relations, and
obstructs conflict resolution (also see Ba-
charach and Lawler 1981; Lawler 1992;
Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988). Research on
explicit bargaining relations generally sup-
ports these predictions (e.g., Bacharach and
Lawler 1981; Deutsch 1973; Michener and
Cohen 1973; Pruitt 1981; Rubin and Brown
1975; Youngs 1986).
Underlying these theories is the assumption
that emotional reactions and impression
management concerns (saving face, appearing
tough) lead actors to retaliate against a
partner's punishment, regardless of the costs,
and that retaliation leads to an escalation of
conflict. Numerous studies examine ways to
promote conciliation in the face of this
conflict, through either reciprocal strategies
(e.g., R. Axelrod 1984; Patchen 1987) or
unilateral initiatives combined with tit-for-tat
retaliation (e.g., Boyle and Lawler 1991;
Lindskold 1978; Lindskold, Betz, and Wal-
ters 1986; Lindskold and Collins 1978).
Thus, rather than studying contingent punish-
ment as a tool for increasing concessions,
bargaining theorists focus primarily on ways
to prevent or end the use of punitive tactics,
which they view as obstacles to reaching
agreements.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Two major research questions emerge from
this analysis. First, do coercive strategies
increase or decrease rewarding by a less
dependent partner in reciprocal exchange
relations? How do these effects vary with the
contingency of punishment and the structure
of punishment power? Second, do coercive
strategies produce undesirable side effects in
the form of negative affect and retaliatory
punishment? The theoretical perspectives dis-
cussed above offer different answers to each
of these questions.
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The effectiveness of punishment strategies.
Subjects in past experiments in this program
used punishment very infrequently, and pun-
ishment power had little effect on exchange.
My analysis predicts that higher probabilities
of punishment, contingent on the partner's
failure to exchange, will be more effective
than low probabilities. As the probability of
contingent punishment increases, the part-
ner's reward exchange should increase. In
contrast, classical exchange theory and most
bargaining theories suggest that the use of
punishment provokes hostility and reduces
cooperative behavior in social relations; thus,
higher probabilities of punishment should
decrease rather than increase reward ex-
change.
Although I predict that compliance will
increase with greater use of punishment
power, and the alternative theories predict
that it will decrease, it is quite possible that
both predictions are partially correct within
certain ranges of punishment. Compliance
may increase with the probability of punish-
ment until very high probabilities are reached,
at which point emotional reactions set in and
a backlash occurs. The opposite also might
occur: concerns about impression manage-
ment may dominate when probabilities of
punishment are low, but at high probabilities,
the costs of noncompliance may overcome
these concerns and compliance may increase.
This study investigates the possibility of such
curvilinear relations.
I also predict that structural variations in
punishment power (average power and power
imbalance) will have more effect on exchange
as the use of that power increases. Thus, at
higher frequencies of contingent punishment,
compliance should be greater when average
power is high and punishment power is
imbalanced in favor of the punisher. The
alternative theories do not address this issue
explicitly, but if the negative effects of
punishment on compliance are the result of
emotional reactions to punishment, then these
should be intensified at greater and more
unequal magnitudes of punishment. If this is
so, the combination of high use of punish-
ment and high punishment power should
produce particularly high levels of noncom-
pliance. Bachrach and Lawler (1981), in fact,
found that this was true for negotiated
exchange: punitive tactics decreased conces-
sion behavior only at higher levels of punitive
 COERCION IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 81
capability.6 Thus both perspectives predict an
interactive effect between structure and strat-
egy on compliance, but with opposite signs.
Side-effects: Retaliation and negative af-
fect. Classical exchange, bilateral deterrence,
and conflict spiral theories all predict that
punishment provokes animosity, which is
manifested both affectively (in negative
feelings toward the partner) and behaviorally
(in retaliation for the partner's punishment).
These theories predict that actors will recipro-
cate punishment, regardless of self-interest or
the structure of punishment power. If this is
so, the frequency of punishment by the target
should increase as the probability of contin-
gent punishment increases. That action will
provoke more punishment by the coercer,
however, and punishment should escalate
over time. Negative affect also should
increase with the probability and the magni-
tude of punishment.
Although I agree that greater use of
punishment is likely to increase negative
affect (Molm 1991; Thibaut and Kelley
1959), my analysis assumes that actors'
behavior varies with the structure and contin-
gency of punishment rather than with their
emotional reactions. Previous research sug-
gests that punitive strategies may provoke
some initial resistance and retaliation, but that
retaliation declines over time when it is
punished contingently (Boyle and Lawler
1991; Molm et al. 1993).
METHOD
Overview of the Design
I tested the hypotheses in a laboratory
experiment in which undergraduate subjects
earned money by exchanging points with
computer-simulated partners who were pro-
grammed to use particular strategies. All
actors (both real and simulated) in the
exchange network could either reward (add
points to) or punish (subtract points from)
their exchange partners.
The focus of the study is the exchange
relation between the subject and one of the
simulated actors. Within this relation, reward
power is imbalanced in favor of the subject,
and the simulated actor uses punishment
6 Both reward and punishment power were balanced
(equal) in this experiment (see Bacharach and Lawler each experimental session, but each subject
1981: Chapter 5).
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power to try to increase the frequency with
which the subject exchanges with that actor
rather than with the subject's more valuable
partner. The structure of imbalanced reward
power provides the simulated actor with the
incentive to use punishment, and makes that
punishment coercive: it is intended to make
the subject act contrary to his or her own
interests in order to benefit the coercive
partner.
One hundred twenty subjects were assigned
randomly to one of the 12 cells of a 3 x 2 x
2 factorial design, with 10 subjects (five
males and five females) in each condition.
The design crossed three strategies of contin-
gent punishment, as used by the disadvan-
taged partner, with two conditions of punish-
ment power imbalance (balanced or
imbalanced in favor of the partner) and two
levels of average punishment power (high or
low). Subjects engaged in nonnegotiated
exchange for 200 opportunities; at the end of
the exchange period, they evaluated both of
their partners on a series of semantic
differential scales.
The Exchange Setting and Procedures
Subjects participated in exchange networks
that ostensibly were composed of four actors.
As shown in Figure 1, each actor was
connected to two of the three other actors in
the network, so that each actor had two
potential partners on an exchange opportu-
nity. Subjects were told that they were
participating in a group of four persons, that
each person would be able to interact with
two of the other three persons, and that each
person could act toward only one partner on
each opportunity.
In reality, both of the subject's (S's)
potential exchange partners were computer-
simulated actors (POs, or "programmed
others"), and there was no fourth actor in the
network. (The subscripts M and C for the two
POs distinguish the PO with the manipulated
punishment strategy from the PO with the
controlled neutral strategy.) This deception
was maintained easily because subjects were
seated in isolated rooms and interacted with
each other through a computer network.
Typically four subjects were scheduled for
interacted with computer-simulated actors
 82 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

