10 Affirmative Surveillance

West Coast Publishing Surveillance 2015 AFFIRMATIVE Page 1
West Coast Publishing
Surveillance 2015
Affirmative
Edited by Jim Hanson
Researchers
Adam McKibben, Ben Menzies, Eric Robinson, Greta Stahl,
Jonathan Barsky, Jonathan Shane, Kendra Doty, Matt Stannard, William James Taylor
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Resolved: The United States federal

government should substantially curtail its
domestic surveillance.
AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE FILE INTRO
SURVEILLANCE 2015-2016
WEST COAST AFFIRMATIVE
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance.
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Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance....2
AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE FILE INTRO............................................................................................................3
SURVEILLANCE TOPIC OVERVIEW..............................................................................................................14
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic
surveillance........................................................................................................................................15
Affirmative Strategies........................................................................................................................18
Negative Strategies............................................................................................................................21
CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACTS AFFIRMATIVE....................................................................................................24
Civil liberties key to democracy.............................................................................................................25
Civil liberties key to the economy..........................................................................................................28
Utilitarian civil liberties bad...................................................................................................................30
Answer to public health.........................................................................................................................31
Answer to terrorism..............................................................................................................................33
Answer to violations of liberties lead to rights......................................................................................35
Answer to only affects criminals............................................................................................................37
CODIS AFFIRMATIVE..................................................................................................................................38
Codis 1AC...........................................................................................................................................39
1AC....................................................................................................................................................43
1AC....................................................................................................................................................44
1AC....................................................................................................................................................45
Privacy Advantage Extension.................................................................................................................46
General privacy Extension.................................................................................................................47
CODIS is a slippery slope....................................................................................................................48
Minority Report Extension.................................................................................................................52
Minority Report Extension.................................................................................................................54
Jim Crow Advantage Extension..............................................................................................................55
African Americans & Latinos are disproportionately included in CODIS............................................56
African Americans & Latinos are disproportionately included in CODIS............................................58
Familial targeting bad / expanding now............................................................................................59
Familial targeting bad / genetic discrimination.................................................................................60
Racism Extension...............................................................................................................................61
Topicality Answers.................................................................................................................................63
The national database system (CODIS) is a federal collection of DNA...............................................64
The national database system (CODIS) is a federal collection of DNA...............................................65
A2: Crime Disadvantage........................................................................................................................66
Non-Unique – Crime is high now.......................................................................................................67
Link Turn – We reduce the backlog...................................................................................................68
A2: Politics........................................................................................................................................69
General Case Extension.........................................................................................................................70
Solvency.............................................................................................................................................71
Inherency Extension – No restrictions now / national database coming...........................................72
Inherency Extension – CODIS expanding now...................................................................................73
Inherency Extension – Maryland v. King............................................................................................75
Inherency Extension – Maryland v. King............................................................................................76
A2: DNA collection good / like fingerprinting...................................................................................77
A2: DNA collection good / fake DNA.................................................................................................78
A2: DNA collection good / exonerates the innocent.........................................................................79
DRONE SURVEILLANCE AFFIRMATIVE........................................................................................................80
Drone Surveillance Aff 1AC....................................................................................................................81
Solvency.................................................................................................................................................82
Advantage One: Accidents.....................................................................................................................83
Advantage Two: Militarization...............................................................................................................86
Drone Surveillance Aff Extensions.........................................................................................................89
Inherency...............................................................................................................................................90
Solvency.................................................................................................................................................93
Accidents Advantage.............................................................................................................................96
Harms................................................................................................................................................97
Impacts............................................................................................................................................101
Militarization Advantage.....................................................................................................................103
Harms..............................................................................................................................................104
Links.................................................................................................................................................107
Impacts............................................................................................................................................109
Privacy Advantage...............................................................................................................................112
1AC Module.....................................................................................................................................113
Harms..............................................................................................................................................115
Impacts............................................................................................................................................116
AT: Neg Offense...................................................................................................................................117
AT: Terrorism DA.............................................................................................................................118
AT: Politics DA..................................................................................................................................120
AT: States CP....................................................................................................................................122
AT: Gendered Language K................................................................................................................123
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 AFFIRMATIVE.................................................................................................125
Thesis...............................................................................................................................................126
1AC..................................................................................................................................................127
1AC..................................................................................................................................................128
1AC..................................................................................................................................................129
1AC..................................................................................................................................................130
1AC..................................................................................................................................................131
1AC..................................................................................................................................................132
Topicality: Domestic Surveillance....................................................................................................133
Curtail..............................................................................................................................................134
Substantially....................................................................................................................................135
Solvency: 12333 Should Be Overturned..........................................................................................136
Solvency: Congress Can Overturn Executive Orders........................................................................137
Inherency: 12333 Enables Mass Surveillance of Citizens.................................................................138
Inherency: Won’t Be Overturned and Gives Unlimited Power........................................................142
Inherency: No Oversight..................................................................................................................143
Surveillance Totalitarianism Impact Scenarios................................................................................144
Surveillance Totalitarianism Extensions...........................................................................................145
Totalitarianism Impacts...................................................................................................................146
Totalitarianism Impacts...................................................................................................................147
Terrorism Disadvantage Answers....................................................................................................148
Terrorism Disadvantage Answers....................................................................................................149
Executive Order 12333 Undermines Separation of Powers.............................................................150

Separation of Powers Impacts.........................................................................................................153
Separation of Powers Impacts.........................................................................................................154
Answers to Supreme Court Counterplan.........................................................................................155
General Kritik Answers: Mass Surveillance Undermines Alternative...............................................158
MUSLIM SURVEILLANCE AFFIRMATIVE....................................................................................................159
Muslim Surveillance 1AC.................................................................................................................160
1AC..................................................................................................................................................161
1AC..................................................................................................................................................162
1AC..................................................................................................................................................164
1AC..................................................................................................................................................166
1AC..................................................................................................................................................169
Affirmative Extension..........................................................................................................................170
State and local law enforcement follows the FBI lead.....................................................................171
SQ does not protect Muslim rights / Inherency...............................................................................172
A2: FBI good....................................................................................................................................173
A2: FBI good....................................................................................................................................174
Radicalization theories are wrong...................................................................................................175
Pre-emptive prosecutions / provocation bad..................................................................................177
A2: Community partnerships..........................................................................................................180
Informants bad / coercion...............................................................................................................181
Informants bad / coercion...............................................................................................................182
FBI manufactures Muslim “Terrorists”............................................................................................183
Solvency Extension..........................................................................................................................186
Solvency Extension..........................................................................................................................188
Racism / Whiteness internals..........................................................................................................189
Racism / Orientalism internals.........................................................................................................191

Islamophobia internals....................................................................................................................192
Islamophobia internals....................................................................................................................193
Islamophobia – Orientalism internal links.......................................................................................194
1st Amendment / Freedom internal links.........................................................................................195
1st Amendment / Freedom internal links.........................................................................................196
A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (radicalization)....................................................................197
A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (mistrust).............................................................................198
A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (ineffective).........................................................................199
A2: Terrorism is real / threat..........................................................................................................200
A2: Lone Wolf Terrorism.................................................................................................................202
A2: Liberalism Good........................................................................................................................203
SOCIAL JUSTICE AFFIRMATIVE.................................................................................................................204
Social Justice 1AC.................................................................................................................................205
Inherency.........................................................................................................................................206
Advantage 1: Racism........................................................................................................................208
Advantage 2: Poverty......................................................................................................................211
Solvency...........................................................................................................................................215
2AC Extensions....................................................................................................................................217
Inherency.............................................................................................................................................218
Solvency...............................................................................................................................................220
Institutional engagement key..........................................................................................................222
Debate key.......................................................................................................................................223
Racism.................................................................................................................................................225
Police = racist...................................................................................................................................226
NSA = racist......................................................................................................................................228
Predictive Policing bad.....................................................................................................................230
AT: Body cameras............................................................................................................................233
R/C Terrorism..................................................................................................................................234
Psychology impact...........................................................................................................................235
Poverty................................................................................................................................................236
Add ons................................................................................................................................................239
Democracy.......................................................................................................................................240
Immigration.....................................................................................................................................241
Imperialism......................................................................................................................................243
Terrorism.........................................................................................................................................244
2AC Answers........................................................................................................................................246
T: Domestic Surveillance......................................................................................................................247
XO CP...................................................................................................................................................248
Courts CP.............................................................................................................................................249
State Bad K..........................................................................................................................................250
Fem K...................................................................................................................................................251
Cap K....................................................................................................................................................252
Post-modernism K...............................................................................................................................254
Schmitt K..............................................................................................................................................255
Terrorism DA.......................................................................................................................................256
AT: “National Security Outweighs”......................................................................................................260
Surveillance not effective................................................................................................................265
AT: Guidelines..................................................................................................................................267
COURTS COUNTERPLAN RESPONSES.......................................................................................................268
Permutation Solvency......................................................................................................................269
Permutation Solvency......................................................................................................................270
Legitimacy Turns..............................................................................................................................271
Courts Ineffective in Checking Executive.........................................................................................272
Counterplan Leads to Judicial Activism............................................................................................273
Counterplan Leads to Judicial Activism............................................................................................274
Legislature is Better than the Courts...............................................................................................275
Counterplan Links to Politics Disadvantage.....................................................................................276
Counterplan Links to Politics Disadvantage.....................................................................................277
Court Stripping Turn........................................................................................................................278
Answers to Separation of powers....................................................................................................279
Answers to Deliberation..................................................................................................................280
EXECUTIVE ORDER COUNTERPLAN RESPONSES......................................................................................282
2AC Perm – Do Both........................................................................................................................283
2AC Perm – Do the CP.....................................................................................................................284
2AC Executive Rollback....................................................................................................................285
2AC Legislative Rollback...................................................................................................................286

2AC Agency Rollback........................................................................................................................287
2AC Judicial Rollback.......................................................................................................................288
2AC Perception + Executive Rollback...............................................................................................289
2AC Links to Politics.........................................................................................................................290
2AC Links to Politics – Links to Elections..........................................................................................291
2AC Tyranny DA...............................................................................................................................292
Executive Rollback...........................................................................................................................293
Legislative Rollback..........................................................................................................................295
Agency Rollback...............................................................................................................................296
Links to Politics................................................................................................................................298
Tyranny DA......................................................................................................................................302
CRIME DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES........................................................................................................303
No Uniqueness....................................................................................................................................304
UQ—Will Expire Now.......................................................................................................................305
No Link.................................................................................................................................................308
Link Defense—Crime Alt Causes......................................................................................................309
Terrorism.........................................................................................................................................310
Doesn’t Prevent Crime.....................................................................................................................311
No Int. Link..........................................................................................................................................314
No Data Analysis..............................................................................................................................315
No Information Shortage.................................................................................................................316
No Information Shortage.................................................................................................................317
Link Turn..............................................................................................................................................318
Information Overload......................................................................................................................319
Impact Turns........................................................................................................................................322
Freedom First—Prior Question........................................................................................................323
Crushes Freedom—Surveillance Specific.........................................................................................324

Crushes Freedom—Surveillance Specific.........................................................................................325
Crushes Democracy.........................................................................................................................326
Crushes Democracy.........................................................................................................................327
Crushes Freedom of Speech............................................................................................................328
Surveillance is Racist—Arabs/ Muslims...........................................................................................329
Surveillance is Racist—African Americans.......................................................................................330
Liberty Good—Vulnerable Populations...........................................................................................331
Liberty Good—Privacy.....................................................................................................................332
General—Laundry List.....................................................................................................................333
Other Aff Answers...............................................................................................................................334
Yes Abuse—Burden of Proof...........................................................................................................335
Yes Abuse........................................................................................................................................336
Yes Abuse........................................................................................................................................337
Parallel Construction Bad—Wrong..................................................................................................338
Parallel Construction Bad—Illegal....................................................................................................339
CYBERWAR DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES.................................................................................................340
Cybersecurity Down – Snowden......................................................................................................341
Cybersecurity Down – Generic........................................................................................................343
Cybersecurity Down – Tech Investment..........................................................................................344
Cybersecurity Down – Financial Incentives......................................................................................345
Link Turn – Surveillance Hurts Cybersecurity...................................................................................346
Link Turn – Surveillance Hurts Cybersecurity...................................................................................347
No Link – Private Sector Solves........................................................................................................348
No Cyberwar....................................................................................................................................349
No Cyberwar....................................................................................................................................350
AT: Accidental War..........................................................................................................................351
AT: China War..................................................................................................................................353
AT: Iran War.....................................................................................................................................354
AT: Iran War.....................................................................................................................................355
No Link.............................................................................................................................................356
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES.............................................................................357
UQ.......................................................................................................................................................358
NU – Obama Won’t Act...................................................................................................................359

NU – AUMF Thumper......................................................................................................................360
NU – Syria Thumper.........................................................................................................................361
NU – Congressional Restrictions......................................................................................................362
NU – Court Restrictions...................................................................................................................363
Links.....................................................................................................................................................364
No Spillover.....................................................................................................................................365
No Link – Congress...........................................................................................................................366
Link Turn + No Spillover – Congress.................................................................................................367
Link Turn + No Spillover – Courts.....................................................................................................369
No Link – Personality.......................................................................................................................370
MPX.....................................................................................................................................................371
AT: Cred – No MPX..........................................................................................................................372
AT: Cred – AT: Heg – No MPX..........................................................................................................374
AT: Cred – AT: Arctic War – No MPX................................................................................................375
AT: Cred – Sequester Thumps..........................................................................................................376
AT: Cred – Shutdown Thumps.........................................................................................................377
AT: Econ – No MPX..........................................................................................................................378
AT: Terror – No MPX........................................................................................................................379
No MPX + MPX Turn – Unilaterial Wars...........................................................................................380
MPX Turn – Unilateral Wars............................................................................................................381
TERRORISM DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES................................................................................................382
No Link – Surveillance Not Key........................................................................................................383
No Link – Alternatives Solve............................................................................................................385
Link Turn – Electronic Surveillance Trades Off with Intelligence.....................................................387
Link Turn – Surveillance Enables Cyberterrorism.............................................................................389
No Impact – Cyber Security.............................................................................................................390
No Impact – Terrorism.....................................................................................................................391
No Impact - Nuke Terror..................................................................................................................393
No Impact - Bio Terror.....................................................................................................................394
No Impact – Cross Border Terror.....................................................................................................395
No Impact - ISIS...............................................................................................................................396
No Impact - Al-Qaeda......................................................................................................................397
BIOPOWER KRITIK RESPONSES................................................................................................................398

Biopower good....................................................................................................................................399
Biopower inevitable.............................................................................................................................402
State inevitable....................................................................................................................................404
No Link—negative state action............................................................................................................405
Permutation........................................................................................................................................407
Feminism aff....................................................................................................................................411
Policing aff.......................................................................................................................................412
Impacts................................................................................................................................................413
AT: Bare life.....................................................................................................................................414
Alternative...........................................................................................................................................415
Solvency—Engagement key.............................................................................................................417
Solvency—History Key.....................................................................................................................421
Solvency—No public support...........................................................................................................422
Framework..........................................................................................................................................423
Utilitarianism.......................................................................................................................................424
AT: Rights bad......................................................................................................................................425
AT: Subjectivity....................................................................................................................................426
AT: Disability Module...........................................................................................................................427
AT: Charismatic Leader........................................................................................................................428
PRIVACY KRITIK RESPONSES....................................................................................................................429
Permutations.......................................................................................................................................430
Permutation solvency......................................................................................................................431
Permutation solvency......................................................................................................................432
Link Answers / Turns...........................................................................................................................433
No link – Legal reforms / Statism.....................................................................................................434
No link – Intellectual privacy............................................................................................................435
Link /Internal link answers...............................................................................................................436
Link Turn / Aff is a pre-requisite......................................................................................................437
Link turns / Permutation solvency...................................................................................................438
Link turn / Permutation solvency - Intersectionality........................................................................439
Link turns – Surveillance is patriarchal.............................................................................................440
Alternative Answers............................................................................................................................441
Feminist criticism fails.....................................................................................................................442

Legal reforms are key......................................................................................................................443
Impact Answers / Turns.......................................................................................................................444
Agency/ Value to life.......................................................................................................................445
Anti-surveillance/Privacy policies are good.....................................................................................446
Anti-surveillance/Privacy policies are good.....................................................................................447
The public/private dichotomy is good.............................................................................................448
Democracy Turn – 2AC....................................................................................................................449
Democracy Extension......................................................................................................................450
SURVEILLANCE TOPIC OVERVIEW
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially

curtail its domestic surveillance.
Overview of Words
Many of the words in the resolution are fairly standard for policy debate resolutions, while the key
phrase “domestic surveillance” contains specific, field-contextual meaning, with the potential to strictly
limit the scope of the resolution. In this section, we will examine the words “substantially,” "curtail,"
“domestic” and “surveillance” (and examine the contextual definition of the two words together,
“domestic surveillance”).
Substantially
“Substantially” exists to limit the scope of the resolution, but its inconsistent and generic definition set
cuts against its limiting qualities. The word’s various quantitative definitions are inapplicable to any
context but their original ones (a particular act, administrative order, court decision, etc.). On the other
hand, the various qualitative definitions tend to be vacuous (important, critical to, etc.) without more
exacting application.
Of the qualitative definitions of “substantially,” two directions emerge: “to a great or significant extent”
and “for the most part, essentially.” The first definition is next to useless, but the second may hold
affirmatives to curtailing most domestic surveillance--at least over 50% if quantifiable, but articulating
“more than half” is also possible qualitatively, descriptively. Overturning Executive Order 12333 is
obviously substantial, since it foundationally justifies most mass data searching.
Or do we even know what “most” would be? The secrecy itself, of domestic surveillance, may make it
impossible to measure how “substantially” an affirmative curtails
We don’t know how big the U.S. surveillance apparatus is today, either in terms of money and
people or in terms of how many people are monitored or how much data is collected. Modern
technology makes it possible to monitor vastly more people -- yesterday's NSA revelations
demonstrate that they could easily surveil everyone -- than could ever be done manually.
(Bruce Schneier, “What We Don't Know About Spying on Citizens: Scarier Than What We Know,”
The Atlantic, June 6, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/what-we-
dont-know-about-spying-on-citizens-scarier-than-what-we-know/276607/)
The lack of public information concerning the scope and extent of domestic surveillance makes it
difficult to have a procedural debate on the parameters of domestic surveillance.
Curtail
There are three categories of meaning for the word “curtail.” The first category worth noting is the
necessity of a specific object of curtailment within the policy. In other words, rather than curtailing the
program as a whole, affirmatives would have to curtail some component of the program: the funding,
personnel and staff, some objective within the program. An example of such a definition would be the
Government Accounting Office definition in this file, where “curtail” is specifically contextualized as
meaning “reduction of budget authority.” This category of meaning is consistent with the way
policymakers use the word. A program as a whole is “reduced” or “eliminated,” while components of
the program are curtailed. Affirmatives can use this definition if they want to advocate fairly specific
types of reductions in programs; doing so would limit negatives’ ability to find disadvantage links or
counterplan ground, as well as limit their solvency arguments. Negatives, on the other hand, can run
topicality violations distinguishing between curtailing components of a program and reducing or
eliminating the general scope of the program.
The second category of meaning of “curtail” is reduction, or cutting back, while the third category is
“curtail as complete elimination.” The second category is more consistent with traditional usage of the
word than the third; normally, curtail is distinct from elimination. However, at least one definition of
curtail in our file is “to end something before it is finished,” which implies elimination. The distinction
between these is very important for the division of ground. If an affirmative eliminates all or nearly all
surveillance, meaning virtually no surveillance is left after the plan, this allows affirmatives to claim a
great deal of solvency--possibly more than even the literature base assumes, since most authors writing
about domestic surveillance assume that at least some surveillance (perhaps what they deem to be
legitimate surveillance) will be left after the plan. On the other hand, curtailing some (but not
eliminating all) surveillance may allow affirmatives to dodge terrorism or other disadvantages premised
on the need for continued surveillance. This suggests that the decision by affirmatives as to how much
surveillance to curtail might influence negative strategy in myriad ways. It also means negatives can
deploy topicality arguments in either direction, depending on the parameters of affirmative curtailment.
Domestic
One question about “domestic” is how much activity and information-gathering must take place within
U.S. borders. Executive Order 12333, authorizing the collection of information on Americans traveling
abroad, is probably considered “domestic” within the scope of most operational definitions, because the
targets are U.S. citizens, and the information is processed by agents of the United States within the
United States. However, because it’s collected from out-of-country locations, and (more importantly)
because the data might incidentally include information about foreigners, an affirmative to curtail 12333
may be extra-topical. Debaters will face such dilemmas when negotiating the parameters of “domestic
surveillance” on this topic. Definitions of “domestic” range from “relating to a particular country”
(meaning the information need only relate to the U.S. and not be in the U.S.) to “originating in the
United States” (presumably meaning that the activity being monitored must take place in the United
States. This will be a debate about limits and ground. If negatives can demonstrate that they are at a
strategic disadvantage against affirmatives whose surveillance arguments go beyond U.S. borders, then
they can probably persuade critics to limit the scope of activity to the U.S.
Two other things seem clear concerning the word “domestic.” First, surveillance of suspected foreign
terrorists inside the United States would fall under the definition. Second, surveillance of suspected
foreign terrorists abroad is not usually called domestic surveillance. This is clarified in a piece of
evidence in this file from the Council on Foreign Relations, but it’s also intuitive—neither the target nor
the activity are, in any way, domestic.
Surveillance
Contextually, surveillance is electronic, gathered for a purpose, typically to provide evidence of

wrongdoing, and yields information that must be processed and analyzed in some way.
Why is surveillance contextually electronic? This is mainly a function of the policy literature on the topic.
Although the constitutional protection against unauthorized searches did not originally contemplate
electronic searches, there is simply no relevant topic literature on non-electronic surveillance. The topic
paper was written mainly with National Security Agency surveillance in mind and, although police
surveillance for non-terrorist crimes, and even corporate/private surveillance may fall into the broad
parameters of the resolution, there is little on-point literature on the large-scale societal harms of such
surveillance. However, within the scope of electronic surveillance is included both direct and indirect
information-gathering. Direct information gathering would occur when the NSA or accompanying
agencies do wiretaps, data-mining, and other searches directly. Indirect surveillance would be those
instances when the NSA and accompanying agencies collect data from private corporations, as when the
NSA receives data from Verizon or other telecommunications companies and then analyzes that data.
Negatives might make the topicality argument that only curtailing direct surveillance is resolutional, a
debate likely resolved at the standards level.
By now you may have noticed that “surveillance” carries very different meanings from dictionary to
policy context. For another instance, prevention of bad acts seems intrinsic to the functional definitions
of “surveillance.” This makes the word distinct from the kind of violations of privacy done by the
corporate world in an effort to better understand consumer behavior. Thus, if a private company
monitors your internet behavior, and the NSA monitors your internet behavior in the same fashion, it
would be contextually accurate to call the NSA's behavior surveillance, but not the private company’s
behavior.
Domestic Surveillance
Add the word “domestic” to “surveillance,” and the range of cases gets even more particular. The most
limiting interpretations of “domestic surveillance” may well hold the resolution to ten or fewer topical
plans. Why? First, because of the word “its” in the topic, which indicates possession of (that definition is
in this file). Second, because domestic law enforcement agencies are unlikely to use the phrase
“domestic surveillance” when referring to their own surveillance practices. Only the federal government
practices both foreign and domestic surveillance, and therefore, only literature specific to NSA (or other
agency) surveillance is likely to make the “domestic” distinction.
One very policy-particularized application of “domestic surveillance” in this file is the evidence specifying
that, in the context of the Bush administration (and, by extension, the Obama administration),
“domestic surveillance” has the attribute of occurring under a “blanket warrant,” an extremely broad
warrant issued for a general search for wrongdoing, the kind of warrant issued by Section 215 of the
Patriot Act, allowing “blanket warrants for federal authorities to obtain massive swaths of personal data,
including bank, doctor and phone company records.” This gives law enforcement broad discretion to
search unspecified places for unspecified things. Traditionally, general warrants are considered
unconstitutional under the specificity requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
With few words and even fewer topic-specific words, this is a manageable resolution from a procedural
standpoint, although lack of information about what, who, and how much domestic surveillance the
government conducts make some limits murkier than others. The hyper-specific literature on the term
“domestic surveillance” enhances that manageability.
Affirmative Strategies
Specific Plans
This section doesn’t attempt to list all potential plans and cases on this year’s resolution, but rather to
provide a small representative sample. The parameters of “domestic surveillance” may limit the topic to
only a few NSA/FBI/CIA surveillance cases; if teams and critics end up preferring broader definitions,
then more applications of law enforcement and even other surveillance may be debatable. Here is a
brief executive agency/Patriot Act/general law enforcement case list.
Racial profiling: At both the NSA/anti-terrorism level and the domestic law enforcement level,
authorities use racial profiling on particular surveillance targets. Such profiling might be implicit, or even
unconscious, but evidence exists of blatant profiling of Arab-Americans as a matter of policy in factions
of institutions such as the FBI and even the NSA. Affirmatives can ban this repugnant practice, claiming
not only racism as an impact, but also institutional credibility and law enforcement effectiveness, soft
power, and international human rights credibility. Negatives may consider counterplan strategies that
access those moral impacts, or kritiks of the paradigms or institutional methodologies that the
affirmative uses to access them.
Drones: The proliferation of drones as mechanisms of surveillance on ordinary U.S. citizens is a stark
symbol of the way the ruling classes deploy technology to erase privacy lines and diminish individual and
group autonomy. Through restrictive regulations or even the outright ban of some types of drones,
affirmatives can substantially curtail the use of drones in gathering information. Such plans would access
myriad privacy, totalitarianism, biopolitical and other kritik-level impacts; there may also be good
resource-shift and focus arguments if affirmatives want to improve the good work of police and
government agencies while eliminating the “bad apple” of drones. Negatives have a wide array of
choices against such affirmatives, from specific counterplans to retain particular drone-types to
arguments about their effectiveness in stopping high-impact crimes or acts of terror.
Maryland v. King (or other court decisions): Maryland v. King is a 2013 United States Supreme Court
decision holding that when officers make an arrest supported by probable cause, the officers are
justified in taking and keeping a DNA sample from the arrestee. The decision was very close, and the
dissent--by both ultra-conservative Scalia and the three liberal justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
arguing that “categorically” and “without exception,” “[t]he Fourth Amendment forbids searching a
person for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime or is
in possession of incriminating evidence.” A range of privacy and constitutionality impacts is possible.
Affirmatives may write similar cases for other court decisions, and the use of the Supreme Court as an
actor potentially avoids many generic disadvantages, and renders most agent counterplans useless.
Negatives can argue a variety of court-specific strategies, from legitimacy to hollow hope to court-
stripping, and there are legal-specific kritiks such as Critical Legal Studies, or legal-specific links to
arguments like capitalism and biopower.
Executive Order 12333: Originally implemented by President Reagan, Executive Order 12333 regulates
many aspects of executive power to deal with enemies or threats, including assassinations and
surveillance powers. Experts say XO 12333 is the fundamental document authorizing the expansion of
data collection activities towards U.S. citizens. The Order has been used by the National Security Agency
as legal authorization for the secret and systematic collection of unencrypted information flowing
through the internet, emails, cell phones, and every other means of electronic information transmission.
The affirmative can mandate that Congress render the Executive Order legally invalid, which Congress is
empowered to do. The Supreme Court may be able to do the same. The main 1AC advantage would
probably be totalitarianism, but separation of powers is also an important advantage to the plan.
Negatives could counterplan with the agent the affirmative did not use; there is good literature on both
sides of the question of whether Congress or the Judiciary are better equipped to check executive
power, particularly of these sweeping executive orders.
Patriot Act Section 215: The National Security Agency's phone sweeping program, collecting numbers,
dates, and durations of phone calls made in the United States, constitutes the very essence of
unconstitutional domestic surveillance, and is embedded in Section 215 of the patriot act, a provision
allowing the government to demand that private telecommunications companies turn over information
about their patrons. However, Congress is currently fiercely debating the extension of the Patriot Act,
with 215 facing immanent expiration. By the time teams start debating in the fall, the issue will probably
be resolved, and if 215 survives, affirmatives may want to do what so many members of Congress want
to do and ban the provision. The advantages of totalitarianism and privacy, and the symbolic significance
of the Patriot Act for the international reputation of the United States, are both potential advantage
areas. Negatives can certainly execute a well-researched strategy holding that 215's data collection does
stop terrorism, including high-impact disasters with WMDs, but negatives may also consider the courts
or even an executive order as alternative agents.
Section 702 of FISA Amendments Act: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act enables the surveillance
targeting of foreign persons located abroad. Section 702 provides for targeting and minimization
procedures, adopted by the U.S. Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, requiring a
valid purpose for the surveillance. Several troubling allegations have emerged concerning the use of the
section. We already know the Act is being used to target Americans abroad. Moreover, the U.S. appears
to be sharing this information with British spies, and capturing mass collections of phone calls and
emails "directly from the physical infrastructure of communications providers" (Nadia Kayyali, “The Way
the NSA Uses Section 702 is Deeply Troubling. Here’s Why,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, May 7,
2014, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/way-nsa-uses-section-702-deeply-troubling-heres-why).
Banning or amending this section would yield both international relations and anti-terrorism
effectiveness impacts. If affirmatives broadly ban Section 702, negatives might consider going all in on
the topicality argument that this is not domestic surveillance, given that the targets and activities are
not U.S. citizens or within the United States, and the topic literature is quite specific about dividing
foreign and domestic surveillance—as evidenced, even, by the title of FISA. If the plans are specific to
only the targeting of Americans abroad, then many of the strategies against Executive Order 12333 may
also work against FISA. The special advocate affirmative may even be a counterplan.
FISA Courtroom Special Advocate: Civil libertarians have called for Congress to amend FISA to provide
for a special advocate on the court, “whose job it would be to represent civil liberties in court
proceedings, and establish a process for declassifying the court's orders.” As of last year, “Those reforms
are included in a Senate version of an intelligence reform bill, but not the House version now under
consideration” (Denver Nicks, “Privacy Advocates Call for FISA Court Reform,” Time, July 10, 2014,
http://time.com/2970766/privacy-freedom-act-reform-secret-nsa-oversight-fisa/). A plan to do this
would incur civil liberties advantages, and probably some international human rights credibility.
Negatives could mandate that the Supreme Court rule that due process requires such a special
advocate.
Impact Areas
Privacy: All domestic surveillance affirmatives can potentially deploy privacy impacts. At the substantive
level, privacy is linked to effective democracy, individual rights, community cohesion, self-actualization,
and a variety of other qualitative but real arguments about living in a good society. At the
critical/philosophical level, privacy is linked primarily to biopolitical freedom, biopower, and the similar
family of arguments about the state’s ability to monitor and control the individual.
Totalitarianism: Government surveillance rips at the fabric of civil society and accountability,
discouraging political engagement and punishing dissent. Surveillance creates the climate of fear useful
to totalitarian leaders. Evidence is particularly passionate right now about these subjects, and history
demonstrates that totalitarianism can cause massive loss of life alongside loss of freedom.
Racism: Profiling cases can emphasize the “original sin” nature of racism, which makes it categorically
more important than whatever small nooks of intelligence needs racial profiling actually fills. Racism is
unacceptable for countless reasons, but some of the most easily articulated are dehumanization,
genocide, and human dignity.
Freedom to dissent: A subset of totalitarian impacts warranting its own specific mention, the closure of
dissent space is a death-knell for democracy (and democracy, in turn, links to several substantive
terminal impacts such as war and human survival). The idea that the government watches activists,
monitoring their communications and tracking their activities and associates, discourages people from
being activists at all. Without people willing to push the boundaries, democracy simply can’t survive.
Soft power: Perception of U.S. adherence to protocols of privacy, decency, respect for other countries’
citizens and modes of communication, respect for our own citizens’ rights, all factor into the rest of the
world’s perception of the U.S. as a moral and political leader. When the U.S. was caught listening in on
communications of leaders in Germany, Brazil, and elsewhere, this damaged U.S. credibility. The impacts
include influence and hegemony, trade and economic policies, and the ability to collectively engage on a
variety of issues facing the planet.
Effective Anti-Terrorism: Many scholars, former intelligence workers, and journalists assert that mass
surveillance is simply ineffective, creates bottlenecks of resources and information flow, demands that
agencies look for needles in haystacks, in general wasting a lot of time and money. Affirmatives wishing
to sidestep or supplement privacy or other “moral” debates can emphasize that curtailing surveillance
opens the door to better anti-terrorism strategies, including those premised on cooperation between
the U.S. and key allies.
International human rights credibility: The United States can’t effectively demand that other countries
respect human rights if we are a surveillance state. Our ability to criticize slavery, genocide, persecution
of minorities, and in particular, totalitarian regimes like North Korea, is undermined by our insistence on
spying on our own citizens
Separation of powers: Many affirmatives on the topic will curtail executive powers that many believe
should be balanced more equally among branches—particularly the legislative branch with regard to the
authorization of operations, and the judicial branch with regard to constitutionality determinations.
Separation of powers is necessary to preserve democracy, ensure international peace, and effective
governance.
Negative Strategies
Counterplans
Alternative Actors: Topic literature on domestic surveillance, American intelligence, and

counterterrorism reveals strong differences of opinion about which branch or agency controls what
policies and outcomes. Thus, there is plenty of literature saying the Executive Branch should have
primacy in intelligence, but there is an equal amount of compelling literature saying Congress must be
the primary actor. There is also evidence speaking to the ability of those two branches to work together,
justifying permutations.
Courts, specifically: Since some lower courts have already ruled that warrantless surveillance is
unconstitutional, and because having the highest court rule on its unconstitutionality is the best
enabling mechanism to ensure that other branches of government ban it, negatives can argue that the
Supreme Court is the best check on executive power or unconstitutional surveillance legislation. Also,
because a Supreme Court ruling is less politically controversial than a congressional action, negatives can
run the politics disadvantage and avoid the link with the counterplan. Affirmatives can respond that
Supreme Court decisions are also political and will not avoid the disadvantage. Affirmatives can also
argue that the Court cannot really control the executive, and that the Court risks backlash and loss of
legitimacy by ruling on surveillance. Permutations would include Congress and the Supreme Court acting
at the same time, Congress banning surveillance and the Court ruling against it, to ensure better
solvency.
Disadvantages
Terrorism: Although it sometimes appears as if the evidence against surveillance is more plentiful and
passionate than the evidence for it, many policy experts believe it is critical in preventing terrorism. This
argument works best in a utilitarian framework: If terrorists deploy weapons of mass destruction, this
outweighs the impacts of the affirmative. The affirmative can link turn this disadvantage by pointing out
the ways surveillance damages the war on terror, such as yielding faulty intelligence or alienating allies.
Politics: Since much of the surveillance state is wrapped up in either executive actions or congressional
legislation, negotiating the curtailment of surveillance will have political impacts. The President may
need to expend capital to get Congress to compromise on new versions of the Patriot Act or FISA.
Congress might give the President a loss by negating an executive order. There is typically fierce
opposition to decreasing the tools available to fight terrorism, and political discourse lacks the nuance to
be able to inform the public, or particularly ideological public officials, that surveillance might
undermine anti-terrorism efforts. Congress may demand concessions from the President in order to
push through some reform in surveillance or, if the policy “belongs to” the President, Congress may use
the decreased political power of a president rebuked on surveillance to push through some other
undesirable policies. Affirmatives can respond with the usual answers to politics—running links the
other way, reading solid uniqueness takeouts (including the numerous ways in which surveillance is
likely to be curtailed over the next several months), and, of course, impact turning the politics scenarios.
Hegemony Good/Bad: Decreased surveillance may weaken our hard-power capacity, and that might be
bad. Or, decreased surveillance may increase our soft power, and that might be bad. The opposite
scenarios might be true: For example, decreased surveillance might strengthen our hard power (some
affirmatives may even claim this in the 1AC, and negatives may argue that’s bad. It’s best to have good
impact files both ways on hegemony good/bad, as well as the many hard power and soft power
dynamics, when debating this resolution.
Cybersecurity: Cybersecurity is important in ways that transcend terrorism prevention. Surveillance of

cyber activity is vital to make improvements in our overall cybersecurity, improvements that are
currently underway but may require more data to reach completion. Loss of cybersecurity at the
governmental level means we’re vulnerable to attacks from Russia or China; loss of individual
cybersecurity may be bad for the same reasons surveillance totalitarianism is bad. Affirmatives can
respond to this disadvantage by demonstrating that wide scale surveillance hinders, rather than helps,
America strengthen its cybersecurity.
Organized Crime/Sex Trafficking: Deep surveillance is necessary to track organized crime, in particular
the hard-to-detect network of underground human trafficking that occurs both globally and in the
United States. The moral weight of sex trafficking makes it compelling as a juxtaposition to the moral
weight of surveillance. Affirmatives can argue that sweeping data searches actually trade off with better
techniques—surveillance or otherwise—for exposing and capturing human traffickers or other
purveyors of organized crime.
Kritiks
Foucault/Biopower: Although it’s more likely affirmatives will deploy Foucauldian notions of biopower
than negatives, space exists for both. Foucault argues that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
power structures began to qualitatively change their methods of human governance, utilizing
technology and methods that evolved from Enlightenment thinking. These became methods of
managing populations, disciplining them, regulating their autonomy rather than just reacting to human
action. Surveillance is a particularly comprehensive method of doing this. Discipline regulates the
behavior of individual bodies within the social body--through the manipulation of space and time,
movement and activity. Surveillance is a method of enforcing this management. The impact to allowing
such methods of control is a level of totalitarianism beyond the political--a very personal totalitarianism
that destroys any vestige of autonomy. Negatives, however, can utilize Foucault’s other argument about
power--that it is diffusive, and not embodied exclusively in political institutions--to argue that banning
surveillance by the government merely gives the illusion of less power, and that such power will
manifest in other, more insidious, potentially violent and dehumanizing ways.
Feminism/Privacy Bad: Privacy, as constructed in traditional liberal discourse, relies on a distinction

between the public and private spheres that is untenable and potentially oppressive. Relegating
personal relationships to the private sphere has long been a tool of patriarchy to justify the intimate
subordination of women—keeping them in the home, regulating their sexual lives or justifying sexual
brutality against them, covering up domestic violence. This kritik can also, in a complimentary fashion,
claim that patriarchy’s subordination of women is a root cause of the kinds of war, terrorism, brutality,
and instability that makes surveillance appear desirable in the first place. Affirmatives can respond with
a permutation calling for criticism of both patriarchy and surveillance; they can also argue that the
tendency of surveillance to crush dissent undermines the solvency of the kritik’s alternative, which is
premised on the ability to spread feminist consciousness through both public and private channels.
Capitalism/Marxism: Although there are many potential starting points for applying Marxist or anti-
capitalist methodology to this resolution, the standard argument is that surveillance and the erasure of
private life, rather than being the effect of security and militarism, is actually the byproduct of
capitalism’s tendency to economically colonize every sphere of human life. Humans are reduced to data-
subjects because doing so makes them easier to materially exploit. Ignoring this root cause makes it
harder to struggle against capitalism, and more likely that the totalitarianism targeted by the affirmative
will manifest in other ways. Failure to transcend capitalism results in terminal impacts (war,
environmental destruction, genocide) greater than those claimed by the affirmative. Affirmatives have
several options in answering this kritik: arguing the capitalism is good (saves environment, prevents war)
and in particular that economic freedom checks totalitarianism; arguing that the anti-capitalist
methodology breeds its own kind of totalitarianism; or deploying a permutation/link turn strategy
arguing that preserving dissent and fighting against surveillance totalitarianism makes it more likely that
anti-capitalist movements will succeed in their goals.
Schmitt: Policies rooted in equality, or those that break down the distinction between enemies and
allies, lead to worse forms of violence because they attempt to universalize the notion of “humanity”
itself. It is better, this kritik says, to create clear “lines in the sand” designating some people as allies and
others as enemies. Those lines contain war to specific parameters, where the erasure of those lines
enables large-scale warfare against anyone deemed a threat to the entire humanistic order
—“ontological damnation.” Affirmatives can answer this kritik by arguing that the so-called specific lines
between enemy and ally are the true source of the otherization the negative fears; that a permutation is
possible that preserves both the friend-enemy distinction and the embrace of liberal internationalist
principles; and that Schmitt's role as a jurist of Nazism makes his call for the designation of enemies
deeply dangerous.
CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACTS AFFIRMATIVE
Civil liberties key to democracy

Civil liberties are fundamental to democracy
Aaron Skaaning. Professor at Boston University. May 29, 2009 . Civil Liberty and Democracy.
Accessed May 10, 2015. http://people.bu.edu/jgerring/Conference/MeasuringDemocracy/documents/
Skaaning.doc
Consequently, a democracy may deprive the individual citizen of civil liberties which he or she might
have under another form of government (Berlin, 1997: 201-203). However, Habermas (1992: 610-616;
1996: 294-301), among others (e.g. Kägi, 1953: 134-136; Beetham, 2005), has criticized this schism
between civil liberties and popular sovereignty to be flawed because certain rights are constitutive
conditions for free political opinion formation and decision-making. Thus, some civil liberties can be
understood as necessary conditions for the meaningful functioning of self-government because they are
immanent to a democratic process. Among the most relevant civil liberties, we have a number of
personal exertion rights: namely the freedoms of expression, association, assembly, and movement
(Dahl, 1989: 221; Rawls, 1971: 225[§ 36]; Beetham, 2005; Lauth, 2004: 330-350), whereas freedom of
religion, residence, and culture in addition to the economic rights regarding property, contract, and
occupation are not democratic rights.
Civil liberties are more central to the function of democracy than any other right
Ariel BenYishay and Roger Betancourt. Professors at University of Maryland. January
2013. Unbundling Democracy: Tilly Trumps Schumpeter. Accessed May 10, 2015.
http://www.eco.uc3m.es/temp/BenYishay%20%20Betancourt%20-%20Unbundling%20Democracy
%20(Draft%20submission).pdf
Summing up, we have shown that liberal democracy as construed by Tilly in terms of two dimensions,
political rights and civil liberties, provides an encompassing framework for analyzing the evolution of
democracy at both the conceptual and empirical level. At the conceptual level, it contains electoral
democracy as construed by Schumpeter and his followers as a special case in which civil liberties and
political rights are independent dimensions of democracy and only the latter matter. At the empirical
level, we have shown that a framework based on liberal democracy overwhelmingly dominates a
framework based on electoral democracy as a basis for analyzing the evolution of democracy.
Conceptually, the encompassing feature is grounded in the differentiation provided by the ability of civil
liberties to provide citizens with satisfaction directly while political rights only do so indirectly.
Empirically, this fundamental difference and other associated differences between civil liberties and
political rights generate a setting where these two dimensions of unbundled democracy evolve in very
different ways. First, the persistence effects of civil liberties on subsequent outcomes are substantial and
statistically robust to the inclusion of political rights in the analysis. By contrast, the persistence effects
of political rights on subsequent outcomes are far less substantial and most often disappear statistically
when civil liberties are included in the analysis. Second, the complementarity effects of civil liberties on
political rights are substantial and robust, whereas the complementarity effects of political rights on civil
liberties are non-existent substantively and statistically
Civil liberties can serve as a starting point for democratizing non-western cultures
Sean M Lynn-Jones. Editor at Belfer Center, Harvard University. March 2008 . Why the
United States Should Spread Democracy. Accessed May 10, 2015.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democra
cy.html
The argument that democracy exacerbates ethnic tensions also is unpersuasive. Managing ethnic
tensions in multiethnic societies isn't easy, but democratic approaches may be at least as successful as
authoritarian ones. Authoritarian states that appeared to control ethnic tensions often did so at a high
price in human life. The Soviet Union avoided ethnic civil war, but under Stalin it decimated or deported
many ethnic minorities. Tito's Yugoslavia avoided violent disintegration, but hundreds of thousands of
suspected separatists were killed on Tito's orders, particularly in the late 1940s. Considerable evidence
indicates that liberal democracy, with its emphasis on tolerance, cooperation, political accommodation,
and respect for civil liberties, provides the best recipe for long-term domestic stability. The third
argument's assertion that democratic government is incompatible with East Asian values is belied by the
relatively successful growth of democracy in Japan, South Korea, and, more recently, Taiwan and the
Philippines. These states have not emulated the Western model of democracy in all respects, but they
are almost universally classified as democracies. In addition to conducting multiparty elections and
maintaining civil liberties, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all have impressive economic records. Some
East Asians point to the Philippines and argue that democracy is responsible for its domestic instability
and economic malaise, but that country's economic performance has improved dramatically in recent
years. In addition, the Korean and Japanese cases show that democracy and growth can go hand in
hand. The former problems of the Philippines may be attributable to the Spanish colonial legacy, not the
flaws of democratic political systems.
Civil liberties are the essence of democracy—all else is frill

Vlasdislav Inozemtsev. Research fellow at the American Interest. February 2012 . The
Cultural Contradictions of Democracy. Accessed May 10, 2015. http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2012/02/01/the-cultural-contradictions-of-democracy/
But this begs an important question: Was the rise of democracy the main driving force behind the
development of contemporary liberal Western societies, or were long gestating developments in
Western societies that fixed concepts of liberties and individual rights instead the drivers of democracy?
The default assumption among most Westerners is the former, but the truth is the latter. American
society, observed Gordon Wood, the reigning dean of early American history, did not become liberally
minded because it was democratic, it became democratic because it was liberally minded. And thus the
late Daniel Bell: I am not a democrat. I don’t believe in democracy. I believe in liberty and rights. . . in
certain elements which you can’t take away from people. Rule of law, the right of assembly, . . . hearings
in open courtrooms—these are rights which guarantee the liberties of people. I basically prefer to deal
with liberty rather than democracy.3 The system of civil liberties that exists today in all truly democratic
countries comes from historical traditions nurtured by certain religious cultures turned outward into the
temporal realm, and from the somewhat accidental felicities of good governance in key cases. They have
nothing to do with the introduction of universal suffrage. No society can host a true liberal democracy
that has not first become free and liberal-minded, and only people who have lost touch with their own
histories can suppose otherwise. This account of causality, once understood, raises three questions.
First, if the establishment of basic liberties and rights precedes democracy, and if those liberties and
rights are now firmly established and well secured in law, then why do we need democracy? What, and
who, is it good for?
Removing civil liberties through domestic surveillance chills expression and threatens
social progress
Laurie Burkhart. Professor at Truman College. March 2010 . The Effect of Government
Surveillance on Social Progress. Accessed May 10, 2015.
www.ethicapublishing.com/confronting/5CH1.pdf
In recent years the "chilling effect" has taken on a much larger role in American society, not only
through increased government surveillance deterring political participation, but through a broad range
of social functions as well. Simple examples will show that social internet networks such as
MySpace.com and The Facebook are having detrimental effects to people's willingness to present
information about themselves or their views. Some users of these networks have lost jobs or have been
forced to censor what they publish in fear of what ramifications it may have on their job status or future
wellbeing. In January, an undisclosed number of student-athletes were dismissed from the University of
Colorado track team after posting indecent pictures of themselves on Facebook4. The enormous
amount of voluntary and involuntary personal information that can be tracked and monitored in today's
information age is causing people to give into the "chilling effect' in both political and social arenas. In all
aspects of life citizens of the U.S. are trying to fit the surveillance system rather than tv to change or
influence it. Once the people give into the system and refuse to participate or rebel out of fear of self-
incrimination then all hope of social progress is lost.
Civil liberties key to the economy

The most robust studies show civil liberties are key to economic development
Ariel BenYishay and Roger Betancourt. Professors at University of Maryland. August
2008. Civil Liberties and Economic Development. Accessed May 10, 2015.
http://econweb.umd.edu/~betancourt/development/BenYishay%20and%20Betancourt%202008%20-
%20Civil%20Liberties%20Paper%20-%20Draft%2016.pdf
Widespread skepticism prevails among economists over a possible connection between civil liberties
and the level of economic activity. Until now, empirical research on economic growth has found mixed
evidence on the influence of civil liberties. Disaggregation of the Freedom House Civil Liberties index
allows a fresh empirical look at the effect of human rights on long-term economic growth and
development. Our results show that one of the four subcategories of the index outperforms all available
indicators of property rights institutions in explaining long-term economic growth. This subcategory,
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights, captures the level of second generation human rights that
affect the mobility of individuals with respect to housing, employment and higher education, as well as
the level of protection of property rights. This result is robust with respect to reverse causation,
important omitted variables such as geography and human capital, and a variety of sensitivity tests. We
also lay out a conceptual framework discussing how civil liberties work as an indicator of the prevalence
of the rule of law and how the latter affects growth or development as an essential public input.
Violations of civil liberty can directly interfere with commerce

Michael German. Senior Policy Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative Office. August
13, 2013. America, NSA Surveillance is Bad for Business. Accessed May 10, 2015.
https://www.aclu.org/blog/america-nsa-surveillance-bad-business
Congress accomplished this ignoble task by altering the definition of "electronic surveillance" so as to
exclude any government eavesdropping that is directed at an entity "reasonably believed" to be outside
the United States from coverage under the protections of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Now
when an American is calling his aunt in Italy, or e-mailing his business associate in Canada, or engaging in
an Internet chat where one of the parties could be overseas [snip] the government can listen in without
any court oversight. This is a fundamental change that has serious ramifications for all Americans, but
especially for American companies that do business in the global economy. Congress gave the
government this eavesdropping authority not to listen to terrorists, but rather to collect "foreign
intelligence," which is loosely defined in FISA to mean any information that "relates to" the conduct of
U.S. foreign affairs. Make no mistake, this means business. The rapid expansion of e-commerce now
allows small mom-and-pop companies in the heartland of America to sell their products in foreign
markets. Because of the bill Congress passed your international business transactions can now be
monitored by the government. Globalization and free trade agreements have made it easier for U.S.
companies to have an international workforce. Now your communications with those foreign employees
can be monitored by the government. The "flattening" of the world opened new opportunities for
Americans to invest in growing world markets and to provide charitable gifts to areas in desperate need.
Now your international investments and philanthropy can be monitored by the government- not
because you are suspected of doing anything wrong, but simply because the government wants foreign
intelligence information. Congress could have easily restricted this new authority to investigations of
suspected terrorists, but it did not.
Lack of civil liberties can deter international investment

Michael German. Senior Policy Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative Office. August
13, 2013. America, NSA Surveillance is Bad for Business. Accessed May 10, 2015.
https://www.aclu.org/blog/america-nsa-surveillance-bad-business
Any businessperson can easily see the ramifications of such unwarranted surveillance. How are trade
secrets going to be protected? Are negotiations regarding government contracts being conducted in
good faith, or are they being compromised by intercepted communications? How are confidential
relationships- employer/employee; attorney/client; journalist/source; doctor/patient; priest/penitent;
husband/wife- going to be protected? How are these captured communications going to be used against
you and your business? The answer is nobody knows because it's all being conducted behind a massive
cloak of secrecy. American companies have much to lose from these government surveillance programs.
When foreign businesses and customers lose confidence that American companies can maintain
confidentiality in their business dealings and financial transactions, they will likely look for other, more
secure partners. According to a report released last week by The Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation, NSA surveillance could cost the U.S. cloud computing industry anywhere from $22 to $35
billion over the next three years if "foreign customers decide the risks of storing data with a U.S.
company outweigh the benefits."
Utilitarian civil liberties bad

The only way insecurity affects our liberties is by forcing us to make bad decisions—
only we can decide if we’re free
Joshua Holland. Writer at American Prospect. January 14, 2015 . Terrorists Will Never Limit
Our Free Speech, But Government Can. Accessed May 10, 2015. http://prospect.org/article/terrorists-
will-never-limit-our-free-speech-government-can
They were only viable because the American public embraced the idea that terrorism represented an
existential threat. Then, as now, we accepted the idea that terrorists had the capacity to undermine our
rights. That day, George W. Bush told the American public that “our way of life, our very freedom came
under attack.” In reality, as traumatic as that day's events were, it was airplanes, buildings and the
people inside them that were attacked—our “freedom” was never in peril. It's important that we
identify where the real threat lies because terrorism is still a tactic. Unlike a group or a specific ideology,
a tactic can't be eradicated. We can fight terrorist organizations—killing their leaders, going after their
sources of funding—but small groups of extremists and “lone wolf” attackers are ultimately just
murderous criminals, with the same degree of institutional power as any other murderers. They pose a
huge challenge for law enforcement; Attorney General Eric Holder says the prospect of such attacks
keeps him awake at night. But we accept a certain amount of violent crime as the price of living in a free
and open society. The only alternative is to accept life under a police state. That's not to say that we
can't do anything to manage the risk posed by these kinds of attacks. But the one thing we shouldn't do
is attribute power to extremists that they don't have, because that only leads to genuine threats to our
liberty and values.
Answer to public health

Civil liberty infringements are unnecessary and ineffective at preserving public health
George J Annas, Wendy K Mariner and Wendy E Parmet. Research fellows at American
Civil Liberties Union. January 2008. Pandemic Preparedness: The Need for a Public Health—Not a
Law Enforcement/National Security—Approach. Accessed May 10, 2015.
https://www.aclu.org/report/pandemic-preparedness-need-public-health-not-law-
enforcementnational-security-approach
The Daniels and Speaker cases are cautionary tales that illustrate the counterproductive nature of a
punitive, law enforcement approach to preventing the spread of disease. Instead of recognizing these
dangers, however, both Congressional leaders and the media presented these cases as demonstrating a
need for even tougher new laws that permit aggressive and punitive action against individuals. In so
doing, they did not note the futility of stopping a disease as widely prevalent as tuberculosis by
detaining one single traveler, nor did they recognize the need to develop more rapid and accurate
diagnostic tests and more effective TB treatments. Nor did they mention that existing treatments are
not currently available to everyone with the disease. Rather, the spotlight remained on the alleged need
to enact new laws to provide officials with more power to "get tough" with individual patients. This is
unfortunate because: It's ineffective. The law enforcement approach has not and cannot prepare us for
serious epidemics. Effective public health efforts, whether aimed at pandemic influenza or more
common diseases such as TB and HIV/AIDS, are neither cheap nor glamorous. They are costly and
difficult. These efforts require working with rather than against communities, providing communities
with as healthy an environment as possible, health care if they need it, and the means to help
themselves and their neighbors. Most importantly, to protect public health, public health policies must
aim to help, rather than to suppress, the public. It's dangerous for civil liberties. The law enforcement
approach to public health offers a rationale for the endless suspension of civil liberties. The "Global War
on Terror" may go on for a generation, but the war on disease will continue until the end of the human
race. There will always be a new disease, always the threat of a new pandemic. If that fear justifies the
suspension of liberties and the institution of an emergency state, then freedom and the rule of law will
be permanently suspended.
Infringing civil liberties can harm public health efforts

George J Annas, Wendy K Mariner and Wendy E Parmet. Research fellows at American
Civil Liberties Union. January 2008. Pandemic Preparedness: The Need for a Public Health—Not a
Law Enforcement/National Security—Approach. Accessed May 10, 2015.
https://www.aclu.org/report/pandemic-preparedness-need-public-health-not-law-
enforcementnational-security-approach
A reliance on coercion. Although most of the verbiage in these plans is vapid and virtually without
content, and based on assumptions that will inevitably turn out to be mistaken, the one commonality
they all possess is reliance on coercive actions such as quarantine and forced treatment. This is despite
the fact that such measures are generally acknowledged by experts to be either completely ineffective
or only potentially marginally effective in the case of flu. But law enforcement and national security
continue to be the key elements, perhaps not surprising given President Bush's first suggestion to
contain a bird flu pandemic: calling out the military to quarantine large sections of the United States to
prevent flu from spreading across the country. A lack of specifics. Because these plans do not give those
in charge any specific, useful tasks to perform (beyond distributing stockpiled drugs and vaccines, if
and when they are developed and produced), public authorities are apt to take useless and counterpro-
ductive anti-civil liberties actions to demonstrate that they are "doing something" to respond to the
crisis. • A loss of privacy. Planning for the worst case encourages health officials to view symptoms of
almost any illness as the potential beginning of a pandemic. Pressure to find the first possible case of flu
as fast as possible has encouraged wide-ranging surveillance systems to permanently monitor
individual medical records and pharmacy purchases and link them to data bases in law enforcement,
homeland security, agriculture, banking, customs and immigration. As a result, the punitive all-hazards
approach encourages the wide-spread, unnecessary and permenant violation of individuals’ privacy.
Answer to terrorism
Terrorism must be defeated with moral superiority with regard to civil liberty
Tom O’Connor. Professor at American University. 2008. Fighting Terror Ethically. Accessed
May 10, 2015. http://www.drtomoconnor.com/3300/3300lect08.htm
Some would say that moral superiority is how to win the war on terrorism (Netanyahu 1986), and
indeed, Prof. Chris Harmon (in How al-Qaeda May End) suggests this also. Most terrorist movements do
come to an end, and doctrinal ideologies can be defeated. Winning a war on terrorism requires that
there be some moral conviction in the justice of the fight. A terror war must give expression to the
morality involved, and fight as if it were a war of ideas. Terrorism, in may ways, is an attack on national
will. Terrorists count on the fact that their targets are "soft and weak" and will not be able to sustain a
coordinated grand strategy. Terrorists know that their targets will critique themselves, and debate
among themselves. They know their targets will argue among themselves, and in fact, they are often
counting on this kind of moral skepticism among their targets before they attack again. The moral
argument that terrorism is permanently unjustifiable should be forcefully restated time and time again,
and by as many voices as possible, globally. The language of morality can be powerful. Not only does it
appeal to foreign audiences, but it can help with domestic morale also. Democratic-minded and
moderate leaders of organizations in the host nations for terrorists should be assisted in having their
"voices" amplified by the democratic nations. Religion can play a part, but as Temes (2003) wonders,
how can a Christian nation like the U.S. get Muslim nations to reign in their extremists? Perhaps it is best
if religion stays out of it. Morality should not be confused with religion.
Violating civil liberties doesn’t stop terrorism

Patrick Eddington. Writer at Reason. January 27, 2015 . No, Mass surveillance won’t stop
terrorist attacks. Accessed May 10, 2015. http://reason.com/archives/2015/01/27/mass-surveillance-
and-terrorism#.ohhwe0:GSfj
It’s worth remembering that the mass surveillance programs initiated by the U.S. government after the
9/11 attacks—the legal ones and the constitutionally-dubious ones—were premised on the belief that
bin Laden’s hijacker-terrorists were able to pull off the attacks because of a failure to collect enough
data. Yet in their subsequent reports on the attacks, the Congressional Joint Inquiry (2002) and the 9/11
Commission found exactly the opposite. The data to detect (and thus foil) the plots was in the U.S.
government’s hands prior to the attacks; the failures were ones of sharing, analysis, and dissemination.
That malady perfectly describes every intelligence failure from Pearl Harbor to the present day. The
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (created by Congress in 2004) was supposed to be the
answer to the "failure-to-connect-the-dots" problem. Ten years on, the problem remains, the IC
bureaucracy is bigger than ever, and our government is continuing to rely on mass surveillance programs
that have failed time and again to stop terrorists while simultaneously undermining the civil liberties and
personal privacy of every American. The quest to "collect it all," to borrow a phrase from NSA Director
Keith Alexander, only leads to the accumulation of masses of useless information, making it harder to
find real threats and costing billions to store.
Violating of civil liberties directly force people into terrorism

Bill Berkowitz. Writer at Alternet. July 30, 2014. How the FBI Is Creating Terrorists. Accessed
May 10, 2015. http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/how-fbi-creating-terrorists
"Indeed, in some cases the Federal Bureau of Investigation may have created terrorists out of law-
abiding individuals by conducting sting operations that facilitated or invented the target's willingness to
act." In addition, there is a good chance that, without the government's active participation, many of
those ensnared by the government did not have the mental or intellectual capacity to plan, finance
and/or carry out a terrorist event. "Americans have been told that their government is keeping them
safe by preventing and prosecuting terrorism inside the US," said Andrew Prasow, Human Rights
Watch's deputy Washington director, in a statement. "But take a closer look and you realize that many
of these people would never have committed a crime if not for law enforcement encouraging,
pressuring, and sometimes paying them to commit terrorist acts." According to the report, entrapment,
or what smells like entrapment, is writ large over several of the cases. However, the report points out
that proving entrapment is not an easy task for defendants: "In theory, the defendants in these cases
should be able to avoid criminal liability by making a claim of 'entrapment.' However, US law requires
that to prove entrapment a defendant show both that the government induced him to commit the act in
question and that he was not 'predisposed' to commit it.
Answer to violations of liberties lead to rights

Remorse over the violation of liberty in wartime does not expand rights
Robert Pushaw. Professor at Chapman Law School. Spring 2009 . JUSTIFYING WARTIME
LIMITS ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES. Accessed May 10, 2015.
http://www.chapmanlawreview.com/archives/1556
An obvious flaw of the “remorse theory” is that sometimes civil rights and liberties are actually
enhanced during wartime. Indeed, perhaps the greatest grant of freedom and equality at the stroke of a
pen, the Emancipation Proclamation, occurred smack in the middle of the supposedly liberty-destroying
Civil War. 147 Furthermore, history refutes the notion that America has progressed in a linear fashion
toward ever-expanding respect for civil liberties in each succeeding war and enhanced civil rights after
each military conflict. 148 For instance, Lincoln’s alleged excesses in curtailing freedom, and civil rights
laws enacted in the late 1860s, did absolutely nothing to prevent later Presidents like Wilson and
Roosevelt from infringing individual rights and liberties in the course of waging war. Concededly,
President Bush avoided some of the more egregious mistakes of the past, such as targeting people for
mistreatment solely because they happened to be members of the same minority group as those of a
nation America was fighting. 149 Nonetheless, perhaps this self-control reflected the fact that the War
on Terror was small potatoes compared to struggles like World War II. 150 If 9/11 had been followed by
major attacks on Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Houston, history does not fill me with
confidence that the executive branch’s response would have been as restrained. Finally, it is almost
impossible to prove a one-to-one correspondence between regret over wartime suppression of
fundamental liberties and subsequent civil rights laws. For example, remorse over Lincoln’s interference
with individual freedoms did not have much to do with the Reconstruction Amendments and statutes.
Most importantly, the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Privileges or Immunities were not aimed at preventing the federal government in later wars from taking
the same sorts of draconian actions as Lincoln. On the contrary, these Amendments completed the
process Lincoln had started in the Emancipation Proclamation-perhaps grossly beyond the bounds of his
Article II powers-by guaranteeing the newly freed slaves (and everyone else) their basic civil rights. 151
Violations of liberty only beget more violations

Robert Pushaw. Professor at Chapman Law School. Spring 2009 . JUSTIFYING WARTIME
LIMITS ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES. Accessed May 10, 2015.
http://www.chapmanlawreview.com/archives/1556
A final difficulty with the “remorse theory” is that many distinguished judges and scholars have posited
the opposite hypothesis: that when the President asserts increased powers during an emergency, they
tend to become permanent and diminish individual rights and freedoms, especially when the Court
approves them. 169 A well-known articulation of this position can be found in Justice Jackson’s dissent
from the Court’s decision to uphold the federal government’s internment of Japanese Americans: [A]
judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to
liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to
last longer than the military emergency. . . . But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to
show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the
Constitution sanctions such an order, this Court for all time has validated [a] principle . . . [which] then
lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and
expands it to new purposes. . . . A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality,
and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the
Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.
170 Logically, the “collective remorse” and “loaded weapon” theories cannot both be correct. Rather,
history demonstrates that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Every armed conflict is unique and
requires a distinctive approach in balancing liberty against security. 171 Similarly, when a war ends, civil
rights progress at a rate that depends on a huge number of legal, political, ideological, social, economic,
and moral variables. More simplistic explanations fail to capture the messiness of the historical
evidence.
Answer to only affects criminals

Everyone is affected by the imbalance of power when civil liberties are violated
Neil M Richards. Professor at Washington University School of Law. May 2013 . The
Dangers of Surveillance. Accessed May 10, 2015. Harvard Law Review. Volume 126 Number 7.
If we have no inkling that we are being watched, if we really do not care that we are being watched, or
if we fear no consequences of being watched, it could be argued that our intellectual freedom is
unaffected. It can thus be argued that if the NSA Wiretapping Program had never leaked, it would have
posed no threat to intellectual privacy. There are two problems with this account. First, no program of
widespread surveillance is likely to remain secret forever. At some point, such a program will inevitably
come to light, either by being leaked (as happened with the NSA program and the Army surveillance in
Laird), or by actions taken pursuant to the program (such as prosecutions or disclosures). The injury
suffered by those thus punished would serve as an example to the rest of us, and the mechanisms of
intellectual privacy would come into effect at that point. Second, surveillance (even secret surveillance)
can create additional harms that are separate from the ones suggested by intellectual- privacy theory.
Scholars working in surveillance studies have explored the phenomenon of surveillance in all of its
contemporary complexity, going beyond the Panopticon to consider private surveillance, the
relationships between watchers and watched, and the wide variety of dangers that modern surveillance
societies raise.97 Recall in this regard that Lyon's definition of surveillance notes that surveillance has a
purpose,98 but in the modern era this purpose is rarely totalitarian domination. All the same, most
forms of surveillance seek some form of subtler influence or control over others. Even when surveillance
is not Orwellian, it is usually about influencing or being able to respond to someone else's behavior. And
while surveillance can sometimes have benign goals (like traffic safety, or parents using baby monitors
or GPS trackers to keep tabs on their children), it is invariably tied to a particular purpose. Critically, the
gathering of information affects the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched, giving the
watcher greater power to influence or direct the subject of surveillance.99 It might sound trite to say
that "information is power," but the power of personal information lies at the heart of surveillance. The
power effects of surveillance illustrate three additional dangers of surveillance: blackmail,
discrimination, and persuasion.
CODIS AFFIRMATIVE
Codis 1AC
Thesis: The federal government is rapidly collecting citizen DNA and storing it in national database, such
as CODIS. While collected primarily on the state and local level, this collection comes at the direction
and persuasion of the federal government. The impacts included here apply to local and state
collection, but independently stem from federal government storage. That storage is what allows state
and local officials to access the wealth of genetic data. Such data is not only a systemic threat to privacy
rights, but also racially coded from overrepresentation.
Contention One: The Status quo

A. A national DNA database is coming. The Supreme Court has already paved the way
Michael T. Snyder, former Washington D.C. attorney, July 9, 2013, “The Coming National DNA
Database,” The Truth Wins, http://thetruthwins.com/archives/the-coming-national-dna-database, ACC.
5-9-2015
A national DNA database is coming. Barack Obama has already said that he wants one. A major
Supreme Court decision last month paved the way for one. The DNA of those that commit “serious
crimes” is already being routinely collected all over the nation. Some states (such as New Jersey) are
now passing laws that will require DNA collection from those charged with committing “low level
crimes”. And a law that was passed under George W. Bush allows the federal government to screen the
DNA of all newborn babies in the United States. So how long will it be before we are all required to give
DNA samples to the authorities? How long will it be before DNA collection is routinely done when we
take a trip to the DMV? This may sound like science fiction to some people, but “security experts” and
law enforcement personnel all over the country are now pushing for a national DNA database to be
established. Unfortunately, there is nothing really standing in the way of that. The Supreme Court has
already spoken. Justice Scalia understood very clearly what the Supreme Court was doing last month.
In his dissent, he made the following statement: “Make no mistake about it: because of today’s decision,
your DNA can be taken and entered into a national database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly,
and for whatever reason.”
B. The FBI is continually trying to expand its surveillance power. They are using
funding to persuade state and local governments to hand over DNA to CODIS and the
NGI to form a centralized federal database
The ACLU of Massachusetts, Staff Writer, January 27, 2015, “The FBI’s plan to collect everyone’s
DNA just got a huge boost from congress,” Privacy SOS, https://privacysos.org/node/1659, ACC. 5-7-
2015
The same is about to be true with DNA, thanks to funds congress has made available specifically for
state and local law enforcement to purchase rapid DNA processing machines. The 2015
omnibus budget includes this provision: “$117,000,000 is for a DNA analysis and capacity enhancement
program and for other local, State, and Federal forensic activities.” These funds will presumably help the
FBI achieve goals it laid out in August 2014, as relayed here by Nextgov—one of the few news outlets to
cover the FBI’s DNA collection plans: Various FBI divisions "are collaborating to develop and implement
foundational efforts to streamline and automate law enforcement's DNA collection processes" including
at arrest, booking and conviction, according to an Aug. 19 notice about the industry briefing. The
ongoing groundwork is expected to facilitate the "integration of Rapid DNA Analysis into the FBI's
Combined DNA Index (CODIS) and Next Generation Identification (NGI) systems from the booking
environment.” Current law requires state and local police to send collected DNA to an accredited lab
before it is shipped off to the feds. But the FBI wants a “legislative tweak” to enable police to skip that
step, and send DNA from arrestees directly to the federal CODIS database. If the feds succeed in
changing the law, we’re in trouble: corporations and congress are already laying the groundwork for the
logistic implementation of a nationwide DNA dragnet.
C. DNA inclusion of misdemeanors is inevitable and moving toward a national

database
Elizabeth E. Joh, U.C. Davis School of Law, December 5, 2014, “Should Arrestee DNA Databases Extend
to Misdemeanors?,” Recent Advances in DNA & Gene Sequences, UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 406, ACC. 5-9-2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534514
While most American jurisdictions do not collect DNA samples from misdemeanor arrestees, it seems
likely that some will consider expanding their existing DNA databases to include them. Such proposals
would be consistent with historical trends toward DNA database expansion and fall within existing
justifications for increasing the number of profiles in the national DNA database.
D. CODIS is a federal database that incorporates federal and state DNA

Derek Regensburger, JD, Attorney and lead instructor in the Legal Studies department at Everest
College, 2009, “DNA Databases and the Fourth Amendment,” Albany Law Journal of Science &
Technology, 19 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 319,
http://www.albanylawjournal.org/Documents/Articles/19.2.319-Regensburger.pdf, ACC. 5-7-2015
The United States has an interconnected series of computerized DNA databases known as CODIS
(Combined DNA Indexing System). It is a series of interlinked DNA databases, including the National DNA
Index System (NDIS) operated by the FBI, state DNA indexes maintained by each state, and agency
databases maintained by local crime laboratories. NDIS primarily relies on the submission of offender
profiles from individual states; less than ten percent of all felons are convicted of federal crimes.
Plan: The United States Supreme Court should, in the next appropriate test case,
should rule that federal collection, storage, and utilization of DNA databank systems
violate the Fourth Amendment.
Advantage One: Privacy

A. A centralized DNA database violates the 4th Amendment on several grounds, paving
the way for genetic discrimination
Jessica Tam, LegalMatch Legal Writer, November 15, 2013, “Does DNA Testing and Database
Cataloguing Violate the Constitution?,” LegalMatch.com,
http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/constitutionality-of-dna-testing-and-database-
cataloguing.html, ACC. 5-7-2015
Attorneys and civil rights groups have questioned the constitutionality of this database. Opponents of
DNA collection say it violates the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. Unreasonable searches and seizures may occur when the police target certain groups and
detain them for DNA collection without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Our judicial holds that
a person is innocent until proven guilty. The Constitution protects this idea as it gives citizens the right to
remain silent and the right to a trial by a jury of peers. Yet, with the advent of a DNA database, a person
in the DNA database can get hauled in for questioning when their DNA is only similar to the sample
found at a crime scene. Finally, a DNA database may invade the right of privacy. Some state
constitutions specifically protect the privacy of its citizens. Civil liberties groups argue that DNA
information is linked with other unique genetic identifiers concerning one’s likelihood of acquiring
diseases such as cancer. This information, which could potentially get into the hands of employers or
insurers, could lead to genetic discrimination.
B. Federal DNA databases allow the government to surveil the people without their
knowledge
Aliya Sternstein, Staff Writer, September 23, 2014, “FBI plans rapid DNA dragnets,” Nextgov,
http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2014/09/fbi-plans-rapid-dna-dragnets/94892/, ACC. 5-7-2015
In the meantime, the potential cataloging of hordes of DNA samples in a central government database is
compounding concerns about domestic espionage. “Your DNA data could be linked to all the other
biometric and biographic information about you that is already in NGI," Lynch said. "Because we
discard DNA wherever we go, this allows the government the ability to further surveil people without
their knowledge."
C. Uneven state protection and judicial discretion mean CODIS can be used for
warrantless searches. A central database make it vulnerable to abuse
Adrienne N. Kitchen, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law, February 12, 2015,
“Genetic Privacy and Latent Crime Scene DNA of Non-Suspects: How the Law Can Protect an Individual's
Right to Genetic Privacy While Respecting the Government’s Important Interest in Combating Crime,”
The Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 52, Issue 2, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2572468, ACC. 5-9-2015
Regarding security, CODIS is in a secret location and encrypts all transmissions. So far, there is no
evidence any DNA databank has been breached. However, the potential for abuse of these databases is
great, particularly since states have varying degrees of protection. Potential database abuse has
concerned courts since computerized data first entered the scene. In 1977, Justice Brennan articulated
this concern regarding medical information: “[t]he central storage and easy accessibility of
computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information.” Regarding DNA
collection, judges raise several valid concerns about court approval of “a programmatic search designed
to produce and maintain evidence relating to ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” without “individualized
suspicion.” There is also fear regarding judicial approval of permanent databases created from
suspicionless searches, with “all of the dangers inherent in allowing the government to collect and store
information about its citizens in a centralized place.”
D. CODIS privacy protections are a sham. DNA samples are often fully retained
Rachel Cox, Georgetown University Law Center, 2014, “Unethical intrusion: The Disproportionate
impact of law enforcement DNA sampling on minority populations, “American Criminal Law Review,
http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/files/2014/1654/8722/ Unethical_Intrusion.pdf, ACC. 5-9-
2015
The risk of function creep is also made greater by the fact that “there is not one state or federal statute
that requires that biological samples collected for identification purposes be destroyed after
identification testing is completed,” allowing “an unlimited span of improper uses . . . so long as those
samples are retained.” Proponents of DNA sampling of arrestees urge that the genetic information of
innocent arrestees is protected because the samples will be destroyed when an individual’s record is
expunged. However, in practice, after samples are analyzed in order to extract a profile for CODIS, the
federal government, Maryland, and a majority of states retain whole samples indefinitely.
1AC
E. Those nightmare movie scenarios are real. Even if states never upload genetic
profiles, crime scene DNA data alone is enough
abstract_id=2572468, ACC. 5-9-2015
One major concern is that much DNA obtained from a crime scene belongs to individuals who have no
connection to the crime, particularly when the scene is a high-traffic location. Because police collect any
and all DNA found at a crime scene, when the crime scene is a high traffic location there necessarily is
genetic material from more individuals at the scene. When police collect all this DNA, they analyze and
retain it, resulting in the inclusion of more and more individual’s genetic profiles in DNA databases.
While states cannot upload genetic profiles of individuals who are never charged with a crime, CODIS
does include forensic crime scene DNA of unknown individuals without requiring any apparent
connection to the crime. This leads to concerns that the “government may intrude into the secret
regions of man’s life at will” and thus “whittle away” American’s “privacy and dignity.” When courts
deem these intrusions reasonable looking at “the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ we all have reason to
fear that the nightmarish worlds depicted in films such as Minority Report and Gattaca will become
realities.”
F. Privacy is essential to preserving the value to life. In the face of advancing

technologies, we must increase protections
Alexandra I. Rengel, JD from Boston University School of Law, LL.M., J.S.D., 2013, “Privacy invading
technologies and recommendations for designing a better future for privacy rights,” Intercultural Human
Rights Law Review, 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 177,
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/92892834/privacy-invading-technologies-
recommendations-designing-better-future-privacy-rights, ACC. 5-11-2015
The concept of privacy has been discussed for centuries by philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists,
and legal scholars. The importance that individuals place on privacy is beyond question and transcends
geographical, cultural and racial boundaries. Individuals' need for secrecy and private space is so
fundamental to forging relationships with others, and to preserving our sense of self, that a society with
a complete lack of individual privacy would be unimaginable. A right to privacy protects individuals from
having the contents of certain private information made public and regulates the means and manner by
which that information is obtained. However, new technologies often make us wonder what level of
protection for our right to privacy is possible in our world where personal information about us can
easily be accessed without the need to infringe into our physical space, but by invisible hands that can
get to know our most private secrets with a keystroke and looking at a screen. As technology becomes
increasingly able to facilitate breaches in our privacy, it becomes most important to establish
protections.
1AC
Advantage Two: The New Jim Crow
A. Inclusion from arrest is arbitrary and racist. CODIS disproportionately includes
African Americans. The status quo will only exacerbate inequalities
Elizabeth E. Joh, U.C. Davis School of Law, December 5, 2014, “Should Arrestee DNA Databases Extend
to Misdemeanors?,” Recent Advances in DNA & Gene Sequences, UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 406, ACC. 5-9-2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534514
What all of this means is that one’s chances of being included in DNA database based on an arrest for a
minor crime may depend on seemingly arbitrary factors like one’s neighborhood, race, attitude, or just
plain bad luck. And given the existing disproportionate representation of minorities in the criminal
justice system, that discretion would likely translate into databases that are even more racially
imbalanced than they are no. Based on felony conviction data, one study suggested in 2006 that African-
Americans constitute about 40% of the CODIS offender index. With the additional reach of familial
matches, that number means that as much 17 percent of all African-Americans could be identified
through samples in CODIS. In the U.K., official estimates suggest that between 45 and 61% of young
black men have profiles in the National DNA Database. Authorizing the inclusion of new profiles by
relying primarily on the discretion of the police is a recipe to further exacerbate these inequities.
B. CODIS is another chapter is American Jim Crow-style racial segregation

Harry G. Levine, PhD-Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, Et al, 2008, “Drug Arrests and DNA:
Building Jim Crow’s Database,” GeneWatch, http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/GeneWatch/
GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=58&archive=yes, ACC. 5-7-2015
Despite the technical errors and errors of interpretation, DNA databases are now being used, and will be
used ever more in the future, to identify suspects and to convict people. As a result, Black and Latino
teenagers and young people who are disproportionately and unjustly arrested for marijuana possession
and other misdemeanors are also disproportionally at higher risk of being falsely suspected, accused and
even convicted of more serious crimes - and so are their genetically similar relatives. The racial
segregation laws in the United States that ran for 89 years - from 1876 to 1965 - were commonly called
Jim Crow laws. We suggest that continual expansion of CODIS and other racially-skewed DNA file and
storage systems should be thought of as building Jim Crow's database.
C. Overrepresentation in CODIS means it effectively codes the entire African American

and Latino/a populations as “criminal”
Kyla Kuvach, Staff Writer, April 6, 2013, “The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless DNA Testing,” Bill
of Rights Defense Committee, http://www.bordc.org/blog/fourth-amendment-and-warrantless-dna-
testing, ACC. 5-8-2015
By having information on such a large percentage of African Americans, the database effectively codes
that population as inherently criminal and therefore in need of further surveillance. Because CODIS
already overrepresents these individuals, it will likely encourage law enforcement to aggressively pursue
warrantless DNA testing on a predominantly African American and Latino population. This database is
also used to identify family members of those arrested and DNA tested. These family members are often
used for police investigations, which is why Howard University has dubbed DNA databases "probable
cause generators."
1AC
D. Not only do we have an ethical obligation to challenge racism, but that challenge is
essential to effective policymaking. People should not be treated as means to an end
Paul Gordon Lauren, Regents Professor, University of Montana, 1996, Power and Prejudice, p. 321.
Yet despite these many problems and centuries of wrestling to find solutions, normative questions
about the ought rather than simply the is of global politics and diplomacy remain before us. Indeed,
such questions are particularly pressing and acute in the area of racial discrimination. Race was the
subject that placed the whole issue of human rights upon the international agenda in the first place, and
for a vast majority in the world race remains the most critical and universal test of how people deal with
other people on the basis of an ethical standard. The principle of racial equality itself flows from a basic
ethical concept, that of human dignity which implies in its simples terms that every human being is an
end in himself or herself, not a mere means to an end, and should be treated as such. Thus, it is only
natural for people to ask whether the conduct of politics and diplomacy supports or opposes racial
discrimination, which is the very negation of the principle of equality. This should not be at all
surprising, for as scholar Stanley Hoffman writes in his penetrating book Duties Beyond Borders: On the
Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics: “We must remember that states are led by
human beings whose actions affect human beings with and outside: considerations of good and evil,
right or wrong, are therefore both inevitable and legitimate.”
Privacy Advantage Extension
General privacy Extension

DNA databases inherently undermine privacy rights
abstract_id=2572468, ACC. 5-9-2015
The Fourth Amendment’s primary purpose is to protect privacy. This privacy protection is a
“fundamental constitutional guarantee[] of . . . inviolability of the person.” Even courts upholding DNA
analysis and the retention of genetic profiles in databases assume “individuals always have a subjective
expectation of privacy in their DNA, unless and until a DNA sample is taken from them, with their
knowledge, for law enforcement purposes.” Merely collecting a DNA sample for law enforcement
purposes is not enough to prove a person does not retain a right of privacy in their DNA. Because DNA is
the building block of every individual, there is a reasonable‒even a significant‒privacy expectation in its
genetic information. Society recognizes individuals have a reasonable privacy expectation in their DNA
even when that DNA is contained in a database. There is a reasonable privacy expectation in DNA, and
individuals cannot lose their privacy rights by abandoning DNA they cannot help but leave behind. It
follows courts should require reasonable particularized suspicion sufficient to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause for the retention and searching of latent crime scene DNA in databases.
Even junk DNA can be used for sensitive genetic data, which violates privacy
Stephanie Beaugh, Loyola Law School, Spring, 2013, “How the DNA Act violates the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy of mere arrestees and pre-trial detainees,” Loyola Law Review, 59 Loy. L.
Rev. 157, http://law.loyno.edu/law-review-volume-59-number-1, ACC. 5-11-2015
Furthermore, it is not out of the realm of possibility that the government might disregard or change its
policy of using only "junk DNA." Considering ongoing technological advances, "junk DNA" could
potentially reveal far more extensive information than it currently divulges. Even though "junk DNA" is a
minimal DNA sample, the amount of information and detail extracted from it is huge. As
mentioned, DNA can already be used to ascertain one's biological traits, medical conditions, and other
relatives. This information is not only private, but it is irrelevant for identification purposes. Access to all
this private information is an invasion of privacy of arrestees and pre-trial detainees, which the Fourth
Amendment was enacted to protect.
Allowing familial searches allows the government to gain sensitive genetic data. This
is a significant invasion of privacy
The court states that "the amount and type of personal information to be contained in the DNA
profile is nominal." However, this is a specious conclusion that evinces a fundamental ignorance of the
amount and type of information actually available or a willful blindness to it. If familial and biological
searches can be conducted, the information appears to be more than nominal. Even if the search merely
yielded "nominal" information on matches, the government still possesses the sample from which
the DNA profile is made. This intrusion on privacy is significant and unreasonable given that the scope of
other personal information that can be obtained from a DNA sample is extraordinarily broad.
Significantly, as a district court correctly concluded, "DNA is "an information science,' "not an
identification science.'"
CODIS is a slippery slope

It’s a Brave New World in the making. The benefits of a federal DNA database system
violates privacy and will soon expand to universal inclusion
David Rangaviz, Esq., law clerk at the Federal District Court for the District of Vermont and Eric
Morgan, third-year law student at Vermont Law School currently working as a judicial intern at the
Federal District Court for the District of Vermont, Winter, 2013, “A Bridge too far: The Upcoming
Mandatory DNA sampling of arrestees,” The Vermont Bar Journal & Law Digest, 38 Ver. B. J. & L. Dig. 18,
http://content.yudu.com/A21bzv/Winter2012/resources/index.htm?referrerUrl=, ACC. 5-11-2015
All fifty states have enacted legislation that allows law enforcement to obtain DNA samples from
offenders. The details of each state statute, however, vary widely; many, like Vermont, require those
charged with a felony, as opposed to convicts, to submit data into the system. At the time of the
publication of this article, the NDIS contains over 9,930,700 offender profiles and has aided law
enforcement in more than 182,800 investigations. Vermont alone has contributed over 14,514 offender
profiles to NDIS and the database has aided law enforcement in 146 cases. But critics dispute their
effectiveness. In many states, large backlogs of samples wait to be uploaded due to high processing
costs. These backlogs derive from the breadth of many state statutes, as twenty-eight states, including
Vermont, allow DNA collection from arrestees. In some states approximately two-thirds of all individuals
charged with a felony ultimately get convicted, calling into question the need for collecting and
cataloguing DNA from the remaining one-third of arrestees who are never convicted. These critics also
argue that any aid to law enforcement comes at too high a cost. The ever-expanding breadth of the
databases raises significant privacy and civil liberties concerns. As a warrantless search, the mandatory
collection of DNA defies constitutional protection. The suggestion of taking profiles from newborn
children and inserting them into a universal database conjures up images of a Brave New World society.
DNA collection stored in CODIS is a slippery slope of government intrusion

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), May 19, 2008, “Re: RIN 1105-AB24 Proposed Rule, DNA-Sample
Collection Under the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 and the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
of 2006, http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file236_35392.pdf, ACC. 5-7-2015
DOJ estimates that under the proposed regulations more than 1.2 million additional individuals will have
their DNA (i) forcibly collected by multiple federal agencies (and potentially state and private
organizations as well); (ii) profiled; and, (iii) maintained in the Combined DNA Indexing System (“CODIS”)
each year. This represents a fifteen-fold increase in the number of DNA samples that will be collected
from federal offenders. This number may increase over time, since the proposed regulations leave open
the door to collection of DNA from even broader categories of individuals.
Rapid DNA systems will make it easier for the government to surveil the entire
population
Aliya Sternstein, Staff Writer, September 23, 2014, “FBI plans rapid DNA dragnets,” Nextgov,
http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2014/09/fbi-plans-rapid-dna-dragnets/94892/, ACC. 5-7-2015
The FBI is preparing to accelerate the collection of DNA profiles for the government's massive new
biometric identification database. Developers of portable DNA analysis machines have been invited to
a Nov. 13 presentation to learn about the bureau's vision for incorporating their technology into the
FBI's new database. So-called rapid DNA systems can draw up a profile in about 90 minutes. The Next
Generation Identification system, or NGI, the successor to the FBI's criminal fingerprint database, is
designed to quickly ID crooks through facial recognition, iris matching, tattoo cross-checks and vocal
recordings, among other unique traits. But critics say aggregating DNA along with all this other data
makes it easier for authorities to track the general population.

There is a real threat of a slippery slope for government intrusion via a national DNA
database
John W. Whitehead, Analyst at The Rutherford Institute, March 09, 2015, “How DNA Is Turning Us
Into a Nation of Suspects,” The Rutherford Institute,
https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/john_whiteheads_commentary/
how_dna_is_turning_us_into_ a_nation_of_suspects, ACC. 5-7-2015
Whereas fingerprint technology created a watershed moment for police in their ability to “crack” a case,
DNA technology is now being hailed by law enforcement agencies as the magic bullet in crime solving.
It’s what police like to refer to a “modern fingerprint.” However, unlike a fingerprint, a DNA print reveals
everything about “who we are, where we come from, and who we will be.” With such a powerful tool at
their disposal, it was inevitable that the government’s collection of DNA would become a slippery slope
toward government intrusion. Certainly, it was difficult enough trying to protect our privacy in the wake
of a 2013 Supreme Court ruling in Maryland v. King that likened DNA collection to photographing and
fingerprinting suspects when they are booked, thereby allowing the government to take DNA samples
from people merely “arrested” in connection with “serious” crimes. At that time, Justice Antonin Scalia
warned that as a result of the Court’s ruling, “your DNA can be taken and entered into a national
database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”
National DNA storage of some DNA makes DNA from everyone inevitable. It is an
empirically proven slippery slope
Michael T. Snyder, former Washington D.C. attorney, July 9, 2013, “The Coming National DNA
Database,” The Truth Wins, http://thetruthwins.com/archives/the-coming-national-dna-database, ACC.
5-9-2015
Those that are promoting a national DNA database claim that collecting the DNA of criminals is just like
fingerprinting them, and that we should all be willing to submit to a slight intrusion to our privacy in
order to make society a safer place. But is it really just a slight intrusion? Once they have the DNA of
every American, the potential for abuse would be absolutely staggering. It would only be a matter of
time before DNA identification replaced Social Security cards and every other form of identification.
Eventually, there would be a very real possibility that we would all have to submit to “DNA verification”
before we could get on an airplane, get a job, get a driver’s license or get a bank account. Of course that
will not happen immediately, but that is the road that we are going down. At first, DNA samples were
only taken from sex offenders. Once that precedent was set, they started taking it from all those
charged with serious crimes. Now they are taking it from those charged with low level crimes. Eventually
it will be all of us.