Balanced Imbalanced
Punishment Power Punishment Power

+4 +8 +4 +8
S . 7 P+OM S 49 5
High +6 -3 -3 +2 +6 -1 -S +2
Average
Punishment
Power +6 -3 + +6 -1 +

POc 4- -- -+ HYP POc --- - HYP

+4 + +

+4 +8 +4 +8
S ^ 35 -1 PO
+6 -7 7 +2 +6 -5 +2
Low
Average
Punishment
Power +6 -7 -+ +6 -5 +

v -3 v- V-5-
POC -
44
- '- HYP
+
POc
44
4- ---
+
HYP
Note: On each dou
number of point
the subject (S), t
fourth actor in the network (HYP). The dotted lines between the POs and HYP indicate that those relations were
implied rather than real.

rather than with the other subjects. Subjects
did not meet each other either before or after
the experiment.7
The exchange networks provided actors
with control over a valued resource: the
money earned in the experiment. This control
consisted of the amount of money actors
could add to each other's earnings (reward-
based power) or subtract from each other's
earnings (punishment-based power) on each
of a series of exchange opportunities. Earn-
7 Postexperimental debriefing revealed occasional in-
stances of suspicion that one or both exchange partners
were computer-simulated. These were no more common,
however, than in previous experiments with four real
subjects, and they were unrelated to behavior. Some
suspicion is an almost inevitable consequence of the
physical isolation, the use of the computer for interac-
tion, and many subjects' expectations that experiments
involve deception.
ings were totaled in points; one point was
equal to 1.5 cents. The amount each actor
could add to or subtract from each partner on
each opportunity was fixed, and was deter-
mined by the structural power on both bases
in a particular experimental condition.
This setting met the assumptions of social
exchange theory. First, subjects were depen-
dent on others for their earnings from the
experiment (and believed that others were
dependent on them). Each person's capacity
to perform a behavior that produced money
for another was a resource in that relation.
Second, to assure that money was valued, I
recruited subjects on the basis of their desire
to earn money. I removed other potentially
valued outcomes from the experimental set-
ting, and instructed the subjects that their only
concern should be earning as much as they

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 COERCION IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 83

could. Third, I met the assumption that social
exchange relations consist of recurring ex-
changes between specific actors (Emerson
1981) by having subjects exchange with the
same partners for 20 exchange opportunities.
The subjects engaged in reciprocal (nonne-
gotiated) exchange. They began the interac-
tion with an initial account of $3.00 (200
points), to which money could be added or
from which it could be subtracted. Then, on
each exchange opportunity, all actors simulta-
neously chose an action toward a partner (to
add points or subtract points from the
earnings of one of their partners) without
negotiation or knowledge of either partner's
intentions. These actions affected only the
partner's earnings: adding to the other's
points did not reduce the subject's own
earnings, and subtracting from the other's
points did not increase the subject's own
earnings. The only cost of initiating an
exchange was the "opportunity cost" of not
exchanging with an alternative partner. Be-
cause each side of the exchange was per-
formed individually, subjects potentially
could gain (or lose) money from one, both, or
neither of their partners on each opportunity.
Throughout the exchange period, the com-
puter screens displayed the fixed amounts of
money that the subjects and their two partners
could gain or lose from each other on each
exchange opportunity. After all actors had
made their choices on each opportunity,
subjects were reminded of their own choices
and informed of their partners' choices: they
were told that each partner added n points to
their earnings, subtracted n points from theiralternative to POM, and because POM has fewer
earnings, or did not act toward them on that
opportunity. Their own point totals changed
to reflect any gains or losses.
At the end of the exchange period, subjects with POM's other partner. This power imbal-
evaluated each of their partners on a series of ance and the resulting imbalance in exchange
semantic differential scales measuring dimen-
sions of affect. The experimenter then paid
them the money they had earned, debriefed
them, and dismissed them individually.
The Manipulation of Punishment Power
In this setting, power was defined opera-
tionally by the relative value of the exchange
resources controlled by an actor's two ex-
change partners, while the number of alterna-
tive partners was held constant. The total
value that each actor in the network poten-
tially could lose from both partners on any
single exchange opportunity was held con-
stant at 10 points (15 cents); similarly, the
total value that each actor potentially could
gain from both partners was 10 points. An
actor's power over an exchange partner (on
either base) consisted of the proportion of this
total for the partner that the actor controlled.
For example, if S could lose seven points
from POc and three points from POc, then
POM's punishment power over S was .7
[7/(7 + 3)], and POc's punishment power over
S was .3 [3/(7 + 3)]. The imbalance on reward
or punishment power in any dyadic exchange
relation in the network is defined as the
difference between the two actors' individual
power dependencies in the relation on that
base; average power is defined as the average
of their power dependencies on that base.
All experimental conditions used the same
reward power structure (see Fig. 1). The sub-
ject, S, was power-advantaged in relation to
POM (S's power over POM was .8 and POM's
power over S was .4, producing a power im-
,balance of .4 in S's favor) and equal in power
to POc (the power of each over the other was
.6). This structure has been studied in previ-
ous experiments in this program, in networks
in which real subjects exchanged with one an-
other. A reward power imbalance of .4 (with
average power at .6) produces predictable dif-
ferences in exchange ratios and substantial in-
equalities in earnings (e.g., Molm 1990, 1993).
The more dependent actor in the relation (here,
POM) typically earns about half as much as the
less dependent actor (here, S) because POM's
alternative to S is far less valuable than S's
opportunities than S to exchange with an al-
ternative partner. That is, POM's more fre-
quent giving to S entails forgoing exchange
provide POM with a clear incentive to use pun-
ishment power to coerce S into giving rewards
more often.
As shown in Figure 1, the experimental
design manipulated both dimensions of pun-
ishment power in the relation between S and
POM. The average punishment power in the
relation was either .7 or .3; punishment power
imbalance was either 0 (balanced power) or
.4, in favor of POM. Average punishment
power affected the magnitude of loss that
POM could inflict on S, when power
imbalance was held constant, and imbalance
in punishment power affected S's capacity to

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 84 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

retaliate against punishment by POM- When
punishment power was imbalanced, POM's
punishment advantage was equal to S's
reward advantage. The exchange relation
between S and POc was balanced in all
conditions, although the amount they could
subtract from each other (the average punish-
ment power in their relation) varied-that is,
S's higher dependency on POM implied a
reward, or nonexchange [p(PIN)], and t
lower dependency on POc, and vice versa.
change .1, .5, or .9 of the time, and
responded with reciprocal nonexchange on
the remaining opportunities. Varying the
conditional probability with which POM
punished S's nonexchange also varied the
contingency of POM's punishment on S's
nonexchange. This contingency is defined
by the difference between the probability
that POM punishes S's withholding of
probability that POM punishes S's rewarding

The Manipulation of Punishment Strategy

[p(PIR)]. Because p(PIR) was 0 in all
conditions, the contingency of POM's pun-
The experiment manipulated the strategy of ishment on S's nonexchange varied directly
one of the programmed actors (POM) and held with p(PIN): both equaled .1, .5, or .9.
constant the strategy of the other (POc). POM
was programmed to punish S's failure to
reward POM, with the probability of punish-
Measures
ment for S's nonexchange set at .1, .5, or .9,
and to reciprocate rewards and punishments Behavioral responses to coercion. The
by s.8 POc always used a tit-for-tat strategymain dependent variable, and the measure of
that reciprocated rewards, punishments, and S's compliance with POM'S coercion, is the
nonexchange by S. This strategy was consis- frequency with which S rewards POM. S's
tent with the balanced relation between S and retaliation against POM's coercion is mea-
POc in all conditions. sured by the frequency with which S
Table 1 displays the conditional probabili- punishes POM- Both variables are standard-
ties that constitute these strategies. On each ized, by dividing by the total exchange
opportunity each actor could reward, punish, opportunities, to range from 0 to 1.
or not act toward a given partner; not acting Although we might expect some correlation
toward one partner implied acting toward thebetween these two variables, they are
other. Thus the description of each PO's strat- potentially independent. Either of the mea-
egy consists of nine conditional probabilities. sures could increase as a result of a decrease
It specifies the probabilities with which the PO in S's exchange with POc, without affecting
responded with each of these three actions, the other measure. Table 2 shows the means
given the occurrence of one of the three ac- and standard deviations of both variables, by
tions by the subject (S) on the previous ex- condition.
change opportunity. In all conditions, both POs Affective responses to coercion. Subjects'
gave to S on the first opportunity. affective evaluations of POM were measured
The modified tit-for-tat strategy used by by their responses to a questionnaire pre-
P?c in all conditions consisted of reciprocat-sented on their computer screens at the end of
ing S's immediately prior behavior .9 of the the exchange period. Subjects were asked
time (responding to rewards by S with first to evaluate POM's behavior toward them
rewards, to punishment with punishment, and on a series of seven-point bipolar semantic
to nonexchange with nonexchange). For the differential scales. Next, these evaluations
remaining .1 of the time, POc responded to were repeated for POc's behavior. Four of the
S's rewards with nonexchange, to S's nonex- items evaluating POM's behavior serve as
change with rewards, and to S's punishment indicators of subjects' positive or negative
with nonexchange. evaluations of POM: good/bad, helpful/
POM always reciprocated S's prior re- unhelpful, nice/awful, and satisfied/dissatis-
wards and, like POc' reciprocated S's fied.9 These items all load above .75 on one
punishment .9 of the time. POM's response
to S's nonexchange (not acting toward POM)
9 For the first three items in the scale, subjects
was manipulated: POM punished S's nonex-
received the instruction "Please evaluate Person X's
behavior toward you," followed by a labeled bipolar
8All probabilities were randomized over blocks of 10 scale. For the fourth item, subjects were asked, "Overall,
actions of the specified type by the subject. how satisfied are you with Person X's behavior toward

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 COERCION IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 85