Including DNA profiles into CODIS allows the federal government to bypass state
expungement
Jessica D. Gabel, Georgia State University - College of Law, 2013, “Indecent Exposure: Genes are More
than a Brand Name Label in the DNA Database Debate,” 42 University of Baltimore Law Review 561
(2013), Georgia State University College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-27,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465192, ACC. 5-9-2015
Not to be left in the dust, all fifty states now have similar provisions that establish DNA databases and
mandate collection of samples from offenders, but the list of suspects is anything but usual. While
databases were initially intended to store the profiles of sex offenders and other violent criminals—and
some states do restrict the offender index to those individuals—state DNA databases have swelled to
include those convicted of misdemeanor crimes. While the list of collectible offenses has multiplied,
states also have begun to follow the federal practice of collecting samples from arrestees. Currently,
twenty-eight states and the federal government actively collect DNA samples from arrestees and add
them to the offender index. Should the charges be dismissed or the government otherwise fail to obtain
a conviction, the DNA profile (and the sample from which it came) may be left in a legal vacuum. The
majority of the states that permit arrestee collection put the onus on the individual to affirmatively seek
destruction of the sample and expungement of the profile. But if that profile has already been uploaded
into CODIS and added to the national database, then it will remain there indefinitely, regardless of what
happens at the state level. The profile may also remain in a local database if there is no provision for
removal from all DNA repositories. In contrast to the prevailing trend of placing the burden on the
arrestee to request expungement, Maryland is one of only a handful of states that affirmatively requires
the state to destroy the sample and eliminate the profile from the state database. Maryland law
includes the corresponding duty to eliminate the profile if it has found its way into the national database
maintained by the FBI. With the passage of Maryland HB 292 and removal of the sunset provision,
section 2- 511(c) does now appear to require removal of the profile from local, state, and federal
databases.
Minority Report Extension

DNA entered into CODIS risks a “Minority Report” scenario of widespread gnetic
surveillance and discrimination
Albert E. Scherr, Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire, School of Law, Winter, 2013,
“Genetic privacy & the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated surreptitious DNA harvesting,” Georgia Law
Review, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 445, http://georgialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Download-PDF-
V47-I2-Scherr.pdf, ACC. 5-11-2015
The informational-privacy dimension of DNA has been the primary focus of the genetic-database case
law on genetic privacy. Though every court has, in the end, declined to act based on the informational-
privacy features of DNA, many of them have highlighted its potential. The classic description
of DNA's informational value is Judge Reinhardt's dissent in United States v. Kincade: What type of
information might the government eventually be able to extract from samples of junk DNA? Even today,
as the plurality admits, "DNA profiles derived by STR may yield probabilistic evidence of the
contributor's race or sex." Yet that seems to be a dramatic understatement. The DNA "fingerprint"
entered into CODIS likely has the potential to reveal information about an individual's "genetic defects,
predispositions to diseases, and perhaps even sexual orientation." DNA analysis can reveal the presence
of traits for thousands of known diseases, and countless numbers of diseases which are currently
unknown. More ominously, some have predicted that the DNA profiles entered into CODIS will someday
be able to predict the likelihood that a given individual will engage in certain types of criminal, or non-
criminal but perhaps socially disfavored, behavior.
Absent limits on government use and storage of DNA a “Minority Report” scenario
becomes a real possibility
Yet if there are no limits to government officials being able to access your DNA and all that it says about
you, then where do you draw the line? As technology makes it ever easier for the government to tap
into our thoughts, our memories, our dreams, suddenly the landscape becomes that much more
dystopian. With the entire governmental system shifting into a pre-crime mode aimed at detecting and
pursuing those who “might” commit a crime before they have an inkling, let alone an opportunity, to do
so, it’s not so far-fetched to imagine a scenario in which government agents (FBI, local police, etc.)
target potential criminals based on their genetic disposition to be a “troublemaker” or their relationship
to past dissenters. Equally disconcerting: if scientists can, using DNA, track salmon across hundreds of
square miles of streams and rivers, how easy will it be for government agents to not only know
everywhere we’ve been and how long we were at each place but collect our easily shed DNA and add it
to the government’s already burgeoning database?
The government can retain CODIS DNA data indefinitely

Additionally, consider if a mistakenly identified person is arrested for a federal crime. The government
receives "the automatic right to sample the arrestee's DNA, to analyze it, and to include a profile derived
from the DNA sample in CODIS." This mistakenly identified person, now an arrestee, has no recourse
and is required to submit his DNA or be charged with a class A misdemeanor. And should an innocent,
mistakenly identified individual choose not to submit to the DNA test and be charged with a class A
misdemeanor, when the mistaken identity comes to light and initial charges are dropped, that individual
is still facing a federal offense for not submitting his DNA for a crime he did not commit in the first place.
Moreover, "although his DNA profile will be expunged from CODIS, the Government will retain
his DNA sample indefinitely," leaving the government still in possession and control of an individual's
person and property, whether it was lawfully obtained or not.
Minority Report Extension

The “Minority Report” scenario is real. The NGI database allows total biometric
knowledge accessible to federal and state law enforcement
ACLU of Massachusetts, Staff Writer, January 27, 2015, “The FBI’s plan to collect everyone’s DNA
just got a huge boost from congress,” Privacy SOS, https://privacysos.org/node/1659, ACC. 5-7-2015
In 2011, 1 in 25 Americans was arrested. In a few years, if the FBI has its way, the federal government
will possess the DNA of all of those people and more. Under the radar of most lawmakers and
journalists, the Bureau—with private industry and congress’ help—is pushing the most massive
expansion of biometric state surveillance since the invention of the fingerprint. Late last year, the FBI cut
the ribbon on its one billion dollar biometrics database, called Next Generation Identification. Since
NGI’s official launch, state and local law enforcement officials have been encouraged to submit face
prints, fingerprints, retina scans, photos of tattoos and scars, and DNA collected from people nationwide
to the FBI’s central database. Those state and local officials can also search against the FBI’s biometrics
store, if they want to identify someone. With NGI in full operation, the scary future of Minority Report
infamy takes a giant leap forward into the world of non-fiction.
DNA usage is approaching a genetic panopticon

Walter Olson, Staff Writer, June 4, 2013, “Big Brother Invades Your Genes,” The Daily Beast,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/ 2013/06/04/big-brother-invades-your-genes.html, ACC. 5-9-
2015
In his dissent, Scalia warns of such a “genetic panopticon.” (The reference is to Jeremy Bentham’s idea
of a prison laid out so that inmates could be watched at every moment.) And it’s closer than you may
think. Already fingerprint requirements have multiplied, as the dissent points out, “from convicted
criminals, to arrestees, to civil servants, to immigrants, to everyone with a driver’s license” in some
states. DNA sample requirements are now following a similar path, starting reasonably enough with
convicts before expanding, under laws passed by more than half the states as well as Maryland, to
arrestees. (“Nearly one-third of Americans will be arrested for some offense by age 23.”) Soon will
come wider circles. How long before you’ll be asked to give a DNA swab before you can board a plane,
work as a lawn contractor, join the football team at your high school, or drive?
Jim Crow Advantage Extension
African Americans & Latinos are disproportionately included in CODIS

Federal DNA databasing discriminates against black and Latino/a peoples and
undermines human rights
Osagie K. Obasogie, associate professor of law at UC Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco and a
senior fellow at the Center for Genetics and Society in Berkeley, April 9, 2010, “The dangers of growing
DNA databases,” Los Angeles Times, http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id= 5150, ACC. 5-7-
2015
The bottom line is, as UC Berkeley law professor Erin Murphy said in a 2008 article, "We're putting too
much faith in a new technology whose limitations and uncertainties we don't yet fully understand." But
the question is not only how many people this policy shift might affect, but which ones? Policies that
expand DNA databases are almost sure to exacerbate racial bias in the criminal justice system. The
grossly disproportionate number of imprisoned blacks and Latinos reflects, in part, the disproportionate
policing of their communities. Although blacks make up only about 13% of the population, estimates
show that they constitute at least 40% of the federal DNA database. Including arrestees who are not
convicted will only widen such disparities. The U.S. criminal justice system is notorious for its long list of
practices that others in the developed world consider to be blatant human rights violations. Our zealous
pursuit of criminals must be balanced with respecting human rights.
Racially biased arrests guarantee the national databank will be racist against black and
latino/a peoples, including family members
Erin Murphy, professor of law, New York University School of Law, March 2013, “The government
wants your DNA,” Scientific American, Vol. 308 Issue 3, pp. 72-77, Ebsco.
Finally, one very disturbing aspect of forensic DNA typing is the disproportionate impact that it has on
minorities. Because blacks and Latinos make up a greater share of those arrested and convicted in our
society, it is their DNA that is most likely to be collected and searched. Yet that is not necessarily
because those groups commit more crime. For instance, studies show that across the country, the arrest
rate for marijuana possession for blacks and Latinos is double, triple or even quadruple that for whites
even though the first two groups do not use marijuana at any higher rate than the third. If police make
arrests in a racially skewed way, then DNA databases will also be racially skewed. And it will be those
groups whose relatives and family members will be most likely to fall under suspicion as a result of
familial-match methods. The need to more closely regulate law enforcement's use of DNA collection and
analysis goes beyond rules and policies related to mandatory collection and familial searches. So far the
discussion has centered on the cases in which a person is ordered to give a DNA sample after arrest or
conviction. It is also possible, however, for police to obtain DNA surreptitiously, as was done in the Grim
Sleeper investigation. In such cases, Fourth Amendment law points in conflicting and often
counterintuitive directions. Constitutional protection has traditionally not extended to discarded
material -- if you throw your bloody shirt in the trash, you cannot complain that your rights were
invaded when law enforcement snatches it up as evidence. But should the same reasoning apply to
DNA, which is "discarded" routinely, albeit unintentionally? It is simply not possible to live in the world
and not shed DNA. Given the myriad ways that DNA can be revealing of intimate personal details, does
its ubiquity mean you have no grounds for complaint if the police pick up your discarded soda can and
try to match your DNA profile with records in CODIS or store your information in a database or
spreadsheet?
African-American are disproportionately targeted by CODIS

Jason Silverstein, PhD student in anthropology at Harvard University, March 27, 2013, “The Dark Side
of DNA Evidence,” The Nation, http://www.thenation.com/article/ 173554/dark-side-dna-evidence,
ACC. 5-7-2015
This is already happening here. By 2011, African-Americans made up 40 percent of the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS), according to Jeremy Gruber, executive director of the Council for Responsible
Genetics. Established by the DNA Identification Act in 1994, CODIS is used by the FBI to store and search
DNA profiles collected by federal, state and local law enforcement. When exact matches cannot be
found for an unknown sample, many states resort to partial matches, using different markers to track
down potential family members.
African Americans & Latinos are disproportionately included in CODIS

Overrepresentation in CODIS allows the federal government to bypass state laws to
target and map 17% of the African American population now
ACC. 5-7-2015
Because African-Americans are significantly overrepresented in CODIS, it is possible to use the database
to identify up to 17 percent of the country’s entire African-American population, researchers at Duke
University’s Center for Genome Ethics, Law and Policy found in 2011. Although only four states explicitly
permit familial searches, the ACLU has found that nineteen have used a partial match to connect an
unknown sample with a potential relative of someone in CODIS—even though fifteen of those states
prohibit using the database for this purpose. In California, which permits familial searching, an “initial
candidate list” of up to 168 people is created. That list is then narrowed and nonrelatives removed. A
potential relative who remains on the list becomes vulnerable to police investigation. This is why
Howard University’s brief calls these efforts a “‘probable cause’ generator.”
CODIS DNA violates the 4th Amendment and is easily manipulated for racial profiling
abstract_id=2572468, ACC. 5-9-2015
The collection of abandoned DNA is nearly limitless. Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
law enforcement officials can collect genetic information from anyone, whether they have an articulable
suspicion or not. Law enforcement can collect DNA for one investigation then reanalyze it for several
other investigations. The use of genetic profiles is difficult to control or limit. Currently law enforcement
compares latent crime scene DNA against DNA stored in databases, but this limitation is not imposed by
any outside organizations or laws. Rather, science is the only limit on governmental gene sequencing.
For instance, the military started collecting DNA samples in 1992, collection supposedly restricted to the
identification of soldiers killed in action, but four years later, the samples were already under
consideration for medical research. Today CODIS contains all military DNA samples. Because courts
uphold and accept repeated analysis, once geneticists isolate genes related to criminal behavior that
could justify preventive detention or other social control. The criminal behavior connection could
correlate with race, raising profiling concerns. Because the Fourth Amendment places no restrictions
and requires no justification for abandoned DNA collection, and these profiles are retained indefinitely
in CODIS, the Fourth Amendment fails to protect private citizens’ “sensitive genetic information”.
Familial targeting bad / expanding now

DNA is unique. Law enforcement will turn to CODIS data for familial searches
Valerie Ross, Staff Writer, January 2, 2014, “Forget Fingerprints: Law Enforcement DNA Databases
Poised To Expand,” Nova Next, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/body/dna-databases/, ACC. 5-9-
2015
But unlike fingerprints, DNA is inherited in a far more consistent way. It shows who’s related to whom—
something a standard fingerprint could never reveal. California, Colorado, Virgina, and Texas are using
that to their advantage, employing a technique called familial search. Law enforcement agencies turn to
familial search when a crime scene sample only contains a partial match. That partial match may point
investigators to that person’s father, brother, son, or another close relative, giving them new leads
where there otherwise may be none.
Familial searches are racist and violate the 4th Amendment

Mike Gloudemans and Nachi Shamaprasad, Genome Sciences & Policy Certificate Program Duke
University, March 17, 2015, “Current Issues in Forensic DNA Applications,” http://www.pged.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Current-Issues-in-Forensic-DNA-Applications.pdf, ACC. 5-9-2015
One objection to familial searching is that it makes suspects out of innocent people; opponents
therefore claim that it violates the Fourth Amendment. There are some concerns as to how far states
might go to catch criminals. So far the states mentioned above have been cautious of privacy concerns,
only using familial searching to test for immediate relatives in serious felony cases with no remaining
leads. But some worry that as familial searching becomes more commonplace, these states might
gradually ease some of these restrictions. A more relaxed definition of what constitutes a “partial
match,” for example, might widen the circle of suspects from only first-degree relatives to second-
degree relatives and beyond. Implicit racial and ethnic biases exist in the use of familial searching.
Minorities whose relatives are overrepresented in the database have a greater chance of detection
through a familial search. According to a 2011 estimate, 17 percent of African Americans have familial
matches in the CODIS database, while only 4 percent of Caucasians have familial matches under the
same search criteria.
Police in several states already use CODIS DNA samples to target family members
John W. Whitehead, Constitutional attorney and president of The Rutherford Institute Forced Blood
Draws, February 26, 2015, “DNA Collection and Biometric Scans: What Country Is This?,”
LewRockwell.com, https://www.lewrockwell.com/2015/02/john-w-whitehead/your-bodily-integrity-2/,
ACC. 5-7-2015
Capitalizing on this, police in California, Colorado, Virginia and Texas use DNA found at crime scenes to
identify and target family members for possible clues to a suspect’s whereabouts. Who will protect your
family from being singled out for “special treatment” simply because they’re related to you? As
biomedical researcher Yaniv Erlich warns, “If it’s not regulated and the police can do whatever they
want … they can use your DNA to infer things about your health, your ancestry, whether your kids are
your kids.” These are just a few of the questions we should be asking before these technologies and
programs become too entrenched and irreversible. While the Fourth Amendment was created to
prevent government officials from searching an individual’s person or property without a warrant and
probable cause—evidence that some kind of criminal activity was afoot—the founders could scarcely
have imagined a world in which we needed protection against widespread government breaches of our
privacy on a cellular level. Yet that’s exactly what we are lacking.
Familial targeting bad / genetic discrimination

CODIS allows the government to analyze samples for a variety of genetic information
beyond the 13-loci
Albert E. Scherr, Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire, School of Law, Winter, 2013,
“Genetic privacy & the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated surreptitious DNA harvesting,” Georgia Law
Review, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 445, http://georgialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Download-PDF-
V47-I2-Scherr.pdf, ACC. 5-11-2015
Even if one only relies on the genetic nametag generated by the standard 13-loci DNA testing-the
genetic fingerprint-the potential for intrusions on an individual's expectation of privacy expand beyond
those associated with a fingerprint. For example, the provisions of the Federal CODIS database
legislation allow for the inclusion of the DNA identification records of "other persons whose
DNA samples are collected under applicable legal authorities, provided that DNA samples that are
voluntarily submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be included in the National DNA Index
System." This language suggests that one's harvested genetic nametag will appear in the FederalCODIS
database as long as such harvesting is constitutional. Once in the database, an "innocent" individual may
be the subject of a coincidental match with a crime-scene sample, a match that would likely at least
require explanation or a partial match, a match that might lead to a court-authorized search of the
family members' genetic profiles. That individual may also be the subject of an erroneous match,
intentional or otherwise. More significantly, unlike the use of a DNA sample taken by authorization of
state or federal statute, the use of a surreptitiously harvested sample is likely unregulated by statute. It
could be included in what has been referred to as either a "linkage" or "rogue" database of suspects' or
others' profiles. The sample could be analyzed for information far beyond that provided by the more
standard 13-loci STR testing, including not only skin pigmentation, bio-geographical origin, gender, and
eye color but also a host of medical diseases, medical and behavioral predispositions, and perhaps even
sexual orientation.
Expanding CODIS means more innocent people get arrested and a higher risk of
genetic discrimination
Opponents of an all-inclusive national database liken the idea to a DNA dragnet that implicates many
innocent people as suspects with the hope of finding a single actual offender. Under the current CODIS
system, it might be possible for an innocent person to be linked to a crime simply because he or she was
present at the crime scene at a different time than when the crime actually occurred. A national DNA
database would exacerbate this problem. Furthermore, if the samples used to generate the database
are not destroyed after extracting the STR information necessary for forensic comparisons, the
possibility remains that the government might later extract further genetic information for purposes not
related to crime-solving with probable cause. To avoid such complications, some have suggested
destroying every person’s DNA sample immediately after typing its CODIS loci.
Racism Extension
Racism is constructed socially through rhetoric and human interaction. This means we
can undo the structures of oppression that organize daily life
David Hall, JD, University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law School, Summer, 1999, “Giving Birth to a Racially Just
Society in the 21st Century,” University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review, 21 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 927,
https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=
21+U.+Ark.+Little+Rock+L.+Rev.+927&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=7128c39417584ebb5f524e6401917bdc, ACC.
5-10-2015
The history of racism and racial discrimination in this society is a classic example of this cycle of
frustration and dashed hopes. As we approach the close of the 20th Century a retrospective analysis
would provide numerous examples of what some have come to call the civil rights shuffle-one step
forward, two steps backwards, side step, side step. This dance was eloquently and consistently
choreographed for the last one hundred years and beyond. This dance does not negate or belittle the
important and significant progress which was made during this century, but one could accurately say at
the dawning of the 21st Century what W.E.B. DuBois said about the 20th Century-the issue of the
century will be the color line. Therefore it is critically important and appropriate to not only learn
lessons from the mistakes of this closing century, but to find the spiritual will to bring an end to this
dance. Though a seminal symposium on race creates important opportunities to discuss these critical
matters, one has to wonder if we are only engaged in a ritualistic exercise that pacifies our insecurities
as the world around us gets worse. In the midst of those moments of sobering reflection, one must
realize that each opportunity we have in life to touch each other's souls, to challenge each other's
minds, and to lift each other's spirits, is a precious gift. The mere possibility that words and human
interaction can make a difference in the reality of the world is what should inspire our future efforts and
dedication, even when there is very little tangible evidence of progress.
DNA profiling is rooted in biological determinist science of racism

Christian B. Sundquist, Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Spring, 2009, “Beyond the
Final Frontier: A "Post-Racial" America?: The Obligations of Lawyers, the Legislature, and The Court,”
Harvard BlackLetter Law Journal, 25 Harv. BlackLetter J. 57, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/CLJC/index.aspx?
mainid=243&issuedate= 2009-08-19&homepage=no, ACC. 5-10-2015
Genetics has once again been relied on to scientifically interpret racial difference, notwithstanding the
unfortunate lessons of history. Modern science and the courts apparently are easily lured by the folk
notion that racial classifications in society are not simply arbitrary artifacts reflecting historical social and
political processes, but rather account for enduring and naturally-occurring biological differences. It is
thus now common and widely accepted for courts in the United States to admit statistical evidence
claiming the scientific ability to interpret genetic racial difference.
Biological determinism is a foundation of racialized hierarchal oppression

Christian B. Sundquist, Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Spring, 2009, “Beyond the
Final Frontier: A "Post-Racial" America?: The Obligations of Lawyers, the Legislature, and The Court,”
Harvard BlackLetter Law Journal, 25 Harv. BlackLetter J. 57, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/CLJC/index.aspx?
mainid=243&issuedate= 2009-08-19&homepage=no, ACC. 5-10-2015
Race was once understood as a scientifically meaningful taxonomic structure for human society.
Science--whether in the guise of taxonomy, biology, anthropology, anthropometrics, anatomy, medicine,
eugenics, or physiognomy--was utilized to define racial boundaries and groupings, as well as to
empirically demonstrate supposedly innate and immutable differences among the "races" in
intelligence, sexuality, morality, and other physical and mental human characteristics. Unsurprisingly,
science played a pivotal role in reinforcing and legitimizing folk beliefs of white superiority and non-
white inferiority, thus maintaining a rigid system of racial oppression and hierarchy. The pseudo-
scientific theories of white racial superiority became applied science during the racial eugenics
movement in the United States and Germany. Following the horrific and coldly technical application of
unsound scientific theories of race by Nazi Germany in World War II, the world flatly rejected biological
conceptions of race and advocated a perception of race as a social and historical construction.
Topicality Answers
The national database system (CODIS) is a federal collection of DNA

The FBI supplies law enforcement with biometric surveillance technology to feed its
central database
ACLU of Massachusetts, Staff Writer, January 27, 2015, “The FBI’s plan to collect everyone’s DNA
just got a huge boost from congress,” Privacy SOS, https://privacysos.org/node/1659, ACC. 5-7-2015
The FBI has big goals when it comes to biometric databases, but they can’t achieve them without the
active buy-in and assistance of state and local police. That’s part of the reason why Department of
Justice and Homeland Security grant programs have paid for state and local police nationwide to
purchase biometric capturing and processing technologies. Ask your local police department about their
electronic fingerprint readers, for example, and you’re likely to hear that they were purchased with
federal funds. Those devices make it easy for police and sheriffs nationwide to submit fingerprints to the
FBI—rapidly, from the field, and with very little effort on behalf of departments.
All DNA collected goes into CODIS

Valerie Ross, Staff Writer, January 2, 2014, “Forget Fingerprints: Law Enforcement DNA Databases
Poised To Expand,” Nova Next, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/body/dna-databases/, ACC. 5-9-
2015
DNA databases help catch criminals, supporters say. And not just any criminals: because the majority of
genetic evidence is collected in homicide and rape cases, the databases are particularly useful in
identifying people who have committed violent crimes. To get a DNA sample—whether from an arrestee
or a convicted criminal—law enforcement officers swab the inside of a suspect’s cheek. They then send
the swab, now coated in DNA, to one of more than 200 public and private labs that analyze samples for
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which catalogs these genetic
profiles at the local, state, and national level. The labs don’t read the full genome of each convict’s or
arrestee’s DNA; in fact, they don’t analyze any actual genes to include in the database, none of the
stretches of DNA that code for health risks or visible traits. They look at 13 locations, called loci, on each
of two sets of chromosomes in what’s commonly called “junk DNA,” or bits of the chromosome that
don’t code for anything in particular. Each DNA profile is made up of 26 data points.
All 50 states collect DNA and feed it to CODIS

John W. Whitehead, Constitutional attorney and president of The Rutherford Institute Forced Blood
Draws, February 26, 2015, “DNA Collection and Biometric Scans: What Country Is This?,”
LewRockwell.com, https://www.lewrockwell.com/2015/02/john-w-whitehead/your-bodily-integrity-2/,
ACC. 5-7-2015
The National Highway Safety Administration, the same government agency that funds the “No Refusal”
DUI checkpoints and forcible blood draws, is also funding nationwide roadblocks aimed at getting drivers
to “voluntarily” provide police with DNA derived from saliva and blood samples, reportedly to study
inebriation patterns. When faced with a request for a DNA sample by police during a mandatory
roadblock, most participants understandably fail to appreciate the “voluntary” nature of such a request.
Unfortunately, in at least 28 states, there’s nothing voluntary about having one’s DNA collected by
police in instances where you’ve been arrested, whether or not you’re actually convicted of a crime. The
remaining states collect DNA on conviction. All of this DNA data is being fed to the federal government.
Indeed, the United States has the largest DNA database in the world, CODIS, which is managed by the
FBI and is growing at an alarming rate.
The national database system (CODIS) is a federal collection of DNA

The federal database system determines how states and local law enforcement access
data
Erin Murphy, professor of law, New York University School of Law, March 2013, “The government
wants your DNA,” Scientific American, Vol. 308 Issue 3, pp. 72-77, Ebsco.
Familial searching, in contrast, has yet to be decided by any court. Like the compiling of arrestee
databases, the guidelines for familial searching vary greatly state to state. Yet unlike the rules about
whose DNA must go in the database, which are set by democratically elected legislatures, the rules
about how police can use the DNA database are often put in place internally by high-level federal or
state officials, administrative agencies, or even the heads of individual state or municipal crime
laboratories. In fact, the situation is so muddy that it can be difficult even to discern which states engage
in what practices. Current data indicate that at least 15 states actively undertake familial searches,
although the most prominent users are law-enforcement officials in California, Virginia, Colorado and
Texas. Unquestionably, other states have informally conducted occasional searches, and a handful of
states are now weighing authorizing legislation. Some states do recognize the potential for abuse.
Maryland and the District of Columbia both forbid intentional familial searches by law, and more than
15 states in addition to Maryland prohibit it through written or unwritten policy.
The FBI threatens state funding if they do not conform to federal databasing
David H. Kaye, Distinguished Professor and Weiss Family Scholar, Pennsylvania State University,
Dickinson School of Law, Fall, 2009, “Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What is the FBI
Afraid Of?,” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 19 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 145,
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/JLPP/ upload/kaye.pdf, ACC. 5-9-2015
The Bureau reportedly has threatened states with cutting off their participation in the national database
system that pools the state and federal data if they release their databases to outside scientists or to
defendants. The misperception that the study is a smoking gun for the usual random-match
probabilities, combined with the FBI's defensiveness, prompted one prominent law professor to demand
"an immediate congressional investigation" that "could raise questions of appeal in hundreds of cases
and [could] lead to some FBI officials being fired." Likewise, the San Francisco Chronicle branded the
FBI's opposition to the use of large, offender databases for population-genetics research "ridiculous and
reprehensible" if not "criminal."
The FBI is a federal agency and is in charge of federal databases

Shane Bauer, Staff Writer, November 20, 2014, “The FBI Is Very Excited About This Machine That Can
Scan Your DNA in 90 Minutes,” Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/rapid-
dna-profiles-database-fbi-police, ACC. 5-11-2015
The FBI is the only federal agency allowed to keep a national DNA database. Currently, police must use a
lab to upload genetic profiles to it. But that could change. The FBI's website says it is eager to see rapid
DNA in wide use and that it supports the "legislative changes necessary" to make that happen.
IntegenX's Heimburger says the FBI is almost finished working with members of Congress on a bill that
would give "tens of thousands" of police stations rapid-DNA machines that could search the FBI's system
and add arrestees' profiles to it. (The RapitHIT is already designed to do this.) IntegenX has
spent $70,000 lobbying the FBI, DHS, and Congress over the last two years.
A2: Crime Disadvantage
Non-Unique – Crime is high now

Crime will be high without Federal Code reform
Evan Feinberg, Staff Writer, April 20, 2015, “Why are so many Americans criminals?,” CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/ opinions/feinberg-criminal-justice-reform/, ACC. 5-10-2015
Criminal justice reform is rapidly becoming one of the few bipartisan issues of our time. It's about time.
America has the highest incarceration rate in the world, with 5% of the world's population and 25% of its
prisoners. Nearly 2½ million Americans are in prison. Over 65 million people, or 20% of the country,
have criminal records. Most disturbingly, nearly 40% of our country's prisoners are African-Americans,
who only make up 13% of the general population. It's time for policymakers to address this criminal
justice crisis head on. We must change the dismal status quo. We must start by asking a simple question:
Why are so many Americans criminals? Look no further than Washington, which has spent the past
century devising the most complicated — and nonsensical — criminal code known to man. The federal
criminal code includes over 4,500 laws and counting, not to mention government regulations for which
there are criminal penalties. The list of federal crimes is so long, so broad and so vague that you and I
likely commit three felonies every day, unwittingly breaking numerous federal laws as we go about our
daily business. No wonder America's prison population is out of control. Americans aren't addicted to
crime; our politicians are addicted to criminalizing things.
WalMart guarantees high crime rates

Simon McCormick, Staff Writer, February 12, 2014, “Walmart Linked To Higher Crime Rates: Study,”
Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/12/walmart-crime-rates_n_4775169.html,
ACC. 5-10-2015
"Always low prices" goes hand in hand with almost-always higher crime rates, at least according to a
recent study published in The British Journal of Criminology. Lead author Scott Wolfe, assistant
professor of criminology and criminal justice at the University of South Carolina, looked at counties
where Walmart expanded compared to counties where the megastore did not. "The crime decline was
stunted in counties where Walmart expanded in the 1990s," Wolfe said in a press release issued last
week. "If the corporation built a new store, there were 17 additional property crimes and 2 additional
violent crimes for every 10,000 persons in a county." The study looked at annual crime rates in 3,109
counties between 1991 and 2009. Wolfe was especially focused on the 1990s, when crime rates
plummeted nationwide and Walmart experienced dynamic growth. The study found that the crime
reduction was slowed in communities where Walmart expanded, a trend that continued in the 2000s.
Link Turn – We reduce the backlog

CODIS has an enormous backlog now
For more than a decade, the number of new DNA samples requiring processing in crime labs has
exceeded labs’ capacity to handle these samples. This backlog is of obvious concern to law enforcement
officials since unanalyzed samples cannot be used to close cases. Backlog includes both casework
awaiting completion and profiles of arrested or convicted offenders waiting to be uploaded to CODIS.
The NIJ did not adopt a formal standard for defining backlog until 2011; starting in 2011 the NIJ required
all the labs it funded to report as backlogged all samples older than 30 days. The number of backlogged
criminal cases increased from 83,603 to 91,323 during 2011. While the number of cases finished in 2011
(248,085) increased by 10 percent from the previous year, the number of new cases submitted also
increased by 16.4 percent. At the start of 2011, there were 187,034 backlogged samples from arrested
or convicted offenders waiting to be submitted to CODIS, but by the end of the year there were only
113,531 backlogged samples. Although the number of samples submitted is high, the labs can process
many of these samples each year: in 2011, forensic labs finished processing a total of 793,457 CODIS
submissions.
Current CODIS expansion will compound the backlog in processing. The plan reverses
this trend
Naseam Rachel Behrouzfard, Southern New England School of Law, 2014, “Strengths, Limitations,
and Controversies of DNA Evidence,” University of Massachusetts Law Review 1.1, 5,
http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=umlr, ACC. 5-9-2015
Simoncelli also argues that expansion of DNA databases will create overburdened crime laboratories,
crime framing, unjustifiable costs, and unfairness. She believes that if crime labs conducted DNA testing
on every person who is arrested or indicted, it would be unconscionable because of the current state of
laboratory backlogs. Because state and local government budgets have been shrinking, laboratories
have been left with insufficient funding for hiring and training scientists. To support her claim Simoncelli
refers to a recent Massachusetts case. In that case, law enforcement officials had a DNA sample from a
suspect in Christina Worthington’s murder for over a year, but did not profile it because they were using
their time and funding on testing local community members.
DNA backlogs prevent effective prosecution and allows violent attacks to go

unchallenged
Ben Protess, Analysts at ProPublica.com, May 5, 2009, “Complex strands of DNA backlog,” Politico,
ACC. May 7, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22070.html, ACC. 5-10-2015
Kellie Greene knows firsthand what can happen when labs fall behind. In 1994, a stranger broke into
Greene’s Orlando, Fla., home and beat and raped her. Greene lived in fear while waiting for police to
find the man. But the DNA he left on her leggings went untested for more than three years. When the
test results finally came back, she learned that her attacker had committed an earlier rape. His DNA from
that case was backlogged for two years — the window of time in which he attacked Greene.
A2: Politics
The public would flip out at the prospect of a national DNA database. They would
think it is 1984
Brian Clark Stuart, JD, University of Mississippi School of Law, 2014, “Dethroning the King: Why the
warrantless DNA testing of arrestees should be prohibited under state constitutions,” Mississippi Law
Journal, 83 Miss. L.J. 1111, ACC. 5-11-2015
The general public will almost certainly disapprove of an expansion of the law enforcement's DNA
database to cover everyone. Ordinary citizens are likely to be wary of the government's possession of
the most intimate details of their lives. Despite the general public's concern, the government's admitted
objective is to make the DNA databases as large as it can. One may also find it disturbing that, after
extracting the DNA profile from the DNA sample, the sample is not merely discarded. Rather, the
government keeps the sample indefinitely, for possible future analysis. The majority was not concerned
with any potential abuse of the vast amount of information held by the government, stating that
"statutory protections . . . guard against further invasion of privacy." This is unlikely to bring comfort to
the ordinary citizen with the recent news of the National Security Agency prying into personal
communications and correspondence. While this complete database encompassing everyone's DNA
might be useful for both true identification and criminal investigation, it is difficult to imagine a scenario
where it could be implemented without the general population justifiably thinking of "Big Brother"
and 1984.
General Case Extension
Solvency
DNA collection is virtually useless without CODIS

Tim Dees, former criminal justice professor and instructor at colleges in Wisconsin, West Virginia,
Georgia, and Oregon, January 27, 2015, “A new way DNA tech can help you ID your unknown suspect,”
Police One, http://www.policeone.com/investigations/articles/ 8193116-A-new-way-DNA-tech-can-
help-you-ID-your-unknown-suspect/, ACC. 5-5-2015
DNA analysis is a wonderful investigative tool. You can match evidence carrying biological trace to the
person who left the trace, with near-certainty you have the right guy. This assumes, of course, that you
have an existing DNA profile that matches evidence, one already on a suspect list or that is found in
CODIS. If you don’t, DNA evidence is only a little better than a fingerprint. You might be able to get close
with a familial match, but mostly you’re still looking for some other connection to the crime. What if
your DNA evidence could also show you what the donor looked like?
Inherency Extension – No restrictions now / national database coming

The status quo is moving toward ever-expanding DNA databases that systemically
undermine privacy
It should not surprise us, then, that the criminal justice system wants to collect DNA from an ever-
increasing spectrum of people who come into contact with it. The notion of privacy and the presumption
of innocence are now blurred figures in this landscape. These concerns do not pertain to simply the
collection of DNA profiles and samples, but also to the other information that may be kept. While
criminal investigations and medical research previously operated in different genetic spheres, those
spheres are starting to converge. When DNA is collected on arrest and uploaded into the database, it is
not simply translated into an identity-free criminal bar code. Ultimately, that digitized profile must link
to a name, to a location, and possibly to a criminal record. Other records may also be available,
especially for released offenders because police must be able to track that person down if there is a hit
in the database later. Ultimately, we may find that when police do contact a database offender they may
also be able to tell that person his or her predisposition to kidney disease.
There are no restrictions on government use and storage of DNA now

The government’s questionable acquisition and use of DNA to identify individuals and “solve” crimes has
come under particular scrutiny in recent years. Until recently, the government was required to at least
observe some basic restrictions on when, where and how it could access someone’s DNA. That has all
been turned on its head by various U.S. Supreme Court rulings, including the recent decision to let stand
the Maryland Court of Appeals’ ruling in Raynor v. Maryland, which essentially determined that
individuals do not have a right to privacy when it comes to their DNA.
Inherency Extension – CODIS expanding now

Function creep is a reality. The ever-expanding DNA database system will soon
include all crimes
Rachel Cox, Georgetown University Law Center, 2014, “Unethical intrusion: The Disproportionate
impact of law enforcement DNA sampling on minority populations, “American Criminal Law Review,
http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/files/2014/1654/8722/ Unethical_Intrusion.pdf, ACC. 5-9-
2015
Function creep has already started to occur with respect to DNA databases. For example, familial DNA
searching allows law enforcement to connect DNA found at crime scenes to family members of
individuals whose profiles are in DNA databases. Additionally, DNA analysis companies have been
marketing services to law enforcement that would allow them to use DNA to predict the specific
ancestry of an offender or infer the offender’s eye color. Although this information may allow police to
better identify and arrest criminals, such expanded use comes with the risk of infringing on personal
liberties. For example, DNA collection may be used to bolster racial profiling efforts, especially when
DNA is generally collected from racial minorities. The risk of function creep is made greater by the fact
that DNA databases are continually expanding. “[W]e have witnessed the ever-widening scope of the
target groups from whom law enforcement collects DNA and rapid-fire proposals to expand genetic
databases to include new categories and ever-greater numbers of persons,” one example of which is the
subject of this note—the addition of arrestees to the group of individuals whose DNA can be sampled
and stored: In less than a decade, we have gone from collecting DNA from convicted sex offenders—on
the theory that they are likely to be recidivists and that they frequently leave biological evidence—to
collecting it from all violent offenders; to collecting it from all persons convicted of a crime; to collecting
it from juvenile offenders in twenty-nine states; and now to proposals, and laws... to collect it from mere
arrestees.
DNA database expansion is inevitable in the status quo and will outpace identity
restrictions
In the wake of the King case, the fingerprint–DNA analogy has overstayed its welcome. Nonetheless, it
seems that it is not slated for retirement any time soon despite enduring concerns about the expansion
of DNA collection. If the extension of DNA databases is in fact inevitable, then it should likewise be
foreseeable that DNA technology may advance and outpace the restrictions once thought sufficient to
keep databases sufficiently void of identifying information. As for now, it seems we would rather be
content to operate databases at the margins of technology and tolerate a certain margin of error when
things go awry. The criminal justice system hungers for the ability to solve crime and convict the guilty.
Databases certainly feed that insatiable beast, but we need to respect that DNA is not the tame
dormouse we once thought it to be.
The FBI is expanding DNA surveillance efforts now

Hannah Yang, Analyst at the Heartland Institute, October 9, 2014, “FBI Expands Spying Powers with
New DNA Database,” The Heartland Institute,
http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2014/10/09/fbi-expands-spying-powers-new-dna-
database, ACC. 5-7-2015
Instead of broadcasting an omnipresent face via telescreen, a new government program may be
bringing “Big Brother” to street corners and traffic intersections near you. In September, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a statement heralding the expansion of the Next Generation
Identification System (NGIS) data network, including two new services, Rap Black and the Interstate
Photo System (IPS). A third new service, called Rapid DNA, is also planned to be integrated into NGIS in
the future. Rapid DNA is a portable genetic testing program which will be plugged “into the FBI's
Combined DNA Index (CODIS) and Next Generation Identification (NGI) systems from the booking
environment.”
Inherency Extension – Maryland v. King

The Court’s decision in Mayland v. King means using DNA means anyone accused of a
crime will be ensnared
Peter Fenn, Fenn Communications, June 4, 2013, “Your DNA in a Database,” US News & World Report,
http:/www.usnews.com/opinion/ blogs/peter-fenn/2013/06/04/the-supreme-courts-invasion-into-dna-
privacy, ACC. 5-9-2015
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday upheld the use of DNA databases to collect genetic information
from suspects arrested but not yet charged, without any requirement that officers first show probable
cause. The 5-4 ruling overrules a state court determination that Maryland’s DNA collection law permits
unconstitutionally invasive searches. In the short term, the ruling means that law enforcement officials
can collect DNA from anyone accused of a violent crime or burglary and upholds existing DNA collection
laws in about 28 states. This DNA stays in a database and can serve as the basis for later accusing people
of other, unrelated crimes. As the Maryland Supreme Court pointed out in their ruling, only 16 percent
of people arrested for some felonies are eventually convicted, and more than one in four people
charged with crimes that are much easier to prosecute are not convicted. This means widespread DNA
testing ensnares a whole lot of innocent people. But even those who believe they could never be
suspected of a violent crime may not be insulated from testing. Justice Antonin Scalia warns in a dissent
joined by three of the court’s more liberal justices that the court’s reasoning would apply equally to
someone accused of any crime or violation at all: When there comes before us the taking of DNA from
an arrestee for a traffic violation, the Court will predictably (and quite rightly) say, ‘We can find no
significant difference between this case and King.’ Make no mistake about it: As an entirely predictable
consequence of today’s decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if
you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.
Maryland v. King gives approval for unlimited collection of DNA by the government
ACC. 5-7-2015
On February 26, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Maryland v. King, which presents the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment permits the warrantless collection of DNA from people
arrested for, but not convicted of, a crime. Currently, twenty-eight states and federal law enforcement
collect DNA upon arrest—when a person is still presumed innocent. During oral arguments, Justice
Samuel Alito called it “perhaps the most important criminal procedure case that this Court has heard in
decades.” The case goes back to April 10, 2009, when Maryland police arrested Alonzo King on assault
charges. A DNA sample was collected, and four months later, it was found to match evidence from an
unsolved rape, which led to King’s conviction for the crime. The case is precisely the sort of example
given by proponents of broad DNA collection: DNA has the power to identify the guilty and exonerate
the innocent. But in King’s case, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that arrestees have privacy
expectations that outweigh the state’s crime-solving interest. In its petition to the Supreme Court,
Maryland argues that collecting DNA is no more invasive than its twentieth-century counterpart, the
fingerprint. But King and opposing groups filing friend of the court, or amicus, briefs respond that unlike
fingerprints, DNA is a trove of personal, medical and ancestral information. What’s more, DNA solves
cases far less frequently than the state suggests. In 2011, Maryland police collected 10,666 DNA
samples; only nineteen led to an arrest. The state’s interest is thus not identification but investigation—
and the Court has neverpermitted suspicionless searches of suspects without a warrant. If it does
in King, there will be no principle limiting when our DNA may be collected in the name of fighting crime.
Inherency Extension – Maryland v. King

The King decision eroded protections against DNA collection
Lesley Hall, JD, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, Summer, 2014, “Arrestee Number Two,
Who Are You? Suspicionless DNA Testing of Pre-Trial Arrestees and the Fourth Amendment
Implications,” Missouri Law Review, 79 Mo. L. Rev. 755, ACC. 5-11-2015
The Court's holding in King distorts the Fourth Amendment's protections and erodes an arrestee's rights.
While DNA testing aids in crime solving, taking DNA samples from pre-trial arrestees for suspicionless
criminal investigatory searches violates the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable
searches, and King's holding further erodes the protections of those who are presumed innocent. As
Justice Scalia announced in his dissent, while solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, "it occupies a
lower place in the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protection of our people from
suspicionless law-enforcement searches. The Fourth Amendment must prevail."
A2: DNA collection good / like fingerprinting

DNA samples in CODIS provide unique genetic data
Is DNA fingerprinting truly the 21st century version of traditional fingerprinting? One important
distinction between DNA fingerprinting and traditional fingerprinting is that DNA samples, if not
destroyed following entry into a database, can potentially provide a wealth of personal health-related
information that is not revealed in a traditional fingerprint. As for the system of maintenance, the FBI’s
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) currently contains fingerprints for over
70 million individuals; fingerprints are added for arrests as well as background checks for some jobs.
Automated fingerprint matching is available for solving cold cases, and the FBI gives an annual “Latent
Hit of the Year” spotlighting an investigator who uses IAFIS to solve a cold case with no remaining leads.
In this regard, maintenance of DNA fingerprints within CODIS, as described previously, is quite similar to
maintenance of traditional fingerprints. Of course, nationwide fingerprint searches in IAFIS have only
become a real option recently due to technological improvements providing increased accuracy and
efficiency, so it might be premature to gauge the uptick in the use of IAFIS.
DNA samples can be easily exploited. They are uniquely different than fingerprinting
abstract_id=2572468, ACC. 5-9-2015
DNA differs significantly from fingerprints. Claiming DNA merely identifies an individual is like saying a
Social Security Number only represents identity. The potential uses of a fingerprint are quite limited.
DNA holds a person’s entire genetic blueprint. It identifies a person’s relatives, and provides information
about health, race, familial ties, and ethnicity. DNA samples may be used for a myriad other purposes
beyond law enforcement, including research, heredity, and potential for disease. Because of its many
other uses, DNA samples and genetic profiles are easy to exploit.
CODIS DNA collection is unique because it allows the government a way to survey
citizens from birth to death
All 50 states now maintain their own DNA databases, although the protocols for collection differ from
state to state. That DNA is also being collected in the FBI’s massive national DNA database, code-named
CODIS (Combined DNA Index System), which was established as a way to identify and track convicted
felons and has since become a de facto way to identify and track the American people from birth to
death.
A2: DNA collection good / fake DNA

DNA can be faked by any biology undergrad
Ernie Austin, Associate Editor, February 23, 2015, “DNA Evidence Can be Faked,” Forensic Magazine,
http://www.forensicmag.com/ news/2015/02/dna-evidence-can-be-faked, ACC. 5-9-2015
In a recent story in The New York Times, Andrew Pollack reports that "scientists in Israel have
demonstrated that it is possible to fabricate DNA evidence, undermining the credibility of what has been
considered the gold standard of proof in criminal cases. "The scientists fabricated blood and saliva
samples containing DNA from a person other than the donor of the blood and saliva. They also showed
that if they had access to a DNA profile in a database, they could construct a sample of DNA to match
that profile without obtaining any tissue from that person." “You can just engineer a crime scene,” Dan
Frumkin, lead author of the paper, which has been published online by the journal Forensic Science
International: Genetics, told the Times. “Any biology undergraduate could perform this.”
DNA in CODIS is prone to human error

Naseam Rachel Behrouzfard, Southern New England School of Law, 2014, “Strengths, Limitations,
and Controversies of DNA Evidence,” University of Massachusetts Law Review 1.1, 5,
http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=umlr, ACC. 5-9-2015
Even though some scholars view DNA evidence as infallible, the use of this evidence raises the same
concerns as all other types of evidence. When humans perform tests, there is always room for human
error. The existence of human error regarding DNA evidence should not be overlooked. Under the DNA
Identification Act, federal laboratories must meet certain specified standards for inclusion in the
Combined DNA Index System. CODIS allows DNA obtained from crime scenes to be matched against the
profiles in the system. Most states, however, do not employ these rigid standards as laboratory personal
are often in charge of testing procedures, which some people view as risky. For example, a recent
investigation examining the Houston Police Department’s crime laboratory revealed a significant
amount of quality issues including lack of training. In 2003, Josiah Sutton was convicted of rape and
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison because DNA tests performed by the Houston Police
Department’s crime lab showed he was the perpetrator. The supposedly definitive lab report revealed
that DNA “consistent with Sutton was detected on the vaginal swab taken from the victim and on semen
found on the backseat of the car.” Two reporters received a tip from defense attorneys that there were
problems in the police department’s crime lab. These reporters decided to investigate. They dug up
transcripts and lab reports and sent them to experts, including University of California criminology
professor, William Thompson. Thompson found that [this case] was “the worst he had ever seen.”
Thompson knew that Sutton was poorly represented: I found consistent distortions of the statistical
certainty of the DNA evidence. I found instances that looked like fudging of results, to fit the
prosecution’s theory of the case, and I found that the lab consistently failed to use appropriate scientific
procedures.
A2: DNA collection good / exonerates the innocent

There are multiple barriers to DNA exoneration
Despite the promise of DNA-based exoneration to reverse injustices and improve the accuracy of
criminal investigations, efforts to reverse wrongful convictions are often hampered by obstacles to
access to DNA evidence. The procedural guidelines for providing DNA evidence for postconviction
testing vary from state to state. For instance, the state of New York lacks any statute regarding the
preservation of biological samples, and the state’s regulations regarding processing of biological samples
do not meet criteria laid out by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Recent legislative
action in Congress seeks to address this issue. H.B 1069, sponsored by Rep. Tina Orwall (D-IA) would
require DNA evidence from violent or sex-related felonies to be preserved throughout the offender’s
sentence. The alleged goals of the legislation are to standardize policies regarding preservation of DNA
samples post-conviction across states, and to facilitate post-conviction appeals. The bill passed the
house on a bipartisan vote in February, and has been referred to the Senate. Other obstacles to
accessing DNA evidence posed by state laws include denying access when a guilty plea was made or
requiring evidence that new DNA testing would reveal the true perpetrator. In addition, petitioning for
access to DNA evidence is often prolonged by procedural requirements and prosecutorial objections, as
seen in the high-profile prosecution and eventual exoneration of Michael Morton. Involvement of the
Innocence Project in this case eventually led to the discovery of prosecutorial misconduct. Some
scholars believe hiding such misconduct has led to district attorneys’ reluctance to allow retesting of
DNA evidence.
DRONE SURVEILLANCE AFFIRMATIVE

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its
domestic surveillance.
Drone technology has advanced significantly in the last 10 years, and has begun to be used by
government agencies for surveillance purposes. The affirmative seeks to ban drone use by the
government for a couple key reasons (advantages). First, drones frequently have accidents that can
destroy themselves, injure people and destroy people when crashing, and sometimes harm other
commercial airplanes while in flight (causing crashes, death, etc.). The affirmative prevents this
proliferation of drones in the skies, preventing the risk of crashes and airplane collisions. Second, while
drones have long been used by the military for both observational and destructive purposes, the use of
drones domestically is new. The shift of drones from the military to the police force is a significant
component of a parallel shift in police forces from a civilian protective agency, to a militarized
oppressive one. Outfitting police forces with drone technology reifies their position of power as
respondents to domestic insurgency, framing the domestic population and citizenry the same was as
enemy combatants abroad: subjects of extermination. Third, the file includes an additional advantage
(the Privacy Advantage). When the population is constantly subject to surveillance by drones, privacy is
violated in ways destructive to freedom and identity.
Drone Surveillance Aff 1AC

Observation One: Inherency
The government is spending millions on drones already – intends to equip police
departments
John W. Whitehead, analyst for the Rutherford Institute, September 30, 2013, “From NSA Spying and
VIPR Sweeps to Domestic Drones: A Round-Up of the Police State Programs NOT Affected by a
Government Shutdown,” accessed May 23, 2015,
from_nsa_spying_and_vipr_sweeps_to_domestic_drones_a_round_up_of_the_police
Domestic drones. The domestic use of drones will continue unabated. As mandated by Congress, there
will be 30,000 drones crisscrossing the skies of America by 2020, all part of an industry that could be
worth as much as $30 billion per year. These machines will be able to record all activities, using video
feeds, heat sensors and radar. A recent Inspector General report revealed that the Dept. of Justice has
already spent nearly $4 million on drones domestically, largely for use by the FBI, with grants for
another $1.26 million so police departments and nonprofits can acquire their own drones.
Surveillance at all-time high

Mark Lerner, analyst for the American Policy Center, August 5, 2014, “The Chilling Effect of Domestic
Spying,” accessed May 20, 2015, http://americanpolicy.org/2014/08/05/the-chilling-effect-of-domestic-
spying/
The Snowden revelations are unique because of the depth and scope of the revelations and because
Snowden had the official documents to back up his assertions. Previously people including former NSA
analysts such as William Binney, Thomas Drake, Russell Tice and Kirk Wiebe had come forward asserting
that our government was spying on citizens.¶ Too many in the government, the media, and the public
dismissed the allegations of these men because it was “easy” to do so rather than believe the worst
about our government, or actually having to do something about domestic spying. To be fair the NSA
has not been the only ones accused of domestic spying. The FBI, DHS, and the CIA have also been proven
to having done their own domestic spying; in the case of the FBI going back over seventy years.¶ I
support the need for our intelligence community, law enforcement, and our military. Unfortunately in
much the same way the “Stockholm Syndrome” results in a person who has been kidnapped falling
victim to the goals and aspirations of the kidnappers, the “rank and file” of those responsible for
protecting us and our freedom have fallen victim to corrupt leadership in our intelligence and law
enforcement communities. The culture of corruption is just as infectious as any chemical or biological
weapon of mass destruction.
Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should ban and cease all of its
agencies from using, developing, and deploying domestic surveillance drones.
Solvency
State privacy laws creates a porous hodgepodge of laws across the country that is
inconsistent and unpredictable – federal legislation solves better
Wells C. Bennett, Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of
Lawfare, September 2014, “Civilian Drones, Privacy, and the Federal-State Balance,” accessed May 18,
2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/09/civilian-drones-and-privacy
Two things stand out about this tripartite array. First, there’s a good-sized body of general privacy law out there, waiting to absorb the coming
influx of domestic drones and associated surveillance. The second is diversity. Notall states define trespassing or drone
surveillance in the same way, or apply identical privacy protections to identical places . Between its
statutes and court-crafted doctrines, this jurisdiction might take a relatively stringent approach to the
safeguarding of “private” privacy, while that one might take a relatively permissive approach . The
phenomenon is most vividly on display with regard to drone-specific statutes; many states don’t have one to begin
with, and thus accordingly handle nongovernmental privacy intrusions through a mix of laws in categories
one and two. In this way, the law of “private” privacy is something of a hodgepodge . Its coverage can be
expansive or porous or even non-existent, depending on where you are, and what sort of technology is
deployed. ¶ That registers a second, related point in the drone federalists’ favor. We don’t quite yet know how effective any
one’s state law will be, as the domestic drone population grows denser and private surveillance more
pervasive; or which states’ laws will withstand court challenges. And we won’t have a better sense on either score for a
while, either. The uncertainty will frustrate consensus about how best to regulate drones, snooping, and
nongovernmental actors—and thus bolster states’ prerogatives in the short run.
Advantage One: Accidents

Drones pose a huge risk to the safety of commercial airlines
Craig Whitlock, Pentagon and National Security specialist for the Washington Post, November 26,
2014, “Near-collisions between drones, airliners surge, new FAA reports show,” accessed May 24, 2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/near-collisions-between-drones-airliners-
surge-new-faa-reports-show/2014/11/26/9a8c1716-758c-11e4-bd1b-03009bd3e984_story.html
Pilots around the United States have reported a surge in near-collisions and other dangerous encounters
with small drones in the past six months at a time when the Federal Aviation Administration is gradually
opening the nation’s skies to remotely controlled aircraft, according to FAA records.¶ Since June 1,
commercial airlines, private pilots and air-traffic controllers have alerted the FAA to 25 episodes in
which small drones came within a few seconds or a few feet of crashing into much larger aircraft, the
records show. Many of the close calls occurred during takeoffs and landings at the nation’s busiest
airports, presenting a new threat to aviation safety after decades of steady improvement in air travel.
Risk of accidents and crashes is high – limited ability to detect and avoid trouble, pilots
make errors, mechanical defects, and unreliable communication links
Craig Whitlock, reporter for the Washington Post, June 20, 2014, “When drones fall from the sky,”
accessed May 22, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/06/20/when-drones-
fall-from-the-sky/
The Post’s analysis of accident records, however, shows that the military
and drone manufacturers have yet to overcome
some fundamental safety hurdles:¶ A limited ability to detect and avoid trouble. Cameras and high-tech
sensors on a drone cannot fully replace a pilot’s eyes and ears and nose in the cockpit. Most remotely controlled
planes are not equipped with radar or anti-collision systems designed to prevent midair disasters.¶ Pilot error.
Despite popular perceptions, flying a drone is much trickier than playing a video game. The Air Force licenses its
drone pilots and trains them constantly, but mistakes are still common, particularly during landings. In four cases over
a three-year period, Air Force pilots committed errors so egregious that they were investigated for
suspected dereliction of duty.¶ Persistent mechanical defects. Some common drone models were
designed without backup safety features and rushed to war without the benefit of years of testing. Many accidents were
triggered by basic electrical malfunctions; others were caused by bad weather. Military personnel blamed some mishaps
on inexplicable problems. The crews of two doomed Predators that crashed in 2008 and 2009 told investigators that their respective planes had
been “possessed” and plagued by “demons.”¶ Unreliable
communications links. Drones are dependent on wireless
transmissions to relay commands and navigational information, usually via satellite. Those connections can be
fragile. Records show that links were disrupted or lost in more than a quarter of the worst crashes.
Airplane crashes are devastating for airline companies – empirics

Melanie Schmitz, reporter for Bustle, March 24, 2015, “How Do Plane Crashes Affect Consumer
Markets? Ticket Sales & Stock Prices Will Unsuprisingly Fall, If Only Briefly,” accessed May 24, 2015,
http://www.bustle.com/articles/71819-how-do-plane-crashes-affect-consumer-markets-ticket-sales-
stock-prices-will-unsuprisingly-fall-if
When a major catastrophe like the Germanwings Airbus A320 crash in France strikes, does it hit
consumer markets equally as hard? For budget airlines, the outlook from their side of the fence might
be worse than expected. After the tragic loss of 150 passengers and crew on Tuesday in the French Alps, several
Germanwings flights were cancelled in order to give grieving and safety-concerned employees room to cope with the incident — but
the full extent of the damage went much deeper as the day went on. ¶ “This is a sad and tragic day for Germanwings
and the entire Lufthansa family,” said CEO Thomas Winkelmann in a press conference on Tuesday afternoon (Lufthansa is the parent company
of Germanwings airlines). As the families and loved ones of crash victims began to flood into the crisis centers and meet with airline-provided
psychiatrists in Barcelona and Düsseldorf however, it
became clear that the airline itself would take a serious hit both
among employee and passenger trust, as well as within its financial ranks.¶ By end of day on Tuesday, as the
European markets closed, positive numbers began trickling in which showed curious potential for the airline company — but the lone bright
spot in the day was short lived. CNBC reported a nearly 5 percent loss on shares of the German airline by midday on
Tuesday, bouncing back slightly to an overall closing rate of 13.57 euros by the closing bell. The French Press Agency (AFP) reported that the
stock finished the day as “the worst performer on the Frankfurt stock market.” And the airline wasn’t
alone — The Telegraph reported that as news of the crash began trickling in, stocks of both Lufthansa and
Airbus, the plane’s manufacturer, began to slump dramatically as well.
Airline industry key to the economy – massive component of GDP that has positive
effects on unquantifiable areas of the econ
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), June 2014, “The Economic Impact¶ of Civil Aviation on the¶ U.S.
Economy,” accessed May 24, 2015, https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/media/2014-economic-
impact-report.pdf
Civil aviation connects the entire globe, providing¶ much needed economic benefits both seen and
unseen¶ for U.S. consumers and businesses. Civil aviation has¶ been a major force behind decreasing
barriers to trade,¶ and U.S. civil aviation industry truly remains a unique¶ engine for innovation and
technological progress.¶ The network connectivity of civil air transportation¶ provides a dynamic and real-time
infrastructure that¶ keeps our nation competitive on the global stage.¶ Specific areas of civil aviation
such as air cargo,¶ have contributed to more effective networking and¶ collaboration between
companies near and far.¶ This report found that when all impacts are included,¶ civil aviation contributed 5.4
percent to the U.S.¶ economy in 2012. The total output of civil aviationrelated¶ goods and services
amounted to $1.5 trillion¶ in 2012 and generated nearly 12 million jobs, with¶ earnings of $459 billion.¶
The economic impacts of civil aviation summarized in¶ this report, represent the quantifiable benefits made¶
possible by civil aviation. Other benefits are only just¶ beginning to be captured by researchers, and there is¶ hope
that new indexes such as the World Bank Air¶ Connectivity Index will provide even more insight¶ into civil aviation’s influence on economic
growth and¶ development. The industry contributes positively to¶ the U.S. trade balance, creates high-paying
jobs, helps¶ keep just-in-time business models viable, and connects¶ us to friends, family, and market
opportunities. Air¶ transportation will continue to move the U.S. and¶ global economy towards a bright and healthy future.
Economic collapse causes massive armed conflicts – extinction

Phil Kerpen, National Review Online analyst, October 29, 2008, “Don't Turn Panic Into Depression,”
accessed May 24, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/dont-turn-panic-into-depression/
It's important that we avoid all these policy errors - not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our
survival. The Great Depression, after all, didn't end until the advent of World War II, the most
destructive war in the history of the planet. In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state
terrorist organizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such
extended duration would risk armed conflicts on an even greater scale.
Advantage Two: Militarization

Drone use by law enforcement fetishizes weapons technology, fusing masculine
fantasies of control with technology
Michael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in
the Militarisation of Policing,” accessed May 20, 2015, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10612-
013-9213-4/fulltext.html
This paper argues that the various and contradictory rationales offered for law enforcement drones are
symptomatic of a ‘weapons fetish’ evident in popular culture. This fetishisation imbues military
technology such as the drone with masculine fantasies of control and domination that obscure the
practical limitations and ethical implications of drones for crime control and prevention. By linking the
pleasures of militarism to crucial shifts in the social and economic order, the paper argues that counter-
terrorism discourse functions to legitimate the militarised masculine subject positions of paramilitary
policing specifically and the neoliberal state generally. In such a context, the drone features as a
regressive ‘weapon-toy’ that fuses state control with technological transcendence.
Even if domestic drones aren’t yet weaponized, the creep of police state power is
incremental – allowing acceptance of surveillance drones makes their weaponization
inevitable
Glenn Greenwald, Salon Analyst, December 12, 2011, “The growing menace of domestic drones,”
accessed May 22, 2015,
http://www.salon.com/2011/12/12/the_growing_menace_of_domestic_drones/
For those dismissing concerns about drones by claiming (falsely) that they are the equivalent of police
helicopters, won’t those same people dismiss concerns over weaponized drones by arguing: there’s no
difference between allowing the police to Taser you or shoot you themselves and allowing them to do
that by drone? This is always how creeping police state powers are entrenched: one step at a time. For
those who are perfectly content with having stealth, hovering drones over U.S. soil for sustained
surveillance purposes — based on the reasoning that the police can already engage in surveillance so
why not let them do it more efficiently? — what possible objections will there be to having the police
use weaponized drones? After all, the police can already Taser, pepper spray and shoot people: why not
let them do it with drones? AV itself certainly expects precisely that lack of resistance: ¶ The fact is that
drones vest vast new powers that police helicopters and existing weapons do not vest: and that’s true
not just for weaponization but for surveillance. Drones enable a Surveillance State unlike anything we’ve
seen. Because small drones are so much cheaper than police helicopters, many more of them can be
deployed at once, ensuring far greater surveillance over a much larger area. Their small size and stealth
capability means they can hover without any detection, and they can remain in the air for far longer
than police helicopters. Their hovering capability also means they can surveil a single spot for much
longer than military satellites, which move with the earth’s rotation (see AV’s Report at p. 11 — the
section entitled “Stratospheric Persistent UAS” — for all the reasons drones can provide uniquely
sustained surveillance in ways that satellites and police helicopters cannot).
The conversion of military technology and strategy for police use reproduces war as a
paradigm for solving social problems – this paradigm only replicates harms and causes
more crime, violence, and disorder
Despite (or perhaps because of) the risk associated with their use of violence, paramilitary police units are generally considered to be
‘elite’ and they are widely idealised by other police (Kraska 1997, 2007; McCulloch 2001). Given this privileged status, it is unsurprising
that the paramilitary appearance and tactics of these units have exerted considerable influence over policing
practice. Over time, paramilitary tactics and weaponry have become features of police responses to a variety
of forms of crime and disorder (Kraska 2001b). This has been linked to the indiscriminate use of teargas,
clubs, pepper spray and rubber bullets for the purpose of crowd control (Hill and Beger 2009). Police uniforms in
some jurisdictions now mimic a form-hugging paramilitary fashion complete with combat boots, cargo
pants and a utility belt which holds once-military technology such as tasers and capsicum spray (McCulloch
2001). The dissemination of paramilitary tactics into ‘normal’ police work has accelerated following the events of September 11 2001 due to the establishment of
joint military-police counter-terrorism operations (Monahan 2010a) and the increasing prominence of ‘national security’ imperatives in the remit of law
enforcement officers (Kraska 2007). This
has been underwritten by formal institutional arrangements and
government funding for the transfer of military and war technology to law enforcement (Haggerty and Ericson
2001).¶ There has been an increasingly military flavour to crime control rhetoric and policy with successive
‘wars’ on ‘drugs’, ‘crime’ and ‘terror’ (Kraska 2001a). However the generalisation of ‘war’ as a paradigm of
response applicable to internal as well as external security concerns has proven to be a poor method of
safeguarding social order; instead, it has produced a range of counterproductive effects (Hardt and Negri 2004;
McCulloch and Pickering 2009). Each successive ‘war’ has tended to legitimise the expansion of law enforcement
budgets (and a corresponding underfunding of social supports) and the differential targeting of disadvantaged, ethnic and
racial minority communities (Meeks 2005). This has eroded rather than supported the capacities of those
communities to develop the social cohesion and capital necessary for resolving collective problems such
as crime and disorder (Wacquant 2009). Furthermore, such ‘wars’ have typically exacerbated the underlying
determinants of social problems, complicated efforts at crime prevention and control, and estranged individuals and communities from the police
and other authorities (Hill and Beger 2009; McCulloch and Sentas 2006; Meeks 2005).
Constant surveillance by weaponized drones causes deep psychological trauma to the

communities below
J. Cavallaro and S. Sonnenberg, Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic
and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, 2012, “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to
Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan,” accessed May 22, 2015,
http://www.livingunderdrones.org/report/
Drones hover twenty-four hours a day over communities in northwest Pakistan, striking homes, vehicles, and
public spaces without warning. Their presence terrorizes men, women, and children, giving rise to anxiety and
psychological trauma among civilian communities. Those living under drones have to face the constant
worry that a deadly strike may be fired at any moment, and the knowledge that they are powerless to
protect themselves. These fears have affected behavior. The US practice of striking one area multiple times, and evidence
that it has killed rescuers, makes both community members and humanitarian workers afraid or unwilling to assist injured victims. Some
community members shy away from gathering in groups, including important tribal dispute-resolution
bodies, out of fear that they may attract the attention of drone operators. Some parents choose to keep
their children home, and children injured or traumatized by strikes have dropped out of school. Waziris told
our researchers that the strikes have undermined cultural and religious practices related to burial, and made family members afraid to attend
funerals. In addition, families who lost loved ones or their homes in drone strikes now struggle to support themselves.
Mass killing of citizens – militarization causes police to treat citizens as enemy

combatants
Shirley Li, writer for The Wire, August 15, 2014, “The Evolution of Police Militarization in Ferguson and
Beyond,” accessed May 22, 2015, http://www.thewire.com/national/2014/08/the-evolution-of-police-
militarization-in-ferguson-and-beyond/376107/
Peter Kraska, a professor at the School of Justice Studies at Eastern Kentucky University and author of
Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System, told The Wire in an email interview that the term
mostly calls out the police, but the escalation in the streets stems from both sides, creating a circle of
distrust:¶ This expansion [of police militarization] is having a dramatic impact on how the police perceive
the public (more as enemy combatants than citizens of the community they are serving) as well as how
the public perceives the police (more as an occupying force that cares only about maintaining law and
order through military style tactics, hardware, and appearance). ¶ This dynamic can readily lend itself to
the police using deadly force inappropriately, and to the public reacting to these incidents with outrage
and complete distrust of what they perceive as an occupying force that does not have their best interest
in mind. ¶ In short, the police lose all legitimacy in the eyes of the people they are serving—which only
reinforces a we vs. they mentality among the police. This has been the danger inherent in this well-
documented trend toward police militarization; this is the ugly reality that is playing out in Ferguson.¶
"Even though I was the first academic to identify, research, and write about these trends," he added,
"even I would not have predicted the extent to which the military model would overtake the community
policing reform movement so rapidly."
Rejecting drone use for surveillance ruptures the doublespeak of the term drone. The
Aff’s rejection of domestic drones reorients the U.S. trajectory away from militarizing
the civilian sphere
Sam Mutter, March 17, 2015, freelance researcher and journalist with an MSc in Politics and
International Relations, “The doublespeak of drones,” accessed May 20, 2015,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/sam-mutter/doublespeak-of-drones
By virtue of its development through America’s covert wars, the moral legitimacy of the military drone has always been
dubious, and now the civilian drone, adopted by police forces to catch criminals and patrol borders, is
edging too into murky waters. How long before these civilian technologies are weaponised? How long,
too, before the affordability of small drones makes them the perfect vehicles for miniature explosives
devices? In the sense that it implicitly accepts these transgressions, the current doublespeak paves the way for a
wholesale militarisation of the civilian domain. The aim of separating the two meanings is not, however,
to once and for all clear the conscience of the civilian drone, determining it as innocent, while the
military drone remains (potentially) guilty. Rather, both must be made subject to thorough critique, but
on different grounds: The civilian drone as an issue of rights to privacy and as an airborne hazard to
commercial airliners; the military drone as a weapon of unaccountable war.¶ It is doubly necessary, therefore, to be
wary of the civilian drone’s trivial allure as it expands its remit from tool to toy. Particularly evident in the build-up to
Christmas – the first (but certainly not the last) Christmas at which quadcopters were the ‘must have’ gadget – was the recurrent
portrayal of drones as playthings. From a Halloween video showing a drone garbed in a skeleton
costume, terrorising morning joggers in an American park, to the new cultural vocabulary of ‘drone selfies’,
gadgetry is one of the most insidious forms of normalization. A society of media is by definition a viral society, and we
must take care that the ambiguous term ‘drone’ does not become infected with unreserved approval,
nor with the cancer of apolitical indifference.
Drone Surveillance Aff Extensions
Inherency
Domestic drone use and technical capability is rapidly expanding
Jennifer Lynch, writer for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, January 14, 2014, “Customs & Border
Protection Loaned Predator Drones to Other Agencies 700 Times in Three Years According to “Newly
Discovered” Records,” accessed May 18, 2015, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/newly-
discovered-drone-records-show-customs-border-protection-flew-its-predator
CBP noted in a recent Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) that it generally flies its drones in support of its
primary mission—“border security.” Yet these records indicate just how blurred that mission has become . This is
problematic because, as CBP also notes, drones like Predators enable “the monitoring of large areas of land more
efficiently and with fewer personnel than other aviation assets.”¶ As the use of Predators moves from
maintaining security at the nation’s borders to general law enforcement elsewhere within the country,
more and more people in the United States will be subject to drone surveillance . CBP states in its PIA
that it stores data unassociated with a particular investigation for no more than 30 days, but much, if
not most of this data will be associated with an investigation and may therefore be stored indefinitely—
even if it includes footage of property, vehicles and people unassociated with the investigation. ¶ CBP also states in the PIA that we shouldn’t be
concerned about the privacy implications of its drones because their sensors cannot yet identify individual people. However, these sensors
are becoming more sophisticated every day, and it won’t be long before surveillance capabilities like
"facial recognition or soft biometric recognition, which can recognize and track individuals based on
attributes such as height, age, gender, and skin color" are added to CBP’s arsenal. We need to address these
issues before that happens.
Defense department extensively monitors the U.S. with drones – the Pentagon
controls about 10,000 drones
Craig Whitlock, Washington Post analyst, September 26, 2014, “White House plans to require federal
agencies to provide details about drones,” accessed May 18, 2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-plans-to-require-federal-
agencies-to-provide-details-about-drones/2014/09/26/5f55ac24-4581-11e4-b47c-
f5889e061e5f_story.html
No department flies more drones than the Pentagon, which has about 10,000 of the aircraft in its
inventory, from four-pound Wasps to the 15-ton Global Hawk. While many are deployed overseas,
Defense Department documents show that the military is making plans to base drones at 144 sites in
the United States. Pentagon officials have said they soon expect to fly more drones in civilian airspace
in the United States than in military-only zones.¶ The Department of Homeland Security also conducts
extensive surveillance with unarmed drones. Its Customs and Border Protection service has nine large
Predator B models, which account for about three-quarters of all drone flight hours reported by federal
civilian agencies.¶ Customs and Border Protection drones patrol a 25-mile-wide corridor along the
nation’s northern and southern borders, as well as over the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico.¶ Records
obtained by the Electronic Frontier Foundation show that the Border Patrol has also outsourced its
drones on hundreds of occasions to other law enforcement agencies throughout the United States.
Details of most of those operations remain secret.
Lots of drones used by the government currently

Melanie Reid, Associate Professor of Law, 2014, “ Grounding Drones: Big Brother’s Tool Box Needs
Regulation Not Elimination,” accessed May 20, 2015, http://jolt.richmond.edu/index.php/grounding-
drones-big-brothers-tool-box-needs-regulation-not-elimination/
Law enforcement, in particular, has caught on to the drone craze. The Miami Police Department in
Florida has drones—two Honeywell aircraft to fly no higher than 400 feet over the everglades. The U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) currently operates ten Predator drones and hopes to expand their
number of drones to twenty-four by 2016. CBP drones patrol the southern border, and the Department
of Defense has sent drones into Mexico to gather information about major drug traffickers.¶ Two
“nanodrones” are currently in production and garnering interest. The hummingbird drone “navigates by
changing the angle and shape of its paper-thin wings—which beat twenty to forty times per second—
and can hover in place for up to 11 minutes.” “It is also small enough to fly through windows or other
small openings, strong enough to carry a microphone or camera, and stable enough to maintain a highly
controlled hover, even in gusts of wind.” The mosquito drone can be remotely controlled and is
equipped with a camera and a microphone. Once it lands, it can take a DNA sample or leave an RFID
tracking device under the skin.¶ Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) have used Predator drones inside the United States. FBI Director Robert Mueller
commented to Congress that drones were “very seldom used” by his agents but that he was aware of at
least three drones in FBI possession as of 2011. The police department in Mesa County, Colorado
operates its Draganflyer drones in their county. Police in Arlington, Texas used drones to assist with
security during the Super Bowl in February 2011 and also for “’training and evaluation’ purposes in
unpopulated areas.” The Texas Department of Public Safety used a bird-sized “Wasp” aircraft to conduct
aerial surveillance during the execution of a search warrant. The city of Ogden, Utah, sought FAA
permission in 2011 to deploy an unmanned blimp for surveillance and crime prevention. National Guard
units around the country operate drones to train for their use overseas and the United States Forest
Service has been known to use drones to fly over national parks.
Drones used by the police to respond to the Baltimore protests

Michael Gould-Wartofsky, analyst for In These Times, May 5, 2015, “From Ferguson to Baltimore, a
5-Step Guide to the Police Repression of Protest,” accessed May 22, 2015,
http://inthesetimes.com/article/17909/ferguson_baltimore_police_repression
Over the course of 24 hours, which would see economically devastated parts of Baltimore erupt in open
rebellion, city and state police would deploy everything from a drone and a “military counter attack
vehicle” known as a Bearcat to SWAT teams armed with assault rifles, shotguns loaded with lead pellets,
barricade projectiles filled with tear gas, and military-style smoke grenades. The BPD also came
equipped with “Hailstorm” or “Stingray” technology, developed in America’s distant war zones to
conduct wireless surveillance of enemy communications. This would allow officers to force cell phones
to connect to it, to collect mobile data, and to jam cell signals within a one-mile radius.
Legislative gap – current law is insufficient to protect us against privacy violation from
drones, drone surveillance is treated less harshly than human pilots
M. Ryan Calo, Director for Privacy and Robotics at the Center for Internet & Society, December 12,
2011, “The Drone as Privacy Catalyst,” accessed May 24, 2015,
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/drone-privacy-catalyst
Agency rules impede the use of drones for now; United States privacy law does not. There is very little in
our privacy law that would prohibit the use of drones within our borders . Citizens do not generally enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy in public, nor even in the portions of their property visible from a public vantage. In 1986, the
Supreme Court found no search where local police flew over the defendant’s backyard with a private
plane. A few years later, the Court admitted evidence spotted by an officer in a helicopter looking through two missing roof panels in a
greenhouse. Neither the Constitution nor common law appears to prohibit police or the media from routinely
operating surveillance drones in urban and other environments.¶ If anything, observations by drones may
occasion less scrutiny than manned aerial vehicles. Several prominent cases, and a significant body of
scholarship, reflect the view that no privacy violation has occurred unless and until a human observes a
person, object, or attribute. Just as a dog might sniff packages and alert an officer only in the presence of contraband, so might a drone scan
for various chemicals or heat signatures and alert an officer only upon spotting the telltale signs of drug production. ¶ In short, drones like
those in widespread military use today will tomorrow be used by police, scientists, newspapers,
hobbyists, and others here at home. And privacy law will not have much to say about it. Privacy advocates
will. As with previous emerging technologies, advocates will argue that drones threaten our dwindling individual and collective privacy. But
unlike the debates of recent decades, I think these arguments will gain serious traction among courts, regulators, and the general public.
Solvency
Law enforcement should not be able to surveil without court order, plan solves
The answer lies not in requiring a warrant or a particular exception to the warrant requirement, but in
requiring law enforcement to seek a court order similar to that required for a pen register under 18 U.S.C §
2703. To obtain such a court order, law enforcement officials would need to demonstrate specific and articulable
facts indicating that the data is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. This would prevent law
enforcement from using drones to randomly search for crime in a particular area. The order would
specify the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the criminal investigation and whom
law enforcement would like to surveil and describe the particularized need for the information that can be
gathered with the drone.¶ The order also should contain language requiring law enforcement to discard any
information collected by the drone that is not relevant to the scope of the investigation within twenty-
four to forty-eighty hours. This requirement would alleviate any concerns that the government would collect this information for
other nefarious purposes in the future. Being that it is a court order, this requirement would have teeth as long as magistrates signing these
orders follow up and demand that law enforcement demonstrate that they in fact have complied with the order and destroyed any irrelevant
information. If
a law enforcement officer fails to comply, a variety of sanctions could be used to demand
compliance. Sanctions even as severe as jail time would cause any law enforcement agent to comply fully.¶ The court order also
should include a penalty for disclosing to unauthorized persons data obtained from a drone , thereby
limiting exposure of the information to government personnel working on the particular case , similar to
grand jury secrecy requirements under the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(7), “[a]
knowing violation of Rule 6 . . . may be punished as a contempt of court.” Moreover, if the drone is flown outside the FAA regulated navigable
airspace and views activity not within the public’s vantage point, penalties should also be in place to punish those individuals in violation of
strict flight guidelines provided in the court order. Punishing individual agents with contempt of court holds both law enforcement and judges
accountable and likely will serve as a more effective means to prevent government abuse than requiring warrants prior to drone flights.
Comprehensive reform needed

Jane Harman, CEO and President of the Woodrow Wilson Center, May 4, 2015, “The Undercooked
Debate on Domestic Drones,” accessed May 20, 2015, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-
undercooked-debate-domestic-drones
We need a serious policy response that engages Congress; federal, state, and local government – and
the private sector. This issue is too big for the FAA, too urgent to postpone, and too important to leave
off the national agenda. Lately, Congress has devoted impressive attention to new risks in cyberspace. It should put at least as much
effort into understanding drones. One option is to encourage commercial firms—through either voluntary or mandatory standards—to
hardwire restrictions into the drones they build and sell. Some
companies already program their drones to stay out of
restricted airspace and away from sensitive sites. Those efforts need a push and a signal boost from
government.
The US should create usage restrictions, create image retention restrictions, give
public notice in areas of drone use, and audit agencies using drones regularly to
ensure compliance
Jay Stanley and Catherine Crump, ACLU analysts producing Recommendations for Government Use
of Drone Aircraft, December 2011, “Protecting Privacy¶ From Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for
Government Use of Drone Aircraft,” accessed May 22, 2015,
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf
The ACLU recommends at a minimum the following core measures be enacted to ensure that this¶ happens:¶
•Usage restrictions. UAVs should be subject to strict regulation to ensure that their use ¶ does not
eviscerate the privacy that Americans have traditionally enjoyed and rightly expect.¶ Innocent Americans should not
have to worry that their activities will be scrutinized by¶ drones. To this end, the use of drones should be prohibited for
indiscriminate mass surveillance,¶ for example, or for spying based on First Amendment-protected activities.
In general,¶ drones should not be deployed except:¶ where there are specific and articulable grounds to believe that the drone will collect
evidence¶ relating to a specific instance of criminal wrongdoing or, if the drone will intrude¶ upon reasonable expectations of privacy, where
the government has obtained a warrant¶ based on probable cause; or¶ where there is a geographically confined, time-limited emergency
situation in which¶ particular individuals’ lives are at risk, such as a fire, hostage crisis, or person lost in the¶ wilderness; or¶ for reasonable non-
law enforcement purposes by non-law enforcement agencies, where¶ privacy will not be substantially affected, such as geological inspections
or environmental¶ surveys, and where the surveillance will not be used for secondary law enforcement ¶ purposes.¶ •Image
retention
restrictions. Images of identifiable individuals captured by aerial surveillance¶ technologies should not be
retained or shared unless there is reasonable suspicion¶ that the images contain evidence of criminal
activity or are relevant to an ongoing investigation¶ or pending criminal trial.¶ •Public notice. The policies and procedures
for the use of aerial surveillance technologies¶ should be explicit and written, and should made public.
While it is legitimate for the police to¶ keep the details of particular investigations confidential, policy decisions regarding overall ¶ deployment
policies—including the privacy tradeoffs they may entail—are a public matter ¶ that should be openly discussed.¶ •Democratic
control.
Deployment and policy decisions surrounding UAVs should be democratically ¶ decided based on open
information—not made on the fly by police departments¶ simply by virtue of federal grants or other autonomous purchasing decisions or
departmental¶ policy fiats.¶ •Auditing and effectiveness tracking. Investments in UAVs should not be made
without¶ a clear, systematic examination of the costs and benefits involved. And if aerial surveillance¶ technology is
deployed, independent audits should be put in place to track the use of¶ UAVs by government, so that citizens and other watchdogs can tell
generally how and how¶ often they are being used, whether the original rationale for their deployment is holding up, ¶ whether they represent
a worthwhile public expenditure, and whether they are being used¶ for improper or expanded purposes.
Limiting drone solves surveillance intrusions on privacy

Walter Simpson, environmental, peace and justice analyst, May 10, 2014, “The end of privacy?
Government and private surveillance pose a growing threat to Americans,” accessed May 24, 2015,
http://www.buffalonews.com/opinion/viewpoints/the-end-of-privacy-government-and-private-
surveillance-pose-a-growing-threat-to-americans-20140510
Limit security cameras, license plate scanners and domestic drones. Laws are needed to limit and
control the deployment of these technologies, recognizing that it’s all too easy to justify their use to
enhance security while their cumulative impact is an unacceptable erosion of privacy. Potential
application of these devices should be subject to a rigorous determination of need and compliance with
serious privacy protection policies placing sensible limits on surveillance in public spaces.
Existing drone use lacks transparency and data-minimization plans

April Glaser and Jennifer Lynch, analysts for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, December 10, 2013,
“The FAA Creates Thin Privacy Guidelines For The Nation's First Domestic Drone "Test Sites",” accessed
May 18, 2015, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/faa-creates-thin-privacy-guidelines-nations-first-
domestic-drone-test-sites
A number of drone bills have been introduced in Congress over the last two years, but Markey's proposed legislation is demanding of both the
FAA and drone operators when it comes to protecting the constitutional rights of Americans. The
Drone Aircraft Privacy and
Transparency Act calls for the FAA to institute and enforce guidelines for all licensed domestic drone
flights—not just test sites—that include clear data minimization procedures, as well as transparency
rules that require drone test site operators to disclose their data collection practices and how drone
operators use, retain, and share all collected data.¶ Markey's bill requires the FAA to create a publicly
searchable database of all awarded drone operator licenses, the logistical details of their operation, and
each drone operator's data collection and minimization statement. Creating a database like this is within
the FAA’s purview. The agency already runs other databases about aircrafts in national airspace , listing
who is in the air, accident reports, and safety information.¶ Law enforcement agencies across the
country are already flying drones without set national privacy guidelines in place . But at this point our most
successful tactic for learning more about drones has been to sue for access to information. The American public shouldn't have to submit a
FOIA request just to know if drones are overhead. Markey’s bill is a strong start to what needs to be an ongoing conversation about the future
of American privacy standards in light of the coming age of domestic drones. We
need more lawmakers to speak up for
greater transparency and accountability of both government and commercial operation of drones in our
national airspace.
Accidents Advantage
Harms
Proliferating drone use poses significant risk of accidents and crashes – control signals
can be jammed or hacked
Regulations mandating safe minimum operating altitudes have not been set forth specifically for drones,
and it is unclear whether some smaller drones may fall under the 1981 advisory circular for model
aircraft. By contrast, the United Kingdom permits private use of RPAS [remotely piloted aircraft] under [twenty kilograms] to be flown within
line of sight to avoid collisions and the operator must maintain constant visual contact with the aircraft. Flights less than 100 feet
above the ground are nearly free of regulation and those between 100 and 400 feet are somewhat free
for non-commercial uses, although all must comply with the basic rules of air. Traditional flight regulations apply to all aircraft over
[twenty kilograms].¶ With an increase in drone usage, the biggest safety concern is the probability of mid-air
collisions. Another concern is drone malfunctions and subsequent crashes due to third parties
interfering with signals sent to the drone, causing the operator to lose control of the aircraft. Drones
require satellites (and satellite links) to relay information to and from the pilots who operate the drones via
remote control; a drone need only be in line of sight with its ground control station when it lands, the rest is done via satellite link. A
third party could jam communications or target the drone’s GPS link and manipulate its flight position. In
December 2011, Iran alleged that it was able to hack into a U.S. government drone’s GPS navigational
controls as it was flying back to its base in Afghanistan and had it safely land in Iran where Iranian engineers were then able
to design their own drones based off the U.S. model.¶ A number of domestic drone accidents have already been
reported. Drones experience an accident rate over seven times higher than general aviation and 353
times higher than in commercial aviation.
Drones crash frequently, more drones pose a significant risk to flight safety, especially
over populated areas
Craig Whitlock, reporter for the Washington Post, June 20, 2014, “When drones fall from the sky,”
accessed May 22, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/06/20/when-drones-
fall-from-the-sky/
More than 400 large U.S. military drones have crashed in major accidents around the world since 2001, a record
of calamity that exposes the potential dangers of throwing open American skies to drone traffic, according to a year-long Washington Post
investigation.¶ Since the outbreak of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, military drones have malfunctioned in
myriad ways, plummeting from the sky because of mechanical breakdowns, human error, bad weather
and other reasons, according to more than 50,000 pages of accident investigation reports and other records
obtained by The Post under the Freedom of Information Act.¶ Commercial drone flights are set to become a widespread
reality in the United States, starting next year, under a 2012 law passed by Congress. Drone flights by law enforcement
agencies and the military, which already occur on a limited basis, are projected to surge. ¶ The documents
obtained by The Post detail scores of previously unreported crashes involving remotely controlled aircraft,
challenging the federal government’s assurances that drones will be able to fly safely over populated
areas and in the same airspace as passenger planes.¶ Military drones have slammed into homes, farms,
runways, highways, waterways and, in one case, an Air Force C-130 Hercules transport plane in midair. No
one has died in a drone accident, but the documents show that many catastrophes have been narrowly averted, often by a
few feet, or a few seconds, or pure luck.
Crash rates of drones are way higher than normal aircraft and are also much easier to
hack
Drones are notoriously difficult to pilot with accident rates estimated to be several times higher than
piloted aircraft (Haddal and Gertler 2010: 4). In 2009, the American Air Force reported that one third of
their Predator drones deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan had crashed (Drew 2009). In the United States,
there have been at least two incidents in which military drones have crashed during test missions
(Benjamin 2013: 23). A large Predator drone being used for border surveillance crashed in Arizona in
2006 and all drone flights in Texas were grounded for a 6 day period in 2010 after a drone lost contact
with the ground control system (Haddal and Gertler 2010: 2). The high rate of drone accidents raises
obvious questions about the potential risks associated with police use of drones. This was further
illustrated in 2012 when a Texas paramilitary police unit staged a photo opportunity for the local media
to photograph a drone in action. Within minutes of launching the US $300,000 Shadowhawk helicopter
there was a communication failure and the drone crashed into a police vehicle (Hill 2012). Concerns over
the reliability and security of the communications signal between drones and the ground system are not
limited to their accident rates and extends to the possibility that the signal can be hacked (BBC News
2013).
Drones crash into larger airplanes, and can get sucked into the engine, causing crashes
Rishi Iyengar, analyst for Time, November 26, 2014, “Drones Are Beginning to Pose a Real Threat to
Flight Safety Says FAA Data,” accessed May 24, 2015, http://time.com/3608494/faa-near-collisions-
planes-drones/
The small, remote-controlled drones that have recently grown in popularity are beginning to pose a
significant threat to flight safety in the United States, according to new data from the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).¶ The data, released Wednesday at the request of the Washington Post and various
other news outlets, reveals 25 near-collisions with airborne drones reported by commercial and private
pilots since June 1. Many of these incidents reportedly occurred near New York and Washington, and
several of them took place at major U.S. airports.¶ Drones, often mounted with cameras for aerial
photography (although Amazon wants to use them to deliver goods as well), are becoming an everyday
object. However, people who operate them often exceed the altitude limits set by the FAA, bringing
them dangerously close to aircraft and helicopter flight paths.¶ “All it’s going to take is for one to come
through a windshield to hurt some people or kill someone,” Kyle Fortune, a private pilot, told the Post.
Fortune said he suddenly spotted a drone 100 feet underneath his aircraft during a Sept. 22 flight. ¶ Other
pilots said that drones getting sucked into engines, rotors or propellers could cause potentially fatal
accidents.
Border patrol drone is especially sloppy – frequent accidents and poor oversight
Craig Whitlock, national security analyst for the Washington Post, June 23, 2014, “Drones pose serious threat
to commercial air traffic! Close encounters with passenger aircraft increasing and FAA unable to handle problem,” accessed May 24, 2015,
http://www.sott.net/article/280863-Drones-pose-serious-threat-to-commercial-air-traffic-Close-encounters-with-passenger-aircraft-increasing-
and-FAA-unable-to-handle-problem
Civilian agencies have reported 236 unsafe or abnormal incidents to the FAA since 2009, the records
show. The vast majority of incidents involved drones flown by Customs and Border Protection, which has
accounted for more than three-quarters of all flight hours by FAA-certified drones . ¶ After the loss of the aircraft
that crashed in January, Customs and Border Protection now operates a fleet of nine unarmed Predator B's from bases in Arizona, Texas, Florida
and North Dakota. The
agency's drone surveillance program began in 2005 but got off to a ragged start. One
drone crashed 100 yards from a house in Nogales, Ariz., in April 2006, prompting the National Transportation
Safety Board to chide the agency for "providing a minimal amount of operational oversight ." ¶ NTSB
records show that three Predator B's belonging to Customs and Border Protection have been involved in
previously unpublicized hard landings that damaged the aircraft. A spokesman for the border agency declined to
comment.
Drones are easy to hack – malware programs and hacker communities have been
developed specifically for drones
Christian de Looper, analyst for the Tech Times, February 4, 2015, “Drones Now Big Hacking Target,
First Drone Malware Identified,” accessed May 24, 2015,
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/30634/20150204/drone-hacking-next-big-security-concern.htm
Hacking aimed at connected devices, those falling under the auspices of the Internet of Things, is getting more prevalent
and a first big piece of evidence is the discovery of malware, Maldrone, built specifically to infiltrate
drones.¶ While drones are becoming more commonplace and being tapped for more uses, such as data
collection, they're quickly becoming a bigger target for hackers who either want to seize the drone for
nefarious purposes or the data being collected.¶ "Drones by nature are remotely operated, just like bank accounts, websites,
smart home automation systems and so forth. Today it is the drones - in the future of cyber warfare, it will be UAV (Unmanned Armed
Vehicles)," says Derek Manky, a global security strategist for Fortinet, told Tech Times. ¶ "Military forces around the world are using UAVs to
assist in missions as well as engage in warfare. Why risk human bodies if a machine can be sacrificed instead? Unfortunately,
this is
opening the door to a lot of scary scenarios moving forward as we further blend the physical world with
the virtual," he adds.¶ As drones are essentially as smart as a smartphone, they are very easy to hack,
explains Manky. In fact, drone hacking appears to be a cooperative and organized effort at this point, notes
another expert.¶ "There has been a thriving community of drone hackers already and several open source
projects available such as Skyjack which uses your drone to take over the drones around it created by the
infamous Samy from the Samy Myspace worm fame," Greg Martin, CTO of ThreatStream, tells Tech Times.
Famous myspace hacker has developed and shared drone hacking software – makes
them easy to take control of and steal information from
Jordan Crook, staff writer, December 4, 2013, “Infamous Hacker Creates SkyJack To Hunt, Hack, And Control Other Drones,” accessed
May 24, 2015, http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/04/infamous-hacker-creates-skyjack-to-hunt-hack-and-control-other-drones/
The gray sky darkens as the sun dips below the horizon. The hum of a thousand drones replace the quiet of sunset, charging through the city
behind a single leader drone. Children tug on the hands of their parents, pointing at the aerial army with concern. ¶ “How did this happen?” one
man asks another.¶ “Amazon,” answers the second man. “And Samy Kamkar.”¶ That name might not mean much to you unless you’re a hacker,
but Kamkar is the serial hacker responsible for the Myspace-crumbling Samy worm, which hit the social
networking site in 2005 and later landed Kamkar in jail.¶ Now, he has released all the necessary hardware and software
specs to create a drone-hacking drone. In other words, anyone can now create an aerial drone that will
be able to hunt down other drones, hack into them, and control them.¶ Kamkar is calling the hack
“SkyJack” and it requires a Raspberry Pi circuit board, as well as a Parrot AR.Drone quadcopter . You’ll also
need a small battery and two wireless transmitters. There will also reportedly be a version of SkyJack that runs on grounded Linux machines to
hack drones within radio range.
Civilian surveillance drones lack the same communication encryptions that military
drones use, meaning they are much easier to hack, jam, or crash
Craig Whitlock, national security analyst for the Washington Post, June 23, 2014, “Drones pose
serious threat to commercial air traffic! Close encounters with passenger aircraft increasing and FAA
unable to handle problem,” accessed May 24, 2015, http://www.sott.net/article/280863-Drones-pose-
serious-threat-to-commercial-air-traffic-Close-encounters-with-passenger-aircraft-increasing-and-FAA-
unable-to-handle-problem
Civilian drones are vulnerable to another safety threat: hacking. ¶ Drones rely on GPS signals to navigate
and are controlled by pilots or operators on the ground via a two-way radio transmission link. ¶ The military
protects the communications and navigation links it uses to control drones with highly advanced encryption
technology. Civilian drones, however, generally rely on unencrypted satellite links and radio
transmissions that can be hacked, jammed or spoofed. ¶ In June 2012, a University of Texas at Austin aerospace
engineering professor and a team of students gathered at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico to perform a
demonstration. Before the eyes of officials from the Department of Homeland Security, the team of academics
used a hand-built device to stealthily seize control of, or spoof, an $80,000 Hornet rotorcraft drone flying about
a kilometer in the distance. ¶ The team transmitted false signals that fooled the drone into thinking it was flying
high when it fact it was plummeting toward the ground. The spoofers from Texas changed course at the last minute and averted a crash. ¶ Todd
E. Humphreys, the professor who led the team, said spoofing a drone is not simple. It took him and his students about three years to perfect
their technique. But he said rapid technology improvements are making the task progressively easier. ¶ In an interview, Humphreys said
it would not be cheap or easy to build defenses against hackers. If the FAA permits widespread commercial
drone traffic before effective solutions are in place, he predicted, "the hackers will come out of the woodwork." ¶ The
most pressing concern, he said, are the large Predator B drones that federal Border Patrol agents fly along
the long borders with Canada and Mexico. Humphreys said he is skeptical that Homeland Security officials have
secured the navigation links well enough to thwart hackers. ¶ "They've never offered any evidence of that, and I don't know how that
can be true," he said. "It's a huge vulnerability."
Impacts
Losing airplanes to crashes shatters consumer confidence and chills community
interest in flying
Jo Piazza, Managing editor for Yahoo News, July 24, 2014, “The Airline Industry's Hellish Summer,”
accessed May 24, 2015, https://www.yahoo.com/travel/the-airline-industrys-summer-of-hell-
92090844047.html
On a normal day, consumer sentiment surrounding airlines is emotional and irrational, but plane crashes
naturally trigger a fear response that leads to negative attitudes.¶ “People will absolutely think twice
about getting on a flight right now,” said Jeff Wise, the author of “Extreme Fear: The Science of Your Mind in Danger.” “It
feels like a completely rational thing to not want to get on their planes at this point.” ¶ In March, Malaysia Airlines Flight 370,
carrying 239 people, disappeared. On July 17, Flight MH17, a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 with 295 people
aboard, crashed near the Russian border with Ukraine.¶ On July 23, a twin-engine turboprop plane crashed in Taiwan’s Penghu Islands,
and on July 24, an Air Algerie flight crashed while traveling from Burkina Faso, Africa, to Algiers, Algeria, with 110 passengers onboard. ¶
Malaysia Airlines flies approximately 37,000 passengers on 250 flights per day to 80 destinations and has won numerous awards for safety and
general excellence. A review by airlineratings.com earlier this year gave the airline a safety rating of five stars out of seven. ¶ But, consumer
perception has nothing to do with the airline’s actual safety record or whether or not the airline is
officially to blame for the incidents.¶ “People are going to avoid Malaysia Airlines, rightly or wrongly,” says
Alastair Rosenschein, an aviation consultant and former Boeing 747 pilot for British Airways. “ They have lost two 777s in fairly
quick succession. That is an appalling record for an airline. Who hasn’t heard of Malaysia Airlines now?”
Airline industry key to econ – allows movement of passengers and goods over borders
and long distances
Teresa Cederholm, analyst for Market Realist, December 29, 2014, “Economic impact of the travel
and tourism industry,” accessed May 24, 2015, http://marketrealist.com/2014/12/impact-travel-
tourism-industry-economy/
Air transport contributes to economic development by enabling the movement of passengers and goods
across borders, irrespective of the distance. According to the IATA (International Air Transport Association), global
air travel has expanded tenfold and air cargo fourteenfold compared to only a threefold to fourfold rise
in world GDP. Share of air transport in the US GDP has also increased over the years, as shown in the
chart below.¶ Airline business models¶ The business structure of airlines, including network, fleet, and cost structure, differ for legacy
carriers and low-cost carriers (or LCCs). Legacy carriers operate a hub and spoke network structure with several aircraft types. Low-cost carriers
operate on the point-to-point model. After
the US airline deregulation in 1978 and the emergence of LCCs,
competition intensified as air fares were reduced, making air travel more affordable. Southwest Airlines Co.
(LUV) was instrumental in revolutionizing the US industry with a differentiated business model. The point-to-point model adopted by Southwest
Airlines, JetBlue Airways Corporation (JBLU), and other LCCs focuses on short-distance, regional, nonstop routes between origin and destination
rather than having connecting flights at hubs, as in the hub and spoke model adopted by legacy carriers such as Delta Air Lines, Inc. (DAL),
American Airlines (AAL), and United Continental Holdings Inc. (UAL). Transportation ETFS such as iShares Transportation Average ETF (IYT) and
SPDR S&P Transportation ETF (XTN) hold 35% to 40% in airline companies.
Airline industry key to the economy

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), June 2014, “The Economic Impact¶ of Civil Aviation on the¶ U.S.
Economy,” accessed May 24, 2015, https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/media/2014-economic-
impact-report.pdf
Results¶ Table
1 summarizes the total impact of U.S. civil¶ aviation on output, earnings, and jobs. In 2012,
economic¶ activity attributed to civil aviation-related goods and¶ services totaled $1.5 trillion, generating
11.8 million jobs¶ with $459.4 billion in earnings. Aviation contributed 5.4¶ percent to GDP, the value-
added measure of overall U.S.¶ economic activity.¶ Civil aviation’s recovery from the last recession¶
accelerated in 2011 with an increase in its contribution to¶ GDP from 5.2 to 5.3 percent by the end of 2011,
followed¶ by 5.4 percent in 2012 (Table 1).
...
Excluding R&D, U.S.