Table 1. The Power Strategies of the Simulated Actors

Probability of PO's Behavior,

Conditionial on S's Prior Behavior

Conditional Conditional Conditional

on Reward on Nonexchange on Punishment

Stratgegy of POM (manipulated)

p(RIR) = 1.0 p(RIR) = 0 p(RIR) = 0
p(PIN) = .1I p(NIR) = 0 p(NIR) = .9 p(NIR) = .1
p(PIR) = 0 p(PIR) = .1 p(PIR) = .9

p(RIR) = 1.0 p(RIR) = 0 p(RIR) = 0

p(PIN) = .5 p(NIR) = 0 p(NIR) = .5 p(NIR) = .1
p(PIR) = 0 p(PIR) = .5 p(PIR) = .9

p(RIR) = 1.0 p(RIR) = 0 p(RIR) = 0

p(PIN) = .9 p(NIR) = 0 p(NIR) = .1 p(NIR) = .1
p(PIR) = 0 p(PIR) = .9 p(PIR) = .9
Strategy of Poc (control)
p(RIR) = .9 p(RIR) = .1 p(RIR) = 0
Modified Tit-for-Tat p(NIR) = .1 p(NIR) = .9 p(NIR) = .1
p(PIR) = 0 p(PIR) = 0 p(PIR) = .9
Note: p (ib) = probability of P0's behavior i at time t, given the
and j = R (reward), N (nonexchange), and P (punishment).

factor of a two-factor solution of a principal ment power are also significant. The interac-
factor analysis; they correlate with one tion between POM's strategy and average
another at .60 or higher; and a scale created punishment power shows that an increase in
by adding the four items together has an alpha the use of punishment heightens the effects of
reliability of .90. The affect scale has a average punishment power. Specifically, av-
potential range of 4 (very negative) to 28 erage punishment power affects S's compli-
(very positive) with a neutral midpoint of 16.
ance only when the probability of contingent
Table 3 shows subjects' mean affective
punishment is .9; when both the capacity to
evaluations by condition.
punish and the probability of contingent
punishment are high, rewarding by S is also

RESULTS at its highest: a mean of .75. This effect is

strong enough, however, to produce a signif-
The Effectiveness of icant main effect for average punishment
Coercion: S's Compliance
power as well. The results also show a
Table 4 summarizes the results of an weaker but significant interaction between
analysis of variance on S's compliance (i.e., punishment power imbalance and POM's use
S's rewards to POM). To examine the effects of punishment. In this case, however, the
of time as well as of structure and strategy on effects of structure are significant only at the
S's behavior, I divided the exchange period intermediate level (.5) of contingent punish-
into four 50-trial blocks and treated trial block
ment.
as a within-subject variable in the analysis. These interactions partially support my
The results show a strong main effect for prediction that the effects of punishment
POM's strategy, in a direction that supports
power on reward exchange will increase when
my predictions: the frequency with which S
that power is used more frequently. Rather
rewards POM increases with the probability of
unexpected, however, is the finding that
POM's contingent punishment of S's nonre-
punishment power imbalance has the stron-
warding (from a mean of .20 to .36 to .63
gest effect at the .5 rather than the .9 level. It
when p(PIN) = .1, .5, and .9 respectively).
The predicted interactions between the use appears that subjects showed some resistance
of punishment and the dimensions of punish- to POM's coercion when it increased to the
intermediate level and they had equal capacity
you?" Again, this question was followed by a labeled to retaliate, and that this resistance vanished
bipolar scale. when coercion increased to the .9 level,

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 86 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

Table 2. Behavioral Reactions to Coercion, by Condition: Means and Standard Deviations of S's Rewarding and
Punishing Actions to POM

Probability of Punishment for Nonexchange

.1 .5 .9

Structure of
Punishment Power X sd X sd X sd

S's Rewarding (compliance)

High punishment power
Balanced .26 (.16) .26 (.16) .75 (.15)
Imbalanced in POM's favor .17 (.07) .45 (.23) .76 (.16)

Low punishment power

Balanced .17 (.11) .30 (.18) .47 (.21)
Imbalanced in POM's favor .19 (.18) .43 (.18) .54 (.26)

S's Rewarding (compliance)

High punishment power
Balanced .02 (.02) .09 (.05) .06 (.06)
Imbalanced in POM's favor .05 (.06) .07 (.06) .05 (.05)
High punishment power
Balanced .07 (.10) .06 (.07) .09 (.08)
Imbalanced in POM's favor .01 (.02) .03 (.04) .06 (.05)

Note: Means are proportions of the 200 exchange opportu

particularly when punishment power was significantly when the probability was .5
high. (F3,117 = .12). The .9 probability produced a
A polynomial analysis shows that overall, rapid increase in rewarding by S during the
the relation between strategy and compliance first three trial blocks; this level stabilized in
is linear. It departs from linearity when the fourth trial block.
average punishment power is high, however, These findings show that coercive strate-
because of the greater increase in rewarding gies can be highly effective, and that their
by S when the probability of punishment is .9 effectiveness increases with both the probabil-
(F1,57 for the deviation from linearity = 7.51,ity and the magnitude of contingent punish-
p < .01) and when punishment power is ment. Although intermediate levels of coer-
balanced, because of the lower compliance cion appear to provoke some resistance when
when the probability of punishment is .5 the target of coercion has equal punishment
(F1,57 = 6.80, p < .05). power, I found no evidence of a "backlash"
The significant interaction between strategy at very high levels of coercion. Clearly, the
and trial block, graphed in Figure 2, shows most effective strategy for producing compli-
that compliance increased significantly over ance combines a strong magnitude with a
time when the probability of contingent strong probability of contingent punishment.
punishment was .9 (F3,117 = 25.17, p < A low probability of punishment, on the other
.001), but decreased when it was .1 (F3,117 =
hand, decreases rather than increases reward
11.26, p < .001). Compliance did not change exchange by S.

Table 3. Affective Evaluations of POM'S Behavior, by Condition: Means and Standard Deviations

Probability of Punishment for Nonexchange

.1 .5 .9

Structure of
Punishment Power X sd X sd X sd

High punishment power

Balanced 10.1 (2.9) 9.4 (5.9) 15.6 (6.7)
Imbalanced in POM's favor 9.5 (5.4) 6.8 (3.5) 12.8 (6.4)

Low Punishment Power

Balanced 8.7 (3.0) 11.3 (5.2) 10.1 (5.3)
Imbalanced in POM's favor 12.4 (8.1) 10.7 (4.6) 11.6 (7.0)

Note: Scale values for evaluations of POM's behavior range from 4 (very negative) to 28 (very positive), with a
neutral midpoint of 16.

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 COERCION IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 87

Table 4. Analysis of Variance in Subjects' Compliance with Coercion by POM

Source df MSS F

Between-Subject Effects
Punishment strategy (PS) 2 7.63 60.34***
Average punishment power (APP) 1 1.05 8.27**
Punishment power imbalance (PPI) 1 0.36 2.84
PS x APP 2 0.79 6.27**
PS x PPI 2 0.40 3.13*
APP x PPI 1 0.04 0.32
PS x APP x PPI 2 0.06 0.51
Within cells 108 0.13

Within-Subject Effects of Triala

Trial (T) 3 0.10 4.50
PS x T 6 0.42 18.27***
APP x T 3 0.00 0.18
PPI x T 3 0.00 0.19
PS x APP x T 6 0.01 0.30
PS x PPI x T 6 0.02 0.95
APP x PPI x T 3 0.01 0.34
PS x APP x PPI x T 6 0.01 0.53
Within cells 324 0.02

a Significance of the F-ratios is calculated after adjusting the degrees of freedom with the Greenhouse-Geisser
epsilon to compensate for lack of sphericity.
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001.

What are the costs of the apparent success (Table 5): the frequency of punishment by S
of strong contingent punishment? Does POM decreased over time (F3,324 = 27.42, p <
secure S's compliance while provoking S's .01). This decrease occurred primarily be-
wrath? An examination of possible "side tween the first and the second trial blocks.
effects" of coercion answers those questions. None of the manipulated variables had any
effect on punishment by S: across all
conditions, S punished POM .06 of the time
The Side Effects of Coercion: on the average. That frequency, and the
Retaliation and Affect tendency of punishment to decline over time,
are both typical of the punitive behavior
S's retaliation. An analysis of variance on
observed in previous experiments in this
S's retaliation (i.e., the frequency with which
program, which studied networks of real
S punished POM)' again using trial block as a
subjects. Thus, in contrast to theories which
within-subject variable, found only one sig-
predict that punishment leads to retaliation
nificant effect, a main effect for trial block
and to the escalation of conflict, these
- p(PIN) = .9 findings show that high levels of punishment
- p(PIN) =.6 produce no more retaliation than very low
0.9-
p(PIN) =.1 levels.
0.8- S's compliance and S's retaliation are also
0.7- unrelated to each other (r = .17, n.s.):
subjects who complied more did not retaliate
8 0.6-
less, and vice versa. These are clearly
0.5-
separate dimensions of behavior, affected by
v 0.4 - ------------------------ --------- ----------------
different variables. The high magnitudes and
probabilities of punishment that are so
0.3
effective in securing compliance do not affect
X 0 .2 - ......................................................... ..........
the likelihood of retaliation.
0.1 -
S's evaluations of POM. Both the high
0-
compliance and the low retaliation displayed
1 2 3 4
Trial Block by subjects are rational responses to the
Figure 2. Subjects' Compliance, by Level of Punishment situation in which they found themselves:
and Trial Block compliance was rewarded, and noncompli-

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 88 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

Table 5. Analysis of Variance in Subjects' Retaliation Against Coercion by POM

Source df MSS F

Between-Subject Effects
Punishment strategy (PS) 2 0.84 2.96
Average punishment power (APP) 1 0.12 0.42
Punishment power imbalance (PPI) 1 0.43 1.52
PS x APP 2 0.79 2.80
PS x PPI 2 0.06 0.19
APP x PPI 1 0.87 3.06
PS x APP x PPI 2 0.29 1.04
Within cells 108 0.28

Within-Subject Effects of Triala

Trial (T) 3 1.60 27.42***
PS x T 6 0.09 1.53
APP x T 3 0.01 0.16
PPI x T 3 0.07 1.23
PS x APP x T 6 0.05 0.92
PS x PPI x T 6 0.04 0.62
APP x PPI x T 3 0.01 0.14
PS x APP x PPI x T 6 0.07 1.26
Within cells 324 0.02

a Arcsine transformations of the variables are used for the analysis.

b Significance of the F-ratios is calculated after adjusting the degrees of freedom with the Greenhouse-Geisser
epsilon to compensate for lack of sphericity.
*** p <.001.