GDP was $15,826.8 billion in¶ 2012. GDP represents the sum of all value-added¶
activities in an economy, so intermediate goods and¶ services used in the production of goods and
services¶ are not included. In the previous section, total output¶ calculation included intermediate goods and services¶ that were
purchased as part of the production process.¶ In order to compare aviation’s contribution to¶ GDP, these intermediate goods and services must
be¶ subtracted from the total output.¶ Each sector within the civil aviation industry has a¶ different impact on the economy. To estimate
civil¶ aviation’s overall contribution to GDP, each impact¶ type is calculated separately using the RIMS II
valueadded¶ coefficients and aggregated. The result is shown in Table 5. In 2012, aviation related¶ value-added economic
activities totaled $847.1¶ billion, or 5.4 percent of U.S. GDP.¶ In 2012, commercial aviation contributed $807.1¶ billion or
5.1 percent to GDP. Within commercial¶ aviation, the largest component is commercial visitor¶ expenditures
totaling $403.7 billion, or approximately¶ 2.6 percent of GDP (Table 5) followed by airline¶ operations at $189.7 billion or 1.2 percent of GDP.¶
General aviation, while quite small in comparison to¶ commercial aviation, still contributed 0.3 percent to ¶ GDP, or nearly $39.9 billion.
Militarization Advantage
Harms
Domestic drone use is the actualization of domestic police militarization, shifting the
country from democracy to military oligarchy
Naomi Wolf, analyst for The Guardian, December 21, 2012, “The coming drone attack on America,”
accessed May 23, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/21/coming-drone-
attack-america
An unclassified US air force document reported by CBS (pdf) news expands on this unprecedented and
unconstitutional step – one that formally brings the military into the role of controlling domestic
populations on US soil, which is the bright line that separates a democracy from a military oligarchy. (The
US constitution allows for the deployment of National Guard units by governors, who are answerable to the people; but this system is intended,
as is posse comitatus, to prevent the military from taking action aimed at US citizens domestically.) ¶ The air force document
explains
that the air force will be overseeing the deployment of its own military surveillance drones within the
borders of the US; that it may keep video and other data it collects with these drones for 90 days without
a warrant – and will then, retroactively, determine if the material can be retained – which does away for good with the
fourth amendment in these cases. While the drones are not supposed to specifically "conduct non-consensual surveillance on on
specifically identified US persons", according to the document, the wording allows for domestic military surveillance of
non-"specifically identified" people (that is, a group of activists or protesters) and it comes with the important caveat, also
seemingly wholly unconstitutional, that it may not target individuals "unless expressly approved by the secretary of Defense". ¶ In other words,
the Pentagon can now send a domestic drone to hover outside your apartment window, collecting
footage of you and your family, if the secretary of Defense approves it. Or it may track you and your
friends and pick up audio of your conversations, on your way, say, to protest or vote or talk to your
representative, if you are not "specifically identified", a determination that is so vague as to be meaningless.
Law enforcement agencies are aggressively trying to procure and utilize drones
Michael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,”
accessed May 20, 2015, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10612-013-9213-4/fulltext.html
One of the most recent developments in the militarization of policing has been the attempts of law
enforcement agencies to secure public funds to purchase drones. Despite the international controversy over the use of
drones overseas, domestic law enforcement agencies have been pursuing the case for the use of drone
technology in policing (McBride 2009). Their interest has been whetted by weapons manufacturers,
aerospace companies and industry groups keen to open up new domestic markets in the wake of the
Western withdrawal from the Middle East (Greenwald 2011, 2013; Singer 2009). These groups are directly
marketing drones to police agencies and lobbying governments alongside expansive claims about the
inexpensiveness, safety and usefulness of drones for law enforcement (Greenwald 2013).¶ In the United States, the
Federal Aviation Authority was ordered by Congress in 2012 to integrate drones into national airspace by 2015
however there remains considerable uncertainty over the privacy, social and legal implications of drones
(Levin 2012). In response, the American Civil Liberties Union has reported an ‘unprecedented surge of activity’ by state legislatures seeking to
restrict or ban drone use, with legislation ‘proposed in 42 states, enacted in 6 states, and still active in 28 states’ (see Bohm 2013). Other
jurisdictions have developed more comprehensive drone regulation frameworks, such as in Europe and
the United Kingdom, where licenses and permits are required for all drones, with heavier drones and surveillance drones attracting
closer scrutiny (Hopkins 2013). In some countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, there are no restrictions on the use of drones for civilian,
commercial or state purposes.¶ Despite the ethical and legal ambiguities, select American police agencies have been
able to use drones for law enforcement since 2005 and some British police forces have been using drone technology since
2008.
Drone representations have been narrowly constructed as a single category – blurring

the retributive violence of military drones with the benevolent assistance of domestic
drone use – causing the militarization of the civilian domain
Sam Mutter, March 17, 2015, freelance researcher and journalist with an MSc in Politics and
International Relations, “The doublespeak of drones,” accessed May 20, 2015,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/sam-mutter/doublespeak-of-drones
The media’s conflation of military and civilian unmanned aerial vehicles is deeply problematic . Such
blurred boundaries pave the way for a wholesale militarisation of the civilian domain. The unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) is a technology that begs an unusually large number of categorical ambiguities. The origin of its common name, ‘drone’, is
seemingly self-evident: it is logical to make a connection between the musical drone and the low hum of a jet engine. This is not, however, the
true etymology. Instead, thename ‘drone’ derives from that of the male honey bee, a bee that, according to the Oxford
English Dictionary, “does no work but can fertilise the queen”, and which shares the black abdominal stripes
used to distinguish the first UAVs. And yet, the bee also buzzes, its wings whirr. Regardless of the intended meaning, the UAV
both is and does drone.¶ More than a conventional fighter jet, the experience of the drone – for those who, as a result of
military campaigns waged predominantly by the US (in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia) and Israel (in Gaza), spend much of their
lives with UAVs loitering in the skies above – is
one characterised by the low, continuous thrum laden with the
imminent potential for destruction and death.¶ If the lesson of this first phenomenon is to accept that it is the very nature of
language to collide, for its words to flow into one another, throwing forth unforeseen meanings, then it is the lesson of a second similar
blurring that at times such unintended consequences must be resisted in spite of their inevitability .¶ Here I
am talking of the softening of the boundary between two realms in which the UAV is used: what are usually termed the ‘military’ and the
‘civilian’ domains. Since 1995, when it flew the GNAT-750 surveillance drone over Bosnia, the CIA has used military drones as a tool of
surveillance; since 2002, when the first CIA drone strike was conducted by an MQ-1 Predator on a ‘tall man’ in Afghanistan – believed to be
Osama bin Laden, but in actual fact one of a group of innocent civilians collecting scrap metal – these drones have held lethal potential. The
problem is that such positive narratives concerning civilian use often begin from the familiar ground of the
military drone. Many of these articles carry the image of the MQ-1 Predator, which has become a sort of habitual mode
of advertising, playing on a combination of brand loyalty and shock tactics to capture the attention of the potential reader. Or else the
kind civilian drone is introduced by way of its troubled former self, constructing a redemptive narrative .¶
In the BBC piece on agricultural use for instance, an upbeat tone accompanies the notion that the drone
is moving ‘from battlefield to farm’. Yet the dangerous reality is that, by viewing the drone as a singular
technology, it is only our gaze that shifts from fields of destruction to those of production. The military
UAV itself remains and continues to kill unabated. As Steven Poole has it, the personality of the drone appears split between
two poles: “assassination or conservation”. The technology’s ambiguous media presence allows for the mutual
contamination of these poles, facilitating a normalization of ‘that which destroys life’ via the benign
discourse of ‘that which saves it’.¶ If we are not cautious of this contagion, the ramifications will be more than merely theoretical. If
the discourses are blurred, the physical uses themselves will not lag far behind in being conflated. Already, it is the nature of
contemporary ‘hybrid’ or ‘non-linear’ warfare for conflict to merge with the sphere of everyday
governance, functioning through a collage of previously distinct agencies. Armies are no longer self-
contained instruments, but are increasingly made up of, and used in coordination with, a milieu of
special forces, police, intelligence, humanitarian NGOs, diplomats, media, and, last but certainly not
least, civilian populations themselves.¶ Especially in the call and response of terrorism and
counterterrorism, a soldier’s battlefield might be their own streets, and a policeman’s beat a foreign
port; the soldier is trained to govern, while the policeman wields a gun; journalists render pens and
cameras into weapons on the front line, and, as we have recently been made aware, come to be
targeted like soldiers themselves.
The threat posed by drones is not limited possibility of weaponization – drones are
scarier than helicopters
There is always a large segment of the population that reflexively supports the use of greater
government and police power — it’s usually the same segment that has little objection to Endless War
— and it’s grounded in a mix of standard authoritarianism (I side with authority over those they accused
of being Bad and want authorities increasingly empowered to stop the Bad people) along with naiveté (I
don’t really worry that new weapons and powers will be abused by those in power, especially when —
like now — those in power are Good). This mindset manifests in the domestic drone context specifically
by dismissing their use as nothing more than the functional equivalent of police helicopters. This is a
view grounded in pure ignorance.¶ The unique dangers of domestic drones, which I documented last
week, exist completely independent of their weaponization potential, but weaponization nonetheless
must be considered. Police officials are already speaking openly about their desire to weaponize their
drones with “nonlethal weapons such as Tasers or a bean-bag gun.” Anyone who doubts that this is
going to happen should just consider what the drone manufacturing industry itself is saying. They
continuously emphasize to investors and others that a major source of business growth for their drone
products will be domestic, non-military use.
Overly powerful weapons are being developed for drone policing – 80,000 volt tasers
Doug Aamoth, writer for Time Magazine, March 10, 2014, “Recently in Controversy: Drone Can Tase People with 80,000 Volts,”
accessed May 22, 2015, http://time.com/19076/recently-in-controversy-drone-can-tase-people-with-80000-volts/
A tech firm is stunning the gadget world with a proof-of-concept demonstration at the South by Southwest Interactive
festival featuring a remote-controlled flying "Stun Copter" capable of delivering 80,000 volts of electricity
to a hapless target¶ This proof-of-concept demo that took place recently at South By Southwest seems to have resulted in some sharply
divided opinions. Chaotic Moon — the outfit recently behind the fancy Pizza Hut touchscreen table concept and the virtual-reality shark-
punching game — is back at it with C.U.P.I.D., which is short for Chaotic Unmanned Personal Intercept Drone. ¶ Chaotic
Moon shortens
the description further by referring to the apparatus simply as a “stun copter,” capable of shooting
“80,000 volts of pure projectile terror directly into the skin of an ill-intentioned hoodlum.” ¶ The young man
on the business end of the drone-mounted Phazzer Dragon is a 26-year-old intern at Chaotic Moon, reports ABC News. Unsurprisingly,
comments on Chaotic Moon’s Facebook page and YouTube video page run the gamut from cheers to jeers, with many of
the less-than-enthusiastic comments making the argument that shooting 80,000 volts into people might not be the
safest activity in the world.
Drones represent a new stage of Orwellian totalitarianism

Michael Salter, PhD, September 6, 2013, “Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing,”
accessed May 20, 2015, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10612-013-9213-4/fulltext.html
Police drones were first imagined by George Orwell (1949: 2) who, in his famous fictional account of a police-
controlled dystopia, described a miniature police helicopter that ‘skimmed down between the roofs,
hovered for an instant like a blue-bottle, and darted away again with a curving flight’ . Given the dual
association of the drone with war and totalitarianism, it is unsurprising that the integration of drone
technology into internal policing in the United States, Britain and elsewhere has been greeted by civil libertarians and
criminologists with considerable unease. Such transfers of military technology into policing are far from unprecedented2 but drones
represents a new stage in the militarisation of policing that has been the subject of critical commentary since the advent of
the Cold War.
Links
Justifications for expanding drone surveillance rely on fantastical threat construction
K.B. Sandvik, Candidata Juris from the University of Oslo, 2015, “The Political and Moral Economies of
Dual Technology Transfers: Arming Police Drones,” accessed May 21, 2015,
http://www.academia.edu/10010089/The_Political_and_Moral_Economies_of_Dual_Technology_Trans
fers_Arming_Police_Drones_forthcoming_
According to Torin Monahan and Jennifer Mokos, an important element of the securitization process is
the creation of compelling narratives to justify the surveillance systems under consideration; Mike Crang
and Stephen Graham (2007) refer to such narratives as “technological fantasies” that position emergent
technological systems as necessary — and effective — responses to dire threats. Such narratives are not,
however, simply instrumental devices designed to achieve desired ends; they also actively shape the
larger security cultures and afford them influence (Monahan and Mokos 2013). I would propose that the
potential for the future deployment of armed police drones – the potential of the technological fantasy-
may lie precisely in the lack of knowledge about the battlefield effectiveness of loitering munitions,
including Switchblade. At the same time, it has been noted that the drone industry’s narratives evoke a
level of havoc that is extremely rare in Western liberal democracies (terrorist atrocities, nuclear
meltdown, high-speed car chases), for which a technological solution — the R&D and procurement of
drones — is proposed, and thereby “used to justify both substantial public expenditure and the
acquisition and use of drones by domestic police forces” (Hayes and Toepfer 2014).
Drone use for policing fuses fantasy with weapon, creating an armament culture of
control and destruction
At present, no police drone is armed with lethal or non-lethal weaponry and any such development
would likely be extremely controversial. Nonetheless the fetishisation of an object does not require the
realisation of its full capacities. To the contrary, the fetishisation of the commodity can be signified by an
‘excess capacity’ that is never utilised (Dant 1996). Dant (1996) provides the example of cars
manufactured with a capacity for speed that would be illegal to deploy on the road. It is this excess of
capacity within the car that acts as a sign of prestige and value. In a similar fashion, drones may be
appealing to police at least in part because their ‘excess capacity’ for weaponisation operates as a
signifier of the individual power of the police officer and collective status of the police force. As such it
accords with the increasingly stylised displays of militarised force that have come to characterise
contemporary policing, marking the indeterminant boundaries between militarisation, gendered
fantasies of domination, and the masculine pleasures of ‘playing war’. This fusion of fantasy and weapon
is characteristic of the products of armament culture and generate considerable consumer interest
(Luckham 1984). Drones are now available on the adult ‘toy’ market, and the bemusing intersection of
weapon and toy in the drone became evident in 2012 when it emerged that an American police agency
had purchased a toy drone although it would be illegal for an officer to use it in the field (Koebler 2013).
Little wonder that the American Civil Liberties Union has suggested the police interest in drones as case
of ‘boys with their toys gone wild’ (cited in Gruber 2011).
Militarization of domestic policing conceptually redefines the purpose of policing –

creating a domestic military intended to win a perpetual domestic “war” against
insurgency
The criminological literature has paid significant attention to the tradition of military technology shifting
to domestic law enforcement and creating a paramilitary police culture (Balko 2013; Holmqvist 2014; Li
2014) According to Abigail Hall and Christopher Coyne (2013b), the political economy underlying the
militarization of domestic policing is premised on “crises” that prompt the government to take
immediate action, but that ultimately become perpetual wars — the War on Drugs and the War on
Terror being the primary examples. Hall and Coyne argue that as the police engage in military-style
training, acquire military weapons, and employ military tactics in everyday operations, the protective
state devolves into a predatory state that undermines the rights of the populace. Because of the entirely
distinct forms of violence in which the police and the military are supposed to engage — domestic police
are trained to use violence only as a last resort, whereas military forces are trained to achieve victory
through combat — the militarization of domestic policing is highly problematic (Hall and Coyne 2013a).
One corollary result is a shift in the conceptualization of the events and behaviours with which law
enforcement is expected to deal: for example, criminality is redefined as insurgency, and crime control
as low-intensity conflict; in a militarized law enforcement environment, both require counterinsurgency
tactics and equipment (Kraska 2007).
NDAA creates the framework for the military to legally transfer equipment to
domestic agencies – transfers also aren’t public record – aff reverses this policy
attrocity
Taylor Wofford, Newsweek analyst, August 13, 2014, “How America’s Police Became an Army: The
1033 Program,” accessed May 23, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/how-americas-police-became-
army-1033-program-264537?piano_t=1
America has been quietly arming its police for battle since the early 1990s.¶ Faced with a bloated military
and what it perceived as a worsening drug crisis, the 101st Congress in 1990 enacted the National
Defense Authorization Act. Section 1208 of the NDAA allowed the Secretary of Defense to “transfer to
Federal and State agencies personal property of the Department of Defense, including small arms and
ammunition, that the Secretary determines is— (A) suitable for use by such agencies in counter-drug
activities; and (B) excess to the needs of the Department of Defense.” It was called the 1208 Program. In
1996, Congress replaced Section 1208 with Section 1033. The idea was that if the U.S. wanted its police
to act like drug warriors, it should equip them like warriors, which it has—to the tune of around $4.3
billion in equipment, according to a report by the American Civil Liberties Union. The St. Louis County
Police Department’s annual budget is around $160 million. By providing law enforcement agencies with
surplus military equipment free of charge, the NDAA encourages police to employ military weapons and
military tactics.¶ 1033 procurements are not matters of public record. And the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA), which coordinates distribution of military surplus, refuses to reveal the names of agencies
requesting “tactical” items, like assault rifles and MRAPs — for security reasons, a spokesperson for DLA
told Newsweek via email. One can only trace “tactical” items as far the county of the requesting agency.
In the case of Ferguson, that means St. Louis County.
Impacts
Weaponized domestic drone use is inevitable – relegates the population to status of
criminality to be controlled and exterminated
Arendt (2004) observed the inexorable repatriation of colonial strategies of control and domination into
the governmental strategies of imperial powers. In a similar fashion, Moyn (2013) suggests that the
drone is an important medium through which the ideology of technologically enhanced counter-
terrorism, elaborated by Western powers in the ‘war on terror’ overseas, is being transposed from
national to internal security. If the distinction between criminal and enemy combatant is increasingly
one of perception (Kahn 2013) and drones typify the ‘logistics of military perception’ (Virilio 1984) then
the incorporation of drones into policing necessarily has militarising impacts on the subject position of
police officers vis a vis ‘the criminal’ and the ethos and culture of crime control. Technology, Corbet and
Marx remind us (1991), is not politically neutral.¶ The military origins of the drone have been
downplayed by police agencies who have instead described them as an extension of existing police
aerial resources (Greenwald 2013). However this is a disingenuous trivialisation of the unavoidable
association of the drone with the missile strikes that have terrorised civilian populations in the Middle
East. Indeed, the potential for weaponisation has been a feature of police and political discourse on the
domestic application of drones. In the United States, some police agencies and weapons manufacturers
are openly speculating that law enforcement drones may be fitted with non-lethal weapons such as
tasers, ‘bean bag’ guns, tear gas canisters and rubber bullets in the future (Stanton 2011; Benjamin
2013, p 79) while the Senator for Kentucky, Rand Paul, recently suggested that it would be legitimate for
a police drone to be used to kill an armed robber (Johnson 2013). Infamously, American military drones
have been used to target and kill American citizens overseas (Cole 2013c). Meanwhile the drone
industry has developed weaponized drones for domestic application and is marketing these ‘assassin
bugs’ to police agencies and governments (Greenwald 2013).
Impact – drone use by police relies on threat construction but targets already
disadvantaged groups and communities
This invocation
of dramatic (although usually rare) scenarios is typical of the manner in which police interest in
drones has been legitimized. Frequently named situations include terrorist attacks, hostage situations, the pursuit of armed
offenders, riots and protests. This is at times supplemented by references to the supposed utility of drones for more mundane policing
activities. In the United States, Missouri
Police Chief Captain Sam Dotson recently applied to the Federal Aviation
Authority for a license to fly a drone, telling the media it would be used for ‘monitoring public spaces’
such as fairs and baseball games as well as ‘for terrorists, suspicious activity’ (Rush 2013). An article
published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin in 2008 imagined a future scenario in which a drone
would be launched to scan city blocks for ‘any known felons, prostitutes or drug dealers’ that might be
‘loitering’ in the area (Reed Jr. 2008: 16). This suggests that, like other examples of police militarisation, drones are likely to
differentially impact on disadvantaged groups and communities (Meeks 2005), situating drones firmly
within the politics of surveillance and risk minimisation (Lyon and Bauman 2013).
Surveillance creates a chilling effect on people’s behavior, and risks discriminatory

targeting and institutional abuse
Jay Stanley and Catherine Crump, ACLU analysts producing Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft, December
2011, “Protecting Privacy¶ From Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft,” accessed May 22, 2015,
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf
In addition, drones raise many of the same issues that pervasive video surveillance brings in any ¶ context. For
example:¶ •Chilling effects. What would be the effect on our public spaces, and our society as a whole,¶ if everyone felt the keen eye of
the government on their backs whenever they ventured outdoors? ¶ Psychologists have repeatedly found that people who
are being observed tend to¶ behave differently, and make different decisions, than when they are not
being watched.¶ This effect is so great that a recent study found that “merely hanging up posters of staring¶ human
eyes is enough to significantly change people’s behavior.”¶ • Voyeurism. Video surveillance is susceptible
to individual abuse, including voyeurism. In¶ 2004, a couple making love on a dark nighttime rooftop
balcony, where they had every reason¶ to expect they enjoyed privacy, were filmed for nearly four
minutes by a New York police helicopter¶ using night vision. This is the kind of abuse that could become
commonplace if drone¶ technology enters widespread use. (Rather than apologize, NYPD officials flatly denied that¶ this
filming constituted an abuse, telling a television reporter, “this is what police in helicopters ¶ are supposed to do, check out people to make sure
no one is … doing anything illegal”).¶ •Discriminatory targeting. The individuals operating surveillance systems
bring to the job all¶ their existing prejudices and biases. In Great Britain, camera operators have been
found to¶ focus disproportionately on people of color. According to a sociological study of how the systems¶ were operated,
“Black people were between one-and-a-half and two-and-a-half times ¶ more likely to be surveilled than
one would expect from their presence in the population.”¶ •Institutional abuse. In addition to abuse by
the inevitable “bad apples” within law enforcement,¶ there is also the danger of institutional abuse.
Sometimes, bad policies are set at the¶ top, and an entire law enforcement agency is turned toward abusive
ends. That is especially¶ prone to happen in periods of social turmoil and intense political conflict. During the labor,¶ civil rights,
and anti-Vietnam war movements of the 20th century, the FBI and other security ¶ agencies engaged in
systematic illegal behavior against those challenging the status quo.¶ And once again today we are seeing
an upsurge in spying against peaceful political protesters¶ across America.¶ •Automated enforcement. Drones
are part of a trend¶ toward automated law enforcement, in which cameras¶ and other technologies are used to mete out
justice¶ with little or no human intervention. This trend raises¶ a variety of concerns, such as the fact that computers¶ lack the
judgment to fairly evaluate the circumstances¶ surrounding a supposed violation, and may be
susceptible¶ to bugs and other software errors, or simply are¶ not programmed to fairly and properly
encapsulate¶ the state of the law as passed by legislatures.
Militarized police forces surpass their intended purpose and are dispatched to
nonviolent crimes – empirics prove, SWAT
Radley Balko, Huffington Post analyst, September 12, 2011, “A Decade After 9/11, Police Departments Are Increasingly Militarized,”
accessed May 23, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/12/police-militarization-9-11-september-11_n_955508.html
The post-September 11 era has also seen the role of SWAT teams and paramilitary police units expand to enforce
nonviolent crimes beyond even the drug war. SWAT teams have been used to break up neighborhood
poker games, sent into bars and fraternities suspected of allowing underage drinking, and even to
enforce alcohol and occupational licensing regulations. Earlier this year, the Department of Education sent its SWAT team
to the home of someone suspected of defrauding the federal student loan program. ¶ Kraska estimates the total number of
SWAT deployments per year in the U.S. may now top 60,000, or more than 160 per day . In 2008, the
Maryland legislature passed a law requiring every police department in the state to issue a bi-annual
report on how it uses its SWAT teams. The bill was passed in response to the mistaken and violent SWAT raid on the home of
Berwyn Heights, Maryland mayor Cheye Calvo, during which a SWAT team shot and killed his two black labs. The first reports showed
an average of 4.5 SWAT raids per day in that state alone.
The impending surveillance state serves military, law enforcement, and commercial
interests – functional equivalent of martial law
Naomi Wolf, analyst for The Guardian, December 21, 2012, “The coming drone attack on America,”
accessed May 23, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/21/coming-drone-
attack-america
This document accompanies a major federal push for drone deployment this year in the United States, accompanied by federal policies to
encourage law enforcement agencies to obtain and use them locally, as well as by federal support for their commercial deployment. That is to
say: now HSBC, Chase, Halliburton etc can have their very own fleets of domestic surveillance drones. The
FAA recently established a more efficient process for local police departments to get permits for their
own squadrons of drones.¶ Given the Department of Homeland Security militarization of police
departments, once the circle is completed with San Francisco or New York or Chicago local cops having
their own drone fleet – and with Chase, HSBC and other banks having hired local police, as I reported here last
week – the meshing of military, domestic law enforcement, and commercial interests is absolute. You
don't need a messy, distressing declaration of martial law.
Privacy Advantage
1AC Module
Drone surveillance creates an Orwellian society where people are constantly aware of
the visual and killing capabilities of airborne robots
I have in mind the effect on citizens of drones flying around United States cities. These machines are
disquieting. Virtually any robot can engender a certain amount of discomfort, let alone one associated in
the mind of the average American with spy operations or targeted killing. If you will pardon the
inevitable reference to 1984, George Orwell specifically describes small flying devices that roam
neighborhoods and peer into windows. Yet one need not travel to Orwell’s Oceania—or the offices of
our own Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency—to encounter one of these machines. You could
travel to one of several counties where American police officers are presently putting this technology
through its paces.
Drones represent a unique and novel threat to privacy

Ben Jenkins, J.D., 2014, “Watching the Watchmen: Drone Privacy and the Need for Oversight,”
accessed May 20, 2015, http://law-apache.uky.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/9-
Jenkins.pdf
Drone technology presents a unique threat to privacy by eliminating¶ practical safeguards against
Fourth Amendment searches. First, drones can be¶ substantially smaller than traditional aircrafts,
making them practically invisible¶ at altitudes where traditional aircraft could be spotted from the
ground. Second,¶ unlike traditional aircraft such as helicopters, many drones can operate almost¶
silently, allowing them to conduct surveillance virtually unnoticed. Third, as¶ one legal scholar notes:
“[w]ith the ability to hover or circle in the sky for hours,¶ [drones] present a potential intrusion far more
pervasive than the mere flyover¶ of a plane or helicopter.” As Justice Alito observed in Jones, constant
long–¶ term surveillance without technology (such as GPS tracking) requires many ¶ agents, multiple
vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance, practically rendering¶ such surveillance impossible. Drone
capabilities have even further opened¶ the doors to previously unknown levels of invasive government
monitoring by¶ rendering it relatively easy and cheap.¶ Similarly, drone surveillance allows a depth of
information collection¶ previously impossible. Like the Jones concurrences’ concern with GPS¶
monitoring, drones allow the collection of a vast amount of intimate personal¶ information—travel
patterns or shopping habits to name a few—but on a¶ much larger scale, and surveillance is not limited
merely to an individual but all¶ people beneath the drone’s all–seeing eye.
Drones revolutionize surveillance technology, we need new legislation like the plan to
protect privacy
Recent shifts in technology and attendant changes to business practices have not led to similar shifts in privacy law, at least not on the order of
1890. Computers, the Internet, RFID, GPS, biometrics, facial recognition—none of these developments has created the same sea change in
privacy thinking. One might reasonably wonder whether we will ever have another Warren and Brandeis moment, whether any
technology will dramatize the need to rethink the very nature of privacy law .¶ One good candidate is the
drone. In routine use by today’s military, these unmanned aircraft systems threaten to perfect the art of
surveillance. Drones are capable of finding or following a specific person. They can fly patterns in search of
suspicious activities or hover over a location in wait. Some are as small as birds or insects, others as big
as blimps. In addition to high-resolution cameras and microphones, drones can be equipped with thermal
imaging and the capacity to intercept wireless communications.¶ That drones will see widespread
domestic use seems inevitable. They represent an efficient and cost-effective alternative to helicopters
and airplanes. Police, firefighters, and geologists will—and do—use drones for surveillance and research.
But drones will not be limited to government or scientific uses. The private sector has incentives to use drones as well. The media, in particular,
could make widespread use of drones to cover unfolding police activity or traffic stories. Imagine what drones would do for the lucrative
paparazzi industry, especially coupled with commercially available facial recognition technology. ¶ You might think drones would already be
ubiquitous. There are, however, Federal Aviation Administration restrictions on the use of unmanned aircraft systems, restrictions that date
back several years. Some public agencies have petitioned for waiver. Customs
and Border Protection uses drones to police
our borders. Recently the state of Oklahoma asked the FAA for a blanket waiver of eighty miles of
airspace. Going forward, waiver may not be necessary. The FAA faces increasing pressure to relax its restrictions and
is considering rulemaking to reexamine drone use in domestic airspace.
Harms
Drone use for policing threatens privacy
The very capabilities that make microdrones effective — intrusiveness and silence — make possible new
forms of privacy invasion. As the ACLU has noted, in light of the crowd-innovation that is characteristic
of drone development, it is likely that “the technology will develop new and more advanced capabilities
that have never existed for police helicopters — such as swarms, or more continuous surveillance”
(Stanley 2013). The use of police helicopters has already raised privacy issues, as well as concerns about
the use of lethal police airpower; however, because manned helicopters are expensive to acquire, staff,
and maintain, cost has so far provided a natural limitation on their use. The ACLU have argued, however,
that drones “erase natural limits” on aerial surveillance (Stanley 2013). As the developer of CUPID has
noted, “This is something that’s affordable for almost everybody and in the next two or three years the
technology will probably cut in half, by price” (Mass 2014).
Impending ubiquitous drone use will be able to gather any and all details about a
person’s life
Jonathan Olivito, Ohio State J.D., 2013, “Beyond the Fourth Amendment: Limiting Drone¶ Surveillance
Through the Constitutional Right to¶ Informational Privacy,” accessed May 24, 2015,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/12/8-Olivito.pdf
As these examples illustrate, ubiquitous drone operation within the United¶ States is not far in the
future. The widespread use of maneuverable and stealthy¶ drones equipped with powerful sensory
tools leads to the unsettling conclusion¶ that domestic drones could gather an inordinate amount of
information about¶ people, both inadvertently and intentionally. The information that government¶
drone operators could obtain through long-term drone observation might range¶ from the trivial—what
gym a person frequents—to the intimate—a person’s¶ healthcare choices—but when considered as a
whole, extended observation can¶ reveal “the full picture of a person’s life .” Also, regardless of
whether UAS¶ operators actually record any information about people’s lives, the prospect of¶ constant
government monitoring and recording “chills associational and¶ expressive freedoms.” The imminent
mass arrival of drones in the United¶ States will almost certainly imperil privacy. But problematically,
the Fourth¶ Amendment, and other current privacy safeguards, fall short of providing¶ sufficient privacy
protection against UAS surveillance.
Impacts
Privacy – The aff turns their drone industry and econ impacts, privacy is key to
innovation and a thriving intellectual culture
Julie E. Cohen, Professor at Georgetown Law Center, 2013, “What Privacy is For,” accessed May 24,
2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2175406
So described, privacy is anything but old-fashioned, and trading it away creates ¶ two kinds of large systemic
risk, which Parts III and IV discuss. Privacy incursions can ¶ be episodic or systematic, but systematic deprivations of privacy also facilitate
episodic ¶ privacy incursions. In this Essay, therefore, I will focus on the interplay between privacy ¶ and systems of surveillance. I will argue that
freedom from surveillance, whether public or private, is foundational to the practice of informed and
reflective citizenship. Privacy therefore is an indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic
political systems. Freedom from surveillance also is foundational to the capacity for innovation, and so the ¶
perception of privacy as anti-innovation is a non sequitur. Innovation occurs in commercial and social contexts and is infused with particular
commercial and social values; in particular, a commercial culture that sees privacy as threatening particular practices of knowledge production
will register privacy regulation as a threat. But a society that values innovation ignores privacy at its peril, for privacy
also shelters the
processes of play and experimentation from which innovation emerges. In short, privacy ¶ incursions harm
individuals, but not only individuals. Privacy incursions in the name of progress, innovation, and ordered
liberty jeopardize the continuing vitality of the political and intellectual culture that we say we value.
Privacy is key to identity construction, freedom, and happiness

Walter Simpson, environmental, peace and justice analyst, May 10, 2014, “The end of privacy?
Government and private surveillance pose a growing threat to Americans,” accessed May 24, 2015,
http://www.buffalonews.com/opinion/viewpoints/the-end-of-privacy-government-and-private-
surveillance-pose-a-growing-threat-to-americans-20140510
Privacy is essential to our humanity. It permits us to create and maintain private lives from which spring
personal identity, self-determination, freedom and, ultimately, happiness.¶ In contrast, surveillance is a
direct assault on privacy. It attacks and eliminates privacy. Its chilling effect constrains and shrinks us
through self-censorship of thought and action. When taken to the extreme, like in George Orwell’s “1984,”
surveillance objectifies so thoroughly that it destroys our internal life.¶ Our nation’s founders recognized
the importance of privacy in the Bill of Rights. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” ¶ While this
language is pre-9/11, Internet and cellphone, it speaks of the kind of nation the founders envisioned. In
America, we have a
constitutionally guaranteed right to a private life safe from unreasonable search and seizure . But our privacy
is being eroded by leaps and bounds every day.
AT: Neg Offense
AT: Terrorism DA
Drones aren’t actually useful for crime prevention
It is becoming clear that police interest in purchasing drones far outweighs their practical utility . In the United States,
the Federal Aviation Administration has reported that 7 % of approximately 300 permits issued for drone
use by government agencies have gone to law enforcement (Balcerzak and Hiegel 2013). However it has
emerged that the majority of those police agencies that purchased drones have never deployed them due
to legal concerns and the ongoing costs (Balcerzak and Hiegel 2013). The theatrical scenarios envisioned by Minister O’Brien and
Captain Dodson above, in which police drones foil terrorist plots or navigate through fiery towers, have yet to
materialize, and are in stark contrast to the current reality of numerous drones gathering dust in police
storage rooms.¶ Police and government rhetoric about drones are characterised by unrealised and
unrealistic fantasies of total surveillance and swift intervention that are disrupted by an absence of supporting evidence
and a tangle of technological, legal and practical limitations. Benjamin (2013) lists a number of incidents in which the capabilities of drones have
been put to good use, such as when drones were used after the 2011 earthquake in Japan to monitor radiation levels in at the Fukishima
nuclear plant, or when crisis services have used drones to monitor floods or fires. However it
has yet to be established through
research or experience that drones have any substantive place in crime prevention, detection or
intervention.
Drones are more expensive and less effective than aircraft piloted by a human
Police and government claims about the utility and cost effectiveness of drones tend to blithely
reproduce the marketing material of manufacturers and industry groups, falling into the
‘technofallacies’ identified by Corbett and Marx (1991). In their analysis of criminal justice enthusiasm
for new technology, they emphasise a tendency to assume that new technology is more effective and
promising than established approaches or non-technological methods. In the case of the drone, such
assumptions are contested by independent analyses. While being considerably cheaper per unit than
piloted aircraft, drones may not be more cost effective since their operation costs are substantially
higher (Congressional Budget Office 2011; Haddal and Gertler 2010: 4; see also Boyle 2012). Law
enforcement is likely to be using smaller drones than the military with a much lower unit cost but this is
offset by the short flight time and limited endurance of small drones, their susceptibility to inclement
weather, and the ongoing costs of pilot licensing, training and operation (Haddal and Gertler 2010: 5). As
a result, ‘the life cycle cost of UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] could actually be greater than the life
cycle cost of manned aircraft’ (ibid.). The limited studies available have found that manned aircraft are
more effective than unmanned aircraft in civilian law enforcement applications (Haddal and Gertler
2010: 6) with the ‘unimpressive’ results of drones coming at a high financial cost (Benjamin 2013: 75).
Drones are more expensive than traditional equipment and pilots

Yet the possibility that the use of surveillance and armed drones will be more expensive than traditional
methods of “keeping order” is rarely communicated: for example, an audit by the Homeland Security Department's
inspector general criticized DHS for buying more Predator drones than the Border Patrol can use . Additionally,
the former president of the National Border Patrol Council, the border agents’ union, has complained that “The
big problem is that they [drones] are more expensive than traditional methods” of patrolling (Bennett
2012b). The same can be said of weaponised microdrones: even as the industry competes for more contracts, an analyst with the Teal Group
Corporation has suggested that LMAMS will be “purchased in limited quantities, especially given the withdrawal
from Afghanistan. The analyst notes that “It [LMAMS] is very expensive per mission compared to more
conventional fire support methods” (Schechter 2014). While it has been reported that the United States is attempting to lower the
cost of the War on Drugs by using drones in the Caribbean (Mick 2013), it has also been reported that Customs and Border
Protection has raided budgets of its manned aircraft to pay for drones, resulting in a cut in flight hours of
surveillance planes hunting smuggling ships (Bennet 2012a). Hence, although drones are cheaper than
traditional police airpower, they may not be cheaper than traditional policing — an equation that is kept out of the
industry’s promotional material.¶ Critics of the cost-effectiveness argument not only question the utility of police drones but also point to the
high rate of vehicle loss, both civilian and military. Observing that “it
is becoming clear that police interest in purchasing
drones far outweighs their practical utility”, Salter (2013) proposes that the various and conflicting
rationales offered by police forces in their pursuit of public support for drones can be understood as
mystifications of the desire to embody and enact the militarized “subject position ” made possible by such
technology — including states seeking to legitimize particular governmental strategies through crime
control.
Impact turn – The war on terror is a dangerous construction used to justify expansions
of surveillance
In the name of “homegrown Terrorism,” so many of the most recent War on Terror expansions have
entailed application for domestic uses: from the Obama administration’s assault on Miranda rights to its
claimed power to assassinate U.S. citizens to the latest detention bill about to pass Congress. The
Surveillance State and the police powers ushered in by the War on Terror have been widely applied to
domestic political dissent. The U.S. Government’s fixation on identifying and punishing dissidents is
illustrated by the administration’s creepy new “hear-something, see-something” campaign against
“domestic radicalization”: encouraging teachers and children to spot and then report those “making
statements that indicate a rejection of American society.”¶ It takes little imagination to see the dangers
of this militarization of domestic police powers; in fact, it takes extreme denseness and authoritarian
trust to dismiss it as “paranoia” or “hysteria.”
AT: Politics DA
Plan is popular – lots of states trying to increase privacy protections against drones –
privacy protections are much more popular than environmental protections
Will Weissert, analyst for the Huffington Post, September 14, 2013, “Texas Drones Law Gets Tough On
Public, Private Use,” accessed May 21, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/14/texas-
drones-law_n_3926849.html
AUSTIN, Texas -- A hobbyist using a remote-control airplane mounted with a digital camera just
happened to capture images last year of a Dallas creek running red with pig's blood. It led to a nearby
meatpacking plant being fined for illegal dumping and two of its leaders being indicted on water
pollution charges.¶ Yet, a Texas law that took effect Sept. 1 tightened rules not on polluters but on taking
such photographs, an effort to better protect private property from drone surveillance.¶ More than 40
state legislatures have debated the increasing presence of unmanned aircraft in civilian airspace, with
most of the proposals focused on protecting people from overly intrusive surveillance by law
enforcement.
Plan is popular – domestic use of drones is politically unpopular

The drone lobby includes both drone manufacturers and providers of supportive services (training,
maintenance, and consulting) (Hall and Coyne 2013a). Despite being open to “members . . . with an active interest in UAVs and the
development of opportunities to use these systems on a routine basis for the overall benefit of mankind” (UAVS 2014), the
industry’s
lobbying organizations perceive themselves as having a “public relations problem” (Wolverton 2012), caused
by its failure to properly “educate the public” about the benefits of drone use in civil airspace. It is useful to examine some of
the reasons for this state of affairs: To begin with, the very use of the term¶ drone¶ continues to be contested. Both the
military and the drone industry object to the word, and have for some time insisted on a variety of alternatives, including UAV (unmanned
aerial vehicle), RPA (remotely piloted aircraft), RPV (remotely piloted vehicle), and UAS (unmanned aircraft system). Critics have responded by
accusing the industry of failing to recognize the existence of “legitimate issues to be debated about how unmanned systems might be used”,
and have observed that the industry appears to believe that a semantic shift will make the criticism go away (McNeal 2013 ).
In the wake
of broad coverage, including human rights reporting, on civilian deaths in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Yemen, the drone industry found itself being regarded as partially responsible for what are known as
“drone wars” (Cavallaro and Sonnenberg 2012). In February 2013, Paul Applewhite, a member of the board of directors of the Association
for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), which represents eighty companies based in the Pacific Northwest region of the United
States, participated in a congressional hearing on drones. In response to a question regarding the backlash against drones, Applewhite said,
“My opinion is that the way that we’re currently using drones in warfare, we’re moving away from indiscriminate killing to discriminate killing”
(Thalen 2013). Yet the
image of drone manufacturers as a particular breed of war profiteers is not the only
problem; another concern is the lack of attention to safety and security as the industry ¶ ¶ attempts to
open civil airspace. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 for example, which was drafted with extensive involvement from the
drone lobby, makes no explicit reference to privacy. To counter an outburst of criticism, AUVSI later issued a code of conduct, which has been
strongly criticized for ignoring key concerns with respect to pilot skills, privacy, and sanctions for violating the code (Thalen 2013). Moreover,
despite general support for drone wars abroad, Americans
remain sceptical about the domestic use of police drones:
in a 2013 poll, 58 percent of respondents agreed that law enforcement’s use of militarized weapons,
armoured vehicles, and drones has gone too far (Detrick 2013).
Drone use unpopular – makes plan regulation popular

Paul Detrick, Reason analyst and documentary specialist on police militarization, privacy, civil liberties
and the First Amendment, December 13, 2013, “Reason-Rupe Poll: Americans Still Uncomfortable with
Cops and Drones,” accessed May 22, 2015, http://reason.com/blog/2013/12/13/reason-rupe-poll-
americans-still-uncomfo
The newest Reason-Rupe poll has found that 58 percent of Americans think law enforcement's use of
militarized weapons, armored vehicles and drones has gone too far. While Americans may be able to see cops
riding around in MRAPS wearing riot gear, it’s the militarized tools that Americans don’t see like drones
flying over their backyards that may be just as scary to them.¶ When Sheriff Gregory Ahern of Alameda County
said that he wanted to use a drone for search and rescue at a public protection committee meeting in February 2013,
privacy advocates and residents pushed back, claiming that it would be too easy for the sheriff’s
department to surveil citizens. “This drone is just another mechanism to invade people’s privacy and spy
on them,” said one woman at the meeting.
AT: States CP
CP fails and gets rolled back – State regulation is a race to the bottom – even when
states pass regulatory legislation it gets struck down, states want minimal regulation
to be available for FAA test site status
Ben Jenkins, J.D., 2014, “Watching the Watchmen: Drone Privacy and the Need for Oversight,”
accessed May 20, 2015, http://law-apache.uky.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/9-
Jenkins.pdf
Some have argued for state and local, rather than federal, regulation of drones, opining these governmental
bodies are better equipped to handle¶ and react to the nuances of an emerging technology, but recent state drone¶ legislation
failures suggest otherwise. Recently, many state drone regulation¶ bills have been struck down as
legislators vie to secure their states as FAA¶ drone–testing sites. It is estimated that within the next few years domestic¶
drone use will create over 70,000 jobs and generate $82 billion. One of the¶ factors considered by the FAA when choosing
test sites is the presence of¶ “drone–restrictive” laws and state legislators have been hesitant to
jeopardize¶ their states’ chances at being selected. After a North Dakota bill that would¶ have banned
police from warrantless use of drones was struck down, a state¶ senator remarked, “Now that we’ve
defeated that bill in the Senate, it sends¶ a clear message to the FAA that North Dakota’s open for
business . . . .”¶ Attitudes and remarks like this suggest that state and local governments cannot¶ be
counted on to protect privacy interests in the face of competing economic ¶ opportunity. Baseline federal
privacy safeguards would sufficiently protect¶ privacy interests and still allow for technological and economic growth in
the¶ drone industry.
CP can’t solve – states don’t have jurisdiction to regulate federal agencies, federal law
preempts state law when it comes to aviation
Jol A. Silversmith, J.D., November 3, 2013, “You Can’t Regulate This: State Regulation¶ of the Private
Use of Unmanned Aircraft,” accessed May 24, 2015,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/air_space_lawyer/2013_december/
ASL_V26N3_WINTER13_Silversmith.authcheckdam.pdf
The U.S. Constitution provides that federal laws¶ are the “supreme law of the land.”¶ In the context of¶
aviation, the doctrine of field preemption—that state¶ action is preempted because Congress intended
to¶ occupy the entire regulatory field—has been held¶ by many courts to generally prohibit state
regulation¶ of aircraft safety and operations.¶ Underlying¶ this position is that the U.S. government by
statute¶ “has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United¶ States.”¶ As the Supreme Court explained
more than¶ 40 years ago in an opinion invalidating a locally¶ imposed curfew on aircraft noise, “a uniform
and¶ exclusive system of federal regulation” is required “if¶ the congressional objectives underlying the
Federal¶ Aviation Act are to be fulfilled.” Thus, in the context¶ of aviation, federal preemption long has
been understood¶ to sweep with a wide broom.
AT: Gendered Language K

UAV is the specific term of art adopted by the DoD, alternatives like “unpiloted” have
different military meaning
I. Colomina and P. Molina, photogrammetry and remote sensing experts, June 2014, “Unmanned
aerial systems for photogrammetry and remote sensing: A review,” accessed May 23, 2015,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0924271614000501
UAS are known under various different names and acronyms, such as “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ” (UAV),
“aerial robot” or simply “drone,” with “UAV” and “drone” being the most popular terms. The term UAS was adopted by
the US Department of Defense (DOD) and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) of the UK. The International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) has introduced the concept of “Remotely-Piloted Aerial System ” (RPAS), a particular class
of UAS, in the ICAO Circular 328 (ICAO, 2011). This term is basically motivated by the fact that only RPAS will be
able to integrate into the international civil aviation system. The aforementioned circular is a key reference in which the
reader may find a comprehensive compilation of terms and definitions associated to UAS.
Language is fluid – their argument ignores inherent ambiguities in language – their

argument ignores the intent of the speaker, which is dehumanizing and totalitarian
Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D., 2006, “Against the Theory¶ of "Sexist Language",” accessed May 23, 2015,
http://www.friesian.com/language.htm
First of all, the

theory of "sexist language" seems to say that words cannot have more than one meaning: if
"man" and "he" in some usage mean males, then they cannot mean both males and females in other
usage (i.e. nouns and pronouns can have both masculine and common gender). Although univocal meanings were once the ideal of
philosophical schools like Logical Positivism, this view is absurd enough as a rule for natural languages (where equivocal
meanings and ambiguity emerge through usage) that there is usually a more subtle take on it: that the use of "man" or "he" to
refer to males and to both males and females means that maleness is more fundamental than femaleness, "subordinating" femaleness to
maleness, just as in the Book of Genesis the first woman, Eve, is created from Adam's rib for the purpose of being his companion. Now, the
implication of the Biblical story may well be precisely that Adam is more fundamental than Eve, but the Bible did not create the language,
Hebrew, in which it is written. If we are going to talk about the linguistic structure of Hebrew as distinct from the social ideology of the Bible, it
is one thing to argue that the system of grammatical gender allowed the interpretation of gender embodied in the story of Adam and Eve and
something very much different to argue that such an interpretive meaning necessarily underlies the original grammar of Hebrew -- or Akkadian,
Arabic, Greek, French, Spanish, English, Swahili, etc. -- or that such a system of grammatical gender requires such an interpretation [note]. ¶
What a language with its gender system means is what people use it to mean. It is an evil principle to
think that we can tell other people what they mean by what they say, because of some theory we have
that makes it mean something in particular to us, even when they obviously mean something else .
Nevertheless, there is now a common principle, in feminism and elsewhere (especially flourishing in literary criticism), that meaning is only in
the response of the interpreter, not in the mind of the speaker, even if the speaker is to be sued or charged with a crime for the interpreter
having the response that they do. There is also on top of this the Marxist theory of "false consciousness," which holds that "true" meaning
follows from the underlying economic structure, today usually just called the "power" relationships. Mostpeople are unaware of
the power relationships which produce the concepts and language that they use, and so what people
think they mean by their own statements and language is an illusion.¶ The implications of these
principles are dehumanizing and totalitarian: what individual people think and want is irrelevant and to
be disregarded, even by laws and political authorities forcing them to behave, and speak, in certain
ways. But they are principles that make it possible to dismiss the common sense view that few people
speaking English who said "man" in statements like "man is a rational animal" were referring exclusively
to males, even though this usage was clear to all, from the context, for centuries before feminism decided that people didn't "really" mean
that. But even if some speakers really did mean that, it is actually irrelevant to the freedom of individuals to mean whatever they intend to
mean through language in the conventionally available forms that they choose.
Focus on speech criticism causes policy paralysis – shifts focus from policy discussion
and actual reform
Wendy Brown, Political Science Professor at US Berkeley, 2001, “Politics Out of History,”
https://books.google.com/books?id=1ruoMPMrw1oC&pg
“Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech. Although Gates was
referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive
space in which one might have offered a substantive political response to bigoted epithet s, his point also
applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions . But
turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain
questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life
insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislated and enforced truth . And the realization of that
patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary
ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of
rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction .
Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged
identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were
born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based
institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries
of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic
reproaches to certain kinds
of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus
identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a
problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and
cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they
condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to
ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that
itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and
liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each
kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty,
violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and
unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the
humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn,
moralize.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 AFFIRMATIVE
Thesis
According to sources in the intelligence community, Executive Order 12333, originally implemented by
President Reagan, is the fundamental document authorizing the expansion of data collection activities
towards U.S. citizens. The Order has been used by the National Security Agency as legal authorization for
the secret and systematic collection of unencrypted information flowing through the internet, emails,
cell phones, and every other means of electronic information transmission. The affirmative has Congress
render the Executive Order legally invalid, which Congress is empowered to do. The main 1AC advantage
is totalitarianism. Separation of powers is an additional advantage in the file.
1AC
Observation One: Inherency

A. Executive Order 12333 falls outside of FISA jurisdiction and is responsible for
the majority of data collection
Erica Newland, former Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Democracy & Technology and member
of Yale Law Journal editorial staff, April 2015
"Executive Orders in Court," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 124,

http://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/executive-orders-in-court (accessed 4/26/2014)
The relative scarcity of attention to E.O. 12,333 is all the more surprising because the Order, according
to some reports, is the authority behind “most of [the] NSA’s data collection.” Despite text that imposes
limitations on surveillance of U.S. persons, press reports have suggested that significant numbers of U.S.
persons are caught in the Order’s web. And compared to activities authorized by the Order’s statutory
counterparts, E.O. 12,333 programs are less likely to be briefed to the congressional intelligence
committees. These programs also fall outside the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC).
B. Executive Order 12333 allows collection of content and metadata without limit,
requiring no warrant, no report to Congress, no consent of the companies
involved and none of Obama’s promised reforms
John Napier Tye, former section chief for Internet Freedom in State Department, July 18, 2014
"Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on Americans," Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-
nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html (accessed
4/25/2015)
Executive Order 12333 contains nothing to prevent the NSA from collecting and storing all such
communications — content as well as metadata — provided that such collection occurs outside the
United States in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence investigation. No warrant or court approval is
required, and such collection never need be reported to Congress.
C. Obama’s promised reforms don’t address the Executive Order

4/25/2015)
None of the reforms that Obama announced earlier this year will affect such collection. Without any
legal barriers to such collection, U.S. persons must increasingly rely on the affected companies to
implement security measures to keep their communications private. The executive order does not
require the NSA to notify or obtain consent of a company before collecting its users’ data.
1AC
D. The Order allows the NSA to bypass the limits on surveillance imposed by FISA
Marcy Wheeler, national security blogger, December 14, 2014
"Section 309: A Band-Aid for a Gaping Wound in Democracy," Emptywheel,

https://www.emptywheel.net/2014/12/14/section-309-a-band-aid-for-a-gaping-wound-in-democracy/
(accessed 4/25/2015)
But instead of extending FISA (which is already inadequate to the technology of bulk collection),
Congress instead moved to impose some retention limits but not use limits on this data. Indeed, the
permitted reasons for retention, and Litt’s insistence that this doesn’t change what they’re already
doing, suggests they’re already using this data for broad purposes, though the really unlimited use of it
would be limited to metadata analysis. At the very least, this means the government is able to engage in
metadata analysis of Americans for far more uses than permitted under FISA, and do so without the First
Amendment review required under FISA. It means NSA can construct the dossiers based on metadata on
Americans so long as they do it with EO 12333 data. The use of EO 12333 also provides a way for the
Attorney General to authorize spying on content that will only, with the new provision, receive outside
oversight after 5 years.
Thus, we advocate the following:
The United States Congress should enact legislation declaring that the provisions of
Executive Order 12333 that authorize surveillance and data collection on American
citizens no longer has legal effect.
Observation Two: Solvency

A. Congress should use legislation to stop the domestic surveillance component of
Executive Order 12333
Mark Jaycox, legislative analyst at Electronic Frontier Foundation, November 5, 2013
"Three Leaks, Three Weeks, and What We've Learned About the US Government's Other Spying
Authority: Executive Order 12333," Electronic Frontier Foundation,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/10/three-leaks-three-weeks-and-what-weve-learned-about-
governments-other-spying (accessed 4/26/2015)
Congress must scrutinize the use of 12333 more closely. If it's being used to collect, data mine, and/or
analyze innocent Americans' information, it must be stopped with legislation by Congress. The stories
show how the NSA is using laws, policies, and procedures to completely skirt the Constitution. Congress
must step in as the major oversight branch of the US government. It can do this by beginning a full-scale
investigation into the NSA's surveillance authorities by a special Congressional committee. More
questions than answers continue to be raised by the ongoing leaks. And it's time for Congress to act.
1AC
B. Congress can declare that a particular provision of an executive order no longer
has legal effect
Vivian S. Chu and Todd Garvey, Legislative Attorneys at Congressional Research Service, April 16,
2014
"Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation," CRS Report 7-5700,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20846.pdf (accessed 4/26/2015)
To effectuate a repeal, Congress need only enact legislation directing that provisions of the executive
order “shall not have legal effect.” For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 explicitly revoked a
December 13, 1912, executive order that had created the Naval Petroleum Reserve Numbered 2. In
1992, Congress similarly revoked an executive order issued by President George H. W. Bush that had
directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a human fetal tissue bank for research
purposes. The repeal legislation stated that “[t]he provisions of Executive Order 12806 ... shall not have
any legal effect.”
C. Their sources are wrong about intelligence being the exclusive realm of the
executive: Congress can check presidential authority on surveillance
David S. Eggert, Professor of Law at Washington and Lee, 1983
"Executive Order 12333: An Assessment of the Validity of Warrantless National Security Searches," Duke
Law Journal, Vol. 1983, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2844&context=dlj
Congress has broad power to regulate the exercise of any presidential power to conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance. No explicit constitutional grant unambiguously gives the President such power .
Youngstown seems decisive: if the President cannot, in the face of congressional hostility, seize steel mills when
he considers the nation's security imperiled, he cannot conduct searches and seizures under similar
conditions. It would be anomalous to hold that Congress has greater capacity to protect individual
property rights than those personal rights Justice Brandeis aptly described as most valued by civilized
men. The president is not a "Lone Ranger" in the field of foreign affairs or in the more specialized area of
national security. Indeed, if the President were free to invoke national security to ignore the will of
Congress, wide categories of legislation might be rendered nugatory. Powers explicitly granted to the
legislative branch by the Constitution would be eroded. Thus, Congress possesses substantial power to
regulate executive activity relating to foreign intelligence surveillance ; it now becomes necessary to determine the
extent to which Congress has exercised this power.
1AC
D. EO 12333 is a direct threat to democracy; it should be replaced via legislation

just as Section 215 is currently being considered. Privacy of domestic citizens
overseas is vital
4/25/2015)
Consider the possibility that Section 215 collection does not represent the outer limits of collection on
U.S. persons but rather is a mechanism to backfill that portion of U.S. person data that cannot be
collected overseas under 12333. Proposals for replacing Section 215 collection are currently being
debated in Congress. We need a similar debate about Executive Order 12333. The order as used today
threatens our democracy. There is no good reason that U.S. citizens should receive weaker privacy and
oversight protections simply because their communications are collected outside, not inside, our
borders.
Advantage One: Totalitarianism
A. Surveillance spurs totalitarianism on the most intimate levels of human activity,

outweighing any national security gains
Henry Giroux, Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, February 10, 2014
"Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State," Truthout,

http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-
state (accessed 4/26/2015)
Intelligence benefits are far outweighed by the illegal use of the Internet, telecommunication companies
and stealth malware for data collection and government interventions that erode civil liberties and
target individuals and groups that pose no threat whatsoever to national security. New technologies
that range from webcams and spycams to biometrics and Internet drilling reinforce not only the fear of
being watched, monitored and investigated but also a propensity toward confessing one's intimate
thoughts and sharing the most personal of information. What is profoundly disturbing and worth
repeating in this case is the new intimacy between digital technologies and cultures of surveillance in
which there exists a profound an unseen intimate connection into the most personal and private areas
as subjects publish and document their interests, identities, hopes and fears online in massive
quantities.
1AC
B. Surveillance directed at foreign enemies will inevitably be used to crush
domestic dissent
Franklin Dmitryev, committee member at News & Letters Collective and activist with Defense Depot of
Memphis Tennessee Concerned Citizens Committee, February 6, 2014
"Rampant U.S. surveillance slouches toward totalitarianism," News & Letters,

http://wordpress.rayadunayevskaya.org/PDF-ARCHIVE/2014/2014-01-02.pdf (accessed 2/26/2015)
It has been the practice of every capitalist state’s repressive apparatus to point the finger abroad to
attack the class struggle and other freedom movements at home. “Terrorism” is today’s equivalent of
Joe McCarthy and J. Edgar Hoover’s “Communist menace,” which justified disrupting the civil rights
movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement, and murdering people like Black Panthers Fred
Hampton and Mark Clark.
C. Surveillance culture turns all of civil society into a war zone and renders class-
and race-based discrimination invulnerable to dissent

Under such circumstances, historical memory offers no buffer to the proliferation of a kind of mad
violence and paranoid culture of media-induced fear that turns every public space into a war zone.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the American public barely blinks in the face of a growing
surveillance state. Nor is it surprising that intellectuals such as Sean Wilentz can claim that "the lack of
fealty to the imperatives of the surveillance community as demonstrated by Edward Snowden, Glenn
Greenwald, and Julian Assange is an assault on the modern liberal state itself." Indeed, what the new
apologists for the surveillance state refuse to recognize is a history of abuse and criminal behavior by US
intelligence apparatuses that were less concerned with implementing the law, arresting criminals and
preventing terrorist acts than they were in suppressing dissent and punishing those groups marginalized
by race and class.
1AC
D. We are on the brink of losing constitutional protections and sliding into

totalitarianism
Peter Van Buren, investigative journalist on State Department issues and author of "We Meant
Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People," February 16, 2014
"The Erosion of the U.S. Constitution ... and It Starts in the White House," Alternet,
http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/erosion-us-constitution-and-it-starts-white-house (accessed
4/26/2015)
At the moment, we are threatened with a return to a pre-Constitutional situation that Americans
would once have dismissed out of hand, a society in which the head of state can take a citizen’s life
on his own say-so. If it’s the model for the building of post-Constitutional America, we’re in trouble.
Indeed the stakes are high, whether we notice or not. The question is: How far will post-
Constitutional America stray from the nation so conceived in the Declaration of Independence and
the Bill of Rights? Because in the twenty-first century, the midnight knock on the door may come not
from the King’s men, but from the sky.
E. Surveillance crushes oppositional thought, controls the public, and militarizes

society
Franklin Dmitryev, committee member at News & Letters Collective and activist with Defense Depot of
Memphis Tennessee Concerned Citizens Committee, February 6, 2014
"Rampant U.S. surveillance slouches toward totalitarianism," News & Letters,

http://wordpress.rayadunayevskaya.org/PDF-ARCHIVE/2014/2014-01-02.pdf (accessed 2/26/2015)
Surveillance is not an end in itself. It is used to control people, to intimidate, to locate and stifle
opposition. Each intelligence agency has close links to the military; the NSA head is always a general or
admiral. Some agencies, like the CIA, have their own paramilitary branches, even their own killer drones.
F. Totalitarianism causes internal genocide and external wars

R.J. Rummell, former professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii, 2002
"20th Century Democide," Death By Government, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/DBG.CHAP1.HTM

A preeminent fact about government is that some murder millions in cold blood. This is where absolute
Power reigns. A second fact is that some, usually the same governments, murder tens of thousands
more through foreign aggression. Absolute Power again. These two facts alone must be the basis of our
reconceptualization and taxonomies. Not, as it is today, only whether states are developed or not, third
world or not, militarily powerful or not, or large or not. But also and more important, whether Power is
absolute, and whether it has engaged in genocide, politicide, and mass murder.
Topicality: Domestic Surveillance
We're topical: Domestic surveillance is definitionally included in the text of Executive

Order 12333 and means the gathering of nonpublic information on American citizens
Matthew L. Small, Presidential Fellow at United States Air Force Academy, 2008
"His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of
National Crisis," Text of A Dialogue on Presidential Challenges and Leadership: Papers of the 2007-2008
Center Fellows, http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf
Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this

context, is “information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been
collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic
surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence community best
understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States
persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)).
Domestic surveillance includes electronic surveillance, eg phone tapping

Matthew L. Small, Presidential Fellow at United States Air Force Academy, 2008
"His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of
National Crisis," Text of A Dialogue on Presidential Challenges and Leadership: Papers of the 2007-2008
Center Fellows, http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf
The ability of the US government to tap into phone conversations opened a whole new realm of
domestic surveillance. Simultaneously, it struck a fear into American citizens. Now, one could use
telephone conversations, which people held to be as private as a one-on-one chat inside one’s own
home, to intrude into a person’s private life or convict a person of a crime. Out of this fear arose the
need to assert the right to privacy.
Domestic needn't be inside the United States; it can mean dealing with the United
States, as in U.S. citizens abroad
Dictionary.com, 2015
"Domestic," dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/domestic (accessed 4/26/2015)
Domestic: of or relating to one's own or a particular country as apart from other countries.
Curtail
Curtailing the power of the executive branch entails cutting off some part
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2015
"Curtail," Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/curtail (accessed
4/27/2014)
Curtail: to make less by or as if by cutting off or away some part <curtail the power of the executive
branch> <curtail inflation>.
Curtail includes to halt

Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 2007
"Curtail," Legal Dictionary at FreeDictionary.com, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/curtail
Curtail: abate, abbreviate, abridge, clip, coartare, cut, cut down, cut short, decrease, diminish, halt,
lessen, lop, make smaller, minuere, pare, pare down, retrench, shorten, subtract, trim
Substantially
Substantially means mainly or most

Oxford Dictionaries, 2015
"Substantially," Oxforddictionaries.com,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/learner/substantially (accessed 4/27/2014)
Substantially: mainly; in most details, even if not completely.
Substantially means in the most important way

MacMillan Dictionary, 2015
"Substantially," Macmillandictionary.com,
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/substantially (accessed 4/27/2015)
Substantially: in the most important or basic way.
We meet: Executive Order 12333 is the main and most comprehensive foundation for
domestic surveillance
Ali Watkins, Washington Bureau Reporter for McClatchy Newspapers, November 21, 2013
"Most of NSA’s data collection authorized by order Ronald Reagan issued," McClatchy D.C.,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/21/209167/most-of-nsas-data-collection-authorized.html
Approved by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, Executive

Order 12333 (referred to as “twelve-triple-three”) still governs most
of what the NSA does. It is a sweeping mandate that outlines the duties and foreign intelligence
collection for the nation’s 17 intelligence agencies. It is not governed by Congress, and critics say it has little privacy
protection and many loopholes. What changes have been made to it have come through guidelines set by the attorney general or other
documents. The result is a web of intelligence law so complicated that it stymies even those tasked with interpreting it. As one former
executive official said, “It’s complicated stuff.” Confusing though it may be, the
order remains the primary authority under
which the country’s intelligence agencies conduct the majority of their operations.
Solvency: 12333 Should Be Overturned

Recommendation 12 of the Intelligence and Communication Review Group specifically
concerns limiting the domestic surveillance power of EO 12333 and could be used as
model legislation directly affecting that part of the order
4/25/2015)
The president’s own Review Group on Intelligence and Communication Technologies, in Recommendation 12 of its public report, addressed the
matter. But the review group coded its references in a way that masked the true nature of the problem. At
first glance,
Recommendation 12 appears to concern Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, which authorizes
collection inside the United States against foreign targets outside the United States. Although the
recommendation does not explicitly mention Executive Order 12333, it does refer to “any other
authority.” A member of the review group confirmed to me that this reference was written deliberately
to include Executive Order 12333. Recommendation 12 urges that all data of U.S. persons incidentally
collected under such authorities be immediately purged unless it has foreign intelligence value or is
necessary to prevent serious harm. The review group further recommended that a U.S. person’s incidentally collected data never
be used in criminal proceedings against that person, and that the government refrain from searching communications
by U.S. persons unless it obtains a warrant or unless such searching is necessary to prevent serious
harm. The White House understood that Recommendation 12 was intended to apply to 12333. That
understanding was conveyed to me verbally by several White House staffers, and was confirmed in an unclassified White House document that
I saw during my federal employment and that is now in the possession of several congressional committees. In that document, the
White
House stated that adoption of Recommendation 12 would require “significant changes” to current
practice under Executive Order 12333 and indicated that it had no plans to make such changes .
Complexity is the only barrier to interbranch reevaluation of 12333

Ali Watkins, Washington Bureau Reporter for McClatchy Newspapers, November 21, 2013
"Most of NSA’s data collection authorized by order Ronald Reagan issued," McClatchy D.C.,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/21/209167/most-of-nsas-data-collection-authorized.html
Executive Order 12333 was intended to bolster a reeling intelligence community and further define its
authority to conduct foreign intelligence gathering. The global telecommunications network didn’t exist,
and collecting foreign communications posed little risk for Americans’ data to be swept up in the
dragnet. But in the three decades since 12333 was written, global communications have changed
dramatically. The order, however, has not. “In 1996, when (12333) was 15 years old, we said, ‘Gee, this
probably ought to be revised.’ Now we’re more than 15 years after that,” said John Bellinger, a former
legal adviser to the National Security Council during the presidency of George W. Bush. Still, the order
hasn’t undergone any major change, “in part, because it’s so difficult and complex to change it,” he said.
Solvency: Congress Can Overturn Executive Orders
Sunset provisions effectively overturn executive orders

Vivian S. Chu and Todd Garvey, Legislative Attorneys at Congressional Research Service, April 16,
2014
Congress may also affect executive orders by amending the language to include a sunset provision. If
Congress lets the sunset provision lapse, the President would no longer have the authority under the
statute to act. For example, Executive Order 11399 established the National Council on Indian
Opportunity (NCIO). This executive order was later amended by Executive Order 11688. In 1969,
Congress appropriated funds to continue the NCIO for five years at which time it would terminate unless
reauthorized by Congress. The NCIO is no longer in existence.
Congress can de-fund executive orders or particular sections of them

Vivian S. Chu and Todd Garvey, Legislative Attorneys at Congressional Research Service, April 16, 2014

Additionally, Congress may also inhibit the implementation of an executive order by preventing funds
from being used to implement the order. For example, Congress has used its appropriations authority to
limit the effect of executive orders by denying salaries and expenses for an office established in an
executive order, or by directly denying funds to implement a particular section of an order.
Inherency: 12333 Enables Mass Surveillance of Citizens
The National Security Agency relies on 12333 to collect mass unencrypted information
from Google and Yahoo data centers
Spencer Ackerman, national security editor for The Guardian, July 2, 2014
"NSA reformers dismayed after privacy board vindicates surveillance dragnet," The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/02/nsa-surveillance-government-privacy-board-report?
CMP=ema_565 (accessed 4/25/2015)
When the board next meets, on July 23, it will consider launching a new inquiry into one of the seminal texts behind
US intelligence authorities, an executive order known as 12333. The NSA relies upon that obscure
document for, among other things, its surreptitious collection of unencrypted information transiting
from Google and Yahoo data centers. After the hearing adjourned Wednesday, Medine, Cook and Wald all indicated their appetite for
reviewing 12333.
12333 is the foundation for the vast majority of data surreptitiously collected on U.S.
citizens
4/25/2015)
Public debate about the bulk collection of U.S. citizens’ data by the NSA has focused largely on Section 215 of the Patriot Act, through which the
government obtains court orders to compel American telecommunications companies to turn over phone data. But Section
215 is a
small part of the picture and does not include the universe of collection and storage of communications
by U.S. persons authorized under Executive Order 12333. From 2011 until April of this year, I worked on global Internet
freedom policy as a civil servant at the State Department. In that capacity, I was cleared to receive top-secret and “sensitive compartmented”
information. Based in part on classified facts that I am prohibited by law from publishing, I believe that Americans
should be even
more concerned about the collection and storage of their communications under Executive Order 12333
than under Section 215.
12333 is more sweeping than Section 215; it includes audio collection and information
on U.S. citizens abroad, all with no congressional oversight
4/25/2015)
For example, Section 215 permits the bulk collection only of U.S. telephone metadata — lists of incoming
and outgoing phone numbers — but not audio of the calls. Executive Order 12333 contains no such
protections for U.S. persons if the collection occurs outside U.S. borders. Issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981
to authorize foreign intelligence investigations, 12333 is not a statute and has never been subject to meaningful
oversight from Congress or any court. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
has said that the committee has not been able to “sufficiently” oversee activities conducted under 12333.

There is less protection/more metadata exploitation under 12333; it makes it easier to
spy on Americans
Marcy Wheeler, National Security Blogger, January 27, 2014
"Important: Changes to Section 215 Dragnet Will Not Change Treatment of EO 12333 Metadata," Empty
Wheel, https://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/27/important-changes-to-section-215-dragnet-will-not-
change-treatment-of-eo-12333-metadata/ (accessed 4/27/2015)
If the data is accessed via one of the FISC-overseen programs, US persons benefit from the additional
subject matter, dissemination, and First Amendment protections of those laws or FISC’s implementation
of them (and would benefit from the minor changes Obama has promised to both Section 215 and FAA).
But if NSA collected the data via one of its EO 12333 programs, it does not get those protections. To be
clear, it does get some dissemination protection and can only be accessed with a foreign intelligence
purpose, but that is much less than what the FISC programs get. Which leaves the NSA a fair amount of
leeway to spy on US persons, so long as it hasn’t collected the data to do so under the programs
overseen by FISC. And when it collects data under EO 12333, it is a lot easier for the NSA to spy on
Americans.
12333 is responsible for metadata collection from mobile apps, Facebook and
YouTube; despite administration claims, Americans have no protection from this
subset of data collection
"Important: Changes to Section 215 Dragnet Will Not Change Treatment of EO 12333 Metadata," Empty
Wheel, https://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/27/important-changes-to-section-215-dragnet-will-not-
change-treatment-of-eo-12333-metadata/ (accessed 4/27/2015)
The metadata from leaky mobile apps almost certainly comes from EO 12333 collection, not least given
the role of GCHQ and CSEC (Canada’s Five Eyes’ partner) to the collection. The Facebook and YouTube
data GCHQ collects (just reported by Glenn Greenwald working with NBC) surely counts as EO 12333
collection. NSA’s spokeswoman will say over and over that “everyday” or “ordinary” Americans don’t
have to worry about their favorite software being sucked up by NSA. But to the extent that collection
happens under EO 12333, they have relatively little protection.
12333 enables mass collection of data from Skype, Facebook messages, emails, and
incidental internet data, giving Americans no protection even when they are not
specifically targeted
Cyrus Farivar, Senior Business Editor at Ars Technica, and is also an author of The Internet of
Elsewhere, August 27, 2014
"The executive order that led to mass spying, as told by NSA alumni," ARS Technica,
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/08/27/a-twisted-history-how-a-reagan-era-executive-order-
led-to-mass-spying/ (accessed 4/25/2015)
The document, known in government circles as "twelve

triple three," gives incredible leeway to intelligence agencies
sweeping up vast quantities of Americans' data. That data ranges from e-mail content to Facebook
messages, from Skype chats to practically anything that passes over the Internet on an incidental basis.
In other words, EO 12333 protects the tangential collection of Americans' data even when Americans
aren't specifically targeted—otherwise it would be forbidden under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) of 1978.
12333 allows the retention of data incidental to any investigation

Most collection of US domestic communications and data is done under EO 12333, section 2.3
paragraph C in the Upstream program. They claim, near as I can tell, that all domestic collection is
incidental. That’s, of course, the vast majority of data.” Specifically, that subsection allows the
intelligence community to "collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States
persons" if that information is "obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism investigation."'
12333 bypasses FISA limitations and allows the executive to ignore all restrictions on
surveillance

Returning to an example with which this Note opened, statutes

like FISA not only empower the government to conduct
surveillance activities, but also place restrictions on those activities—restrictions that are, theoretically
anyway, legally enforceable. Moreover, such restrictions may not be withdrawn or modified without the
public approval of Congress and the President. In contrast, E.O. 12,333, the executive order counterpart
to these statutes, appears to have created new surveillance powers for the federal government “with
the stroke of the pen.” Meanwhile, judicial decisions have rendered the restrictions that the order publicly
purports to place on government activities unenforceable in courts.
12333 trumps FISA law

Loomis, Binney, and others were pushing a surveillance program known as ThinThread, which was discontinued weeks before the September
11 attacks. ThinThread supporters claim it had the ability to encrypt US persons' data so that analysts would not know who it was about. Prior
to September 11, according to Loomis, the NSA's policy was that the FISA law trumped EO 12333,
whereas after, it essentially became the other way around. (This is likely what Snowden was referring to
in his internal query regarding the hierarchy of laws.)
The Order is responsible for the most controversial and unscrutinized surveillance
activities

Yet a different law—one that has long served as a linchpin of surveillance programs and that reportedly
authorizes many of the NSA’s most controversial activities—has largely escaped public and
congressional scrutiny. This law is not a statute but rather an executive order that dates back to 1981. Known as E.O. 12,333 (twelve-
triple-three), the surveillance executive order creates a framework for intelligence programs that target
“the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their
agents.” Its sweep is extensive, and its first principles are explicit: “All reasonable and lawful means must
be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence available. ”
Inherency: Won’t Be Overturned and Gives Unlimited Power
No chance of 12333 being overturned in the status quo

Earlier this month, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board said it would re-examine EO 12333
after all the fanfare. But based on history, overturning an executive order simply isn't a common
outcome. Unless done by a subsequent executive order, it's extremely difficult and has rarely happened.
So for now, American data remains as accessible as it's ever been.
Executive orders have no procedural requirements; they give the president unlimited
powers

In contrast to legislation or agency regulation, there are almost no legally enforceable procedural
requirements that the president must satisfy before issuing (or repealing) an executive order or other
presidential directive. That, no doubt, is central to their appeal to presidents. They rid the president of
the need to assemble majorities in both houses of Congress, or to wait through administrative
processes, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, to initiate policy.
Inherency: No Oversight
There is no congressional oversight to intelligence gathering activities under 12333;

congress doesn’t even know the right questions to ask

Executive Order 12,333 again provides a useful illustration. While members of the Senate and House
intelligence committees—and the so-called Gang of Eight—have received at least some briefings on the
executive branch’s creative interpretations of the surveillance provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act,
presidents appear to have kept congressional leadership in the dark about how related provisions in E.O.
12,333 have been interpreted and implemented. In 2013, a senior Senate Intelligence Committee staff
member told the Washington Post that the Committee is “far less aware of operations conducted under
[Executive Order] 12333” than they are of operations conducted under the USA PATRIOT Act. The NSA
“would not routinely report these things, and, in general, [E.O. 12,333 programs] would not fall within
the focus of the committee,” the staffer explained. And if congressional leadership were to seek
information about E.O. 12,333 programs, they would not even know the right questions to ask. If the
President’s greater access to information justifies affording him greater latitude on matters relating to
national security, then it should also caution against application of the acquiescence doctrine, or any
variant thereof, in the national security context. After all, Congress cannot meaningfully acquiesce to
activities that it knows little about.
Court order requirement doesn’t check abuse—12333 relies on self-monitoring of

executive branch with no real oversight
Jeramie Scott, National Security Counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, July 23, 2014
"Prepared Statement for the Record of Jeramie D. Scott, National Security Counsel, Electronic Privacy
Information Center Public Meeting Before the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board," EPIC.org,
https://epic.org/news/privacy/surveillance_1/EPIC-Statement-PCLOB-Review-12333.pdf (accessed
4/26/2014)
Although 12333 requires a court order to target a United States Person, this is of little comfort. Given
the global nature of communications, the indiscriminate mass surveillance the NSA conducts overseas
captures the information of United States Persons. Furthermore, the government can use and share this
information without any order from a judge or oversight from Congress. As a matter of fact, the only
check on surveillance under 12333 comes from Executive oversight. This type of self-regulation has
proven to be ineffective at best in limiting surveillance overreach. The minimal oversight in place does
not even give the appearance of the checks and balances provided by judicial or congressional oversight.
Congress has admitted to very little oversight of the activities under 12333. Additionally, Executive Order
12333 does not fall within the purview of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; thus, no neutral
arbiter reviews 12333 surveillance for compliance with the Fourth Amendment.
Surveillance Totalitarianism Impact Scenarios
Government surveillance destroys civil society and accountability, discourages

political engagement, and punishes dissent

Some of the most dreadful consequences of neoliberal modernity and cultures of surveillance include
the elimination of those public spheres capable of educating the public to hold power accountable, and
the dissolution of all social bonds that entail a sense of responsibility toward others. In this instance,
politics has not only become dysfunctional and corrupt in the face of massive inequalities in wealth and
power, it also has been emptied of any substantive meaning. Government not only has fallen into the
hands of the elite and right-wing extremists, it has embraced a mode of lawlessness evident in forms of
foreign and domestic terrorism that undercuts the obligations of citizenship, justice and morality. As
surveillance and fear become a constant condition of American society, there is a growing indifference,
if not distaste, for politics among large segments of the population. This distaste is purposely
manufactured by the ongoing operations of political repression against intellectuals, artists, nonviolent
protesters and journalists on the left and right. Increasingly, as such populations engage in dissent and
the free flow of ideas, whether online or offline, they are considered dangerous to the state and become
subject to the mechanizations of a massive security apparatuses designed to monitor, control and
punish dissenting populations.
Surveillance creates a climate of fear, destroying critical thought and collapsing the
distinction between friends and enemies

As the line collapses between authoritarian power and democratic governance, state and corporate
repression intensifies and increasingly engulfs the nation in a toxic climate of fear and self-censorship in
which free speech, if not critical thought, itself is viewed as too dangerous in which to engage. The NSA,
alone, has become what Scott Shane has called an "electronic omnivore of staggering capabilities,
eavesdropping and hacking its way around the world to strip governments and other targets of their
secrets, all while enforcing the utmost secrecy about its own operations. It spies routinely on friends as
well as foes."
Surveillance Totalitarianism Extensions
We are on the brink of total collapse into surveillance-based totalitarianism


America is not simply in harm's way, it stands at the end of precipice about to fall into what Hannah
Arendt once called "dark times." As memory recedes so does political consciousness, particularly the
danger that the surveillance state has posed to poor and working-class Americans who have been
monitored for years and as Virginia Eubanks points out "already live in the surveillance future."
Surveillance technology will be used to track every move and document promulgated
by every citizen
Naomi Wolf, author of The Beauty Myth and Give Me Liberty and cofounder of DailyClout.com, August
15, 2012
"The new totalitarianism of surveillance technology," The Guardian,

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/15/new-totalitarianism-surveillance-
technology (accessed 4/26/2015)
What is very obvious is that this technology will not be applied merely to people under arrest, or to
people under surveillance in accordance with the fourth amendment (suspects in possible terrorist plots
or other potential crimes, after law enforcement agents have already obtained a warrant from a
magistrate). No, the "targets" here are me and you: everyone, all of the time. In the name of "national
security", the capacity is being built to identify, track and document any citizen constantly and
continuously.
Mass surveillance is an unstoppable slippery slope to totalitarianism, creating an

unquenchable desire for more power and infiltrating the most private areas of human
life
John Suarez, human rights activist and host of Notes from the Cuban Exile Quarter, October 18, 2013
"The US Surveillance State and the Totalitarian Tipping Point," Pan Am Post,
http://panampost.com/john-suarez/2013/10/18/the-us-surveillance-state-and-the-totalitarian-tipping-
point/ (accessed 4/26/2015)
This expansion and centralization of power has continued under both

Unfortunately, there is no plan; there is no conspiracy.
Republicans and Democrats in the United States and would most likely continue under a third party.
Centralized power has become an end unto itself, and as the late Czech president Vaclav Havel observed: "Once the claims of
central power have been placed above law and morality, once the exercise of that power is divested of public control, and once the institutional
guarantees of political plurality and civil rights have been made a mockery of, or simply abolished, there is no reason to respect any other limitations.
The expansion of central power does not stop at the frontier between the public and the private, but
instead, arbitrarily pushes back that border until it is shamelessly intervening in areas that once were
private." The United States is reaching a tipping point that leads into a totalitarian abyss and the crackdown on privacy
whistleblowers is one of many ominous signs regarding where this centralization of power is heading.
Totalitarianism Impacts
Totalitarianism causes genocides


So Power kills and absolute Power kills absolutely. What then can be said of those alleged causes or
factors in war, genocide, and mass murder favored by students of genocide. What about cultural-ethnic
differences, outgroup conflict, misperception, frustration-aggression, relative deprivation, ideological
imperatives, dehumanization, resource competition, etc.? At one time or another, for one regime or
another, one or more of these factors play an important role in democide. Some are essential for
understanding some genocides, as of the Jews or Armenians; some politicide, as of "enemies of the
people," bourgeoisie, and clergy; some massacres, as of competing religious-ethnic groups; or some
atrocities, as of those committed against poor and helpless villagers by victorious soldiers. But then
neighbors in the service of Power have killed neighbor, fathers have killed their sons, faceless and
unknown people have been killed by quota. One is hard put to find a race, religion, culture, or distinct
ethnic group whose regime has not murdered its own or others. These specific causes or factors
accelerate the likelihood of war or democide once some trigger event occurs and absolute or near
absolute Power is present. That is, Power is a necessary cause for war or democide. When the elite have
absolute power, war or democide follows a common process (which I call "the conflict helix").
Disproportionate power creates cultures of violence, killing hundreds of millions; the

reverse is true—lack of totalitarianism means less violence

In sum, then, where absolute Power exists, interests become polarized, a culture of violence develops,
and war and democide follow. In this century alone, by current count, absolute-totalitarian-Power has
murdered near 138,000,000 people (table 1.6). Over 14,000,000 more of its subjects have died from
battle in their wars. Where among states Power is limited and accountable, interests are cross-pressured
and a culture of nonviolence develops, no wars have occurred and comparatively few citizens have been
murdered by the governing elite, and even most of those killed is questionable. About 90 percent of the
citizens killed by democracies have been by marginally democratic Spain (during its 1936-1939 Civil War
and by Republicans after the war), India, and Peru (during its struggle against the communist Shining
Path guerrillas).
Totalitarianism Impacts
Totalitarianism results in mass murder

Bryan Caplan, professor in Department of Economics and Center for Study of Public Choice, George
Mason University, January 2006
"The Totalitarian Threat," George Mason University Economic Faculty Web Page,
http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/total4.doc (accessed 4/26/2015)
The connection between totalitarian goals and totalitarian methods is straightforward. People do not
want to radically change their behavior. To make them change anyway requires credible threats of
harsh punishment – and the main way to make such threats credible is to carry them out on a massive
scale. Furthermore, even if people believe your threats, some will resist anyway or seem likely to
foment resistance later on. Indeed, some are simply unable to change. An aristocrat cannot choose to
have proletarian origins, or a Jew to be an Aryan. To handle these recalcitrant problems requires special
prisons to isolate dangerous elements, or mass murder to eliminate them.
Totalitarianism creates social disasters

Bryan Caplan, professor in Department of Economics and Center for Study of Public Choice, George
Mason University, January 2006
"The Totalitarian Threat," George Mason University Economic Faculty Web Page,
http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/total4.doc (accessed 4/26/2015)
From the viewpoint of the ruling party, this may be a fair trade: More and worse disasters are the price
of social control. From the viewpoint of anyone concerned about global catastrophic risks, however,
this means that totalitarianism is worse than it first appears. To the direct cost of totalitarianism we
must add the indirect cost of amplifying other risks.
Terrorism Disadvantage Answers

Mass surveillance fails to stop terror—multiple reports conclude
Gaurav Laroia, Legislative Counsel, ACLU Washington Legislative Office, January 14, 2014
"Growing Chorus Agrees Mass Surveillance Just Doesn't Work," American Civil Liberties Union Blog,
https://www.aclu.org/blog/growing-chorus-agrees-mass-surveillance-just-doesnt-work?redirect=blog/
speakeasy/growing-chorus-agrees-mass-surveillance-just-doesnt-work (accessed 4/25/2015)
The New America Foundation (NAF) published a strong critique yesterday of the effectiveness of the
NSA's surveillance program. Its conclusion echoes a similar one reached by the president's NSA Review
Group - the agency's mass surveillance program simply does not work. The Review Group was unable to
find a single example of the NSA's phone metadata program providing crucial intelligence in a terrorism
investigation. The New America Foundation Report uses even stronger language, concluding that the
administration's claims about the role of warrantless NSA surveillance programs in keeping Americans
safe are "overblown and even misleading."
The entire premise of mass surveillance fails: big data collection never tells us
anything
Francis Gouillart, president of Experience Co-Creation Partnership, June 10, 2013
"Big data NSA spying is not even an effective strategy," Fortune, http://fortune.com/2013/06/10/big-
data-nsa-spying-is-not-even-an-effective-strategy/ (accessed 4/25/2015)
Unfortunately, as the administration trades privacy for intelligence insights, President Obama is
exchanging a cherished American value for an unproved theory. The Obama Administration loves data.
It argues that the president was reelected because of its enormous people database and use of polling
and social media. And the Affordable Care Act is built in part on a belief that massive troves of electronic
health records will pave the way for predictive algorithms that will prevent costly hospital readmissions,
or identify medical practices that lead to better patient health. But the evidence for big data is scant at
best. To date, large fields of data have generated meaningful insights at times, but not on the scale
many have promised. This disappointment has been documented in the Wall Street Journal, Information
Week, and Smart Data Collective.
Terrorism Disadvantage Answers
Requiring warrants won’t impede intelligence gathering

David S. Eggert, Professor of Law at Washington and Lee, 1983
"Executive Order 12333: An Assessment of the Validity of Warrantless National Security

Searches," Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1983, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2844&context=dlj (accessed 4/25/2015)
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the

warrant requirement will not significantly impede the
purpose behind foreign intelligence surveillance. Thus, as in Camara and Keith, it is unnecessary to pursue the
weighing process demanded by the third branch of the proposed test. Because the purpose is not frustrated, no government
interest counterbalances the diminution to individual rights flowing from lack of pre-seizure judicial scrutiny. The
scales tip
decisively in favor of the warrant requirement. Any inconvenience imposed on the executive by
the warrant requirement is substantially outweighed by the protection of privacy expectations.
It follows, therefore, that a general national security exception to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement does not satisfy the guidelines articulated by the Supreme Court in
Camara. To the extent Executive Order 12,333, section 2.5, relies on such an exception to avoid securing pre-search warrants for
foreign intelligence surveillance searches, the Order is unconstitutional.
Mass data collection results in false positives and fake conclusions

Nassim N. Taleb, Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New York University
Polytechnic School of Engineering, February 8, 2013
"Beware the Big Errors of 'Big Data,'" Wired, http://www.wired.com/2013/02/big-data-means-

big-errors-people/ (accessed 4/26/2015)
But beyond that, big data means anyone can find fake statistical relationships, since the spurious
rises to the surface. This is because in large data sets, large deviations are vastly more
attributable to variance (or noise) than to information (or signal). It’s a property of sampling: In
real life there is no cherry-picking, but on the researcher’s computer, there is. Large deviations
are likely to be bogus.
Executive Order 12333 Undermines Separation of Powers
The President doesn’t have unlimited authority on foreign relations—constitutional

checks exist
Jonathan D. Forgang, Associate Attorney at Goodwin Procter and J.D. from Fordham Law School, 2009
"'The Right of the People': The NSA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance of Americans Overseas," Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78 Issue 1,
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4468&context=flr (accessed 4/27/2015)
Though cases have often relied on Curtiss-Wright to show the President's ability to conduct foreign
affairs, the Court in Curtiss-Wright still warned that "like every other governmental power, [the
President's plenary power over foreign relations] must be exercised in subordination to the applicable
provisions of the Constitution."' Thus, the unquestioned executive prerogative for gathering foreign
affairs intelligence that some courts have found when holding that there is a foreign intelligence
exception is not actually written into the text of the Constitution.
The framers intended checks and balances to limit presidential power on foreign
affairs
In Truong, the Fourth Circuit held that the foreign intelligence needs of the executive are so compelling
that a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the President's ability to carry out his foreign affairs.
However, the Truong court overlooked the fact that the President's foreign affairs decisions are subject
to the same checks and balances as all other powers of the federal government. The Truong court also
reasoned that under the separation of powers doctrine, the executive has been entrusted with the
safety of the country and foreign intelligence surveillance. The Butenko court stated that foreign
intelligence needs often cannot be anticipated and, if courts required a warrant to carry out foreign
intelligence, the President might have to act illegally in order to fulfill the constitutional duties of the
office. While this is a valid concern, Congress has previously regulated the activities of foreign
intelligence agents. Checks and balances help combat the human tendency to abuse power. It does not
appear that the Framers wanted to suspend checks and balances when they affect the President's
foreign affairs power.
Leaks are not unique to any particular branch; there ought to be interbranch checks on
executive intelligence
Because of the secrecy of many foreign affairs matters, some commentators and courts believe it is
improper for parties outside the executive to view many classified documents. Some leaks of secret
information could pose a threat to national security and the lives of agents and confidential sources.
However, there are countervailing reasons to believe the courts are equally capable of handling
sensitive foreign affairs information. First, there is no reason to believe that the executive is less
susceptible to leaks than the judiciary. Government secrets are always capable of leaking, no matter
which branch of government holds them. Second, leaks from the judiciary are less likely because FISA
has solved many of the executive's concerns about security leaks with its strict secrecy requirements.
Separation of powers is vital to apply to executive intelligence gathering

It is not enough for a country to state its intention to uphold certain basic rights. The Founders knew
that a government must include internal checks and balances to ensure the protection of important
constitutional rights. Privacy is a basic right, protected by the laws and Constitution of the United States.
While national security is an immensely important interest, the government should not sacrifice all else
while trying to protect it. Warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance of Americans overseas is not an
evil act. It is the act of a government working hard to keep the country safe. However, a better balance
between the competing interests of privacy and national security is necessary to preserve a truly free
nation. It will take a vigilant and conscientious government to achieve this balance. Yet by looking to the
Constitution for guidance, it is possible for the United States to come closer to this essential equilibrium.
Excessive executive power over intelligence-gathering violates separation of powers

"The Impasse on Executive Spying," Empty Wheel, https://www.emptywheel.net/tag/eo-12333/

When NSA chose to avoid First Amendment review on the 3,000 US persons it had been watch-listing by
simply moving them onto a new list, when it refused to tell John Bates how much US person content it
collects domestically off telecom switches, when it had GCHQ break into Google’s cables to get content
it ought to be able to obtain through FISA 702, when it rolled out an Internet dragnet contact-chaining
program overseas in part because it gave access to US person data it couldn’t legally have here, NSA
made it clear it will only fulfill its side of the compromise so long as no one dares to limit what it can do.
That is, Snowden has made it clear that the “compromise” never was one. It was just a facade to make
Congress and the Courts believe they had salvaged some scrap of separation of powers. NSA has made it
clear it doesn’t much care what its overseers in Congress or the Court think. It’ll do what it wants,
whether it’s in the FISC or at a telecom switch just off the US shore. And thus far, Obama seems to
agree with them. Which means we’re going to have to start talking about whether this country believes
the Executive Branch should have relatively unfettered ability to spy on Americans. We’re going to have
to take a step back and talk about separation of powers again.
Involvement of the judiciary is critical to maintaining separation of powers in national

security surveillance policy
William C. Banks, Professor at Syracuse University College of Law, and M.E. Bowman, Associate General
Counsel at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000
"Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance," American University Law Review Vol. 50 Issue 1,
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1766&context=aulr (accessed
4/27/2015)
However, the “broader spirit” of the Fourth Amendment, as expressed in United States v. Katz, and “the
convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values” in national security wiretapping cases, made the
Court especially wary of possible abuses of the national security power. The Court proceeded to balance
“the duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger posed by
unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expression.” Justice Powell found that waiving
the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement could lead the executive to “yield too readily to
pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
speech.” Justice Powell stated that maintaining separation of powers and protecting individual freedoms
requires a judicial role in issuing warrants.
Separation of Powers Impacts
Separation of powers key to preserve democracy—history proves

David Samuels, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, 2014
"Separation of Powers," The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics,

http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~dsamuels/Boix%20&%20Stokes%20Samuels%20ch.pdf (accessed
4/26/2015)
Perhaps the most fundamental institutional difference across the world’s democracies is whether the
executive and legislative powers are fused or separate. Intelligent people have explored the question of
the ‘‘best’’ constitutional design since antiquity: Aristotle was perhaps the first comparativist, sending
his acolytes-cum-graduate students into the Weld to gather comparative constitutional ‘‘data.’’ Yet it
was the nightmare of Weimar Germany’s collapse into Nazi terror that sparked interest in this question
for twentieth-century scholars (Hermens 1941). For many scholars, the failure of democracy in many
countries during the Cold War (1945–90), particularly in Latin America, provided additional confirmation
that the separation of powers can affect democracy’s potential to flourish (e.g. Linz 1990).
Democracy ensures peace

James Lee Ray, professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, 1998
"Does Democracy Cause Peace?" American Review of Poliical Science vol. 1,

https://my.vanderbilt.edu/jamesleeray/files/2014/01/ray-does-democracy-cause-peace.pdf (accessed
4/27/2015)
Does democracy cause peace? The empirical evidence in favor of the proposition that democratic states
have not initiated and are not likely to initiate interstate wars against each other is substantial,
especially when compared with that which could be brought to bear by specialists in the 1970s. Criticism
of this evidence has so far met with reasonably persuasive counterarguments by the defenders of the
proposition.
Separation of Powers Impacts
Separation of powers is key to prevent tyranny

Charles R. Kesler, senior fellow of The Claremont Institute and editor of the Claremont Review of
Books, December 17, 2007
"What Separation of Powers Means for Constitutional Government," First Principles Series Report #17
on Political Thought, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/12/what-
separation-of-powers-means-for-constitutional-government (accessed 4/27/2015)
The argument from liberty holds that separation is needed in order to prevent tyranny. According to
Publius's famous definition, "The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." Tyranny is a danger because man's passions and
reason are not perfectly harmonious; his reason may be distorted by desire. Although each man has by
nature the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, he cannot secure these rights without
joining together with other men to form a civil society, a people. Despite the legal unity of this people, it
is composed of individuals whose impassioned opinions and interests divide them into majorities and
minorities. As a precaution against injustice, therefore, the powers of government must be so divided
that no man or group of men may wield all of them at once. This precaution would not be necessary if
reason and passion were utterly harmonious, and if the whole comprising such reason and passion were
a priori unitary rather than synthetic.
Separation of powers is key to governmental effectiveness

Charles R. Kesler, senior fellow of The Claremont Institute and editor of the Claremont Review of
Books, December 17, 2007
"What Separation of Powers Means for Constitutional Government," First Principles Series Report #17
on Political Thought, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/12/what-
separation-of-powers-means-for-constitutional-government (accessed 4/27/2015)
For in addition to the negative function of preventing tyranny, the separation of powers actively
promotes good government. That is to say, it allows the branches of the federal government to perform
their respective functions well or at least better than they otherwise could. In the first argument,
"power" is treated as a generic thing, abstracted from any ends for which it might be used, regarded as a
dangerous end in itself (hence its "encroaching" nature). But in the second, "power" is divided into
"powers," acknowledging that each has a "nature" that aims at the excellent performance of certain
definite functions.
Answers to Supreme Court Counterplan
Supreme Court ruling has settled the issue and establishes a no-standing precedent
Ryan Gallagher, reporter on surveillance and national security, February 26, 2013
"Supreme Court Says Americans Can't Challenge 'Dragnet Surveillance' Law," Slate,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/02/26/fisa_supreme_court_says_americans_don_t_ha
ve_standing_to_challenge_surveillance.html (accessed 4/27/2015)
Now, the Supreme Court has weighed in to settle the issue, reversing the 2nd Circuit’s judgment on a 5-
4 vote and agreeing with the government that the plaintiffs have no standing to challenge the spy law.
The Supreme Court said that the plaintiffs’ argument “fails” in part because it “rests on a speculative
chain of possibilities that does not establish that their potential injury is certainly impending or is fairly
traceable.” The ruling states that “it is highly speculative whether the government will imminently target
communications to which respondents are parties,” adding that “they have no actual knowledge of the
government’s [FISA] targeting practices.”
Court has already ruled that there is no standing to sue to stop surveillance
Bill Mears, CNN Supreme Court Producer, November 18, 2013
"Supreme Court allows NSA to continue looking at telephone records for now," CNN.com,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/18/politics/supreme-court-nsa-phone-records/ (accessed 4/27/2015)
The revelations of the NSA program and the inner workings of the Surveillance Court came after a
former agency contractor, Edward Snowden, leaked documents to the Guardian newspaper in Britain.
Snowden fled to Hong Kong and then Russia to escape U.S. prosecution, and his supporters say they are
working on asylum deals with other countries on his behalf. The Justice Department urged the high
court to stay out of the current fight, called a "mandamus" review. EPIC's petition "does not meet the
stringent requirements for mandamus relief, and this court lacks jurisdiction" to act, Solicitor General
Donald Verrilli said in the government's brief, filed last month. "The mandamus petition does not
establish that it is more than speculative that the NSA has reviewed, or might in the future review,
records pertaining to petitioner's members, particularly given the stringent, (Surveillance Court)-
imposed restrictions that limit access to the database to counterterrorism purposes," the Obama
administration added. The U.S. Supreme Court does not comment on pending cases. The privacy rights
group now has the option of going back to the lower courts and starting the legal process anew. Prior
lawsuits against the NSA program have been unsuccessful.

Supreme Court precedent is clear in the status quo and accepts the government’s
interpretation in toto
Ryan Gallagher, reporter on surveillance and national security, February 26, 2013
"Supreme Court Says Americans Can't Challenge 'Dragnet Surveillance' Law," Slate,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/02/26/fisa_supreme_court_says_americans_don_t_ha
ve_standing_to_challenge_surveillance.html (accessed 4/27/2015)
It’s also worth noting that the Supreme Court judgement is clear in that it accepts “the government’s
interception of a private telephone or e-mail conversation amounts to an injury that is ‘concrete and
particularized’.” The reason the plaintiffs’ case failed was that they could not prove that they were
subject to surveillance—and they could not do so because the government refuses to comment on its
surveillance capabilities or divulge details about whom it is targeting. Indeed, in a bizarre piece of
circular reasoning, the NSA told lawmakers last year that it could not even so much as provide a rough
estimate of how many Americans it has spied on because it argues that providing this information would
itself “violate the privacy of U.S. persons.” This hammers home the point that the problem is not
necessarily the surveillance per se, but the secrecy that surrounds the surveillance.
Stare decisis is key to court legitimacy

Adam N. Steinman, Associate Professor of Law at University of Cincinnati, 2004
"A Constitution for Judicial Lawmaking," University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 65,
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/lawreview/article/viewFile/13/13 (accessed 4/27/2015)
A system where courts are free to decide cases knowing that the decision will not bind them in the
future could undermine the legitimacy of the court by permitting arbitrary or unprincipled
decisionmaking. The essence of principled decisionmaking, arguably, is to base decisions on principles
that will hold fast beyond just the immediate case. Thus, allowing broad judicial lawmaking can
legitimate the judicial role, because it helps to ensure that decisions are reached in a principled manner.
Stare decisis is necessary for public perception of principled judiciary

Adam N. Steinman, Associate Professor of Law at University of Cincinnati, 2004
"A Constitution for Judicial Lawmaking," University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 65,
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/lawreview/article/viewFile/13/13 (accessed 4/27/2015)
The benefits that judicial lawmaking creates would be lost if future courts were free to modify that law
without sufficient justification. In addition, stare decisis impacts the legitimacy of judicial
decisionmaking. If courts may disregard the principles articulated in prior cases without proper
justification, the legitimating notion that cases are reached in a principled manner is eroded.
Court legitimacy key to prevent terrorism

Jeremy Shapiro, Associate Director at the Brookings Institute, 2003
“French Lessons: The Importance of the Judicial System in Fighting Terrorism,” Brookings Institute,
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cusf/analysis/shapiro20030325.htm (accessed 4/27/2015)
The unique nature of terrorism means that maintaining the appearance of justice and democratic
legitimacy will be much more important than in past wars. The terrorist threat is in a perpetual state of
mutation and adaptation in response to government efforts to oppose it. The war on terrorism more closely
resembles the war on drugs than World War II; it is unlikely to have any discernable endpoint, only irregular periods of calm. The French
experience shows that ad-hoc anti-terrorist measures that have little basis in societal values and shallow support in public opinion may wither
away during the periods of calm. In the U.S., there is an enormous reservoir of legitimacy, established by over 200 years of history and tradition,
in the judiciary. That reservoir represents an important asset that the U.S. government can profit from to maintain long-term vigilance in this
type of war. Despitethe unusual opportunity for innovation afforded by the crisis of September 11, the U.S.
government has not tried to reform American judicial institutions to enable them to meet the threat of
terrorism. To prevent the next wave of attacks, however far off they might be, and to avoid re-inventing a slightly different wheel each time
will require giving life to institutions that can persist and evolve, even in times of low terrorist activity. Given the numerous differences between
the two countries, the U.S. cannot and should not simply import the French system, but it can learn from their mistakes. Their experience
suggests a few possible reforms: A specialized U.S. Attorney tasked solely with terrorism cases and entirely responsible for prosecuting such
cases in the U.S. Direct and formal links between that U.S. Attorney’s office and the various intelligence agencies, allowing prosecutors to task
the intelligences agencies during judicial investigations Special procedures for selecting and protecting juries in terrorism cases and special rules
of evidence that allow for increased protection of classified information in terrorist cases Creating a
normal, civilian judicial process
that can prosecute terrorists and yet retain legitimacy is not merely morally satisfying. It may also help
to prevent terrorist attacks in the long run. Not incidentally, it would demonstrate to the world a
continuing faith in the ability of democratic societies to manage the threat of terrorism without
sacrificing the very values they so desperately desire to protect.
General Kritik Answers: Mass Surveillance Undermines Alternative

Surveillance stops the fruition of critical ideas, meaning the alternative won’t spread
Margot E. Kaminski, Professor of Law at Ohio State University, and Shane Witnov, California
attorney, January 1, 2015
"The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech,"
University of Richmond Law Review, Vol. 49, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2550385 (accessed 4/27/2015)
If the First Amendment serves to foster a marketplace of ideas, surveillance thwarts this purpose by
preventing the development of minority ideas. Research indicates that surveillance more strongly affects
those who do not yet hold strong views than those who do. If the First Amendment serves to encourage democratic self-
governance, surveillance thwarts this purpose as well. Surveillance discourages individuals with unformed ideas from
deviating from majority political views. And if the First Amendment is intended to allow the fullest development of the autonomous self,
surveillance interferes with autonomy. Surveillance encourages individuals to follow what they think others expect of
them and conform to perceived norms instead of engaging in unhampered self-development.
Surveillance destroys the ability to change one’s beliefs

Margot E. Kaminski, Professor of Law at Ohio State University, and Shane Witnov, California
attorney, January 1, 2015
"The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech,"
University of Richmond Law Review, Vol. 49, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
Further, a person‘s commitment to a minority position is directly related to her ability to resist majority
influence, and surveillance is likely to make it harder to become committed to a minority position. In a
variation on Asch‘s experiment, researchers had subjects make a commitment to an answer by writing it down, before all of the members of the group announced their answers. The more
committed the subject was to the answer before hearing the responses of the group, the greater her ability to resist the group norm. In the White and Zimbardo study on police surveillance,
individuals who were less-

the surveillance had less effect on individuals who had already taken a public position on legalization of marijuana. On the other hand,
decided were most influenced by the conforming effect of the surveillance. Accordingly, the conforming effect caused by
surveillance can result in smaller and less confident minorities. These minorities, in turn, will be less successful than they otherwise might have been at challenging the status quo and the
individuals and the public will miss out on the better, more deliberate, more creative, and
majority views. Thus,
more critical thinking that results from minority influences.
Surveillance undermines critical speech acts of oppressed

Paul Bernal, Lecturer in Media Law at the University of East Anglia Law School, November 19, 2014
"Surveillance, power and chill . . . and the Chatham House Rule," Paul Bernal's Blog,
https://paulbernal.wordpress.com/2014/11/19/surveillance-power-and-chill-and-the-chatham-house-
rule/ (accessed 4/27/2015)
the chill of surveillance is real. And, perhaps most importantly, it’s real for precisely those people that need support
So yes,
in freedom of expression terms. People whose voices are heard the least often – and people who have
the most need to be able to take advantage of the opportunities that our modern communications
systems offer. The internet can enable a great deal, particularly for people in those kinds of positions – from freedom of expression to freedom of assembly and association and
much, much more – but surveillance cannot just jeopardise that but reverse it. If it only enables freedom of speech
for those already with power, it exacerbates the power differences, and makes those already quiet even
quieter, whilst those with power and voice can get their messages across even more powerfully .
MUSLIM SURVEILLANCE AFFIRMATIVE
Muslim Surveillance 1AC

Thesis: The FBI regularly conducts sting operations where informants target vulnerable Muslims with no
real interest in terrorism. This is called a “provocation” strategy, whereby informants supply
encouragement, arms, money, and other support to radicalize the individual. Once they engage in a
botched attempt, they are prosecuted and conviction. The focus on Muslims as inherent terrorists in
clearly racist and should be reversed.
OBSERVATION ONE: THE STATUS QUO

A. Anti-Muslim surveillance is racial and religious profiling. The FBI manipulates
religion through informants and agents to literally create terrorists they can catch
Human Rights Watch, Staff Writer, July 2014, “The Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US
Terrorism Prosecutions,”
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usterrorism0714_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf, ACC. 5-22-2015
In many of the sting operations we examined, informants and undercover agents carefully laid out an
ideological basis for a proposed terrorist attack, and then provided investigative targets with a range of
options and the weapons necessary to carry out the attack. Instead of beginning a sting at the point
where the target had expressed an interest in engaging in illegal conduct, many terrorism sting
operations that we investigated facilitated or invented the target’s willingness to act before
presenting the tangible opportunity to do so. In this way, the FBI may have created terrorists out of
law-abiding individuals. In these cases, the informants and agents often seemed to choose targets
based on their religious or political beliefs. They often chose targets who were particularly vulnerable
—whether because of mental disability, or because they were indigent and needed money that the
government offered them. In some cases—which have been particularly troubling for American
Muslim communities—targets were seeking spiritual guidance, and the government informants or
agents guided them towards violence. Relevant aspects of these cases are described below.
B. The FBI has virtually unrestrained power to engage in domestic surveillance

Bill Chambers, Staff Writer, July 14, 2014, “NSA & FBI Spying on Muslims: Old Story, New Target,”
Chicago Monitor, http://chicagomonitor.com/2014/07/nsa-fbi-spying-on-muslims-old-story-new-
target/, ACC. 5-22-2015
Now with the advanced, mass surveillance technology at the disposal of the NSA, the FBI has almost
unlimited ability to target all the communications of specific people or a very large group of people with
very little effort. The other Snowden revelations have already shown that the NSA did not require much
in the way of legal justifications, evidence of criminality, or court approval to gather large amounts of
data on any American. How much legal justification, evidence, or approval would the FBI really have
needed to convince the judge in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that these five American
Muslims were terrorists potentially plotting terrorist acts?
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C. FBI anti-Muslim sting operations manufacture “terrorists” with no will or capability
to engage in lone wolf attacks
Trevor Aaronson, Senior Fellow at the Shuster Institute for Investigative Journalism, 2013, The Terror
factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, pp. 225-226
For the FBI, terrorism sting operations net results, and results confirm to the Bureau that a problem or
threat exists, thereby supporting the belief that more terrorism sting op erations are needed. While this
type of cycle could be created from any kind of crime and with any law enforcement agency, it is hard to
imagine that the public would tolerate widespread sting operations and aggressive informants used in
anything other than terrorism investigations in Muslim communities. Imagine, for example, if law
enforcement sent informants and undercover officers into poor minority communities in South Los
Angeles and offered cash for stolen cars—and then used the resulting rash of arrests to prove how well
the police were curbing the growing problem of auto theft, a problem the police had created in the first
place. Would the public, alerted by African American and Hispanic community leaders to what would
appear to be entrapment and racial and ethnic targeting, tolerate such behavior from law enforcement?
The answer is no. Yet since 9/11, leaders in Muslim communities nationwide have objected to the FBI
tactics used against their people, without any kind of support from the public or the media. I can only
believe that the public either does not understand how egregious the FBI's practices are, or believes that
keeping the United States safe from would-be terrorists justifies limits to justice and civil rights for a
single minority group. To this day, the FBI continues to manufacture terrorism crimes in Muslim
communities. By not challenging the FBI and the Justice Department, the public and the media have
tacitly condoned sting operations against men with no capacity on their own to commit serious crimes.
If the FBI’s top priority is to find and stop lone wolves, and these lone wolves are found only through FBI
stings that border on entrapment and target easily influenced men with financial troubles or mental
problems, providing the FBI with a deep pool of potential terrorists, then how will the Bureau ever know
when terrorism is no longer a threat, and the time has come to shift priorities?
D. Local law enforcement follow the FBI’s lead on anti-Muslim surveillance

Madiha Shahabuddin, JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, September 2014, “The
More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be”: How Government Surveillance of Muslim
Americans Violates First Amendment Rights,” Chapman Law Review, Vol. 18:2, 577-610,
http://www.chapmanlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Shahabuddin.pdf, ACC. 5-22-2015
The government’s use of informants to infiltrate mosques throughout the country is particularly
troubling, reminiscent of the days of COINTELPRO and the massive distrust the government sowed
throughout the politically dissident community. Agencies like the FBI—and by extension local law
enforcement like the NYPD—have aggressively sought to recruit and send informants to mosques to
infiltrate Muslim American communities, befriend unwitting mosque attendees, Muslim community
leaders, and even Muslim student organization members to record, report, and in many instances,
incite violence or discussions of violence to see which Muslims will be caught in the dragnet.
Investigative journalist and author Trevor Aaronson dedicated years to studying the terrorism
prosecutions that resulted from the use of government informants. According to data he collected in
August 2011, almost ten years since 9/11, out of 508 terrorism defendants, “243 had been targeted
through an FBI informant, 158 had been caught in an FBI terrorism sting, and 49 had encountered an
agent provocateur.” By numbers alone, then, during that time period, nearly forty-eight percent of the
defendants prosecuted for terrorism-related crimes had been apprehended by the use of a government-
sent informant, tasked with setting up—and often supplying materials for—a terror plot and bringing
the targeted individual into the fold of it.
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E. The paradigm of prevention lowers the bar for FBI investigations and specifically
calls for targeting Muslims
Arun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at NYU, 2014, The Muslims
are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, pp. 194-195
After 9/11, the FBI adopted a preemptive stance on countering terrorism—what John Ashcroft, then
attorney general, repeatedly promoted as a new "paradigm of prevention." The belief was that the usual
principles of the rule of law—investigating individuals when there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal
intent—were insufficient for tackling terrorism. Surveillance had to be broadened to a wider group
suspected of radicalization. In line with this, Ashcroft revised the FBI's guidelines so that the threshold
for counterterrorism investigations was significantly lowered." Whereas earlier, informants could be
used only when there was strong evidence of criminal activity, after 9/11 they could be employed much
more widely. Philip Mudd, who in 2006 became associate executive director of the National Security
Branch of the FBI, explained the consequences of the new preventive approach: "By definition, if you are
preventative, there will be people dragged into those investigations who did not do something wrong."
Mudd was recruited to lead the process of transforming the FBI into a spy agency on the model of
Britain's MI5, of moving the bureau beyond investigating individual cases to a wide- ranging gathering of
information on American Muslim communities in general. He had previously been deputy director of the
CIA's Counterterrorism Center, during the period when it tortured terrorism suspects, and in the run-up
to the Iraq war, when he liaised with then secretary of state Colin Powell prior to his notorious speech at
the UN, which was based on fabricated intelligence. Mudd introduced a program at the FBI called
"domain management" that involved producing electronic maps showing in detail where ethnic groups
were clustered, cross-referencing such information with databases of financial transactions, charitable-
giving activities, jobs held, and so on. This then became the basis for allocating resources and informant
recruitment to specific neighborhoods—effectively, a form of ethnic profiling. The FBI's Domestic
Investigations and Operations Guide, which implements The Attorney General Guidelines, calls on
agents to refrain from profiling "solely" on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion. But
they permit the collection of information regarding ethnic behaviors "reasonably believed to be
associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community"—which, given the
FBI's model of radicalization, would allow for all kinds of Muslim religious practices to be subject to
surveillance. Also permitted is the identification of "locations of concentrated ethnic communities [and]
the locations of ethnic-oriented businesses and other facilities," which presumably includes mosques.
F. Current FBI approaches are designed to pacify Congress through manufacturing

“terrorists”. This guarantees we will be unprepared for the next attack
These are unanswerable questions. But as I researched terrorism sting operations and talked with
current and former FBI agents who complained that in terrorism stings the government was creating
bogeymen from buffoons, I've thought a lot about these questions, which remind me of a line that Peter
Ahearn, the retired FBI agent who directed the Western New York Joint Terrorism Task Force and
oversaw the investigation of the Lackawanna Six, offered when we sat in a coffee shop in the
Washington, D.C., suburbs. "If you concentrate more people on a problem," Ahearn told me, "you'll find
more problems." The corollary to that, of course, is that if you concentrate fewer people on a problem,
you'll find fewer problems. It's conceivable that had the FBI not been chasing terrorists of its own
creation, federal agents might have had the resources to prevent the financial crimes that ultimately
brought the world economy to the brink of collapse—or stopped the sovereign citizen movement before
men like Brandon Paudert were killed. However, since the U.S. Congress continues to mandate that the
FBI focus on terrorism, and the FBI in turn churns out Islamic terrorism cases to prove that it is respon -
sive to that mandate, it's conceivable that the Bureau will not notice or arrive too late to address the
real crimes and threats of tomorrow.
1AC
PLAN: The Federal Bureau of Investigation should end its domestic surveillance
practices of preemption and provocation directed at Muslim communities.
ADVANTAGE ONE: RACISM

A. Current anti-Muslim counterterrorism is rooted in racist orientalism thinking that
buttresses U.S. imperialism
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, Strategic Culture Foundation April 6, 2015, “Imagery and Empire:
Understanding the Western Fear of Arab and Muslim Terrorists,” Global Research,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/imagery-and-empire-understanding-the-western-fear-of-arab-and-
muslim-terrorists/5440478, ACC. 5-22-2015
The notion that the majority of terrorist attacks are committed by Arabs or Muslims not only lacks a
historical perspective, but is an unempirical argument that is tied to modern Orientalism that is alive and
kicking. Orientalism, itself is heavily tied to US views of exceptionalism. It is an area of thinking where
exceptionalist and racist views coincide profoundly. In fact, there is a thin line between all three. In an
outdated linear and geo-ethnocentric way of thinking, whatever societies are located east, as well as
south, of the US, Canada, and Western Europe — particularly France, Britain, and the Germanic-
speaking countries — are viewed as deficient and inferior. In Europe, this means everyone east of
Germany is either tacitly or overtly portrayed as culturally backward. This means the Balkans, Slavic
peoples, Albanians, Greeks, Turks, Romanians, Orthodox Christianity, and the ex-Soviet republics. Under
Orientalist thinking in the US, even lower on the totem pole are non-Europeans. This means the peoples
of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Like exceptionalist attitudes, Orientalist views are
important for supporting Washington’s foreign policy and wars as a noble enterprise. US Orientalist
attitudes see the rest of the world, from Mexico to Iraq and Russia, as needing US tutelage and
stewardship. This is a reconstruction of what was called the «white man’s burden» that was used to
justify the colonization of people that were perceived as non-whites.
B. Post-911 fears have infested the intelligence community with racial bias against
Muslim Americans. This systemically makes the system rigged against an entire race
Glenn Greenwald, journalist and constitutional lawyer, and Murtaza Hussain, Staff Writer, July 8,
2014, “Meet the Muslim-American leaders the FBI and NSA have been spying on,” The Intercept,
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/, ACC. 5-22-2015
Whatever the specific reasons and methods used to monitor the five men’s emails, the surveillance
against them took place during the chaos and fear that enveloped the national security community in
the years after 9/11. The Clinton Administration had avoided investigating potential links between
Muslim charities and suspected terrorists, and the FBI was scrambling to catch up and scrutinize dozens
of organizations on the orders of the Bush Administration. Those probes led to some prosecutions and
convictions, but they also generated a huge backlash of criticism for targeting innocent groups. One
former law enforcement official said that, while the FBI was diligent in trying to hew to the law, there
may have been “some missteps” along the way. Those missteps have landed heavily on Americans of
Muslim heritage. Even when the surveillance process is overseen by officials and judges who don’t
share the Islamophobic mindset of John Guandolo, mainstream and constitutionally protected forms
of activism by American Muslims have come to be seen by some within the intelligence community as
potentially dangerous—a dynamic that raises the potential for abuse, especially when warrants are
issued in secret and authorized by a law that gives wide latitude to those seeking them. A Washington
Post report earlier this week found that the government used FISA procedures to intercept and retain
vast amounts of private data belonging to “ordinary internet users” who had no evident connection to
terrorism or espionage and had been “caught in a net the [NSA] had cast for somebody else.”
1AC
C. The FBI uses human surveillance through false relationships in an effort that
criminalizes Muslim identities and thought. We have an obligation to reject the
spectacle of Muslim extremism that makes violence by the US empire invisible
The consequences of making the notion of radicalization central to the domestic war on terror are far-
reaching. When the government widened the perceived threat of terrorism from individuals actively
inciting, financing, or preparing terrorist attacks to those having an ideology, they brought
constitutionally protected activities of large numbers of people under surveillance. Most discussion of
state surveillance attends to wiretapping, collection of Internet communications data, closed-circuit
television cameras, and other forms of electronic surveillance of our online and offline lives. Edward
Snowden's whistle-blowing has made clear the extent to which the US National Security Agency
conducts warrantless surveillance of Internet and phone communication globally and domestically. But
central to counter-radicalization practice is another form of surveillance that is addressed less often:
using personal relationships within targeted communities themselves for intelligence gathering. When
community organizations and service providers such as teachers, doctors, and youth workers develop
surveillance relationships with law enforcement agencies, when government community engagement
exercises mask intelligence gathering, and when informants are recruited from communities,
surveillance becomes intertwined with the fabric of human relation ships and the threads of trust upon
which they are built. The power and danger of these forms of surveillance derive from their entangle-
ment in everyday human interactions at the community level rather than from the external monitoring
capabilities of hidden technologies. Moreover, having established such structures of surveillance in
relation to Islamist extremism, it becomes easy to widen them to other forms of radicalism—
occasionally to cover the far Right, but more often to left-wing protesters and dissidents. Following from
the widening of surveillance is the criminalization of ideological activities previously understood to be
constitutionally protected. This can happen through the entrapment of individuals by law enforcement
agencies or through measures criminalizing the material support of terrorism, the definition of which
has been widened to include a broad range of ideological activities. Then, because ideologies circulating
among Muslim populations have been identified as precursors to terrorism, the perception grows that
Muslims have a special problem with radicalization. In this context, leaders of targeted Muslim
communities have become intimidated by the general mood and aligned themselves with the
government, offering themselves as allies willing to oppose and expose dissent within the community.
Everyone who rejects the game of fake patriotism falls under suspicion, as opposition to extremism
becomes the only legitimate discourse. Finally, the spectacle of the Muslim extremist renders invisible
the violence of the US empire. Opposition to such violence from within the imperium has fallen silent, as
the universal duty of countering extremism precludes any wider
D. FBI training materials teach agents to see all Muslims as terrorists to be destroyed
Glenn Greenwald, journalist and constitutional lawyer, and Murtaza Hussain, Staff Writer, July 8,
2014, “Meet the Muslim-American leaders the FBI and NSA have been spying on,” The Intercept,
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/, ACC. 5-22-2015
The FBI—which is listed as the “responsible agency” for surveillance on the five men—has a
controversial record when it comes to the ethnic profiling of Muslim-Americans. According to FBI
training materials uncovered by Wired in 2011, the bureau taught agents to treat “mainstream”
Muslims as supporters of terrorism, to view charitable donations by Muslims as “a funding
mechanism for combat,” and to view Islam itself as a “Death Star” that must be destroyed if terrorism
is to be contained.
E. Racism is constructed socially through rhetoric and human interaction. We can and
must take every opportunity to dismantle the structures of oppression that organize
daily life
David Hall, JD, University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law School, Summer, 1999, “Giving Birth to a Racially Just
Society in the 21st Century,” University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review, 21 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 927,
https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=
21+U.+Ark.+Little+Rock+L.+Rev.+927&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=7128c39417584ebb5f524e6401917bdc, ACC.
5-23-2015
The history of racism and racial discrimination in this society is a classic example of this cycle of
frustration and dashed hopes. As we approach the close of the 20th Century a retrospective analysis
would provide numerous examples of what some have come to call the civil rights shuffle-one step
forward, two steps backwards, side step, side step. This dance was eloquently and consistently
choreographed for the last one hundred years and beyond. This dance does not negate or belittle the
important and significant progress which was made during this century, but one could accurately say at
the dawning of the 21st Century what W.E.B. DuBois said about the 20th Century-the issue of the
century will be the color line. Therefore it is critically important and appropriate to not only learn
lessons from the mistakes of this closing century, but to find the spiritual will to bring an end to this
dance. Though a seminal symposium on race creates important opportunities to discuss these critical
matters, one has to wonder if we are only engaged in a ritualistic exercise that pacifies our insecurities
as the world around us gets worse. In the midst of those moments of sobering reflection, one must
realize that each opportunity we have in life to touch each other's souls, to challenge each other's
minds, and to lift each other's spirits, is a precious gift. The mere possibility that words and human
interaction can make a difference in the reality of the world is what should inspire our future efforts and
dedication, even when there is very little tangible evidence of progress.
OBSERVATION TWO: DO THE RIGHT THING

A. The federal government should stop suspicionless surveillance of Muslim
Americans
The government—both federal and local—should stop the practice of widespread, suspicionless
surveillance of Muslim Americans in the form of mosque infiltration and informant sting operations.
Community and grassroots activists, legal civil rights groups, and Muslim American leaders are all calling
for the end of such a practice. Choosing to spy on Muslims simply because they are Muslim and attend
a mosque is based upon a faulty and invidious presumption that terrorist threats only come from
Muslims, and namely those Muslims who are more “religious.” Such a presumption must be retracted
in order for the government’s approach to be narrowly tailored. Moreover, the current surveillance
techniques have not proved effective in achieving their stated goals. In 2012, Assistant Chief Thomas
Galati of the NYPD himself attested under oath that during the more than six years of its
implementation, the surveillance program did not yield a single lead, nor did it spark the need to initiate
any terror investigations. There are also limits to how useful a tool surveillance can be for crime
prevention.
1AC
B. Status quo policies undermine counter-terrorism goals. The federal government
should adopt an approach that respected Muslim rights in surveillance policies
US counterterrorism policies call for building strong relationships with American Muslim communities.
Yet many of the practices employed are alienating those communities and diverting resources from
other, more effective, ways of responding to the threat of terrorism. The US government should focus
its resources on a rights-respecting approach to terrorism prosecutions, one that protects security
while strengthening the government’s relationship with communities most affected by abusive
counterterrorism policies.
C. We have a moral obligation to reverse anti-Muslim counterterrorism. The FBI

manipulates young Muslims and turns them into would-be mass murders
Mark S. Hamm, PhD, Professor of Criminology at Indiana State University, 2015, “Book Review - Arun
Kundnani: The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror,” Critical
Criminology, 23:1, pp. 141-143
After 9/11, FBI agents began hunting the lowly and wretched. Several of the Muslims identified by
Kundnani as sting targets suffered from schizophrenia. One kept bottles of his urine at his bedside;
another was hallucinating on PCP throughout the investigation. The NYPD’s biggest terrorism get has
been a Spanish Harlem heroin addict named Jose Pimentel, a man so mentally disturbed that he
circumcised himself.
A more appropriate reference for the FBI’s sting program is the “broken windows” approach to urban
law enforcement. But instead of emphasizing arrests for “quality of life” and petty drug crimes to
maintain order in working-class neighborhoods, FBI agents trawl cyber neighborhoods of the Internet
looking for what they call Kramer jihadists (after the bumbling Seinfeld character) who espouse violence
against the United States. The FBI’s mission is to lure these opinionated but criminally inept young
Muslim men into conspiracies where agents can provide them with the tutelage and encouragement
necessary to turn relatively harmless people into would-be mass murderers—never once considering
how such a costly method of wrecking lives might be converted into soft power approaches to salvage
them. That may be the ultimate moral failure of domestic counterterrorism in the twenty first Century
and Kundnani is to be applauded for making academic sense of it.
Affirmative Extension
State and local law enforcement follows the FBI lead

The FBI sets the standard for local surveillance of Muslim communities
Diala Shamas, Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project at CUNY
School of Law, October 31, 2013, “Where’s the Outrage When the FBI Targets Muslims?,” The Nation,
http://www.thenation.com/article/176911/wheres-outrage-when-fbi-targets-muslims, ACC. 5-22-2015
Contrary to popular perception, however, the NYPD has not gone rogue. In fact, the NYPD is following in
the footsteps of its federal counterparts at the FBI. Both agencies claim their intelligence gathering
activities are governed by rules; the difference is that while the NYPD faces some skepticism with
regards to the validity—or relevance—of its justifications, the FBI’s own surveillance policies have been
accorded far more deference. As an attorney working with New York’s Muslim communities at the
Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR) project at CUNY School of Law, along
with student attorneys and colleagues, I have engaged in various efforts to hold the NYPD accountable
for its surveillance and tactics. Along with the ACLU and the NYCLU, we represent Muslim individuals
and organizations bringing a legal challenge to the NYPD’s surveillance program. But CLEAR clients’
experiences also show us that the NYPD’s tactics are not exceptional. Aggressively intrusive and harmful
intelligence gathering on Muslims’ daily lives is a national epidemic—and the chief culprit is the FBI. The
task of holding the NYPD accountable must not supersede the equally, if not more important, task of
holding the FBI—and the broader law enforcement community—to account for their own misguided
post-9/11 policies.
SQ does not protect Muslim rights / Inherency

Domestic surveillance is engrained in Islamophobia. The Patriot Act allows the federal
government unrestrained power of surveillance it uses to racialize an entire group of
people.
Dalia F. Fahmy, Department of Political Science, Long Island University, March 2015, “The Green Scare
is not McCarthyism 2.0: How Islamophobia is redefining the use of propaganda in foreign and domestic
affairs,” Dialectical Anthropology, Volume 39, Issue 1, pp 63-67
The state utilized various technologies at its disposal and protected by the US Patriot Act (or Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
of 2001). The US Patriot Act allows the state to ‘‘enhance’’ domestic security against terrorism, institute
its new surveillance procedures, remove obstacles to investigating terrorism, circumvent criminal law
statutes, and utilize new forms of surveillance measures, all without the knowledge of the public and
under secret authorization. And while the extent of surveillance is only beginning to come to light
through the recent revelations of Edward Snowden and Glen Greenwald, the program has reified the
Islamophobic discourses by allowing for the targeting of Muslims in the name of security, without
yielding real fruit, while alienating and racializing a segment of the nation.
FISA and the FISC do not prevent FBI surveillance of American Muslims
target/, ACC. 5-22-2015
Even FISA and its Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) implemented to stop FBI abuse in
investigating dissidents is being used to continue the exact same practice, i.e. gathering intelligence
on American citizens who the NSA and FBI has decided are suspected terrorists. Now that group of
“dissidents” appears to be Americans Muslims.
FBI anti-Muslim stings are used to justify its bloated budget

Deirdre Fulton, Staff Writer, July 21, 2014, “FBI Entrapment Created 'Illusion' of Terrorist Plots:
Report,” Common Dreams, http://www.commondreams.org/news/2014/07/21/fbi-entrapment-
created-illusion-terrorist-plots-report, ACC. 5-25-2015
Federal officials and law enforcement agents are treating American Muslims like "terrorists-in-waiting,"
according to a new report released Monday by Human Rights Watch and Columbia Law School's Human
Rights Institute. The FBI, under pressure to appear effective and worthy of its $8.4-billion budget, has
"targeted American Muslims in abusive counterterrorism 'sting operations' based on religious and ethnic
identity"; sent informants to mosques to "troll for leads"; and in some cases encouraged or even paid
individuals to undertake terrorist acts, the report (pdf) reveals.
A2: FBI good

FBI anti-Muslim surveillance fosters psychological trauma
Alexander J. O’Connor and Farhana Jahan, University of California, Berkeley, 2014, “Under
Surveillance and Overwrought: American Muslims’ Emotional and Behavioral Responses to Government
Surveillance,” Journal of Muslim Health, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2014,
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jmmh/10381607.0008.106/--under-surveillance-and-overwrought-
american-muslims?rgn=main;view=fulltext, ACC. 5-23-2015
In early 2012, it was uncovered that the New York Police Department established an extensive program
of surveillance and infiltration of Muslim student organizations in universities across the northeast. That
this surveillance occurred both within and outside of New York City—in Connecticut and Pennsylvania,
for instance—was early evidence of the extent and support of covert surveillance of American Muslims
by United States law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Similar instances of widespread
surveillance conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were later uncovered in other areas
of the country. Such reports of governmental surveillance, profiling, and monitoring—all which we
consider in the present study—increased after September 11th, 2001. The USA PATRIOT Act (2001),
signed in the months after 9/11, by reducing restrictions in law enforcement agencies' ability to conduct
surveillance on anyone suspected of involvement in terrorism, provided the legal legitimacy for much of
the subsequent surveillance. Revelations about the National Security Agency’s surveillance program
suggest that these methods have since expanded. Such surveillance, however, has targeted many
people, Muslims in particular, with no connection to terrorism. Alongside other forms of post-9/11
discrimination experienced by American Muslims, government surveillance is associated with
psychological distress—including depression and subclinical forms of paranoia. Little is known,
however, about (1) American Muslims’ emotional reaction to being monitored by the government and
(2) how they respond to, manage, and regulate these emotions alongside the prospect of continuing or
future surveillance. The present work examined these two phenomena.
A2: FBI good

The FBI has a long history of labelling certain groups for surveillance and
criminalization of the people
target/, ACC. 5-22-2015
So presumably these individual names had to be taken in front of a judge at the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court with evidence that they were “not only agents of an international terrorist
organization…but also ‘are or may be’ engaged in or abetting espionage, sabotage, or terrorism.” In
other words, they were terrorists possibly involved in planning terrorist acts in the U.S. There has been
no indication or evidence that any of these individuals are terrorists so how was this surveillance ever
approved? Anyone who has any knowledge of the FBI’s history will recognize this scenario. A group of
people who challenge the government or U.S. foreign policy are assigned a label, criminalized by a law
or program, and then put under surveillance with the goal of an indictment or at least a disruption of
their activism. The label has ranged from “anarchist”, “socialist”, “communist”, “black nationalist”, to
today’s “terrorist”. There have been a series of laws, FBI programs, and Supreme Court decisions
attached to these labels that justified the surveillance and criminalization of the group. Laws have
ranged from the Espionage Act 1917, Alien and Sedition Act 1918, Smith Act 1940, McCarran Act 1950,
COINTELPRO (Domestic Counterintelligence Program) 1960′s, COMINFIL (Communist Infiltration
Program), the Patriot Act 2001, and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010. As the article points out,
even the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted in 1978 in response to disclosures that
J. Edgar Hoover and a long line of presidents from both parties had used U.S. intelligence agencies to spy
on dissidents and political enemies. Intended to allow authorities to covertly investigate suspected
spies or terrorists on U.S. soil, the surveillance is often used simply to gather intelligence, not to build
a criminal case.
Radicalization theories are wrong

Studies prove anti-Muslim surveillance inspires anxiety, not anger
Alexander J. O’Connor and Farhana Jahan, University of California, Berkeley, 2014, “Under
Surveillance and Overwrought: American Muslims’ Emotional and Behavioral Responses to Government
Surveillance,” Journal of Muslim Health, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2014,
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jmmh/10381607.0008.106/--under-surveillance-and-overwrought-
american-muslims?rgn=main;view=fulltext, ACC. 5-23-2015
Work by political scientists finds two dominant emotion responses—anxiety and anger—when
people imagine being monitored by the government. The emotional response of people personally
experiencing government surveillance is, however, unknown. In the case of American Muslims
experiencing government surveillance, anxiety levels are likely particularly pronounced. Consider that
American Muslims monitored by the government, even after they are cleared of suspicion, are in a
precarious position. Given the covert nature of US government surveillance, those previously
monitored can never be certain that monitoring has ceased. Even when believing surveillance has
ceased, they may view themselves as likely targets of future surveillance. Anxiety, not anger, is the
typical response to such feelings of uncertainty and uncontrollability in response to the prospect of
negative events. Furthermore, given evidence of higher levels of anxiety, depression, sub-clinical
paranoia, and dis-identification among American Muslims who report more general forms of religious
discrimination, those with potentially interminable experiences with government surveillance may be
especially prone to higher levels of anxiety.
Radicalization theories and fears of domestic Muslim terrorism are unfounded. Most
reject extremism
Fears of homegrown terrorism and radicalization theories have driven federal agencies to treat
American Muslim communities as uniquely susceptible to terrorist propaganda and to subject them to
greater government scrutiny. Yet this assumption is unsubstantiated. As a 2009 Pew study put it,
“[v]iolent jihad is discordant with the values, outlook and attitudes of the vast majority of Muslim
Americans, most of whom reject extremism.”
FBI counterterrorism efforts are guided by internal guidelines for broad-based

surveillance on radicalization
are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 194
Since 9/11, this problem has become far worse, as the FBI increasingly sees its counterterrorism role as
collecting broad-based intelligence on radicalization that is unconnected to any specific criminal act. Key
to this shift have been changes to the FBI's internal rules, known as the Attorney General's Guidelines.
These were originally introduced in 1976, following the revelations of abuses in the FBI's Hoover-era
countersubversion programs, such as COINTELPRO, which sought to discredit, harass, and criminalize
legitimate political movements. The guidelines clarified that the FBI's role was not to conduct open-
ended domestic intelligence operations. Intrusive investigative techniques could only be used when
there were specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or group is or may be
engaged in activities which involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve the
violation of federal law. The basis for starting such investigations had to be recorded, so that an audit
trail was available if allegations of government abuse were later raised. However, over time, the
guidelines were gradually adjusted so that the authority to collect information became less and less
dependent on having evidence of completed or impending criminal acts.
Pre-emptive prosecutions / provocation bad

94.2% of federal terrorism convictions are based on pre-emptive prosecutions
Abdullah Al-Arian, assistant professor of history at Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service in
Qatar, July 21, 2014, “The informants: Manufacturing terror,” AlJazeera News,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/informants-manufacturing-terror-
20147218131267614.html, ACC. 5-22-2015
A startling report utilising the Department of Justice's internal statistics recently stated that in the
decade after 9/11, 94.2 percent of federal terrorism convictions were obtained, at least in part, on the
basis of preemptive prosecutions. Given how pervasive this practice has been, it is noteworthy that
American Muslim civil rights groups have not developed a coordinated response to what has plainly
become a widespread use of informants nationwide. In some instances, they have even attempted to
downplay the problem of preemptive prosecutions, as in one report by a prominent American Muslim
organisation that states that "while the numbers clearly show informants are frequently used by federal
law enforcement, a majority of these cases do not involve them at all." The use of informants to target
communities is one of the most alarming trends to have developed since 9/11, as it threatens to undo
the fabric of a free society. That these recent investigative films have laid bare this troubling
phenomenon and displayed its consequences for all to see, is a critical first step in confronting its
damaging effect not only on the vulnerable American Muslim community but on American society as a
whole.
The FBI operates under the assumption that all Muslims are terrorists, or can be
turned into terrorists. The pre-emptive mandate is a program of provocation to
manipulate radicalization and create “terrorists”
Moreover, FBI agents believe that just monitoring young people in these radicalization stages is
insufficient. They claim surveillance alone is unreliable, because it risks missing crucial developments
that, they say, can occur over as little as a few months. Equally, the FBI believes that in other cases it
could be years before low-level radicalism moves to involvement in actual terrorist activity, by which
time the case may have been dropped because a period of surveillance failed to indicate any criminal
activity. Given these perceptions, as well as the demand that the FBI adopt counterterrorism as its top
priority and the requirement that it take a preemptive stance on perceived threats, a more aggressive
strategy has inevitably followed. That strategy is provocation: the use of agents provocateurs to test if
individuals expressing radical views can, in circumstances carefully engineered by the govern ment, be
pushed into criminal activity, so that they can then be arrested and prosecuted. As a RAND Corporation
study puts it, agents provocateurs need to be used to "lubricate" suspects' decision making.' The
assumption is that if an FBI undercover agent or informant can, through elaborate sting operations
lasting many months, create circumstances that manipulate radicalized young people into conspir ing to
commit acts of terror—with the FBI supplying fake weapons then that is sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that a person was already on a radicalization journey to becoming a terrorist. If the key
difficulty of a preventive approach to counterterrorism is knowing whether someone who is not
currently a terrorist is going to become one in the future, the FBI's solution is to ask a different question:
can someone who is not currently a terrorist be made into one by the FBI?

FBI provocation programs fail and lead to information overload. This erodes trust,
causes fear, and silences political dissent to undermine democracy
Mark S. Hamm, PhD, Professor of Criminology at Indiana State University, 2015, “Book Review - Arun
Kundnani: The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror,” Critical
Criminology, 23:1, pp. 141-143
Another problem is data overload. Kundnani cites a report showing that for a two-year period (2009–
2011), FBI agents conducted 42,888 national security assessments involving informants, interviews, and
physical surveillance. (All stings originate here.) Vast amounts of information has been collected (see
Edward Snowden), much of it unconnected to criminal activity. Kundnani illuminates the tragic irony.
“More often than not, when the US government has failed to prevent terrorist acts,” he writes, “it is not
because the intelligence was missing but because its significance was not identified amid the huge tracts
of surveillance data the national security state collects” (p. 194). Underwear bomber Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, Bledsoe and Hasan, and the Boston Marathon bombers—intelligence existed on all of
these post-9/11 terrorists prior to their attacks but its meaning became lost in the data overload.
Beyond these life-and-death concerns, the FBI’s agent provocateur program has concentrated its
resources primarily in Muslim-American communities, thereby eroding community trust, instigating fear,
and silencing political dissent necessary for democracy.
FBI convictions & the provocation strategy are a sham that constructs a self-fulfilling
prophecy and perpetual stereotyping
are coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror, p. 199-200
A second consequence of the provocation strategy is the distorting effect on perceptions of the
domestic terrorist threat. The FBI has generated a stream of terrorist convictions that are considered
genuine by policy makers and analysts. That these cases would not have existed without FBI fabrication
is ignored. This means that mainstream analysis of the scale and nature of the terrorist threat is in part a
self-fulfilling prophecy, reflecting the FBI's choices of whom to target. If the numbers of people arrested
in a particular year go up, it is as likely to be because of a step-up in the number of agent provocateur
operations the FBI is carrying out as the result of an independent increase in terrorist plotting. If
Muslims constitute the majority of those indicted for terrorism in the US, this is in large part a product
of whom the FBI is deciding to target in provocation operations rather than an objective measure of
where the threat of terrorism comes from. In the two decades leading up to 2010, 348 people were
killed in acts of political violence committed by the American far Right in the United States. Of course, a
much larger number of people died in the 9/11 attacks, carried out by Muslims present in the US as
foreign visitors. But the number of people killed in acts of political violence carried out by Muslim-
American citizens or long-term residents of the US is much smaller: twenty people between 1990 and
2010. Yet because the FBI considers Muslim Americans a special risk, it targets them with agents
provocateurs to a far greater degree than it does the far Right. The result is that every two months or so
the FBI announces another high-profile arrest of a Muslim terrorist suspect, keeping the US on its war on
terror footing and sustaining the multibillion- dollar homeland security industry, while the far Right
threat is downplayed. In turn, the stereotype of Muslims as inherently prone to terrorism is

perpetuated.

Today’s anti-terrorism stings are unique and target whole Muslim communities. They
are targeted because of their identity, not criminal history
Eugenia Lulo, Associate Media Director of the Brown Political Review, December 9, 2014, “Terrorists-
In-Waiting: The Problems With FBI Sting Operations,” Brown Political Review,
http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/12/terrorists-in-waiting-the-problems-with-fbi-sting-
operations/, ACC. 5-25-2015
Sting operations are not new to counterterrorism strategy. Rather, they have been a large part of the
FBI’s strategy almost as long as the organization has existed. The difference between a traditional sting
operation and its current iterations is that traditional sting operations deal with targets that have a
history of committing the same type of crime. Today, anti-terrorism sting operations often target people
because their communities, opinions and backgrounds are stereotypically associated with terrorism, and
criminal history is no longer the distinguishing factor. In the case of the Newburgh Four, Hussain began
search for a target by visiting mosques. Targeting mosques and other religious institutions that Muslim-
Americans frequent insinuates that Muslims are predisposed to terrorism, and inevitably results in
“treating American Muslims as terrorists-in-waiting.”
A2: Community partnerships

Community partnerships between the FBI and Muslim communities are top-down
programs. So-called moderate Muslim leaders are usually government plants
Whatever the merits of community-oriented policing to tackle drugs and gang-related crime, using it for
counterterrorism is a different proposition. Community partnerships are unable to provide any means of
accountability or shared decision making, because how the FBI investigates terrorism is decided in
Washington, DC, and driven by political forces that Muslim-American organizations have been unable to
challenge. Moreover, there is next to no information on terrorism that American Muslims can share with
law enforcement agencies, no matter how much trust they have in them, because hardly any have come
across terrorist recruitment. In practice, partnerships between the FBI and Muslim communities to
tackle terrorism have been part of a top-down strategy to prevent radicalization that goes way beyond
knowing about imminent crimes. The moderate Muslims who are recruited to such roles are rarely civil
rights advocates with a commitment to government accountability; more often they are, in effect,
advocates for the government, conveying its political message to community members rather than the
other way around.
The FBI treats Muslim communities as unified blocs, where civil rights claims are
vilified. They use community relations to gather intelligence
In the imaginations of FBI agents, immigrant Muslim communities are made up of monolithic blocs
headed by patriarchs—like the "tribes" many ex-military FBI agents thought they were confronting in
Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan before they joined the bureau. What this ignores is that communities are
complex tapestries, not only with different ethnic strands, but with multiple interwoven power
relationships of class, gender, and age. Who represents Muslims is not something that can be decided by
empirical indicators such as influence or the number of members in a congregation or an organization.
Communities do not come ready-made with leaders—to identify one is to make a political choice. And
potential leaders who take a civil rights stand are often vilified as conveyors of the extremist ideas that
supposedly make people into terrorists. While the Obama administration has rhetorically embraced the
idea of forging community partnerships with moderate Muslims in its domestic war on terror, in practice
the role communities are allowed to play in preventing terrorism has been reduced to intelligence
gathering and the self-policing of radical views.
Informants bad / coercion

FBI informants form the largest spy group since J. Edgar Hoover, focused on anti-
Muslim surveillance
What became clear from my reporting is that in the decade since 9/11, the FBI has built the largest
network of spies ever to exist in the United States—with ten times as many informants on the streets
today as there were during the infamous Cointelpro operations under FBI director J. Edgar Hoover
with the majority of these spies focused on ferreting out terrorism in Muslim communities. The
Mother Jones story revealed for the first time the inner workings of the FBI's informant program and
how agents provocateurs were behind most of the scary terrorist plots you've heard about since 9/11.
But after that story was published, I couldn't help but think about all of the material I had that didn't
make it into the article—the rich history of how the FBI transformed into something of a domestic CIA,
the inside stories of dozens of terrorism sting operations, interviews with current and former FBI agents
I'd met during my reporting, and the full explanation of how the government has exaggerated the threat
of Islamic terrorism in the United States. I believe the FBI's use of terrorism stings is one of the most
important national security stories of the last decade, and a desire to tell that story in full, and in as
much detail I could, led me to write this book.
FBI informants are paid to coerce Muslims into becoming terrorists they can then
prosecute. Even those with lawful status are threatened with no-fly status
The informant stories are all quite similar. An FBI informant—usually with a checkered past—is tasked
with posing as a Muslim with “contacts” to terrorist organizations and told to approach certain targets
who are often antisocial, almost “loner” types with few ties to a community—and sometimes with
mental health issues—to conjure a terror plot that will lead to those individuals’ prosecution and
conviction. Hefty financial incentives abound for the informants, who can be paid up to $100,000 or
more per case, with the added possibility of earning tens of thousands more if their operation results in
a conviction. The FBI does not stop there, supplying the informants with thousands of dollars at their
disposal to offer as financial inducements to their targets, thereby increasing the likelihood they will
get a “prosecutable” case. In addition, the FBI often uses the vulnerable immigration statuses of some
Muslims (e.g., an overstayed student visa or undocumented status) to coerce or exert immense
pressure upon immigrant Muslims to become informants in exchange for their immigration problems
“going away.” Such individuals are faced with the “choice” of either being deported, or, if they refuse,
being prosecuted for terrorism crimes themselves. Even Muslim Americans with lawful status are
approached by the FBI to become informants and threatened with being placed on the no-fly list and
barred from commercial air travel.
Informants bad / coercion

FBI terrorism informants only care about the money
Derek Royden, Staff Writer, January 29, 2015, “Manufacturing Terror: How the FBI Invents Some
Plots, and Ignores Others, In the War on Freedom,” Occupy.com,
http://www.occupy.com/article/manufacturing-terror-how-fbi-invents-some-plots-and-ignores-others-
war-freedom, ACC. 5-22-2015
Almost all FBI stings have one thing in common: the use of informants who are themselves trying to
get out of criminal charges, and are doing the job for cash, or both. The main informant in the Liberty
City case, Elie Assad, courted the men who practiced their own religion based on elements of
Christianity, Judaism and Islam, and who called themselves “The Seas of David.” The informants’
motivations seem obvious today; in all, Assad and another informant, Abbas al-Saidi, got more than
$130,000 for their work helping FBI handlers build a case against the seven men. Another interesting
note about the Seas of David: they never actually engaged in anything resembling violence, and
even refused to receive weapons when they were offered them. James J. Wedick, a former agent with
the Bureau, said of the group: “These guys couldn’t find their way down the end of the street. They
were homeless types. And, yes, we did show a picture where somebody was taking an oath to Al Qaeda.
So what? They didn’t care. They only cared about the money. When we put forth a case like that to
suggest to the American public that we’re protecting them, we’re not protecting them.”
Successful scuttles of terrorist plots are a misnomer. FBI informants coerce people to
take steps
factory: Inside the FBI’s manufactured War on Terrorism, p. 55
The FBI uses informants and terrorism stings to create a hostile environment for terrorist recruiters and
operators—by raising the risk of even the smallest step toward violent action. It's a form of deterrence,
an adaptation of the "broken windows" theory used to fight urban crime. Advocates such as Tidwell
insist it has been effective, noting that there hasn't been a successful large-scale attack against the
United States since 9/11. But what can't be answered—as many former and current FBI agents ac -
knowledge—is how many of the Bureau's targets would have taken the step over the line at all were it
not for the pressure and coercion of an informant.
Informants target poor and mentally ill Muslims who had no interest in terrorism, but
are assumed to be inherent terrorists
These biases become even more apparent during trials. As criminal defense lawyer Martin Stolar said to
Al Jazeera, “In the post-9/11 era, Muslims accused of terrorism start out with three strikes against them
and maybe four strikes,” making the justice system inherently unfair. Furthermore, these operations
have historically targeted the young, people with mental or intellectual disabilities, and the economically
disadvantaged — all of whom are particularly susceptible to being persuaded by an informant to join a
terrorist plot and who probably wouldn’t have the means or the initiative to pull it off otherwise. Most
of the suspects have no previous involvement with any terrorist groups when they are initially targeted
by an informant.
FBI manufactures Muslim “Terrorists”

FBI counterterrorism success claims are a fantasy constructed through coercion by
informants
The FBI currently spends $3 billion annually to hunt an enemy that is largely of its own creation.
Evidence in dozens of terrorism cases—involving plots to blow up synagogues, skyscrapers, military
recruiting stations, and bars and nightclubs—suggests that today's terrorists in the United States are
nothing more than FBI creations, impressionable men living on the edges of society who become bomb-
triggering would-be killers only because of the actions of FBI informants. The FBI and the Justice
Department then cite these sting cases as proof that the government is stopping terrorists before they
strike. But the evidence available for review in these cases shows that these "terrorists" never had the
capability to launch an attack themselves. Most of the targets in these stings were poor, uneducated,
and easily manipulated. In many cases, it's likely they wouldn't have come up with the idea at all without
prodding by one of the FBI's 15,000 registered informants. In sting after sting, from Miami to Seattle, the
FBI and its informants have provided the means for America's would-be terrorists to carry out an attack,
creating what a federal judge has called a "fantasy terror operation.""
The FBI regularly targets Muslims and coerces them into abusive interrogations to turn
them as informants
On a daily basis, our clients are targeted by FBI agents inquiring into the most intimate and protected
areas of their lives. They are approached at night at their homes, stopped in front of their neighbors or
children, solicited outside their subway stops or interrogated at their workplaces in front of their
colleagues and customers. And the interrogations are far from voluntary. FBI agents regularly warn our
clients who invoke their right to have an attorney present that “they can do this the easy way or the
hard way.” One client was so frightened by the agents’ threats that he agreed to accompany them to FBI
headquarters and let them strap him to what they claimed was a polygraph machine for four hours as
they peppered him with questions, accused him of lying and then turned around and asked him to work
for them as an informant.

The FBI largely manufactures terrorism plots. Anti-Muslim surveillance is an
empirically proven farce
For more than a decade, the FBI has thrown as much as it can toward an effort to stop the "next"
terrorist attack. Every year, the U.S. government allocates $3 billion to the FBI to prevent the next 9/11,
more money than the Bureau receives to combat organized crime. But what an analysis of ten years'
worth of Justice Department data shows is that Islamic terrorism in the United States is not an
immediate and dangerous threat. The FBI's thousands of informants and billions of dollars have not
resulted in the capture of dozens of killers ready and able to bomb a crowded building or gun down
people in a suburban shopping mall. Instead, the FBI's trawling in Muslim communities has resulted
largely in sting operations that target easily susceptible men on the margins of society, men like
Michael Curtis Reynolds. Since 9/11, the FBI and the Justice Department have labeled as terrorists a
mentally troubled man who worked at Walmart, a video game store clerk whose only valuable
possession was a set of stereo speakers, a university student who was about to be evicted from his
apartment, and a window washer who had dropped out of college, among others. All of these men
were involved in FBI terrorism stings in which an informant came up with the idea and provided the
necessary means and opportunity for the terrorist plot. While we have captured a few terrorists since
9/11, we have manufactured many more.
Anti-Muslim surveillance happens under the pretext of the FBI stopping future attacks
by a “lone wolf”
The FBI has a term for Martinez and other alleged terrorists like him: lone wolf. Officials at the Bureau
now believe that the next terrorist attack will likely come from a lone wolf, and this belief is at the core
of a federal law enforcement policy known variously as preemption, prevention, and disruption. FBI
counterterrorism agents want to catch terrorists before they act, and to accomplish this, federal law
enforcement officials have in the decade since 9/11 created the largest domestic spying network ever to
exist in the United States. In fact, the FBI today has ten times as many informants as it did in the 1960s,
when former FBI director. J. Edgar Hoover made the Bureau infamous for inserting spies into organiza-
tions as varied as Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s and the Ku Klux Klan. Modern FBI informants
aren't burrowing into political groups, however; they are focused on terrorism, on identifying today the
terrorist of tomorrow, and U.S. government officials acknowledge that while terrorist threats do exist
from domestic organizations, such as white supremacist groups and the sovereign citizen movement,
they believe the greatest threat comes from within U.S. Muslim communities due, in large part, to the
aftereffects of the shock and awe Al Qaeda delivered on September 11, 2001. The FBI's vast army of
spies, located in every community in the United States with enough Muslims to support a mosque, has
one primary function: to identify the next lone wolf. According to the Bureau, a lone wolf is likely to be a
single male age sixteen to thirty-five. Therefore, informants and their FBI handlers are on the lookout for
young Muslims who espouse radical beliefs, are vocal about their disapproval of U.S. foreign policy, or
have expressed sympathy for international terrorist groups. If they find anyone who meets the criteria,
they move him to the next stage: the sting, in which an FBI informant, posing as a terrorist, offers to help
facilitate a terrorist attack for the target.

Informants and coercion are used to manufacture “terrorists” for the FBI
Since 9/11, the FBI has routinely labeled men like Khalifah Al-Akili as terrorists, despite the lack of
evidence that these men would commit terrorist acts without the aggressive prodding and assistance of
FBI informants. (In Al-Akili's case, even the persistence of the informant was insufficient to push him into
going along with a terrorist plot.) Part of the reason that the FBI is able to get away with this is because
the public and the media don't question whether the individuals the Bureau puts on display are real
terrorists or just men on the margins made to look like terrorists. Even when the government is clearly
putting on a show, neither the public nor the mainstream media have stopped it. In the prosecution in
Houston of a man who worked with a person he believed was an Al Qaeda trainer, for example, the
federal government put on the witness stand an informant wearing a black mask, telling the judge that
the mask was necessary because showing the informant's face could make him a target for terrorists. No
one pointed out that since actual terrorists weren't involved in the investigation, no real terrorists
existed who would want to target the informant.
Solvency Extension
Provocation strategies foster a 1st Amendment chill and rights denial that encourages
terrorism. The plan is the best way to solve
The use of a provocation strategy to secure terrorism convictions among American Muslims has had a
number of far-reaching consequences beyond the impacts on the individuals prosecuted. Given the
large numbers of informants operating in Muslim-American communities, mosque congregations and
Muslim community organizations understand that there is the possibility of an informant jotting down
names and conversations and passing the information to the government. With the prosecutors of the
war on terror blurring the distinctions between First Amendment-protected speech and criminal activity,
many feel it is safest to avoid discussing certain topics, such as Western foreign policy, except with one's
closest friends and family. Relationships of trust within Muslim, communities are thereby eroded, as
people consider open discussions risky. Those who hold views critical of the government choose not to
express themselves publicly. As fear takes hold, the traditional avenues of political activism, such as
taking to the streets to protest, are less likely to occur. According to official theories of radicalization, an
atmosphere in which political opposition to US imperialism cannot be freely expressed by Muslims helps
prevent terrorism. But in reality, the more those angry at foreign policy see their community paralyzed
by fear and reluctant to express itself openly, the more likely it becomes that some will end up
supporting terrorism. A strong, active, and confident Muslim community enjoying its civil rights to the
full and able to engage with young people on issues they feel strongly about is the best way of
preventing violence.
Current government surveillance of Muslim Americans is unconstitutional. The

government should not prosecute people based on race or religion through dragnets
and informants. The plan secures rights without sacrificing anti-terrorism
Although the government has proffered the compelling interest of national security as a justification
for its widespread network of surveillance and informants for the purpose of essentially monitoring
Muslim American daily life, the means it has employed are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive
strict scrutiny in the face of constitutional First Amendment protections of free association and
speech. This has led to a significant “chilling” of religious and political expression, as well as the
curtailment of actual religious activities such as mosque attendance, donations for charity, or
participation in a Muslim Student Association on college campuses. Through the refining of the
government’s scope of surveillance, and the creation of objective, transparent criteria for individuals
who do warrant such government scrutiny, Muslim Americans can be secured their fundamental rights,
while still allowing law enforcement to accomplish its goal of fighting actual terrorism. Additionally,
the government should not prosecute those vulnerable, and easily susceptible individuals who were
unsuspectingly caught in the government “dragnet” of informant sting operations. Instead, law
enforcement should allow the Muslim American community its own space to address the issue on its
own terms, by offering such individuals social programs and mental health services as needed, without
fear of government scrutiny or prosecution. This will not only empower Muslim Americans, a
community largely marginalized post 9/11, but also allow them to mold their own destinies in this
nation. It is not the place of a government based on fundamental constitutional principles of freedom
to punish individuals for mere adherence to their faith, no matter how stigmatized they are. Courts
must now step in to uphold those fundamental rights that have been pushed aside out of
misunderstanding and fear.
Solvency Extension
The FBI should make broad-based reforms to current domestic surveillance practices
To the Federal Bureau of Investigation • Ensure that decisions to initiate assessments, preliminary
investigations or investigations are not made on the basis of religious behavior, political opinion, or
other activity protected by the right to freedom of expression under international law. • Revise the
Domestic Investigations Operations Guide (DIOG) to prohibit the recruiting and tasking of informants in
assessment and preliminary investigation phases. • Declassify and make public key portions of the
DIOG detailing guidance provided to FBI agents for initiating monitoring of religious and political
institutions. • Report to congressional committees on the deployment of informants into community
or religious spaces, including the number of informants and the scope of their activities. • Ensure that
information obtained through community outreach is not used for intelligence purposes, in
accordance with existing FBI policy. • Ensure that law enforcement agents do not use threats,
including those involving the “no-fly” list, when recruiting informants.
Racism / Whiteness internals

The FBI uses entrapment and racial profiling against Muslim Americans, setting the
precedent for other marginalized groups
Derek Royden, Staff Writer, January 29, 2015, “Manufacturing Terror: How the FBI Invents Some
Plots, and Ignores Others, In the War on Freedom,” Occupy.com,
http://www.occupy.com/article/manufacturing-terror-how-fbi-invents-some-plots-and-ignores-others-
war-freedom, ACC. 5-22-2015
In criminal law, a person is “entrapped” when s/he is induced or persuaded by law enforcement
officers, or their agents, to commit a crime that s/he had no previous intent to commit. Most
Americans know there have been some dubious prosecutions in the FBI’s ongoing effort to thwart
terror attacks on American soil. Unfortunately, it seems many Americans are too scared to care. The
vast majority of these cases have involved Muslim Americans, a group that has never had much power
in terms of American politics and less so in the wake of 9/11 and two wars in majority Muslim countries.
My purpose isn't to dismiss these cases, but to show the slippery slope they represent: when one
group gets targeted successfully, other marginalized groups usually follow.
FBI stings rely on racial stereotypes and prey on vulnerable populations. Deterrence
does not work for real terrorists and undermines effectiveness
There is little doubt that preventing terrorism attacks has been the highest priority for the FBI and other
law enforcement agencies since 9/11, but sting operations are not the best way to find terrorists. Not
only do these operations blatantly rely on stereotypes and prey on vulnerable targets, but their
effectiveness is also questionable at best. While traditional agent provocateur cases are useful in
infiltrating a community and acquiring evidence against the leaders of a group, these sting operations
target the very bottom of the food chain. True terrorists cannot be deterred by the possibility of
prosecution, which makes prevention the primary goal of anti-terrorism strategy. The targets of these
operations are more akin to thugs-for-hire than terrorists, a distinction that may not mean much in the
judicial system but is extremely important in the developing of an effective counter-terrorism strategy.
The value of arresting these so-called terrorists discovered by informants is chronically overestimated
and weakens the overall system as a result. Terrorism, as a word, has many serious implications and
connotations. By claiming that these sting operations are foiled terrorist plots, the FBI is both corrupting
and belittling the concept of terrorism.
Anti-terrorism perspectives on Muslims are embedded in whiteness

Race proved at least as strong a factor as religion in shaping the experiences of US Muslins in the period
after 9/11. As Dawud Walid, an African-American Muslim activist in Detroit, notes: Arab Americans
were right at the door of what's called "whiteness" in America. Whiteness in America doesn't mean skin
color. It's a level of assimilation and social fluidity. Even on the census, Arabs are considered white. But
now socially they're not white any more-9/11 took away their social white card. So some of these
people want to do whatever they can do to be accepted as white. To be accepted in the mainstream.
Now, I'm black, and we have a different history in this country. I've never desired to be white, and it's
impossible for me to be white. Hence, from us black Americans who are Muslims, you will hear a
different type of talk. And sometimes they think that we're more like the angry black people. It's not
that. It's just that I want a dignified space for us in America. It's not my goal to be accepted by certain
people. And I don't have any fear of being deported. I'm coming from a totally different psychological
disposition.
Racism / Orientalism internals

The foundation of anti-Muslim counterterrorism is a depoliticized worldview of Islam
as inherently terroristic, savage, and primitive. This sanitizes U.S. imperialism
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, Strategic Culture Foundation April 6, 2015, “Imagery and Empire:
Understanding the Western Fear of Arab and Muslim Terrorists,” Global Research,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/imagery-and-empire-understanding-the-western-fear-of-arab-and-
muslim-terrorists/5440478, ACC. 5-22-2015
Illusions are at work in the world. The truth has been turned on its head. The victims are being portrayed
as the perpetrators. Whether stated candidly, implied, or unmentioned, the notion of Arabs and
Muslims as savages and terrorists plays on the imagery that the so-called Western World embodies
equality, freedom, choice, civilization, tolerance, progress, and modernity whereas the so-called Arab-
Muslim World underneath its surface represents inequality, restrictions, tyranny, a lack of choices,
savagery, intolerance, backwardness, and primitiveness. This imagery actually serves to de-politize the
political nature of tensions. It sanitizes the actions of empire, from coercive diplomacy with Iran and
support for regime change in Syria to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and US military intervention
in Somalia, Yemen, and Libya. As mentioned earlier, in varying degrees, this imagery extends to other
places that are seen by US Orientalists as non-Western places or entities, like Russia and China. At its
roots, this imagery is really part of a discourse that sustains a system of power that allows power to be
practiced by an empire over «outsiders» and against its own citizens. It is because of US foreign policy
and economic interests that Arabs and Muslims are unempirically portrayed as terrorists while real
world data that shows that US intervention is creating terrorism is ignored. This is why there is a fixation
on the attack on Parliament Hill in Canada, the Martin Place hostage crisis in Sydney, and the Charlie
Hebdo attack in Paris, but US, Canadian, Australian, and French governmental support for terrorism that
has cost tens of thousands of lives in Syria is ignored.
Islam is not a crime! The FBI and NYPD regularly violate 1st Amendment rights of
Muslim Americans, which is a failed racist policy
In using these tactics, the FBI is operating on the same faulty and dangerous assumptions that guide the
NYPD: that the religious practices of millions of ordinary Muslims can be indicators of criminal activity. In
2007, the NYPD laid out its theory of “Muslim radicalization,” ascribing a range of criminal implications
to commonplace religious practices. The FBI has propagated the same logic in its training materials for
years. Both agencies consider wearing religious attire and growing facial hair to be indicators of a
potential terrorist. Both agencies make it their business to intrude on sacred—and First Amendment–
protected—spaces. Neither has shown that this is a strategy that makes us any safer. So why is the
outrage not equally directed at the federal culprits?
Islamophobia internals
The federal government is engrained in Islamophobia, using 1 st Amendment rights as a
smokescreen for cultural and ideological assimilation
But Islamophobic campaigning only has the effect it does because its message resonates with the
culturalist and reformist Muslim problem narratives that infuse the discourse of US government
agencies. The view that there is a deep, internal struggle taking place within Muslim communities, between our values and
Islamist extremism, that the wars the US is fighting are a necessary response to a violence-prone Islamist ideology, and that
American Muslim political leadership needs to be pressed to demonstrate its loyalty to American values—all this is not confined
to a far Right fringe but is official analysis as well, and is supported by liberals in the Obama administration as much as by
conservatives. Domestically liberals tend to maintain a rhetorical defense of First Amendment rights and
pursue a cultural policy of assimilating moderate Islam into the mainstream of America. Obama's Depart-
ment of Justice makes some limited efforts to prosecute hate crimes and defend the rights of Muslims to build mosques. But
Government
such efforts are ultimately undermined by the deeper structures of official thinking on extremism.
counterterrorism officials hold there to be a domestic ideological threat of Muslim extremism that is
serious enough to warrant the extrajudicial killing of US citizens who advocate extremist ideologies. That
threat is, under Obama, usually understood in terms of a reformist narrative that distinguishes between
good Muslims and bad Muslims—the former defined by their embrace of American values, the latter by
their support for an extremist ideology that causes terrorism. But that still leaves in place the misguided
assumptions of a Muslim problem and the militarized identity politics of a war between the West and
radical Islam. It is no surprise, then, that a survey of likely voters in May 2012 found that 63 percent
believed there was a conflict in the world today between Western civilization and Islamic nations. The
basic assumptions of the war on terror have remained largely in place throughout the Obama years.
The discourse of Orientalism frames the world in an East-West binary that describes
non-Western peoples as savage and backwards. These ideas get translated into
policymaking and hierarchal power relations
Turgay Yerlikaya, MA student at Marmara University, School of Communication, June 3, 2014, “From
Orientalism to Islamophobia,” Turkey Agenda, http://www.turkeyagenda.com/from-orientalism-to-
islamophobia-796.html, ACC. 5-25-2015
Orientalism is a thought style based on ontological and epistemological difference between the “East”
and the “West”. Orientalism can be analyzed as a Western paradigm that deals with the East, describes,
legitimizes, determines, and dominates it. This paradigm had found liveliness via an essential ontological
pre-acceptance during the process of evolving from a discourse used in daily life to a literary and
scientific expression. This pre-accepted object is the East itself over which knowledge is produced and speculated about in
every area. However, the East which is a speculation object is an imaginary category that is shaped under the influence of
collective imaginary opinions rather than complementing an absolute geography and sociology. This imaginary East fantasy
established by an orientalist discourse, carries out a function in the service of foresight of a certain authority as unveiled by
Said. In other words with the expression of Rana Kabbani, the orientalist literature portrays the East as a land of
backwardness and defectiveness and as being the complementary of these defectiveness’s, this
literature attributes savior mission to the West and calls it for help. Accordingly, this orientalist discourse
is an extension of an essential policy where deeper structural and cultural ties are established as well as
micro-macro power and hierarchic relationships, outside of a framework that forms the East mentally
and describes it.
Islamophobia internals
Muslims are always and already radicalized under the discourse of counterterrorism.
The federal government operates through a racialized lens of Islamophobia to sustain
state power
Dalia F. Fahmy, Department of Political Science, Long Island University, March 2015, “The Green Scare
is not McCarthyism 2.0: How Islamophobia is redefining the use of propaganda in foreign and domestic
affairs,” Dialectical Anthropology, Volume 39, Issue 1, pp 63-67
Islamophobia is defined as an ‘‘unfounded, irrational fear or hostility toward Islam and Muslims that is
perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination, and the marginalization and
exclusion of Muslims from America’s social, political, and civic life.’’ Essentially, Islamophobia allows for
the racialization of Muslims into a subjective group whose experiences can be eliminated and
preference be given to the ways with which they are viewed. This leads to the exclusion of Muslims from
the perceived nation and from national identity, and primacy given to the lens of Islamophobia. Such
exclusion is perpetuated and facilitated through various technologies that have become imbedded in
state power. A primary example of this is the culture of surveillance that exists in the USA today. In the
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the discourses of counter terrorism that emerges
encourages the practice of racialization of Muslims and of ethnic/religious profiling. This is carried out
through the executive branch’s law enforcement apparatus that grew to include the FBI, the
Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Counter Terrorism Council,
as well as police departments. Furthermore, the legal apparatus became a tool through which to
facilitate the culture of surveillance and ultimately exclusion to serve the War on Terror (140). The
rounding up of thousands of South Asian and Arab Muslims in the immediate weeks after 9/11, in which
they were questioned by FBI and immigration officials, led to the detention and deportation of over
1,000 Muslims, citizens and non-citizens. The requirement of immigrants from 25 suspect countries to
report the immigration officials signaled that not only was citizenship unequal, but some countries,
mostly ‘‘Islamic’’ countries, produced suspect citizens who needed to be watched even if they had no
ties to any criminal activity. This resulted in a community that was suspect, citizens that were not
perceived as belong to the nation, and deportation that could at anytime cleans the nation of ‘‘suspect’’
Muslims.
Empirically, Islamophobia leads to exaggerated predictions

The rising influence of far Right Islamophobia at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century
was largely responsible for creating the political atmosphere in which an upsurge in anti- Muslim
violence in the US became likely. Islamophobic violence was not a spontaneous reaction to terrorist
attacks. It emerged nine years after 9/11 and, while the Fort Hood shooting in late 2009 and the
attempted car-bomb attack on Times Square in May the following year had given Islamophobes hooks
around which to mobilize, by themselves these attacks could not have generated the worsening climate
that followed. The government had for years been telling Americans to expect more terrorism, even
suggesting attacks would likely involve weapons of mass destruction. When actual incidents did occur,
they were, if anything, less disturbing than what had been predicted.
Islamophobia – Orientalism internal links

Islamophobia is the modern extension of Orientalism
Turgay Yerlikaya, MA student at Marmara University, School of Communication, June 3, 2014, “From
Orientalism to Islamophobia,” Turkey Agenda, http://www.turkeyagenda.com/from-orientalism-to-
islamophobia-796.html, ACC. 5-25-2015
The main contradiction of the Orientalist knowledge that is founded on the Western discourse about the
East, is that it is based on perceptive ground rather than a factual reality. These Western depictions
presented about the East and Islam, finds its meaning through this perceptual ground. The
representation generated through variety of Western forms, is generally symbols that are
generated/derived from imaginary knowledge. The imaginary error in the Western mentality which is
historically continuous, shows its influence in a quiet broad area including politics, media, minority
politics, human rights and freedom. Islamophobia which is seen as a major issue of Western socio-politic
life style recently, makes up the modern form of a similar imaginary error.
1st Amendment / Freedom internal links

Current Muslim surveillance practices are unconstitutional. The plan curbs
unwarranted surveillance and increase the government’s ability to fight real terrorism
Myers argues that gang injunctions, which literally criminalize associative behaviors such as walking
down the street or riding in a car with another individual who is suspected to be a gang member, are
unconstitutional for the same reasons that Muslim surveillance is: there are other reasonable
alternatives to achieving the government’s goal of fighting gang violence. The criteria that law
enforcement use to label someone a gang member has been seen as too subjective, arbitrary, and
burdensome of expressive rights, such as the ability to wear a certain colored t-shirt, sport a tattoo, or
speak with another person on the street. These are much like the “indicators” law enforcement use to
label Muslims as terrorist threats because of their garb, physical appearance, or political ideologies.
Thus, Myers’s call for “[t]ighter and more definite standards, like beyond a reasonable doubt” for law
enforcement to meet before subjecting an individual to closer scrutiny within the gang injunction
context also applies to Muslim surveillance. In the early 1990s, Irving A. Spergel, an expert on gangs,
also suggested that gang intervention programs for youth should focus on those who “are already
engaged in law-violating behaviors.” The latter idea is key in implementing a successful approach, for
then it means the government’s method will truly be narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s
national security interest. Such a standard, albeit simple, does not infringe upon free exercise,
association, or speech rights, but still does offer a basic minimum standard to follow, creating something
closer to a “bright line” rule. Approaches such as the ones suggested for the gang context may equally
apply to the Muslim surveillance issue, for the government should operate upon more than an
individual’s mere adherence to Islam to target them. This will also be more narrowly tailored to
achieve the government’s purpose of protecting against domestic terrorism, because it will attempt to
target real criminals, rather than everyday mosque congregants.
FBI surveillance of Muslim communities is unconstitutional and criminalizes an entire

group of people
target/, ACC. 5-22-2015
As we hear more and more from NSA documents released by Edward Snowden, we need to continue to
be outraged that our government has a very advanced surveillance program to capture personal data on
individual Americans as well as on targeted groups of people like Muslims. But we should not be
surprised that this unwarranted surveillance has a long history in this country and all the past outrage to
stop this unconsitutional attack on free speech and privacy has not been effective. Maybe it is time to
ask why the FBI and our Justice Department seem to have a continual need to criminalize an entire
group.
1st Amendment / Freedom internal links

FBI surveillance of Muslim communities violates free speech rights and creates a
political chill that actually fosters radicalization
Abdullah Al-Arian, assistant professor of history at Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service in
Qatar, July 21, 2014, “The informants: Manufacturing terror,” AlJazeera News,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/informants-manufacturing-terror-
20147218131267614.html, ACC. 5-22-2015
By treating the political opinions of American Muslims as cause for suspicion, government investigators
operate on the assumption that free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the US
Constitution do not extend to a particular segment of the American people. Over the years, the FBI's
actions have had a dramatic chilling effect on the ability of Muslims to express their political views.
Motivated by such pressures from the government, many community leaders around the country have
since attempted to suppress political expression in mosques and community centres. But absent such
healthy community spaces through which to channel passions for humanitarian concerns around the
globe, it actually becomes more likely that young Muslims could channel their frustrations through
alternative modes of oppositional politics. This type of quietist, disaffected atmosphere sanitised of all
political expression is precisely the environment in which agent provocateurs thrive.
The FBI’s surveillance of Muslim communities violates international law and human
rights
The FBI investigation tactics described in this section raise serious human rights concerns, including
discriminatory treatment on the basis of the target’s protected political and religious expression and
association, and violation of the right to fair trial due to criminal entrapment. Under international law,
a government may restrict freedom of association, expression or privacy for national security
purposes within strict limitations. However, a government may never do so in a discriminatory
manner. The UN Human Rights Committee, the international body of experts that monitors state
compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), has repeatedly
highlighted that restrictions on freedom of expression and privacy must be necessary to achieve a
legitimate aim, and be proportionate to the aim pursued. Pursuing sting operations on the basis of
individuals’ religious practice or political beliefs violates the obligation under international law that
investigations and prosecutions be impartial, and conducted in a non-discriminatory fashion. Such
investigations may also have a chilling effect on others’ exercise of their basic rights.
A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (radicalization)

Anti-Muslim McCarthyism backfires. The assumption of radicalization actually causes
more terrorism and undermines law enforcement
Tom Risen, technology and business reporter, July 9, 2014, “Racial Profiling Reported in NSA, FBI
Surveillance,” U.S. News & World Report, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/09/racial-
profiling-reported-in-nsa-fbi-surveillance, ACC. 5-22-2015
A 2005 FBI memo about surveillance procedures featured in The Intercept story uses a fake name
“Mohammed Raghead” for the agency staff exercise. This latest report about email surveillance of
successful Muslim-Americans is akin to “McCarthyism” that fed paranoia about communist spies during
the Cold War, says Reza Aslan, a professor at the University of California, Riverside. “The notion that
these five upstanding American citizens, all of them prominent public individuals, represent a threat to
the U.S. for no other reason than their religion is an embarrassment to the FBI and an affront to the
constitution,” Aslan says. There is a risk of radicalization among citizens Americans, evidenced by some
who have gone to fight jihads in Syria and Somalia, but mass shootings carried out by U.S. citizens of
various racial backgrounds occurs much more often, says Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow on
foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Since 1982, there have been at least 70 mass shootings across
the U.S. “We have seen very little domestic terrorism in the U.S.,” Felbab-Brown says. This lack of
terrorism is due in part to the willingness of the Islamic community to cooperate with law enforcement
to identify possible radical threats, out of gratitude that the U.S. is a stable, secure country compared
with the Middle East, she says. “That could go sour if law enforcement becomes too aggressive, too
extreme,” she says.
A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (mistrust)

FBI surveillance of Muslim communities employs tactics that only increase fear of law
enforcement
With expanded authorities, and based on radicalization theories, the FBI has conducted surveillance
on communities based on their religious and ethnic makeup. It has created demographic profiles to
map the racial, ethnic and religious composition of neighborhoods, including the location of mosques
and beliefs of congregants. As we describe in section VII, the FBI has also used voluntary interviews
and activities presented as “community outreach” to solicit information from American Muslims,
which have fed fears of law enforcement and distrust within communities.
Targeting everyday Muslims is ineffective

Anthony M. Destephano, Staff Writer, April 15, 2014, “NYPD stops Muslim surveillance program,”
Newsday, http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/nypd-stops-muslim-surveillance-program-
1.7717811, ACC. 5-22-2015
A New York state politician who didn't want to be named said Bratton took this action to smooth over
relations with the Muslim community, adding that police would carry out some investigative activities
through their larger counterterrorism activities. One former high-level NYPD official who also didn't
want to be named criticized the notion that collaborative relations would be fruitful in terrorism
probes. "Your average Muslim in New York City isn't going to have information on terror plots," the
official said.
A2: Terrorism / Law enforcement DA (ineffective)

FBI efforts are misplaced. There is no evidence of a “lone wolf”
The FBI's logic to support the use of terrorism stings goes something like this: By catching a lone wolf
before he strikes, federal law enforcement can take him off the streets before he meets a real terrorist
who can provide him with weapons and munitions. However, to this day, no example exists of a lone
wolf; by himself unable to launch an attack, becoming operational through meeting an actual terrorist in
the United States. In addition, in the dozens of terrorism sting operations since 9/11, the would-be
terrorists are usually uneducated, unsophisticated, and economically desperate—not the attributes of
someone likely to plan and launch a sophisticated, violent attack without significant help.
Federal government profiling tactics undermine the goals of building Muslim cohesion
and trust and undermine religious freedom
The cases we examined—and the hundreds of other terrorism prosecutions in the US since the
September 11 attacks—have not occurred in a vacuum. At the same time as the government has
aggressively sought out terrorism suspects, sometimes before the individual concerned has expressed
any intention to use violence, it has sought to build relationships with American Muslim community
leaders and groups, believing they are critical sources of information to prevent terrorist attacks. It has
also sought to build American Muslim communities’ sense of cohesion and trust in law enforcement, as
part of a strategy for what it calls “Countering Violent Extremism.” However, many of the practices
described in this report are counter to the goals of these policies: in some communities, they have led to
anxiety and a fear of interacting with law enforcement. Some Muslim community members said that
fears of government surveillance and informant infiltration had negatively transformed the quality of
the mosque from a place of spiritual sanctuary and togetherness to one of vigilance. Now, they said,
they must watch what they say, to whom, and how often they attend services.
A2: Terrorism is real / threat

The fear of terrorism gets manipulated by political leaders, resulting in disastrous
policies that also fail. History is on our side.
Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford
University, and a member of the National Advisory Board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation, March 2015, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71(2)
75–87.
Human history displays many examples of political leaders who manipulate public fears to gain support
for policies that, in the end, produce disastrous outcomes for large numbers of people. Racist fears
helped Nazis obtain support for the oppression and ultimate murder of millions of Jews, Slavs,
homosexuals, and Roma. Eliminating Nazi predations required a war that cost 50 million lives. Excessive
fear of communism built support for a war in Vietnam that resulted in two million lives lost in that
country and another two million lost on the killing fields of a destabilized Cambodia. Today, the fear of
terrorism brought on by 9/11, coupled with the fear of nuclear weapons, has become the source of
policies that threaten the destruction of American democracy because of a lack of perspective in the
public discussion of these issues.
Exaggerating the threat of terrorism and Islam makes it more likely

Ed Kilgore, managing editor for the Democratic Strategist, March 20, 2015, “Exaggerated Perceptions
of “Threats” Are Threatening to National Security,” Washington Monthly,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal-a/2015_03/exaggerated_perceptions_of_
thr054718.php, ACC. 5-21-2015
Perhaps unfortunately, American politicians cannot talk that way. Yes, we’ve been very lucky in that
compared with an awful lot of other countries we’ve suffered relatively low military casualties in our
wars (aside, of course, from the Civil War), and extremely limited civilian casualties. But ironically, that
has produced a low tolerance for risk that in turn is more “emboldening” to terrorists and other enemies
than all the objective weaknesses in the world. It is our exaggerated sense of the threat posed by IS that
feeds its ambition and sense of power—and potentially its actual power if it obtains leverage over us or
our people. When politicians whip up fears about terrorists, they are actually whipping up vulnerability
to terrorists, particularly when they have nothing in the way of any practical strategy for defeating them,
beyond insulting their religion and raging at Barack Obama for not making them all disappear.
The threat of terrorism is socially constructed

Krista McQueeney, Merrimack College, 2014, “Disrupting Islamophobia: Teaching the Social
Construction of Terrorism in the Mass Media,” International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher
Education, Volume 26, Number 2, 297-309, http://scholarworks.merrimack.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1002&context=crm_facpub, ACC. 5-22-2015
From a social constructionist perspective, social problems should not be taken for granted as objective
conditions that afflict society. Instead, they are analyzed as a process. Social constructionists ask, how
and why do people come to perceive that some condition should be viewed as a social problem? From
this perspective, terrorism is not a real threat embodied by individuals and groups who can be hunted
down and killed. Instead, terrorism is constructed through the interpretation of events, the use of claims
made up of language and symbols, and the work of claims-makers to attract the public’s attention and
sway public opinion in support of some interests over others. Basic to this process is that claims-makers
deploy dominant language and symbols that circulate in the culture to construct social problems.
Moreover, the issues that are defined as social problems in the real world are products of ideological
power struggles.
A2: Lone Wolf Terrorism

“Lone wolfs” are only so-called a “threat” when they are Muslim
Matthew Harwood, Staff Writer, February 5, 2015, “Lone Wolf Terrorists Are Exceedingly Rare, So
Why Does Everyone Keep Talking About Them?,” Mother Jones,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/02/government-using-fear-lone-wolf-terrorist-justify-
police-state, ACC. 5-25-2015
By contrast, when the apparent lone wolf isn't a Muslim or other minority, he rarely finds the fear-
inducing terrorist label pinned on him by the government, the media, or security experts. Take James
von Brunn, a white supremacist who murdered a security guard at the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum. According to the Department of Homeland Security, the act had no connection to
terrorism, although it was ideologically motivated, as one FBI official acknowledged.
You should be skeptical of terrorism and lone-wolf scenarios. The risks are exceedingly
rare
Mathew Hardwood, Senior Writer/Editor for the ACLU, February 8, 2015, “Terrorism’s new
boogeyman: Charles Krauthammer and the toxic myth of the “lone wolf”,” Salon.com,
http://www.salon.com/2015/02/08/terrorisms_new_boogie_man_charles_krauthammer_
and_the_toxic_myth_of_the_lone_wolf_partner/, ACC. 5-21-2015
Like all violent crime, individual terrorism represents a genuine risk, just an exceedingly rare and
minimal one. It’s not the sort of thing that the government should be able to build whole new, intrusive
surveillance programs on or use as an excuse for sending in agents to infiltrate communities. National
programs now being set up to combat lone-wolf terrorism have a way of wildly exaggerating its
prevalence and dangers — and in the end are only likely to exacerbate the problem. For Americans to
concede more of their civil liberties in return for “security” against lone wolves wouldn’t be a trade; it
would be fraud. The “literature” on both terrorism and the lone wolf should be approached with a
healthy degree of skepticism. To this day, there is little consensus on what exactly terrorism is; the same
is true of the lone-wolf variety.
A2: Liberalism Good

The War on Terrorism is code for a war on Islam. Liberalism constructs Islam as
ideological extremism
In its campaign to transform Islamic identity, liberalism itself underwent a transformation: it became an
ideology of total war that led its advocates into what Italian theorist Domenico Losurdo calls "a tragic
performative contradiction." War on terror liberals reproduced the weaknesses of the conceptual
scaffolding they inherited from the cold war. They located the problem of radical political challenges to
Western society in alien ideologies that by their very nature were bound to produce violence. In so
doing, they disavowed the structural violence on which liberal society itself depended: the ways in
which racialized "others" live in a "state of exception" in which liberal norms are permanently
suspended—paradoxically, in the name of defending the liberal way of life." Fighting an extremist
enemy constructed as Huntington's "ideal enemy" both "ideologically hostile" and "racially and
culturally different" required that liberalism become an identity politics, a call to recharge the batteries
of belonging, to take a stand defending a way of life—militarily, intellectually, and culturally—while still
claiming the mantle of a universal civilization.
SOCIAL JUSTICE AFFIRMATIVE

This affirmative defends curtailing US domestic surveillance. The racism advantage focuses on how
domestic surveillance and policing are discriminatory on the basis of race. The impact to that kind of
discrimination is psychological trauma or PTSD. The second advantage is poverty and focuses on the
“broken window” system of domestic surveillance that disproportionately targets low-income
communities. There are additional impacts in the 2AC portion of the file, all of which hinge on disparate
enforcement of domestic surveillance policies.
Social Justice 1AC
Inherency
The government is currently considering surveillance bills in an effort to stifle national
security threats but no one is talking about it
Keertan Kini, 4-9-2015, “Opinion: The unnoticed expansion of domestic surveillance,”
http://tech.mit.edu/V135/N10/kini.html
The biggest criticisms stem from the bill’s broad definitions and uses of the shared data. Under the bill,
the government may retain and use any shared information resulting from cybersecurity threats related
to “an imminent threat of death, serious bodily harm, or serious economic harm.” The use of shared
data is not limited to any specific agency. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the data would be
shared with “all appropriate government agencies,” including the FBI and NSA. The data may be used
not only in combating broad threats but also in criminal proceedings. Since all data shared under the act
by companies is voluntary, the data would be accessible without a warrant, without a judge to
determine relevance. Lastly, given the liability protections extended to companies who share data,
consumer privacy protections from corporations are potentially undermined.¶ We live in a constantly
accelerating world of sensors and networks, where the Internet of Things is becoming more real every
day. Not knowing what information about you is being shared and analyzed is disconcerting at best and
terrifying at worst. Yet instead of engaging with these pressing issues, the news is inundated with
predictions of a presidential contest 19 months away.
Domestic surveillance is ever-expanding and unchecked violating constitutional rights

Patrick G. Eddington, a policy analyst in homeland security and civil liberties at CATO, 4-13-2015,
“Confronting the surveillance state,” http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/confronting-the-
surveillance-state/article/2562696
What was supposed to be a temporary, emergency program became permanent on October 4, 2001.
President Bush signed a secret memorandum formally authorizing it. For the first time since the Vietnam
era, an American president was initiating warrantless spying on American citizens.¶ The chronology of
this program, codenamed Stellar Wind, is laid out in great detail in the documents Snowden leaked.
Since the publication of documents from the Snowden Archive, two things have become clear. Even as
the Bush administration was negotiating with Congress for increased surveillance authority in 2001 —
first in the authorization of the use of military force, and later in what became known as the Patriot Act
— it was not prepared to be constrained by any act of Congress in its quest to gather data on al Qaeda.
That included an unprecedented and for several years successful effort to keep as few lawmakers
informed as possible informed, and then only in a cursory way, about the scope of Stellar Wind and
related programs. And even after domestic surveillance activities were revealed by news organizations,
Congress has not passed legislation to slow down, even a little, the most constitutionally questionable of
these activities.¶ Contrast that with the Watergate era. The Congressional investigation into NSA
domestic spying programs known as Shamrock and Minaret took place in 1975, and reforms under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) became law in 1978. While Executive Order 12333, signed by
President Reagan in 1981, created a possible path around FISA, the public evidence so far suggests that
FISA restrained presidents in surveillance until the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. ¶ The same month
President Bush authorized the secret Stellar Wind program, Congress began the Patriot Act, an omnibus
counterterrorism bill. The 131-page bill was, in the words of an ACLU letter to Congress, the result of a
closed door deal that granted "the Attorney General and federal law enforcement unnecessary and
permanent new powers to violate civil liberties that go far beyond the stated goal of fighting
international terrorism. These new and unchecked powers could be used against American citizens who
are not under criminal investigation, immigrants who are here within our borders legally, and also
against those whose First Amendment activities are deemed to be threats to national security."
Advantage 1: Racism
Between the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, domestic surveillance has lead to a
rise in incarceration rates functionally creating a racial caste system
Corinna Mullin, activist and academic currently based in Tunis, and Azadeh Shahshahani, human
rights attorney based in Atlanta and President of the National Lawyers Guild, 8-21- 2014, “From Gaza to
Ferguson: Exposing the Toolbox of Racist Repression,” http://fpif.org/gaza-ferguson-exposing-toolbox-
racist-repression/
Although mass incarceration as a tool of oppression entails less blatant violence than past forms of racial
control practiced in the United States, its impact has nevertheless been harmful and extensive. The
institutionalized racism inherent in this system has led Alexander to describe U.S. mass incarceration as
the “new Jim Crow,” likening it to the “racial caste system” maintained through racist laws and violence
after the formal abolition of slavery.¶ University of London professor Laleh Khalili agrees. In Time in the
Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies, she examines continuities in carceral strategies from
19th-century colonial rule until today. Khalili shows that while the use of mass incarceration rather than
brute force to control “problematic populations” may have developed as one of the “more humane,”
“administrative and legal solutions” to social unrest, their aims have often been the same: “to oblige” an
oppressed or “occupied people to admit defeat and recognize their own subjugation.”¶ With the “war on
terror,” the practice of mass incarceration has expanded in use and impact, with a dramatic increase in
the targeting of Muslim and Arab communities. An Associated Press report in 2011 found that in the
United States alone, there had been 2,934 terrorism-related arrests and 2,568 convictions since 9/11—
eight times the number of such arrests in the previous decade.¶ Activists have raised serious concerns
regarding the “discriminatory investigations” and “questionable” prosecutorial tactics that have
characterized many of these cases. These allegations were detailed in a report by Human Rights Watch
and Columbia Law School’s Human Rights Institute, which cited prosecutors’ use of “evidence obtained
by coercion, classified evidence that cannot be fairly contested, and inflammatory evidence about
terrorism in which defendants played no part” to convict suspects of terrorism.
Discussions of domestic surveillance must begin with an analysis of surveillance from a

racial standpoint and integrate the centuries of repression
Malkia Amala Cyril, founder and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and co-
founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network, a national network of 175 organizations working to
ensure media access, rights, and representation for marginalized communities, 3-30- 2015, “Black
America's State of Surveillance,” http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-
state-surveillance
My mother was not the only black person to come under the watchful eye of American law enforcement
for perceived and actual dissidence. Nor is dissidence always a requirement for being subject to spying.
Files obtained during a break-in at an FBI office in 1971 revealed that African Americans, J. Edger
Hoover’s largest target group, didn’t have to be perceived as dissident to warrant surveillance. They just
had to be black. As I write this, the same philosophy is driving the increasing adoption and use of
surveillance technologies by local law enforcement agencies across the United States. ¶ Today, media
reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by Edward Snowden that
millions of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mother’s visit from the FBI reminds me
that, from the slave pass system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow, black
people and other people of color have lived for centuries with surveillance practices aimed at
maintaining a racial hierarchy. ¶ It’s time for journalists to tell a new story that does not start the clock
when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand that data has
historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually
maintain an impoverished underclass.
Domestic surveillance policies grant the government the power to selectively enforce
the law depending on who a person is
Sharda Sekaran, Managing Director of Communications, Drug Policy Alliance, 7-24-2013, “In Order to
Address Racism, We Must Confront the Drug War,”
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharda-sekaran/drug-war-racism_b_3639579.html
Trayvon and Oscar were from opposite sides of the country and in many ways lived different lives but in
the aftermath of their murders, as arguments were put forth for why they could have been seen as
suspicious or potentially threatening, a history of involvement with drugs was cited. Drugs remain an
enduring part the collection of social and historical biases commonly summoned to put the character of
young black men under a microscope. The underlying assumption seems to be it is not so much a matter
what you do but who you are.¶ From caffeine to nicotine to aspirin to alcohol, when was the last time
most of us have experienced a truly "drug free" day in our lives? By and large, we regularly consume
some sort of substance that alters how we feel or offers pleasure instead of pain. This is why drug
prohibition has been such a pernicious tool for perpetuating bias, corruption and bigotry. When the
power is granted to selectively criminalize behavior that everyone engages in, unequal applications of
law and social judgment are inevitable. This is why civil rights advocate and academic Michelle
Alexander calls the drug war "The New Jim Crow."¶ Frank conversations about race at the national level
are long overdue. If any good is come from the Trayvon Martin tragedy, hopefully it will include bringing
this dialogue to the forefront. But we absolutely cannot talk about race without talking about the war on
drugs. This failed social experiment not only leads to the disproportionate targeting, arrest, conviction
and incarceration of people of color, despite equal rates of drug consumption across race, it fuels the
underlying thread of judgment, stigma and marginalization that permeates how we value human life
and enable acts of violence.
The criminal justice system is anything but that—the US strives to incarcerate as many
black people as possible
Margaret Kimberley, Freedom Rider columnist, 5-15-2013, “When Cops and Prosecutors are Racist
Criminals – Half of Wrongfully Convicted Prisoners in America Are Black,”
http://www.globalresearch.ca/when-cops-and-prosecutors-are-racist-criminals-half-of-wrongfully-
convicted-prisoners-in-america-are-black/5335151
Those words may have been spoken by one man, but they represent the thinking of an entire system
and its attitudes towards black people. One-half of all wrongfully convicted prisoners are black. Mass
incarceration depends on an assembly line of conviction and imprisonment and too few who are
charged with caring about justice really do.¶ It is indisputable that America strives to put as many black
people behind bars as possible. Inevitably some white people will be caught up too, but the goal of
criminal justice is to make every black person a criminal. No one knows how many Shabaka Shakurs and
Derrick Hamiltons there are behind bars in New York and across the country.¶ Any discussion of ending
mass incarceration must address these travesties which take place on a daily basis. The crooked
prosecutors and cops must be held accountable. They ought to be charged criminally themselves. There
is no incentive for them to obey the law if they are not. The exonerated men and women are expected
to quietly accept their misfortune and disappear without expecting any relief. In a sense that is the
expectation for all black people. We are known to be innocent but the system doesn’t care.
Racism is psychologically debilitating and very closely tied to post-traumatic stress

disorder
Monnica T Williams, Ph.D., conducts PTSD research and treats PTSD cross-culturally, 5-20-2013, “Can
Racism Cause PTSD? Implications for DSM-5,” https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/culturally-
speaking/201305/can-racism-cause-ptsd-implications-dsm-5
Allen was a young African American man working at a retail store. Although he enjoyed and valued his
job, he struggled with the way he was treated by his boss. He was frequently demeaned, given menial
tasks, and even required to track African American customers in the store to make sure they weren’t
stealing. He began to suffer from symptoms of depression, generalized anxiety, low self-esteem, and
feelings of humiliation. After filing a complaint, he was threatened by his boss and then fired. Allen’s
symptoms worsened. He had intrusive thoughts, flashbacks, difficulty concentrating, irritability, and
jumpiness – all hallmarks of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Allen later sued his employer for job-
related discrimination, and five employees supported his allegations. Allen was found to be suffering
from race-based trauma (from Carter & Forsyth, 2009).¶ Epidemiology of PTSD in Minorities¶ PTSD is a
severe and chronic condition that may occur in response to any traumatic event. The National Survey of
American Life (NSAL) found that African Americans show a prevalence rate of 9.1% for PTSD versus 6.8%
in non-Hispanic Whites, indicating a notable mental health disparity (Himle et al., 2009). Incresed rates
of PTSD have been found in other groups as well, including Hispanic Americans, Native Americans,
Pacific Islander Americans. and Southeast Asian refugees (Pole et al., 2008). Furthermore, PTSD may be
more disabling for minorities; for example, African Americans with PTSD experience significantly more
impairment at work and carrying out everyday activities (Himle, et al. 2009).¶ Racism and PTSD¶ One
major factor in understanding PTSD in ethnoracial minorities is the impact of racism on emotional and
psychological well-being. Racism continues to be a daily part of American culture, and racial barriers
have an overwhelming impact on the oppressed. Much research has been conducted on the social,
economic, and political effects of racism, but little research recognizes the psychological effects of
racism on people of color (Carter, 2007).Chou, Asnaani, and Hofmann (2012) found that perceived racial
discrimination was associated with increased mental disorders in African Americans, Hispanic
Americans, and Asian Americans, suggesting that racism may in itself be a traumatic experience.
Advantage 2: Poverty
“Broken windows” surveillance policies disproportionately affect impoverished people
—particularly homeless—and traps them in a cycle of fines, arrests and poverty
Maria Foscarinis, Founder and executive director, National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty,
9-2-2014, “Ferguson, New York, and the Criminalization of Poverty,”
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maria-foscarinis/criminalization-of-poverty_b_5754294.html
I think it also reflects the growing misuse of the criminal justice system to address deepening poverty
and inequality in our country -- both closely related to race. The increasing criminalization of people
experiencing homelessness -- an extreme form of poverty that disproportionately affects people of color
-- is one example of this trend.¶ Indeed, homeless people were among the first targets of the broken
windows theory, as implemented in the early 1990s by New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Their
crimes included sleeping, sitting, and eating in public places -- despite the lack of housing or even
shelter.¶ Often called "quality of life" measures, laws criminalizing such basic acts of human survival are
intended to improve the lives of those fortunate enough to have a home by protecting them from
having to encounter destitution in their midst. Ironically the quality of the lives of those most directly
affected is not included in this term.¶ Since then, the criminalization of homelessness and poverty has
only grown. According to a report released last month by the National Law Center on Homelessness &
Poverty, citywide ordinances making it a crime to sleep in public rose by 60 percent since 2011 -- even
though there is a severe shortage of affordable housing and shelter.¶ This misuse of the criminal justice
system to address a social problem sends a message that some lives matter less than others. In fact,
according to a recent report by the National Coalition for the Homeless, violence against homeless
people -- including lethal violence -- is also up.¶ The images from Ferguson of a militarized police force
were frightening but apt reminders of the war being waged against poor, homeless, minority Americans
-- who are increasingly shut out of decent living conditions, education, and opportunity. Increasingly, the
justice system too works against the poor who, typically without access to legal counsel, are often
trapped in a cycle of fines they cannot pay, that turn into warrants for their arrest, that turn into jail
time and criminal convictions that further dim their chances of employment and housing.
Policing poverty can lead to tragic deaths as in Walter Scott’s case