ance and retaliation were punished. That
subjects behaved so as to decrease their
losses, however, does not mean that they
liked doing so. As shown by the means in
Table 3, subjects tended to evaluate POM's
behavior negatively (below the neutral point
of .16) in all conditions.
Do these evaluations become more nega-
tive as the probability and magnitude of
punishment by POM increase? An analysis of
variance on S's evaluations of POM shows
that they do not (Table 6). Strategy has both a
significant main effect on affect and a
significant interaction with average punish-
ment power, paralleling the effects of these
variables on S's compliance. S's evaluation
of POM becomes less negative, however, not
more negative, as the probability of coercion
by POM increases. This effect occurs only
when average punishment power is high
(F2,57 = 7.03, p < .002). It results becau
the evaluations in the .9 strategy condition are
significantly higher than in either the .1 or the
.5 condition, which do not differ significantly
from each other. When average punishment
power is low, strategy has no effect on affect
(F2,57 = .03).
In short, the combination of structure and
strategy that produces the greatest compli-
ance-a high probability of contingent pun-
ishment, combined with the power to inflict
high losses-also produces the least negative
affect. Remember, subjects in this condition
were coerced, through repeated strong pun-
ishment, into exchanging with a less valuable
partner most of the time. Nevertheless, they

Table 6. Analysis of Variance in Subjects' Evaluations of POM's Behavior

Source df MSS F

Punishment Strategy (PS) 2 98.42 3.19*

Average Punishment Power (APP) 1 0.30 0.01
Punishment Power Imbalance (PPI) 1 .163 0.05
PS x APP 2 100.82 3.27*
PS x PPI 2 26.11 0.85
APP x PPI 1 93.63 3.04
PS x APP x PPI 2 4.41 0.14
Explained 11 50.47 1.64
Residual 108 30.85

* p <.05.

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 COERCION IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 89

felt less negative about their coercers than did Experimental Variations: Exploring the
subjects who were punished only occasionally Limits of the Findings
and less severely.
How can we explain these results? Are I conducted three additional experiments to
determine the theoretical generalizability of
subjects who volunteer for social psychology
the findings to structures and strategies that
experiments more masochistic than the rest of
vary on one or more dimensions which might
the population? Intriguing though that possi-
affect either the effectiveness of coercion or
bility is, the correct explanation is probably
emotional reactions to coercion.
quite simple: strong and consistent coercion Experiment 2. A second experiment elimi-
works; weak and inconsistent coercion does nated S's punishment power and hence S's
not. When coercion is used in combination ability to retaliate against coercion by POM .
with rewards for compliance, coercion that The effects of the same coercive strategies
works produces more rewarding interactions (.1, .5, and .9) were examined under both
and fewer punitive interactions than ineffec- high (.7) and low (.3) values of punishment
tive coercion. The subjects who experienced by POM of S in a 3 x 2 factorial design.
the former soon became engaged in mutually Analyses compared the results obtained in
rewarding exchanges with POM: 75 percent of this experiment with those obtained in
Experiment 1. S's ability to retaliate had no
the time they experienced POM as a partner
effect on either S's behavior or S's evalua-
who always reciprocated their rewards (albeit
tions of POM. Removal of S's ability to
unequally). The subjects who experienced the
retaliate did not increase S's compliance, but
latter did not increase their giving to POM
neither did it provoke more negative affect
(some decreased it); consequently they con- toward a partner who used coercion against a
tinue to receive punishment from POM, even target lacking the ability to punish back.
if weakly and infrequently. Experiment 3. The manipulations in Exper-
This point is illustrated effectively by anal- iment 1 confounded the contingency and the
yses of the net rewards that S received from probability of punishment by POM. Because I
POM (i.e., the frequency of rewards minus pun-held constant the conditional probabilities of
ishments): when average punishment power was punishment by POM, given prior rewards and
high and a .9 coercive strategy was used, the prior punishment by S [i.e., p(PIR) and
mean net frequency with which S received re- p(PIP)], varying the probability of punishment
by POM' given S's prior nonexchange
wards from POM was .54. Under the other five
combinations of average punishment power and
[p(PIN)] varied both the contingency of
punishment by POM on S's nonexchange
strategy, this mean fell below .12, and the av-
[i.e., p(PIN) - p(PIR)] and the overall or
erage across these conditions was .06. Further- unconditional probability of punishment by
more, when net rewards were entered as a co-
POM .
variate in the analysis of variance in subjects' Experiment 3 sought to determine the
evaluations, I found that 1) whether the effect independent effects of these two variables by
of net rewards was assessed before or after the comparing both high and low probabilities of
main effects of the experimental variables, its punishment for two of the levels of punish-
effect was far stronger than the effects of any ofment contingency (.1 and .5) used in
Experiment 1. I created two new high-
the experimental variables (F1,107 = 18.67 when
entered after the main effects; 22.30 when en- probability conditions by changing some of
the probabilities in the . 1 and .5 strategy
tered before; p < .001 for both), and 2) the
conditions of Experiment 1. I increased both
effects of the experimental variables became
nonsignificant when the covariate was entered p(PIR) and p(PIN) by .3, thus raising the
overall probability of punishment while main-
first, an indication that these variables affect
taining the contingency of punishment
evaluations through their effects on net re-
[p(PIN) x p(PIR)] in the original conditions.
wards. Thus S's more positive evaluation of These strategies were studied under the
POM under conditions of the most intense co- structure of high imbalanced punishment
ercion reflects S's overall experiences with POM,
power in Experiment 1.
which were more positive than negative be- In a statistical comparison of the results of
cause strong coercion was effective. these two conditions with the comparable