Danielle C. Belton, associate editor at The Root, 4-10-2015, “Poverty Was the Crime in Walter Scott’s
Slaying,”
http://www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2015/04/poverty_was_the_crime_in_walter_scott_s_slaying.
html
The video revealed an ugly truth beyond the fact that Slager killed an unarmed man who was of no
threat to him. It revealed that Scott did not die because he was a criminal or had defied an officer’s
orders; he died because he was black and poor.¶ Scott had a warrant out for his arrest—not for robbery
or homicide—but for child support, a nonviolent crime that affects families. Neither stopping him for a
broken taillight nor killing him for running does anything to provide for his children, raise city revenue or
alleviate society’s ills—unless you believe that the very poverty Scott suffered was also his most fatal
crime.¶ There is no explicit law that says people can’t be poor in America, but there are a lot of laws, if
broken, that will ensure you stay poor.¶ The sometimes violent, often punitive enforcement of child
support fits right in with other “keep ’em poor” policing tactics that turn traffic violations, homelessness,
mental illness and drug addiction into arrest-worthy crimes. If you have money, they’re inconveniences,
but if you’re subsisting on a paycheck-to-paycheck existence, they are monumental.¶ If you are wealthy
and can’t or don’t pay child support, you can hire a lawyer and create an elaborate defense. Tickets? You
either pay them off or fight them in court. Money allows you to easily hide your recreational-drug use or
hire legal counsel when you can’t. No worries about loitering because your home is a house, not the
curb. When taillights break on your car, they are replaced. And if you are mentally ill with money, you’re
not actually “mentally ill” at all, but among our most protected class: trust-fund babies who suffer from
“affluenza.”¶ If you’re poor, you are one broken taillight from homelessness—or, in Scott’s tragic case,
death.
Poverty draws generation after generation into the cycle and threatens to destabilize
the country
Poverties.org, research for social and economic development, May 2013, “Causes & Effects of
Poverty¶ On Society, Children & Violence,” http://www.poverties.org/effects-of-poverty.html
The vicious cycles of poverty mentioned before mean that lifelong handicaps and troubles that are
passed on from one generation to another. To name just a few of these hereditary plagues: no school or
education, child labor to help the parents, lack of basic hygiene, transmission of diseases.
Unemployment and very low incomes create an environment where kids can't simply go to school. As
for those who can actually go to school, they simply don't see how hard work can improve their life as
they see their parents fail at the task every day.¶ Other plagues associated with poverty:¶ Alcohol &
substance abuse, from kids in African slums to adults in the US, this is a very common self-destructing
habit often taken as a way to cope with huge amounts of stress and... well, despair;¶ Crippling accidents
due to unsafe working environments (machinery in factories or agriculture) as well as other work
hazards such as lead poisoning, pesticide poisoning, bites from wild animals due to lack of proper
protection;¶ Poor housing & living conditions, a classic cause of diseases;¶ Water and food-related
diseases, simply because the poor can't always afford "safe" foods.¶ Effects of poverty on society as a
whole¶ In the end, poverty is a major cause of social tensions and threatens to divide a nation because of
the issue of inequalities, in particular income inequality. This happens when wealth in a country is poorly
distributed among its citizens. In other words, when a tiny minority has all the money. ¶ The feature of a
rich or developed country for example is the presence of a middle class, but recently we've seen even
Western countries gradually losing their middle class, hence the increasing number of riots and clashes.
In a society, poverty is a very dangerous factor that can destabilize and entire country. The Arab Spring is
another good example, in all of the countries concerned, the revolts started because of the lack of jobs
and high poverty levels. This has led to most governments being overthrown).
We need to focus on poverty—too many people are falling through the cracks because
of the racial and poverty-related problems with the criminal justice system
Peter Edelman, professor at Georgetown University Law Center, 6-22-2012, “The State of Poverty in
America,” https://prospect.org/article/state-poverty-america
Even worse, we have destroyed the safety net for the poorest children in the country. Seven million
women and children are among the 20.5 million in deep poverty. One in four children in a household
headed by a single mother is in deep poverty. We have to restore the safety net for the poorest of the
poor.¶ Getting serious about investing in our children—from prenatal care and early-childhood
assistance on through education at all levels—is also essential if we are to achieve a future without such
calamitous levels of poverty. In addition, we must confront the destruction being wrought by the
criminal-justice system. These are poverty issues and race issues as well. The schools and the justice
system present the civil-rights challenges of this century. ¶ Combining all of the problems in vicious
interaction is the question of place—the issues that arise from having too many poor people
concentrated in one area, whether in the inner city, Appalachia, the Mississippi Delta, or on Indian
reservations. Such places are home to a minority of the poor, but they include a hugely disproportionate
share of intergenerational and persistent poverty. Our most serious policy failing over the past four-plus
decades has been our neglect of this concentrated poverty. We have held our own in other respects, but
we have lost ground here. ¶ Finally, we need to be much more forthright about how much all of this has
to do with race and gender. It is always important to emphasize that white people make up the largest
number of the poor, to counter the stereotype that the face of poverty is one of color. At the same time,
though, we must face more squarely that African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans are all poor
at almost three times the rate of whites and ask why that continues to be true. We need as a nation to
be more honest about who it is that suffers most from terrible schools and the way we lock people up.
Poverty most definitely cuts across racial lines, but it doesn’t cut evenly.¶ There’s a lot to do.
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic
surveillance
Solvency
The politics of fear has justified surveillance and restrictions on civil liberties—this
must be a focal point
David L. Altheide, Regents’ Professor in the School of Justice and Social Inquiry at¶ Arizona State
University, 2007, “The mass media and terrorism,” Pg. 304-305,
http://www.ensany.ir/storage/Files/20110208190538- ‫تروریسم‬20%‫و‬20%‫جمعی‬20%‫های‬20%‫رسانه‬.pdf
The politics of fear was joined with this discourse. Citizens became accustomed¶ to ‘safety rhetoric’ by
police officials, which often required them to permit police¶ searches, condone ‘overaggressive’ police
action, as well as join in myriad crime-prevention¶ efforts, many of which involved more human as well
as electronic¶ surveillance of work places, neighborhoods, stores, and even our ‘bodies,’ in the¶ form of
expansive drug screening. The discourse of fear promotes the politics of¶ fear, and numerous
surveillance practices and rationale to keep us safe (Monahan,¶ 2006). By the mid-1990s, many high
school students had ‘peed in a bottle’ as a¶ condition of participating in athletics, applying for a job, and
in some cases, applying¶ for student loans and scholarships. Several legal challenges to this scrutiny¶
were turned down, as the courts (with a few exceptions) began to uphold the¶ cliché that was echoed by
local TV newscasters and others: ‘why worry if you¶ have nothing to hide?’ In short, US citizens had been
socialized into the garrison¶ state, no longer being offended by surveillance, and indeed, two-thirds of
parents¶ choose to use the rapidly expanding – and inexpensive – technology to monitor¶ their own
children, including testing them for drugs. Safety, caring, and control ¶ are wrapped in the discourse of
fear:¶ ‘It is our responsibility as parents to do everything in our power to protect our children ¶ from the
perils of drug abuse, and we believe that fostering greater communication ¶ between parents and their
children coupled with utilization of a home drug test are¶ the keys to preventing drug abuse and
addiction,’ said Debbie Moak, co-founder of¶ notMYkid. (Spratling, 2006, emphasis added)
Crime mapping only creates the perception of “high-crime” areas that are typically
determined by profiling the inhabitants and creates a positive feedback loop of
policing and crime in the designated area
Steven R. Morrison, Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law, 2014 “The
System of Domestic Counterterrorism Law Enforcement,” Pg. 357,
https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-law-policy-review/print/2014/06/
morrison_25_stan._l._poly_rev._341_final.pdf
Crime mapping has obvious strategic advantages in assisting law enforcement¶ agencies in deploying
assets to address and, ideally, lower the crime rate.¶ Supporting this notion, Frank Zimring, discussing
New York City’s dramatic¶ crime drop, challenged the assumption that crime prevented by police on
one¶ block will simply shift to the next block.109 This means that attention to the geography ¶ of crime
has the potential to reduce it, rather than shift it. Detailed¶ crime mapping should, therefore, be taken
seriously as a legitimate tool of effective¶ law enforcement.¶ Crime mapping’s effectiveness is, however,
also a source of its major criticism.¶ It brands certain neighborhoods as crime hot spots, resulting in a
higher¶ law enforcement presence and more intensive policing. This in turn results in a¶ higher absolute
and relative crime rate, a continued mapping of that neighborhood¶ as a crime hot spot, and further
deployment of assets in that neighborhood.¶ 110 This produces a positive feedback loop that provides
an explanation¶ for a number of systemic inefficiencies. At the level of physical geography, it¶ helps to
explain the persistence of racial profiling in segregated communities.¶ 111 At the level of community
groups, it explains why Muslims, wherever¶ they reside and whatever their income level, are
overrepresented as terrorism¶ suspects.
Now is key—domestic surveillance tactics are going to get progressively worse

Paulina Phelps, intern at The Seattle Globalist, 6-25-2013, “Arab and Muslim communities react to
NSA surveillance leak,” http://seattleglobalist.com/2013/06/25/arab-and-muslim-nsa-surveillance-
leak/14225
“Suspicionless surveillance does not become okay simply because it’s only victimizing 95 percent of the
world instead of 100 percent,” whistleblower Edward Snowden said in an online Q & A hosted by the
Guardian last week, referring to assurances that only communications outside the US are being
monitored. “Our founders did not write, ‘we hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all US Persons are
created equal.’”¶ Arsalan Bukhari, executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
Washington Chapter, agrees that the system is unconstitutional. But he’s more optimistic about the
ultimate outcome of the leak.¶ “I hope the good that comes out of this are clear guidelines that regulate
when and how the government can survey a person.” he said. “For too long we’ve had unconstitutional
surveillance. We want to make sure the constitution is the law of the land and is followed — which
means you have to get a warrant.”¶ Egyptian-American Muslim activist Tarek Dawoud compared the
government’s actions to that of other countries. “This is what is happening in Egypt… it’s not a good sign
you can see this country going down that path and it’s a concern because one of the greatest gifts
people have here is to be free and the ability to challenge authority.”¶ Ultimately all of these voices on
the issue, including the person behind the leak, echo feelings of betrayal by the government. And they
seem to agree that the existing system is unconstitutional and vulnerable to racial profiling.¶ Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians have been experiencing government surveillance as a “national security
measure” ever since 9/11. So for the entire country to suddenly realize they may be subject to the same
thing is almost a relief.¶ “Often, if you have certain communities targeted for certain things it’s only a
matter of time that the entire American population is targeted with the same sort of tactic,” Bukhari
said.¶ “There is a huge discrepancy between what the US citizens think their government is entitled to do
and what the government does” said Dawoud. “It’s about time that people became aware of this
because its been going on for a while and it’s getting progressively worse.”
2AC Extensions
Inherency
Change is not coming now—plan is key to ensure change in how inequality functions
unabated
Dyanoosh Youssefi, legal studies professor, social justice advocate and writer, 4-14-2015, “Toronto
police set to embrace institutionalized racism,”
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2015/04/14/toronto-police-set-to-embrace-
institutionalized-racism.html
But in the 10 months since Blair wrote those promising words in a Star opinion piece, the police have
reverted to denial and resistance. Inexplicably, the chief and his bosses on the Police Services Board,
including Toronto’s new mayor, participated in a closed mediation. The result: the PSB is now set to vote
on a policy that is meek, offensive and insidious. This new policy not only eliminates the requirement to
issue receipts, but it takes us back even further than we were a few months ago.¶ So we’ve gone from
refusal, to resistance, to resignation, to recognition of the problem, to partial resolution (the PACER
report) and now, to retraction, recalcitrance and regression.¶ Where is the commitment to a fair and
equitable society, to bias-free policing?¶ When our police force and the Police Services Board were
initially faced with the undeniable proof of racial profiling, they could shield themselves with claims of,
“We did not know the extent of the bias. We are not racist.” Indeed, in the PACER report, the police
drew a valid distinction between bias and racism. And Blair, in his Star piece, declared, “We are not
racist but we are all human. The science of bias teaches us that even the best-intentioned, most decent
and honourable people can be influenced by the implicit bias we all have.” ¶ But the police can no longer
hide behind good intentions and claims of “mere” bias. We know that racial profiling occurs and that it is
discriminatory and harmful. While human nature makes us prone to bias, institutional policies can either
prevent that bias or promote it. We had taken some steps to rectify the problem. And now we have
reverted.
National strategies for dealing with criminal justice are ineffective

System of Domestic Counterterrorism Law Enforcement,” Pg. 376-377,
Conversely, nationalized criminal justice tends to produce law enforcement¶ approaches that contain a
number of inefficiencies.217¶ First, nationalized criminal justice tends to be politicized.218 Since
prohibition,¶ the media and national political figures have used a perpetual crime¶ wave219 to justify
their existence. Whether the concern was alcohol, communism,¶ drugs, or terrorists, nationalized crime
moves respond not solely to¶ demands of justice or nuanced policy needs, but also to politicized fears
that are¶ rarely reflective of reality. Relative to the actual danger, inordinate amounts of ¶ resources have
been directed at these concerns.220¶ Second, nationalized criminal justice tends to dehumanize
offenders by¶ viewing them not as people or community members, but merely as criminals .¶ 221 This
approach discounts the value of leniency and dismisses alternative¶ sentencing as an ineffective attempt
at rehabilitation and an elision of retributivist¶ principles.¶ Third, nationalized criminal justice tends to be
blind to local needs and¶ concerns. Disgruntled members of the American populace who may tend
toward¶ terrorist conduct probably do not do so for the same reasons, or in the¶ same ways. The missing
Somali teens in Minneapolis in 2009, thought to have¶ joined Al Shabaab;222 lone wolves who took
criminal action, like the Times¶ Square would-be bomber Faisal Shahzad;223 those who responded to a
government¶ sting and may be mentally ill, like Rezwan Ferdaus;224 and those who¶ responded to a
government sting based on arrogant anger, like Tarik Shah,225¶ would all probably respond differently to
different interventions. Managing the¶ domestic war on terror from Washington, as has been the
case,226 may not produce¶ the nuanced justice that traditional criminal law demands. It is unclear,¶
furthermore, that centralized policing ensures public safety more than localized ¶ approaches. It is clear,
however, that the positive feedback loop engendered by¶ massive, centralized policing creates
inefficiencies and unjust outcomes.
Solvency
There are currently no counterbalances on domestic surveillance due to the fear
associated with terrorism—the US until recently was willing to sacrifice constitutional
rights in favor of “not another 9/11” justifying illegal searches and bad evidence
standards
Evidentiary and constitutional rules are supposed to ensure that relevant,¶ probative, fair evidence is
admitted at trial and evidence that would lead either¶ away from the truth or would result in procedural
injustice is excluded. These¶ rules normally have the external effect of guiding law enforcement agents
to¶ abide by the law and obtain relevant evidence fairly and guiding prosecutors to ¶ use their discretion
to prosecute when the evidence is good and forego prosecution¶ when it appears that the evidence
would not be substantially usable.¶ In the post-9/11 War on Terror, the government often elides these
evidentiary¶ and constitutional stabilizers through the use of conspiracy charges, pretextual ¶ immigration
or material witness arrests, reference of defendants to military¶ tribunals, or indefinite detention as
enemy combatants. Secretive FISA¶ warrants, National Security Letters, and surreptitious collection of
big data¶ (which reflects Justice Alito’s Fourth Amendment concern in United States v. ¶ Jones142) also
contribute to this elision. In the best of times, evidentiary and¶ constitutional standards are not always
met. The stakes in the post-9/11 era appear¶ higher, justifying additional elision of stabilizing
standards.143¶ Public policy and public sentiment in the War on Terror evoke similar policy ¶ and
sentiments as those during the Red Scare of the 1950s and the drug¶ wars of the 1980s and 1990s. In all
three periods, public policy and sentiment¶ were shaped by a persistent fear of a massive, but poorly
discernable, entity¶ that threatened the fabric of the country. Communists were thought to be moving¶
against every town in America, large and small, from their headquarters¶ abroad. Inner city drug gangs
occupied a land just as foreign, romanticized, and¶ stereotyped144 as the foreign communist hive and
Edward Said’s Orient.145 Just¶ as the Cold War was real, and narcotics certainly a problem, the 9/11
attacks¶ provided a genuine basis upon which to build smart counterterrorism law en-forcement policy.
The not-another-9/11 imperative, felt by both governmental¶ actors and private citizens, drove that
policy.¶ The strength of the imperative provides no internal stabilizing force (as indicated¶ by passage of
the PATRIOT Act, its 2005 amendment, and the current¶ troubling use of its business records provision to
obtain massive amounts of¶ telephone call data), and so it has contributed to the positive feedback
loops. In¶ response to the recent revelations about NSA surveillance, there has been unprecedented ¶
pushback, with members of Congress calling for legislation that¶ would limit the NSA,146 scale back
PATRIOT Act provisions, and throw some¶ light on secretive FISA court proceedings.147 It remains,
however, to be seen¶ whether government and society will modify their response to the not-another- ¶
9/11 imperative to promote individual rights and just outcomes while continuing ¶ to protect against
future terrorist attacks.
Current counter-terrorism efforts fail—we must stop looking at the hard-power

approach
Hamed El-Said, chair and professor at the Manchester Metropolitan University, n adviser to the United
Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UNCTITF), the UN body responsible for
implementing the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, 2-24-2015, “In defence of soft
power: why a “war” on terror will never win,”
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/02/defence-soft-power-why-war-terror-will-never-win
Not all is good within the world of counter terrorism. Despite almost 15 years of “war on terror”,
terrorism remains one of the major threats that the world community is facing. The phenomenon has
recently assumed a new and mystifying phase of brutality. Decapitations, assassinations, kidnapping,
suicide operations, and even burning the “enemy” alive have all become the landmark of a gruesome
thought that adopts extreme brutality and violence as a tactic. This abominable thought seems to be
spreading globally at a pace unseen before. From Ottawa to Ontario, Boston, Sydney, Brussels,
Copenhagen to Paris, terrorism has become truly global, although this was not the case just a few years
earlier.¶ While most victims of terror are Muslims living in Muslim majority states, “the number of
terrorist attacks around the world has increased dramatically”, according to a recent report by the
Institute for Economics and Peace (2014). This raises important questions regarding our counter
terrorism strategy, one that remains overwhelmingly kinetic in nature.¶ There is no military solution to
terrorism. As David Miliband, a former British Foreign Minister, stated in 2009, “the war on terror was
wrong”, and it brought “more harm than good”. It has also undermined the search for alternative, more
successful approaches to countering violent extremism by giving the impression that only a military
solution exists to counter violent extremism.¶ Both the European Union and the UN long recognised the
futility of a purely military approach as a solution to violent extremism. Therefore, the 2005 European
Union Counter Terrorism Strategy and the 2006 United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy
viewed terrorism as a process and tactic, and thus called for a better understanding of the "conditions
conducive to radicalisation and extremism that lead to terrorism" as a prerequisite for developing
effective counter terrorism policies.¶ Although the EU and UN’s “soft” approaches, which called for
“addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism” in the first place, held great potential,
they were watered down by the continued prevalence of hard military approach worldwide. The United
States, for instance, has never bought into the “soft” approach and continued to follow a military
strategy, despite noticeable change in terminology. As a report by the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National
Security Preparedness Group concluded in 2001, the US government has shown little interest in “soft”
counter radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies.
Institutional engagement key

Institutional engagement is key—adapting via respectability politics is not enough to
ensure safety
UK Progressive, 4-6-2015, “Why “Respectability Politics” Is a Sham,”
http://www.ukprogressive.co.uk/why-respectability-politics-is-a-sham/article37862.html
But Washington’s plea of black success in the face of racism was heard again last month here on the East
Coast. When cops in Virginia took Martese Johnson into custody during a bloody arrest on the University
of Virginia’s campus in March during an incident that was captured on video, the teen shouted, “I go to
UVA. I go to UVA. How did this happen, you fucking racists? How does this happen?”¶ Because he’s
black. That’s how. No amount of adapting would have saved Johnson from the white supremacist abuse
he endured last month. His injuries required 10 stitches.¶ As The Root’s Kirsten West Savali explained in
a column about the incident, “The greatest trick white supremacy ever pulled was positioning racism as
only a belief system and not a power structure. This racist system is designed to make you believe that if
you just act right, you’ll reach the safety of rarefied air; then they remind you not to breathe. Now is not
the time to be more tolerant about race; rather, it’s time to be more intolerant about racism.”¶ There is
too much data available that proves black people, whether they are on the road or not, are preyed upon
by racists with police badges. I believe Chris Rock is often stopped because he is black and I won’t be
tricked into believing that adapting to the racism that singles him out will make the comedian any safer.
Government legislation is necessary—key to establishing public trust

Mary McCarthy, an attorney and former senior director for Intelligence Programs at the National
Security Council, a member of The Constitution Project's Liberty and Security Committee, 9-18- 2014,
“Finally, a chance to protect Americans from NSA : Column,”
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/09/18/nsa-surveillance-reform-senate-usa-freedom-act-
column/15662427/
Legislation that establishes constitutional, common sense rules for domestic surveillance is clearly
overdue. Despite the Snowden revelations, not a single law has been passed in the last year to prevent
the NSA from suspicion-less domestic surveillance.¶ Public concern about excessive surveillance hasn't
died down. The lead architect of the Patriot Act now believes it's time to take it apart. Wisconsin
Republican Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, an original cosponsor of the USA Freedom Act, believes that "[t]he
collection and retention of all telephone records coming in and out of the United States is excessive and
does not fall within the guidelines of [the Patriot Act]."¶ He is not alone. A majority of people believe the
NSA's data collection program is a violation of Americans' privacy. President Obama's own surveillance
review group found that "the current storage of bulk metadata creates potential risks to public trust,
personal privacy and civil liberty." Most Americans believe that the NSA has gone too far and that
legislation is long overdue.¶ This legislation will pair greater oversight with the creation of a safety net for
U.S. persons who believe their rights have been violated by the bulk collection programs. It would also
require the government to report the total number of U.S. persons that were subject to orders
authorizing surveillance. Such increases in transparency are key to self-governance and are needed to
restore trust between the public and our elected officials. And it will also reform the secret Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court to provide more accountability and transparency, including by appointing
a panel of privacy and civil liberties advocates to the court.
Debate key
Youth engagement and discussing these issues head on is critical to achieving racial
equality—Ferguson proves.
La June Montgomery Tabron, Detroit Free Press guest writer, president and CEO of the W.K. Kellogg
Foundation, 4-18-2015, “Recognize the progress and hope after Ferguson,”
http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/contributors/2015/04/18/ferguson-aftermath/25964915/
Spurred by young leaders and abetted by social media, active engagement is on the rise. Community
voices are driving change again, standing up to sustain our democracy. The positives propelling change
are overwhelming. Rallies have been held where marchers of all races have protested police brutality.
Civic leaders are calling for an end to police mistreatment of blacks. Would the Justice Department have
investigated Ferguson’s police and political structures as thoroughly without such a vibrant public
outcry?¶ Brown’s death was the boiling point for children and young adults in Ferguson. Through their
words and tireless actions, the youth demonstrated such frustration, such angst and such desperation.
“We are prepared to die because we have nothing to lose,” a young woman from Ferguson said at a
meeting I attended with civil and justice rights leaders in Washington last fall. Everyone was stunned.
What had happened that could elicit such a distressed plea for help?¶ Now the world knows. The Justice
Department determined that black people in Ferguson routinely had their civil rights violated.¶ Our
young people emerged as the real heroes. They are working to bring positive change to their
communities. Their energy and activism should be rekindled wherever people of color are routinely
profiled and targeted. Our young people can spur racial healing.
Domestic surveillance is due to the destruction of the liberal democratic political order
—discourse like the affirmative is key
Henry Giroux, Ph.D., Professor in Communication at McMaster University in Canada, 2004, “War Talk,
the Death of the Social, and Disappearing Children: Remembering the Other War,” pg. 206-207
http://cnqzu.com/library/Politics/Henry%20Giroux/war%20talk,%20the%20death%20of%20the
%20social,%20and%20disappearing%20children-remembering%20the%20other%20war.pdf
War, fear, and a particularly virulent contempt for social needs, as these¶ quotes suggest, have now
become the dominant motifs shaping the domestic¶ and foreign policies of the United States. This is
evident not only in the all-embracing¶ militarization of public life that is emerging under the combined¶
power and control of neoliberal zealots, religious fanatics, and far right-wing ¶ conservatives but also in
the destruction of a liberal democratic political order¶ and a growing culture of surveillance, inequality,
and cynicism.1We are living¶ in dangerous times in which a new type of society is emerging unlike
anything¶ we have seen in the past—a society in which symbolic capital and political¶ power reinforce
each other through a public pedagogy produced by a concentrated¶ media, which has become a
cheerleading section for dominant elites and¶ corporate ruling interests. This is a society increasingly
marked by a poverty of¶ critical public discourse, thus making it more difficult for young people and¶
adults to appropriate a critical language outside of the market that would allow¶ them to translate
private problems into public concerns or to relate public¶ issues to private considerations. This is also a
social order that seems incapable¶ of questioning itself, just as it wages war against the poor, youth,
women,¶ people of color, and the elderly.
The discourse of war must be the focal point of any analysis

Henry Giroux, Ph.D., Professor in Communication at McMaster University in Canada, 2004, “War Talk,
the Death of the Social, and Disappearing Children: Remembering the Other War,” pg. 209-210
http://cnqzu.com/library/Politics/Henry%20Giroux/war%20talk,%20the%20death%20of%20the
%20social,%20and%20disappearing%20children-remembering%20the%20other%20war.pdf
As Ulrich Beck (2002, p. 1) has argued, the language of war has taken a distinctly¶ different turn in the
new millennium. War no longer needs to be ratified¶ by Congress as it is now waged by various
government agencies that escape the¶ need for official approval. War has become a permanent
condition adopted by a¶ nation-state that is largely defined by its repressive functions in response to its ¶
powerlessness to regulate corporate power, provide social investments for the ¶ populace, and
guarantee a measure of social freedom. The concept of war occupies¶ a strange place in the current
lexicon of foreign and domestic policy. It no¶ longer simply refers to a war waged against a sovereign
state such as Iraq, nor is¶ it merely amoral referent for engaging in acts of national self-defense. The
concept¶ of war has been both expanded and inverted. It has been expanded in that¶ it has become one
of the most powerful concepts for understanding and structuring¶ political culture, public space, and
everyday life. Wars are now waged¶ against crime, labor unions, drugs, terrorism, and a host of alleged
public disorders.¶ Wars are not declared against foreign enemies but against alleged domestic¶ threats.
The concept of war has also been inverted in that has been removed¶ from any concept of social justice
—a relationship that emerged under President¶ Lyndon Johnson and was exemplified in the war on
poverty. War is now¶ defined almost exclusively as a punitive and militaristic process. This can be¶ seen
in the ways in which social policies are now criminalized so that the war on¶ poverty is now a war against
the poor, the war on drugs is now a war waged¶ largely against youth of color, and the war against
terrorism is now largely a war¶ against immigrants, domestic freedoms, and dissent itself. In the Bush,
Perle,¶ Rumsfeld, and Ashcroft view of terrorism, war is individualized, as every citizen¶ becomes a
potential terrorist who has to prove that he or she is not dangerous.¶ Under the rubric of emergency
time, which feeds off government-induced¶ media panics, war provides the moral imperative to collapse
the “boundaries¶ between innocent and guilty, between suspects and non-suspects” (Beck, 2002, ¶ p. 3).
War provides the primary rhetorical tool for articulating a notion of the¶ social as a community organized
around shared fears rather than shared responsibilities¶ and civic courage. War is now transformed into
a slick Hollywood¶ spectacle designed to both glamorize a notion of hypermasculinity fashioned in¶ the
conservative oil fields of Texas and fill public space with celebrations of ritualizedmilitaristic ¶ posturing
touting the virtues of either becoming part of “an¶ Army of one” or indulging in commodified patriotism
by purchasing a new¶ Hummer. War as spectacle easily combines with the culture of fear to divert¶
public attention away from domestic problems, define patriotism as consensus,¶ and further the growth
of a police state. The latter takes on dangerous overtones¶ not only with the passage of the Patriot Act
and the suspension of civil liberties but also with the elimination of those laws that traditionally
separated¶ the military from domestic law enforcement and offered individuals a vestige of¶ civil liberties
and freedoms. The political implications of the expanded and¶ inverted use of war as a metaphor can
also be seen in the war against “big government,”¶ which is really a war against the welfare state and the
social contract¶ itself—this is a war against the notion that everyone should have access to¶ decent
education, health care, employment, and other public services. One of¶ the most serious issues to be
addressed in the debate about Bush’s concept of¶ permanent war is the effect it is having on one of our
most vulnerable¶ populations, children, and the political opportunity this issue holds for¶ articulating a
language of both opposition and possibility.
Racism
We are living in a world of new racism where cultural pluralism is understood as
nationally destructive which has made exclusion morally acceptable
Maggie Ibrahim, Research Officer with the Climate Change and Development Group, 2005, “The
Securitization of Migration:¶ A Racial Discourse,” Pg. 166-167,
http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/Migration_and_Security.pdf
In order to provide security for their population, nations develop traditions.¶ Traditions, systems of
justice and rights, ensure the security and stability of a¶ nation. Through the disruption of existing
traditions, immigrants, who bring¶ with them different cultures, imbalance the nation. The principle, or
position,¶ which links immigrants and the demise of the nation, is that cultural differences ¶ threaten the
existing way of life. It is thus seen as rational to preserve ones¶ culture through the exclusion of other
cultural groups. This negative attitude¶ toward migrants should be understood as racism. As outlined
above, the negative¶ belief and a discriminatory action toward somebody on the basis of his or her¶
social membership is prejudice. This racial prejudice that migrants face is a¶ result of reifying race and
cultural difference and associating such difference¶ with threat.¶ The defining feature of new racism is
that cultural pluralism will lead to interethnic¶ conflict which will dissolve the unity of the state. This logic
has been¶ used for decades as a means of limiting immigration and asylum seekers by¶ right-wing
governments. However, the attempt to preserve the state by rejecting¶ others is now a measure upheld
by liberal governments as well. Divisions¶ based on cultural difference are¶ just as intractable and
fundamental as the natural hierarchies they have partly¶ replaced, but they have acquired extra moral
credibility and additional political¶ authority by being closer to respectable and realistic cultural
nationalism and¶ more remote from bio-logic of any kind. As a result, we are informed not only¶ that the
mutually exclusive cultures of indigenes and incomers cannot be¶ compatible but also that mistaken
attempts to mix or even dwell peaceable¶ together can only bring destruction. From this perspective
exposure to otherness¶ is always going to be risky (Gilroy, 2004: 157).¶ As a result of concentrating on
cultural difference and the preservation of the¶ state, new racism has modernized racism and made it
respectable (Duffield,¶ 1996: 175). No longer bound to the concern of the nation-state, cultural
difference¶ and the risk it poses are an international concern.
Police = racist
Police routinely breach constitutional rights of individuals, disproportionately African
Americans
Philip Sherwell, reporter for The Sunday Telegraph, former Chief Foreign Correspondent who covered
the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo, 3-4-2015, “The shocking racism at the heart of one US police
force,” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11450804/The-shocking-
racism-at-the-heart-of-one-US-police-force.html
He said that police routinely breached residents’ constitutional rights by stopping them without
reasonable suspicion, arresting them without probable cause, and using unreasonable force against
them.¶ “Many of these constitutional violations have become routine,” he said. “For instance, even
though it’s illegal for police officers to detain a person – even briefly – without reasonable suspicion, it’s
become common practice for officers in Ferguson to stop pedestrians and request identification for no
reason at all.¶ “And even in cases where police encounters start off as constitutionally defensible, we
found that they frequently and rapidly escalate – and end up blatantly and unnecessarily crossing the
line.”¶ The targets were disproportionately African-Americans, investigators found, and the department
of justice has recommended a radical overhaul of both the police and courts. “It is time for Ferguson’s
leaders to take immediate, wholesale and structural corrective action,” said Mr Holder.¶ But he also
noted that the issues, however acute in Ferguson, were not limited to one suburb in the American
heartlands. The challenges, he reminded the country, were "national in scope".
Racialized police violence is institutional and systemic

Vincent Warren, the executive director of the Center for Constitutional Rights, 11-26- 2014, “Structural
and Institutional Racism Exists Within Police Forces,”
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/11/25/does-ferguson-show-that-cops-who-kill-get-off-
too-easily/structural-and-institutional-racism-exists-within-police-forces
Police officers are so rarely held accountable for killing even unarmed black and brown people, that no
one was really surprised at the outcome this time. People have lost faith in the system, which repeatedly
tells them black lives don’t matter.¶ But even if the grand jury had indicted Darren Wilson for killing Mike
Brown, even if the grand jury in Staten Island indicts Daniel Pantaleo for killing Eric Garner, it wouldn’t
resolve the structural and institutional racism that underlies police violence against black people. Yes,
more officers should be held accountable for killing unarmed young men, but it isn’t a few bad apples,
it’s the way that police are trained to see communities of color as war zones and to behave like
occupying forces. In his testimony, Wilson called the neighborhood a “hostile environment” and told the
grand jury, “it is just not a very well-liked community.”
Black children are racially profiled, dehumanized and targeted by law enforcement
Margaret Kimberley, Freedom Rider columnist, 5-28-2014, “Racism and Law Enforcement in the U.S.:
Police Target Black Children,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/racism-and-law-enforcement-in-the-u-s-
police-target-black-children/5384314
“All across the country black children as young as kindergarteners have been hand cuffed and arrested
as if they are adults.”¶ Americans should take a long look in the mirror before criticizing other nations for
human rights abuses. The law enforcement system in the United States ranks among the worst in the
world in the cruel treatment meted out to its citizens. Even children in this country are not safe if they
are black and unlucky enough to interact with the police. Of all the various ethnic and national groups in
the United States, only black people have to worry that their child may be pushed through a glass
window by officers of the law.¶ A recent study published in the Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology demonstrated what black people have always known. Black children are dehumanized to
such an extent that they aren’t perceived as children at all. They are assumed to be older, less innocent
and inherently guilty of some wrong doing. Study co-author Matthew Jackson said, “With the average
age overestimation for black boys exceeding four-and-a-half years, in some cases, black children may be
viewed as adults when they are just 13 years old.” Two recent cases involving the New York City police
department show the truth of these words and the perils black people face even in childhood.
Black life is criminalized in the United States

Matt Peppe, writes about politics, U.S. foreign policy and Latin America, 12-30-2014, “Broken
Countries Policing: American Terrorism & Racist Violence,”
http://www.mintpressnews.com/MyMPN/broken-countries-policing-american-terrorism-racist-
violence/
In his Pulitzer-prize-winning book “Slavery By Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans
From the Civil War to World War II,” Douglas Blackmon describes how southern states criminalized black
life, using the legal system to punish black and then lease them to corporations to work in coal mines,
steel furnaces, farms, quarries and factories. This served the dual purposes of marginalizing blacks
politically and supplying cheap labor to capitalist commercial interests.¶ “The original records of county
jails indicated thousands of arrests for inconsequential charges or for violations of laws specifically
written to intimidate blacks – changing employers without permission, vagrancy, riding freight cars
without a ticket, engaging in sexual activity – or loud talk – with white women,” Blackmon writes. ¶ The
criminalization of black life has continued since the Reconstruction era, morphing into a new form.
Whereas once there was convict leasing, now there is mass incarceration. People are warehoused in
prisons at the highest rate in the entire world. Public prisons create jobs for construction workers and
corrections officers in rural, mainly white communities, while private prisons turn prisoners into profit
centers for corporations and their investors.¶ One hundred years ago, African Americans were
persecuted through the criminal justice system en masse. Today the system is remarkably similar.
Besides exploitation for profit, criminalization of African American enables many of same types of
discrimination as previously existed under Jim Crow.¶ Michelle Alexander notes in her book “The New
Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness” that discrimination against African
Americans today is arguably even more pernicious than under Jim Crow because it is carried out under a
nominally colorblind legal system. However, the mindblowing numbers of imprisoned ethnic minorities
who are imprisoned mostly for nonviolent crime make the racial aspect of the system indisputable. The
result is eerily similar to post-Civil War discrimination against blacks.
NSA = racist
NSA surveillance is racially targeted and given the nature of FISA, there need be no
justification
Natasha Lennard, staff writer for VICE News, 7-9-2014 “The NSA’s Racist Targeting of Individuals Is as
Troubling as Indiscriminate Surveillance,” https://news.vice.com/article/the-nsas-racist-targeting-of-
individuals-is-as-troubling-as-indiscriminate-surveillance
According to documents leaked by Edward Snowden, the NSA has been spying on five distinguished
Muslim-Americans under a law — the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) — that is meant to
target international terrorists or foreign agents. The inclusion of the email accounts of these five people
in a spreadsheet listing the targeted accounts of more than 7,000 others belies the NSA’s claim that it’s
in the business of marking only terrorist suspects.¶ Here are the agency’s suspected “terrorists”: Faisal
Gill, who was appointed to (and thoroughly vetted by) the Department of Homeland Security under
President George W. Bush; Asim Ghafoor, an attorney who has defended clients suspected of terrorism;
Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of public policy and international development at
Rutgers University; Agha Saeed, founder and chairman of the American Muslim Alliance and a former
political science professor at California State University; and Nihad Awad, the executive director of the
Council on American-Islamic Relations.¶ This is anti-Muslim discrimination pure and simple. While the
NSA’s broad data collection is disturbingly total and unspecific, its targeted spying is evidently racist.
Another leaked document punctuates this point with a dull, disgusting thud: a 2005 training document
explaining how to “properly format internal memos to justify FISA surveillance” offers a sample memo
that uses “Mohammed Raghead” as the name of a fictitious terrorism suspect.¶ Your NSA at work, ladies
and gentlemen!
The NSA racially profiles Muslim Americans when conducting domestic surveillance
Tom Risen, a technology and business reporter for U.S. News & World Report, 7-9-2014, “Racial
Profiling Reported in NSA, FBI Surveillance,” http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/09/racial-
profiling-reported-in-nsa-fbi-surveillance
The National Security Agency and the FBI have reportedly been overzealous trying to prevent terrorist
attacks to the point that anti-Islamic racism in those agencies led to the surveillance of prominent
Muslim-Americans, revealing a culture of racial profiling and broad latitude for spying on U.S. citizens.¶
An NSA document leaked by former agency contractor Edward Snowden to reporter Glenn Greenwald
shows 202 Americans targeted among the approximately 7,485 email addresses monitored between
2002 and 2008, Greenwald’s news service The Intercept reports. ¶ To monitor Americans, government
agencies must first make the case to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is probable
cause that the targets are terrorist agents, foreign spies or “are or may be” abetting sabotage, espionage
or terrorism. Despite this filter The Intercept identified five Muslim-Americans with high public profile
including civil rights leaders, academics, lawyers and a political candidate.¶ Racial profiling of Muslims by
security officers has been a controversy since the terrorist attacks of 2001 spiked fears about al-Qaida
trainees preparing more attacks. The New York Police Department has disbanded its unit that mapped
New York’s Muslim communities that designated surveillance of mosques as “terrorism enterprise
investigations” after pressure from the Justice Department about aggressive monitoring by police. ¶ A
2005 FBI memo about surveillance procedures featured in The Intercept story uses a fake name
“Mohammed Raghead” for the agency staff exercise. This latest report about email surveillance of
successful Muslim-Americans is akin to “McCarthyism” that fed paranoia about communist spies during
the Cold War, says Reza Aslan, a professor at the University of California, Riverside.¶ “The notion that
these five upstanding American citizens, all of them prominent public individuals, represent a threat to
the U.S. for no other reason than their religion is an embarrassment to the FBI and an affront to the
constitution,” Aslan says.
Predictive Policing bad

“Broken windows” policing is racially targeted and ingrained in law enforcement and
the public’s perception of crime
Michael Greenberg, the author of Hurry Down Sunshine and Beg, Borrow, Steal: A Writer’s Life, 11-6-
2014, “‘Broken Windows’ and the New York Police,”
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/06/broken-windows-and-new-york-police/
The stop-and-frisk tactic that was heavily employed during the Bloomberg administration is an example
of the logic of the broken windows theory taken to an extreme: beat cops were told to dispense with
the pretense of minor infractions to identify suspects; simply being on the street became sufficient
cause for a frisk, and then a search, to take place. Eighty-seven percent of those stopped were black or
Hispanic.¶ In 2011, two years before Judge Shira Scheindlin of the US District Court ruled that stop and
frisk was a form of “indirect racial profiling” and that it violated the Constitution’s equal protection
clause, more than 50,000 New Yorkers were arrested for “displaying” tiny amounts of pot. After the
state court complained about the flood of cases, Bloomberg’s police commissioner, Ray Kelly, scaled
back the arrests. But in 2013, small pot busts still numbered about 28,000. As of June of this year, with
Bill de Blasio as mayor and a federal monitor watching over the NYPD as a result of the stop-and-frisk
ruling, small pot busts were on track to be at least as numerous.¶ The inequity is glaring. With the aim of
maintaining order in poor, high-crime neighborhoods, police saddle thousands of young men with
criminal records for an offense that the state has largely decriminalized and that white people regularly
commit with impunity. Penalties imposed by the courts for possession are usually minimal—dismissal of
the case after six months if the person has no further run-in with the law—but the damage can still be
considerable, taking the form of rejected job and housing applications or being banned from joining the
military and attending certain colleges.¶ William Bratton, the current police commissioner, continues to
endorse the busts, but marijuana possession is not a “feeder crime,” as he has often maintained. In
2012, Human Rights Watch found that only 3 percent of those arrested for low-level possession went on
to commit a violent felony.¶ New York’s legacy of using drug possession to create a criminal class that
had not existed before, and that disproportionately singles out blacks and Hispanics, can be traced back
to the Rockefeller Drug Laws of 1973. Pushed through the state legislature when Nelson Rockefeller was
governor, they were the toughest laws of their kind in the country, mandating, for example, a minimum
of fifteen years to life in prison for possessing 113 grams of pot. The mass incarceration that resulted is
universally recognized to have been a catastrophic failure, and most of Rockefeller’s mandates have
been amended. But the psychology of the practice is still ingrained, both in the criminal justice system
and in the public’s way of thinking about crime.
“Broken windows” policing alienates cops from their communities and causes
situations like Eric Garner’s death
Justin Peters, a writer for Slate, 12-3-2014, “Broken Windows Policing Doesn’t Work,”
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2014/12/broken_windows_policing_doesn_t_
work_it_also_may_have_killed_eric_garner.html
This renewed emphasis on misdemeanor “quality of life” arrests has sparked renewed criticisms from
community members who are tired of being hassled. These criticisms spiked after Garner’s death in July.
Six members of New York’s congressional delegation sent Attorney General Eric Holder a letter noting
that “Mr. Garner’s death has taken place in the context of a broken windows policing strategy that
appears to target communities of color for the enforcement of minor violations and low-level offenses.” ¶
Two weeks after Garner’s death, de Blasio held a press conference to address these criticisms and
defend broken windows. “Breaking a law is breaking a law, and it has to be addressed,” said de Blasio. ¶
That’s nonsense. The cornerstone of effective policing is discretion. If the cops enforced every single law
on the books in every single precinct at all hours of the day, New York City would become a police state.
Is that what de Blasio and Bratton want?¶ For mayors and police commissioners, being “tough on crime”
means actively implementing some specific policy. But given that violent crime seems to be declining on
its own regardless of what they do, there’s a case to be made that de Blasio and Bratton are only making
things worse. Here’s a suggestion for a new policing policy for New York City: First, do no harm.
Predictive policing is premised on identifying “quality of life crimes” and racial

profiling which results in targeted surveillance of predominantly black communities
Malkia Amala Cyril, founder and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and co-
founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network, a national network of 175 organizations working to
ensure media access, rights, and representation for marginalized communities, 3-30- 2015, “Black
America's State of Surveillance,” http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-
state-surveillance
Predictive policing, also known as “Total Information Awareness,” is described as using advanced
technological tools and data analysis to “preempt” crime. It utilizes trends, patterns, sequences, and
affinities found in data to make determinations about when and where crimes will occur. ¶ This model is
deceptive, however, because it presumes data inputs to be neutral. They aren’t. In a racially
discriminatory criminal justice system, surveillance technologies reproduce injustice. Instead of reducing
discrimination, predictive policing is a face of what author Michelle Alexander calls the “New Jim
Crow”—a de facto system of separate and unequal application of laws, police practices, conviction rates,
sentencing terms, and conditions of confinement that operate more as a system of social control by
racial hierarchy than as crime prevention or punishment. ¶ In New York City, the predictive policing
approach in use is “Broken Windows.” This approach to policing places an undue focus on quality of life
crimes—like selling loose cigarettes, the kind of offense for which Eric Garner was choked to death.
Without oversight, accountability, transparency, or rights, predictive policing is just high-tech racial
profiling—indiscriminate data collection that drives discriminatory policing practices.
“Broken windows” policing is perceived as dependent on the racial composition of a

community rather than things like boarded up windows
Michael Greenberg, the author of Hurry Down Sunshine and Beg, Borrow, Steal: A Writer’s Life, 11-6-
2014, “‘Broken Windows’ and the New York Police,”
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/06/broken-windows-and-new-york-police/
When “Broken Windows” was published, in 1982, tax revenues in New York were shrinking at an
alarming rate and the city’s ability to maintain itself was in doubt. In 1980, the population had fallen to
7,071,639, a drop of about 800,000 from ten years earlier and around where the city’s population had
been in 1930. Crime by blacks—not the collapse of local manufacturing or the flight of middle-class
families to the suburbs—was popularly perceived to be the primary cause.¶ This racial perception is no
less prevalent today. The most comprehensive study to date on the roots of crime found that the central
factor in how people perceive the safety of a neighborhood is not disorder or even the presence of
boarded-up stores and abandoned buildings, but the number of African-Americans (and to a lesser
extent Hispanics) who live there. This perception was true for blacks and whites alike.4 The link is
ingrained in the American psyche. When we criticize the police for racial prejudice, we are decrying a
condition that is bigger than the police, a prejudice that we may share ourselves.¶ In their original
presentation of the theory, Kelling and Wilson worried that in implementing broken windows, “skin
color or national origin or harmless mannerisms [would] become the basis for distinguishing the
undesirable from the desirable.” They offered “no wholly satisfactory answer to this important
question” beyond the vague hope that police would be trained to understand “the outer limit of their
discretionary authority.” But this trust in individual discretion was never realistic. Jennifer Eberhardt, a
social psychologist at Stanford, has demonstrated the deeply coded visual association that Americans—
and especially policemen—make between race and crime. When she flashed images of faces across a
screen, Eberhardt found that her subjects were better able to detect weapons when the faces were
black.
AT: Body cameras

Increasing surveillance will not be effective, we need to focus on the institutional
racism prevalent in policing tactics
Agatha Beins, 4-17-2015, “Police body cameras will not change the culture of racism in America,”
http://qz.com/384315/police-body-cameras-will-not-change-the-culture-of-racism-in-america/
Politicians and police departments have turned toward the body camera to improve relations between
police officers and the communities they serve and to lessen violence perpetrated by—and we hope
against—police officers. But it will take more than body cameras, police dashboard cameras, and
cameras installed in public places to make people feel safer. Increasing surveillance is not enough. ¶
While police body cameras may be useful in processes of legal arbitration, it is not clear if they will
actually prevent violence, and those who have studied the effects of these cameras still call for more
research. One study shows that complaints against police and the use of force by police dropped during
a nine-month period when officers were wearing body cameras.¶ Yet Eric Garner’s death in New York
City in July 2014—among others—offers one example of an incident in which awareness of being filmed
did nothing to stop police from assaulting someone, according to legal theorist Justin Hansford: “The
officers who forcibly pushed Garner’s body into the ground knew a witness was recording the incident,
and at least one of them spoke to the videographer,” he wrote in the Washington Post. ¶ Hansford
astutely notes, “It’s lax laws that prevent us from holding police accountable, not a lack of evidence.” His
call for justice is spot on; however, his proposal that we use the law and “financial penalties” to change
behavior still places the burden on an individual (police officer) rather than a discriminatory system. The
many trenchant and eloquent critiques by scholars and activists about systemic racism and the prison
industrial complex, however, indicate that the systems themselves must change.
R/C Terrorism
Institutionalized racism is the root cause of terrorism—psychological trauma fuels
violent radicalization
John Fitzgerald Gates, Ph.D., National Diversity Expert; Principal and Chief Strategist of Criticality
Management Consulting; Former Associate Dean of Harvard College, 4-24-2015, “Institutionalized
Racism: National Security Threat and Mental Health Crisis,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-
fitzgerald-gates-phd/institutionalized-racism_b_7130822.html
Racism is not only destroying black lives, it is causing some African Americans such psychological trauma
that they have developed externalized bias as a coping mechanism -- feeding any sense of paranoia or
psychosis they may have to deepen their attraction to violent radicalization. Attorney General Loretta E.
Lynch said of the ISIS sympathizers that the United States would root out any threat to the homeland.
But what if the threat to the United States comes from our own institutionalized racism? How do we
root that out?¶ Here are some suggestions.¶ 1. Institutionalized racism and externalized bias must be
treated as national security threats that are giving rise to a new generation of extremists committed to
harming the homeland.¶ 2. Allocate part of the nation's counter terrorism budget to eradicating
institutionalized racism, including: the prison industrial system, biased policing, economic violation of
minorities and the poor, homelessness, and mental health disparities.¶ 3. Create pathways to hope
through respect for all people. Start by respecting President Obama and not killing unarmed black men. ¶
4. Recognize that good people are complicit in nurturing racially stressful environments. Examine
honestly any part you may play, and change it.¶ 5. For business leaders, consider the potential threat
that institutionalized racism poses to the security, productivity and profitability of your business. Like
cyber attacks, institutionalized racism has a capacity to destroy businesses from the inside out.
Dismantle institutionalized racism wherever you find it.¶ 6. Ensure that all Americans have access to
mental health care and that for minorities suffering from mental illness, racial PTSD is regularized as part
of diagnostic assessment.¶ Our nearly singular focus on Islam as the road to extremism blinds us to our
national complicity in enabling a racialized environment, actors with motivations and a rallying ideology
that gives rise to and nurtures violent radicalization. Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. DuBois famously
argued that the central issue facing America in the 20th century was the "the problem of the color line."
More than one hundred years later, the central problem facing the nation remains the color line. ¶ The
color line, as a form of slow terror, is driving some African Americans to their breaking points. Rather
than endure the unremitting blows of racism, they have opted for fast terror by joining with ISIS. They
are no longer tolerant of American systems of injustice that have left them bereft of hope, faith or
opportunity. They have decided to fight their oppressors, albeit their fight is really against oppression.
Classic examples of "chickens coming home to roost," they prefer the terror of violent radicalization to
the terror of being black in America. It is time for the nation to attack violent radicalization at its sources,
one of which is American institutionalized racism.
Psychology impact
We have to acknowledge and discuss the psychological implications of racial
discrimination
Veronica Y. Womack, Social Psychologist and Research Associate at the Northwestern University
Feinberg School of Medicine, 3-27-2015, “A Movement Against Racism Should Be a Movement for
Mental Health,” http://time.com/3761684/movement-against-racism-mental-health/
It’s important to deconstruct the sources for both systemic and interpersonal racism to pinpoint why
these infractions still exist, and the steps that are necessary for change. We can kickstart that first step
by implementing the second step: talking. Institutional and employment leaders must engage
employees in conversations around inclusion, equality, and difference; this is a key step in the process of
addressing mental health disorders among African Americans.¶ Substantive dialogue is critical, but it’s
equally vital to note that simply starting these conversations is a powerful thing. It’s a move that shows
both internal and external stakeholders that your organization values the tenets of social justice and
reflects an investment in community well-being. Beginning these conversations is also an explicit
acknowledgement of the problem, which could help employees affected by racial discrimination build
back trust in the institution.¶ This critical dialogue also can’t just be a one-time thing—it requires
consistency and commitment. To be effective, these conversations have to be on-going, inclusive, and
employ a technique called active listening. Active listening communicates empathy and builds trust by
using signs of attentiveness (i.e. paraphrasing, assumption checking, asking questions) to indicate
unconditional acceptance and confirming the other’s experience. This type of listening behavior will
ensure that an employer’s responses are not dismissive and authoritative. This form of listening reflects
that the individual is respecting the other person’s experiential reality, not just waiting to speak and give
a predetermined statement.
Poverty
Government interventions have been effective at addressing poverty
Peter Edelman, professor at Georgetown University Law Center, 6-22-2012, “The State of Poverty in
America,” https://prospect.org/article/state-poverty-america
These dire facts tempt one to believe that there may be some truth to President Ronald Reagan’s often-
quoted declaration that “we fought a war against poverty and poverty won.” But that is not the case.
Our public policies have been remarkably successful. Starting with the Social Security Act of 1935,
continuing with the burst of activity in the 1960s, and on from there, we have made great progress. ¶ We
enacted Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and many health indicators for low-
income people improved. We enacted food stamps, and the near-starvation conditions we saw in some
parts of the country were ameliorated. We enacted the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax
Credit, and the incomes of low-wage workers with children were lifted. We enacted Pell grants, and
millions of people could afford college who otherwise couldn’t possibly attend. We enacted
Supplemental Security Income and thereby raised the income floor for elderly and disabled people
whose earnings from work didn’t provide enough Social Security. There is much more—housing
vouchers, Head Start, child-care assistance, and legal services for the poor, to name a few. The Obama
administration and Congress added 16 million people to Medicaid in the Affordable Care Act,
appropriated billions to improve the education of low-income children, and spent an impressive amount
on the least well-off in the Recovery Act.¶ All in all, our various public policies kept a remarkable 40
million people from falling into poverty in 2010—about half because of Social Security and half due to
the other programs just mentioned. To assert that we fought a war against poverty and poverty won
because there is still poverty is like saying that the Clean Air and Clean Water acts failed because there is
still pollution.
Poverty has many problematic implications that have been expanding since the great
recession began
Melissa S. Kearney, Director of the Hamilton Project; a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and a
Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland, Benjamin H. Harris, the Policy
Director of The Hamilton Project; a Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings; and Deputy Director of the
Retirement Security Project at Brookings, and Karen L. Anderson, 6-19-2014, “Policies to Address
Poverty in America – Introduction,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/06/19-policies-
address-poverty-america-introduction-kearney-harris
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, some disadvantaged workers struggle to obtain the necessary
training for fruitful employment, while others grapple with long-term unemployment at unprecedented
rates. Long-term challenges remain with us: too many of our nation’s youth drop out of high school, too
many of our children are born into unstable home environments, and too many of our young adults are¶
out of school and out of work. This threatens our nation with the prospect of a permanent class of
individuals who are unable to contribute productively to and benefit from a thriving economy.¶
Furthermore, research demonstrates that poverty leads to substantial and sustained neurobiological
stressors that can inhibit intellectual and emotional development and sound decision making. For
children in particular, poverty means living with the stress that comes from insufficient nutritional
intake, living in the presence of violence in their community or household, and not having a secure place
to sleep at night. These challenges make it harder for children to learn and thrive in school, which, in
turn, leads to problems that cumulate over childhood and into adulthood. The concern is that children
born into deprivation will live their lives stuck in a perpetual poverty trap.
The “broken windows” policy is nonsensical and has not been shown to reduce serious
crime rates
Matt Peppe, writes about politics, U.S. foreign policy and Latin America, 12-30-2014, “Broken
Countries Policing: American Terrorism & Racist Violence,”
http://www.mintpressnews.com/MyMPN/broken-countries-policing-american-terrorism-racist-
violence/
The “broken windows” theory that you can nip violent crime in the bud by punishing minor “quality of
life” violations like smoking and drinking in the street or sleeping on the subway is so transparently
nonsensical it is hard to believe anyone could even consider it seriously.¶ It is equivalent to a diet to
prevent obesity that consists of forgoing vegetables and grains because foods with the least calories are
a gateway to fatty, fried foods with no nutritional value. Corn seeds are not twinkies, and sleeping on a
subway train is not murder.¶ Basic common sense and years of empirical data demonstrate that broken
windows theory has no effect on preventing serious crime. When you understand this, it is easy to see
that the broken windows theory put into practice is about something entirely different than its
professed aims.¶ There is a strong correlation between race and socioeconomic status in the U.S. Racial
minorities suffer disproportionately lower socioeconomic status compared to whites, creating a racial
caste system. With the drastic decline in recent decades of agriculture, manufacturing and other forms
of manual labor, populations previously depended on for cheap labor have become disposable in the
modern economy.¶ The state has undertaken a system of social control to prevent any solidarity and
political opposition that would recognize and oppose unjust racial castes. Not coincidentally, broken
windows policing has been carried out predominantly against African American and Latino citizens.
Studies prove that “broken windows” policies are not connected to crime reductions
Bernard E. Harcourt, a professor of law at the University of Arizona, 9-11-2001, “The Broken-Windows
Myth,” http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/11/opinion/11HARC.html
There is little, if any, evidence that the crackdown on squeegee men and graffiti scribblers has played
much of a role in reducing crime in New York. Since the early 1990's, most major American cities have
seen their crime rates drop significantly, in some cases even further than New York's has. Many of these
cities did not undertake anything like New York's crackdown on small-time offenses. ¶ A 1999 study of the
17 largest cities compared each city's most recent drop in homicides. New York's rate of decline was the
fifth-largest, behind those of San Diego, Washington, St. Louis and Houston.¶ San Diego, seated along a
major drug smuggling corridor close to the Mexican border, is particularly interesting. In the late 1980's,
its police department began adopting a very different style — a problem-solving, community-oriented
approach. While recording impressive drops in crime between 1993 and 1996, the city also posted a 15
percent drop in arrests and an 8 percent decline in complaints of police misconduct. ¶ Criminologists say
a number of other factors have contributed to declining crime rates in New York — among them, the
sharp increase in the police force. Former Mayor David Dinkins hired more than 2,000 new police
officers, and Mr. Giuliani hired another 4,000. From 1991 to 1998 the force grew by almost a quarter,
giving New York the highest ratio of officers per civilian of the nation's large cities.¶ A fall in the crack
cocaine trade, a strong economy, new computerized police tracking systems, more prisoners and an
aging population have also contributed to lower crime rates.¶ The best social-scientific evidence has
shown that a neighborhood's graffiti, litter or public drunks do not necessarily point to a serious crime
problem. The research suggests that rather than leading to serious crime, disorder — like crime — is
caused by conditions like poverty and a lack of trust between neighbors.
Add ons
Democracy
Militarization of domestic police forces via surveillance techniques risks undermining
democracy by creating a force that is not responsive to popular demands
Michael German, fellow with the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security Program,
which seeks to ensure that our government respects human rights and fundamental freedoms in
conducting the fight against terrorism, 12-18-2014, “The Militarization of Domestic Surveillance is
Everyone’s Problem,” https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/militarization-domestic-surveillance-
everyone’s-problem
Many Americans were shocked to see the militarized police response to public protests this summer in
Ferguson, Missouri. Of course, many working on police reform issues have identified the growing
militarization of police tactics and equipment as a problem for over two decades. What is less
observable but equally dangerous to American civil liberties is the increasing militarization of domestic
law enforcement intelligence operations.¶ The American tradition of prohibiting military involvement in
domestic policing is designed to ensure that we maintain democratic and civilian control over an
extraordinarily powerful fighting force. An army designed and equipped to protect Americans should
never be turned against Americans except to quell active rebellion. But just as the drug war fuelled
increased military participation and militarization in domestic policing, the war on terrorism is driving
the militarization of domestic intelligence operations. Unlike the purchases of armored vehicles, military
weapons, and SWAT gear, domestic intelligence activities take place mostly in the dark and neither the
public nor policymakers really know what is happening.¶ Military intelligence officials are trained for war
against hostile enemies. Their tools, tactics, and attitudes reflect that mission, and are completely
inappropriate to a domestic application.
Immigration
Domestic surveillance of immigration status infiltrates all aspects of daily life and
requires noncitizens to risk “self-deployment”
Anil Kalhan, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, 2014, “Immigration Surveillance,” Pg. 60-
61, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlr
On the other hand, the expansion of both direct and indirect post-entry¶ enforcement simultaneously
draws the migration border inward, self-consciously¶ constructing virtual, domestic border checkpoints
throughout¶ the country’s interior by identifying “events that are necessary for life in a¶ modern society”
where it may be possible to “exercise control” over¶ individuals in a manner analogous to the control
exercised at the territorial¶ border.245 The particular approaches of these post-entry enforcement¶
initiatives vary considerably, and each one involves a distinct set of public¶ and private actors—including
law enforcement and criminal justice¶ officials, but also welfare agencies, public hospitals and health
agencies,¶ motor vehicle licensing agencies, private employers, private landlords, and¶ potentially others.
Collectively, however, these initiatives establish a kind¶ of immigration panopticism, which eliminates
zones in society where¶ immigration status is invisible and irrelevant and puts this large array of¶ public
and private actors in the position of identifying individuals and¶ determining immigration status;
collecting, analyzing, and storing personal¶ information; screening and identifying potential immigration
law violators;¶ and sharing information with federal immigration authorities.246 While¶ these initiatives
increase the likelihood of placing many individuals in¶ removal proceedings, proponents place even
greater emphasis on their¶ ability to trigger a process they characterize as “self-deportation,” which¶
disciplines potentially deportable noncitizens into internalizing the¶ perception that their immigration
status is constantly being monitored and,¶ ultimately, into both revealing their status in a range of day-
to-day settings¶ and conforming to social expectations that they depart the country.247
Migration is securitized in an effort to prevent any malfunction in national economic

markets
Maggie Ibrahim, Research Officer with the Climate Change and Development Group, 2005, “The
Securitization of Migration:¶ A Racial Discourse,” Pg. 172,
http://www.eldis.org/fulltext/Migration_and_Security.pdf
Under our current economic paradigm, which is based on the manipulation of information and providing
services, social mobility is labelled as increasingly threatening. This increasing trend of viewing migrants
as a threat may be to some extent explained through Hardt and Negris assertion that international
migration has significant macroeconomic effects  mainly the increased difficulty to manage national
markets, especially national labour markets, individually.
Migrants who leave the South for employment in the North contribute to the blurring of the boundaries
between the North and the South. Through migration, the North and the South incorporate a part of
each other. The North receives southerners, who set up shantytown, favela, always again produced
and reproduced  (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 254), while the South receives the North in the form of
stock exchanges and banks, transnational corporations and icy skyscrapers of money and command
(2000: 254). The economic and political geography between the North and South are being undermined,
increasingly becoming more fluid. As a result, the entire world market tends to be the only coherent
domain for the effective application of capitalist management and command  (2000: 254). With the
incorporation of migrant labour searching for freedom from the periphery, comes a challenge to the
existing social and productive relations. International migration can, therefore, be understood as an
obstacle to the governance and maintenance of the liberal world system. Thus, the securitization of
migration creates an agency for global governance in order to maintain and secure global market
systems.
Imperialism
Domestic surveillance programs are justified by the narrative of terrorist prevention
but in reality are a tool of extending US imperialism
Danny Haiphong, activist and case manager in the Greater Boston Area, 10-1-2014, “Police State
America: US Department of Justice to Train “Community Leaders” to be Snitches for the Empire,”
http://www.globalresearch.ca/police-state-america-us-department-of-justice-to-train-community-
leaders-to-be-snitches-for-the-empire/5405650
In quick time after Obama declared a prolonged war on Iraq and Syria, the Department of Justice
partnered with the Department of Homeland Security and the National Counterterrorism Center to
launch a new domestic surveillance program. This program seeks to expand the surveillance dragnet by
training “community leaders” to monitor their communities for signs of “radicalization.” The imperialists
are using manufactured fear of ISIS, the proxy jihadists of America’s own creation, as a means to justify
such surveillance. The DOJ’s new program is another reinforcement of Washington’s ”War on (of)
Terror,” which has provided the ideological foundation for white supremacist, imperialist warfare since
2001. Under the guise of fighting “terror,” the imperialists have waged an all out war on the poor,
working class, and those who stand against Empire. In doing so, the “War on Terror” has made it
impossible for the ruling class to hide the national security-state apparatus of US imperialism. The
passage of the Patriot Act and National Defense Authorization Act, as well as the maintenance of
Guantanamo Bay, has sent a clear message that the imperialists are waging permanent war all over the
planet for control and plunder. However, the expansion of the national security state is supported by
the racist, deceptive narrative of “terrorist” prevention. In reality, imperialism’s erasure of
Constitutional law through mass repression stems from a deep fear of popular rebellion. The purpose of
the national security state’s illegal wire-taps, search and seizures, raids, and collections of private
information is to neutralize any potential threat to the corporate and military dictatorship of US
imperialism.
Terrorism
Counter-terrorism efforts have led to a militarization of police who then see inner-city
environments as warzones
Gregory Shank, managing editor of Social Justice, degrees in sociology, criminology and the sociology of
education from U.C. Berkeley, 2009, “Overview: Policing Protest and Youth,” Pg. 1-2
http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/pdf_free/115Intro.pdf
This issue contains two views on how globalization affects policing practices in¶ the United States,
including the policing of protest and of inner-city youth. Stephen ¶ Hill and Randall Beger argue that
“paramilitarization” of U.S. security represents¶ the convergence of two trends, with the police
becoming more militarized (e.g.,¶ Special Weapons and Tactics units) and the U.S. military increasingly
taking on¶ police functions. The rapidity with which this trend is progressing, Hill and Beger ¶ argue, must
be reversed before it reaches a threshold already crossed by the heavily¶ militarized Israeli National
Police. Paramilitary forces have often been historically¶ synonymous with political repression and are
generally undemocratic and unaccountable.¶ Militarization of policing is a global trend since all states
operating in¶ the globalized neoliberal economy respond to the same pressures. However, U.S. ¶ support
for foreign paramilitary police forces and paramilitary police units abroad¶ has intensified this process. A
blurring of traditional distinctions between military/¶ police, war/law enforcement, and internal/external
security, the authors argue, is¶ a product of globalization. As criminal and social issues such as drug
trafficking,¶ illegal immigration, and organized crime have become increasingly transnational¶
enterprises, they have been subsumed under the mantle of counterterrorism. Yet¶ the use of heightened
national security threats to justify militarization of policing¶ first emerged in the late 1970s, when
Congress seized upon the War on Drugs to¶ amend the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which had clearly
delineated between police¶ and soldiers. The more militarized the police become, the more they
resemble their¶ military counterparts in ideology and form. This “military operational model”
encourages¶ street-level officers and law enforcement executives to view the inner-city ¶ environment as
a war-zone and the urban underclass as the enemy.
The U.S. has used fear tactics regarding terrorism to justify intervention and
surveillance
David L. Altheide, Regents’ Professor in the School of Justice and Social Inquiry at¶ Arizona State
University, 2007, “The mass media and terrorism,” Pg. 292-293,
http://www.ensany.ir/storage/Files/20110208190538- ‫تروریسم‬20%‫و‬20%‫جمعی‬20%‫های‬20%‫رسانه‬.pdf
Major changes in US foreign and domestic policy essentially went unreported ¶ and unchallenged by the
dominant news organizations (Armstrong, 2002). Notwithstanding¶ the long relationship in the United
States between fear and crime,¶ the role of the mass media in promoting fear has become more
pronounced since¶ the United States ‘discovered’ international terrorism on 11 September 2001. ¶ This
discourse was grounded in several decades of the ‘fear of crime,’ but it was¶ also promoted by political
action that sought a reorientation and redefinition of¶ the role of the United States in world affairs.¶ This
broad story about the Iraq War involved negative terms for the enemy,¶ but it also included US
retaliation, the hunt for Al Qaeda leaders (e.g. Osama bin¶ Laden), and plans to attack countries and
‘outlaw regimes’ that supported or¶ harbored terrorists. Implementing these programs involved invading
Afghanistan¶ and expanding the US military presence throughout the world. Other adjustments¶ were
made in foreign policy, military budgets, domestic surveillance and attacks ¶ on civil liberties (Johnson,
2004; Kellner, 2003). But these were all contextualized¶ by fresh metaphors that justified extraordinary
acts against a very vile enemy.¶ Threats to invade other countries – the ‘axis of evil’ – that included Iraq,
were part¶ of an effort to ‘defend’ the United States from future attacks. Terrorism became¶ a very broad
symbol that encompassed fear, consumption, and international¶ intervention (Kellner, 2004). The
meaning of terrorism expanded from a tactic¶ to also mean an idea, a lifestyle, and ultimately, a
condition of the world. News¶ reports contributed to this broad definition of terrorism as a condition
(Altheide,¶ 2004). A key source for this news theme was the Project for a New American¶ Century
(PNAC).
2AC Answers
T: Domestic Surveillance
Surveillance is defined as watching or observing the behavior of another to prevent a
crime
Merriam-Websters Dictionary, no date,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/surveillance
Surveillance: the act of carefully watching someone or something especially in order to prevent or
detect a crime
XO CP
Presidential powers surrounding the WOT are fascist—there are no checks and
balances leading to policies like Abu Ghraib
Rebecca Sanders, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Toronto, Assistant Professor at the
University of Cincinnati, April 2011, “(Im)plausible legality: the¶ rationalisation of human rights abuses¶
in the American ‘Global War on Terror’,” The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol 15, No. 4, pg.
609, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2011.561991
For popular authors like Naomi Wolf, the post-9/11 world has ‘historical echoes’ of¶ fascism,
contemporary events are ‘mirrored in history’.33 She proceeds to make numerous ¶ comparisons,
analogising the rhetoric of the administration to that of the Nazis.34 More¶ importantly she argues that
there is a ‘structural echo’: ‘the way dictators take over democracies¶ or crush pro-democracy uprisings
by invoking emergency decrees to close down civil¶ liberties; creating military tribunals; and criminalizing
dissent’.35 Through the successive¶ erosion of human rights, the Bush administration set America on a
path towards the¶ fascist tipping point.¶ There is no doubt that much in the post-9/11 period lends itself
to interpretations based¶ around the concept of exception and decisionistic leadership. As Nixon
summed up his¶ vision of the ‘imperial presidency’ over 30 years ago, ‘When the President does it, that¶
means it’s not illegal.’36 This tendency has overtly manifested itself in the GWOT with¶ the invocation of
the theory of the ‘unitary executive’. Arguing that Article II of the constitution ¶ gives the president
exclusive control of defense, proponents exempt the executive ¶ from congressional oversight or judicial
scrutiny. As articulated by John Yoo, in this view¶ the president has an absolute monopoly to dictate
security policy: ‘The Framers. . .created¶ an executive with its own independent powers to manage
foreign affairs and address emergencies¶ which, almost by definition, cannot be addressed by existing
laws.’37¶ This aggressive assertion of executive power is evident in the huge number of executive ¶ orders
and ‘presidential signing statements’ issued by the Bush administration. For¶ example, the McCain
Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill of 2005 attempted¶ to prohibit CID treatment of
prisoners. Upon signing, President Bush essentially declared¶ the law not binding: ‘The executive branch
shall construe. . .the Act, relating to detainees,¶ in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority
of the President to supervise the¶ unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief.’38
Courts CP
Domestic surveillance has been conducted in such a way that the courts won’t have
anything to latch onto—everything has occurred with the assumption of plausible
denial
Rebecca Sanders, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Toronto, Assistant Professor at the
University of Cincinnati, April 2011, “(Im)plausible legality: the¶ rationalisation of human rights abuses¶
in the American ‘Global War on Terror’,” The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol 15, No. 4, pg.
610, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2011.561991
Throughout post-World War II (WWII) American history, the doctrine of ‘plausible deniability’¶ was
ubiquitous. Yet, it has been a less common frame of reference for analysts¶ seeking to understand
contemporary developments. Most observers perceive that something ¶ important is different after 9/11.
Old patterns of conduct have changed. Nonetheless,¶ there are echoes of this paradigm in the current
day that are worth exploring.¶ Unlike a state of exception, practices conducted under the cover of
plausible denial do¶ not suspend the law or openly transgress norms, but violate them stealthily. The
demand for¶ denial evinces awareness of the distinction between legality and illegality and the risk of ¶
sanction, embarrassment, and blowback that might accompany the latter. While secrecy ¶ to protect
‘sources and methods’, for instance to conceal the identity of an informer, is a¶ legitimate necessity for
clandestine intelligence collection, plausible denial has traditionally¶ been associated with covert action.
Covert action denies agency. As explained in NSC¶ 1012, covert operations should be ‘so planned and
executed that any US Government¶ responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorised persons and
that if uncovered the¶ US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them’.43 Covert
action¶ ranges from propaganda, to financial aid, to violent intervention. As defined by contemporary ¶
American law, covert action is ‘an activity or activities of the United States Government ¶ to influence
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the ¶ role of the [government]
will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly’.44¶ For much of the Cold War, plausible denial of covert
action was the name of the game.¶ Long time intelligence journalist Thomas Powers captures the ethos:
‘Think of intelligence¶ organizations as the instrument of a nation’s id – the desire of a government to do
certain¶ things without having to explain, defend, or justify them’, he writes. ‘Fairness, justice,¶ restraint
and respect for the rights of others may be important terms in the public language ¶ of international
politics’, but when a state feels threatened it ‘may seek recourse outside the ¶ limits of official
remonstrance and international law, and may seek to impose its will in¶ secret with methods it would
never confess in public.’45 As the 1954 Doolittle Report¶ put it, the threat of an ‘implacable enemy
whose avowed objective is world domination¶ by whatever means and at whatever cost’ necessitated
that ‘hitherto accepted norms of¶ conduct’ cease, that ‘long-standing American concepts of “fair play”’
be reconsidered,¶ and that ‘no one should be permitted to stand in the way’ of the ‘fundamentally
repugnant¶ philosophy’ of ruthless covert action.46
State Bad K
Engaging with state institutions is critical to fixing flawed policies that have material
consequences on marginalized groups
Thea Shahrokh, a Research Officer at the Institute of Development Studies, a researcher in
International Development for over five years, with a particular focus on issues of gender, citizenship,
exclusion and violence, and Erika Lopez-Franco, Research Officer at the Institute of Development
Studies, conducting research and advocacy for the participation of vulnerable groups in development
policies and programmes from a 'rights-based' approach and using power analysis in development,
March 2015, “Achieving meaningful accountability for¶ people living in poverty and marginalization,”
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/6002/
Participate_Accountability_PB.pdf?sequence=1
Global normative frameworks and human¶ rights agreements play a critical role in shaping¶ legislation at
the national and local level. Where¶ these frameworks have local ownership they are¶ integral to
challenging institutional discrimination¶ and power imbalances that marginalise different¶ groups of
citizens.¶ However, for the poorest and most marginalised¶ people, laws and policies at all levels rarely¶
translate into the realisation of rights.¶ •• This disconnect relates to contextual and¶ discriminatory social
norms that are deeply¶ embedded in institutions that mediate access¶ to services and realisation¶ of
rights.¶ ••Where a person’s rights have¶ been violated, discrimination,¶ corruption and high transaction¶
costs prevent marginalised¶ groups accessing justice.¶ •• In the case of socially¶ marginalised identities
(such¶ as LGBTQI) legal recognition¶ through changes in identity¶ cards does not automatically lead to
respect¶ and inclusion in their lived realities. People may¶ still experience discrimination and exclusion,¶
often violently.¶ Making this gap between legislation and¶ reality visible is critical. For accountability to¶
be meaningful, citizens need to be engaged¶ with policymakers in both the creation,¶ implementation,
and monitoring of laws, policies¶ and programmes. Organised citizen groups are¶ taking action to hold
government programmes to¶ account for reaching more marginalised people,¶ and also acting as a
platform for marginalised¶ people to enter government schemes to claim¶ their entitlements:¶ •• In
Bangladesh, community-based¶ organisations are playing an important role¶ in ensuring that government
development¶ committees include diverse and inclusive groups¶ of older people and people with
disabilities in¶ their constitution.¶ •• In India, education on rights and entitlements¶ by NGOs has
accompanied group-building¶ processes for sexual minority persons and the¶ resulting advocacy has
broken down barriers¶ to access in government social protection¶ schemes.
Fem K
Perm do both—only the affirmative grapples with the logic of fear that is foundational
to gendered and raced surveillance. The criticism is nothing but detached theoretical
assertions
Iris Marion Young, was Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and affiliated with the
Center for Gender Studies and the Human Rights program there, Autumn 2003, “The Logic of
Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the
Current Security State,” http://ffc.twu.edu/content/Young,%20Logic%20of%20Masculinist

%20Protection.pdf
Although some feminist theorists of peace and security have noticed¶ the appeal to protection as
justification for war making (Stiehm 1982;¶ Tickner 1992, 2001), they have not elaborated the gendered
logic of¶ protection to the extent that I try to do here. These accounts concentrate¶ on international
relations, moreover, and do less to carry the analysis to¶ an understanding of the relation of states to
citizens internally. My interest¶ in this essay is in this dual face of security forms, those that wage war¶
outside a country and conduct surveillance and detention inside. I notice¶ that democratic values of due
process, separation of powers, free assembly,¶ and holding powerful actors accountable come into
danger when leaders¶ mobilize fear and present themselves as protectors.¶ Since the attacks of
September 11, 2001, I argue, the relation of the¶ leaders of the United States to its citizens is well
illuminated by interpreting¶ it under the logic of masculinist protection. The Bush administration¶ has
mobilized the language of fear and threat to gain support for¶ constricting liberty and dissent inside the
United States and waging war¶ outside. This stronger U.S. security state offers a bargain to its citizens:¶
obey our commands and support our security actions, and we will ensure¶ your protection. This
protection bargain between the state and its citizens¶ is not unique to the United States in this period
but rather often legitimates¶ authoritarian government. I argue that the bargain is dangerous in¶ this
case, as in most others. The essay concludes with a gendered analysis¶ of the war against Afghanistan of
fall 2001. While the Bush administration¶ initially justified the war as a defensive action necessary to
protect Americans,¶ its rhetoric quickly supplemented this legitimation with an appeal¶ to the liberation
of Afghan women. I suggest that some of the groundwork¶ for this appeal may have been laid by
feminist campaigns concerning the¶ Taliban, which the Bush administration chose at that moment to
exploit.¶ I argue that the apparent success of this appeal in justifying the war to¶ many Americans should
trouble feminists and should prompt us to examine¶ whether American or Western feminists sometimes
adopt the stance¶ of protector in relation to some women of the world whom we construct¶ as more
dependent or subordinate.
Cap K
Only looking at economics forecloses an analysis of how race is perceived and
interacted with within class struggles
George Yancy, Professor of Philosophy at McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts, works
primarily in the areas of critical philosophy of race, critical whiteness studies, and philosophy of the
Black experience, and Falguni A. Sheth, associate professor of philosophy and political theory, holds a
Ph.D. in Philosophy. She works in the areas of continental philosophy, political philosophy and legal
theory, critical race theory and philosophy of race, post-colonial, theory, and sub-altern and gender
studies, 2-27-2015, “How Liberalism and Racism are Wed,”
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/how-liberalism-and-racism-are-wed/?_r=0
G.Y.: There are some theorists who continue to want to reduce race to class. My sense is that W.E.B. Du
Bois was correct regarding his claim that even poor whites possess whiteness. Do you think that such a
distinction has any relevance in our contemporary moment in American history? ¶ F.A.S.: In “Black
Reconstruction in America” (1935), Du Bois discussed the wages of whiteness paid to white workers by
the Southern white bourgeoisie — through the vehicle of racial apartheid — in order to divide and
conquer the working class, and get white and black workers to hate and fear each other, despite, as he
says, “their practically identical interests.” There is certainly truth in the claim for today, but it also
depends on context, geography, historical moment, and situation—and the racial perspectives of those
in power.¶ Poor whites won’t be racially profiled by white police, or store clerks, or white or nonwhite
landlords to the same degree as darker men across economic classes will be. Yet, thinking institutionally,
because economic policies adversely impact those who are already disadvantaged, poor blacks and poor
whites will both suffer that impact. However, those in power and positions of authority will most often
blame working-class and poor blacks for various moral character flaws. We have seen it countless times:
from Daniel Moynihan’s infamous 1965 report which traces poverty to character flaws of African-
Americans to Ronald Reagan’s vilification of poor black women who then came to be referred to as
“welfare queens,” to President Obama’s multiple admonitions to black men to be more responsible
fathers. This is despite the fact that we have ample evidence illustrating that black men are incarcerated
six times as often as white men, and that they suffer from racial profiling and discrimination and unfair
laws like “stop and frisk,” which collectively inhibit them from finding employment, housing or economic
success.¶ Presumably, if poor blacks suffer from “character flaws,” then so do poor whites and other
populations of color, but we rarely hear the same moral admonitions directed towards them.
Perm do both—Neoliberalism, police violence and “broken windows” surveillance are

intrinsically tied and must be addressed together
Brittney Cooper, a contributing writer at Salon, and teaches Women's and Gender Studies and Africana
Studies at Rutgers, 4-15-2015, “Blood money, killer cops: How privatization is funding the racist logic of
America’s police,”
http://www.salon.com/2015/04/15/blood_money_killer_cops_how_privatization_is_funding_the_racist
_logic_of_americas_police/
Baldwin illuminates for us the way that America exists as a place predicated on the refusal of Black
breath and the denial of Black people’s right to move freely in the world without losing our lives for
having a broken taillight or playing with a toy gun, or for standing on the street chatting with friends.¶
This refusal of breath is not only anti-Black, but multigenerational, and harder to combat because of the
way neoliberalism and acts of privatization have invaded police forces. As Eric Harris’ breath left him,
other officers reminded him that “you ran!” Similar charges were levied against Walter Scott by pundits
and commentators last week. “Why did he run?”¶ Neoliberal structures of self-governance demand that
we all control ourselves and “do the right thing,” in order to avoid negative consequences. Meanwhile,
the conditions that enable us to actually do the right thing continue to slip away. Walter Scott ran
because as a poor Black man who was in arrears on his child support, he did not want to be subject to a
long prison sentence and fines he could not pay. The sense of precariousness about not being able to
enjoy simple pleasures, like going for a ride on the weekend because you might find yourself in prison
interminably for bills you can’t pay, is surely not just.¶ These are not justifications for Walter Scott’s
wrongdoing. They are reminders that many of us manage to do the right thing because we live in
conditions that allow us to pay bills, adequately support our children, and find sufficient employment.
Many, many Americans, a disproportionate number of them Americans of color, do not live in such
conditions.¶ Yelling at them or executing them for making bad choices in a system that offers limited
options shows us how often we miss the point. Under this kind of logic, the supposed lack of control of
working-class Black and Brown people justifies the stultifying overpolicing of our communities, the
stranglehold of our prison system saddling Black people with jail time, fines, probation, parole and a
constant sense of threat, and finally, the ultimate refusal of one’s breath by a trigger-happy police
officer if you fail to submit in any way to this unjust state of affairs.
Post-modernism K
The criticism is doublespeak that disavows the material reality of the body and
differences among groups of people—the particularized nature of the affirmative is
preferable
George Yancy, Professor of Philosophy at McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts, works
primarily in the areas of critical philosophy of race, critical whiteness studies, and philosophy of the
Black experience, and Linda Martín Alcoff, Professor of Philosophy at Hunter College and the CUNY
Graduate Center, 2-4-2015, “Philosophy’s Lost Body and Soul,”
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/philosophys-lost-body-and-soul/
G.Y.: You mentioned how questions of embodiment were not treated in any substantive way in your
early philosophical training. Why is it that the profession of philosophy, generally speaking, is still
resistant to questions of embodiment and by extension questions of race?¶ L.M.A.: In my view this is
primarily a methodological problem. Philosophers of nearly all persuasions — analytic, continental,
pragmatist — aim for general and generalizable theories that can explain human experience of all sorts.
And the ultimate aim, of course, is not description but prescription: how can we come to understand
ourselves better, to know better, to understand our world better, and to treat each other better?
Worthy goals, but they are usually pursued with a decontextualized approach, as if the best answers
would work for everyone. To get at that meta-level of generality, some aspects of one’s context need to
be set aside, lopped off, cut out of the picture, and this has traditionally meant the concrete materiality
of human existence as we actually experience it in embodied human form.¶ This is just a way of saying
that the body had to be ignored except in so far as we could imagine our bodies to be essentially the
same. And to achieve that trick of imagination — to imagine all of our wild diversity in embodiment to
be irrelevant — required a bad faith that can be seen throughout the canon: racist asides and ridiculous
theories about women alongside generic pronouncements about justice and beauty and the route to
truth.¶ I call it bad faith because, on the one hand, nearly all the great philosophers divided human
beings into moral and intellectual hierarchies even while, on the other hand, they presumed, from their
consciously particularist space, to speak for all. Hence, methodologically, the problem for philosophy is
how to speak for all when one does not, in fact, speak to all. And the solution is to enact a doublespeak
in which one justifies not speaking to the mass of humanity at the same time that one imagines oneself
to be speaking for the human core which exists in all of us. The body, and difference, is simultaneously
acknowledged and disavowed.¶ This is why philosophers such as Bartolomé de Las Casas in the 16th
century and W.E.B. DuBois from even his early writings in the 19th century are such powerful figures:
They each explore their own specificity and its impact on how they view the world and others, even to
how they formulate moral questions. They model a discourse that can become part of a general
dialogue in which others can have a voice as well.
Schmitt K
Schmitt’s theory no longer applies to present-day politics—too much has changed
since 9/11
Kim Lane Scheppele, John J. O'Brien Professor of Comparative Law and Professor of Sociology,
University of¶ Pennsylvania, May 2004, “Law in a time of emergency: States of exception and the
temptations of 9/11,” http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1365&context=jcl
In this Article, I have tried to explain why the logic of Schmitt's¶ analyses no longer work as a practical
matter to justify states of exception,¶ even when it is clear to the international community that
something¶ fundamental has changed in the world system since 9/11. The¶ institutional elaboration of a
new international system that has occurred¶ since Schmitt's time make his ideas seem all the more
dangerous,¶ and yet all the more dated. There are simply fewer states in¶ the world willing to tolerate
either Schmitt's conception of politics or¶ his conception of the defining qualities of sovereignty.
Schmitt's philosophy¶ has, in short, been met with a different sociology. For his¶ ideas to be either
persuasive or effective, they must be more than internally¶ coherent or even plausible; they must be
loosed in a context¶ in which they can win against other competing ideas. Precisely because¶ of the
horrors of the twentieth century, much of the international¶ community that has entrenched both
democracy and the rule¶ of law has turned away from these extra-legal justifications for states¶ of
exception. Instead, such states have attempted to embed exceptionality¶ as an instance of the normal,
and not as a repudiation of the¶ possibility of normality. Only the United States, with its eighteenth-
century¶ constitution and Cold War legacy of exceptionalism, seems to¶ be soldiering on in this new legal
space of conflict unaware that the¶ defining aspect of the new sovereignty is that even the new
sovereign¶ is bound by rules.
Terrorism DA
Non-unique—Tolerance for surveillance high now. Congress is pushing to maintain the
Patriot Act and surveillance techniques used by the NSA
Associated Press, 4-22-2015, “Senate leaders propose extending NSA phone records storage,”
http://kdhnews.com/business/senate-leaders-propose-extending-nsa-phone-records-storage/
article_0da4e9cc-d2c8-55fa-b5ad-f38d3ef5cc91.html
Weeks before a key surveillance law expires, Senate Republicans have introduced a bill that would allow
the National Security Agency to continue collecting the calling records of nearly every American.¶ The
measure by Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and intelligence committee Chairman Richard Burr would
bypass Senate committees and reauthorize sections of the Patriot Act, including the provision under
which the NSA is requiring phone companies to turn over the "to and from" records of most domestic
landline calls.¶ After the program was disclosed in 2013 by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden,
President Barrack Obama and many lawmakers called for legislation to end that collection, but a bill to
do so failed last year. Proponents had hoped that the expiration of the Patriot Act provisions on June 1
would force consideration of such a measure.¶ A bipartisan group of House members is set to introduce
such legislation later Wednesday, dubbed the USA Freedom Act. But the move by McConnell and Burr
shows that there is support in the leadership for maintaining the status quo. Congressional aides, who
declined to be quoted speaking about internal deliberations, said the rise of the Islamic State group and
the threat of extremists returning to the U.S. after fighting in Syria has shifted the political climate
toward more tolerance of surveillance.
The idea that information gathering is crucial for counterterrorism operations is

fallacious—it only increases the size of the haystack and produces false positives and
false negatives
It is held as truth that more data, if it is well-managed—that is, arranged in¶ a useful way that reflects its
true meaning—and effectively searchable, will inevitably¶ improve law enforcement’s ability to spot
dangerous patterns and discern¶ criminal intent.8¶ This Article challenges that assumed truth on two
fronts. First, data mining¶ may not produce its presumed accurate results. Bruce Schneier, for example,¶
has argued that data mining will produce wasted law enforcement efforts in¶ chasing false positives, and
will also produce false negatives, because all that¶ data mining does is enlarge the haystack. When what
you are looking for is a¶ rarity—as terrorist plots, or at least attacks, are9—and its rate of occurrence rel-
¶ ative to all environmental conduct is quite low, then enlarging that field will ¶ make detecting the rarity
statistically even more unlikely.10¶ Second, the positive feedback loop resulting from counterterrorism
law enforcement¶ produces increasing systemic inefficiencies that (1) do not reduce¶ data noise or reveal
real criminal patterns; (2) reinforce the preconceived notion¶ that such law enforcement does reduce
noise and reveal patterns; and (3), as a¶ result of (1) and (2), often lead to inaccurate targeting of
suspects (either as¶ false positives or false negatives). These results are inaccurate and inefficient¶ law
enforcement responses. Because this is a positive, or self-reinforcing, feedback¶ loop, these three
inefficiencies tend to grow over time, resulting in systemic¶ instability.¶ These inefficiencies emerge
because of the apparent, but unproven, reliability¶ of the digital age mosaic database that allows the
government to link suspects¶ with each other in social network maps, whether they have an actual
relationship¶ or not.11 The faith that the government gives to these linking efforts¶ amounts almost to a
fetish.12 It is instantiated at trial as prosecutors invoke the¶ global jihad movement,13 a rhetorical tactic
that is not entirely vacuous, accurate,¶ or new.14 In the 1950s, prosecutors alleged the existence of an
“international¶ Communist movement,”15 similar in form and function to the global jihad¶ movement.
Both were supposed to indicate a worldwide network of people,¶ closely aligned in ideology and criminal
purpose to destroy the United States.¶ They both worked to enable prosecutors to allege damning
conspiracies and introduce¶ questionably relevant evidence thereof.16 They both also retained cur-¶
rency as valid evidentiary tropes because observers believed that they signaled ¶ real foreign existential
threats to democracy and society itself.17 This expansive¶ vision produces expansive law enforcement,
and thus the feedback loop.
The distinction between an act of terrorism and one of domestic crime is incredibly
difficult to distinguish which leads to ever-expanding NSA surveillance
Robert M. Bloom, Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, and William J. Dunn, J.D., Boston
College Law School, spent three years as a civilian intelligence¶ analyst for the Department of Defense
prior to law school, which included a one-year assignment¶ at the National Military Joint Intelligence
Center in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon,¶ one year as a sensitive source reporting analyst and Central
Intelligence Agency liaison for¶ the Office of Naval Intelligence, and one year as an all-source Middle East
analyst, 2007, “The Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless NSA¶ Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential
Power and¶ the Injury to the Fourth Amendment,”
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=lsfp
When there is an imminent terrorist threat, the use of traditional law enforcement¶ officials and
procedures to address terrorism casts doubt on whether a clear distinction¶ can be made between
terrorism and general crime control.416 The purpose of the warrantless¶ NSA surveillance is to detect
and prevent the death and destruction that¶ comes from attacks on American people and
infrastructure.417 It is difficult, if not¶ impossible, to determine how a car bomb detonated by an Al
Qaida operative is distinguishable¶ from a car bomb detonated by a domestic criminal. In 2002, the
United¶ States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, in In re Sealed Case, ¶ recognized that
this distinction is especially difficult when attempting to justify¶ foreign intelligence collection of a United
States person under the FISA definition¶ of an “agent of a foreign power.”418 The court noted that “the
definition of an agent¶ of a foreign power—if he or she is a U.S. person—is grounded on criminal
conduct.”419¶ The warrantless NSA surveillance includes domestic citizens and places; therefore, ¶ it falls
within conduct closely associated with criminal activity.420 Upholding a warrantless¶ search to
effectuate this purpose would constitute an expansion of the Supreme¶ Court’s narrow “special needs”
cases to include searches that employ law enforcement¶ officials in a manner similar to crime
control.421
Terrorism scholarship is fundamentally flawed—be skeptical of their research

conducting the fight against terrorism, 4-7-2015, “Is Flawed Terrorism Research Driving Flawed
Counterterrorism Policies?,” https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/flawed-terrorism-research-
driving-flawed-counterterrorism-policies
One such factor is the cottage industry of government-funded academic programs that propagate
flawed terrorist radicalization theories. Terrorism studies programs have come under significant criticism
for failing to uphold rigorous standards of empirical social science research. A NATO Security in Science
review found that, “of 1535 scholarly papers published on the subject of terrorism between 2000 and
2004, only 121 had the word ‘data’ in their abstracts and a careful review reveals that genuine new data
was reported in less than 10% of that subgroup.”¶ Arun Kundnani, author of The Muslim’s are Coming!
Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror recently explained to me how these flawed
academic studies programs have great influence intelligence and law enforcement agencies: ¶ The FBI
agents Kundnani interviewed said they preferred a simple explanation of terrorist radicalization over a
more complex one, even if it was contradicted by evidence. But there may be more to why the
government prefers these theories than mere simplicity.¶ Dr. Lisa Stampnitzky, of Harvard University,
shares Kundnani’s view that terrorism studies often have an unhealthy financial and intellectual
dependence on government:¶ “Terrorism expertise has its origins as an adjunct to the developing
counterterrorism apparatus of the state, with the earliest organized efforts at terrorism studies largely
sponsored by the state, and often explicitly oriented toward developing practical techniques of
control.”¶ This insight is crucial to understanding the government’s continuing embrace of radicalization
theories. Simply put, the government continues to be the primary sponsor of radicalization studies
because they justify counterterrorism policies that maximize its policing powers. As Kundnani has
written, “[s]cholarship that associates a particular kind of ‘disposition’, be it ‘cultural,’ ‘psychological’…,
with terrorist violence enables intelligence gatherers to use that disposition as a proxy for terrorist risk
and to structure their surveillance accordingly.”¶ Treating terrorism as the spread of an ideological
infection within a vulnerable community also allows the government to put aside difficult questions
about the role U.S. foreign and national security policies play in generating anti-American grievances,
which the Defense Department raised in this 2004 report. Studies supporting government radicalization
theories rarely mention U.S. military actions in Muslim countries, lethal drone strikes, torture, or the
Guantanamo Bay prison as radicalizing influences, though many terrorist reference them in attempting
to justify their actions.¶ The reliance on radicalization theory also provides benefits to those who support
the current political, social, and financial status quo, particularly in regard to U.S. foreign policy. The
support for these theories comes from a broad array of organizations.
AT: “National Security Outweighs”

National security is founded on racism and operates on a system of exclusion that
targets individuals based on who they are not what they do
Corinna Mullin, activist and academic currently based in Tunis, and Azadeh Shahshahani, human
rights attorney based in Atlanta and President of the National Lawyers Guild, 8-21- 2014, “From Gaza to
Ferguson: Exposing the Toolbox of Racist Repression,” http://fpif.org/gaza-ferguson-exposing-toolbox-
racist-repression/
With the violent policing of American black communities traceable back to the “slave patrols” of the
early 18th century, the origins of the U.S. national security state are particularly deep-rooted and brutal.
Yet although the context is different, the United States’ history of settler-colonialism and techniques of
racial and economic domination yield many similarities with Israel’s methods.¶ Importantly, both states
operate according to a “national security state” logic, in which a host of violent as well as mundane
administrative practices result in physical harm and limits to individual and group freedoms. ¶ Linked to
the notion of a “state of exception,” a context in which a state claims leeway to violate a host of legal
and constitutional norms, the national security state requires a dehumanized “Other” to sustain its
politics of fear. Those constructed as “Other” are deemed threatening not on the basis of their actions,
but rather on the basis of their identity or perceived ideology. In other words, it is not what they do, but
who they are (Blacks, Palestinians, Muslims, Arabs, Islamists, etc.) that matters in determining whether a
criminal act has been committed. Inversing the logic of the law, the Other in a “state of exception” is
guilty until proven innocent.¶ The national security state is characterized by a concentration of power in
the hands of the executive, violations of due process and other constitutional guarantees, and liberal
use of the state secrecy prerogative. It also entails increased restrictions on speech, association, and
privacy; the targeting of whistle blowers, lawyers, and civil liberties advocates; the criminalization of
entire communities; and an expanded role for the military and intelligence agencies in civil life, including
through the militarization of the police and the use of violence against civilian populations.
There is a way to maintain national security and protect the privacy rights of American
citizens—the government must be transparent about surveillance so the public can
hold them accountable.
Al Franken, US Senator from Minnesota, 7-23-2013, “We need transparency on domestic
surveillance,” http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/23/opinion/franken-nsa-spying/
The government must give proper weight to both keeping America safe from terrorists and protecting
Americans' privacy. But when Americans lack the most basic information about our domestic
surveillance programs, they have no way of knowing whether we're getting that balance right. This lack
of transparency is a big problem.¶ Since I came to the Senate, I've been working to fix this. I've supported
amendments to the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that would have required
greater public reporting on the use of surveillance authorities and greater disclosures about the legal
opinions and safeguards that support them. When those amendments failed, I voted against renewing
both of these laws.¶ I want to be clear: I didn't vote "no" because I wanted to end these programs or
because I thought they were unnecessary. Based on briefings, I believe these programs protect our
country and have saved lives and have reasonable safeguards in place to protect Americans' privacy. I
voted the way I did because I wanted to send a loud signal to my colleagues that transparency was
critical and that there was too little of it in place. National security laws must protect national security.
But they must also protect the public trust and preserve the ability of an informed electorate to hold its
government to account.¶ I'm working on legislation that will require the federal government to annually
report how it uses key authorities under the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
including the authorities underlying the phone metadata and the PRISM electronic surveillance
programs that recently came to light. For each of these authorities, the government must disclose how
many Americans' information is being collected and how many Americans' information is being queried
and actually seen by federal officers or agents.¶ My legislation would also allow companies to publicly
report on how many Patriot and FISA orders they're getting and how many of their customers these
orders affect. There's a way to do this that protects national security. Since 2009, Google has been
reporting on the number of national security letters it receives, and that hasn't hurt anyone. I frankly
think that after Snowden's disclosures, an even stronger case can be made that we can achieve greater
transparency without harming national security.
Government surveillance tactics are unknown and even when they are discovered
individuals don’t know what the harms of surveillance are—it’s important to challenge
this
Neil M. Richards, Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, 2013, “The Dangers of
Surveillance,” http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol126_richards.pdf
Although we have laws that protect us against government surveillance,¶ secret government programs
cannot be challenged until they are¶ discovered. And even when they are, our law of surveillance
provides¶ only minimal protections. Courts frequently dismiss challenges to such¶ programs for lack of
standing, under the theory that mere surveillance¶ creates no harms. The Supreme Court recently
reversed the only major¶ case to hold to the contrary, in Clapper v. Amnesty International¶ USA,3 finding
that the respondents’ claim that their communications¶ were likely being monitored was “too
speculative.”4¶ But the important point is that our society lacks an understanding¶ of why (and when)
government surveillance is harmful. Existing attempts¶ to identify the dangers of surveillance are often
unconvincing,¶ and they generally fail to speak in terms that are likely to influence the ¶ law. In this
Article, I try to explain the harms of government surveillance.¶ Drawing on law, history, literature, and
the work of scholars in¶ the emerging interdisciplinary field of “surveillance studies,” I offer an¶ account
of what those harms are and why they matter. I will move¶ beyond the vagueness of current theories of
surveillance to articulate a¶ more coherent understanding and a more workable approach.¶ At the level
of theory, I will explain why and when surveillance is¶ particularly dangerous and when it is not. First,
surveillance is harmful¶ because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties. With respect¶ to civil
liberties, consider surveillance of people when they are thinking,¶ reading, and communicating with
others in order to make up their¶ minds about political and social issues. Such intellectual surveillance¶ is
especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment¶ with new, controversial, or deviant
ideas. To protect our intellectual¶ freedom to think without state oversight or interference, we need
what¶ I have elsewhere called “intellectual privacy.”5 A second special harm¶ that surveillance poses is its
effect on the power dynamic between the¶ watcher and the watched. This disparity creates the risk of a
variety¶ of harms, such as discrimination, coercion, and the threat of selective¶ enforcement, where
critics of the government can be prosecuted¶ or blackmailed for wrongdoing unrelated to the purpose of
the¶ surveillance.
State of emergency exceptions have been drastically out of control and led to
compromising international commitments—reject this logic
Kim Lane Scheppele, John J. O'Brien Professor of Comparative Law and Professor of Sociology,
University of¶ Pennsylvania, May 2004, “Law in a time of emergency: States of exception and the
temptations of 9/11,” http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1365&context=jcl
Against this background of the exception and its rationales, I next¶ explore the specific responses of the
United States to 9/11 in both¶ domestic and foreign policy in Part II of this Article. Since 9/11, the¶ Bush
administration has repeatedly invoked its ability to make exceptions¶ to normal legality to cope with the
terrorist threat in domestic¶ policy through increasing invocation of military rationales for its actions.¶
The commander-in-chief powers that have been invoked by the¶ President have had the effect of
undermining both separation of¶ powers and individual rights at home. In foreign policy, the Bush¶
administration acted as though 9/11 created the basis not only for a¶ national state of emergency, but
also an international state of emergency¶ that requires other countries to make exceptions to both
international¶ law and their constitutional orders. The United States, as¶ a result, has urged its allies to
compromise their constitutional and¶ international commitments to meet the new threat.¶ As I will
show, the Bush administration's response to 9/11 in both¶ domestic and foreign policy is not what one
would typically expect of¶ a true emergency; namely, quick responses that violate the constitutional ¶
order followed by a progressive normalization. Instead, the¶ American government (including all three
branches working together)¶ responded with much constitutional care right after 9/11,¶ fully aware that
the temptation would be to overreact. The greater¶ abuses have come as 9/11 recedes and executive
policy has turned¶ toward larger and larger constitutional exceptions, with the active acquiescence ¶ so
far of both Congress and the courts. The reaction to¶ 9/11 was not the declaration of a sudden
emergency that has gradually¶ abated, but instead has involved a measured immediate response¶
followed by ever-expanding justifications for the assertion of executive¶ and unilateral power.
The blurring of boundaries between the police and intelligence gathering agencies is
not an effective means of combatting terrorism
Aleš Završnik, Faculty of Law at the Institute of Criminology, Ljubljana, 2013, “Blurring the Line
between Law Enforcement and¶ Intelligence: Sharpening the Gaze of¶ Surveillance?,”
http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/452
Seen from a longer historical perspective, the current relaxation of borders in the control¶ and security
domain is not at all new. The influence of different agencies has varied over¶ time and so has the kind of
work they carry out. A full account of these evolutions is¶ obviously beyond the scope of the present
discussion. The focus here will thus be on how¶ law enforcement and foreign intelligence work has
overlapped, in institutional,¶ functional, operative, technological and spatial terms, over the last two
decades. We¶ may summarise the resulting blur as follows: institutionally, new hybrid agencies and¶
organs have been formed to facilitate cooperation and information exchange. In spatial¶ terms, law
enforcement agencies have started focusing on external threats in¶ ‘peacekeeping and stabilisation
operations’ (cf. Last 2010) while intelligence agencies¶ began turning to domestic threats. In functional
and operative terms ‘intelligence-led¶ policing’ is increasingly the prototype of all police work (cf.
Lemieux 2008) and police¶ forces have been permitted to employ more invasive secret service-type
powers¶ (examples would include digital searches with on-line ‘Trojan horses’ that fall outside the ¶ scope
of judicial overview1 and video surveillance enhanced with face-recognition or ¶ registration plate-
recognition systems).2¶ The blurring of these boundaries cannot be assessed simply as a positive or
negative¶ development. It can be interpreted in several contradictory ways: as complementary or¶
competitive; as a trend providing a security net; or one demolishing the safety net of ¶ human rights.
Hermetically sealed dividing lines between police and intelligence lead to ¶ unjustifiable inefficacy and
inefficiency on both sides, and agencies should obviously be¶ allowed to exchange relevant information.
But the examples to be outlined in this paper¶ will show that impulsively blurring the boundaries
between these fields is not a solution¶ to growing fears of terrorism, cross-border crime and irregular
migration. Walls torn-down¶ raise the level of ‘emergency criminal law’ (Vervaele 2005) and lead us
towards a¶ ‘pre-crime society’ (Zedner 2007).
Surveillance not effective

Domestic surveillance tactics are not effective and trades off with more beneficial
forms of law enforcement
Nicole Pasulka, staff writer and reporter, 10-20-2014, “Snowden Says Mass Surveillance Could Make
the U.S. More Vulnerable to Attacks,” http://www.takepart.com/article/2014/10/20/edward-snowden-
and-lawrence-lessig
According to Snowden, the problem is not simply that the NSA database is “a violation of our natural
rights.” Even if the government were just collecting this data, not searching it without warrants, the
information hasn’t served its alleged purpose of detecting criminal activity.¶ Snowden isn’t the first
person to point this out. In January, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, an independent
group created by Congress after 9/11, released a report that found only one instance in seven years of
the NSA telephone metadata surveillance program leading to a legitimate tip on a terrorist suspect.
Members had full access to this classified information and were “incentivized to exonerate these
programs,” Snowden said.¶ “We miss attacks. We miss leads, and investigations fail because when the
government is doing what it calls a ‘collect it all’ investigation, we’re not seeing anything with specificity.
It’s impossible to keep an eye on all your targets when you’re constantly dumping more hay on top of
them,” Snowden said.¶ “We have finite resources, and the question is, should we be spending $10 billion
dollars a year on mass surveillance programs at the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective
means of traditional targeted surveillance?”¶ That the collection of phone metadata distracts from more
effective forms of law enforcement wasn’t the only argument Snowden made against the program. He
also disagreed when Lessig asked him about a suggestion, first proposed by CIA whistle-blower William
Binney, that the data be collected but encrypted and accessible only with proper authorization from the
courts.
The FBI tricks law-abiding citizens into committing terrorist attacks in an effort to
appear effective
Deirdre Fulton, staff writer, 7-21-2014, “FBI Entrapment Created 'Illusion' of Terrorist Plots: Report,”
http://www.commondreams.org/news/2014/07/21/fbi-entrapment-created-illusion-terrorist-plots-
report
The FBI, under pressure to appear effective and worthy of its $8.4-billion budget, has "targeted
American Muslims in abusive counterterrorism 'sting operations' based on religious and ethnic identity";
sent informants to mosques to "troll for leads"; and in some cases encouraged or even paid individuals
to undertake terrorist acts, the report (pdf) reveals.¶ “Americans have been told that their government is
keeping them safe by preventing and prosecuting terrorism inside the US,” said Andrea Prasow, deputy
Washington director at Human Rights Watch and one of the authors of the report. “But take a closer
look and you realize that many of these people would never have committed a crime if not for law
enforcement encouraging, pressuring, and sometimes paying them to commit terrorist acts.”¶ The study,
entitled Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in U.S. Terrorism Prosecutions, examines 27 federal
terrorism cases (of more than 500 since September 11, 2001) from initiation of the investigations to
sentencing and post-conviction conditions of confinement, finding infractions at every turn. ¶ By preying
on vulnerable individuals, utilizing questionable legal tactics, and subjecting citizens to harsh and
disproportionate confinement conditions, the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI show disregard for
civil rights and "may be creating terrorists out of law-abiding citizens," report co-author Tarek Z. Ismai
writes at Just Security.
Law enforcement operates with a large degree of confirmation bias which allows for
context-inappropriate responses to events
At the collective level, 9/11 can be said to be the United States’ triggering ¶ event. Since the attacks, law
enforcement has operated in a sustained survival¶ mode. It suffers from confirmation bias, and therefore
produces “context-¶ inappropriate” responses to events.169 One such response is the view that
Muslims¶ and others from the Middle East present a threat that justifies targeting¶ them as a group.170¶
Confirmation bias also contributes to positive feedback loops because confirmatory¶ evidence builds
confidence in a pre-existing strategy and inhibits the¶ ability to change. As the commitment to a strategy
continues through time, confidence¶ in that strategy increases, resulting in increased commitment to
the¶ strategy and to the search for even more confirmatory evidence.171 And so,¶ confirmation bias
drives the positive feedback loop, but the feedback loop also¶ drives the confirmation bias.172¶
Confirmation bias produces perceived, self-reinforcing law enforcement ¶ successes,173 as it entails
conspiracy charges, pseudo-entrapment, and pretextual¶ charges. The heuristics associated with biased
thinking lead to systematic errors,¶ failure to update belief sets, underestimation of uncertainty, and
excessive¶ crediting of salient evidence.174 It is possible that operation of confirmation biases¶ increases
the rate of false positives and false negatives.175 Confirmation¶ bias also, however, may produce more
true positives because those subject to¶ the bias are hypersensitive to threats.176 Discovery of these
true positives drives¶ positive feedback loops and immunizes them somewhat from criticism. Given ¶ the
not-another-9/11 imperative, people may be more comfortable with a larger ¶ ratio of false positives to
true positives than they would be otherwise.177
AT: Guidelines
Restrictions on intelligence gathering operations have decreased since 9/11 and the
government and law enforcement are not recognizing the distinction between
domestic and foreign operations
conducting the fight against terrorism, 12-18-2014, “The Militarization of Domestic Surveillance is
Everyone’s Problem,” https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/militarization-domestic-surveillance-
everyone’s-problem
Unfortunately, the federal government has loosened or ignored law enforcement guidelines restricting
intelligence gathering in the years since 9/11, removing or weakening the criminal predicates necessary
to ensure a proper focus on illegal activity. The results were predictable —increased police spying on
minorities and political dissidents and increased efforts to escape judicial and public oversight. Federal
law enforcement agencies have adopted policies of “parallel construction” to mask the surveillance
methods they use to gather evidence, misleading courts and depriving defendants of their right to
challenge their constitutionality. Where evidence of improper FBI surveillance has leaked to the public,
the Justice Department invoked “state secrets” to shut down litigation. And at the request of the State
Police and FBI, the Virginia legislature exempted its intelligence fusion center from open government
laws.¶ Trained by the military to spy on hostile foreign nations, Dahl cautioned that “you wouldn’t want
to hire me to conduct domestic surveillance.” His statement should serve as a warning to those in
Congress who authorized the NSA to play a major role in seizing Americans’ electronic communications
(and want to give it more authority over U.S. cyber security), and sat silent as the FBI has transitioned
into a domestic intelligence agency.¶ It should also serve as a warning to federal, state and local law
enforcement officials. As these agencies have increasingly claimed a role in intelligence collection,
they’ve looked to the military and foreign intelligence agencies for tactics, expertise and personnel,
without sufficiently recognizing the important distinctions between domestic and foreign intelligence.
COURTS COUNTERPLAN RESPONSES
Permutation Solvency
Empirically, Congress and the Supreme Court work together with overlapping
responsibilities
Deanell Reece Tacha, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and Chair of
Committee on the Judicial Branch, United States Judicial Conference, 1991
Ohio State Law Journal: Volume 52, Issue 1,
https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/64544/OSLJ_V52N1_0279.pdf?sequence=1
The historical record of our nation is replete with examples of overlapping responsibilities and close
interaction between Congress and the judiciary. Although the possibility of simultaneous responsibility
in both branches has been largely foreclosed in the modern era-to the great relief of overworked
legislators and judges-the regular, uninhibited interaction between members of both branches as they
went about their official duties and their personal lives remains an example for us today.
Courts and legislative actions empirically work together to secure constitutional rights
Scott Barclay, head of Department of History and Politics at Drexel College, October 3, 2013
"Let's Talk: How Congress and the Court Make It Work," Life of the Law,
http://www.lifeofthelaw.org/2013/10/lets-talk-how-congress-and-the-court-make-it-work/ (accessed
5/21/2015)
This interplay is not the popular image of how rights are achieved: the edict brought from constitutional
powers on high, as the myth of Brown v Board of Education would have us believe. But, in fact, it is the
more historically accurate version. Brown was largely implemented through the actions by federal
bureaucratic agencies who took their policy lead from congressional actions and ongoing court decisions
that determined the look of the policy on-the-ground. Similarly, notwithstanding the US Supreme Court
intervention in 2003 in Lawrence v Texas, the elimination of state sodomy prohibitions from the 1962
through 2003 occurred through a dynamic mix of state legislative action and state court decisions,
before federal court action finally completed the task.
Permutation Solvency
Separate actions can spur dialogue between the branches, resulting in policy
improvement
The complexities of the law-making and law interpreting tasks in the third century of this republic cry
out for systematic dialogue between those who make and those who interpret legislation. History
suggests that dialogue between the legislative and judicial branches of government was anticipated by
the framers of the Constitution. Common sense supports the notion that the public good-and the
economy-would be served by enhanced communication between these branches. Even with enhanced
dialogue, separation of powers would be preserved by each branch's exercise of its primary power,
structural constraints established by the Constitution, and the independence of the individual players.
Congress and courts acting together remove constraints to social change

Gerald N. Rosenberg, Professor of Law and Political Science at University of Chicago, 2008
"Ideological Preferences and Hollow Hopes," University of Chicago Press Page,
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/rosenberg/index.html (accessed 5/20/2015)
The second problem with this criticism is that it assumes that whenever the Congress reacts to a Court decision, this is a strike against my
argument. For example, Devins, in a long discussion of Court, Congress, and executive interaction in civil rights,
argues that in the areas of tax breaks for racist schools, diversity preferences for minority broadcasters,
and employment discrimination, the other branches responded to Court decisions in ways that
furthered civil rights (Devins 1992, 1046–54). I believe Devins is correct but also believe that nothing in The Hollow Hope argues against
this. In each of these subject areas there was legislation or executive orders furthering the civil rights goals. The
existence of such political action means that each of the constraints were or could be overcome. The
first constraint was overcome because governmental actors created a statutory right, the second
constraint was overcome because that action signaled to the justices that they were unlikely to suffer
consequences for acting, and the third constraint could be overcome if administrative officials, whose
acquiescence was required for implementation, were supportive.
Coordination serves the orderly development of law

Even assuming the reluctance of legislators and judges to interact is grounded in an appropriate concern
for separation of powers, our history is replete with examples of constructive dialogue between the
branches serving the orderly development of our law. Separation was not intended to mean alienation
or to create antagonistic positions. The relationship between the judiciary and Congress was not marked
by professional distrust and begrudging compromise when the Constitution originally established
separate branches with distinct powers.
Legitimacy Turns
Controversial decisions undermine Supreme Court legitimacy

James L. Gibson, Professor of Political Science at Washington University Saint Louis, and Gregory
Caldeira, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, July 4, 2007
"Supreme Court Nominations, Legitimacy Theory, and the American Public: A Dynamic Test of the
Theory of Positivity Bias," Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
But opinions can indeed change, with at least two types of “exogenous” sources — controversial
Supreme Court decisions and politicized confirmation hearings — providing engines for attitude change.
Events such as these may awaken attitudes from their hibernation, allowing for the possibility of
updating. Two types of change seem possible: Attention to things judicial may be associated with
exposure to highly legitimizing symbols of judicial power (e.g., robes), symbols that teach the lesson that
the Court is different from ordinary political institutions and therefore is worthy of esteem. Gibson and
Caldeira refer to this as “positivity bias.” Alternatively, events may teach that the Court is not different,
that its role is largely “political,” and that the “myth of legality” really is a myth. Since so few studies
have adopted a dynamic perspective on attitudes toward institutions, we know little about how these
processes of attitude change take place.
Court legitimacy is key to fighting terrorism

Jeremy Shapiro, Director of Research, Center on the United States and Europe, March 2003
"French Lessons: The Importance of the Judicial System in Fighting Terrorism," Brookings Institute,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2003/03/france-shapiro (accessed 5/21/2015)
On February 19, 2003 a court in Germany handed down the first guilty verdict related to the September
11 attacks. A panel of judges in Hamburg found Mounir Al-Motassadeq, a Moroccan studying in
Germany, guilty of over 3000 counts of accessory to commit murder. The verdict was a signal victory in
the war against terrorism. The very fact, however, that the first such conviction occurred abroad is also a reminder of how little
success the U.S. government has had since September 11 in involving the U.S. courts in the struggle against terrorism. The Bush
administration's judicial inactivity reflects a widely held discomfort in the U.S. with using the courts for dealing with national security threats.
The process is considered too slow, too dependent on inflexible rules, too prone to leaks of valuable intelligence, and too unresponsive to the
needs of a rapidly evolving and essentially political threat. These concerns are certainly valid, but they must be weighed against the points
raised by numerous human rights organizations and legal scholars that indefinite detentions and military tribunals are inconsistent with deeply
held American principles of fairness and justice. There is no simple formula for reconciling the war on terrorism's short-term requirement for
speed and flexibility with the same war's long-term need for legitimacy. Nonetheless, understanding
the importance of judicial
procedures and legitimacy requires a long-term view of the problem of terrorism that the United States
lacks. The long French experience with terrorism provides some perspective and demonstrates why
judicial institutions that can handle terrorist cases are a critical piece of a nation's counterterrorism
arsenal.
Courts Ineffective in Checking Executive

The Court can't check executive power--only Congress can
Frederick M. Kaiser, Specialist in American National Government at Congressional Research Service,
2001
"Congressional Oversight," CRS Report for Congress,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/CRS.Oversight.pdf (accessed 5/21/2015)
The authority to oversee derives from these constitutional powers. Congress could not carry them out
reasonably or responsibly without knowing what the executive is doing; how programs are being
administered, by whom, and at what cost; and whether officials are obeying the law and complying with
legislative intent. The Supreme Court has legitimated Congress’s investigative power, subject to
constitutional safeguards for civil liberties.
Standing prevents legal action against executive authority

Elizabeth Price Foley, Professor of Law at Florida International University, February 7, 2014
"Why not even Congress can sue the administration over unconstitutional executive actions," Daily
Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2014/02/07/why-not-even-congress-can-sue-the-administration-over-
unconstitutional-executive-actions/ (accessed 5/21/2015)
First, courts have limited ability to check a president’s failure to execute. The primary obstacle is
“standing,” a doctrine that requires a plaintiff to have a concrete, personal injury in order to sue.
Citizens can’t file generic lawsuits to enforce the Constitution; they must prove that the government has
harmed them in a personal, palpable way.
The Supreme Court has no enforcement--executive can just ignore its decisions
Lisa L. Miller, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, February 16, 2006
"Too little too late: The Supreme Court as a check on Executive power," Mother Jones,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/02/too-little-too-late-supreme-court-check-executive-
power (accessed 5/21/2015)
The Supreme Court must rely on the other branches of government to enforce its decisions and as an
unelected body that must react to cases brought before it, the Court is highly constrained in the issues it
can address. A brief look at cases involving executive power reveals few instances in which the court
bucked the status quo. The best we can say about Supreme Court rulings in this area is that they have,
on occasion, drawn some loose boundaries around presidential authority. However, in the absence of
clear congressional opposition to executive action, the Supreme Court has largely affirmed broad
discretion, particularly in times of war or other national security crises. This is not surprising since the
Constitution provides specific powers to both Congress and the executive in these areas but grants no
such direct authority to the Supreme Court.
Counterplan Leads to Judicial Activism

Sua sponte hearing of politically contentious case spurs judicial activism
Rosemary Krimbel, Special Deputy for Regulatory Reform for the City of Chicago, January 1989
"Rehearing SUA Sponte in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Procedure for Judicial Policymaking," Chicago-Kent
Law Review, Vol. 65, no. 3, http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3234&context=cklawreview (accessed 5/19/2015)
Through the interplay of the Court's discretion to grant writs of certiorari and request rehearing sua
sponte, the Court may reach out and pick specific issues as well as cases. This interplay raises the
specter of what has been called the "countermajoritarian difficulty," which arises when the politically
unaccountable Court intervenes in the political process. The memorandum opinion that requested
reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union s brought to the forefront the question of whether the
Court's inherent power to administer its docket -the foundation for its ability to rehear cases sua
sponte-may be abused by an activist Court.
Adding a case to the docket transforms the Court into a player in policymaking
As a result, the Court can address the policy decisions made by the politically accountable branches-
Congress and the Executive-only when presented with legal challenges to those decisions. But the Court
has the inherent ability to add an issue to a case already on its docket simply by requesting rehearing
sua sponte, as the Court did in the Patterson case over vigorous dissents by four Justices. This Note will
examine how the Supreme Court's broad discretion to select cases and issues has changed the Court
from a passive institution "with neither force nor will but merely judgment" to the influential arbiter of
"whether the political solutions to major national problems devised by the legislative and executive
branches [will] be allowed to proceed."
Counterplan Leads to Judicial Activism

Small steps toward judicial lawmaking spread out of control to complete lack of
judicial restraint
Anthony D'Amato, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, 2010
"Judicial Legislation," Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons, Faculty Working
Papers No. 107, http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1106&context=facultyworkingpapers (accessed 5/22/2015)
Lawyers, as well as the public at large, need a sense of certainty that existing law can be counted upon
and plans can be made grounded in legal research and thought. The idea of judicial legislation creates a
hole in the system, into which is poured the unpredictable lawmaking preferences of whichever judge
happens to be sitting in a given case. The hole widens when lawyers, counseling clients, perceive that an
issue is sufficiently close for a future judge to make up a new rule governing it. Uncertainty grows, and it
spawns more and more litigation. Soon there are gaps everywhere, and judges become lawmakers—
unelected, unaccountable, and unrestrained by whatever rules and principles of law the parties relied
upon in the first place.
When Court addresses issues not settled by legislature or executive, it raises the
countermajoritarian difficulty
By rehearing sua sponte, the Court can accelerate the "sooner or later" timing of an issue's arrival and,
thereby, evade the Constitution's jurisdictional constraints. Thus, the Court can address either issues
that have not been decided by a politically accountable body or, worse, issues that have been decided
by political representatives. The latter set of issues gives the Court the opportunity to invalidate
legislative enactments without anyone requesting that they do so. Both actions raise the
countermajoritarian difficulty and possibly violate the Constitution's case or controversy limitation.
Activism causes inevitable conflict of interest

Anthony D'Amato, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, 2010
"Judicial Legislation," Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons, Faculty Working
Papers No. 107, http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1106&context=facultyworkingpapers (accessed 5/22/2015)
On the other hand, the attitude that a judge may legislate could shade imperceptibly into some of these
conflicts of interest. A judge who owns shares of stock might find that, once he is legislating for the good
of society, social policy requires that corporations should tend to prevail in litigation against private
persons or the government. A judge who has heavily invested in the stock market and who has a
personal fortune that is dependent on good business conditions might well be inclined to favor decisions
that are supportive of a good business environment. These kinds of factors may have a powerful effect
upon a judge who feels that in close cases he is freed from the burden of finding the law and instead is
called upon to make wise new rules for the social good.
Legislature is Better than the Courts

Congress is better equipped to deal with surveillance issues than the courts
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Law, Technology & the Arts, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, 2010
"Unlimited Power: Why the President's (Warrantless) Surveillance Program is Unconstitutional," Faculty
Publications, Paper 576, http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/576 (accessed
5/19/2015)
In addition to being the proper constitutional body to decide these questions, legislatures are
institutionally more competent than courts to make the types of policy decisions associated with
authorizing government surveillance. Since they are politically accountable, they are more likely to
evaluate the policy implications of certain surveillance technologies, balancing, among other things, the
threat to privacy and the potential for abuse. In other words, this is a balancing of the demands of public
security from a potentially abusive government against the demands for public safety from groups and
individuals who may do us harm.
Legislative branch understands technology better than the courts and takes public
interest more into account
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Law, Technology & the Arts, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, 2010
"Unlimited Power: Why the President's (Warrantless) Surveillance Program is Unconstitutional," Faculty
Publications, Paper 576, http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/576 (accessed
5/19/2015)
The legislative branch is also better able to develop a factual record with respect to the nuances and
details of new technologies and their costs and benefits. Moreover, whatever one might think of the
legislative process, it is more likely to take the interests of the general public into account in fashioning
rules governing surveillance than courts who are asked to make such decisions in cases in which a search
revealed evidence of a defendant's guilt, and the only remedy is exclusion of that evidence.
Counterplan Links to Politics Disadvantage

Congress perceives and reacts to Supreme Court decisions
Danette Brickman, Associate Professor of Political Science at St. Bonaventure University, January 3,
2007
"Congressional Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: Understanding the Introduction of Legislation
to Override," AllAcademic.com,
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/4/3/2/6/p143265_index.html?
phpsessid=5gc4bojrvb0fbsa4sqjita4u34 (accessed 5/21/2015)
The United States Constitution sets forth a government that prescribes specific roles for each of its branches. While, constitutionally, Congress
is the policy-making branch, the U.S. Supreme Court enters the policy-making arena through statutory interpretation and judicial review
decisions. The preferred policies of these two branches of government do not always coincide, causing
conflict between the Court and Congress. At such times this conflict can lead to a battle over control of
national policy. This paper explains congressional reaction to Supreme Court decisions by relaxing two of the assumptions of the
separation of powers game and incorporating changing congressional preferences and context. U.S. Supreme Court decisions tend
to be viewed “not as a mere interpretation of law, but a determinative statement of national policy that
is, for all practical purposes, irrevocable” (Paschel 1991:144). While the majority of Supreme Court decisions
remain untouched by Congress, a number of statutory interpretation and judicial review decisions have
been successfully overridden by the legislative branch, making it apparent that Supreme Court decisions
are not necessarily final. In certain circumstances Congress is willing to do battle with the Court to
achieve their preferred policy.
It’s implausible to separate judicial decisions and politics

Barry Friedman, Professor of Law at New York University, 2005
"The Politics of Judicial Review," Texas Law Review, Vol. 84, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
This Part examines how the necessity of separating law from politics became a central tenet of
constitutional theory. By explaining how we have arrived at the present, history opens space for
understanding our world differently. What began as a rhetorical response by opponents of particular
Supreme Court decisions has become a fixture of theories of judicial review. This instinct is not wrong:
There clearly is a longstanding and central societal belief that law and politics are not the same and
should not be considered as such. At the same time, however, history suggests that a strict separation of
law and politics is - and always has been - implausible.
Counterplan Links to Politics Disadvantage

We can’t isolate Supreme Court decisions from the political process—decisions have
political repercussions
Only recently - sparked, as is typically the case, by a spate of contentious Supreme Court decisions - have
many begun to see that constitutional judging cannot be insulated from "ordinary" politics in quite the
way theory demands. Recognition of the relationship between law and politics is on the rise. Still, it is apparent that normative scholars
remain uncomfortable with the implications of positive scholarship, even as they take notice. Legal theorists indicate their discomfort by
moving quickly from positive assertions about the relationship between law and politics to conclusions that positive scholars would suggest
simply are implausible. To take a frequent example, some normative scholars look to the political branches to correct errant judges without
considering whether there is any reason to think the political branches are likely to do so at present.
Supreme Court decisions send political messages

Joseph L. Smith, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Alabama, 2007
"Presidents, Justices, and Deference to Administrative Action," Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2, http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/2/346.full (accessed 5/21/2015)
This article continues a line of research begun by Linda Cohen and Matt Spitzer in the 1990s. Cohen and Spitzer began with the insight that
Supreme Court decisions evaluating agency actions do more than merely uphold or overturn the action
being litigated. These decisions also communicate legal doctrine to the lower courts, sending signals
regarding the level of deference they should show to agency decisions. Given the small number of administrative law
cases the Supreme Court hears each term, they assert that the signal-sending or doctrinal element of these decisions will have a larger impact
on policy than the direct effects on the litigants. Cohen and Spitzer argue that Supreme
Court Justices can best achieve their
policy-related goals if they consider their ideological relationship with the executive branch and then
factor this relationship into their decisions evaluating administrative actions. Their model generally
suggests that as the median member of the Court gets ideologically closer to the president, the Court
should become more deferential to the administrative action.
There are myriad historical instances of judicial review sparking political battles
Throughout American history, views about judicial review have been shaped more by political responses
to judicial decisions in heated controversies than by any jurisprudential theory of what it means to live
under a constitution. This was true during the first great clash of will between the courts and the
"political" branches following the election of 1800. All the famous partisan skirmishes of that era - the
Marbury litigation, the repeal of the Circuit Judges Act, and the impeachment of Samuel Chase - were
motivated by the Federalist party's withdrawal to the judiciary and the immediate political challenge this
withdrawal posed to Republican policy. Nonetheless, these disputes played out as debates about judicial
independence, popular accountability, and the separation of politics and law.
Court Stripping Turn

Empirically controversial decisions spark legislative court-stripping initiatives
W. David Kubiak, Project Censored Award-winning journalist and a Kyoto Journal contributing editor,
March 24, 2005
"Introducing the Constitution Restoration Act," The Scoop,
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0503/S00266.htm (accessed 5/21/2015)
Just when you thought the corporatist/Christian Coalition had milked the 9/11 "surprise" for all it was worth in powers, profits and votes, we
regret to report that you may have to think again. Just in case you've briefly fallen behind on your rightwing mailing lists, you
might have
missed the March 3rd filing of Senate bill S. 520 and House version is H.R. 1070, AKA the "Constitution
Restoration Act" (CRA). In the worshipful words of the Conservative Caucus, this historic legislation will "RESTORE OUR
CONSTITUTION!", mainly by barring ANY federal court or judge from ever again reviewing "any matter to
the extent that relief is sought against an entity of Federal, State, or local government, or against an
officer or agent of Federal, State, or local government (whether or not acting in official or personal
capacity), concerning that entity's, officer's, or agent's acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source
of law, liberty, or government."
Barriers to court stripping are being lifted and Congress has a propensity to pass court-
stripping legislation in response to controversial decisions
Helen L. Norton, Professor of Law at University of Colorado, 2006
"Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress's Latest Challenge to Judicial Review," Social Science Research
Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=948268 (accessed 5/21/2015)
Not only are these efforts increasingly successful, they are likely to reemerge in future proposals to
shape subject matter jurisdiction and thus the balance of judicial power. The House's passage of two
separate court-stripping bills in the same Congress represents a high-water mark in the court-shaping
movement, as does its passage of the Pledge Protection Act in successive Congresses. Indeed, some of
the dynamics that helped thwart earlier court-stripping measures appear to have diminished or
disappeared altogether.
Court stripping allows Congress to pass unconstitutional laws and destroys judicial
review
Max Baucus, former U.S. Senator from Montana, and Kenneth R. Kay, Chief Minority Counsel, United
States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, January 1, 1982
"The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress," Villanova Law
Review, Vol. 27, http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2375&context=vlr
These hypotheticals are the reasonable extension of the strategy being put forward in the court
stripping bills, not fanciful ruminations. If one supports removal of Supreme Court jurisdiction over
abortion or school prayer, one necessarily supports the possibility of Congress precluding review of any
legislation that might run afoul of any constitutional principle, including those held most dear by current
proponents of jurisdiction removal. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Congress will use restraint and limit
itself to neutral prospective removal of subject matter jurisdiction. A current example of more far
reaching legislation is the proposed "human life statute."
Answers to Separation of powers

Interaction between Congress and the courts doesn’t violate separation of powers
One way to test whether constitutional separation of powers is a valid justification for limiting
interaction between Congress and the judiciary is to consider its effect on communications between
other branches of government. For example, no one would suggest that the President's communications
with either the House or Senate erode the independence of the President's decision to veto a particular
piece of legislation. Nor is regular interaction between legislators and the staff of administrative agencies regarded as destroying the
independent judgment of either branch. Further, federal agencies often appear as parties or intervenors in cases filed in federal court and, in
that capacity, directly address the judiciary. An officer or agent of the federal government may file an amicus brief in federal court without
obtaining either the consent or leave of the court. The activities of joint commissions such as the Sentencing Commission, composed of
representatives from all three branches, clearly do not violate separation of powers. Although
separation of powers allows
these intercommunications, many judges and legislators still believe the Constitution is the reason for
their inclination not to communicate with the other branch on a regular basis. This perception, however,
is not derived from the separation of powers doctrine established in the Constitution .
Separation of powers refers to separate responsibilities, not the absence of any

interaction
Thus, Madison's writings demonstrate a conviction that separation of power was not meant to be total
separation or an unnatural isolation of members of one branch from the others. Rather, separation of
powers was established by granting each of the three branches of government primary responsibility for
the tasks of enacting, interpreting, or enforcing the law. Additionally, each branch is partially responsible
for restraining the other branches through a system of checks and balances expressly established in the
Constitution. As long as these structural protections are maintained, according to Madison, the proper
degree of separation will not be disturbed by interaction between the branches that would connect and
blend them. Moreover, Madison suggested that such interaction is necessary to maintain the proper
functioning of a free government.
Answers to Deliberation
Benefits of deliberation are exaggerated
Michael E. Morrell, professor of political science at University of Connecticut, 2005
"Deliberation, Democratic Decisionmaking and Internal Political Efficiency," Political Behavior, Vol. 27
No. 1, http://web.posc.jmu.edu/polbehavior/readings/Topic5_Efficacy+Trust/democ
%20deliber+internal%20effic.pdf (accessed 5/21/2015)
The results tend to reinforce previous findings such as those of Gastil (2004), and they go even further by showing that, when tested
using the most reliable and valid measure of internal political efficacy, it is likely that deliberative
decision-making will not necessarily directly increase citizens' feelings of personal political competence .
This is also in line with the empirical evidence Hibbing and Theiss-Morse report on the effects of deliberation in three areas: improving
decisions, improving legitimacy and improving people (2002, ch. 8). Although they do not specifically discuss internal political efficacy, the
concept most clearly fits into the general category of "improving people." That
deliberation did not significantly affect the
global measure of internal political efficacy lends support to their claim that deliberation will not achieve
what deliberative theorists' expect in regards to making better citizens.
Deliberation is sabotaged by manipulation

Günther Schönleitner, Director, International Financial Institutions at Ministry of Finance, Austria,
2004
"Can Public Deliberation Democratise State Action?" Politicising Democract: The New Local Politics of
Democratisation, http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/sv/iss/SGO2400/h05/undervisningsmateriale/
Schonleitner.pdf (accessed 5/21/2015)
Deliberation is a discursive process in which free and equal participants arrive at collective choices
through public reasoning, argumentation, and persuasion For liberal democrats democracy is about aggregating given,
.
unchangeable preferences prior to the political process, while deliberative democrats believe in the transformation of preferences through
political interaction. Arrow’s (1963) impossibility theorem has shown the arbitrariness and instability of voting mechanisms. Thus liberal
democrats call for ‘minimal democracy’ limited to the selection of rulers rather than policies, while deliberative democrats advocate non-voting
mechanisms of democratic will-formation aimed at consensus. Yet deliberation too is subject to the social choice critique. Processes of
argumentation and reflection are prone to strategic calculations, deception and manipulation; and
deliberative arrangements rely also on voting if consensus is unattainable Dryzek (2000:49) replaces consensus with
.
the more realistic aim of ‘reasoned agreement opens the door to bargaining, strategy, and
’, but this too
manipulation .
Too many barriers to effective deliberation

Günther Schönleitner, Director, International Financial Institutions at Ministry of Finance, Austria,
2004
"Can Public Deliberation Democratise State Action?" Politicising Democract: The New Local Politics of
Democratisation, http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/sv/iss/SGO2400/h05/undervisningsmateriale/
Schonleitner.pdf (accessed 5/21/2015)
Deliberative participation is embedded in rather than autonomous from local power dynamics, which it
is meant to transform. Deliberation depends upon a peculiar power constellation that remains fragile,
especially if not bolstered by strong horizontal forms of civic and political organising . Effective deliberation
presupposes conditions most likely to be found in already more democratic polities. This suggests a ‘hierarchy’ between representative and
deliberative democracy. Conventional means of ‘aggregative’ politics and electoral transformation are logically prior and superior. Only with
power-political obstacles removed can public deliberation contribute to deepening democracy.
Democratic consolidation can hardly be achieved by prescribing deliberative ‘add-ons’ to the prevailing
institutional matrix. Any serious attempt to overcome ‘institutional hybridism’ must address the
malfunctions of the country’s core political institutions of representative democracy.
EXECUTIVE ORDER COUNTERPLAN

RESPONSES
2AC Perm – Do Both
Concurrent war powers mean the perm is best

Jules Lobel, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School, 2008, “Conflicts Between the
Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War”,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf
Separation of powers doctrine generally operates on what has been termed a horizontal axis to draw
subject matter lines to separate and demarcate the proper boundaries between legislative, executive,
and judicial authority. 23 The powers of Congress and the President to control the conduct of a war
authorized by Congress is best understood, however, if viewed sequentially, not horizontally. Rather
than drawing a boundary between legislative and executive power based on subject matter or some
other normative principle, the two branches have concurrent constitutional power over the conduct of
authorized warfare. Those powers are divided in practice by timing, not subject matter. The President
has the power of initiative, the ability and authority to act quickly in the face of rapidly changing
wartime realities in the theater of action. Congress, on the other hand, has a more deliberative,
reflective power, allowing it to check and limit presidential initiative both before and after the Executive
acts.
2AC Perm – Do the CP
Normal means is executive action – empirics

John E. Owens, Professor of Government at the Centre for the Study of Democracy @University of
Westminster, Faculty Fellow in the Centre for Congressional and Presidential Studies at the American
University in Washington, DC, 2010, “The Impact of the “War on Terror” on Executive-Legislative
Relations in the UK and US: A Comparative Analysis”, http://www.britishpoliticsgroup.org/BPG%202010-
Owens-Shephard.pdf
Notwithstanding some efforts to challenge and check the Obama administration (as during the Bush
administration) – notably on military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan, and detainees at
Guantánamo - on most “war on terror” issues the Democratic Congress has not challenged the Obama
administration to overturn many of the Bush administration’s “war on terror” policies (including
extraordinary rendition, military tribunals, and the use of Bagram and other CIA prisons abroad) or insist
on the prosecution of CIA officials and others guilty of torture, Cabinet and other executive officers who
lied or failed to disclose illegal programmes to the Congress, or manipulated intelligence (see Conyers
2009 for a more or less complete charge sheet). In February 2010 the President signed into law HR 3961
which provides for further time extensions of several terrorist surveillance provisions included in the
PATRIOT Act. In sum, congressional non-decision making has continued, and although some legislators
(mainly liberal Democrats) have raised issues and the administration has showed a new willingness to
conduct conversations with the Congress, congressional legislators have collectively continued to offer
deference to the executive in this domain.
2AC Executive Rollback
Obama or future presidents will roll back the CP – our evidence is topic specific
William Bendix, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Keene State College, and Paul J. Quirk, Phil
Lind Chair in U.S. Politics and Representation at the University of British Columbia and former research
associate at the Brookings Institution, March 2015, “Secrecy and Negligence: How Congress Lost
Control of Domestic Surveillance,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/02-secrecy-negligence-congres-
surveillance-bendix-quirk/ctibendixquirksecrecyv3.pdf
For the immediate future, however, Congress appears to have gone out of the business of determining
policy for antiterrorism surveillance. In the near term, the best hope for privacy interests is for President
Obama to make good on his post-Snowden pledge, repeated in his 2015 State of the Union Address, to
reform surveillance programs in order to instill “public confidence…that the privacy of ordinary people is
not being violated.” He promised to work with Congress on the issue. If Congress is not capable of
acting, the executive branch can impose its own constraints on surveillance practices.57 But the
maintenance of self-imposed executive-branch constraints would depend entirely on the strength of the
administration’s commitment—and, in two years’ time, on the disposition of the next president.
Because of the president’s central responsibility for national security, the presidency is hardly a reliable
institutional champion for privacy interests.
2AC Legislative Rollback
Congress rolls back executive orders

Vanessa K. Burrows, Legislative Attorney for Congressional Research Service, 4-25-2010, “Executive
Orders: Issuance and Revocation”, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20846_20100325.pdf
Further, as long as it is not constitutionally based, Congress may repeal a presidential order, or
terminate the underlying authority upon which the action is predicated. For example, in 2006, Congress
revoked part of an executive order from November 12, 1838, which reserved certain public land for
lighthouse purposes.28 Congress has also explicitly revoked executive orders in their entirety, such as in
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which revoked a December 13, 1912, executive order that created Naval
Petroleum Reserve Numbered 2.29 Another example of the express nullification of an executive order
by Congress involved the revocation of an executive order by President George H. W. Bush to the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to establish a human fetal tissue bank for
research purposes.30 To effectuate this repeal, Congress simply directed that the “the provisions of
Executive Order 12806 shall not have any legal effect.”31 There have been numerous similarly revoked
executive orders and proposals to revoke particular executive orders.
2AC Agency Rollback
Agencies roll back restrictions on their operations – independent of presidential will

Harold H. Bruff, Professor of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1-28-2011, “PLACING YOUR FAITH
IN THE CONSTITUTION”, http://www.tulsalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Bruff.Final_.pdf
For cabinet departments and other nonindependent agencies, the limits of presidential direction are
generally understood to be as follows. First, since Congress routinely grants authority to administer
statutes to these officers, not the President, they must make the formal decisions. The President is free
to direct them to make a particular decision and, if they resist for legal or policy reasons, to remove and
replace them, 24 but the President may not exercise statutory authority granted to these officers
himself. Presidents also issue executive orders that require the agencies to consult with the White
House about the costs and benefits of their proposed regulations; Congress has acquiesced in these
orders.25 Thus, the power to supervise the executive branch is shared between the President and
Congress in ways that are compromised and are based more on history than on grand theory. The
advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement are known. To a pluralist, the arrangement is within
constitutional limits, its messiness being offset by the benefits of the creative tension that results from
involving both political branches in oversight of the executive agencies. Calabresi and Yoo reject the
desirability of this power sharing in favor of the benefits of clean and strong lines of political
accountability to the President. Here they must envision a world that does not currently exist - their
promised land of a new and improved federal government. What they do not do, however, is paint any
detailed picture of the altered landscape, of the practical differences they envision if the unitary
executive is endorsed by the Supreme Court. Would newly empowered presidents seize the reins of
power and bring the unwieldy bureaucracy under control? It is quite unclear that presidents can do
much more to control the bureaucracy than they now attempt. The fact that President Obama felt the
need to create various “czars,” his own new bureaucracy to control the bureaucracy, reveals the serious
practical limits to comprehensive control by the President himself.
2AC Judicial Rollback
Courts can rule executive orders unconstitutional

Phillip Cooper, Professor of Public Administration at Portland State University, 2002, By Order of the
President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action” pg. 77
Despite the apparent deference by the judiciary to the president's orders, this chapter has plainly
demonstrated any number of instances in which the White House has lost in court. Executive orders,
both legal and illegal, can expose officials to liability. It is an old argument, developed long before the
battle over the so-called Nuremberg defense, that illegal orders do not insulate a public official from
liability for his or her actions. The classic example harks back to Little v. Barreme 13 1 during the
Washington administration. Even legal orders can expose the government to liability. Though the federal
courts have often upheld dramatic actions taken by the president during difficult periods, they have not
been hesitant to support claims against the government later. The many cases that were brought
involving the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation after World War I provide examples of
just how long such postorder legal cleanup can take and how much it can Cost. 112 Later, in a 1951 case,
the Supreme Court subjected government to claims by business for the damages done to their interests
during the government's operation of the coal mines during World War II after FDR seized the mines in
1943.133 Thus, the legal issues that may arise are concerned with both the validity of orders and with
addressing the consequences of admittedly legitimate decrees.
2AC Perception + Executive Rollback
Executive orders can’t solve credibility or perception advantages – viewed as going

through an improper channel – and future presidents can roll it back
Tara L. Branum, JD from UT Austin, 2002, “PRESIDENT OR KING? THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE
ORDERS IN MODERN-DAY AMERICA,” http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?
shr=t&csi=138729&sr=(%22President%20or%20King-The%20Use%20and%20Abuse%20of%20Executive
%20Orders%20in%20Modern-Day%20America%22)+AND+DATE+IS+2002
The increased use of executive orders and other presidential directives is a fundamental problem in
modern-day America. The Constitution does not give one individual an "executive pen" enabling that
individual to single-handedly write his preferred policy into law. Despite this lack of constitutional
authority, presidential directives have been increasingly used--both by Republicans and Democrats n3--
to promulgate laws and to support public policy initiatives in a manner that circumvents the proper
lawmaking body, the United States Congress. It would be foolhardy to ignore the danger inherent in this
situation, simply because one might like the individual currently holding the presidential pen. n4 It
would be hypocritical, as well as dangerous, to seek change when a president from the opposing
political party is in power, but to ignore the problem once a president from one's own party has been
elected. n5 While the current president [*3] may back acceptable policies or refrain from using his
executive power in a tyrannical fashion, there is no guarantee that all future presidents will continue to
do so as well.
2AC Links to Politics
Unilateral XOs link to politics

Megan Covington, Vanderbilt School of Engineering, 2012, “Executive Legislation and the Expansion
of Presidential Power”, http://ejournals.library.vanderbilt.edu/ojs/index.php/vurj/article/view/3556
Just because presidents can bypass Congress so efficiently, however, does not mean they always rely on
executive legislation. A president who used only executive orders and did not work with Congress at all
would certainly earn sharp criticism from both parties and the media. A president’s bill that has been
passed by Congress is a much bigger accomplishment and is more permanent than a policy enacted by
executive order, meaning presidents will always have some incentive to work with Congress to achieve
their goals. Crenson and Ginsberg argue that one of the reasons for this reliance on executive legislation
is that presidents have lost traditional avenues of accomplishing their policy goals.61 Before C-SPAN
continuously broadcasted Congress, the president had the advantage in using the media to appeal to
the people, and with the recent decrease in party strength, the president can no longer rely on fellow
party members and party loyalty as he once did. No president can rule entirely by executive legislation
and expect the other two branches to stand docile while he makes major policy change; presidents still
have to take Congress into account when passing executive legislation.62 For example, President Clinton
could have easily passed an executive order repealing the military’s ban on gays serving openly, but he
never issued any such directive, largely because he did not want to risk Congress passing legislation
making the ban permanent. 63 Congress is not in danger of losing its functionality entirely, but the
extent to which modern presidents can unilaterally effect change was certainly unintended and
unforeseen by the Founding Fathers.
2AC Links to Politics – Links to Elections
Unpopular executive orders have political consequences – public perceives them and
they backlash
Clay Risen, Managing editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, M.A. from the University of Chicago, 7-
16-2004 “The Power of the Pen: The Not-So-Secret Weapon of Congress-wary Presidents” The
American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_power_of_the_pen]
The most effective check on executive orders has proven to be political. When it comes to executive
orders, “The president is much more clearly responsible,” says Dellinger, who was heavily involved in
crafting orders under Clinton. “Not only is there no involvement from Congress, but the president has to
personally sign the order.” Clinton's Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument executive order may
have helped him win votes, but it also set off a massive congressional and public backlash. Right-wing
Internet sites bristled with comments about “dictatorial powers,” and Republicans warned of an end to
civil liberties as we know them. “President Clinton is running roughshod over our Constitution,” said
then–House Majority Leader Dick Armey. Indeed, an unpopular executive order can have immediate--
and lasting--political consequences. In 2001, for example, Bush proposed raising the acceptable number
of parts per billion of arsenic in drinking water. It was a bone he was trying to toss to the mining
industry, and it would have overturned Clinton's order lowering the levels. But the overwhelmingly
negative public reaction forced Bush to quickly withdraw his proposal--and it painted him indelibly as an
anti-environmental president.
2AC Tyranny DA
Executive orders deck judicial independence and separation of powers – set the stage
for a tyrannical fascist state
Lindsay Harrison, Lecturer in Law, University of Miami Law School, Harvard Law School (J.D. 2003),
clerked for United States District Judge Alan S. Gold (Southern District of Florida) from 2003-2004,
worked at Jenner & Block in Washington D.C., 11-15-2005, “More on Executive Orders,”
http://legaldebate.blogspot.com/2005/11/more-on-executive-orders.html
If courts were to suddenly take executive pronouncements as the rule of law, it would essentially abolish
the separation of powers and the independent judiciary. The very definition of tyranny is the placement
of all government authority in a single branch -- if courts were always bound to follow executive
pronouncements as to what conduct is constitutional and what is unconstitutional, our nation would
have all the essential preconditions for the rise of a tyrranical state akin to Nazi Germany. Professor
Erwin Chimerinsky (former Northwestern debater) explains: The Framers created separation of powers
in the Constitution precisely because they thought that the accumulation of power in the Executive
would lead to tyranny. As Dorsen and Shattuck note: " All unlimited power is inherently dangerous, and
it is the salutary function of the courts to circumscribe the boundaries of the executive and legislative
powers so that neither branch is exalted at the expense of the other." Controlling Presidential power is
necessary to safeguard individual liberties, and it is the role of the courts to protect these rights. (Erwin
Chimerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 863, 894 (1983)).
Executive Rollback
Future presidents will roll back the CP – empirics

Vanessa K. Burrows, Legislative Attorney for Congressional Research Service, 4-25-2010, “Executive
Orders: Issuance and Revocation”, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20846_20100325.pdf
Illustrating the fact that executive orders are used to further an administration’s policy goals, there are
frequent examples of situations in which a sitting President has revoked or amended orders issued by
his predecessor.37 This practice is particularly apparent where Presidents have used these instruments
to assert control over and influence the agency rulemaking process. President Ford, for instance, issued
Executive Order 11821, requiring agencies to issue inflation impact statements for proposed
regulations.38 President Carter altered this practice with Executive Order 12044, requiring agencies to
consider the potential economic impact of certain rules and identify potential alternatives.39 Shortly
after taking office, President Reagan revoked President Carter’s order, implementing a scheme asserting
much more extensive control over the rulemaking process. Executive Order 12291 directed agencies to
implement rules only if “the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs
to society,” requiring agencies to prepare a cost-benefit analysis for any proposed rule that could have a
significant economic impact.40 This order was criticized by some as a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine, on the grounds that it imbued the President with the power to essentially control
rulemaking authority that had been committed to a particular agency by Congress.41 Despite these
concerns, there were no court rulings assessing the validity of President Reagan’s order. In turn,
President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866, modifying the system established during the Reagan
Administration.42 While retaining many of the basic features of President Reagan’s order, E.O. 12866
eased cost benefit analysis requirements, and recognized the primary duty of agencies to fulfill the
duties committed to them by Congress. President George W. Bush issued two executive orders
amending E.O. 12866, E.O. 13258, and E.O. 13422, both of which were revoked by President Obama in
E.O. 13497.43 President Bush’s E.O. 13258 concerned regulatory planning and review, and it removed
references in E.O. 12866 to the role of the Vice President, replacing several of them with a reference to
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or the Chief of Staff to the President.44
E.O. 13422 defined guidance documents and significant guidance documents and applied several parts
of E.O. 12866 to guidance documents, as well as required each agency head to designate a presidential
appointee to the newly created position of regulatory policy officer.45 E.O. 13422 also made changes to
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA’s) duties and authorities, including a requirement
that OIRA be given advance notice of significant guidance documents.46 President Obama’s executive
order revoking E.O. 13258 and E.O. 13422 also directed the Director of OMB and the heads of executive
departments and agencies to rescind orders, rules, guidelines, and policies that implemented those
executive orders.
Huge leeway for future presidents to roll back executive orders

Conor Friedersdorf, staff writer at the Atlantic, 5-28-2013, “Does Obama Really Believe He Can Limit
the Next President's Power?” http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/does-obama-really-
believe-he-can-limit-the-next-presidents-power/276279/
Obama doesn't seem to realize that his legacy won't be shaped by any perspicacious limits he places on
the executive branch, if he ever gets around to placing any on it. The next president can just undo those
"self-imposed" limits with the same wave of a hand that Obama uses to create them. His influence in the
realm of executive power will be to expand it. By 2016 we'll be four terms deep in major policy decisions
being driven by secret memos from the Office of Legal Counsel. The White House will have a kill list, and
if the next president wants to add names to it using standards twice as lax as Obama's, he or she can do
it, in secret, per his precedent.
Future presidents can amend executive orders

Phillip Cooper, Professor of Public Administration at Portland State, November 1997, “Power tools for
an effective and responsible presidency” Administration and Society, Vol. 29
Even if they serve temporary goals, executive orders can produce a significant amount of complexity and
conflict and not yield a long-term benefit because the next president may dispose of predecessors’
orders at a whim. It may be easier than moving a statute through Congress and faster than waiting for
agencies to use their rule-making processes to accomplish policy ends, but executive orders may
ultimately be a much weaker foundation on which to build a policy than the alternatives.
Legislative Rollback
Congress can check the president – amend or block unilateral action

William G Howell, Associate professor at Harvard University, 2005 Unilateral Powers: A Brief
Overview, published in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35 issue 3 pg. 417
Plainly, presidents cannot institute every aspect of their policy agenda by decree. The checks and
balances that define our system of governance are alive, though not always well, when presidents
contemplate unilateral action. Should the president proceed without statutory or constitutional
authority, the courts stand to overturn his actions, just as Congress can amend them, cut funding for
their operations, or eliminate them outright. (4) Even in those moments when presidential power
reaches its zenith--namely, during times of national crisis--judicial and congressional prerogatives may
be asserted (Howell and Pevehouse 2005, forthcoming; Kriner, forthcoming; Lindsay 1995, 2003; and
see Fisher's contribution to this volume). In 2004, as the nation braced itself for another domestic
terrorist attack and images of car bombings and suicide missions filled the evening news, the courts
extended new protections to citizens deemed enemy combatants by the president, (5) as well as
noncitizens held in protective custody abroad. (6) And while Congress, as of this writing, continues to
authorize as much funding for the Iraq occupation as Bush requests, members have imposed increasing
numbers of restrictions on how the money is to be spent.
Agency Rollback
Executive agencies will go rogue – uniquely true for domestic surveillance – they
empirically ignore restrictions
Trevor W. Morrison, Associate Professor of Law at Cornell Law School, October 2006, “Constitutional
Avoidance in the Executive Branch”,
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/constitutional-governance/files/
Constitutional-Avoidance-in-the-Executive-Branch.pdf
Consider, for example, President Bush's authorization of the Na- tional Security Agency (NSA) to engage
in the warrantless gathering of "signals intelligence" within the United States, from communications in-
volving United States citizens.255 One of the core legal issues in this controversy is whether the
surveillance complies with the Foreign Intelli- gence Surveillance Act (FISA), which lays out the basic
legal structure governing electronic surveillance within the United States.256 As a general matter, FISA
authorizes electronic surveillance within the United States only upon certain specified showings, and
only with a court-issued warrant.257 Beyond that, FISA makes it a criminal offense to engage in any
electronic surveillance not authorized by statute,258 and another provision in the federal code
specifies that FISA and certain other provisions governing wiretaps for criminal investigation are the
"exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . may be conducted."'259 Shortly after news broke
that the President had authorized the surveillance in question,260 the Justice Department offered a
formal defense of the program in a letter addressed to members of the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees.261 The letter was later supplemented by a much more detailed white paper sent to the
Senate majority leader,262 though the basic argument remained the same. It had two essential parts.
First, the Department argued that the President has substantial constitutional authority to order
warrantless intelligence surveillance even within the United States.263 Second, and more pertinently for
present purposes, the Department asserted that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) of
September 18, 2001 "confirms and supplements" the President's inherent constitutional authority in this
area. The AUMF empowers the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons" he determines to be responsible for the September 11 attacks, but
says nothing whatever about surveillance within the United States.265 On its face, therefore, the Justice
Department's AUMF argument would appear to conflict with FISA's express identification of the
statutory provisions setting forth "the exclusive means" for conducting domestic electronic
surveillance.
The president won’t challenge agencies – he’ll decide that the costs are too high
Harold H. Bruff, Professor of Law at University of Colorado, 2010, “PRESIDENTIAL POWER MEETS
BUREAUCRATIC EXPERTISE”, https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/conlaw/articles/volum
e12/issue2/Bruff12U.Pa.J.Const.L.461(2010).pdf
These observations about the politics of removal suggest that within limits, Presidents are more likely to
tolerate than to remove balky or ineffective subordinates. Threats of dismissal and vigorous purges are
not preferred supervisory tools for any good manager, especially in government. Firing someone you
had earlier selected invites criticism of your own judgment. In the executive branch, another position
must often be found for a subordinate who is to be eased out (an ambassadorship, perhaps?). And most
important, for any principal officer a substitute must be found who can survive confirmation by a
possibly aroused Senate. At the least, the replacement process invites unwelcome congressional
oversight and criticism of the administration. It is often better to muddle along.
The executive branch routinely ignores its own restrictions – drone war proves
Muhammad Ahmad, a Glasgow-based sociologist with a specialization in US foreign policy, 7-3-2013,
“Obama won't end the drone war, but Pakistan might” Aljazeera,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136247465532652.html
The only concrete proposal, a restrictive targeting criteria codified in a Presidential Policy Guidance,
which in principle should have ended "signature strikes", was quickly undermined by administration
officials who told the press that the attacks would continue regardless. It also nullified Obama's claim
that a "high threshold" had been set for lethal action against "potential terrorist targets, regardless of
whether or not they are American citizens". Far from reassuring non-Americans, it should alarm US
citizens. ¶ But there was also a true statement in Obama's speech. "America cannot take strikes
wherever we choose," he said. "Our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for
state sovereignty." ¶ The drone war will not end by a presidential epiphany. It will need political
pressure and practical obstacles to stop it - mostly outside the US. Few Democrats are willing to criticise
Obama, and Republicans rarely shrink from actions that result in dead foreigners; as long as the war's
cost are borne by others, it is unlikely that a critical mass of opinion would emerge to force a
reconsideration of policy.
Links to Politics
Executive actions link to politics – causes huge fights

Ginger Gibson, writer at Politico, 1-29-2014, Republicans bash Obama for overstepping bounds,
dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=B6D21B66-98C7-4059-B77D-8CFB4009563F
In his State of the Union address Tuesday night, President Barack Obama said if Congress won’t help him
get things done, he’ll do it on his own — and congressional Republicans aren’t pleased. Many in the GOP
said they don’t intend to sit quietly if Obama starts signing executive orders. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.)
had sharp criticism for the president’s expanded authority. “I think it’s unfortunate, I think it’s divisive
and quite frankly, borderline unconstitutional on many of those issues,” Rubio said. “I understand the
[legislative] process takes long and can be frustrating, but I think it truly undermines the republic.” Rep.
Tim Huelskamp (R-Kan.) said the president requested more controversial pieces of legislation — like
immigration reform — than he did when Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress. “Suddenly
he wants things that Republicans won’t give him that he didn’t ask Democrats to do — it seems like a lot
of theatrics,” Huelskamp said. Huelskamp said he joked with fellow members that he’s going to file
legislation that doesn’t require a presidential signature. The Kansas conservative said there are ways
Republicans could push back at Obama’s executive orders but that he doesn’t think the GOP leadership
is willing to wage the fight. “There are things we can do — I’m just afraid leadership is not willing to
challenge them,” he said. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) argued that Obama employing executive powers
could harm the Democrats as a whole. “I think he’s going to create a narrative for himself that’s going to
hurt Democrats by acting unilaterally,” Graham said. “I think he’s going to create an impression among
the American people that he’s abusing the power of his office and that will hurt Democrats.” Rep. Tom
Cole (R-Okla.) took a soft approach to criticizing the president for overstepping his bounds on executive
orders. “We’ll wait and see what he does,” Cole said. “The president has certain executive powers, but if
he wants to achieve anything, an executive order is not a very good way to do it. Usually legislative
achievement is what is enduring achievement. Executive orders are like writing on the beach, it may
last a while but when the tide comes in or goes out, it disappears. So I think it’s a poor way to govern.”
Sen. Tim Scott (R-S.C.) said acting without congressional authority is problematic. “We continue to erode
the whole notion of the rule of law,” Scott said. “To the extent that he continues to move unilaterally
without the consent of Congress, I think it doesn’t sit well with a message of unity.”
Executive orders are perceived – drain PC

Todd Eberly, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at St Mary’s College, 1-21- 2013,
“The Presidential Power Trap” http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-
capital-20130121_1_political-system-george-hw-bush-party-support
Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal
powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have
the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and
direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well,
appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to
avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit
close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.
Relying on executive orders drains PC – Congress backlashes

Steven Schier, Dorothy H. and Edward C. Congdon Professor of Political Science at Carleton College,
December 2011, “The Contemporary Presidency: The Presidential Authority Problem and the Political
Power Trap” published in Presidential Studies Quarterly
The frustrations of popular and Washington leadership thus encourage presidents to exercise their
formal powers to get results. As Sidney Milkis and Jesse Rhodes put it, this leads a president “to impose
his will through the bureaucracy in pursuit of politics that substantially outstrip congressional and public
support” (2009, 3). Presidential appointments remain a resource for such assertions (see note 1). Recent
presidents have employed executive orders as a way around important policy difﬁculties. Though the
total number of executive orders per year has not increased greatly since the 1940s, the number of
important executive orders has risen since 1960 and particularly since 1985 (Howell 2003, 81-82) as has,
over the last 20 years, presidential use of signing statements to shape policy (Congressional Research
Service 2007; Savage 2009). The frustrations of maintaining authority in order to consolidate their
regimes’ control of government and politics encourages presidents to rely on their powers and to
employ their political authority in support of their exercise of powers. Nixon attempted this when
surrounded by Democrats in Washington, as did Clinton when surrounded by Republicans. Neither
attempt ultimately did their parties any good. Nixon’s efforts led to constitutional violations. For both
Nixon and Clinton, the use of formal powers when political authority was deﬁcient led to charges of
illegitimacy and impeachment proceedings. So the “presidential authority problem” has several parts.
Authority among elites faces limits due to the institutional thickening in national government. Authority
among the public and in Congress suffers from the lessening of presidential political capital detailed in
this article. Political authority, according to Skowronek, is designated in advance, works through
institutions, and has enforceable mandates and perceptions (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 125). The
decline in presidential political capital means that nowadays such traits are hard for presidents to come
by. Advance designations frequently vanish among American governing elites and the mass public.
Institutions are less “workable” for presidents. Mandates and perceptions are now evanescent, much
less enforceable. This leads to a “presidential power trap.” Maintaining authority is hard and frustrating
work, and in seeking to maintain it, presidents encounter widespread constraints. Yet the modern
presidency grants an incumbent many formal powers over executive branch administration, foreign, and
national security policy. The power is there, if the authority is not. So why not use the power—via
unilateral decisions, signing statements and executive orders—while you have it, if authority is so hard
to garner? The risk is that by using such powers, a president effectively destroys his authority.
Congress backlashes to unilateral executive orders – costs PC

Todd Eberly, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at St Mary’s College, 1-21- 2013,
“The Presidential Power Trap” http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-
capital-20130121_1_political-system-george-hw-bush-party-support
Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack Obama's narrow re-
election victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and
Democratic majority Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's
recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of
his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on
claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his
political capital.
Unpopular executive orders link to politics – massively controversial and decimate the
agenda
Marybeth Ulrich, Professor of Government in the Departmnet of National Security and Strategy at the
US Army War College, July 2004, “Presidential Leadership and National Security Policymaking,”
published in the U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, pg. 227-228
Executive orders have mainly been used in three areas: to combat various forms of discrimination
against citizens, to increase White House control over the executive branch, and to maintain secrets.19
When Congress perceives that executive orders are taken to bypass Congress on controversial issues,
they may elicit great political controversy and be a source of conflict between the two branches. Even
the prospect of an executive order being issued can erupt in major political controversy as was the case
with President Clinton’s proposal to lift the ban on gays serving in the military. There was no question
that the president had the legitimate authority to issue such an order as Truman had done to integrate
the armed forces in 1948, but the political backlash was so strong in 1993 that Clinton abandoned the
idea in order to salvage his domestic agenda before Congress.20
Unpopular executive orders spark Congressional and public backlash

Chris Miles, writer at Policymic, 1-15-2013, “An Obama Gun Control Executive Order Could Sink the
President’s Favorability” http://www.policymic.com/articles/23296/an-obama-gun-control-executive-
order-could-sink-the-president-s-favorability/345290
Could Obama be wasting valuable political capital by issuing an executive order on gun control? If
Obama acts unilaterally on gun control, the event will likely fire-up conservatives and pro-gun
advocates, calling out the president for failing to use the legislative process. The conservative Drudge
Report compared executive action to dictators Hitler and Stalin. The backlash could be immense and
could cost Obama leverage in future political battles, most notably the coming debt ceiling fight next
month. Obama has often pulled the "popular mandate" card, saying that his re-election in November
proves the American people are behind him ... almost unconditionally. But what do the American people
really think about the gun debate. Well, for starters, just 4% of Americans identify guns as the nation's
top problem, per Gallup. Based on that alone, Obama may think twice about pushing popcorn policies
that will only splash onto headlines and divide Americans. Any executive action could even hurt his
favorability rating, and by extension his ability to negotiate in the future.
Congressional backlash to executive orders weakens the president

Michael Posner, Professor Emeritus at the University of Oregon and Adjunct Professor at the Weill
Medical College in New York, 1-1-2000, “Blocking the Presidential Power Play” National Journal,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20000101_15.php
Some legal experts counsel Congress to be careful not to usurp legitimate presidential power. One
expert urging caution is Douglas Cox, a lawyer who was deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of
Legal Counsel at the Justice Department during the Bush Administration. "When a President
overreaches and uses executive orders to invade or supersede the legislative powers of Congress,
Congress may be sufficiently provoked to consider an across-the-board approach to rein in those
abuses," he told the House Rules subcommittee. "Although that reaction is understandable, Congress
must be careful to understand the extent to which executive orders are a necessary adjunct of the
President's constitutional duties," Cox added. "At all times, Congress has ample legislative and political
means to respond to abusive or lawless executive orders, and thus Congress should resist the
temptation to pursue more sweeping, more draconian, and more questionable responses."
Executive orders turn the President into a lightning rod

Phillip Cooper, Professor of Public Administration at Portland State, November 1997, “Power tools for
an effective and responsible presidency” Administration and Society, Vol. 29
Interestingly enough, the effort to avoid opposition from Congress or agencies can have the effect of
turning the White House itself into a lightning rod. When an administrative agency takes action under
its statutory authority and responsibility, its opponents generally focus their conflicts as limited disputes
aimed at the agency involved. Where the White House employs an executive order, for example, to shift
critical elements of decision making from the agencies to the executive office of the president, the
nature of conflict changes and the focus shifts to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue or at least to the executive
office buildings The saga of the OTRA battle with Congress under regulatory review orders and the
murky status of the Quayle Commission working in concert with OIRA provides a dramatic case in point.
The nature and focus of conflict is in some measure affected by the fact that executive orders take
administrative action outside the normal rules of administrative law. And although there are tensions in
that field of law, the fact is that it has been carefully developed over time with the intention of
accommodating the needs of administration and the demands for accountability by agencies filled with
unelected administrators who make important decisions having the force of law in the form of rules and
administrative adjudications. On one hand, administrative law requires open, orderly, and participative
decision processes, but it also creates significant presumptions in favor of administrative agencies. The
courts provide legal support in the form of favorable decisions as well as assisting agencies in
enforcement through orders enforcing subpoena and other investigative authority while also ordering
compliance with agency decisions once the investigations and decision processes are complete.
Administrative law also provides a vehicle for integrating administrative decisions having the force of
law with the larger body of law and policy. The use of executive orders to confound or circumvent
normal administrative law is counterproductive and ultimately dysfunctional.
Tyranny DA
Executive orders wreck democracy

Megan Covington, Vanderbilt School of Engineering, 2012, “Executive Legislation and the Expansion
of Presidential Power”, http://ejournals.library.vanderbilt.edu/ojs/index.php/vurj/article/view/3556
Fears of the president becoming some type of dictator are overblown, but the tendency by modern
presidents to use executive legislation to expand the scope of their power is especially dangerous
considering that neither the Supreme Court nor Congress is very likely to challenge an executive order,
rendering the most important check on presidential legislation virtually nonexistent. Using executive
orders to work around Congress, undercut federal agencies, or escape accountability violates the
principle of checks and balances our Founding Fathers felt was crucial to our democracy and unlawfully
increases the power of the president.6 Allowing the president to continue abusing executive orders and
other presidential directives sets a dangerous precedent, one that could result in a future president
using executive legislation to act outside his given authority, potentially by suspending civil liberties or
ignoring the will of Congress. This increased and unchecked use of executive legislation has expanded
the power of the president beyond constitutional bounds and poses a serious threat to our democracy.
After discussing the types of executive legislation and their use by recent presidents, I will analyze the
effectiveness of the checks on presidential power and explore the potential threats posed by the
expansion of the presidency.
CRIME DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES
No Uniqueness
UQ—Will Expire Now

Broad reauthorization of section 215 of the Patriot Act will fail—big blow to broad
surveillance
Nadia Prupis, staff writer for Common Dreams, April 22, 2015, “As GOP Pushes Patriot Act Renewal,
Critics Demand End to Mass Surveillance Provision,” Common Dreams, Accessed May 12, 2015,
http://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/04/22/gop-pushes-patriot-act-renewal-critics-demand-
end-mass-surveillance-provision
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt), ranking

Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee and an outspoken backer of
surveillance reform, criticized McConnell's maneuver. "Republican leaders should be working across the aisle on
legislation that protects both our national security and Americans' privacy rights, but instead they are
trying to quietly pass a straight reauthorization of the bulk-collection program that has been proven
ineffective and unnecessary," Leahy stated on Tuesday. "And more, they are attempting to do so without the
committee process that the majority leader has promised for important legislation. This tone-deaf
attempt to pave the way for five and a half more years of unchecked surveillance will not succeed."

Most egregious surveillance power is collapsing now—public pressure will force
Congress to let the provisions of the Patriot Act expire that allow bulk surveillance
Patrick G. Eddington, Writer for the Washington Examiner, April 13, 2015, “Confronting the
surveillance state,” Washington Examiner, Accessed May 11, 2015,
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/confronting-the-surveillance-state/article/2562696
This year began with both surveillance reformers and their opponents circling one date on their
respective calendars: June 1, 2015. On this date, the Patriot Act's Sec. 215 "business records," "lone wolf" and "roving
wiretap" provisions will expire unless Congress agrees to extend them. If public opinion on the topic is any
indication, mass surveillance supporters have a tough job on their hands. In March 2015, Pew released the results of
its latest poll on attitudes on surveillance. Seventy percent of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents said
they were "less confident the surveillance efforts are serving the public interest." Over half of Democrats
or those leaning Democratic felt the same way. And of the 87 percent of adults who have heard of the
surveillance programs, 34 percent had "taken at least one step to hide or shield their information from
the government." This is how the true costs of mass surveillance programs should be measured: not just in dollars, but in how they have
eviscerated the Constitution's free association, speech and privacy guarantees. The chilling effect of government surveillance is real, and the
poll makes clear it is causing this country's citizens to disconnect from one another, alter what they
search for online, and even self-censor. Our own government, not al Qaeda or ISIS, is responsible for this fear
and subversion of constitutional rights that has produced these ominous changes. A child born on September 12,
2001 has lived his or her entire life under the shadow of this surveillance state. Whether their full constitutional right to be
free from warrantless search and seizure of their online communications will be restored remains to be
seen. What is clear is that unless their elders force Congress to end the surveillance state, the generation born after Sept. 11, and all those
who follow, will live in a country that would shock Madison, and the Founders.

Bipartisan legislation coming now to strike down bulk surveillance—major blow to
surveillance power
Julian Hattem, Writer for The Hill political news website, April 16, 2015, “Congress closes in on deal to
renew Patriot Act provisions,” The Hill, Accessed May 11, 2015,
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/239022-congress-closes-in-on-deal-to-renew-patriot-act-
provisions
Members of Congress are starting to coalesce around a bipartisan plan that would scale back
government surveillance while renewing portions of the Patriot Act that are set to expire in May. While the
legislation, which could be unveiled as soon as this week, could fall short of more expansive proposals for curbing the
National Security Agency, sources say it could include the most significant reforms of intelligence
practices in years. “I think there’s a good chance that we’ll be able to get something,” said Rep. Jerrold Nadler
(D-N.Y.), a senior member of the House Judiciary Committee who is a vocal critic of government spying. “I don’t want to say much more, but I
think the agreement may come together fairly soon.” The House and Senate Judiciary committees have
jurisdiction over the law, and the negotiations have largely occurred between those panels’ four leaders :
Sens. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Reps. Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) and John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.). The talks have
also included lawmakers who were involved in the issue last year, including Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), the
original author of the Patriot Act. According to people involved in the discussions, the plan would largely mirror last year’s
failed effort to end the NSA’s bulk collection of millions of Americans’ phone records.
No Link
Link Defense—Crime Alt Causes

Surveillance doesn’t lower crime in any substantial way—while several factors lower
crime, no one thing is the silver bullet
Inimai M. Chettiar, Director of the Justice Program at New York University Law School’s Brennan
Center, February 11, 2015, “The Many Causes of America’s Decline in Crime,” The Atlantic, Accessed
May 11, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/the-many-causes-of-americas-
decline-in-crime/385364/
There is no shortage of candidates. Every

year, it seems, a new study advances a novel explanation. Levitt attributes
about half the crime drop to the legalization of abortion. Amherst economist Jessica Reyes attributes
about half the violent crime drop to the unleading of gasoline after the Clean Air Act. Berkeley law
professor Franklin Zimring credits the police as the central cause. All three theories likely played some role. Instead of a
single, dominant cause, our research points to a vast web of factors, often complex, often interacting, and some unexpected. Of the theories we
examined, we found the following factors had some effect on bringing down crime: a growth in income (5 to
10 percent), changes in alcohol consumption (5 to 10 percent), the aging population (0 to 5 percent), and decreased
unemployment (0 to 3 percent). Policing also played a role, with increased numbers of police in the 1990s
reducing crime (0 to 10 percent) and the introduction of CompStat having an even larger effect (5 to 15 percent). But none is solely,
or even largely, responsible for the crime drop. Unfortunately, we could not fully test a few theories, as the data did not exist
at the detailed level we needed for our analysis. For those, we analyzed past research, finding that inflation and
consumer confidence (individuals’ belief about the strength of the economy) probably had some effect on crime. The
legalization of abortion and unleading of gasoline may also have played some role. In aggregate, the
fourteen factors we identified can explain some of the drop in crime in the 1990s. But even adding all of
them together fails to explain the majority of the decrease. No one factor brought down crime. Today,
incarceration has become the default option in the fight against crime. But more incarceration is not a
silver bullet. It has, in fact, ceased to be effective in reducing crime—and the country is slowly awakening to that reality. Incarceration can
be reduced while crime continues to decline. The research shows this and many states are watching it unfold.
Terrorism
Robust studies show bulk data collection doesn’t prevent terrorism
Peter Lampert Bergen et al, Print and broadcast journalist, author, documentary producer, and CNN's
national security analyst, January 13, 2014, “New America Foundation: Do NSA's Bulk Surveillance
Programs Stop Terrorists?,” Council On Foreign Relations, Accessed May 11, 2015,
http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/new-america-foundation-do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-
stop-terrorists/p32209
However, our review of the government's claims about the role that NSA "bulk" surveillance of phone and
email communications records has had in keeping the United States safe from terrorism shows that
these claims are overblown and even misleading. An in-depth analysis of 225 individuals recruited by al-
Qaeda or a like-minded group or inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology, and charged in the United States with an act of
terrorism since 9/11, demonstrates that traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips
from local communities, and targeted intelligence operations, provided the initial impetus for
investigations in the majority of cases, while the contribution of NSA's bulk surveillance programs to
these cases was minimal. Indeed, the controversial bulk collection of American telephone metadata , which
includes the telephone numbers that originate and receive calls, as well as the time and date of those calls but not their content, under Section
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, appears to have played an identifiable role in initiating, at most, 1.8 percent of
these cases. NSA programs involving the surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside of the United States under Section 702 of the FISA
Amendments Act played a role in 4.4 percent of the terrorism cases we examined, and NSA surveillance under an unidentified
authority played a role in 1.3 percent of the cases we examined.
Doesn’t Prevent Crime

Government surveillance is a guise for control—it doesn’t prevent crime
Kit Daniels, Writer for Info Wars, March 30, 2015, “NSA FAILS TO PREVENT CROSSDRESSERS FROM
INVADING HEADQUARTERS DESPITE MASS SURVEILLANCE,” Info Wars, Accessed May 11, 2015,
http://www.infowars.com/nsa-fails-to-prevent-crossdressers-from-invading-headquarters-despite-
mass-surveillance/
Two men who were dressed as women tried to ram their SUV through a gate at the NSA headquarters in
Ft. Meade, Md., on Monday, prompting security to kill one of the men and seriously injure the other. “The FBI said … it was
conducting an investigation with NSA police and other law enforcement agencies, and interviewing
witnesses on the scene,” CNN reported. Similarly, a former state correctional officer was charged with a string of shootings near the
NSA headquarters earlier this month. The NSA’s failure to anticipate these incidents at its own headquarters
contradicts previous statements from officials claiming the NSA’s domestic surveillance would help stop
such events from occurring. In particular, former NSA Director Keith Alexander claimed the agency’s surveillance program foiled “50
potential terrorist events” and former FBI Director Robert Mueller claimed that if such dragnet surveillance had been in place before 9/11, it
may have curtailed the attacks. And the
public is expected to believe all that despite the NSA’s failure to stop
crossdressers from invading its headquarters. That’s
because the government is simply using the guise of “crime
prevention” to hide its real intent behind mass surveillance: to control the population.

Police insiders admit surveillance doesn’t curb crime
Sonia Roubini, Paralegal with the ACLU Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project, April 9, 2015, “Police
Chief: Surveillance Cameras Don’t Help Fight Crime,” ACLU, Accessed May 10, 2015,
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/police-chief-surveillance-cameras-dont-help-fight-crime
There are two important points to be made regarding this announcement. First, it followed a trend of government officials
acknowledging the ineffectiveness of some surveillance tools. These announcements often fly under the
radar, but it’s worth noting that even the greatest proponents of mass surveillance occasionally admit to
its shortcomings. The second point is that Lincoln’s police department did something that too few authorities do, which is to actually
monitor and audit the performance of a surveillance technology. Every agency adopting a new
surveillance technology (whether it be a camera, drone, cellphone tracking device, or anything else)
should build in a process to evaluate its effectiveness. This will ensure that the agency and the public alike can understand
whether they’re getting reasonable returns on both their investment and their privacy sacrifice. People might disagree over how
much power we need to give to law enforcement so they can try to stop crime, but if the surveillance
that they're doing isn't even effective, then there's no need for debate.

Surveillance isn’t about catching criminals—it’s a way for elites to increase their
power over the population
Maria Xynou, Researcher with the Tactical Technology Collective in Berlin, January 8, 2015, “Lies and
Revelations: Why mass surveillance is not about catching the “bad guys”,” My Shadow, Accessed May
11, 2015, https://myshadow.org/lies-and-revelations-why-mass-surveillance-not-about-catching-bad-
guys
In response to the Snowden revelations, many governments have argued that we need surveillance to safeguard
national security – and this is not a new rhetoric. Ever since 9/11, governments across the globe which have,
directly or indirectly, aligned with U.S foreign policy have argued that there is a trade-off between civil
liberties and security. This implies that it is acceptable for intelligence agencies to spy on our
communications so that they can detect criminals and terrorists – otherwise known as the "bad guys". However, if
we look a bit closer at the classified documents leaked by Snowden, it is evident that targeted surveillance is largely used
to enhance the political and economic advantage of those in power, while mass surveillance is directed
at spying on almost everyone – regardless of whether they have engaged in criminal activity or not.
No Int. Link
No Data Analysis
The disad conflates intelligence gathering with intelligence sharing—raw information
is useless unless we can effectively analyze it
David L. Carter, Ph.D. School of Criminal Justice Michigan State University, November 2004, “Law
Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies,” COPS
(Community Oriented Policing Services), Accessed May 9, 2015,
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e09042536.pdf
Pieces of information gathered from diverse sources, for example, wiretaps, informants, banking records, or
surveillance (see Figure 1-1), are simply raw data which frequently have limited inherent meaning. Intelligence is
when a wide array of raw information is assessed for validity and reliability, reviewed for materiality to the issues at question, and given
meaning through the application of inductive or deductive logic. Law
enforcement intelligence, therefore, is the product
of an analytic process that provides an integrated perspective to disparate information about crime,
crime trends, crime and security threats, and conditions associated with criminality.” 5 The need for
carefully analyzed, reliable information is essential because both policy and operational decisions are
made using intelligence; therefore, a vigilant process must be in place to ensure that decisions are made
on objective, informed criteria, rather than on presumed criteria. Often “information sharing” and
“intelligence sharing” are used interchangeably by persons who do not understand the subtleties, yet
importance, of the distinction. In the strictest sense, care should be taken to use terms appropriately because, as will be seen in
later discussions, there are different regulatory and legal implications for “intelligence” than for
“information” (see Figure 1-2). As such, the subtleties of language can become an important factor should the
management of a law enforcement agency's intelligence records come under scrutiny. State and local
law enforcement have consistently defined law enforcement intelligence as containing the critical
element of “analysis” before any information can be characterized as “intelligence.” For example, the
Intelligence-Led Policing report funded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services observes
that: …intelligence is the combination of credible information with quality analysis–information that has
been evaluated and from which conclusions have been drawn.
No Information Shortage
More information doesn’t mean less crime—we don’t have an information shortage in
crime fighting efforts
Andrea Castillo, Program manager of the Technology Policy Program for the Mercatus Center at
George Mason University, May 07, 2015, “Cybersecurity bill more likely to promote information
overload than prevent cyberattacks,” The Hill, May 11, 2015,
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/241242-cybersecurity-bill-more-likely-to-
promote-information
This concerns privacy advocates who point out that such

data collection could serve as an alternative surveillance tool
for the NSA. Section 5(A) of CISA authorizes federal agencies to “disclose, retain, and use” shared data
for many purposes beyond promoting cybersecurity, like investigating terrorism, the sexual exploitation
of children, violent felonies, fraud, identity theft, and trade secret violation . In other words, CISA would allow
federal agencies to use data obtained under the auspices of “cybersecurity protection” in entirely unrelated criminal investigations —
potentially indefinitely. Indeed, CISAis currently stalled in the Senate in deference to debate over the NSA’s
controversial bulk collection programs. But the Senate cool-down should not let us forget that CISA does not just
threaten civil liberties, it could actually undermine cybersecurity. Information security experts point out
that existing information sharing measures run by private companies like IBM and Dell SecureWorks
rarely prevent attacks like CISA advocates promise. One survey of information security professionals finds that 87 percent of
responders did not believe information sharing measures such as CISA will significantly reduce privacy breaches. The federal
government already operates at least 20 information sharing offices collaborating on cybersecurity with
the private sector, as Eli Dourado and I found in our new analysis through the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. These
numerous federal information-sharing initiatives have not stemmed the tidal wave of government
cyberattacks. Another Mercatus Center analysis Dourado and I conducted finds that the number of reported federal information security
failures has increased by an astounding 1,012 percent—from 5,502 in FY 2006 to 61,214 in FY 2013. Almost 40 percent of these involved the PII
of federal employees and civilians. CISA
could therefore have the unintended consequence of creating a juicy and
unprepared target for one-stop hacking.
No Information Shortage
We don’t have an information problem, we have an action problem. We knew who
the 9/11 terrorists were and what they were up to
Mattathias Schwartz, Writer for the New Yorker, January 26, 2015, “The Whole Haystack,” The New
Yorker, Accessed May 8, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack
In Washington, many people blamed 9/11 on a “wall” between intelligence gathering and criminal
investigations. In a report on pre-9/11 failures, the Department of Justice criticized the F.B.I.’s San Diego
field office for not making counterterrorism a higher priority. Two of the hijackers —Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid
al-Mihdhar—took flying lessons in San Diego and attended a mosque where the imam, Anwar al-Awlaki, had
been the target of an F.B.I. investigation. They lived for a time in an apartment that they rented from an
F.B.I. informant, and Mihdhar made phone calls to a known Al Qaeda safe house in Yemen. But the F.B.I.
wasn’t solely at fault. The C.I.A. knew that Mihdhar had a visa to travel to the U.S., and that Hazmi had
arrived in Los Angeles in January, 2000. The agency failed to forward this information to the F.B.I.
Link Turn
Information Overload
Wide-net surveillance doesn’t make us safer—it create “information overload” that
prevents effective police work
Ben Schreiner, Author and political commentator for Counter Punch, April 21, 2015, “Police Body
Cameras and Police Surveillance,” Counter Punch, Accessed May 8, 2015,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/04/21/police-body-cameras-and-police-surveillance/
Such a rush by law enforcement to deploy all the latest surveillance technologies on the American
people quite predictably leaves the collecting agencies awash in more data than could ever possibly be
of use. In fact, such mass surveillance is quite lousy at its purported purpose of predicting and preventing
crime or “terrorism.” As Julia Angwin writes in her book Dragnet Nation, “the flood of data can be overwhelming and
confounding to those who are charged with sorting through it to find terrorists.” “But,” Angwin goes on to add,
“ubiquitous, covert surveillance does appear to be very good at repression.”
Big-net surveillance makes police work less efficient—allows more crime to occur and
trades off with funding for good police work
Asa Jay, Writer for Cop Block, March 13, 2015, “The FBI’s Ever Increasing Role In Domestic
Surveillance,” Cop Block, Accessed May 8, 2015, http://www.copblock.org/118043/fbi-increasing-role-
domestic-surveillance/
A report released in 2013 by the American Civil Liberties Union provides a

comprehensive accounting of the bureau’s
expanded post-9/11 investigative and intelligence collection authorities, their impact on civil liberties in
the United States, and the FBI’s evasion of oversight that enables abuses to continue. “Rather than
aiding its terrorism prevention efforts, the FBI’s expanded investigative and intelligence powers have
overwhelmed agents with a flood of irrelevant information and false alarms,” said Michael German, senior policy
counsel at the ACLU’s Washington Legislative Office. “Instead of funding these ineffective and suspicionless
intelligence collection programs, Congress should examine whether American communities could be
made safer overall by spending that money to help state and local police solve violent crime.”
Too much surveillance drags in too much information—makes effective crime fighting
impossible
Glyn Moody, Writer for Tech Dirty, December 3, 2014, “The Repeated Failure Of The US And UK
Governments' 'Add More Hay' Approach To Surveillance,” Tech Dirt, Accessed May 11, 2015,
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141201/09320729286/repeated-failure-us-uk-governments-add-
more-hay-approach-to-surveillance.shtml
Recently we wrote about a UK Parliamentary report absolving the UK spy agencies of any responsibility for the failure to stop the killing of a
British soldier last year. Significantly, one
explanation given for the fact that the UK's MI5 undervalued the threat,
despite investigating the men responsible several times, was that it has several thousand suspects under
surveillance at any one time, and so it was beyond its capabilities to follow all leads thoroughly. Of course,
that is a consequence of the "needle in a haystack" approach that the US and UK agencies have adopted:
collect as much information as possible in the hope that somehow it will be possible to sift through all
the irrelevant hay to find the needle. But as an important piece by Coleen Rowley in the Guardian points out, this is not the
first time that a "failure to connect the dots" from information to hand resulted in missed opportunities
to stop attacks: as an FBI whistleblower and witness for several US official inquiries into 9/11 intelligence
failures, I fear that terrorists will succeed in carrying out future attacks -- not despite the massive collect-it-
all, dragnet approach to intelligence implemented since 9/11, but because of it. This approach has made terrorist
activity more difficult to spot and prevent. She reminds us: The common refrain back then was that, pre 9/11, intelligence had been flowing so
fast and furiously, it was like a fire hose, "and you can’t get a sip from a fire hose". Intelligence
such as the Phoenix memo --
which warned in July 2001 that terrorist suspects had been in flight schools and urgently requested
further investigation -- went unread.
Impact Turns
Freedom First—Prior Question

Freedom is a prior question to security—true security comes from freedom
Leonard E. Read, founder of FEE (Foundation for Economic Education), July 4, 2014, “#12 – “I Prefer
Security to Freedom”,” Foundation for Economic Education, Accessed May 11, 2015,
http://fee.org/freeman/detail/12-i-prefer-security-to-freedom
Many people wander unwittingly into socialism, gulled by assumptions they have not tested. One
popular but misleading
assumption is that security and freedom are mutually exclusive alternatives—that to choose one is to
forego the other. In the United States during the past century, more people achieved greater material security than their ancestors had
ever known in any previous society. Large numbers of people in this country accumulated a comfortable nest egg,
so that “come hell or high water”—depressions, old age, sickness, or whatever—they could rely on the
saved fruits of their own labor (and/or that of family members, friends, or parishioners) to carry them through any
storm or temporary setback. By reason of unprecedented freedom of choice, unparalleled
opportunities, provident living, and the right to the fruits of their own labor—private property—they
were able to meet the many exigencies that arise in the course of a lifetime. We think of these enviable,
personal achievements as security. But this type of security is not an alternative to freedom; rather, it is
an outgrowth of freedom. This traditional security stems from freedom as the oak from an acorn. It is not a case
of either/or; one without the other is impossible. Freedom sets the stage for all the security available in
this uncertain world.
Crushes Freedom—Surveillance Specific

Surveillance strips away innate human need for privacy—increased “security” doesn’t
justify loss of privacy
Nottingham Post, British news organization, April 02, 2015, “Joe Pursehouse: Privacy is more
important than security provided by CCTV,” Nottingham Post, Accessed May 11, 2015,
http://www.nottinghampost.com/Joe-Pursehouse-Privacy-important-security/story-26266201-detail/
story.html
However, such suggestions raise serious questions regarding the impact that such a proliferation of in-home
CCTV cameras might have on our privacy rights. Before we rush out to install an all-seeing-eye into the places we hold most
intimate, it is important to consider who might gain access to the footage recorded. It seems there are an
infinite number of ways in which such footage can be used and abused – and no suggestions about how
the use of such cameras might be regulated. Family members spying on one another and guests who might visit the home is
beyond bad taste – it is fundamentally wrong. Even if we trust our nearest and dearest not to do such things, the
very fact that we are being monitored in our home can have a chilling effect on us. This is because, despite the
fact that we increasingly relinquish vast amounts of information about our private lives on social media, privacy still holds value,
particularly in the home. The home gives us a space outside of society where we can be free from the scrutiny of unchosen others.
Even if this Orwellian intrusion does not offend your sensibilities, there are serious questions regarding
the necessity of such CCTV surveillance in any case. External CCTV, modern forensic techniques, and preventive technologies
such as alarms, can offer protection which serve as a much more visible deterrent for burglars in the first instance. Thus, before we
welcome and encourage the use of this invasive technology into our homes, it is important we give due
consideration to its impact and its worth. Whilst Sir Bernard stresses that such cameras are now cheaply
available, he overlooks the costs to our individual privacy.
Crushes Freedom—Surveillance Specific

Surveilling the population probing for crime destroys liberty—its antithesis of a free
and open society
Thomas Mullen, Writer for Communities Digital News, January 18, 2014, “Obama’s NSA speech proves
government can’t prevent terrorism in a free society,” Communities Digital News, Accessed May 9,
2015, http://www.commdiginews.com/politics-2/obamas-nsa-reforms-prove-he-doesnt-understand-
checks-and-balances-2988/
Ben Franklin was right. Those who trade essential liberty for temporary safety deserve neither. President
Obama means well, but his worldview prevents him from understanding the problem . He believes government is a force for
good, but that’s un-American. The United States was born out of the idea that it is at best a necessary
evil. Government has only one tool in its toolbox: to bring to bear the combined capacity for violence of
the whole society. That’s what makes it, in words often attributed to George Washington, “a
troublesome servant and a fearful master.” No society can remain free if that irresistible force is allowed
to be employed preemptively. Asking the government to prevent crime or terrorism destroys liberty, by
definition. Twelve years after 9/11, Americans should know by now that they’re no freer or safer for
giving the government more power. It’s time for real solutions. It’s time to take that power back.
Crushes Democracy
Surveillance undermines the foundations of democracy—respect of legal processes,
human rights, and checks and balances
Pieter Omtzigt, Reporter on mass surveillance, and Günter Schirmer, Deputy head of the secretariat
of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, February 23, 2015, “Mass surveillance: wrong in practice as well as principle,” Open
Democracy, Accessed May 10, 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/pieter-omtzigt-g
%C3%BCnter-schirmer/mass-surveillance-wrong-in-practice-as-well-as-principle
The threat to human rights and democracy by the seemingly inexorable growth of the ‘surveillance-
industrial complex’ should not be underestimated. As shown in the legal committee’s report, the intelligence
agencies of several countries have secured huge and fast-growing budgets. All bureaucracies, especially those
intertwined with private business, crave budget increases—providing their leadership with added power, the rank-and-file with more posts and
promotion prospects, and private contractors and their lobbies with ever-increasing profits. Democratic
oversight and the usual
‘checks and balances’ provided by the open discussion of pros and cons of government programmes,
including the vetting of budgetary requirements, are made extremely difficult by the secret nature of the
agencies’ activities. In addition, the technologies used, their effectiveness and the potential consequences
are highly complex and difficult to assess for outsiders and technological laypersons—including the
elected political leadership and even, it sometimes seems, the top brass of the spying agencies themselves.
Crushes Democracy
Surveillance erodes true democracy—the plan is a step to ensure
Sputnik News, News and media outlet, February 14, 2015, “Snowden: NSA Surveillance About
Control, Fight Against It About Democracy,” Sputnik News, May 10, 2015,
http://sputniknews.com/military/20150214/1018252725.html
Surveillance, a Threat to Democracy Addressing the libertarian group, Snowden spoke of the need for people to
stand up against the government and demand an end to mass surveillance as a way to protect
democracy. “When we think about democracy, we think about the way we interact, the way we control
our relationship with the government as a civil society,” he said. “We have to have an even playing field
and, at the end of the day, not think about what divides us but about what holds us together.” “No matter
how you feel about this particular program, about this particular controversy on the Republican side of the fence or the Democratic side of the
field, ultimately
as long as we can agree that we have basic rights.” Snowden called the government’s
surveillance program unconstitutional, noting that federal courts had attached the label. When the NSA
previously admitted to collecting telecommunications information and metadata, they defended their
acts by saying they did not review all the collected information and most Americans were, therefore,
unaffected.
Crushes Freedom of Speech

Surveillance makes true freedom of speech and expression impossible
Heini Järvinen, Writer for European Digital Rights, January 14, 2015, “PEN report reveals concerns
about the impact of mass surveillance,” European Digital Rights, May 11, 2015, https://edri.org/pen-
report-reveals-concerns-impact-mass-surveillance/
The report presents four key findings: Writers in democratic and non-democratic countries are equally worried
about levels of government surveillance in their countries. The majority of writers around the world said
they were “very” or “somewhat” worried about levels of government surveillance in their countries,
including 75% in countries classified as “free”, 84% in countries classified as “partly free”, and 80% in
“not free” countries. Writers’ fear and uncertainty regarding surveillance is so widespread that several
survey respondents expressed concern over submitting their responses to the survey. Writers around
the world are engaging in self-censorship due to fear of surveillance. The respondents were asked whether they had
engaged in different types of self-censorship in their written work, personal communications and online activity. Writers living in liberal
democratic countries have begun to engage in self-censorship at levels approaching those seen in non-
democratic countries, indicating that mass surveillance has undermined writers’ trust on democratic
governments respecting their freedom of expression and right to privacy. Because of pervasive
surveillance, writers are concerned that expressing certain views even privately or researching certain
topics may lead to negative consequences. Self-censorship has a devastating impact on freedom of
information: If writers avoid exploring topics for fear of possible retribution, the material, particularly
controversial material, available to readers may be greatly impoverished. Mass surveillance programmes
by the US government have damaged its reputation as a protector of free speech in the US. The report
indicates that particularly in other “free” countries, writers do not believe freedom of expression is
better protected in the US than in their countries. Even in countries classified as “partly free”, nearly one third of the writers
think freedom of expression enjoys less protection in the US. Mass surveillance by the US government has damaged its reputation as a
champion of freedom of expression around the world. Approximately
two thirds of the respondents think US credibility
“has been significantly damaged for the long term” by its surveillance programs.
Surveillance is Racist—Arabs/ Muslims

Surveillance is racist—it disproportionately targets certain groups. Legal reforms like
the aff are key to prevent this
Natasha Lennard, Writer for Vice, July 9, 2014, “The NSA’s Racist Targeting of Individuals Is as
Troubling as Indiscriminate Surveillance,” Vice, Accessed May 10, 2015,
https://news.vice.com/article/the-nsas-racist-targeting-of-individuals-is-as-troubling-as-indiscriminate-
surveillance
This is anti-Muslim discrimination pure and simple. While the NSA’s broad data collection is disturbingly total and
unspecific, its targeted spying is evidently racist. Another leaked document punctuates this point with a dull,
disgusting thud: a 2005 training document explaining how to “properly format internal memos to justify
FISA surveillance” offers a sample memo that uses “Mohammed Raghead” as the name of a fictitious
terrorism suspect. Your NSA at work, ladies and gentlemen! As the existence of this document makes clear, legality is a tortured
issue at the heart national security misdeeds. NSA agents are trained to ensure that their surveillance
practices fall within the letter of the law — and the law here is at fault, shaped not by a spirit of justice
but by surveillance-state paranoia. The Intercept report does not skirt around this point: Indeed, the government’s ability
to monitor such high-profile Muslim-Americans — with or without warrants — suggests that the most
alarming and invasive aspects of the NSA’s surveillance occur not because the agency breaks the law,
but because it is able to exploit the law’s permissive contours. “The scandal is what Congress has made
legal,” says Jameel Jaffer, an ACLU deputy legal director. “The claim that the intelligence agencies are complying with
the laws is just a distraction from more urgent questions relating to the breadth of the laws
themselves.”
Surveillance is Racist—African Americans

Surveillance has historically and continues to be used as a means of silencing dissent
from African Americans. Surveillance represents racial bias that must be rejected
Malkia Amala Cyril, Writer for The Progressive, March 30, 2015, “Black America's State of
Surveillance,” Progressive, Accessed May 10, 2015,
http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-state-surveillance
Today, media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by Edward

Snowden that millions of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mother’s visit from the FBI reminds me
that, from the slave pass system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow, black
people and other people of color have lived for centuries with surveillance practices aimed at
maintaining a racial hierarchy. It’s time for journalists to tell a new story that does not start the clock
when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand that data has
historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually
maintain an impoverished underclass. In an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy
of data collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to
collect massive amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to
this technological advance.
Liberty Good—Vulnerable Populations