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 90 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

conditions with lower punishment probabili- of punishment increases with both the contin-
ties in Experiment 1, an increase in the gency of punishment use and the magnitude
probability of punishment had no effect on of punishment power; the combination of the
S's compliance or on S's affective evalua- two produces the strongest compliance. Sec-
tions; only the contingency of punishment ond, increasing the contingency of punish-
was significant. The higher probability of ment increases the partner's reward exchange
punishment, however, provoked greater retal- without increasing retaliation by the partner.
iation than in Experiment 1: a mean of .11 And third, although all punitive strategies
rather than .06. This finding suggests that produce negative affect in recipients, a
punishing a partner's "good" behaviors as partner who uses strong and consistent
well as the bad is more likely to provoke punishment to secure compliance is regarded
retaliation, even if the difference between the more favorably than one who punishes
probabilities of punishment remains constant. sporadically and ineffectively.
The amount of retaliation, however, remains The variations in punishment strategy and
relatively low. structure tested in Experiments 2-4 show that
Experiment 4. Several analyses suggest that the findings are quite robust. They hold when
S's retaliations should increase if the proba- the partner has no capacity to retaliate, and
bility with which POM punishes it is de- they hold when the probability of punishment
creased (e.g., Boyle and Lawler 1991; Ford is increased without changing the contin-
and Blegen 1992). Experiment 4 investigated gency. The conclusion that emerges from
the effects of decreasing p(PJP) (i.e., the these systematic variations is that the most
probability of punishment by POM' given important factor in the effectiveness of
prior punishment by S) from .9 to .5, while punishment strategies is contingency: the
p(NIP) was increased from .1 to .5. This probability of punishment for undesirable
change in strategy decreased the negative responses (punishing or not exchanging with
consequences of S's retaliation for coercion the partner) must be greater than the
by POM: half of the time, POM punished S's probability of punishment for desirable re-
retaliation; the other half of the time, POM sponses (giving rewards to the partner); the
ignored it. I studied the new probabilities in greater the difference, the more effective the
combination with two of the contingency strategy of punishment.
levels (.5 and .9) from Experiment 1, using As predicted, the effects of structural
the structure of high balanced punishment variations in punishment power increased
power from Experiment 1. with more frequent and more consistent use of
In a statistical comparison of these two punishment, with one exception: a significant
conditions with the comparable conditions in effect of power imbalance on reward ex-
Experiment 1, I found no significant effects change appeared when the probability of
of the decrease in punishment on S's punishment increased to .5, but disappeared
retaliation. Reducing p(PJP) from .9 to .5, when it increased to .9. Quite possibly the
however, effectively eliminated the effects of capacity to retaliate with equal harm becomes
the contingency of punishment on S's compli- irrelevant if an exchange partner continues to
ance and on S's affective reactions. Although punish at very high probabilities despite the
this effect was not anticipated, it is quite other's capacity to retaliate. These results,
logical. Punishing nonexchange by S with a like those of earlier studies (e.g., Molm
higher probability than punishment by S is 1990), suggest that how actors use punish-
inconsistent with a strategy of contingent ment is more important than their power to
punishment; responding inconsistently in this punish.
respect probably destroyed the benefits of the The relations between punishment and
consistent response to S's failure to reward. affect are unexpected and intriguing. The
analysis suggests that a high probability of
strong punishment produced less negative
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
affect because it quickly produced compli-
These experiments show that punishment ance, allowing the relation to change from
power, if used consistently and contingently,one of coercion to one of mutually beneficial
can be-a potent means of influence in social exchange. This finding supports Lawler and
exchange relations. Three conclusions are Yoon's (1993) recent theory of affect in
particularly important. First, the effectiveness bargaining relations, which argues that the

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 COERCION IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 91

experience of completing agreements, how-
ever beneficial they are, produces positive
affect. In this study, even though strong
coercion resulted in subjects' exchanging
more often with a less valuable partner, the
very frequency of that reward exchange made
them feel more positive toward the less
valued partner. '0
These results refute the classical exchange
theorists' arguments that punishment is inef-
fective and leads to retaliation or to the
dissolution of exchange relations, and provide
critical support for a developing theory of
coercive power in social exchange. They
show, as predicted, that the ineffectiveness of
punishment as an influence technique cannot
explain the weak effects of punishment power
in exchange relations in which actors have
both bases of power. By demonstrating that
low levels of punishment actually decrease
reward exchange (at least when used against a
reward-advantaged partner), while high levels
increase it, the results give credence to the
argument that the infrequent use of punish-
ment power, rather than the ineffectiveness of
punishment per se, accounts for its weak
effects in previous studies."I
At the same time, these results help us
understand the wide acceptance of the belief
that punishment is ineffective. Previous
experiments on nonnegotiated exchange have
shown that most subjects (and probably many
people in exchange relations outside experi-
ments) use low levels of punishment, compa-
rable in frequency to the lowest level
employed in this experiment (Molm 1988,
1990). In addition, they are more likely to use
weak punishment power than strong (Molm
1989b). As these experiments show, weak,
inconsistent punishment is not effective: it
decreases rather than increases reward ex-
change, but at the same time it produces just
10 Alternatively, these findings might be explained by
cognitive dissonance or self-perception theories (e.g.,
Bem 1967). That is, subjects who comply with coercion
may later explain or justify their behavior by evaluating
their coercer more positively.
l Although this temporal pattern in general remains to
be established, other studies report similar patterns.
Boyle and Lawler (1991), for example, found that
punitive tactics decreased over time when they were
reciprocated with strong (100%) contingencies of punish- of both defensive and offensive punishment effectively
ment, but increased when they were not. These findings
also are consistent with Axelrod's (1984) emphasis on the by the other. It is also understandable that neither
provokability of strategies-that is, the importance of
punishing without delay a partner's first defections from of concession because neither was contingent on
cooperation.
as much retaliation and negative affect from
the partner as would more effective punish-
ment. Because it does not work, the behavior
that provokes it continues, and the punish-
ment continues as well-weak and ineffec-
tive, but highly irritating. Examples abound:
the nagging spouse, the critical boss, the
ineffectual parent with the misbehaving child.
This is not an argument for using stronger
punishment in exchange relations, but rather
an explanation of why punishment is both so
common and so ineffective in exchange.
Although the results of these experiments
provide clear and compelling support for the
predictions, they are at odds with a substantial
body of research showing that the use of
punitive tactics reduces cooperation, in-
creases retaliation, and leads to prolonged
conflict. How can we account for these
differences in findings? An adequate answer
to that question requires more than theoretical
speculation, but two possible explanations
warrant further study.
First, as this study has shown, punishment
is effective only when it is used contingently.
Many of the experiments that report negative
effects of punishment study the interaction of
real subjects, whose use of punishment is
uncontrolled. Subjects who punish frequently
may be contingently punishing an opponent
who fails to cooperate or who punishes them,
or they may be punishing noncontingently or
offensively to project an image of strength or
toughness. As illustrated by Ford and Ble-
gen's (1992) analysis of offensive and
defensive punishment, different uses of pun-
ishment can provoke very different responses:
offensive punishment increases punishment
by the partner, producing a conflict spiral
effect, whereas defensive (retaliatory) punish-
ment decreases it. 12 If the aim of punishment
is to increase another's reward exchange or
cooperation, it must be contingent on nonex-
change or noncooperation.
Similarly, coercion that is used only to
exploit, rather than to increase cooperation or
12 Defensive punishment decreased punishment by the
other only when offensive punishment was low (Ford and
Blegen 1992). This interaction is consistent with the
principle that punishment must be contingent; high levels
eliminated any contingency of punishment on punishment
defensive nor offensive punishment affected magnitude
bargaining concessions.