Data mining targets the most vulnerable populations and strip them of their Civil
Liberties
Brent Skorup, Writer for Reuters, December 12, 2014, “Cops scan social media to help assess your
‘threat rating’,” Reuters, Accessed May 9, 2015,
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/12/12/police-data-mining-looks-through-social-media-
assigns-you-a-threat-level/
There are many troubling aspects to these programs. There are, of course, obvious risks in outsourcing
traditional police work — determining who is a threat — to a proprietary algorithm. Deeming someone a
public threat is a serious designation, and applications like Beware may encourage shortcuts and snap decisions. It is also
disconcerting that police would access and evaluate someone’s online presence. What types of
comments online will increase a threat score? Will race be apparent? These questions are impossible to answer
because Intrado merely provides the tool — leaving individual police departments to craft specific standards for what information is available
and relevant in a threat score. Local
departments can fine-tune their own data collection, but then threat
thresholds could vary by locale, making oversight nearly impossible. Tradition holds that justice should
be blind, to promote fairness in treatment and avoid prejudgment. With such algorithms , however, police
can have significant background information about nearly everyone they pull over or visit at home.
Police are time-constrained, and vulnerable populations – such as minorities living in troubled
neighborhoods and the poor — may receive more scrutiny.
Liberty Good—Privacy
Surveillance crushes our ability to enjoy basic freedoms and rights such as privacy—
it’s more important now than ever before
Zack Whittaker, Writer and editor for Zero Day news, January 20, 2015, “As terror threats rise,
privacy is now more important than ever,” Zero Day, Accessed May 11, 2015,
http://www.zdnet.com/article/as-terror-threats-rise-privacy-is-now-more-important-than-ever/
On a similar vein, the Obama administration (among other federal agencies -- no surprise that the FBI and NSA have weighed in, too)
has hinted strongly that Apple and Google are helping its criminal users evade justice by giving them in-
built device encryption. The irony is that it came partly in response to the government pushing over the past two years to clamp down
on cellphone crime by including kill-switches and other security features on devices. Privacy has come to be seen as something
people need when they have "something to hide," or used by dissidents and protesters to hide their
faces. And with that goes an association and assumption that they are bad people -- the same bad
people that want to blow us up in a suicide bombing on a busy street. No wonder privacy is seen as a
bad thing when our perception of it has been skewed. The reason we'll lose our right to privacy won't be
because surveillance has crept up on us without us noticing. It's because so many didn't even realize
they benefited from it when they did.
General—Laundry List
Bulk surveillance crushes the US economy, cyber security, and liberty
Kim Zetter, Writer for Wired, July 29, 2014, “Personal Privacy Is Only One of the Costs of NSA
Surveillance,” Wired, Accessed May 10, 2015, http://www.wired.com/2014/07/the-big-costs-of-nsa-
surveillance-that-no-ones-talking-about/
THERE IS NO doubt the integrity of our communications and the privacy of our online activities have
been the biggest casualty of the NSA’s unfettered surveillance of our digital lives . But the ongoing
revelations of government eavesdropping have had a profound impact on the economy, the security of
the internet and the credibility of the U.S. government’s leadership when it comes to online governance.
These are among the many serious costs and consequences the NSA and those who sanctioned its
activities—including the White House, the Justice Department and lawmakers like Sen. Dianne Feinstein—apparently have not considered,
or acknowledged, according to a report by the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute. “Too often, we have discussed
the National Security Agency’s surveillance programs through the distorting lens of a simplistic ‘security
versus privacy’ narrative,” said Danielle Kehl, policy analyst at the Open Technology Institute and primary author of the report. “But
if you look closer, the more accurate story is that in the name of security, we’re trading away not only
privacy, but also the U.S. tech economy, internet openness, America’s foreign policy interests and
cybersecurity.” Over the last year, documents leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, have disclosed numerous NSA spy
operations that have gone beyond what many considered acceptable surveillance activity. These included infecting the
computers of network administrators working for a Belgian telecom in order to undermine the
company’s routers and siphon mobile traffic; working with companies to install backdoors in their
products or network infrastructure or to devise ways to undermine encryption; intercepting products
that U.S. companies send to customers overseas to install spy equipment in them before they reach
customers. The Foundation’s report, released today, outlines some of the collateral damage of NSA surveillance in several areas, including:
Economic losses to US businesses due to lost sales and declining customer trust. The deterioration of
internet security as a result of the NSA stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities, undermining encryption and
installing backdoors in software and hardware products. Undermining the government’s credibility and
leadership on “internet freedom” and governance issues such as censorship.
Other Aff Answers
Yes Abuse—Burden of Proof

The burden of proof is on surveillance advocates to prove sufficient safeguards when
privacy is at steak
David Firestone, Writer for the NY Times Taking Note blog, November 20, 2014, “There’s No Proof of
Surveillance Abuse?,” NY Times, Accessed May 10, 2015,
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/theres-no-proof-of-surveillance-abuse/?_r=0
One of the big points made by the Republican senators who shot down the surveillance bill on Tuesday was that there
was no proof the National Security Agency’s program of collecting millions of Americans’ telephone
records had ever been abused. The bill would have stopped the existing programs of bulk collection. Opponents of collection, said
Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, “cannot cite a single example of this program ever being abused.
Not one single example of this specific program being abused by anybody intentionally. Not one. So we
are dealing with a theoretical threat.” The world, of course, doesn’t know the full extent of the program
or its abuses, because it is secret, revealed only by the leaks of Edward Snowden. But those leaks revealed that on
several occasions the N.S.A. spied on innocent Americans because of mistakes in tracing the calls made
by foreign suspects. One internal audit by the N.S.A. said the agency had broken privacy laws or violated
its legal authority thousands of times a year since 2008, mostly through unauthorized surveillance of Americans. More
generally, the leaks showed that the very existence of the program — allowing the government to secretly trace the calls
of millions of innocent American citizens with no connection to terrorism — was itself an abuse. It’s useful to turn Mr. Rubio’s argument
on its head, because there have also been no examples of the collection program doing any good. The five-
person White House review group, which examined these programs in detail, said the N.S.A. claimed bulk collection
had contributed to the prevention of possible terrorist attacks. But the group simply didn’t believe the
N.S.A.’s claim. “Our review suggests that the information contributed to terrorist investigations by the
use of Section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks,” the group’s report said. (That’s
a reference to the legal authority for the collection program.) The same information could have been collected if the
N.S.A. had just asked for it from the phone companies, the report said, as the failed surveillance bill would
have required. It’s a classic policy standoff. Opponents of the bill say you can’t prove the program is a
problem. Supporters say you can’t prove it’s even needed. But when the privacy of millions of people is
at stake, those who defend the intelligence agencies should have a much stronger argument than the
one they’re presenting.
Yes Abuse
US surveillance gathering constitutes gross privacy and human rights violations
Vladimir Platov, Researcher for Global Research, January 05, 2015, “US Social Surveillance Abuse Puts
Civil Liberties in Jeopardy,” Global Research, Accessed May 11, 2015, http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-
social-surveillance-abuse-puts-civil-liberties-in-jeopardy/5422864
The intelligence community is also sponsoring the development of the Aladdin program designed for
automated analysis and description of video content (Automated Low-Level Analysis and Description of Diverse Intelligence
Video – VACE). The main goal of this program is to provide intelligence analysts with automated search
capabilities to track videos that could be of interest for them. Videos for analytical processing can come
from different sources – television, surveillance cameras, regular pictures, interviews or even footage shot by drones. The footage
is systematized by time and place to identify certain individuals and determine the sequence of their
actions which may be in certain semantic relations to present-day events. Currently, IARPA implemented a program
called Babel, which aims at developing effective speech recognition software in different languages and dialects. Washington and its
agencies are literally spending billions of taxpayer dollars annually under the convenient guise of the
“war on terror”, which in fact turns out to be a hidden war against its own citizens, now deprived of
basic human rights. But what makes it even worse is that it’s pushing its satellite countries to launch an
all-out offensive against the civil liberties of Europe and beyond.
Yes Abuse
Mass surveillance abuses the Civil Liberties of every American subject to it
Devlin Barrett, Staff reporter for the Wall Street Journal covering security, terrorism, cybercrime,
drugs, and corruption, January 26, 2015, “U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers,” Wall Street Journal, May
10, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-1422314779
Officials have publicly said that they track vehicles near the border with Mexico to help fight drug cartels. What
hasn’t been previously disclosed is that the DEA has spent years working to expand the database
“throughout the United States,’’ according to one email reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Many state and local law-
enforcement agencies are accessing the database for a variety of investigations, according to people
familiar with the program, putting a wealth of information in the hands of local officials who can track
vehicles in real time on major roadways. The database raises new questions about privacy and the scope
of government surveillance. The existence of the program and its expansion were described in
interviews with current and former government officials, and in documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union
through a Freedom of Information Act request and reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. It is unclear if any court oversees or approves the
intelligence-gathering. A
spokesman for Justice Department, which includes the DEA, said the program
complies with federal law. “It is not new that the DEA uses the license-plate reader program to arrest
criminals and stop the flow of drugs in areas of high trafficking intensity,’’ the spokesman said. Sen. Patrick Leahy,
senior Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee, said the government’s use of license-plate readers “raises
significant privacy concerns. The fact that this intrusive technology is potentially being used to expand
the reach of the government’s asset-forfeiture efforts is of even greater concern.’’ The senator called for
“additional accountability’’ and said Americans shouldn’t have to fear ”their locations and movements
are constantly being tracked and stored in a massive government database.’’
Parallel Construction Bad—Wrong

Parallel construction is wrong—it puts defendants as presumed guilty and erodes their
ability to mount a proper defense
Hanni Fakhoury, Writer for Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), January 23, 2015, “The Many
Problems with the DEA's Bulk Phone Records Collection Program,”
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/many-problems-deas-bulk-phone-records-collection-program
That’s because on September 1, 2013, the New York Times reported for the first time the existence of a program
known as “Hemisphere” which allows the DEA and local law enforcement to obtain call records from
AT&T. As government presentations about the program repeatedly make clear, law enforcement agencies are given
instructions on “protecting the program,” and advised to “never refer to Hemisphere in any official
document.” Earlier in 2013, Reuters reported about the DEA and IRS’s secret use of investigative tips
provided by the NSA and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies . Like “Hemisphere,” agents are
instructed to keep the true source of this information under wraps and to recreate the investigative trail
through some other means. The government calls this practice “parallel construction” but it’s really
“intelligence laundering,” designed to insulate surveillance programs from the scrutiny of defense
attorneys and judges. Given the DEA’s well-documented tendency to be less than truthful when it comes to explaining where it really
got investigative information, it’s likely the DEA laundered the results of their bulk phone records database too.
That puts criminal defendants at a serious disadvantage in defending their cases and undermines the
courts ability to act as an effective check on government surveillance.
Parallel Construction Bad—Illegal

Parallel construction relies on illegally obtained evidence—even if it secures
convictions, it is illegal
Shane Trejo, Writer and internet activist, September 30, 2014, “The Perils of Parallel Construction,” Off
Now, Accessed May 11, 2015, http://www.offnow.org/the_perils_of_parallel_construction
Edward Snowden revealed that the NSA intercepts huge amounts of electronic data warrantlessly without
our permission. However, that is not the only way the surveillance state violates our rights. The NSA uses
other underhanded schemes behind-the-scenes to exploit us. One of them is known as 'parallel
construction.' Through this shady process, the NSA snoopers supply information to other government agencies.
These agencies include other federal bureaucracies, and local and state government entities as well. The
information is then rearranged to cover up the exact whereabouts of where it came from, thereby
removing any evidence of malpractice for the courts. A more appropriate term to describe this process ,
coined by the EFF, is 'information laundering.' This insidious process operates primarily through a formerly secret DEA unit known as
the Special Operations Division (SOD). As Exposed by Reuters last year, the SOD is involved in information sharing with state and local law
enforcement. Almost none of this warrantlessly gathered data has anything to do with foreign intelligence
or "terrorism." It primarily involved run of the mill criminal investigations, mostly drug related. The SOD
is exempt from any type of oversight from judges or prosecutors. This means the feds get free reign to
use illegally-gathered information to fill our exploding prisons at an even faster rate.
CYBERWAR DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES
Cybersecurity Down – Snowden

Snowden’s leaks crushed US cybersecurity already
Felicia Schwartz, reporter in the Washington bureau of the Wall Street Journal, 6-17-2014, “Snowden
Leaks Cost Nation’s Cyber Security Efforts, Former NSA Official Says,” Wall Street Journal,
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/06/17/snowden-leaks-cost-nations-cyber-security-efforts-former-
nsa-official-says/
A former deputy National Security Agency director said intelligence secrets leaked by Edward Snowden
last June derailed legislative attempts to encourage the public and private sectors to share information
about vulnerabilities in cyberspace, and said the government must do more to encourage such collaboration. The Snowden
leaks “unfairly, inappropriately, unfortunately” damaged the private sector, said Chris Inglis, the former NSA deputy. Mr. Inglis
made his comments Tuesday at The Wall Street Journal’s CFO Network annual meeting in Washington, D.C. Mr. Inglis retired from the NSA in
January and will join Securonix’s advisory board, the company announced today. He
pointed to Iran’s “denial of service” cyber
attacks on the U.S. in 2012 and 2013 as the most frightening cyber security threat to businesses . In working
with businesses to prevent future attacks, the government must figure out how to exercise its authority to defend cyberspace. “I think the
government is doing what it can, given what understanding there is at this point,” Mr. Inglis said. “ There
are many challenges in
this space.” He also said the Snowden leaks delayed legislation that would have provided companies
with legal protections to share data with the government in an effort to improve security measures.
US national cybersecurity is low even if private individuals are more secure

Benjamin Wittes, senior fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution and codirector of the
Harvard Law School–Brookings Project on Law and Security, 2-25-2015, “The Snowden Revelations And
Cybersecurity,” The Briefing, http://www.hoover.org/research/snowden-revelations-and-cybersecurity
The trouble is that some

of the people best positioned to take advantage of the slew of information Snowden
made available are exactly the sort of actors whose empowerment may not serve broader cybersecurity
objectives. Is American cybersecurity better off if the People’s Liberation Army and Vladimir Putin know
the details of NSA’s programmatic activity? I suspect not. Are companies like Sony less vulnerable if
North Korea knows a great deal more about our government’s capabilities and constraints? I doubt it.
Are you individually safer online if your and your employer’s cybersecurity practices improve marginally
but those of the many criminal gangs after your credit cards and your company’s data improve
dramatically? Again, probably not, and those criminal gangs are in fact far better positioned thanks to
the Snowden materials to improve their tradecraft than you or your employer are to improve your
defenses. In other words, the answer to the question of the effects of the Snowden revelations on cybersecurity depends a great deal on
one’s vision of what cybersecurity really is. If, with the great libertarian security theorist Bruce Schneier, you imagine cybersecurity as an
Internet resistant to all attackers — including those we call law enforcement and intelligence agencies operating under the rule of law — the
effects of Snowden have certainly been positive. If
you believe, with the US government, that not all attacks are
created equal policywise — that some are hugely damaging criminal and national security threats while
others are policy objectives of the highest order and some actually augment larger cybersecurity
objectives by enabling the prevention of the damaging intrusions — the landscape is far more
complicated. Snowden has clearly had an impact, but it’s an impact that pushes toward a more Schneierian vision of Internet
security. And that’s a vision far friendlier to some US objectives than to others .
Cybersecurity Down – Generic

Most companies have no incentive to protect their assets or disclose breaches
Lily Hay Newman, staff writer and lead blogger for Slate on National Security, 5-11-2015, “What if a
Cybersecurity Attack Shut Down Our Ports?” Slate,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/05/maritime_cybersecurity_ports_are_u
nsecured.html
It’s easy to forget when you’re on dry land that 90 percent of the world’s goods are shipped on boats. While
we worry about the
cybersecurity of power grids and nuclear missile silos, most of us have never thought about whether the
container ships and ports that bring us our clothes, electronics, food—everything—are secured against digital threats.
Spoiler alert: They’re not. The April newsletter from maritime cybersecurity consulting firm CyberKeel
contained a scary stat. According to a spot check the group conducted, 37 percent of maritime
companies with Windows webservers haven’t been keeping up with installing security patches from
Microsoft. As a result, more than one-third of these sites are vulnerable to denial of service attacks and
certain types of remote access. We already know that companies are slow to protect their networks . On
the first anniversary of the discovery of Heartbleed last month, one study showed that 74 percent of companies on the
Forbes Global 2000 list hadn’t comprehensively patched their systems against what was possibly the
worst vulnerability ever discovered. Maritime companies, though, are responsible not just for customer data (which is already
extremely valuable), but for physical goods. If their systems suffer an outage, companies might not know where
their ships are, or ports might not be able to unload cargo. Doesn’t this sound kind of, um, important?
Over the last few years, groups around the world have been working to bring maritime cybersecurity to
the fore and begin talking about the reality of the threats. When breaches occur, private companies
currently have virtually no incentive to disclose them, because it will only generate bad publicity and
breed distrust among customers and investors. Incidents have started to come out, and this first step toward
transparency is promising.
Cybersecurity Down – Tech Investment

Lack of investment in tech development has decimated US cybersecurity
Caroline Craig, East Coast site editor for InfoWorld, 5-1-2015, “MIT paints grim picture for future of
U.S. tech research,” Info World, http://www.infoworld.com/article/2917200/government/mit-report-
cuts-to-federal-funding-threaten-the-countrys-future.html
Cyber security Computer hacking, data theft, and other cyber attacks cost the United States billions of
dollars per year, and the number of attacks is increasing rapidly. But "fundamentally more secure
systems -- where security is built in, and doesn't depend on programmers never making mistakes or
users changing their passwords -- are possible." In addition to redesigning computers to eliminate core
security weaknesses in their architecture -- a historical legacy from the late 1970s and early 1980s, when computers were
10,000 times slower, had much smaller memories, and were not networked -- a second fundamental cause of cyber insecurity
is the weakness of our access authorization. "Both of these fundamental weaknesses could be overcome,
if we decided to do so .... But current investments in these priority areas, especially in non-defense
systems, are either non-existent or too small to enable development and testing of a prototype system
with demonstrably better security and with performance comparable to commercial systems ."
Cybersecurity Down – Financial Incentives

Cybersecurity is down because cyber-attacks are just too lucrative
Robert Dethlefs, founder of the CISO Coalition, a membership organization for chief information
security officers at U.S. corporations and founder and CEO of Evanta, a leadership association of
business executives, 5-1-2015, “How cyber attacks became more profitable than the drug trade,”
Fortune, http://fortune.com/2015/05/01/how-cyber-attacks-became-more-profitable-than-the-drug-
trade/
Information security professionals, no matter how big the enterprise they work for, are currently
overwhelmingly outgunned by cybercrime. The threat of these criminal enterprises is large and growing
and if left unchecked will have a disastrous impact on our economy in the near term . McKinsey & Company
estimates that cyber attacks will slow the pace of technology and business innovation over the next few years and cost the economy as much as
$3 trillion annually. Data breaches have already taken a heavy toll and costs are on the rise. An IBM-sponsored survey conducted by the
Ponemon Institute found that the average cost to the company of a corporate data breach is now $5.9 million . Of
this, the cost of lost business from a breach averages $3.2 million. However, this average can be misleading because some of the more widely
publicized breaches in recent years have cost the affected companies billions of dollars in revenue and shareholder value. Cyber
criminals
run highly organized and collaborative enterprises that operate with troubling and destructive efficiency .
Juniper Networks conducted a study that found that global cybercrime takes in larger profits than the illegal drug
trade. “The cyber black market has evolved from a varied landscape of discrete, ad hoc individuals into a
network of highly organized groups, often connected with traditional crime groups (e.g., drug cartels,
mafias, terrorist cells) and nation-states,” the report said. And even when the goals of the attackers are not monetary gain, the
costs can be enormous. Though not a penny of its cash was stolen, the attack on Sony last December cost the entertainment company billions
of dollars through the release of data. Types of data stolen can include financial data, personal health information (PHI) and associated
insurance information. What’s more, cyber
attackers have adopted the practice of gaining strength in numbers.
There is a network of collaboration these criminals easily tap into to help them with their schemes. With
these hackers constantly working together to do damage to businesses, it only makes sense for
businesses to start working together on a large scale.
Link Turn – Surveillance Hurts Cybersecurity

Surveillance actually harms cybersecurity – it creates backdoors that hackers can
exploit
Denver Nicks, journalist and writer for TIME on National Security, 7-8-2014, “NSA Spying Hurts
Cybersecurity for All of Us Say Privacy Advocates,” TIME, http://time.com/2966463/nsa-spying-
surveillance-cybersecurity-privacy-advocates-schneier/
Privacy advocates Monday slammed the National Security Agency for conducting surveillance in a way they
say undermines cybersecurity for everyone and harms U.S. tech companies. “We have examples of the
NSA going in and deliberately weakening security of things that we use so they can eavesdrop on
particular targets,” said Bruce Schneier, a prominent cryptography writer and technologist. Schneier referenced a Reuters report that
the NSA paid the computer security firm RSA $10 million to use a deliberately flawed encryption
standard to facilitate easier eavesdropping, a charge RSA has denied. “This very act of undermining not only
undermines our security. It undermines our fundamental trust in the things we use to achieve security.
It’s very toxic,” Schneier said. In the year since former NSA contractor Edward Snowden’s first leaks, attention has focused on the Agency’s
surveillance itself, fueling debates over whether it is legal and ethical to spy on American citizens or to eavesdrop on the leaders of allied
countries. NSA policies that intentionally undermine cybersecurity too often get left out of the debate , said
panelists Monday at a New American Foundation event titled “National Insecurity Agency: How the NSA’s Surveillance Programs Undermine
Internet Security.” “If
the Chinese government had proposed to put in a backdoor into our computers and
then paid a company $10 million to make that the standard we would be furious ,” said Joe Hall, chief technologist
at the Center for Democracy and Technology. “That’s exactly what the NSA has become: the best hacker in the entire
world.”
Link Turn – Surveillance Hurts Cybersecurity

NSA spying creates vulnerabilities that hackers can exploit – that crushes cyber
security
Brendan Sasso, tech policy correspondent for National Journal, 4-29-2014, “The NSA Isn't Just Spying
on Us, It's Also Undermining Internet Security,” National Journal,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/the-nsa-isn-t-just-spying-on-us-it-s-also-undermining-internet-
security-20140429
Bolstering the nation’s defenses against hackers has been one of the Obama administration’s top goals .
Officials have warned for years that a sophisticated cyberattack could cripple critical infrastructure or allow thieves to make off with the
financial information of millions of Americans. President Obama pushed Congress to enact cybersecurity legislation, and when it didn’t, he
issued his own executive order in 2013. “The cyber threat to our nation is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we
face,” Obama wrote in a 2012 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal. But critics argue that the National Security Agency has
actually undermined cybersecurity and made the United States more vulnerable to hackers . At its core, the
problem is the NSA’s dual mission. On one hand, the agency is tasked with securing U.S. networks and
information. On the other hand, the agency must gather intelligence on foreign threats to national
security. Collecting intelligence often means hacking encrypted communications . That’s nothing new for the NSA;
the agency traces its roots back to code-breakers deciphering Nazi messages during World War II. So in many ways, strong Internet
security actually makes the NSA’s job harder. “This is an administration that is a vigorous defender of surveillance,” said
Christopher Soghoian, the head technologist for the American Civil Liberties Union. “Surveillance at the scale they want
requires insecurity.” The leaks from Edward Snowden have revealed a variety of efforts by the NSA to
weaken cybersecurity and hack into networks. Critics say those programs, while helping NSA spying,
have made U.S. networks less secure. According to the leaked documents, the NSA inserted a so-called
back door into at least one encryption standard that was developed by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology. The NSA could use that back door to spy on suspected terrorists, but the
vulnerability was also available to any other hacker who discovered it.
No Link – Private Sector Solves

The private sector is already boosting cyber security in order to protect from domestic
surveillance
Tom Risen, technology and business reporter for U.S. News & World Report, 6-5-2014, “Cybersecurity
Boosted After Snowden NSA Revelations,” US News and World Report,
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/06/05/cybersecurity-boosted-after-snowden-nsa-
revelations
Silicon Valley has come a long way boosting privacy and cybersecurity since reports in June 2013
disclosed that the National Security Agency was collecting data from Internet companies. Tech
companies including Google, Twitter and Yahoo commemorated a year of news reports detailing secret
government surveillance Thursday by supporting campaigns that both pressure government privacy
reform and raise consumer awareness about cybersecurity. Those three companies were among the nine firms that make
up the Reform Government Surveillance advocacy group, which called for the Senate to boost privacy protections against mass surveillance
with a stronger version of the USA Freedom Act bill. The House passed a version of the bill to end mass phone surveillance that privacy
advocates criticized as ineffective on privacy. “Over the last year many of our companies have taken important steps,
including strengthening the security of our services and taking action to increase transparency ,” the group
said in a letter to the Senate. “But the government needs to do more.” The separate Reset the Net advocacy campaign
against mass surveillance also gives Internet and mobile cybersecurity tips, while companies including
Google pledge to boost their encryption. Google also released a test version of a program to keep Gmail
encrypted until it reaches other Gmail users. Reset the Net is the latest step in a “renaissance of Internet
security” since former NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked documents to the press about agency
surveillance on Internet companies, says Kevin Bankston, policy director of the New America
Foundation's Open Technology Institute. “Countless organizations and companies have really stepped
up their game when it comes to hardening their systems and protecting the security of our
communications,” Bankston says. Reports have shown the NSA requested information from Internet companies through the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act court, which nearly always approved a government query, but has also tapped Yahoo and Google servers, installed
back doors onto routers and installed spyware onto computers. The Electronic Frontier Foundation advocacy group made a handy, and lengthy
list of all the disclosures that expanded public awareness of government surveillance. “ The
Snowden leaks have taught tech
companies a hard lesson that not only do they have to secure their services against Chinese spies and
hackers, but they also need to treat their own government as a security threat,” Bankston says. “In
response to that lesson we have seen a substantial improvement around Internet security.”
No Cyberwar
No chance of cyber catastrophe
Susan Landau, faculty member in the Worcester Polytechnic Institute Department of Social Science
and Policy Studies, where she works on cybersecurity, privacy, and public policy, 3-10- 2015, “What We
Must Do about Cyber,” Lawfare, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/03/what-we-must-do-about-cyber/
At the same time that technological capabilities improved, strategic analysis also shifted. We’d been
hearing about cyber Pearl Harbors since 2011, and about electronic Pearl Harbors for fifteen years before that. No one
says “cyber Pearl Harbor” anymore — and that’s a correct assessment. The entities capable of launching
a massive, multi-prong attack on US critical infrastructure through cyber have little strategic interest in
doing so. Instead, DNI Clapper suggested that the threat will be, Rather than a “Cyber Armageddon”
scenario that debilitates the entire US infrastructure, we envision something different. We foresee an ongoing series of low-to-
moderate level cyber attacks from a variety of sources over time, which will impose cumulative costs on
US economic competitiveness and national security. These will be disruptive attacks on industry, a la Sony
and JPMorgan, and more dangerously, there is the potential of low-level attacks to critical infrastructure. Clapper mentioned
this, specifically calling out Russian cyber actors who are developing the ability to access industrial control systems. He is concerned about
efforts to degrade quality of information — and thus the ability of systems to work correctly. This
new understanding of threats
changes in two fundamental ways what our responses must be. The first, as Clapper points out, is that we
must increase our focus on information integrity. Technical solutions, including cryptographic hashes to ensure data integrity,
will play an increasingly important role here. (Interestingly, you also see information integrity play out in Google’s new initiative to rank
webpages based on the accuracy of the facts that they contain rather than on the links to them; thus, for example, webpages claiming a link
between the Measles-Mumps-Rubella vaccine and autism would be downranked.) The
second important aspect is resilience,
the continued ability to function despite degraded performance; this will be increasingly critical . In the last
several years, resilience has become part of DoD cyber doctrine; it also appears in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. This
capability also needs to become deeply embedded within the private sector. As DNI Clapper observed, “cyber risk must be managed.” The
Worldwide Threat Assessment brings a much more sophisticated and nuanced version of the cyber threats the US faces than earlier DoD
descriptions did. It behooves not just the US military and political leaders to pay attention, but also US industry leaders. Unlike
the
previous cyber Armageddons characterizations, this assessment captures the real threats to the US
public and private sectors. Such threats will only grow more complex and more severe with time; that argues for beginning the
development of responses now. Sony and JPMorgan are undoubtedly paying attention to this; one hopes that a much wider swath of US
industrial leaders are as well.
No Cyberwar
No risk of cyber “Pearl Harbor” – their impact is hype
Peter W. Singer, Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Senior Fellow in
Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, 1-22-2014, “What Americans Should Fear in Cyberspace,”
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/01/22-what-americans-should-fear-in-cyberspace-
singer
Despite its central position in both congressional testimony and Hollywood movies, no person has
actually been hurt or killed by an act of cyber terrorism. Indeed, squirrels have taken down power grids,
but hackers never have. But that is not to say there's no threat. Indeed, our own creation, the Stuxnet worm, which attacked Iran's
nuclear infrastructure, demonstrated that cyber weapons can cause damage. But the fiction of a "cyber Pearl Harbor" gets far
more attention than the real, and arguably far greater, impact of the massive campaign of intellectual property
theft emanating from China. As with 9/11, the way that we react (or overreact) to an attack, terrorist or otherwise,
is what truly determines the impact of it. Understanding the difference between hackers doing
something annoying and doing something with the capacity to cause serious harm will better direct our
fears and resources. Cyber security has to be seen as a management problem that will never go away . As
long as we use the Internet, there will be cyber risks. The key is to move away from a mentality of
seeking silver bullets and ever-higher walls and instead to focus on the most important feature of true
cyber security: resilience. In both the real and online worlds, we can't stop or deter all bad things, but
we can plan for and deal with them.
AT: Accidental War

There is no chance of an accidental nuclear war
Michael Quinlan, Consulting Senior Fellow for South Asia International Institute for Strategic Studies,
2009, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons,” amazon
Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm .
Critics again point to the fact, as it is
understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called
for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these Instances , it Is accepted, did matters get at all
near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again. critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference
from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents Itself once more: that the
probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote . Precisely because any
nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many
steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that
because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild
hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History
anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear
revolution imposed an order-of-magn itude increaw In caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be
triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potennal
adversay)’. No such launch is known to have occurred In over sixty years. The probability of it is thcrcfore very low. But even if it did
happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to
consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 6—4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust
might be mistakenly precipitated In this way belongs to science fiction. one special form of miscalculation appeared sporadically
in the speculations of academic commentators, though it was scarcely ever to be encountered—at least so far as my own observation went—in the utterances of
practical planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneously triggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack
misreading either what sort of attack it was lwing subjected to, or where the attack came from. One special form of miscalculation appeared sporadically in the
speculations of academic commentators, though it was scarcely ever to be encountered—at least so far as my own observation went—in the utterances of practical
planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneously triggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack misreading
either what sort of attack It was being subjected to, or where the attack came from.The postulated misreading of the nature of the
attack referred in particular to the hypothesis that if a delivery system —normally a missile—that was known to
he capable of carrying either a nuclear or a conventional warhead was launched in a conventional role, the target
country might, on detecting the launch through its early. warning systems, misconstrue the mission as an imminent nuclear strike
and immediately unleash a nuclear counter-strike of its own. This conecture was voiced , for example, as a criticism of the pro- lls (or giving the US
Trident SL11M long associated with nuclear missions, a capability to deliver conventional warheads. Whatever the nwrit of those proposals (it Is
not explored here), It is hard to regard this particular apprehension as having any real-life credibility. The
flight time of a ballistic missile would not exceed about thirty minutes, and that of a cruise missile a
few hours, before arrival on target made its character—conventional or nuclear—unmistakable. No government
will need, and no non- lunatic government could wish, to take within so short a span of time a step as
enormous and irrevocable as the execution of a nuclear strike on the basis of early-warning
Information alone without knowing the true nature of the incoming attack. The speculation tends
moreover to be expressed without reference either to any realistic political or conflict-related context
thought to render the episode plausible, or to the manifest interest of the launching country, should
there be any risk of doubt, in ensuring—by explicit communication if necessary—that there was no misinterpretation of its
conventionally armed launch.
Governments will act with restraint – they won’t miscalculate in conflict

Walter Slocombe, Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 2009, De-Alerting: Diagnoses,
Prescriptions, and Side-Effects, http://www.ewi.info/system/files/Slocombe.pdf
Moreover, in recent years, both the US and Russia, as well as Britain and China, have modified their procedures
so that even if a nuclear-armed missile were launched, it would go not to a “real” target in another country but – at
least in the US case - to empty ocean. In addition to the basic advantage of insuring against a nuclear detonation in a populated area, the
fact that a missile launched in error would be on flight path that diverged from a plausible attacking trajectory
should be detectable by either the US or the Russian warning systems, reducing the possibility of the accident being
perceived as a deliberate attack. De-targeting, therefore, provides a significant protection against
technical error. These arrangements – PALs and their equivalents coupled with continued observance of the agreement made in
the mid-90s on “de-targeting” – do not eliminate the possibility of technical or operator-level failures, but they come very close to
providing absolute assurance that such errors cannot lead to a nuclear explosion or be interpreted as
the start of a deliberate nuclear attack.6 The advantage of such requirements for external information to activate weapons is of
course that the weapons remain available for authorized use but not susceptible of appropriation or mistaken use. The drawback from a
deterrence and operational point of view is, of course, that the system for transmitting the information must not be susceptible of interruption
– that is, there must be assurance that an authorized decision maker will be able to act and have the decision – and the accompanying
authenticated orders and unlock combinations – communicated to and received by the operators of the weapon systems. Accordingly, a system
of combination-locked safeties requires a highly survivable network for decision and communication with the operators. Otherwise there would
be pressures for early transmission of the codes, with their insertion subject to a later execute order or even more dangerous, pre-delegation of
authority to issue the execute orders. In this, as in other aspects of measures to meet the “never” requirement, a highly capable and highly
survivable command and control system is essential.
AT: China War

Interdependence checks China war
John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago, 4-8-2014, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204
Probably the most frequently heard argument that China’s rise can be peaceful is based on the theory of economic interdependence. This
perspective has two components. First is the claim that China’s
economy is inextricably bound to the economies of its
potential rivals, including Japan and the United States. This linkage means not only that China and its
trading partners depend on each other to keep prospering but also that prosperity in turn depends on
peaceful relations among them. A war involving them would have disastrous economic consequences
for all the belligerents. It would be tantamount to mutual assured destruction (MAD) at the economic
level.
No China war – deterrence checks

Joseph S. Nye, University Professor at Harvard University, former US assistant secretary of defense, and
former chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, 1-13-2014, “1914 Revisited?”
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joseph-s--nye-asks-whether-war-between-china-and-
the-us-is-as-inevitable-as-many-believe-world-war-i-to-have-been
Today’s world is different from the world of 1914 in several important ways. One is that nuclear weapons give
political leaders the equivalent of a crystal ball that shows what their world would look like after
escalation. Perhaps if the Emperor, the Kaiser, and the Czar had had a crystal ball showing their empires
destroyed and their thrones lost in 1918, they would have been more prudent in 1914. Certainly, the
crystal-ball effect had a strong influence on US and Soviet leaders during the Cuban missile crisis. It
would likely have a similar influence on US and Chinese leaders today.
AT: Iran War

No scenario for Iran war – their military is too weak
Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and
a Professor at Georgetown University, 1-20-2012, , “Iran is not an existential threat,”
http://thedailynewsegypt.com/global-views/iran-is-not-an-existential-threat.html
The danger of war is growing again over Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran is rattling its sabers, the Republican presidential candidates and others are rattling theirs. But
even if Iran gets the bomb, Israel will have overwhelming military superiority over Iran , a fact that should not be
lost in all the heated rhetoric. Former head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, says Iran won't get the bomb until at least 2015. In contrast, Israel has had nuclear weapons
since the late 1960s and has jealously guarded its monopoly on them in the region. Israel has used force in the past against developing nuclear threats. Iraq in 1981
and Syria in 2007 were the targets of highly effective Israeli air strikes against developing nuclear weapons programs. Israel has seriously considered conducting
such a strike against Iran and may well do so especially now that it has special bunker-busting bombs from the US. Estimates of the size of the Israeli arsenal by
international think tanks generally concur that Israel has about 100 nuclear weapons, possibly 200. Even under a crash program, Iran won't achieve an arsenal
that size for many years — perhaps decades. Israel also has multiple delivery systems. It has intermediate range ballistic missiles, the Jericho, that are
capable of reaching any target in Iran. Its fleet of F15 long-range strike aircraft can also deliver nuclear payloads. Some analysts have suggested
that it can also deliver nuclear weapons from its German-made Dolphin submarines using cruise missiles. Israel will also continue to have
conventional military superiority over Iran and the rest of the region. The Israel Defense Forces has a
demonstrated qualitative edge over all of its potential adversaries in the region, including Iran. The
Israeli air force has the capability to penetrate air defense systems with virtual impunity as it demonstrated in
2007 when it destroyed Syria's nascent nuclear capability. The IDF's intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities are vastly
superior to its potential rivals. The 2006 Lebanon war and the 2009 Gaza war demonstrated that there are limits to Israel's conventional
capabilities but those limits should not obscure the underlying reality of Israel's conventional military superiority over its enemies. Iran, on the other hand, has
never fully rebuilt its conventional military from the damage suffered in the Iran-Iraq war. It still relies
heavily for air and sea power on equipment purchased by the Shah 40 years ago, much of which is
antique today. Moreover, the June 2010 United Nations sanctions, UN Security Council resolution 1929, impose a very stringent arms ban on Iran .
Virtually all significant weapons systems — tanks, aircraft, naval vessels, missiles, etc — are banned from sale or transfer
to Iran. Training and technical assistance for such systems is also banned. In other words, even if Iran wants to try to improve its
conventional military capability in the next few years and has the money to do so, the UN arms ban will
make that close to impossible. Iran does not have the capability to produce state-of-the-art weapons on its own, despite its occasional claims of
self-sufficiency. It certainly cannot build a modern air force to compete with the IDF on its own. Finally, Israel will continue to enjoy the support of the world's only
superpower for the foreseeable future. Assistance from the United States includes roughly $3 billion in aid every year. That is the longest running financial
assistance program in American history, dating back to the 1973 war. It is never challenged or cut by Congress and permits Israeli planners to do multi-year planning
for defense acquisitions with great certitude about what they can afford to acquire. When Texas Governor Rick Perry suggested cutting aid to Israel to zero in one
Republican debate, his poll numbers plummeted. He backtracked fast. US assistance is also far more than just financial aid. The Pentagon and Israel engage in
constant exchanges of technical cooperation in virtually all elements of the modern battle field. Missile defense has been at the center of this exchange for over 20
years now. The United States and Israel also have a robust and dynamic intelligence relationship, which
helps ensure Israel's qualitative edge. Every American president from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama has been a supporter of maintaining
Israel's qualitative edge over its potential foes, including US allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Iran, in contrast, has no major power providing it
with financial help. Its arms relationships with Russia and China have been severed by Security Council Resolution 1929. Its only military ally is Syria, not
exactly a powerhouse. And Syria is now in the midst of a civil war; its army is dissolving. If President Bashar Al-Assad falls, Iran is the biggest loser in the "Arab
spring". Hezbollah will be the second largest loser. The deputy secretary general of Hezbollah and one of its founders, Sheikh Naim Qassem, wrote in 2007 that Syria
is "the cornerstone" of Hezbollah’s survival in the region. While Syria and Hezbollah have their differences, the relationship is a "necessity" for Hezbollah. So don't
let the hot air from Tehran or the Republican debates confuse the reality on the ground. Iran is a dangerous country but it is not an existential
threat to either Israel or America.
AT: Iran War

Iran isn’t a threat
Alireza Nader, Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, and James Dobbins, former U.S.
assistant Secretary of State and Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at
RAND, 1-5-2012, “Iran’s Self-Destructive Gamble”,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/06/opinion/irans-self-destructive-gamble.html?_r=1
In these circumstances, it is important to realistically judge the nature and extent of the Iranian threat. For
all its bluster, the Iranian
regime is more vulnerable than at any time in its 32-year history. Internally, Iran is constrained by deep political
divisions, civil strife and a woeful economy. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has directly challenged the country’s supreme
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while Khamenei has spoken of eliminating the presidency. The life of the ordinary Iranian becomes more
precarious every day, with rising unemployment, inflation, state repression, and the country’s growing international isolation. The regime has
maintained a superficial sense of stability through repression. Legislative elections are scheduled for early March. Leaders of the reformist
Green movement are threatening to boycott the ballot, but there will still be a closely fought contest between the more religious and secularist
wings of the regime. Both this election and the presidential vote next year could well become occasions for public demonstrations of the sort
that threatened the regime three years ago and have since toppled several Middle East governments. Iran is on the brink of losing
its only real ally, Syria, as President Bashir al-Assad looks as if he could be the next Arab dictator to fall. Tightening international
sanctions are slowing Iran’s nuclear program while limiting its ability to project power. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s
principal regional rival, is leading the other Gulf states in an ever more explicit anti-Iranian coalition. The
United States is strengthening its military and political ties with several of these states. Iran’s leaders have
watched U.S. forces topple Saddam Hussein and the Taliban with relative ease and NATO help do the same with Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in
Libya; Iran’s antiquated conventional forces are no match for the U.S. military. And the Iranian regime believes that
the United States remains committed to a policy of regime change, even though Washington might not presently have the appetite for a new
military intervention.
No Link
Increasing privacy prevents cyber attacks
Susan Landau, faculty member in the Worcester Polytechnic Institute Department of Social Science
and Policy Studies, where she works on cybersecurity, privacy, and public policy, 9-29- 2014, “Securing
Phones – and Securing US,” Lawfare, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/09/securing-phones-and-
securing-us/
How do you protect US assets? Cryptography is necessary. What do you protect? Every communications
and storage device people use: computers, laptops, tablets, iPads, telephones, cell phones, smart
phones. And you design the security system so that no unauthorized user can break in. That means no
hacker, not a different nation state — and not your own. Is the FBI upset? Of course. For a dozen years, law
enforcement has been in a golden age of easily tapped phones that revealed increasingly personal
information about users. Despite encryption, some of that information, such as users’ location and connection data, will remain
accessible to law enforcement (the phone companies will have it). Such transactional information is remarkably revealing to investigators: it
shows who is talking with whom, where the bad guys are, who they are with. Access to such information has enabled the US Marshals Service,
which tracks fugitives, to cut the average time to locate the criminals from forty-two days to two. And any information that’s backed up to the
cloud — emails, your searches, etc. — will be present at the cloud provider, still obtainable by law enforcement. Yes,
the decision to
secure the content of iPhones (cryptography without backdoors) and Androids (cryptography on by
default) will make investigations of low-level drug dealers and other criminals more complicated for law
enforcement, especially for those forces with fewer technical capabilities. There are solutions, including using vulnerabilities (under
warrant procedures), to tap phones. State and local law enforcement won’t have the technical expertise to do this, and the FBI will need to
share its skills. Terrorists are a different situation, of course. But the smart ones, like the most advanced criminal groups (think Zetas), have
been using strong security measures, including cryptography, for years. The NSA
has used various skillful means to listen in,
and it will continue to do so. The bottom line is the same as in 1996, when the National Academies
issued its report. We’re more secure with the wide use of strong cryptography — and that means
cryptography without back doors. The moves by Apple and Google are very positive steps for security;
arguing otherwise is taking a short-term view for our safety and security — to the peril of all.
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS DISADVANTAGE

RESPONSES
UQ
NU – Obama Won’t Act
Obama has zero power – even if he had some, he can’t wield it effectively
Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, 9-30-2013, “The Obama Conundrum,”
Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-engelhardt/obama-presidency_b_4016791.html
Among the curious spectacles of our moment, the strangeness of the Obama presidency hasn't gotten
its full due. After decades in which "the imperial presidency" was increasingly in the spotlight, after
two terms of George W. Bush in which a literal cult of executive power -- or to use the term of that
moment, "the unitary executive" -- took hold in the White House, and without any obvious diminution in
the literal powers of the presidency, Barack Obama has managed to look like a bystander at his own
funeral. If I had to summarize these years, I would say that he entered the phone booth dressed as
Superman and came out as Clark Kent. Today, in "The Mystery of Washington's Waning Global Power,"
Dilip Hiro points out that, as far as Obama's foreign (and war) policy, it's almost as if, when the
American president speaks, no one in the Greater Middle East -- not even our closest allies or client
states -- is listening. And true as it may be for that region, it seems, bizarrely enough, no less true in
Washington where the president's recent attempts to intervene in the Syrian civil war were rejected
both by Congress (though without a final vote on the subject) and by the American people via opinion
polls. It should be puzzling just how little power the present executive is actually capable of wielding.
He can go to the U.N. or Kansas City and make speeches (that themselves often enough implicitly cast
him as a kind of interested observer of his own presidency), but nothing much that he says in
Washington seems any longer to be seriously attended to. In the foreign policy arena, he is surrounded
by a secretary of defense who ducks for cover, a secretary of state who wanders the world blowing off
steam, and a national security advisor and U.N. ambassador who seem like blundering neophytes and
whose basic ideological stance (in favor of American -- aka "humanitarian" -- interventions globally) has
been rejected in this country by almost any constituency imaginable. Unlike previous presidents, he
evidently has no one -- no Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker, or even Henry Kissinger -- capable of working the
corridors of power skillfully or bringing a policy home. Domestically, who ever heard of a presidency
already into its second term that, according to just about all observers, has only one significant
achievement -- Obamacare (whatever you think of it) -- and clearly hasn't a hope in hell of getting a
second one? Just as he's done in Syria, Obama will now be watching relatively helplessly as
Republicans in Congress threaten to shut the government down and not raise the debt ceiling -- and
whatever happens, who expects him to be the key player in that onrushing spectacle? America's waning
power in the Greater Middle East is more than matched by Obama's waned power in this country. In
our lifetime, we've never seen a president -- not even the impeached Clinton -- so drained of power or
influence. It's a puzzle wrapped in an enigma swaddled by a pretzel. Go figure.
NU – AUMF Thumper
Obama is reigning in his own powers via the new AUMF

Peter Baker, White House correspondent for the NYT, 2-25-2015, “Assessing the Balance of Power in
an Era of Widespread Mistrust” NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/us/a-back-and-forth-view-
of-the-presidents-executive-power.html
These clashes are flaring even as Mr. Obama seeks to enact limits on the president’s war powers in a
way that few, if any, of his predecessors have sought to do. He has already been launching airstrikes
against the Islamic State for six months, citing existing authorizations of force passed under Mr. Bush,
but Mr. Obama agreed with critics that Congress should have a role. The draft measure he sent to
Capitol Hill would authorize what he has already been doing in Iraq and Syria while repealing one of
those existing authorizations, the one passed in 2002 that paved the way for the invasion of Iraq. But
Mr. Obama’s proposal would ostensibly bar him and the next president from launching “enduring
offensive ground combat operations” against the Islamic State and would expire in three years, requiring
his successor to go back to Congress if he or she determined that operations were still necessary.
NU – Syria Thumper
Syria outweighs the link

David Rothkopf, CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy, 8-3-2013, “The Gamble,”
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/31/the_gamble?page=full
Obama has reversed decades of precedent regarding the nature of presidential war powers -and
whether you prefer this change in the balance of power or not, as a matter of quantifiable fact he is
transferring greater responsibility for U.S. foreign policy to a Congress that is more divided, more
incapable of reasoned debate or action, and more dysfunctional than any in modern American history.
Just wait for the Rand Paul filibuster or similar congressional gamesmanship. The president's own action
in Libya was undertaken without such approval. So, too, was his expansion of America's drone and cyber
programs. Will future offensive actions require Congress to weigh in? How will Congress react if the
president tries to pick and choose when this precedent should be applied? At best, the door is open to
further acrimony. At worst, the paralysis of the U.S. Congress that has given us the current budget crisis
and almost no meaningful recent legislation will soon be coming to a foreign policy decision near you.
Consider that John Boehner was instantly more clear about setting the timing for any potential action
against Syria with his statement that Congress will not reconvene before its scheduled September 9
return to Washington than anyone in the administration has been thus far. Perhaps more importantly,
what will future Congresses expect of future presidents? If Obama abides by this new approach for the
next three years, will his successors lack the ability to act quickly and on their own? While past
presidents have no doubt abused their War Powers authority to take action and ask for congressional
approval within 60 days, we live in a volatile world; sometimes security requires swift action. The
president still legally has that right, but Obama's decision may have done more -for better or worse -to
dial back the imperial presidency than anything his predecessors or Congress have done for decades. 5.
America's international standing will likely suffer. As a consequence of all of the above, even if the
president "wins" and persuades Congress to support his extremely limited action in Syria, the perception
of America as a nimble, forceful actor on the world stage and that its president is a man whose word
carries great weight is likely to be diminished. Again, like the shift or hate it, foreign leaders can do the
math. Not only is post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan America less inclined to get involved anywhere, but when
it comes to the use of U.S. military force (our one indisputable source of superpower strength) we just
became a whole lot less likely to act or, in any event, act quickly. Again, good or bad, that is a stance that
is likely to figure into the calculus of those who once feared provoking the United States. A final
consequence of this is that it seems ever more certain that Obama's foreign policy will be framed as so
anti-interventionist and focused on disengagement from world affairs that it will have major political
consequences in 2016. The dialectic has swung from the interventionism of Bush to the leaning away of
Obama. Now, the question will be whether a centrist synthesis will emerge that restores the idea that
the United States can have a muscular foreign policy that remains prudent, capable of action, and
respects international laws and norms. Almost certainly, that is what President Obama would argue he
seeks. But I suspect that others, including possibly his former secretary of state may well seek to define
a different approach. Indeed, we may well see the divisions within the Democratic Party on national
security emerge as key fault lines in the Clinton vs. Biden primary battles of 2016. And just imagine
Clinton vs. Rand Paul in the general election.
NU – Congressional Restrictions
Congressional backlash is inevitable – weakens the executive

Tobias Gibson, Department of Political Science, Westminster College, August 2012, “Power and
Constraint: The Accountable Presidency after 9-11,” http://www.lpbr.net/2012/08/power-and-
constraint-accountable.html
This pattern failed in the wake of the World War II and the ride of the Cold War. Truman was the first
president to send troops abroad, and to claim that Congress did not have the power to stop him from
doing so. Presidents from Truman to Nixon led to the rise of what would become known as the “imperial
Presidency,” acting nearly unfettered until backlash from Nixon’s Watergate scandal and questionable
actions during the Vietnam War led Congress to again rise to the challenge of impeding the
centralization and augmentation of presidential power. As Goldsmith notes, these actions, including the
War Powers Resolution and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ( among several others), which
seemed to work in the short term were then seemingly discarded during military actions in several
locations. The popular consensus was that the reforms had failed. Instead, according to Goldsmith, these
congressional actions laid the groundwork for a formidable backlash to the presidency in the wake of
9/11 and unilateral actions. Vice President Dick Cheney famously stated that the presidency had been
weakened in the decades between the Nixon and Bush (II) presidencies, and Goldsmith readily agrees.
Indeed, he argues, when Bush tried to take several actions that previous commanders in chief had
taken, including surveillance, detention and interrogation, he was “hemmed in by legal restrictions in
the decades before 9/11” (p.37). The reaction by Congress and the courts has continued into the Obama
administration, in part because the new president continued several policies implemented under Bush.
As but one example of the fettered president, despite a long history of presidents transferring detained
enemies around the world, including to the United States mainland, Congress reacted forcefully to
prevent the transfer of Gitmo detainees to prisons in the United States (see Johnson, Gibbons and
Gibson, 2010).
NU – Court Restrictions
Courts have placed huge restrictions on presidential authority

Ilya Somin, Law Professor at George Mason University, 7-23-2013, “Supreme Court Shutouts Reveal
Reckless Decisions,” http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/07/22/supreme-court-losses-
column/2576625/
When a president pursues policies that require such expansive federal power that he can't get a single
justice to agree, something is probably amiss. Such overreach, though, has become a part of our political
culture. Administrations of both parties are often unwilling to accept constitutional limits on their
authority. In Horne v. Department of Agriculture, a decision issued in June, the justices unanimously
rejected the Obama administration's argument that raisin farmers did not have the right to go to court
to contest the seizure of hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of raisins. The Fifth Amendment states
that the government must pay "just compensation" whenever the government takes private property
for "public use." But the administration claimed that farmers could not even raise the takings issue in
court without first enduring lengthy delays and paying a $483,000 fine. Horne was the administration's
third unanimous defeat in a property rights case in 18 months. In Sackett v. Environmental Protection
Agency, it claimed that a couple had no right to go to court to seek compensation after the EPA blocked
construction of their "dream house." In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, it
unsuccessfully argued that the Fifth Amendment doesn't require compensation when the federal
government repeatedly and deliberately floods property owners' land. Even liberal justices normally
skeptical of property rights claims, including one of President Obama's appointees, found these
arguments too much to swallow. The Obama administration has also suffered unanimous defeats in
several other important cases. Last year, the justices rejected the administration's position that the
religious freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment does not apply to churches' decisons to hire and
fire employees with religious duties, such as teaching theology. Obama appointee Justice Elena Kagan
called the administration's position "amazing." In United States v. Jones, another 2012 case, the justices
unanimously rejected the administration's claim that the Fourth Amendment does not restrict the
government's authority to attach a GPS tracking device to a car. War on terror Obama isn't the first
president to promote dubious theories of federal power. George W. Bush's administration, among
others, did so as well. All but one Supreme Court justice rejected its claims of nearly unlimited authority
to detain U.S. citizens determined to be "combatants" in the war on terror.
Links
No Spillover
No spillover to other forms of executive power

Charlie Savage, writer at the New York Times, 9-8-2013, “Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian
Conflict” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-of-power-in-
syrian-conflict.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Steven G. Bradbury, a head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush administration, said it would be
“politically difficult” to order strikes if Congress refused to approve them. But he predicted future
presidents would not feel legally constrained to echo Mr. Obama’s request. “Every overseas situation,
every set of exigent circumstances, is a little different, so I don’t really buy that it’s going to tie future
presidents’ hands very much,” he said.
No Link – Congress
Congressional regulations don’t restrict presidential command

Jennifer Elsea et. al., legislative attorney, 2-19-2013, “Congressional Authority to Limit Military
Operations, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/206121.pdf
In sum, it seems that under the constitutional allocation of powers Congress has the prerogative of
placing a legally binding condition on the use of appropriations to regulate or end the deployment of
U.S. Armed Forces. Such a prohibition seems directly related to the allocation of resources at the
President’s disposal, and would therefore not appear to interfere impermissibly with the President’s
ability to exercise command and control over the U.S. Armed Forces. Although not beyond question,
such a prohibition would arguably survive challenge as an incident both of Congress’s war power and of
its power over appropriations.
Link Turn + No Spillover – Congress
The plan locks in presidential power – prevents Congress or the courts from
undermining the president
Robert Chesney et al, Professor at the University of Texas School of Law, nonresident senior fellow at
the Brookings Institution, distinguished scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security
and Law, and cofounder of Lawfare, (Other authors – Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law
at Harvard Law School, member of the Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security
and Law, former assistant attorney general of the Office of Legal Counsel, Matthew C. Waxman,
Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
member of the Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, and formerly
served in senior positions at the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council,
and Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, member of the
Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, and editor-in-chief of
Lawfare), 2013, “A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats,”
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-Generation-
Terrorist-Threats.pdf
Second, presidential action based on statutory authority has more political and legal legitimacy than
action based on Article II alone. Article II actions leave the president without overt political support of
Congress, which can later snipe at his decisions, or take actions to undermine them. We saw this
happen, for example, in response to many of the Bush administration’s unilateral assertions of
authority, and also to some degree in response to President Obama’s unilateral assertion of authority in
Libya. This is a problem that grows with reliance on Article II over time. Also, of course, any subsequent
judicial review of the president’s use of force is more likely to be upheld if supported by Congress.
No spillover – plan reinforces pres power and prevents future reductions

Robert Chesney et al, Professor at the University of Texas School of Law, nonresident senior fellow at
the Brookings Institution, distinguished scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security
and Law, and cofounder of Lawfare, (Other authors – Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law
at Harvard Law School, member of the Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security
and Law, former assistant attorney general of the Office of Legal Counsel, Matthew C. Waxman,
Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
member of the Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, and formerly
served in senior positions at the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council,
and Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, member of the
Hoover Institution’s Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, and editor-in-chief of
Lawfare), 2013, “A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats,”
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-Generation-
Terrorist-Threats.pdf
While we believe there will be a need for a new AUMF, and while we discuss options for such a new
statute in Parts II and III, we first pause to note the general downsides of a new AUMF. As the discussion
of inherent presidential power implies, a new statutory framework for presidential uses of force against
newly developing terrorist threats might diminish presidential flexibility and discretion at the margins.
At the same time, of course, it enhances the legitimacy of presidential action in domestic courts and
with domestic public opinion. This constraint-legitimacy tradeoff is commonplace. And to the extent that
the constraint achieves legitimacy it promotes sustainable counterterrorism policy, politically and
legally, over the long term. A strong statutory basis makes it less likely that Congress or courts will
intervene later with constraints that dangerously hamper the president’s agility to respond to threats.
Link Turn + No Spillover – Courts
Judicial review actually supports presidential powers – legal clarity

Rick Pildes, law professor at NYU, 8-5-2013, “Does Judicial Review of National-Security Policies
Constrain or Enable the Government?” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/does-judicial-review-of-
national-security-policies-constrain-or-enable-the-government/
But two very significant benefits to government policy in this area can also result from judicial review.
Over the many years since 9/11, I have come to wonder more whether our system calibrates these
potential benefits and costs well. First, government actors have a need for legal clarity, particularly in
national-security areas where the legal questions are novel and the stakes of guessing wrong particularly
high. In the absence of more definitive court guidance, government lawyers and policymakers have
spent a staggering number of hours trying to anticipate what courts might conclude is the valid scope of
the government’s power to detain, or to use military trials, and similar questions. In many contexts, a
significant element in what government actors need is simply legal clarity; knowledge of where the lines
lie between the permitted and the forbidden can help government actors figure out how best to reach
their legitimate goals. Surely there is something not fully functional about a system that requires a
decade’s worth of guesswork, and all the resources involved, about exactly where the legal boundaries
lie. Second, judicial decisions do not just call a halt to government action, they also legitimate it. A
definitive legal ruling that some controversial program is lawful can diminish (even if not eliminate)
some of the power of the charge of illegality Those resistant to judicial review, including the
government, can too easily lose sight of this power of courts to legitimate government action. Many of
us on Lawfare have argued for years that government needs to embrace more transparency to help
explain and legitimate its national-security policies. Judicial review can be seen as part of that
transparency effort. By way of contrast, the Supreme Court of Israel has eliminated virtually all
procedural obstacles to judicial review, including of national-security issues — to an extent that would
be shocking to those familiar only with American judicial practice. But one of the benefits is that the
Israeli Court has issued the most important judicial decision in the world on the lawful parameters of
targeted killings, and the Israeli government now has clarity about the lawful scope of any such actions.
None of these comments is designed to make a starry-eyed, overly idealist case for judicial review.
Courts can, indeed, make mistakes. Judicial review must not compromise legitimate national-security
needs, such as protecting confidential sources and methods, as well as not compromising necessarily
covert programs. And some of the constraints on American judicial review are deeply rooted in
constitutional law and history, while others are more matters of prudential limits. But I want to call more
attention to that the American practice of narrow, “case and controversy” judicial review is an outlier
among courts in many other major democracies. And there are some significant costs — from the
perspective of the government itself, not just those who seek to challenge government action in the
courts — to a structure of judicial review that still leaves us, more than a decade after 9/11, with so little
legal guidance from courts on so many novel, essential, and continuing issues at the center of counter-
terrorism law.
No Link – Personality
Presidential authority comes from personal qualities, not formal powers

Terry Moe, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution, and William Howell, graduate student in political science at Stanford University, December
1999, “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory”
http://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2088.7/Kitrosser/fn059.moe.howell.unilateral
%20action.pdf
What are the foundations of presidential power? Almost forty years ago, Richard Neustadt (1960)
offered an answer that transformed the study of the American presidency. Neustadt observed that
presidents have very little formal power, far less than necessary to meet the enormous expectations
heaped on them during the modern era. The key to strong presidential leadership, he argued, lies not in
formal power, but in the skills, temperament, and experience of the man occupying the office and in his
ability to put these personal qualities to use in enhancing his own reputation and prestige. The
foundation of presidential power is ultimately personal.
MPX
AT: Cred – No MPX
No impact – cred isn’t key to anything

Nuno Monteiro, assistant professor of political science at Yale University, 12-29-2011, “Why we
(keep) fighting,” Foreign Policy,
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/29/why_we_keep_fighting
Both these views are wrong. The war in Afghanistan does not prevent the United States from badly
damaging any non-nuclear state that defies it while suffering relatively little itself. And the U.S.'s new
enemies are no less rational than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming "we will
bury you" Khrushchev and his hundreds of intercontinental nuclear missiles, why is the United States
unable to stop North Korea and its handful of rudimentary warheads -- not to mention Iran, which has
none? Because threats are not the problem. Backed by the mightiest military in history, U.S. threats are
eminently credible. In fact, the absence of another great power capable of deterring Washington gives
the U.S. a free hand abroad. As Saddam's foreign minister Tariq Aziz lamented after Iraq's humiliating
defeat in the Gulf War, "We don't have a patron anymore. If we still had the Soviets as our patron,none
of this would have happened." The problem lies elsewhere. During the Cold War, mutually assured
destruction kept the peace. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack, which would ultimately lead to
the U.S.'s own destruction, was unthinkable. But now that the Soviet Union is gone, America's enemies
feel vulnerable even if they comply with Washington's demands. They know that the United States has
the wherewithal to take them down if it so decides, so they are unlikely to accept any U.S. demands (to
abandon a nuclear program, for example) that would leave them in a position of even greater weakness.
This is what explains U.S. involvement in so many "hot" wars since the Cold War ended. As the world's
sole superpower, the United States is often seen as an aggressive behemoth. To make its threats
effective, we are told, it must restrain itself through a less aggressive military posture, a commitment to
multilateral action, or even a pledge to eschew regime change. But even if it does all this, as long as U.S.
power remains unmatched, Washington will continue to face difficulties having its way without resorting
to war. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.
Zero impact to cred – best polisci

Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College and
Coordinator of War and Peace Studies at Dartmouth’s John Sloan Dickey Center for International
Understanding, and Jennifer Lind, Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth
College, 5-6-2013, “Red Lines and Red Herrings”
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/06/red_lines_and_red_herrings
The problem is that there's little evidence that supports the view that countries' record for keeping
commitments determines their credibility. Jonathan Mercer, in his book Reputation and International
Politics, examined a series of crises leading up to World War I and found that backing down did not
cause one's adversaries to discount one's credibility. In another book, Daryl Press examined a series of
Cold War crises between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. From 1958 to 1961, Nikita Khrushchev repeatedly
threatened to cut off NATO's access to West Berlin. Each time, the deadlines passed and Khrushchev
failed to carry out his threats. If backing down damages credibility, Khrushchev's credibility should have
been plummeting, but the deliberations of American and British leaders show that his credibility steadily
grew throughout this period. And a year after the 1961 Berlin confrontation, when the same American
decision-makers confronted Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis, they took his threats very
seriously. Senior U.S. leaders were convinced that Khrushchev would respond to any forceful U.S. act
against Cuba with an immediate Soviet attack against Berlin. Four years of backing down had not
damaged Soviet credibility in the least. Documents from American and British archives reveal that when
NATO leaders tried to assess the credibility of Soviet threats, they didn't focus on the past. Instead, they
looked at Khrushchev's current threat and the current circumstances and asked themselves two simple
questions. Can he do it? And would it serve his interests? In the eyes of the Macmillan, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy governments, Soviet credibility was growing -- despite Khrushchev's bluster -- simply because
Soviet power was expanding. Power and interests in the here-and-now determine credibility, not what
one did in different circumstances in the past. Even the canonical case for reputational arguments --
Hitler's dismissal of French and British threats in 1939 -- shows that credibility stems from power and
interests. When Hitler told his generals why the British and French would not oppose him when he
invaded Poland, he listed seven reasons, every one of which was about the balance of power. The
"worms" quote was a throwaway line after a detailed analysis of the balance of military power and
Poland's indefensibility.
Cred doesn’t exist – issues are compartmentalized which means the aff doesn’t spill
over to all credibility
Ganesh Sitaraman, Assistant Professor of Law at the Vanderbilt Law School, January 2014, “Credibility
and War Powers,” http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/127/january14/forum_1024.php
In the context of military threats and the use of force, credibility arguments suffer from some
important limitations. First, because both past actions and reputation are based on audience
interpretations, a country can have multiple reputations and a single action can create different
reputations among different audiences.17 To some, following through on a threat demonstrates resolve;
to others, foolishness. Second, action in one context might not migrate into reputation in another.18 If
the United States sets a “red line” on a fishing issue for Micronesia and then backs down, it is unlikely to
send a signal to Iran that all American “red lines” are bluffs. The Iranians may ignore the Micronesian
case because it is fundamentally different from their own.
AT: Cred – AT: Heg – No MPX
No impact to heg
Christopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, former Professor of History
at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, 8-3-2010, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for
What Purpose?” http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/
Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s
indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from
the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds
with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the
international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the
costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most.
Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet
Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight
Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and
Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between
nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United
States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to
play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions.
US power is sustainable – no challengers

Noah Berlatsky, writer at the Atlantic, 6-17-2014, “The Moral Argument for American Restraint – in
Iraq and Beyond,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/the-moral-argument-for-
restraintin-iraq-and-around-the-world/372933/
Barry Posen, a professor of political science at MIT and a foreign-policy realist, advocates a different
approach. The title of his new book, Restraint, succinctly expresses his policy recommendation. The U.S.,
he argues, needs to stop trying to do more and more. Instead, it needs to do less. Or, as he puts it,
"Efforts to defend everything leave one defending not much of anything." Posen rests his discussion on
two basic arguments. The first is that the United States is, by any reasonable metric, an incredibly secure
nation. It is geographically isolated from other great powers—a position that makes invading or even
attacking the U.S. mainland prohibitively difficult. U.S. conventional forces are by far the most powerful
in the world. Posen notes that the U.S. "accounted for a little more than a third of all the military
spending in the world during the 1990s," and has increased the percentage to about 41 percent of all
military spending in the world today. On top of that, the U.S. has a massive nuclear deterrent. It is
simply not credible to argue that Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Pakistan, or even Russia or China have the
combination of dangerous capabilities and malign intentions to pose a serious existential threat to the
United States in anything but the most paranoid neocon fantasies.
AT: Cred – AT: Arctic War – No MPX
No Arctic war – economic interest trumps

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 11-28-2012, “Russia in the Arctic: Economic Interests
Trump Military Ambitions”
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/11/28/russia_in_the_arctic_economic_interests_trump_
military_ambitions_100373-2.html
Despite the signs of heightened military activity in the region, the greatest stabilising factor in the region
is mutual economic interest, and the points of friction around border delimitation and military activity
are unlikely to override this. Russia, in particular, is eager to open up the Northern Sea Route for trade
purposes, as it perceives great potential for commerce along its otherwise remote northern coast and
the possibility of imposing transit fees for shipping through the route. Russia's relations with NATO and
the US will have a major impact on levels of cooperation or mistrust in the Arctic. Rebuilding its decaying
infrastructure and managing the Northern Sea Route that can connect Europe and Asia will advance
Russia's strategic goals in the region more effectively than an unnecessary military build-up.
No Arctic war – regional disputes won’t escalate – their authors are sensationalists
David Axe, American military correspondent, 1-11-2011, “How the U.S. Wins the Coming Arctic War”
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/how-the-u-s-wins-the-coming-arctic-war/
And besides, an Arctic war is highly unlikely, at best. “Militarized conflict over the Arctic is unlikely, and
regional disputes are unlikely to cause an overall deterioration in relations between or among polar
nations,” the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded in a 2009 conference. “Security
issues should not be sensationalized in order to attract attention towards the Arctic.”
AT: Cred – Sequester Thumps
Sequester decimates warfighting capabilities and cred

Gordon Lubold, national security reporter at Foreign Policy, 1-16-2014, “America's Emaciated Army,”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/16/the_us_military_is_slated_to_shed_150000_soldier
s_can_it_still_go_to_war_with_so
The U.S. Army, already reeling from the beginning of a round of cuts that will drop from its peak of
570,000 to about 490,000, was just told that those cuts don't begin to cut it. Now the Army has begun
planning to plan to shrink even more: to a force of about 420,000. The writing was on the wall. With Iraq
now a distant memory and Afghanistan winding down by the end of the year, the Army had expected to
drop in size. But to some, this means "cutting into bone," as one officer observed, and that raises a
question about what a smaller Army can do -- and what it can't. The Army leadership have framed
almost any cuts to end strength as draconian. Speaking before a December budget deal that softens
some of the blow, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno attempted to make the case that a smaller Army
couldn't do what it was supposed to do. "If Congress does not act to mitigate the magnitude, method
and speed of the reductions under the Budget Control Act with sequestration, the Army will be forced to
make significant reductions in force structure and end strength, adding: "Such reductions will not allow
us to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and will make it very difficult to conduct even one
sustained major combat operation."
AT: Cred – Shutdown Thumps
US credibility is terminally shot – shutdown

Joel Brinkley, the Hearst professional in residence at Stanford University and a Pulitzer Prize-winning
former correspondent, 10-11-2013, “Shutdown eroding U.S. credibility, status abroad,”
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/brinkley/article/Shutdown-eroding-U-S-credibility-status-abroad-
4888940.php
The shutdown is damaging America's foreign policy in ways that might not be recoverable. The effects
are not as immediately apparent today as, say, the closure of the Lincoln Memorial or the Head Start
program hiatus. But how is the United States going to remain an important player in the world as
foreigners observe that we can't even manage our own country? Just one important example: For years
now, this country has been trying to ramp up the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an exclusive trading group
that partners Asian economies with the United States. China is deliberately excluded. Many states find
the idea appealing. While I was in Taiwan in August, President Ma Ying-jeou told me and others that his
country was working hard to build up its economy specifically so Taiwan could qualify for the
partnership. China started its own exclusive trade group that deliberately excludes the United States: the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Well, President Obama had planned to use last week's
trip to a couple of Asian summit meetings to persuade undecided Asian countries to join the Trans-
Pacific Partnership. But he canceled the trip because of the government shutdown. That brought
immediate repercussions. As K. Shanmugam, Singapore's foreign minister, put it in a local TV interview:
If the shutdown prevents Obama from coming to Asia, "then, of course, the U.S. leadership in the rest of
the world, including Asia, will be questioned," adding that "the longer-term consequences" of the
shutdown "for the rest of the world can be pretty serious as well." Or, as Secretary of State John Kerry
put it while subbing for Obama in Asia, Americans should worry about "the message that we send to the
world when we can't get our own act together." While Obama remained in Washington trying to resolve
the budget deadlock with right-wing Republicans, China's president, Xi Jinping, was gallivanting through
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Bali and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
meeting in Brunei, slapping backs, giving speeches - striving to recruit members for China's trade group.
How effective Xi's efforts will be in the long term cannot be predicted. But this was the third time
Obama skipped planned meetings in Asia because of problems at home, lapses that certainly have not
gone unnoticed in that part of the world. "How can the United States be a reliable partner when
President Obama can't get his own house in order?" Richard Heydarian, a foreign-policy adviser to the
Philippine congress, told the New York Times. "It makes people wonder: Is the United States really in a
position to come to our aid in the event of a military conflict?" The Asian controversies are not just
about competing trade pacts, though their importance cannot be understated. After all, Asian
economies account for nearly half of the world's gross domestic product. At the same time, though,
China's assertion that it controls virtually all of the South and East China seas is causing extreme
tensions that seem to be leaving the region perpetually on the brink of war. That festering conflict has
been one impetus behind Obama's purported "pivot" to Asia. But now, many Asian nations see that as
more rhetoric than anything else.
AT: Econ – No MPX
Econ decline doesn’t cause war

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked”
http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations/irony-global-economic-governance-system-worked/
p29101
The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder
conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial
crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.19 Whether through
greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict,
there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict.
Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the
Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests
otherwise, however. A fundamental conclusion from a recent report by the Institute for Economics and
Peace is that “the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”20
Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis—as have military
expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not
triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the
Cold War has not been reversed.21
The global economy is resilient – institutions increase coordination to prevent collapse

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked”
http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations/irony-global-economic-governance-system-worked/
p29101
It is equally possible, however, that a renewed crisis would trigger a renewed surge in policy
coordination. As scholar G. John Ikenberry has observed, “the complex interdependence that is
unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates some expanding realms of exchange and
investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups and other sorts of political
stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system.”75 The post-2008
economic order has remained open, entrenching these interests even more across the globe. Despite
uncertain times, the open economic system that has been in operation since 1945 does not appear to be
closing anytime soon.
AT: Terror – No MPX
No WMD terrorism
Rachel Oswald, writer at Global Security Newswire, 4-17-2013, “Despite WMD Fears, Terrorists Still
Focused on Conventional Attacks” http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/despite-wmd-fears-terrorists-still-
focused-conventional-attacks/
Organized group plots against the U.S. homeland since Sept. 11, 2001 have all involved conventional
means of attack. Beyond that have been a handful of instances in which individuals used the postal
system to deliver disease materials -- notably this week’s ricin letters to President Obama and at least
one senator and the 2001 anthrax mailings. Terrorism experts offer a range of reasons for why al-Qaida
or other violent militants have never met their goal of carrying out a biological, chemical, nuclear or
radiological attack on the United States or another nation. These include: -- substantive efforts by the
United States and partner nations to secure the most lethal WMD materials; -- improved border security
and visa checks that deny entry to possible foreign-born terrorists; -- a lack of imagination and drive on
the part of would-be terrorists to pursue the kind of novel but technically difficult attacks that could lead
to widespread dispersal of unconventional materials; -- a general haplessness on the part of the native-
born U.S. extremists who have pursued WMD attacks, specifically involving weaponized pathogens; --
elimination of most of al-Qaida’s original leadership, notably those members with the most experience
orchestrating large-scale attacks abroad; and -- the Arab Spring uprisings have likely drawn down the
pool of terrorists with the proper training and focus to organize WMD attacks abroad as they have opted
instead to join movements to overthrow governments in places such as Syria and Yemen. “We killed a
lot of people. That was one thing,” said Randall Larsen, founding director of the Bipartisan WMD
Terrorism Research Center, referring to the deaths in recent years of al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden
and any number of his direct or philosophical adherents.
Reject faulty reasoning that justifies using war powers to fight terrorism – no threat
Rosa Brooks, Law Professor at Georgetown University, Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America
Foundation, former counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary for policy, and former senior advisor
at the U.S. State Department, 3-14-2013, “Mission Creep in the War on Terror,”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/14/mission_creep_in_the_war_on_terror
But this begs the essential question: Why exactly is the United States chasing after every two-bit
Islamic terrorist on the planet? With the sole exception of 2001, terrorist groups worldwide have never
managed to kill more than a handful of Americans citizens in any given year. According to the State
Department, 17 American citizens were killed by terrorists in 2011, for instance. The terrorist death toll
was 15 in 2010, and nine in 2009. These deaths are tragedies -- but keep the numbers in perspective. On
average, about 55 Americans are killed by lightning strikes each year, and ordinary criminal homicide
claims about 16,000 U.S. victims each year. No one, however, believes we need to give the executive
branch extraordinary legal authorities to keep Americans from venturing out in storms, or to use armed
drones to kill homicide suspects.
No MPX + MPX Turn – Unilaterial Wars
No impact to presidential powers – an unrestrained executive creates wars to justify

power
Gene Healy, vice president at the Cato Institute and author of the Cult of the Presidency, 6- 2011,
“Book Review: Hail to the Tyrant,” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/book-review-hail-
tyrant
Fair enough in the abstract — but Posner and Vermuele fail to provide a single compelling example that
might lead you to lament our allegedly atavistic “tyrannophobia.” And they seem oblivious to the fact
that those same irrational biases drive the perceived need for emergency government at least as much
as they do hostility towards it. Highly visible public events like the 9/11 attacks also instill dread and a
perceived loss of control, even if all the available evidence shows that such incidents are vanishingly
rare. The most recent year for which the U.S. State Department has data, 2009, saw just 25 U.S.
noncombatants worldwide die from terrorist strikes. I know of no evidence suggesting that unchecked
executive power is what stood between us and a much larger death toll. Posner and Vermuele argue
that only the executive unbound can address modernity’s myriad crises. But they spend little time
exploring whether unconstrained power generates the very emergencies that the executive branch uses
to justify its lack of constraint. Discussing George H.W. Bush’s difficulties convincing Congress and the
public that the 1991 Gulf War’s risks were worth it, they comment, “in retrospect it might seem that he
was clearly right.” Had that war been avoided, though, there would have been no mass presence of U.S.
troops on Saudi soil — “Osama bin Laden’s principal recruiting device,” according to Paul Wolfowitz —
and perhaps no 9/11. Posner and Vermuele are slightly more perceptive when it comes to the home
front, letting drop as an aside the observation that because of the easy-money policy that helped inflate
the housing bubble, “the Fed is at least partly responsible for both the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and
for its resolution.” Oh, well — I guess we’re even, then. Sometimes, the authors are so enamored with
the elegant economic models they construct that they can’t be bothered to check their work against
observable reality. At one point, attempting to show that separation of powers is inefficient, they
analogize the Madisonian scheme to “a market in which two firms must act in order to supply a good,”
concluding that “the extra transaction costs of cooperation” make “the consumer (taxpayer) no better
off and probably worse off than she would be under the unitary system.” But the government-as-firm
metaphor is daffy. In the Madisonian vision, inefficiency isn’t a bug, it’s a feature — a check on “the
facility and excess of law-making … the diseases to which our governments are most liable,” per
Federalist No. 62. If the “firm” in question also generates public “bads” like unnecessary federal
programs and destructive foreign wars — and if the “consumer (taxpayer)” has no choice about whether
to “consume” them — he might well favor constraints on production. From Franklin Roosevelt onward,
we’ve had something close to vertical integration under presidential command. Whatever benefits that
system has brought, it’s imposed considerable costs — not least over 100,000 U.S. combat deaths in the
resulting presidential wars. That system has also encouraged hubristic occupants of the Oval Office to
burnish their legacies by engaging in “humanitarian war” — an “oxymoron,” according to Posner. In a
sharply argued 2006 Washington Post op-ed, he noted that the Iraq War had killed tens of thousands of
innocents and observed archly, “polls do not reveal the opinions of dead Iraqis.”
MPX Turn – Unilateral Wars
Flexibility causes misguided wars

Martin Indyk, vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program, 6-20-2013, “The Road to War:
Presidential Commitments and Congressional Responsibility” Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/06/20-war-presidential-power
Ever since WWII, Kalb said that “history has led us into conflicts that we don’t understand” because
presidents do not seek approval from Congress for declarations of war. The country has reached a point
now where “presidential power is so great, words out of his mouth become policy for the United
States.” Kalb used the Syrian civil war and President Obama’s “red line” policy as an example of how a
president’s words become strategy for the United States. Kalb argued that this presidential “flexibility”
in foreign policy decision-making has repeatedly led the country into one misguided war to the next
such as the Vietnam and Iraq wars. To nullify these poor decisions, Kalb believes that formal
congressional declarations of war will help “trigger the appreciation for the gravity of war” and assist in
“unifying the nation” behind a strategic military intervention, resulting in more positive outcomes for
the United States.
TERRORISM DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES
No Link – Surveillance Not Key

Surveillance irrelevant – US lacks intelligence capabilities to understand information.
Peter Bergen, director of the National Security Program at the New America Foundation, David
Sterman, research assistant, Emily Schneider, research assistants and Bailey Cahall, research
associate, January 2014, “Do NSA's Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?”
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Bergen_NAF_NSA
%20Surveillance_1_0.pdf (accessed 4/24/15)
Finally, the overall problem for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that they need vaster amounts of
information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they don’t sufficiently understand or widely
share the information they already possess that was derived from conventional law enforcement and
intelligence techniques. This was true for two of the 9/11 hijackers who were known to be in the United States before
the attacks on New York and Washington, as well as with the case of Chicago resident David Coleman Headley, who
helped plan the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, and it is the unfortunate pattern we have also seen in
several other significant terrorism cases.
We already have too much data – surveillance is irrelevant.

Mattathias Schwartz, staff writer, January 26, 2015, The New Yorker,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack (accessed 4/26/2015)
Almost every major terrorist attack on Western soil in the past fifteen years has been committed by
people who were already known to law enforcement. One of the gunmen in the attack on Charlie Hebdo,
in Paris, had been sent to prison for recruiting jihadist fighters. The other had reportedly studied in Yemen with Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber, who was arrested and interrogated by the F.B.I. in 2009. The leader of the 7/7 London suicide
bombings, in 2005, had been observed by British intelligence meeting with a suspected terrorist, though MI5 later said that the bombers were
“not on our radar.” The
men who planned the Mumbai attacks, in 2008, were under electronic surveillance by
the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, and one had been an informant for the Drug
Enforcement Administration. One of the brothers accused of bombing the Boston Marathon was the
subject of an F.B.I. threat assessment and a warning from Russian intelligence. In each of these cases,
the authorities were not wanting for data. What they failed to do was appreciate the significance of the
data they already had. Nevertheless, since 9/11, the National Security Agency has sought to acquire
every possible scrap of digital information—what General Keith Alexander, the agency’s former head, has
called “the whole haystack.” The size of the haystack was revealed in June, 2013, by Edward Snowden. The N.S.A. vacuums up
Internet searches, social-media content, and, most controversially, the records (known as metadata) of United States phone calls—who called
whom, for how long, and from where. The agency stores the metadata for five years, possibly longer.
Current programs fail – internal NSA assessments prove.

Ken Dilanian, Associated Press, March 31, 2015, Forensic Magazine,
http://www.forensicmag.com/news/2015/03/nsa-weighed-ending-phone-surveillance-program-leak
The National Security Agency considered abandoning its secret program to collect and store American
calling records in the months before leaker Edward Snowden revealed the practice, current and former
intelligence officials say, because some officials believed the costs outweighed the meager
counterterrorism benefits. After the leak and the collective surprise around the world, NSA leaders strongly defended the phone
records program to Congress and the public, but without disclosing the internal debate. The proposal to kill the program was circulating among
top managers but had not yet reached the desk of Gen. Keith Alexander, then the NSA director, according to current and former intelligence
officials who would not be quoted because the details are sensitive. Two former senior NSA officials say they doubt Alexander would have
approved it. Still, the behind-the-scenes NSA concerns, which have not been reported previously, could be
relevant as Congress decides whether to renew or modify the phone records collection when the law
authorizing it expires in June. The internal critics pointed out that the already high costs of vacuuming up and
storing the "to and from" information from nearly every domestic landline call were rising, the system
was not capturing most cellphone calls, and the program was not central to unraveling terrorist plots,
the officials said. They worried about public outrage if the program ever was revealed.
No Link – Alternatives Solve

Alternative approaches solve – community intelligence gathering proves.
One alternative to data-driven counterterrorism is already being used by the F.B.I. and other agencies.
Known as “countering violent extremism,” this approach bears some resemblance to the community-
policing programs of the nineteen-nineties, in which law enforcement builds a listening relationship with
local leaders. “The kinds of people you want to look for, someone in the community might have seen
them first,” Mudd said. After the Moalin arrests, the U.S. Attorney’s office in San Diego began hosting a
bimonthly “Somali roundtable” with representatives from the F.B.I., the Department of Homeland
Security, the sheriff’s office, local police, and many Somali organizations. “They’ve done a lot of work to
reach out and explain what they’re about,” Abdi Mohamoud, the Somali nonprofit director, who has
attended the meetings, said.
Bulk surveillance not key – alternatives more effective.

Peter Bergen, director of the National Security Program at the New America Foundation, David
Sterman, research assistant, Emily Schneider, research assistants and Bailey Cahall, research
associate, January 2014, “Do NSA's Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?”
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Bergen_NAF_NSA
%20Surveillance_1_0.pdf (accessed 4/24/15)
However, our review of the government’s claims about the role that NSA “bulk” surveillance of phone and email
communications records has had in keeping the United States safe from terrorism shows that these claims are
overblown and even misleading.* An in-depth analysis of 225 individuals recruited by al-Qaeda or a like-
minded group or inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology, and charged in the United States with an act of terrorism since 9/11, demonstrates
that traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips from local communities, and
targeted intelligence operations, provided the initial impetus for investigations in the majority of cases,
while the contribution of NSA’s bulk surveillance programs to these cases was minimal . Indeed, the
controversial bulk collection of American telephone metadata, which includes the telephone numbers that originate and
receive calls, as well as the time and date of those calls but not their content, under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, appears to have
played an identifiable role in, at most, 1.8 percent of these cases. NSA programs involving the surveillance of non-U.S.
persons outside of the United States under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act played a role in 4.4 percent of the terrorism cases we
examined, and NSA surveillance under an unidentified authority played a role in 1.3 percent of the cases we examined. Regular FISA warrants
not issued in connection with Section 215 or Section 702, which are the traditional means for investigating foreign persons, were used in at
least 48 (21 percent) of the cases we looked at, although it’s unclear whether these warrants played an initiating role or were used at a later
point in the investigation. (Click on the link to go to a database of all 225 individuals, complete with additional details about them and the
government’s investigations of these cases: http://natsec.newamerica.net/nsa/analysis).
Conventional investigation less likely to lead to false positives.

Ryan Cooper, national correspondent, April 5, 2015, The Week,
http://theweek.com/articles/547119/simple-math-problem-that-blows-apart-nsas-surveillance-
justifications (accessed 4/26/15)
Indeed, it's arguable that an obsessive focus on dragnet surveillance is actually a distraction from more
effective investigative techniques, because even moderately competent terrorists will avoid electronic
communication altogether. Bin Laden was suspicious of even encrypted email years before the Snowden
leaks, but especially today, one would have to be grossly misinformed to express sympathy for terrorism
online. This might explain why the FBI has spent so much time of late baiting utterly hapless chumps or
the mentally ill into taking fake weapons and explosives they never would have been able to get on their
own. At any rate, as I've argued before, simple bureaucratic competence and bog-standard detective work are
vastly underrated compared to piling up gigantic quantities of irrelevant data. But the false positive
problem ought to be the final nail in the dragnet coffin. Unless terrorism becomes thousands of times
more common than it is today, such broad techniques will be utterly useless against real terrorism . *Out of
every million people, 1 will be a terrorist, and 1000 (0.1 percent of 1 million) will be false positives. Therefore, Jeff's probability is 1/(1000+1) =
0.001, or 0.1 percent.
Link Turn – Electronic Surveillance Trades Off with Intelligence

Electronic surveillance trades off with human intelligence – more effective at fighting
terrorism.
Sebastian Rotella, Pulitzer Price nominee and staff writer at ProPublica, June 19, 2013, “How the
NSA’s High-Tech Surveillance Helped Europeans Catch Terrorists,” ProPublica,
http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-nsas-high-tech-surveillance-helped-europeans-catch-
terrorists (accessed 4/24/15)
At the same time, some European experts see the furor as a sign that the strengths of the American giant
intertwine with its weaknesses. U.S. agencies devote huge resources to sophisticated technology to the
detriment of analysis and human spying, they say. As a result, they say, U.S. agencies sometimes appear
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of information. “The problem is not collecting information, it’s
understanding it,” said Alain Bauer, a well-connected French criminologist who has served as a presidential adviser.
“What is the sense of such programs? They are too big. They will not work . We are a former colonial empire. We
know the value of human intelligence. It is more efficient and less expensive than technological fetishism .
Fortunately, we do not have enough money to do it the other way.” Spy agencies such as France’s DCRI and Britain’s MI5 have long experience
cultivating human sources. In
early 2008, Spain’s Civil Guard broke up a plot to bomb the Barcelona subway
thanks to a French informant. He was a Pakistani who infiltrated the network in the training camps and traveled with the would-be
bombers to Spain. He sounded the alarm when the attack seemed imminent.
Surveillance programs make it impossible to identify real targets – trades off with
effective intelligence gathering.
By flooding the system with false positives, big-data approaches to counterterrorism might actually
make it harder to identify real terrorists before they act. Two years before the Boston Marathon
bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older of the two brothers alleged to have committed the attack, was
assessed by the city’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. They determined that he was not a threat. This was
one of about a thousand assessments that the Boston J.T.T.F. conducted that year, a number that had
nearly doubled in the previous two years, according to the Boston F.B.I. As of 2013, the Justice
Department has trained nearly three hundred thousand law-enforcement officers in how to file
“suspicious-activity reports.” In 2010, a central database held about three thousand of these reports; by
2012 it had grown to almost twenty-eight thousand. “The bigger haystack makes it harder to find the
needle,” Sensenbrenner told me. Thomas Drake, a former N.S.A. executive and whistle-blower who has
become one of the agency’s most vocal critics, told me, “If you target everything, there’s no target.”
Drake favors what he calls “a traditional law-enforcement” approach to terrorism, gathering more
intelligence on a smaller set of targets. Decisions about which targets matter, he said, should be driven
by human expertise, not by a database.
Domestic surveillance leads to false leads – wastes resources crucial to catching real
suspects.
Hina Shamsi, director of the ACLU's National Security Project, and Matthew Harwood, the ACLU's
senior writer/editor, November 6, 2014, Mother Jones,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/how-surveillance-turns-ordinary-people-terrorism-
suspects (accessed 4/26/15)
Law enforcement officials, including the Los Angeles Police Department's top counterterrorism officer, have themselves
exhibited skepticism about suspicious activity reporting (out of concern with the possibility of
overloading the system). In 2012, George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute
surveyed counterterrorism personnel working in fusion centers and in a report generally accepting of SARs noted
that the program had "flooded fusion centers, law enforcement, and other security outfits with white
noise," complicating "the intelligence process" and distorting "resource allocation and deployment
decisions." In other words, it was wasting time and sending personnel off on wild goose chases. A few
months later, a scathing report from the Senate subcommittee on homeland security described similar
intelligence problems in state-based fusion centers. It found that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel
assigned to the centers "forwarded 'intelligence' of uneven quality—oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely,
sometimes endangering citizens' civil liberties and Privacy Act protections... and more often than not
unrelated to terrorism."
Link Turn – Surveillance Enables Cyberterrorism

Domestic surveillance enables cyberterrorism – enemies can tap into systems to target
the US.
Steven M. Bellovin et al, professor of computer science at Columbia University, 2007, IEEE Security &
Privacy, http://www.crypto.com/papers/paa-ieee.pdf (accessed 4/24/2015)
Implicit in the FISA update was the need to protect the US against non-state actors, who have indeed shown themselves to be adept at using
the Internet to communicate. Some of the tools provided for by the Protect America Act could in fact aid in the disruption of various nefarious
plots. But building surveillance technology into a communications infrastructure creates risk of penetration
by trusted insiders, foreign powers, and non-state actors (with trusted insiders being the greatest threat). Disrupting
attacks by non-state actors could be a short-term gain, but surveillance architectures rarely go away. The dangers created by the
Protect America Act present a longterm risk. (This is exemplified by the exploit in the Greek wiretapping case, which relied on an earlier
software version that included wiretapping capabilities but not the auditing system.) The Protect America Act, a
law enacted in haste,
holds the possibility of a vast increase in the number of Americans whose communications and
communication patterns will be studied. The surveillance provides access to US communications, a
target of great value. The US could build for its opponents something that would be too expensive for
them to build for themselves: a system that lets them see the US’s intelligence interests, a system that
could tell them how to thwart those interests, and a system that might be turned to intercept the
communications of American citizens and institutions. It is critical that the new surveillance system neither enable
exploitation of US communications by unauthorized parties nor permit abuse by authorized ones.
No Impact – Cyber Security

Cyber security threats overblown.
Jerry Brito, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and Tate Watkins,
Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2011, Harvard National Security
Journal, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol-3-Brito-and-Watkins.pdf (accessed
4/26/15)
Security risks to private and government networks from criminals and malicious state actors are no doubt real and pressing. However, the
rhetoric of "cyber doom" employed by proponents of increased federal intervention in cybersecurity
implies an almost existential threat that requires instant and immense action. Yet these proponents lack
clear evidence of such doomsday threats that can be verified by the public. As a result, the United States may be
witnessing a bout of threat inflation similar to that seen in the run-up to the Iraq War. Additionally, a
cyber-industrial complex is emerging, much like the military-industrial complex of the Cold War. This
complex may serve not only to supply cybersecurity solutions to the federal government, but to drum
up demand for those solutions as well.
No terminal impact to cyber threats – economy and society are resilient.