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 92 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY
mutual exchange, is more likely to provoke
retaliation and resistance (e.g., Youngs
1986). The strategies in this study combined
contingent punishment for undesirable behav-
iors (punishment and nonexchange) with
contingent rewards for reward exchange.
Purely coercive strategies, in which actors
either give or withhold punishment but do not
reward, will be less effective. They are
unlikely to be effective at all unless compli-
ance with punishment is more beneficial than
noncompliance. 13
Second, punishment is more likely to
provoke negative reactions when the context
of the relation increases the salience of
concerns other than cost-benefit consider-
ations (e.g., saving face, looking tough,
anticipating attacks). Such conditions are
more likely to be found in formal bargaining
relations than in reciprocal exchange. Three
of these conditions in particular distinguish
experiments on explicit bargaining from the
experiments in this study: 1) a high level of
explicit conflict, 2) the use of verbal threats,
and 3) a normative framework that is
antithetical to punishment.14
When conflict is more intense or more
explicit, actors are more likely to expect
hostile and competitive interaction, and to
respond accordingly (see Tedeschi et al.
1973). Most research on explicit bargaining
assumes, as a scope condition, a relatively
high level of explicit conflict. Such conflict
gives actors the impetus to come to the
bargaining table initially. To meet this
assumption, subjects in bargaining experi-
ments typically begin with clearly deflned,
opposing positions (e.g., Deutsch 1973;
Lawler and Ford 1993) or are given the role
of adversaries with a history of conflictual
relations (e.g., Michener and Cohen 1973).
Exchange theories, in contrast, do not assume
13 A previous experiment (Molm 1993) suggests that
even pure coercion can be effective when the magnitude
of punishment outweighs the rewards that an actor can
receive from alternative partners. In this experiment,
however, the actors who used coercion had no power to
reward. It remains to be seen whether the use of pure
coercion, by an actor who had the capacity to reward,
would be effective.
14 Other experimental conditions that might affect the an integral part of virtually all exchange
relative weight of these concerns include face-to-face
versus computerized interaction, expectations of future
interaction between interaction partners, and material
versus nonmaterial benefits. These conditions, however,
have been relatively constant across experiments report-
ing different effects of punishment.
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that actors begin with opposing positions or
an awareness of conflict. Although the level
of conflict is objectively the same (i.e., actors
can realize the greatest payoffs if their
partners do all the giving), conflict becomes
salient only through the unequal dependencies
of imbalanced relations. In balanced rela-
tions, most subjects perceive their interests to
be the same.
Punishment in the context of explicit
bargaining is likely to be accompanied by
verbal threats. As Lindskold et al. (1986)
suggest, threats may convey different sym-
bolic meanings than do purely behavioral
strategies. In addition to verbally communi-
cating punishment contingencies, threats may
insult, challenge, and raise concerns about
saving face. Both the use and the availability
of threats may influence how actors interpret
and respond to punishment by a partner.
Finally, as Bacharach and Lawler (1981)
note, much of the bargaining literature
implicitly assumes that punitive tactics are
antithetical to the normative framework of
formal bargaining. Despite the conflict of
interests that creates the need for bargaining
in the first place, the structure of bargaining
relations is more cooperative in some ways
than the structure of nonnegotiated exchange.
Actors agree to bargain in order to resolve
conflict, not to create it. Punitive tactics may
be perceived as a violation of this initial
agreement, and may create a climate of
distrust that makes continued cooperation
difficult. The timing of punishment also may
be involved in this difference; in bargaining
experiments, punishment typically is used
during the process of negotiation rather than
in response to success or failure in reaching
an agreement.
To conclude, let me comment briefly on
the normative implications of this study.
Showing that coercion can be an effective
form of power in social exchange relations
says nothing about whether its use is good or
bad. Questions of whether or when coercion
is justified are perhaps best left to philoso-
phers. Yet right or wrong, just or unjust,
there is little question that negative actions are
relations. Omitting them from our theories
leaves us with an incomplete model of
behavior. This study takes us one step further
toward developing a more comprehensive
theory of social exchange.
 COERCION IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 93
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