Jerry Brito, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and Tate Watkins,
Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2011, Harvard National Security
Journal, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol-3-Brito-and-Watkins.pdf (accessed
4/26/15)
Finally, it should be pointed out that even if one were to determine that cybersecurity is under-provided by the private sector, one would then
have to proceed to the next questions in an economic analysis: consider different alternatives to regulation, as well as alternative forms of
regulation, and determine whether the benefits of the chosen alternative outweigh its costs. Indeed, although
cyber-doom
scenarios are often presented as existential threats to our fragile interconnected society, the evidence
from history from WWII to 9/11 to Katrina-is that people and institutions are incredibly resilient and
would likely bounce back from any probable cyber attack. As Aaron Wildavsky puts it when addressing
how best to respond to dangers that cannot be understood in advance: "[m]y vote goes to the resilience
that comes from passing many trials and learning from errors so that the defects of society's limited
imagination are made up by larger amounts of global resources that can be converted into meeting the
dangers that its members never thought would arise."
Terrorists will never have the capability to launch devastating cyber attacks
Joshua Green, Editor of the Washington Monthly, November 2002, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism,”
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html (Accessed 4/25/2015)
There's just one problem: There is no such thing as cyberterrorism--no instance of anyone ever having been
killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. Nor is there compelling evidence that al Qaeda or
any other terrorist organization has resorted to computers for any sort of serious destructive activity .
What's more, outside of a Tom Clancy novel, computer security specialists believe it is virtually impossible to use the
Internet to inflict death on a large scale, and many scoff at the notion that terrorists would bother
trying. "I don't lie awake at night worrying about cyberattacks ruining my life," says Dorothy Denning, a
computer science professor at Georgetown University and one of the country's foremost cybersecurity
experts. "Not only does [cyberterrorism] not rank alongside chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, but it is not anywhere near as serious
as other potential physical threats like car bombs or suicide bombers."
No Impact – Terrorism
Incredibly low risk of terrorism attacks – the numbers don’t lie.
Ronald Bailey, Science Correspondent, September 6, 2011, Reason Magazine,
http://reason.com/archives/2011/09/06/how-scared-of-terrorism-should (accessed 4/26/2015)
Taking these figures into account, a rough calculation suggests that in the last five years, your chances of being
killed by a terrorist are about one in 20 million. This compares annual risk of dying in a car accident of 1 in 19,000; drowning in
a bathtub at 1 in 800,000; dying in a building fire at 1 in 99,000; or being struck by lightning at 1 in 5,500,000 . In other words, in the
last five years you were four times more likely to be struck by lightning than killed by a terrorist. The
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has just published, Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years
Later [PDF]. The report notes, excluding the 9/11 atrocities, that fewer than 500 people died in the U.S. from terrorist attacks between 1970
and 2010. The report adds, “From 1991-2000, the United States averaged 41.3 terrorist attacks per year. After 2001, the average number of
U.S. attacks decreased to 16 per year from 2002-2010.” Of course, the police and politicians will cite the lack of deaths from terrorism as
evidence that their protective measures are working. Earlier
this year, the conservative Heritage Foundation compiled
a list of 39 terror plots that had been foiled since September 2001. Going through the list, about 23 of
the plots might plausibly have resulted in terror attacks of one sort or another. Several were aimed at subways,
military bases, and shopping malls. To get a feel for the number of people that might be killed in typical terrorist attacks, consider that four
subway bombs killed 52 people in London in 2005; the deadliest attack on a military base killed 13; and blowing up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killed 187 people in 1995. Making
the huge assumption that all 23 plausible plots
would have succeeded in killing an average of 100 Americans each, that means that 2,300 would have
died in the last 10 years, or about 230 per year. (This implies a rate that is 10 times higher than the rate between 1970 and
2010, excluding the 9/11 attacks, by the way.) Even at this higher rate, your chances of dying in a terrorist attack
would be about 1 in 1.7 million.
Catastrophic terrorists attacks are unlikely – their impact is all media hype
Christopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, March 2010,
“Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396331003764603, accessed
(4/23/2015)
Even terrorists equipped with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would be incapable of causing damage so cataclysmic that it would prove
fatal to modern states. Though the prospect of terrorists obtaining and using such weapons is one of the most
consistently terrifying scenarios of the new era, it is also highly unlikely and not nearly as dangerous as sometimes
portrayed. As the well-funded, well-staffed Aum Shinrikyo cult found out in the 1990s, workable forms
of weapons of mass destruction are hard to purchase, harder still to synthesise without state help, and
challenging to use effectively. The Japanese group managed to kill a dozen people on the Tokyo subway
system at rush hour. While tragic, the attack was hardly the stuff of apocalyptic nightmares. Super-
weapons are simply not easy for even the most sophisticated non-state actors to use.
Even if an attack occurs the impact will be contained

Christopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, March 2010,
“Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396331003764603, accessed
(4/23/2015)
If terrorists were able to overcome the substantial obstacles and use the most destructive weapons in a
densely populated area, the outcome would of course be terrible for those unfortunate enough to be nearby. But we should not
operate under the illusion that doomsday would arrive. Modern industrialised countries can cope with
disasters, both natural and man-made. As unpleasant as such events would be, they do not represent
existential threats. The American public can be forgiven for being afraid of nuclear-, biological- or chemical-armed terrorists, since the
messages they have been receiving from US leaders have been uniformly apocalyptic, informed by worst-case thinking. The responsibility for
this pathological fear lies with those who ought to know better – who know, for instance, that plastic sheeting and duct tape are not realistic
protections against anything, but who recommend their stockpiling anyway. Terrorists can kill people and scare many more,
but the localised damage they can cause is by itself incapable of changing the character of Western
civilisation. Only the people of the West, largely through their own overreaction, can accomplish that.
No Impact - Nuke Terror

Zero risk of nuclear terrorism – no motive, tech, expertise, or money
John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, November 2013, “Calming Our
Nuclear Jitters,” http://issues.org/26-2/mueller/AKG (Accessed 4/27/2015)
In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less
progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of
alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The
most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves
from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a
daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence.
Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but
because chase would be immediate.
No nuclear terror threat – no motive or technical capability

Leonard Weiss, Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford
University, 2015, “On fear and nuclear terrorism”, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75 (Accessed
4/20/2015)
While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the
search for Saddam’s nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has
swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:
Nuclear terrorism ...turns out to be a world of truly worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a world of fantasies,
nightmares, urban legends, fakes, hoaxes, scams, stings, mysterious substances, terrorist boasts,
sensational claims, description of vast conspiracies, allegations of coverups, lurid headlines, layers of
misinformation and disinformation. Much is inconclusive or contradictory. Only the terror is real. (Jenkins, 2008: 26)
To illustrate in more detail how fear has distorted the threat of nuclear terrorism, consider the three possibilities for terrorists
to obtain a nuclear weapon: steal one; be given one created by a nuclear weapon state; manufacture
one. None of these possibilities has a high probability of occurring.
Too many obstacles for a successful nuclear attack

John J. Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, January 2014
“America Unhinged,” nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show (Accessed
4/21/2015)
What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a
game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply
terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that
weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon,
but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.
No Impact - Bio Terror

Technical barriers to a successful attack are overwhelming
Rebecca Keller, Analyst at Stratfor, March 2013, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,”
www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential (Accessed 4/22/2014)
There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology
needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-
state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and
humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it
requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of
people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something
that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that
would limit the necessary human contact.
Bioterror threat is non-existent

Mason Ryan Davenport, Professor of Security Studies at American, August 2014, “The Lingering
Specter of Bioterrorism: Assessing Al-Qaeda’s Intent and Capability to Use Biological Weapons against
the U.S.”, digitalcommons.apus.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=theses (Accessed
4/23/2015)
Al-Qaeda’s failure to either acquire or cultivate lethal biological agents over the last decade should bear
more weight on D.C.’s incessant terrorism-cum-bioweapons debate. As ‘imminent’ bioterror threats
continually fail to pan out, it stands to reason that al-Qaeda’s attempts at bioterrorism are more wishful
thinking than serious dedication
No risk of bioterror
Chris Schneidmiller, Global Security Newswire, January 2009, “Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear,
Biological Terrorism,”http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/experts-debate-threat-of-nuclear-biological-
terrorism/ (Accessed 4/27/2015)
Bioterrorism has killed five U.S. citizens in the 21st century -- the victims of the 2001 anthrax attacks, he said.
Meanwhile, at least 400,000 deaths are linked each year to obesity in this country. The United States has
authorized $57 billion in spending since the anthrax mailings for biological prevention and defense
activities, Leitenberg said. Much of the money would have been better used to prepare for pandemic flu, he argued. "Mistaken threat
assessments make mistaken policy and make mistaken allocation of financial resources," Leitenberg said. The
number of states with offensive biological weapons programs appears to have stabilized at six beginning in
the mid-1970s, despite subsequent intelligence estimates that once indicated an increasing number of efforts, Leitenberg said. Caveats in
present analyses of those states make it near-impossible to determine the extent to which their activities remain offensive in nature, he added.
There has been minimal proliferation of biological expertise or technology to nations of concern in
recent decades.
No Impact – Cross Border Terror

Terrorists won’t be able to get operatives into the US
Scott Stewart, VP of Tactical Analysis at Stratfor, July 2014, “Examining the Terrorist Threat from
America's Southern Border,” www.stratfor.com/weekly/examining-terrorist-threat-americas-southern-
border#axzz39S7rDCvL (Accessed 4/22/2015)
Another factor to consider is the changes in the way militant groups have operated against the United
States since 9/11. Because of increased counterterrorism operations and changes in immigration policies
intended to help combat terrorist travel, it has become increasingly difficult for terrorist groups to get
trained operatives into the United States. Even jihadist groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
have been forced to undertake remote operations involving bombs placed aboard aircraft overseas
rather than placing operatives in the country. This indicates that the group does not have the ability or
the network to support such operatives.
Terrorists aren’t entering via the Mexican border

Joshua Keating, Staff writer at Slate focusing on international affairs, August 2014, “’El Qaida’: The
Persistent, Baseless Claim That Terrorists Will Swarm the U.S. From Mexico,”
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/08/25/rick_perry_says_isis_could_sneak_into_the_u_s_
from_mexico_the_el_qaida_meme.html (Accessed 4/21/2015)
The Mexican government is expressing some irritation with Texas Gov. Rick Perry, who suggested last
week that there’s a “very real possibility” that members of ISIS or other terrorist groups are entering the
U.S. illegally via Mexico. As Perry acknowledged in his own remarks—and as the Pentagon confirmed—there’s “no clear
evidence” that this is happening. But as is generally the case when fears of “El Qaida” periodically emerge, a lack of evidence is no
barrier to bold sweeping claims. Intelligence officials have warned for some time that there’s a possibility of terrorists entering the U.S. from
Mexico, and there is indeed some evidence of groups like Hezbollah operating in South America . It would be
foolish, then, to completely rule out the possibility that terrorists have crossed into the United States from down Mexico way. But the
frequent claims that this is already a major problem are, well, ridiculous.
Expert consensus – no risk and counterterror increasing

Tom Barry, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy, January 2013,
“With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What
Does It Really Mean?” http://www.alternet.org/immigration/resurrection-immigration-reform-well-
hear-lot-about-securing-our-borders-what-does-it (Accessed 4/24/2015)
One likely reason the Border Patrol does not address its counterterrorism in any detail is that the agency’s
border security buildup on the southwestern border has not resulted in the apprehension of members
of foreign terrorist organizations, as identified by the State Department. Experts in counterterrorism agree there is
little risk that foreign terrorist organizations would rely on illegal border crossings – particularly across
the U.S.-Mexico border – for entry into the United States. While the fear that foreign terrorists would illegally
cross U.S. land borders drove much of the early build-up in border security programs under the newly created homeland
security department, counterterrorism seems to have dropped off the actual and rhetorical focus of today’s
border security operations.
No Impact - ISIS
ISIS has no military power and no allies – they’re not a threat
Patrick J. Buchanan, Senior advisor to three Presidents, August 2014, “To Defeat the Islamic State,”
http://www.creators.com/conservative/pat-buchanan/to-defeat-the-islamic-state.html (Accessed
4/26/2015)
Undeniably, these are bloodthirsty religious fanatics who revel in beheadings and crucifixions and have exhibited battlefield bravery and skill.
But are 17,000 jihadi fighters in landlocked regions of Iraq and Syria really an imminent and mortal
threat to an America with thousands of nuclear weapons and tens of thousands of missiles and bombs
and the means to deliver them? How grave is this crisis? Consider the correlation of forces. Who are the vocal
and visible friends and fighting allies of ISIS? They are nonexistent. The Turks, Saudis, Qataris and
Kuwaitis who, stupidly, have been aiding ISIS in bringing down Bashar Assad and blowing a hole in the "Shia Crescent" of Tehran, Baghdad,
Damascus and Hezbollah, have lately awakened to their idiocy and are cutting off aid to ISIS. Moderate Sunnis
detest ISIS for its barbarism and desecration of shrines. The Christians and Yazidis fear and loathe them.
The Kurds, both the Syrian YPG and PKK, which broke open the exit route for the Yazidis from Mount Sinjar, and the peshmerga
despise ISIS. Lebanon's army, Syria's army, Hezbollah and Iran have been fighting ISIS with Russian
assistance. Vladimir Putin himself warned us of the absurdity of our attacking Assad last year, arguing that we would be allying ourselves
with the same terrorists who brought down the twin towers. Was Putin not right? Even al-Qaida and Hamas have repudiated
ISIS.
Territorial control does not determine the strength of ISIS

Paul R. Pillar, Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University, August 2014,
“ISIS in Perspective,” http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/isis-perspective-11150 (Accessed
4/19/2015)
The control by a group of a piece of territory, even if it is mostly just sand or mountains, is what most
often is taken mistakenly as a measure of the threat a group poses, and this phenomenon is occurring in
spades with ISIS. Probably seizure of land is interpreted this way because following this aspect of the progress of a group is as simple as
looking at color-coded maps in the newspaper. The history of terrorist operations, including highly salient operations
such as 9/11, demonstrates that occupying some real estate is not one of the more important factors
that determine whether a terrorist operation against the United States or another western country can
be mounted. To the extent ISIS devotes itself to seizing, retaining, and administering pieces of real estate
in the Levant or Mesopotamia—and imposing its version of a remaking of society in those pieces—this represents a turn
away from, not toward, terrorism in the West. Significant friction between ISIS (then under a different name) and al-Qaeda
first arose when the former group's concentration on whacking Iraqi Shias was an unhelpful, in the view of the al-Qaeda leadership, digression
from the larger global jihad and the role that the far enemy, the United States, played in it.
ISIS can’t get WMDs

Matthew Cottee, Research analyst with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2014, “The very small Islamic State WMD threat,”
http://thebulletin.org/very-small-islamic-state-wmd-threat7729 (Accessed 4/24/2015)
ISIS does seem interested in acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons , but ambitions do
In short,
not necessarily equate with reality. The complexities of such weapons, combined with the difficulties
involved in obtaining and handling the necessary material, make the likelihood of its use remote. Let’s not
exaggerate the threat.
No Impact - Al-Qaeda
No risk of Al Qaeda attack
Scott Stewart, Strategic Analyst at Stratfor, January 2011, “Why Al Qaeda is Unlikely to Execute
Another 9/11,” http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110831-why-al-qaeda-unlikely-execute-another-911
(Accessed 4/23/2015)
Since we published our 2011 forecast, bin Laden has been killed as well as senior al Qaeda leader Atiyah Abd al-
Rahman, who reportedly died in a strike by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle Aug. 22 in Pakistan's North Waziristan region. We continue to
believe that the al Qaeda core group is off balance and concerned for its security -- especially in light of the
intelligence gathered in the raid on bin Laden's hideout. The core group simply does not enjoy the
operational freedom it did prior to September 2001. We also believe the group no longer has the same operational capability in
terms of international travel and the ability to transfer money that it had prior to 9/11. Some people believe there is a greater chance of an
attack on this year's 9/11 anniversary because of the killing of bin Laden, while others note that al-Zawahiri may feel pressure to conduct an
attack in order to prove his credibility as al Qaeda's new leader. Our belief, as noted above, is that al
Qaeda has been doing its
utmost to attack the United States and has not pulled any punches. Because of this, we do not believe it possesses the
ability to increase this effort beyond where it was prior to bin Laden's death. As to the pressure on al-Zawahiri, we noted in December 2007
that the al Qaeda core had been under considerable pressure to prove itself relevant for several years and that, despite this pressure, had yet
to deliver. Because of this, we do not believe that the pressure to conduct a successful attack is any heavier on al-Zawahiri today than it was
prior to bin Laden's death. Finally, we believe that if al Qaeda possessed the capability to conduct a spectacular attack it would launch the
attack as soon as it was operationally ready, rather than wait for some specific date. The risk of discovery is simply too great.
New data shows Al Qaeda irreparably damaged

Rick Maze, Staff Writer at Military Times, January 2012, “Intel chief: Bin Laden death crippled al-
Qaida,” http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2012/01/military-intel-chief-bin-laden-death-crippled-al-
qaida-013112/ (Accessed 4/25/2015)
The al-Qaida terrorist network has not and maybe never will recover from the death of Osama bin Laden,
the top U.S. intelligence official said Tuesday. Testifying in a rare open session to discuss global threats, James Clapper, the
retired Air Force lieutenant general who is director of national intelligence, said bin Laden’s successor as head of the
terrorist network has a “leadership style less compelling than bin Laden’s image as a holy man and
warrior.” The new al-Qaida leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, will not receive the same “deference” as bin Laden, Clapper said, adding that the
loss of other leaders through death or capture is “so substantial, and [the group’s] operating
environment so restricted, that a new group of leaders, even if they could be found, would have
difficulty integrating into the organization and compensating for mounting losses.” Still, al-Qaida isn’t finished,
Clapper said. Even with degraded capabilities, the terrorist network “will seek to execute smaller, simpler plots to demonstrate relevance to the
global jihad” while aspiring to attack larger targets, including the U.S. homeland, he said. Al-Qaida operatives in Pakistan increasingly rely on
militant factions there to conduct attacks, Clapper said. Pakistan’s military has had only “limited success” against this threat. Regional
affiliates of al-Qaida, such as the Northern Africa affiliate Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghred or AQIM,
receive communications from network leaders but have limited ability to conduct out-of-area attacks.
“We will never again have a hearing where someone asks where is Osama bin Laden,” noted Sen. Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, the intelligence
panel’s ranking Republican.
BIOPOWER KRITIK RESPONSES
Biopower good
Surveillance is not wholly bad—the particular problems the aff identifies are
contingent and able to be remedied, surveillance as a whole is not bad but useful
David Lyon, directs the Surveillance Studies Centre, is a Professor of Sociology, holds a Queen’s
Research Chair and is cross-appointed as a Professor in the Faculty of Law at Queen's University in
Kingston, Ontario, 2002, “Everyday Surveillance: Personal data and social classifications,”
http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/cyberspace/lyon_ics.pdf
Let me make this clear. I am not suggesting that classification and surveillance¶ are socially negative
processes. They are necessary aspects of all social situations¶ and serve social purposes, from the vital to
the vicious. The point is that as¶ powerful means of governance, of social ordering, they are also
increasingly¶ invisible and easily taken-for granted. The risk management (and other) classifications of
surveillance societies involve categories that are inherently political, that ¶ call for ethical inspection. I am
not suggesting either that such classifications are¶ each powerful in the same way. Surveillance as
understood here exists on a long¶ continuum along which data is collected and processed for a range of
purposes¶ from policing and security to consumption and entertainment. It produces¶ categorical
suspicion at one end (such as ethnic profiling at airport security checks) ¶ and categorical seduction (such
as targeting of potential car rental customers from¶ lists of airline loyalty club members) at the other.
Cities are increasingly splintered¶ into socio-economically divided consumption and security enclaves by
these¶ practices (Graham and Marvin 2001). But either way, the categories have ethics; ¶ the codes have
politics.¶ This, then, is why surveillance matters. It does indeed provoke privacy¶ concerns from time to
time. But, as expressed, these personal concerns are¶ frequently temporary and contingent ones, often
relating to mistakes and errors¶ in databases or telecommunications systems, or to loss of access to the
tokens of¶ trust such as credit cards or driver’s licenses. They are not high on any political¶ agenda. And
when, for example, surveyed Internet users claim to care about¶ online privacy, it turns out,
paradoxically, that the very same persons key-in PINs¶ and credit card numbers online! (Washington Post
2000) They want the benefits¶ of e-commerce even if they also want assurances that their personal
details are¶ secure and not being used for purposes beyond the immediate transaction. When¶ it comes
to legal restrictions on surveillance, whether construed as data protection ¶ or as privacy laws, it is usually
the data-subject who has to make an appeal. The¶ law only acts as a guarantee of some right to self-
protection. This is why legal¶ limits, though not insignificant, scarcely scratch the surface of the social
issues¶ raised by rapidly rising surveillance levels in everyday life.
Biopower is good—it is founded on love and care in an effort to maximize quality of

life for a population
Mika Ojakangas, Faculty member of Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at University of
Jyväskylä, 2005, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault,”
http://ej.lib.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/viewFile/856/874
The vivid discussion around Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life can be seen
as a sign that the book is little by little gaining the status of a “post‐modern political classic”. As is well
known, its point of departure is Michel Foucault’s concept of bio‐political power or bio‐power that he
elaborates in the end of The History of Sexuality. For Foucault, bio‐power is an essentially modern form
of power and its purpose is to exert a positive influence on life, to optimise and multiply life, by
subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. In contrast to this power Foucault
opposes the classical sovereign power that was exercised mainly as a means of deduction – the seizing
of things, time, bodies, and ultimately the¶ seizing of life itself. Although Agamben admits that our
societies are bio‐political ones, he nevertheless sees the Foucauldian opposition between bio‐power and
sovereign power as superfluous. According to him, in fact, these models of power essentially intersect,
although in a previously concealed manner. Agamben calls “bare life” – the life of homo sacer that is
exposed to an unconditional threat of death – the hidden point of intersection between the sovereign
and bio‐political models of power. As fine as Agamben’s analysis is, however, it is precisely this
argument that is most dubious in Homo Sacer. Not bare life that is exposed to an unconditional threat of
death, but the care of “all living” is the foundation of bio‐power.
Biopower is concerned with protecting law abiding citizens, it’s main goal is not to
destroy lives
Dominic Corva, Faculty member in the politics department at Sarah Lawrence College, BS, Economics,
University of Houston. BA, Creative Writing, University of Arizona. MA and PhD, Geography, University
of Washington, 2009, “Biopower and the Militarization of the¶ Police Function,” http://www.acme-
journal.org/vol8/Corva09.pdf
The police/military distinction in the age of modernity relied upon and¶ reproduced the sovereignty of
the liberal nation-state. The military function acted¶ upon disorderly subjects outside of, and the police
functioned to engage disorderly¶ subjects within, the borders of the nation-state. The main difference
between the¶ two had to do with the use of coercive state power against subjects who were ¶ considered
part of a social contract with the state, defined through regimes of¶ national citizenship, and those who
were not.¶ The liberal regime of biopower, with respect to policing, is concerned above¶ all with making
and protecting law-abiding subjects rather than destroying the lives ¶ of lawbreakers. In the historical
context of the U.S. and U.K. welfare states, this¶ meant an emphasis on rehabilitation and retribution (in
the sense of restorative¶ sanctions, not vengeance) as well as an expansion of the rights of the accused
(see¶ Beckett, 1997, and Garland, 2000). The liberal police function should be¶ understood as concerned
with the rights and responsibilities of the liberal subject as¶ s/he is part of society, rather than its enemy.
The enemies against which society is¶ to be defended are deviant, scientifically correctable behaviors,
rather than¶ incorrigible subjects. Hence the medicalization of the criminal as a subject exposed ¶ to “root
causes” such as poverty, and in need of restorative care more than harshly¶ punitive sanctions.
Biopower is key to ensure freedom

Ali Muhammad Rizvi, Ph.D., Lecturer, Critical Thinking and Philosophy¶ Universiti Brunei Darussalam,
2012, “Freedom, power and capitalism: From disciplines to biopower,”
http://philpapers.org/archive/RIZBGA
There is a theme running throughout Foucault’s analyses of¶ governmentality, biopower, the changing
nature of state and its¶ relation to society, and neo-liberalism. The theme is particularly¶ clear in the
contrasts he makes between governmentality and the¶ arts of government in previous centuries (the
reason of state and¶ the theory of police, etc.), biopower versus disciplinary power,¶ and the modern
state versus the early modern state (and medieval¶ state). The theme is that of freedom: the nature of
freedom, and its¶ relation to other notions such as power, rationality, etc. Foucault¶ wants to reject a
certain notion of freedom. Let us call it a negative¶ notion of freedom, expressed in terms of the absence
of something¶ else, something it is not: A way out.1 Specifically, negative freedom¶ is seen as absence of
repression and domination, notions that are¶ in turn associated with power. Hence, negative freedom
becomes¶ absence of power, and the way to freedom is a way out of power¶ relations. In this view,
power is domination. The assumption is¶ that where there is power there is no freedom, and where
there is¶ freedom there is no power. Let’s call this the ‘exclusory’¶ hypothesis;2 power and freedom,
according to this hypothesis,¶ are mutually exclusive. But this, Foucault argues, is to¶ misunderstand the
nature of modern freedom and power, and the¶ way they operate in modern societies. Such notions of
freedom¶ and power might have some relevance to early modern and¶ medieval societies, but they are
quite inadequate in understanding¶ our contemporary societies.3¶ One of the insights of the analysis is
that freedom is a¶ great managing power (and not just a liberating force), and power¶ is not necessarily
something bad (it can lead to either domination¶ or freedom). Freedom, and a particular positive notion
of freedom,¶ is the paradigm of the new techniques of government, the new art¶ of government.
Freedom is meant here not as an ideology¶ (although that is important as well, even though much less¶
important than is normally thought), but simultaneously as the¶ principle (mechanism) through which
the system works. Freedom¶ in this sense is not to be understood primarily as the property of¶ will (in the
tradition of human rights and legal discourses), but as¶ the freedom of movement and freedom of
circulation – freedom to¶ develop, grow, enhance – and is applied to both people and¶ things (that is
both to physical and human capital). The new art¶ of government is not primarily based on prohibitions
and¶ exclusions, but is “carried out through and by reliance on freedom¶ of each” (Foucault 2007, p. 49).
Biopower inevitable
Biopower is an inevitable part of the human condition—it’s impossible to solve
entirely but the affirmative is a productive point of rupture
Mathew Coleman, Ph.D., Associate Professor in the Department of Geography at Ohio State
University, and Kevin Grove, professor at Ohio State University 2009, “Biopolitics, biopower, and the
return of sovereignty,”
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kevin_Grove2/publication/248881741_Biopolitics_biopower_and
_the_return_of_sovereignty/links/0a85e538c993020d9a000000.pdf
Third, and finally, is there a way in which we can account for both Agamben's and¶ Hardt and Negri's
departure from Foucault on what counts as biopolitics? Foucault's¶ approach to the term sees the life
that is the object of power—which is typically¶ referred to as `population', but, as we saw above, is more
accurately about a range of¶ forms of individual and collective life implicated by the discipline ^
biopolitics ^ racism¶ triplet—as an effect of power/knowledge. As we argued in the first section of the ¶
paper, this does not mean that regimes of power are fragile, here-today-gone-tomorrow ¶ `speech acts'.
However, it does mean that biopolitics—as well as other modes of¶ power/knowledge—can have no
strong metaphysical foundation. Rather, as a mode¶ of power/knowledge, biopolitics describes
rationalities and programs of government¶ which are contingent upon certain conditions of possibility.
This is where both¶ Agamben and Hardt and Negri part company with Foucault, as signaled by their¶
shared insistence that Foucault does not properly get at the `real dynamics' of¶ biopolitical society,
whether in terms of his forgetting of death (Agamben) or his¶ refusal to explore the ontological
substance of social production (Hardt and Negri).¶ Agamben, for example, in asserting that the sovereign
ban is the original and ongoing¶ political relation, and that the production of bare life is the original and
ongoing core¶ of sovereign power, posits biopolitics (the sovereign ban and bare life, together) as a¶
necessary condition of human existence as we know it. Hardt and Negri, despite their¶ obvious
differences with Agamben, pursue a similarly metaphysical definition of bio- ¶ politics. For them,
biopolitics-as-biopotenza describes the innate ability of humans to¶ produce social life at the edge of
time. Moreover, the productivity of labor (biopotenza)¶ is, for Hardt and Negri, literally what gives shape
and substance to history—including¶ the many forms of biopotere launched against the multitude. For
both Agamben and¶ Hardt and Negri, then, we contend that biopolitics works as a sort of ontological¶
and metaphysical anchor, a transcendentalizing condition of possibility for the human ¶ condition.
Governance is not a static, overarching institution, reject their generalizing claims—

freedom means individual participation like the affirmative
Douglas Brown, an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Education, University of Regina, Canada,
2014, “Liberalism, Advanced Liberalism, and the Governmental Policy Challenge in Education,”
http://ineducation.ca/ineducation/article/view/187/655
As governance moves past fixed understandings concerning hierarchical power (state and civil society),
subject freedom becomes participant in forms of organization and regulation. The freedom of the
individual then stands in contradiction to the frequently proffered position that pinpoints the state as a
unified player, a dispenser of cohesion and authority (diplomaticly and militarily). Foucault argues that
the state possesses none of this fixity or functionality (Foucault, 2007).¶ A theorist or citizen, then,
should be less concerned with overarching theories of power than with “actions upon actions,” or the
exercising of power within a given social context (Foucault, 1982, p.220). Simplistic a priori narratives
engaging domination and oppression are exchanged for inquiries into the practices of governance.
Governance becomes more a methodology, a practice or rational way of doing things. Governmentality
references multiple forms of conduct amongst many players. This may include the government of
oneself, the government of souls, the government of the household, or the governance of one’s children
(Foucault, 1991). The formation of governing mechanisms implies connections between the individual
and governance forms. Here we have the blending of the “microphysical with the macropolitical”
(Burchell, 1996, p. 20), or the linking of the individual practices of the self with forms of external
domination. Foucault (as cited in Burchell, 1996) writes:¶ I think that if one wants to analyse the
genealogy of the subject in Western societies, one has to take into account not only techniques of
domination, but also techniques of self. Let’s say one has to take into account the interaction of these
two types of techniques. (p. 20)¶ The involvement, or exchange, hinging on this analytics of power as
government, is set through the interplay of actors and agencies. Governance must be understood as the
way in which power is exercised in reciprocal correspondence between self and other, as a means in
which our conduct/regulation is bound to institutional and/or state processes.
State inevitable
The state is inevitable—even during a period of organized anarchy, the strong will
coalesce and have incentive to create a government
Randall G. Holcombe, DeVoe Moore Professor of Economics at Florida State University, 2004,
“Government: Unnecessary¶ but Inevitable,”
http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_08_3_1_holcombe.pdf
In the foregoing arguments, I have maintained that although government may not be¶ desirable, it is
inevitable because if no government exists, predators have an incentive¶ to establish one. From a
theoretical standpoint, Nozick’s argument—that competing¶ protection firms will evolve into a
monopoly that then becomes the state—represents¶ one form of the general argument that
government is inevitable. Because of the¶ prominence of Nozick’s work, I offer no further theoretical
defense of it here. More¶ significant, however, as de Jasay notes, “Anarchy, if historical precedent is to
be taken¶ as conclusive, does not survive” (1989, 217). Every place in the world is ruled by government.¶
The evidence shows that anarchy, no matter how desirable in theory, does ¶ not constitute a realistic
alternative in practice, and it suggests that if government ever¶ were to be eliminated anywhere,
predators would move in to establish themselves as¶ one by force.18 One can debate the merits of
anarchy in theory, but the real-world libertarian¶ issue is not whether it would more be desirable to
establish a limited government¶ or to eliminate government altogether. Economist Bruce Benson notes,
“When¶ a community is at a comparative disadvantage in the use of violence it may not be able¶ to
prevent subjugation by a protection racket such as the state” (1999, 153). Libertarian ¶ philosopher Jan
Narveson writes, “Why does government remain in power?¶ Why, in fact, are there still governments?
The short answer is that governments command¶ powers to which the ordinary citizen is utterly
unequal” (2002, 199–200).¶ Government is inevitable, and people with no government—or even with a
weak¶ government—will find themselves taken over and ruled by predatory gangs who will ¶ establish a
government over them.19 As de Jasay observes, “An anarchistic society may¶ not be well equipped to
resist military conquest by a command-directed one” (1997,¶ 200). People may not need or want
government, but inevitably they will find themselves¶ under government’s jurisdiction.20
No Link—negative state action

Domestic surveillance is the pinnacle of biopower—the affirmative is a good move
John Hayward, columnist for Breitbart, 5-8-2015, “France Approves Domestic Spying with ‘Almost no
Judicial Oversight’,” http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/05/08/france-approves-
domestic-spying-with-almost-no-judicial-oversight/
The new measures in France include cellphone and email metadata harvesting, along the lines of the
National Security Agency’s controversial programs in the United States.¶ But there’s much more. “The
provisions, as currently outlined, would allow the intelligence services to tap cellphones, read emails
and force Internet companies to comply with requests to allow the government to sift through virtually
all of their subscribers’ communications,” reports The New York Times, adding:¶ The intelligence services
could also request the right to put hidden microphones in a room or on objects such as cars or in
computers, or to place antennas to capture telephone conversations or mechanisms that capture text
messages. Both French citizens and foreigners could be tapped.¶ As in the United States, civil liberties
activists are uneasy with these sweeping surveillance powers. The head of the Paris bar association flatly
dismissed the government’s arguments for the new measures and its promises of accountability as “a
state lie,” accusing proponents of using terrorism scares to increase government spying on law-abiding
citizens.¶ Even the editor of Charlie Hebdo thought the new laws were “opportunistic” and excessive,
telling The New York Times editorial board that existing provisions should be adequate to combat
domestic terrorism, if used properly.¶ Prominent terrorism Judge Marc Trevidic called the new law
“dangerous” because it would substitute a National Commission to Control Intelligence Techniques for
routine judicial review, and the Prime Minister would have the power to override recommendations
from the commission.
Government surveillance is one of the most prominent and potent examples of

biopower—it’s executive overreach without any checks
Patrick G. Eddington, a policy analyst in homeland security and civil liberties at CATO, 4-13-2015,
“Confronting the surveillance state,” http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/confronting-the-
surveillance-state/article/2562696
The creation of what many refer to as the "American Surveillance State" began in secret, just days after
the Sept. 11 attacks. As the wreckage of the Twin Towers smoldered, President Bush and his top
national security and intelligence advisers were making decisions that would trigger a constitutional
crisis over surveillance programs that the public was told was essential to combating terrorism. The first
act in this post-Sept.11 drama began on Capitol Hill.¶ On Sep. 12, 2001, just as the Senate was about to
vote on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against al Qaeda, Majority Leader Tom
Daschle received urgent messages from senior White House officials. Even though there was a bipartisan
agreement on the resolution, the Bush administration was seeking a radical change in the language. As
Daschle revealed in a Dec. 2005 Washington Post op-ed, "Literally minutes before the Senate cast its
vote, the administration sought to add the words 'in the United States and' after 'appropriate force.' This
last-minute change would have given the president broad authority to exercise expansive powers not
just overseas — where we all understood he wanted authority to act — but right here in the United
States, potentially against American citizens. I could see no justification for Congress to accede to this
extraordinary request for additional authority. I refused."¶ But Bush administration officials wouldn't
take "no" for an answer.¶ Just two days after the confrontation with Daschle, then-NSA Director General
Michael Hayden green-lighted more data collection of global communications system surveillance,
including from people inside the United States. And while the country would only learn of this
warrantless surveillance program from the New York Times story, many of the specifics about Hayden's
action only came to light much later, through a previously top secret NSA Inspector General report
Snowden provided to the Guardian newspaper in June 2013.
Permutation
The affirmative is a productive way of strategically engaging biopolitics—recognition
of contingency is necessary
Anne Bloom, Professor of Law, the University of the Pacific/McGeorge School of Law, 2012, “Speaking
‘Truth’ to Biopower,” http://dev-web.swlaw.edu/pdfs/lr/41_2bloom.pdf
“Speaking „Truth‟ to Biopower” is a pragmatic strategy for legal activism that incorporates postmodern
insights regarding the nature of both “truth” and “power.” “Truth” is in quotes to emphasize its
contingency – the impossibility of understanding what truth means outside of a particular political and
social context. “Biopower” replaces “Power” to highlight the ways in which the body is a key site of
contestation in contemporary political struggles.3 While these insights are postmodern,4 the strategy I
propose is not. Instead of rejecting legal arguments that rely upon foundational beliefs or “truths” (as
would be characteristic of a postmodern approach),5 I argue it is more useful to strategically deploy
legal “truths” in¶ ways that acknowledge their political and social contingency. In short, “Speaking
„Truth‟ to Biopower” is a strategy that recognizes both the political utility and the limitations of legal
arguments that rest on foundational claims.¶ “Speaking „Truth‟ to Biopower” is also a strategy that
champions the political utility of rights. While rights-based tactics have many limitations,6 I argue that
they can be useful when they are employed in ways that take into account the surrounding political and
material conditions. Moreover, because tort litigation tends to be more focused on material conditions
than other areas of the law,7 I argue that rights-based strategies may be particularly useful when they
are deployed in tort litigation. Thus, “Speaking „Truth‟ to Biopower” encourages activists to view tort
litigation as a potentially important site of political struggle where rights can be strategically asserted to
address injustices in material conditions.
The opposite of biopolitics is the private becoming political, not the destruction of the
state—the permutation is necessary to solve the impacts
Bogdana Koljević, an associate of the Institute for Political¶ Studies and is on the editorial staff of the
“New Serbian Political¶ Thought” magazine, 2008, “Biopower and government¶ techniques,”
http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/94254/ichaptersection_singledocument/
5C5F47D0-3DAA-475C-9141-3CBDC11230C7/en/6.pdf
In numerous concrete examples the answer is quite simple¶ and plausible - it is a politics opposing the
idea of an all out¶ “chipization“, a policy against biometric measures and identification¶ systems, and at
that level the idea comes across fairly¶ clearly. Far less clear however is whether the policy of freedom¶
today should or could at all be defined only as negative¶ freedom, “freedom from”, i.e. as an eminently
neoliberal or¶ even libertarian concept of liberty? In the same vein, is the¶ idea of a minimal state at the
background of this “policy of¶ freedom“. The limitation of the negative freedom theory is, in¶ a sense,
structural. That is also the reason why one of the¶ leading issues of modern debates is how to attain
positive¶ freedom, thus not only (negative) freedom of individuals, but¶ the freedom of society as a
whole. This is the case of theories¶ formulated in a wide theoretical span from Habermas’ idea¶ about
the key role of the informal public sphere to radical¶ theories of Antonio Negri’s total systemic change.¶
That is because the opposite of biopolitics are not human¶ or civil rights, the right and liberty of an
individual - the¶ opposite of biopolitics is politics as public activity, activity¶ within the polis, i.e.
community. Crucial for biopolitics is the¶ fact that oikos (the private sphere) enters the polis (the public¶
realm). The process where life is politicized and politics¶ depoliticized in its retreat before life and in the
name of life is¶ what Foucault calls biopolitics. It is also what Foucault¶ implied by referring to the
progressive animalization of man¶ through the most sophisticated techniques.
Reform is necessary and inevitable—millennials don’t want surveillance which is a

large component of biopower
Anthony D. Romero, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, 4-20-2015, “With
millennials gaining influence, surveillance reform is inevitable,”
http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-83344281/
Though surveillance reform may confront resistance in the near term, millennials have made it clear that
they don't want government agencies tracking them online or collecting data about their phone calls. In
the United States, millennials will surpass the baby boomer generation this year, and by 2020, they will
represent 1 out of 3 adults. As they grow in influence, so too will the demand to rein in the surveillance
state.¶ Conventional wisdom says that the young and idealistic grow up and shed their naive ideals as
they confront the real world. By that logic, as millennials age, they will recognize the need for the
surveillance state to keep us safe from terrorism. But given the lack of evidence that mass surveillance
works — President Obama's own review group concluded that the National Security Agency's call-
records program never played a pivotal role in any investigation — it is unlikely this generation of digital
natives will shed a fundamental commitment to the free exchange of information.¶ Their ethos — that
the Internet should be a place where people are free to share knowledge and ideas without government
interference — is already reflected in tech culture. Technology companies, compelled by profit and
principle, recognize how governments continue to violate their citizens' trust with secretive surveillance
practices, and some have responded by providing encryption measures for their customers to
circumvent it. Last month, the Reform Government Surveillance coalition, which includes Google, Apple,
AOL, Facebook, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter and Yahoo, sent a letter to U.S. lawmakers calling for the
government to end the bulk collection of data.¶ It's important to remember how fast even the most
entrenched beliefs can change. Not so long ago, the majority of Americans opposed same-sex marriage.
In 2003, the Pew Research Center found that 59% of the U.S. population opposed same-sex marriage.
But that same year, 51% of millennials supported it. Since then, support for it has increased every year,
in every age group. Federal legalization of same-sex marriage now appears inevitable. ¶ It took about a
decade for U.S. policies and laws to catch up to millennials on same-sex marriage. But Congress will have
an opportunity to tackle the surveillance issue much faster. In June, key provisions of the Patriot Act are
set to expire, including Section 215, which the NSA claims as the legal backing for its bulk collection of
Americans' phone call records. Congress should let these provisions expire.¶ When millennials translate
their political ideals into public policy, the future will be more in the spirit of 1776 than 1984, and
Snowden will assume his place in American history as whistleblower and patriot. The establishment
might not like him now, but one day, it will erect a monument honoring him.
The permutation creates the space for institutional reform in which society and
individuals are able to reflect on how they are complicit in systems of biopolitical
control which is necessary to any solvency
Peyi Soyinka-Airewele Ph.D¶ Professor of International Relations,¶ & Comparative Studies, Carnegie
Fellow at the Department of¶ Political Science and International Relations,¶ Covenant University, Canaan
Land, Ota, March 2015, “The end of politics?: Reclaiming humanity in an age of biopower and
necropolitics,” http://covenantuniversity.edu.ng/content/download/35623/245151/file/
40th+Public+Lecture.pdf
But what would emerge in its place? Still politics, but hopefully¶ a reformed politics that can travel into
the future. The word ‗reform‘¶ sounds tame besides our preferred terms of revolution and¶
transformation but I use it advisedly in the context of Foucault‘s caution ¶ against constructing utopias
that degenerate into biopower. The¶ dilemma with necropolitics is that even as we protest its putrid¶
formations, we often lose sight of how much it has entwined itself¶ around our lives, swamped and
overwhelmed our vision, language,¶ relationships, communities and lives. We ignore how deeply we are¶
invested in and complicit with its norms and enticements. So perhaps¶ seeking reform or transformation
is a first step to recognizing, unlike¶ the local party bosses of China, our own complicity in corruption and
in¶ systems of power and fear.¶ Although the medical field utilizes surgical debridement to save¶ lives
threatened by necrotic trauma, the only assured mode the human¶ species has of defeating death is
ensuring that life is constantly birthed.¶ So at various levels of the polity, we must continue to mobilize,
debate¶ and seek to elect ethical, visionary and responsive leaders; demand a¶ national political structure
rooted in true federalism; and hold leaders in¶ all societal sectors accountable for their discourses and
actions or lack¶ thereof.
Feminism aff
The feminist analysis of the aff offers space for alliances—power is disrupted by
shifting, interconnected sites of resistance—the perm solves best
Catriona Macleod, Ph.D., Harvard University¶ Edmund J. and Louise W. Kahn Term Professor in the
Humanities, Professor of German, and Kevin Durrheim, PhD, social psychologist, ¶ Professor of
Psychology¶ University of KwaZulu-Natal, March 2002, “Foucauldian Feminism: the Implications of
Governmentality,”
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kevin_Durrheim/publication/227994027_Foucauldian_Feminism_
the_Implications_of_Governmentality/links/02bfe513888f232b6f000000.pdf
In Foucauldian terms resistance takes the form of reverse or subjugated discourses and practices
subverting hegemonic discourses and practices. These subjugated knowledges include those of the
psychiatric patient, the hysteric, the midwife, the housewife, the teenage mother etc. Foucault does not
see resistance as radical rupture or overt revolution. There is “no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of
revolt” (Foucault 1978, p. 96) but rather shifting points of resistance that “inflame certain parts of the
body, certain moments in life” (Foucault, 1978, p. 96). What governmentality adds to this is the
possibility of identifying and resisting concentrations of power. This does not mean a reversal to a
“single locus of great Refusal”, but rather that alliances of shifting points of resistance around
concentrations of power become a possibility.¶ The implication of this in terms of feminist political
practice is that such practice becomes a matter of alliances rather than one of unity around a universally
shared interest (Allen & Baber, 1992). We would more rightly talk of the practice of feminisms. Within
this politics, the aim is not to overcome differences in order to achieve political unity. Rather it is to use
difference as a resource around which to establish multiple points of resistance to the myriad of micro-
and macro-level gendered relations of inequality and domination. The commonality around gendered
relations remains, but one strategy of resistance is not privileged over another. Feminist-informed
governmental analyses may provide the intellectual grounds for holding diversity within commonality
(i.e. making the links between micro-level practices and strategies of resistance and macro-level
concentrations of power, e.g. patriarchy). This means that the practice of feminisms need not collapse
into something in which anything goes. On the basis of specific theoretical analyses of particular
struggles generalisations can be made, and patterns in power relations and the effectiveness of various
strategies identified.
Policing aff
Domestic policing has expanded the power of the sovereign, we must look at the
intersections between policing and biopower—only the permutation solves
Scholars who focus on the intersection of poverty and penality often assert,¶ though rarely explore, the
claim that the war on drugs has become a primary¶ justification for the militarization of the police
function within the U.S. (see¶ Wacquant, 2003, for example). By “militarization” I refer to the expansion
of the¶ criminal justice apparatus to intensify unprecedentedly harsh punitive sanctions and ¶ coercive
practices, with attendant collateral damage, especially in urban centers and ¶ against socioeconomically
excluded populations. This has been the expansionary¶ sector of the federal budget during a time when
welfare expenditures have been¶ restructured along neoliberal lines (Peck 2001), especially since 1986
when the¶ first omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed. Gilmore (2002) calls it the¶ warfare-welfare
state, Peck (2003) calls it the penal state, Wacquant (2001) calls it¶ the carceral state/prison society, and
Andreas (1998) calls it the crimefare state.¶ Whatever one calls it, this form of state restructuring has
expanded police power¶ (and firepower), prosecutorial discretion, mass incarceration, welfare¶
conditionalities, employment qualification, and the erosion of civil liberties while ¶ downsizing citizenship
rights and universal participation in public space. The war¶ on drugs fundamentally alters the rights and
responsibilities of the most vulnerable¶ sectors of the U.S. population by normalizing what it means to
be an economically¶ productive body in society. This biopolitical discourse, in turn, has underwritten¶ the
highly repressive practices of the national penal state.
Impacts
AT: Bare life

Bare life is not a necessary condition of biopower—the sovereign must have a
condition of life that is in line with its goals and thus strives for the multiplicity of life,
increasing quality of life for the majority
Mika Ojakangas, Faculty member of Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at University of
Jyväskylä, 2005, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power: Agamben and Foucault,”
http://ej.lib.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/viewFile/856/874
Moreover, life as the object and the subject of bio‐power – given that life is everywhere, it becomes
everywhere – is in no way bare, but is as the synthetic notion of life implies, the multiplicity of the forms
of life, from the nutritive life to the intellectual life, from the biological levels of life to the political
existence of man.43 Instead of bare life, the life of bio‐power is a¶ plenitude of life, as Foucault puts it.44
Agamben is certainly right in saying that the production of bare life is, and has been since Aristotle, a
main strategy of the sovereign power to establish itself – to the same degree that sovereignty has been
the main fiction of juridico‐institutional thinking from Jean Bodin to Carl Schmitt. The sovereign power
is, indeed, based on bare life because it is capable of confronting life merely when stripped off and
isolated from all forms of life, when the entire existence of a man is reduced to a bare life and exposed
to an unconditional threat of death. Life is undoubtedly sacred for the sovereign power in the sense that
Agamben defines it. It can be taken away without a homicide being committed. In the case of bio‐power,
however, this does not hold true. In order to function properly, bio‐power cannot reduce life to the level
of bare life, because bare life is life that can only be taken away or allowed to persist – which also makes
understandable the vast critique of sovereignty in the era of bio‐power. Bio‐power needs a notion of life
that corresponds to its aims. What then is the aim of bio‐power? Its aim is not to produce bare life but,
as Foucault emphasizes, to “multiply life”,45 to produce “extra‐life.”46 Bio‐power needs, in other words,
a notion of life which enables it to accomplish this task. The modern synthetic notion of life endows it
with such a notion. It enables bio‐power to “invest life through and through”, to “optimize forces,
aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern.”47
Alternative
The alternative leads to other groups like NGOs filling in and being more violent than
the government
Laurence McFalls, Professor in the department of political science at Université de Montréal, 2010,
“Benevolent Dictatorship:¶ The Formal Logic of Humanitarian Government,”
http://www.mcgill.ca/files/isid/FormalLogic.pdf
The NGO’s negative form of definition clearly signals the shift in rationality away from the legal-rational
instrumentalism of the modern state. Just as the explosive economic growth of modern capitalism
depended on a shift from a rationality of ends (i.e. wealth) to a rationality of means (productivity), the
unprecedented development of the bureaucratic, sovereign state resulted from the western European
political dynamic of the pursuit of power as an end in itself, i.e., from the subjection of politics to a
purely instrumental rationality. The internal, circular logic of the preservation and aggrandizement of
state capacities obscured, as Agamben shows, the inclusive exclusion of political value rationality, which
manifested itself in the growing bio-politicization of modern state power. The emergence, since the
1970s, of the NGO has simply completed the backdoor-return of political value rationality. Performing
social functions previously associated with the state and doing so largely with funding of state origin,
NGOs short-circuit the self-sustaining circular logic of the bureaucratic state’s formal, impersonal
rationality. More than a neo-liberal privatisation of an allegedly bloated, inefficient and self-serving (but
procedurally legitimate) state bureaucracy, NGOs confer the means of¶ legitimate violence to particular,
personal, and passing substantive value rationalities. Feigning a non-political, humanitarian vocation,
NGOs, whose missions and methods can change with the prevailing wind, in fact embody a politics of
arbitrary life force imposing its values and visions.
Abolishing the risk of negative governance means abolishing the opportunity of

freedom—only the permutation solves.
In a sense, this encapsulates the whole problem of¶ governance in the age of capitalism, which in a way
is still with¶ us. The example of a town here is important for several reasons.¶ Capitalism as a movement
emerges in free towns, away from the¶ shackles of early modern (feudal) sovereign territorial states.¶
Foucault at one point says that “the town was par excellence the¶ free town” (ibid., p. 64), and that “the
town was always an¶ expansion within an essentially territorial system of power¶ founded and developed
on the basis of a territorial domination¶ defined by feudalism” (ibid.). For a feudal, territorial state the¶
problem is entirely negative, that is, of “fixing and demarcating¶ the territory”; the problem of the newly
emerging, positive art of¶ government on the other hand is: “(A)llowing circulations to take¶ place, of
controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring¶ that things are always in movement, constantly
moving around,¶ continuously going from one point to another, but in such a way¶ that the inherent
dangers of this circulation are cancelled out”¶ (ibid., p. 65). In governing open, fluid multiplicities
without¶ hindering the fluidity – in other words, managing the space of¶ governance in such a way as to
maximise opportunity and minimise¶ dangers (possible disruptions to the positive task) – fluidity,¶
openness, and inherent ungovernability are seen not just as¶ dangers (conceptually speaking), but as
opportunities. The task¶ of the newly evolving arts of government (which of course would¶ draw upon all
the present and past available resources) is to¶ evolve techniques, strategies, policies in order to do just
that: “It¶ is simply a matter of maximising the positive elements, for which¶ one provides the best
possible circulation, and of minimising¶ what is risky and inconvenient, like theft and disease, while¶
knowing that they will never be completely suppressed” (ibid., p.¶ 19). This last point is very important.
Whence comes this¶ realisation that ‘risk’ can only be ‘managed’ but never ‘completely¶ suppressed’? I
submit that this is (at least in part) due to the¶ realisation of the role of freedom in the whole game. If
the purpose¶ is to maximise ‘opportunity’, ‘utility’, or ‘positivity’ (whatever¶ you want to call it) then
freedom is essential to the system as a¶ whole; and, if freedom is essential, risk and uncertainty are also¶
essential, as they are part and parcel of freedom. Risk cannot be¶ abolished without abolishing freedom,
and hence the system itself.¶ It also follows from this that such a strategy of governance is¶ primarily
positive (as it is based on positivity par excellence –¶ freedom20) and only secondarily negative (aimed at
reducing risk).
Solvency—Engagement key
Surveillance is conducted and depends on information infrastructure—without
engaging that infrastructure, the alternative fails
David Lyon, directs the Surveillance Studies Centre, is a Professor of Sociology, holds a Queen’s
Research Chair and is cross-appointed as a Professor in the Faculty of Law at Queen's University in
Kingston, Ontario, 2002, “Everyday Surveillance: Personal data and social classifications,”
http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/cyberspace/lyon_ics.pdf
Surveillance depends, then, on information infrastructures, invisible frameworks¶ that order the data
according to certain criteria, purposes and interests.¶ In the later twentieth century, information
infrastructures were decisively¶ computerized, which simultaneously made them even less visible and
even more¶ powerful, and also produced some specific kinds of coding (Lessig 1999). The¶ kinds of
interests behind social classifications expanded to include not only¶ government departments and
policing or security services, but also a multitude¶ of commercial organizations as well (Gandy 1993; Lyon
1994). Beyond this,¶ particular kinds of agencies have become prominent – above all insurance¶
companies – and their interests often transcend those of either governmental or¶ commercial domains.
They have become, albeit as an unintended consequence of¶ their activities, very powerful social actors
on the contemporary landscape¶ (Strange 1996).
Decentered, localized resistance fails—must engage the federal government if we

want to create real change
War as a regime of biopower not only has an uneven geography, it is¶ reproduced as a liberal strategy
through the militarization of the state’s police¶ function. The uneven geography of state power has, in
turn, facilitated the¶ transnationalization of the militarized police function, to places where its¶
biopolitical liberalism has been, and continues to be, widely contested. The ¶ biopower of the drug war
rests on two principles. First, that “drugs” are a global¶ security threat to normal, healthy bodies and
economies. Second, that this threat is¶ so massive that narcotics-related police functions should more
closely resemble¶ warfare: against enemies, not citizens, and transnational in scope. These principles¶
can be contested, in turn, many different ways by many different actors. But the¶ necessary nexus for
the consolidation of these principles has been, and continues to¶ be, the U.S. state at the federal level—
not a decentered, hegemonic network of¶ biopower.¶ As Foucault states, “[p]ower as a pure limit set on
freedom is, at least in our¶ society, the general form of its acceptability” (Foucault, 1978, 86). Where
this¶ acceptability is located, however, has mattered a great deal for the¶ transnationalization and
militarization of the police function. The widespread¶ cultural stigmatization of “drugs” in the U.S. has
catalyzed to a significant degree¶ the thickening of the police function, particularly throughout the U.S.
and Latin¶ America. As long as “drugs” are embedded in the U.S. biopolitical economy of¶ transnational
fear, the U.S. narco-industrial complex will augment the¶ militarization of liberal democratic state-society
relationships through the police¶ function throughout the world (albeit in an uneven and contingent
fashion).¶ The normalization of repressive sovereign power within a regime of¶ biopower is facilitated
when the latter produces credible ways of understanding¶ threats to the social body as emanating from
individuals that can be treated as¶ enemies, rather than social transformations. Drug war discourses
produce locally¶ acceptable truths connecting real social disorder to fetishized, illicit commodities ¶ rather
than to local and global political and economic inequalities. This¶ normalization has legitimated the
expansion of the coercive capacity of states and¶ illicit economic actors. Many of the trends in state
militarization that are now used¶ in the war on terror were developed in the spaces of the war on drugs.
Dyncorp and¶ other military contractors were active in the privatization of the military function11 ¶ in the
Andes long before they were in Iraq (see Azzelini and Kanzleiter, 2005; and ¶ Borger and Hodgeson,
2001). The discursive association of illicit immigration with¶ dangerous individuals, justifying the
militarization of border police, was¶ predominantly drug-related before 9/11 (see Andreas and
Nadelman, 2006, 165-8).¶ And the practice of detaining suspects without due process, with years before
trial,¶ was happening in Cochabamba, Bolivia, long before Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (see¶ Farthing, 1997,
259).
State engagement is key otherwise the sovereign will be able to strategically define
resistance movements to shut down any hope for change
Aihwa Ong, a professor of sociocultural anthropology¶ and Asian studies at the University¶ of California,
Berkeley, 2012, “Powers of sovereignty: State, people, wealth, life,”
http://www.aihwaong.info/sg_userfiles/Powers_of_Sovereignty.pdf
An analytic of interacting powers (state and¶ people) recognizes the situated mix of resistance,¶
accommodation, and manipulation, and¶ uncertain outcomes. The state goal is to manipulate¶ any
political situation in order to achieve¶ an implicit state-people bargain that trades acceptance¶ of political
authoritarianism for sustained¶ improvements in economic and social¶ well-being. Each event crystallizes
conditions of¶ struggle in which the state seeks to thwart or¶ use the will of the people. But we need to
grasp¶ the convergence of events and opportunities at¶ different moments in time, and how the
interactions¶ crystallize heterogeneous possibilities¶ and outcomes, not predetermined victory for¶ the
people or for state authoritarianism. That is,¶ the authoritarian state, in its multifaceted embroilment¶
with global capital, cannot be frozen¶ in a posture of opposition to the masses, but¶ must strategically
intervene in unstable conditions,¶ one moment acting as a draconian oppressor¶ of workers, the next as
a protector of¶ labor against the depredations of global capital.¶ Besides its dynamic and heterogeneous
sites of¶ struggle, the distinctive circumstances of¶ China’s rise also make it hard to imagine Chinese¶
masses would politically identify with a¶ borderless global multitude.
State engagement is key—obtaining and maintaining freedom necessitates a

substantial amount of intervention on the part of the government
There are various instruments and preconditions of¶ power relations, viz. freedom, knowledge,
charisma, and charm,9¶ to mention a few. Let us suppose I want to control your life; the¶ question can
arise only if you are free and only to the extent that¶ you are free; if you are not free (e.g. if you are
chained, or are¶ enslaved),10 I do not need to control your activities. In this specific¶ sense, freedom is
the general condition of any power relation,¶ and it is also a general condition of governance. Similarly,¶
knowledge of the object/person one wants to govern also seems¶ to be a general condition of power
relations as well as governance.¶ However, the active, positive role of freedom, as well as¶ knowledge,
beyond this minimal sense changes depending on¶ the nature of power involved, the specific object of
governance,¶ etc. Now, if you are free, and if I need to control your activities¶ (and control may or may
not involve repression), I need to have¶ some sort of power over you. I need to have a certain strategy
in¶ place to govern, restrict, and streamline (depending on the¶ context) your (possible) actions. Various
factors can influence¶ such strategies. If, for example, my purpose is just that you do¶ not become too
powerful relative to me, then my purpose is¶ entirely negative. I have no positive interest in managing
your¶ life (or at least, only to the point that it is necessary for the¶ negative purpose of stopping you from
usurping my privileges).¶ My interest in positively governing you (restricting, managing¶ your actions or
conduct) exists only to the extent that it is related¶ to the negative task of limiting your power over me.
On the other¶ hand, if my interest in governing you is positive, it will require¶ much more elaborate
techniques, and the nature of¶ governance will vary according to the purpose,¶ objectives, and level of
techniques available.¶ All things being equal, negative governance involves much less¶ work than positive
governance.11 If you are more knowledgeable,¶ physically robust, and resourceful, it is more difficult to
govern¶ you. Generally speaking, the freer she is, the harder it is to govern¶ her, which paradoxically may
mean that freedom potentially¶ requires much more intervention on the part of the governor,¶ and not
less. Finally, if I want you to live in certain ways (that is,¶ govern you positively), it is much more
convenient (if possible)¶ to persuade you of the worth of living in that way, rather than¶ threaten you,
bribe you, and then constantly monitor you to see¶ if you comply or not. Self-discipline, self-subjection,
and self-governance¶ are thus more efficient ways of governing people.¶ Generally speaking, the strategy
of governance, especially when¶ it involves freedom as a technique of governance, is much more¶
efficient when it relies on strategies of self-governance.
Solvency—History Key
Without the specific analysis of the history of domestic surveillance the alternative
fails—prefer the aff
William O. Saas, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication Arts and Sciences, where he
specializes in rhetorics of war and peace, 2012, “Critique of Charismatic Violence,” symploke, V.20, No.
1-2, http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/symploke/v020/20.1-2.saas.html
Notably absent in Dawes’ highly useful analysis, however, is a sense of¶ modern bureaucracy’s
contingent historical character. By focusing on fictive¶ portrayals of both submission and resistance to
the depersonalized rule of¶ bureaucratic domination, Dawes foregoes historicization of the bureaucratic¶
organizational form as such. Also absent, then, is an account of the rhetorical¶ forces that conspired to
fix the shape and scope of the modern military¶ bureaucracy. As Walter Benjamin wrote, “The critique of
violence is a philosophy¶ of its history” (1978, 299). And as Max Weber demonstrated, the state¶
bureaucracy is particular to Western history, an Enlightenment innovation¶ radically divergent from and
eminently more resilient than traditional structures¶ of power (Breiner 1996, 134-135). Further, as Priest
and Arkin have¶ shown, the national security bureaucracy of today takes on an elaborately¶ different
form than that of even four years ago, owing to the Obama administration’s¶ continued rhetorical
development of the Bush administration’s most¶ covert and violent counter-terrorism policies (which
were themselves radical¶ declensions from the policies of previous administrations). To Dawes’ call¶ for
recognizing organizational forms as the nexus of the modern language-violence ¶ relationship, then, I will
add that understanding the relationship¶ between language and violence today demands understanding
the historical¶ conditions that precipitated the development of bureaucracy, as well as ¶ an understanding
of those exceptional rhetorical situations, whereby the¶ entrenched state bureaucracy can be adapted to
novel conditions and oriented¶ toward new ends. Only with a grasp of the national security
bureaucracy’s¶ evolutionary history—its material, contingent, and rhetorical origins—can¶ one begin to
imagine subverting or reshaping these actually existing bureaucratic¶ forms. Such is the task of the
following section.
Solvency—No public support

The alternative can’t garner the public support it needs—too many people are
supportive of executive overreach, the affirmative is the only feasible solution
William O. Saas, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication Arts and Sciences, where he
specializes in rhetorics of war and peace, 2012, “Critique of Charismatic Violence,” symploke, V.20, No.
1-2, http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/symploke/v020/20.1-2.saas.html
Controversial primarily among critics of U.S. foreign policy, the Obama¶ administration’s expansive
interpretations and extensions of executive¶ power and concomitant expansion of the national security
bureaucracy are¶ not sources of substantive lay-public outcry. Priest’s and Arkin’s July, 2010¶ exposé of
the vast post-9/11 expansion of the national security bureaucracy,¶ which became the subject of a PBS
Frontline episode in late 2011, did not¶ reach far beyond a relatively small (if also strident) readership.
Neither has¶ increasingly widespread news of the use of drone attacks—and the significant¶ number of
civilian deaths they have caused—spurred much popular debate.¶ A February, 2012 poll in the
Washington Post showed that a vast majority¶ of the American electorate supports the Obama
administration’s “counterterrorism”¶ policies (Wilson and Cohen 2012), with “83 percent of Americans”¶
and “fully 77 percent of liberal Democrats” endorsing the use of drone strikes¶ for assassinations, leading
the pollsters to conclude that “Obama is unlikely¶ to suffer any political consequences as a result of his
policy in this election¶ year.” What was divisive along party-lines under the second Bush administration¶
has now become a site of unusually strong bi-partisan consensus: the¶ Post poll also found that “53
percent of self-identified liberal Democrats—¶ and 67 percent of moderate or conservative Democrats—
support keeping¶ Guantanamo Bay open.” Where candidate Obama campaigned on a promise¶ to
reverse these policies, President Obama may be re-elected in part because ¶ he has in fact enhanced
them.
Framework
It is important to discuss policy implementation and practice the specific nature of
institutional engagement if we want to be effective members of government—this is
especially true in the context of biopower
Douglas Brown, an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Education, University of Regina, Canada,
2014, “Liberalism, Advanced Liberalism, and the Governmental Policy Challenge in Education,”
http://ineducation.ca/ineducation/article/view/187/655
Alteration in governance results in alternative formations of conduct (e.g., subject formation, care of the
self, and social technologies). Governance within a liberal democracy (liberalism or advanced liberalism)
is a "reasoned" activity. Anchored in day-to-day methodologies and practices, liberal governance
empowers individuals and agencies to act in relatively predictable ways. Social or institutional function
and change occurs in recognition of this process. With advanced liberalism, social mechanisms of
government, control, and paternalism give way to a new prudentialism. Subjects affect greater
responsibility (freedom) for living choices, or the assurance of survival and happiness (e.g., education,
health, and superannuation). Future consequences (e.g., calculable dangers and acceptable risks) are
calculations affecting things like diet, home security, and education through individualised governance
of conduct. Citizens embrace specific truth regimes, as played out upon participant bodies, and subject
positions in educated and knowledgeable relation to self-care. Importantly, while the individual is
answerable to and artificer of bureaucratic practices, we should not see these practices as structures, in
that they do not predetermine a given reality. Change is possible, in fact probable. However, it is
incorrect to assume that schooling, as a community project, is simply political. The processes of
schooling are mired in the routines of the everyday (e.g., values, beliefs, habits, and policies). What
makes these routines governable is that they become practice; they are mechanisms influencing
conduct and, in turn, regulation.¶ In recent years, the phenomenon of neoliberalism (both as an ethos
and as a series of practices) has drawn significant criticism in countries like Canada, the United Kingdom,
Australia, and the United States. Specific to education, critics have maligned policy-driven changes,
identifying them as draconian, as less than subtle attempts to de-professionalize or proletarianize the
field (e.g., de-professionalization of teaching, shrinking budgets, and the centralized control of curricula).
Recent adaptations include, open jurisdictional boundaries (in both staffing and recruiting), the call for
greater school choice (e.g., charter schools, private schools, and alternative schools), the standardization
of curricula and assessment, and merit pay. Within the debate forces have become highly polarized,
pitting Left against the Right, politicians against acting professionals, and professional associations
against think tanks, taxpayer associations, and media. Unfortunately, the act of political contestation can
blur or mask substantive issues and complexities as inherent in the act of policy choice. For strong public
censure can result in open debate and admonition with groups partitioned, issues reified, and
allegiances blurred.
Utilitarianism
In the context of security, utilitarian calculations are important. Biopower allows for
individual desires to be evaluated and for a collective desire to be actualized
The model of security, on the other hand, manages desires¶ on the macro level, providing space for
desires to flourish and¶ bloom (even spurring them on). People will be incited to discourse¶ about their
desires (sexual discourses for example) (Foucault¶ 1981, pp. 44-49); on the other hand, those desires are
managed¶ from a distance of anonymity – it is not this or that desire which¶ is important, not your or my
desire, but the general mechanism¶ and the logic of desire. Knowledge of individual desire allows¶
management of desire from a distance, culminating in the interests¶ of the population. It is realised that
“this desire is such that if¶ one give it ‘free play’, it will lead to the general interest of the¶ population”
(Foucault 2007, p. 73). The technique of government¶ no longer concerns itself with the desire of each
and every¶ individual, but with what is desirable for the population as a¶ whole. Policy initiatives
concentrate on making sure that these¶ interests are served and maximised, and if they have to
intervene¶ in the individual life (which will be not infrequently of course), ¶ that it will be in the name of
safeguarding the interests of the¶ population based on discourses and expertise developed in the¶ area,
and not in the name of guiding the individual in her private¶ life. Managing desires from the distance of
interest provides a¶ better model of desirability, efficiency, and feasibility. This should¶ all ideally lead to
a reformulation of disciplinary techniques¶ according to the new model of population and security¶
discourses.
AT: Rights bad

Human rights based strategies are necessary—the law is predicated on rights based
language and it is the most effective starting point
Anne Bloom, Professor of Law, the University of the Pacific/McGeorge School of Law, 2012, “Speaking
‘Truth’ to Biopower,” http://dev-web.swlaw.edu/pdfs/lr/41_2bloom.pdf
Many contemporary critics of rights take a similar approach.20 The leading critic of rights, for example,
argues that rights “in the abstract” have¶ no meaning and, as a result, it only makes sense to speak of
rights in terms of how they operate in particular social settings.21 Contemporary legal scholars also
detail the limitations of placing too much emphasis on rights-based claims, including the tendency of
right-based legal tactics to fragment political movements and to deemphasize or obscure a movement‟s
desire for more fundamental reform.22 Despite these critiques, however, many Critical Race and
Feminist Scholars argue for the continuing utility of rights if only because there appears to be no other
useful strategy.23¶ My argument here begins at a similar place. Whatever the limitations of rights, I do
not believe it is possible to do resistance work today without engaging the language of rights. The
language of rights and equality currently structures our thinking so much that it is all but impossible to
get outside of these discourses, particularly in legal settings.24 Even if it were possible, however, I would
be more than a little afraid to abandon rights rhetoric all together. While critics are correct to point out
how rights-based strategies can be damaging to political movements,25 strategies without respect for
rights also pose problems.26 As Patricia Williams has noted, the United States‟ “worst historical
moments have not been attributable to rights assertion but to a failure of rights commitment.”27
Certainly, rights-based work can be confining.28 But, like Williams,29 I am more afraid of what might
happen in the absence of rights.¶ To say that someone has rights is to show respect for her as an
individual and acknowledge that she is part of a shared humanity.30 The conferral of rights makes the
person a recognized member of society to whom, at least in theory, some respect and “collective
responsibility” is owed.31 These expressions of respect and collective responsibility are¶ extremely
important in a political system – such as ours – that is largely inaccessible to certain classes and groups
of people.32 For these otherwise excluded individuals and groups, rights-based claims provide an
important opening and an opportunity to be heard in ways that are otherwise not available.33 The fact
that the system frequently fails to respond to rights-based claims does not diminish their significance.34
The mere making of a demand for inclusion and respect can be empowering, even when the demand
goes unrealized.35
AT: Subjectivity
Only if we recognize the dignity of other individuals, as with the affirmative, can we
create a community that is for the good of the whole rather than a select few
Peyi Soyinka-Airewele Ph.D¶ Professor of International Relations,¶ & Comparative Studies, Carnegie
Fellow at the Department of¶ Political Science and International Relations,¶ Covenant University, Canaan
Land, Ota, March 2015, “The end of politics?: Reclaiming humanity in an age of biopower and
necropolitics,” http://covenantuniversity.edu.ng/content/download/35623/245151/file/
40th+Public+Lecture.pdf
In their examination of Fukuyama‘s essay, twenty-five years after its¶ original publication, Stanley and
Lee declare that away from the¶ excitement of the late 1980s: the imminent collapse of the Berlin Wall ¶
and the Soviet Union, and the ―orgy of free-market excitement,‖ ―today, ¶ it‘s hard to imagine
Fukuyama being more wrong. History isn‘t over¶ and neither liberalism nor democracy is ascendant‖
(Stanley & Lee,¶ 2014). Thus, they offer us a modified conceptualization of a liberalism¶ that might be
relevant for the future, made perhaps more powerful by its¶ very simplicity, ―liberalism is defined by a
commitment to liberty … a¶ concept grounded in the individual. It is the freedom to be all that one¶ is, to
actualize the fullness of one‘s potential as a human being endowed¶ with the capacity for creativity and
the ability to make autonomous¶ value judgments for ourselves.‖ Stanley and Lee also expose two¶
compelling realities that could frame a resurrected politics of life and¶ human dignity:¶ The first is that we
all share the same degree of dignity: No one¶ has any less potential than any other, and no one‘s
humanity is¶ any less pronounced than anyone else‘s. The second is that our¶ humanity imposes upon us
the same basic needs. By virtue of our¶ nature, we all require food, shelter, clothing, security, and a
range¶ of other basic goods necessary for sufficiency and survival.¶ Though deceptively simple, these
implications have profound¶ meaning when we consider how individual liberty is to be¶ translated into a
social and political construct … the principles of¶ equity and the common good must be embedded in the
structure¶ of society (Stanley and Lee, 2014).¶ No wonder several liberation scholars and theologians,
including¶ Gustavo Gutierrez for instance, insist that the social and economic¶ rights of the poor can only
be achieved by acknowledging that ―the poor¶ are a by-product of the system in which we live and for
which we are¶ responsible … hence the poverty of the poor is not a call to generous¶ relief action, but a
demand that we go and build a different social order‖¶ (cited in Farmer, 2004). Stanley and Lee caution
that it is only if¶ everyone recognizes the dignity of the human person that they will¶ recognize, and
strive to defend and preserve not only their own liberty,¶ but also that of all others in their society using
law. If we lose our¶ commitment as a polity to seek and defend human dignity, ―society¶ becomes a
jungle in which it is everyone for himself; self-interest¶ dominates, law becomes partial, and tyranny
supplants liberty‖ (2014).
AT: Disability Module

Surveillance techniques that include disability can be empowering and provide tools
to address the ableist system
Natasha Saltes, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology, Queen's University, Canada, 2013,
“‘Abnormal’ Bodies on the Borders of Inclusion:¶ Biopolitics and the paradox of Disability Surveillance,”
Surveillance & Society 11(1/2): 55-73.¶ http://www.surveillance-and-society.org
However, in order to improve accessibility, remove disabling barriers and develop adequate programs, ¶
services, and accommodation it is necessary to measure and count the prevalence and impact of¶
impairment. When conducted for this purpose, disability surveillance operates according to the
principles¶ and goals of the disability rights movement and is conducted according to a definition of
disability that¶ does not reduce disability to the body, but instead recognizes the ways in which social
constructions and¶ processes contribute to disability. This presents a paradox whereby the techniques of
disability¶ surveillance become a venue for both exclusion and empowerment. Disability surveillance
reinforces¶ ableist norms, but also provides the tools to change them. This paper problematizes
normalization and¶ definitions of disability grounded in medical discourse for its legitimization of the
perception of abnormal¶ that is used to rationalize exclusionary biopolitical agendas. I conclude with a
theoretical argument that¶ aims to resolve the paradox of preventing ‘risk’ and promoting rights by
applying Ojakangas’ (2005)¶ notion of an affirmative biopolitics of care.
AT: Charismatic Leader

No link: Surveillance is not the product of a charismatic leader—the affirmative is a
response to “therapeutic domination” by the government.
Laurence McFalls, Professor in the department of political science at Université de Montréal, 2010,
“Benevolent Dictatorship:¶ The Formal Logic of Humanitarian Government,”
http://www.mcgill.ca/files/isid/FormalLogic.pdf
I have elsewhere associated this fourth form with scientific authority, under which the impersonal
procedure of scientific method challenges existing orders of knowledge in a revolutionary process of
scientific advancement,¶ 9 but by metonymic analogy to medical knowledge we can also call this fourth
pure form of authority therapeutic domination. Under this form, as in the doctor-patient relationship of
command, the ruler claims obedience by virtue of the application of a scientifically valid, impersonal
procedure—a treatment protocol—in the extraordinary context of crisis. As Vanessa Pupavac has
argued, humanitarian interventions have in empirical practice taken on the quite literally medicalized
form of what she calls “therapeutic governance,” i.e., the application of social and clinical psychological
treatments to traumatized or otherwise stressed target¶ populations.10¶ While it encompasses
substantive practices of therapeutic governance in Pupavac’s sense, the concept of therapeutic
domination abstractly describes any relationship of command justified by an appeal to an impersonal
rule or procedure in rupture with a previous enduring order. Nonetheless, the formal structure of
figuratively therapeutic domination logically suggests that the substantive contents of its normative
claims will be literally therapeutic. As with legal-rational claims to authority, therapeutic domination’s
appeal to impersonal procedure applies to no-body in particular and hence to every-body in general.
Paradoxically, and in contrast to legal-rational authority, the apparently disembodied norms of
therapeutic authority focus precisely on the human body itself because of this mode of domination’s
extra-ordinary temporal quality.¶ Intervening in rupture with established practices, therapeutic
domination not only depersonalizes but decontextualizes social relationships. Without any reference to
culture or history, therapeutic domination reduces social agents to human bodies. Thus, unlike
charismatic, traditional or even legal-rational authority, no particular conception of the good life, but
only the minimal but absolute value of life itself, can inform therapeutic domination.
PRIVACY KRITIK RESPONSES
Permutations
Permutation solvency
Their critique inevitably relies on legal solutions. This proves the permutation solves
Tracy E. Higgins, Law Professor at Fordham Law School, 2000, “Reviving the Public/Private Distinction
in Feminist Theorizing,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 75Chi.-Kent L. Rev.847 (1999-2000),
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/323, ACC. 4-17-2015
A second reason why feminists should consider working within the public/private dichotomy and
perhaps reshaping it is that a distinction between public and private is implicit within the theoretical
critique itself. Specifically, the first critique-that the public/private dichotomy inappropriately restricts
state but not private action-is almost always an argument for the greater regulation of the private action
viewed as harmful. Similarly, the second critique-that the public/private dichotomy emphasizes action
and ignores inaction-is almost always an argument for the exercise of public power (or location of a
constitutional obligation to act) as a check on private power. This argument is advanced only so far by
collapsing public and private power and regarding them as equally threatening to individual liberty.
Indeed, a much more powerful argument can be made that, given the differences between public and
private power, there are good reasons to prefer the exercise of public power over the default allocation
of private power in the face of competing liberty or privacy concerns.
Law is the endpoint of their alternative

Claire Pomeroy, Bryn Mawr College December, 2004, “Redefining Public and Private in the
Framework of a Gendered Equality,” Knowing the Body: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Sex and
Gender, http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/sci_cult/courses/knowbody/f04/web3/ cpomeroy.html, ACC. 4-
21-2015
The regulation of things within the private realm is precarious, because "by its very terminology –
privacy – the doctrine suggests at its core that it is plausible to divide the world into two spheres: the
public and the private. The presupposition is that privacy should be protected because private acts do
not affect public life." On the contrary, the public and private are deeply interconnected spheres and do
affect one another greatly. Some privacy must be forfeited to gain protection from potential harm that
may occur in the private sphere. There must be laws intact to deal with the consequences of harm that
take place in private.
Even the biggest feminist critics still support legal reforms for privacy
Part I of this Essay addresses critiques of the public/private line that defines a zone of decisional or
spatial privacy. First, Part I briefly describes the most important of these critiques. It then suggests that,
notwithstanding assertions regarding the personal as political, most feminists, including the strongest
critics of the public/private line, find much that is worth preserving in the right of privacy. Part II
addresses critiques of the public/private line in the second sense, as a limit on the scope of
constitutional rights. Here again, after briefly describing two important types of critiques, Part II argues
that neither of the critiques supports an elimination of the line altogether. Acknowledging that the issue
is reform and not elimination of the distinction, Part III explores the utility of the public/private line,
particularly the differential constitutional treatment of public and private power; suggests ways of
refocusing and refining the critique; and lays out an agenda for further exploration.
Permutation solvency
Defending the public/private dichotomy as an analytical distinction does not mean
one matters to the exclusion of the other. This proves the permutation of acting on an
individual and policy level solves
This defense of the public/private line requires some immediate qualifications. First, the difference I
describe does not track perfectly the contours of public and private action. Certain forms of private
violence such as that based on racial or religious hatred can have a collective, political impact
comparable to state-sponsored violence. To the extent that it does, it ought to be viewed as implicating
the allocation of political power in a way that affects the public sphere. Second, private violence that is
pervasive and without legal remedy contributes to political oppression in a way that is increasingly and
appropriately regarded as implicating the state. Finally, acknowledging the existence of a qualitative
difference between private and state-sponsored violence does not lead to the conclusion that one
matters while the other does not. The feminist deconstruction of the distinction between public and
private violence responds to the tendency to ignore or downplay the private. However, one need not
collapse the categories analytically to argue that both should be taken seriously. Indeed, maintaining the
distinction may prove useful for the purposes of understanding the nature of the harm and developing
appropriate responses both on the individual and the policy level.
Link Answers / Turns
No link – Legal reforms / Statism

Legal reforms can solve. The 1AC protects civil liberties and disrupts the power
imbalance between the people and the State
Neil M. Richards, Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis, May 20, 2013, “The Dangers
of Surveillance,” Harvard Law Review, http://harvardlawreview.org/2013/05/the-dangers-of-
surveillance/, ACC. 4-19-2015
The challenge to our law posed by the Age of Surveillance is immense. The justifications for surveillance
by public and private actors are significant, but so too are the costs that the rising tide of unfettered
surveillance is creating. Surveillance can sometimes be necessary, even helpful. But unconstrained
surveillance, especially of our intellectual activities, threatens a cognitive revolution that cuts at the core
of the freedom of the mind that our political institutions presuppose. Therefore, surveillance must be
constrained by legal and social rules. The technological, economic, and geopolitical changes of the past
twenty years have whittled away at those rules, both formally on their substance (for example, the
Patriot Act and the expansion of National Security Letter jurisdiction) and in practice (for example, the
pressure that the technological social practices of the Internet have exerted on privacy). By thus
recognizing the harms of surveillance and crafting our laws accordingly, we can obtain many of its
benefits without sacrificing our vital civil liberties or upending the power balance between individuals on
the one hand and companies and governments on the other.
No link – Intellectual privacy

Intellectual privacy transcends the public/private dichotomy. Reforming law is at
least a good first step
But we must also remember that in modern societies, surveillance fails to respect the line between
public and private actors. Intellectual privacy should be preserved against private actors as well as
against the state. Federal prosecutions based on purely intellectual surveillance are thankfully rare, but
the coercive effects of monitoring by our friends and acquaintances are much more common. We are
constrained in our actions by peer pressure at least as much as by the state. Moreover, records collected
by private parties can be sold to or subpoenaed by the government, which (as noted above) has shown a
voracious interest in all kinds of personal information, particularly records related to the operation of
the mind and political beliefs. Put simply, the problem of intellectual privacy transcends the
public/private divide, and justifies additional legal protections on intellectual privacy and the right to
read freely. Constitutional law and standing doctrine alone will not solve the threat of surveillance to
intellectual freedom and privacy, but they are a good place to start.
Protecting intellectual privacy is justified because surveillance here affects our very
thinking
At the level of theory, I will explain why and when surveillance is particularly dangerous and when it is
not. First, surveillance is harmful because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties. With respect to
civil liberties, consider surveillance of people when they are thinking, reading, and communicating with
others in order to make up their minds about political and social issues. Such intellectual surveillance is
especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment with new, controversial, or deviant
ideas. To protect our intellectual freedom to think without state oversight or interference, we need
what I have elsewhere called “intellectual privacy.” A second special harm that surveillance poses is its
effect on the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched. This disparity creates the risk of a
variety of harms, such as discrimination, coercion, and the threat of selective enforcement, where critics
of the government can be prosecuted or blackmailed for wrongdoing unrelated to the purpose of the
surveillance.
Link /Internal link answers

No internal link—Utilizing the distinction does not mean we choose sides
This is not to say that, categorically, state action should be regarded as legitimate and private action
suspect. It would be a mistake for feminists to underestimate the very real threat posed by tyranny of
the majority by focusing our attention only on the consequences of private power and the virtues of
public power. Feminists need no reminder that women's equality has been and continues to be
threatened by the exercise of public power. Yet, maintaining the distinction does not require choosing
sides in a categorical way. The point is not simply to favor one form of power over the other but to
recognize their differences and to theorize more carefully about the kind of threats each may pose.
Deconstructing the public/private divide erodes the benefits of protecting the private
sphere as a space for feminine experience
Claire Pomeroy, Bryn Mawr College December, 2004, “Redefining Public and Private in the
Framework of a Gendered Equality,” Knowing the Body: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Sex and
Gender, http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/sci_cult/courses/knowbody/f04/web3/ cpomeroy.html, ACC. 4-
21-2015
The deconstruction of the public/private divide is not only causing the loss of the individuality and
uniqueness of the female experience, but it is also threatening the sanctity of the private space. The
private space is being destroyed because of its intrinsic association with the oppression of females, but
as it is being destroyed, the benefits of private space are also being ruined. Both the public and private
realms have morally associated characteristics with them. The public moral evaluation – duty, justice,
right, equality, liberty, legitimacy, resistance – is counterbalanced by the private moral sentiment and
emotion – affection, responsibility, love, mercy, compassion, decency, kindness. Associated with the
private sphere is intimacy; with the public sphere is detachment and coldness. The private sphere is a
place that a person can escape from the impersonal public sphere. Privacy "allows us to do things we
would not do in public, to experiment, to engage in self-reflection; it protects us from majoritarian
pressures; it allows us to control who we will have access to ourselves and to information about
ourselves, and to make decisions that critically affect our lives." It is not intended to secure separation
from social pressure, but to assist social involvements and intimacy.
Link Turn / Aff is a pre-requisite

The Aff is a pre-requisite to the alternative. Only working with the plan can we
reconstruct privacy through a gendered lens
Linda C. McClain, Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law, March, 1999, “Reconstructive
tasks for a liberal feminist conception of privacy,” William & Mary Law Review,
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1556&context=wmlr, ACC. 4-22-2015
All of this probably sounds familiar, perhaps even too familiar. Reconstructing privacy requires moving
beyond restating such rebuttals to feminist critiques of privacy. If they have not already done so, liberals
should readily grant that an adequate conception of privacy in its various dimensions must clearly reject
privacy's legacy of confinement and subordination, as well as the immunity of private aggression from
the law's reach. The reconstructive task for an adequate liberal-and liberal feminist-model of privacy
requires a normative argument as to why society should honor some form of public/private distinction
and some limiting principles that admit of an appropriate role for governmental regulation of "private"
life, "private" places, and "private" relationships.
Link turns / Permutation solvency

Laws over privacy can be central to women’s freedom. The alternative’s assumption of
a universal feminist vision of privacy is false and implicitly fosters fractures within
feminism, which internal link turns the kritik and is a net-benefit to the permutation
The persistence of these critiques-often under the banner "the personal is the political" - suggests that
feminists have very little use for the notion that the private sphere is worthy of protection from
government regulation or government scrutiny. This turns out not to be the case. Indeed, some
feminists have defended a liberal conception all along. For example, both Anita Allen and Linda McClain,
among others, have consistently argued that a modified liberal conception of privacy is central to
women's liberty interests. While taking feminist critiques of liberal privacy seriously, McClain has
challenged feminists to clarify and refine their arguments with respect to the core concerns of privacy.
She has made a compelling case that decisional privacy is central to women's freedom and need not
unduly limit affirmative efforts by the state to secure women's equality. Anita Allen has advocated a
liberal conception of privacy that would simultaneously preserve those values served by a right of
privacy and respond to feminist critiques of traditional definitions of both spatial and decisional privacy.
Like McClain, Allen's theory of privacy would not preclude state intervention in the private realm where
necessary to secure women's equality and security.
Greater access to public power means women can theorize and take advantage of the
public/private distinction
Finally, there are practical reasons for maintaining the public/private distinction in feminist theorizing.
Michelman articulates the view of a "confirmed optimist" about the democratic process. I suggest that
his view of public power might also be appealing to the confirmed feminist, not only for theoretical but
also for instrumental reasons. I suggest as much simply because there are good reasons to believe that
women may have greater access to public power than to private power. Because women are a majority
of the population, in a well-functioning democracy one would expect that women's interests would be
well reflected in the legislative process. Yet, owing to the exclusion of women from the political realm,
both de jure and de facto, women have never exercised as much political power as is their due.
Nevertheless, even before women were entitled to vote, they were often successful at influencing
legislative bodies. For example, married women gained property rights through legislative change before
women could vote. Later, women achieved income support for widows and workplace protections
through legislative means. More recently, women have won changes in rape statutes, child support
standards, and child support enforcement. During the last decade, Congress has passed two important
pieces of legislation protecting women's rights: the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Violence
Against Women Act.
Link turn / Permutation solvency - Intersectionality

The intersectional method of the 1AC can be combined with the alternative, which
solves better. The alternative alone ignores collectives denied power
Yasmeen Abu-Laban, University of Alberta, 2015, “Gendering Surveillance Studies: The Empirical and
Normative Promise of Feminist Methodology,” Surveillance & Society,
http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/gend, ACC. 4-21-2015
The insights emerging from these recent works are suggestive of how complex forms of identity may be
at work in the surveillant gaze, and this is connected to power. In fact, it has been noted that the
surveillant gaze frequently fixates on specific collectivities lacking power and construed as flawed such
as poor women of colour, welfare recipients, immigrants or those perceived as “illegal” immigrants,
prisoners, homeless people or enemy combatants. Gendering Surveillance Studies, and pushing the
boundaries of empirical understanding, may be further enhanced by much more explicitly and
systematically embracing intersectionality as part of the methodological understanding informing how
research proceeds and is analyzed. This may also serve to illuminate extant concepts in the field in ways
that are attuned to complexity and possible differentiation at local, national and global levels, as well as
over time. In this sense “the surveillant gaze” may take multiple and intersecting forms as concerns for
example masculinity, imperialism, whiteness, adulthood, and so on.
Link turns – Surveillance is patriarchal

Surveillance targeted at the poor and welfare recipients disproportionately hurts
women, especially racialized women
Yasmeen Abu-Laban, University of Alberta, 2015, “Gendering Surveillance Studies: The Empirical and
Normative Promise of Feminist Methodology,” Surveillance & Society,
http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/gend, ACC. 4-21-2015
The work on gender and surveillance also reflects on how state surveillance may take gendered forms.
One sphere in which women are especially prone to encountering state surveillance is in the area of
social welfare. As a contemporary example, Monahan notes how electronic benefit transfer systems for
American welfare and food stamp recipients serve to surveil poor and often racialized women.
Introduced in the U.S. as part of the 1996 reform of welfare, ostensibly to prevent fraud, these systems
track purchases made with electronic cards, with consequences for individual budgeting strategies and
choices. What is equally noteworthy is that as early as World War One, Britain’s embryonic welfare state
pension programme designed for war widows involved gendered bureaucratic surveillance. In this way,
the state effectively replaced the deceased husband as both the financial and moral guardian of war
widows. These findings suggest the deeply embedded forms of gendered bureaucratic surveillance
contained in the welfare state, a finding echoed about the judicial branch of the state by criminologists
addressing gender and crime. Such work has much to say about how surveillance practices relate to
gender and other social divisions, how new forms of surveillance and surveillance technologies may
reinforce existing social divides along new lines, and also how a variety of state institutions may be
mobilized. On the latter, for instance Flavin draws attention to how the courts, laws and law
enforcement agencies, and social welfare/child welfare agencies, work in tandem to effectively “police”
women’s reproduction in the United States in relation to conception, abortion, pregnancy and child-
rearing.
Surveillance is a tool of patriarchy

Rohini Lakshané, GenderIT, June 11, 2014, “Feminist Principles of the Internet,” WELDD,
http://www.weldd.org/resources/feminist-principles-internet, ACC. 4-21-2015
Surveillance by default is the tool of patriarchy to control and restrict rights both online and offline. The
right to privacy and to exercise full control over our own data is a critical principle for a safer, open
internet for all. Equal attention needs to be paid to surveillance practices by individuals against each
other, as well as the private sector and non-state actors, in addition to the state.
Alternative Answers
Feminist criticism fails

Feminist criticism of the public/private dichotomy lacks unity and overstates the
threat to agency and equality
The line between public and private has at least two distinct meanings within feminist theorizing.
Feminists sometimes use the concept to refer to the demarcation of a zone of personal privacy
protected from state regulation. This usage, in turn, has at least two variations, sometimes referring to
"decisional privacy," a concept related to personal autonomy, and at other times referring to spatial
privacy, related to the sanctity of home and family, both of which enjoy a degree of constitutional
protection. In other contexts, feminists use the concept of the public/private line to denote the limits of
the application of constitutional constraints. In this sense of the term, actions falling on the public side
of the line implicate the constitution and those on the private side do not. Clearly the uses are related;
however, just as clearly they are not the same. The first demarcates a constitutional limit on the reach of
state action. The second demarcates a state action limit on the reach of the constitution. In this Essay, I
argue that feminist critiques of both uses of the public/private distinction tend to overstate the threat
the concepts pose to women's liberty and equality and to understate or ignore altogether the potential
value of the distinction for feminist theorizing. With respect to the first definition, the private as the
personal, this "meta-critique" is not particularly new. Liberal feminists have always defended the value
of privacy, and, increasingly, other feminists are beginning to rethink its value in a number of contexts.
With respect to the second definition of the public/private distinction, focusing on state action,
feminists remain remarkably unified in the deconstructive project. In this Essay, I hope to raise a
challenge to this unity and provoke a reexamination of the public/private line, moving the critique from
the category of "foregone conclusion" to "unfinished business."
Legal reforms are key

The alternative fails. Changing the courts is essential to redefining the public-private
dichotomy
Tamara Dinev, PhD, Professor, Chair, Dept. of Information Technology & Operations Management,
College of Business, Florida Atlantic University, 2014, “Why would we care about privacy?,” European
Journal of Information Systems (2014) 23, 97–102,
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ejis/journal/v23/n2/full/ejis20141a.html, ACC. 4-18-2015
Historically, the need for definition and conceptualization of privacy originated in the law and the needs
of courts to define the boundaries between public and private. When it was only concerning physical
privacy, the approach was relatively easy: the boundaries of the physical space such as room, house,
private property, satisfied the quest for that definition. The landscape changed when the courts and
states found the need to include information and data gathering in the definition of privacy and with this
to rigorously redefine public–private boundaries. It is important to remember that it will be the courts
and states again who will need the definitions and conceptualization that the scientists will flesh out
from their research on privacy. And this is where the largest societal impact of MIS privacy research lies.
Impact Answers / Turns
Agency/ Value to life

Privacy does not foreclose agency, but is essential to maintaining spaces for
subjectivity and value to life
Julie E. Cohen, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, May, 2013, “What privacy is for,”
Harvard Law Review, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904,
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol126_cohen.pdf, ACC. 4-21-2015
But here we must come back to privacy, for the development of critical subjectivity is a realistic goal only
to the extent that privacy comes into play. Subjectivity is a function of the interplay between emergent
selfhood and social shaping; privacy, which inheres in the interstices of social shaping, is what permits
that interplay to occur. Privacy is not a fixed condition that can be distilled to an essential core, but
rather “an interest in breathing room to engage in socially situated processes of boundary
management.” It enables situated subjects to navigate within preexisting cultural and social matrices,
creating spaces for the play and the work of self-making. And once this point is established, privacy’s
dynamism becomes clear. Lack of privacy means reduced scope for self-making — along the lines of the
liberal ideal, or along other lines. Privacy does not negate social shaping. “In a world with effective
boundary management, however, there is play in the joints, and that is better than the alternative. . . .
Privacy’s goal, simply put, is to ensure that the development of subjectivity and the development of
communal values do not proceed in lockstep.” Privacy will not always produce expressions of
subjectivity that have social value, and here I mean expressly to leave open the question whether there
might be particular types of privacy claims that do not merit protection or even respect. Even so, privacy
is one of the resources that situated subjects require to flourish.
The pursuit of happiness is dependent on privacy protections

Adam D. Thierer, George Mason University - Mercatus Center, March 2013, “The Pursuit of Privacy in
a World Where Information Control is Failing,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy,
This framework provides a useful way of thinking about privacy. Even if we cannot agree whether we
have a right to privacy, or what the scope of any particular privacy right should be, the right to pursue it
should be as uncontroversial as the right to pursue happiness. In fact, pursing privacy is probably an
important element of achieving happiness for most citizens. Almost everyone needs some time and
space to be free with their own thoughts or to control personal information or secrets that they value.
But that does not make it any easier to define the nature of privacy as a formal legal right, or any easier
to enforce it, even if a satisfactory conception of privacy could be crafted to suit every context.
Privacy is an inherent human right that is essential to dignity

Bruce Schneier, CTO of Counterpane Internet Security, May 2006, “The Eternal Value of Privacy,”
Wired, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/05/70886, ACC. 4-
23-2015
The most common retort against privacy advocates -- by those in favor of ID checks, cameras, databases,
data mining and other wholesale surveillance measures -- is this line: "If you aren't doing anything
wrong, what do you have to hide?" Some clever answers: "If I'm not doing anything wrong, then you
have no cause to watch me." "Because the government gets to define what's wrong, and they keep
changing the definition." "Because you might do something wrong with my information." My problem
with quips like these -- as right as they are -- is that they accept the premise that privacy is about hiding
a wrong. It's not. Privacy is an inherent human right, and a requirement for maintaining the human
condition with dignity and respect.
Anti-surveillance/Privacy policies are good

Totalistic surveillance should be rejected. At the very least we must problematize
surveillance efforts at every turn to prevent escalating violations of civil liberties
At a practical level, I propose a set of four principles that should guide the future development of
surveillance law, allowing for a more appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of government
surveillance. First, we must recognize that surveillance transcends the public/private divide. Public and
private surveillance are simply related parts of the same problem, rather than wholly discrete. Even if
we are ultimately more concerned with government surveillance, any solution must grapple with the
complex relationships between government and corporate watchers. Second, we must recognize that
secret surveillance is illegitimate and prohibit the creation of any domestic-surveillance programs whose
existence is secret. Third, we should recognize that total surveillance is illegitimate and reject the idea
that it is acceptable for the government to record all Internet activity without authorization.
Government surveillance of the Internet is a power with the potential for massive abuse. Like its
precursor of telephone wiretapping, it must be subjected to meaningful judicial process before it is
authorized. We should carefully scrutinize any surveillance that threatens our intellectual privacy.
Fourth, we must recognize that surveillance is harmful. Surveillance menaces intellectual privacy and
increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrimination; accordingly, we must recognize surveillance
as a harm in constitutional standing doctrine. Explaining the harms of surveillance in a doctrinally
sensitive way is essential if we want to avoid sacrificing our vital civil liberties.
New technologies of surveillance demand that we actively protect privacy

What is certain is that privacy is important and urgently in need of preservation, and that current
regulatory strategies seem unlikely to prove up to the task. Imbuing our networked information
technologies with a different politics will require both the vision to appreciate privacy’s dynamism and
the will to think creatively about preserving it.
Surveillance is built on the idea of systemic exclusion and mass discrimination

Kirstie Ball, Business School, Open University, Birmingham, UK, Et al. 2009, “Editorial: Surveillance
Studies Needs Gender and Sexuality,” Surveillance & Society 6(4): 352-355.
Surveillance theory holds that surveillance processes are routine, systemic, purposeful and focused.
They are woven into everyday life. They aggregate individuals into populations, in part by creating
robust, replicable analytical categories. This is done with the strategic objective of institutional
management of those populations and the everyday life of the individuals that comprise them.
Marginalisation, exclusion and mass discrimination are necessary byproducts of this manageable order.
Anti-surveillance/Privacy policies are good

We must confront the problems underlying surveillance to take advantage of the
benefits of surveillance and avoid privacy intrusions
Thomas B. Kearns, JD, Attorney, 1999, “Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of
Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal,
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/ wmborj/vol7/iss3/10, ACC. 4-17-2015
Technological advances are changing the face of American society dramatically. New technology affects
individuals in countless ways, including the manner in which they interact with each other, with
businesses, and with the government. While technology makes it possible to accomplish many tasks
more efficiently, and even to accomplish tasks previously not possible, these accomplishments do not
come without costs. Even though they provide solutions to current problems, many technological
developments often create new, sometimes unforeseen, problems. As society incorporates these
developments into its structure, the problems that the developments create must be confronted so that
the benefits of technology outweigh its burdens. One area in which new technology currently is creating
such problems is the right to privacy. Surveillance technology invokes privacy concerns perhaps more
directly than any other type of technology because surveillance equipment, by its very nature, is
designed to enable a surveillant to observe that which the subject does not intend to be observed.
Although surveillance is a useful and necessary aspect of criminal investigation, new developments in
surveillance technology equipment, such as magnetic gradient measuring, passive millimeter wave
imaging, back-scattered x-ray imaging, and radar-skin scanning, give rise to privacy issues that previously
did not exist. Furthermore, although privacy concerns stemming from surveillance activity traditionally
involve government intrusion, private actors increasingly have access to surveillance equipment and the
ability to invade individuals' privacy.
The public/private dichotomy is good

The public/private distinction is inevitable and can be good in some instances
Richard J. Arneson, Prof. in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego,
Summer, 2000, “Egalitarian Justive Versus the Right to Privacy,” Social Philosophy and Policy 17, No. 2,
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/privacy3.pdf, ACC. 4-17-2015
Broad, diffuse, and contentless, the right to privacy construed as the right to be let alone does not
capture all that one might have in mind in invoking a public/private distinction in political argument.
The distinction can be made between behavior that is considered appropriate in private places such as
within private homes and behavior that is deemed appropriate in public spaces such as streets, parks,
and businesses open to the public. A society might have different codes of behavior for public and
private spaces without endorsing the idea that individual discretion should reign in the private spaces.
Individual conduct might be strictly regulated in both spheres, but differently in each. Rules that specify
appropriate behavior in public and private might take the form of conferring rights on persons that
others behave in public and private in these approved ways. In this way when a couple romantically
inclined makes love in a public park, this is an invasion of the privacy of those who wish to use the park
without being distracted by this sight, or rather, an invasion of the public sphere by what ought to be
conduct done in private. An example of intrusion of public behavior into the private sphere would be
my launching into a sermon, as though to my Sunday congregation, at a private dinner party.
The public/private dichotomy is good in certain circumstances and justifies state

action
The first and simplest reason for maintaining the public/private distinction for certain purposes is that it
may actually capture a difference that is meaningful to women's experiences. For example, consider the
critique of the emphasis on state action in the context of international human rights. Although it is
certainly correct that a human rights regime that focuses exclusively on harms directly perpetrated by
the state fails to address important threats to women's lives and liberty, it may also be correct that state
sponsored violence is qualitatively different from private violence. This view is consistent with the
reports of victims of human rights abuses. Acts of private violence indisputably have an impact on the
lives of individual victims that may include profound and long-lasting physical and psychological
consequences. When rape and torture are perpetrated by soldiers or police, however, those physical
and psychological consequences are compounded by political powerlessness and vulnerability that often
extend beyond the individual to the broader community. This distinction may justify different
approaches to regulating the harm, including different theories of state responsibility.
Democracy Turn – 2AC

Privacy is the bedrock of freedom and democracy
Thomas B. Kearns, JD, Attorney, 1999, “Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of
Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal,
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/ wmborj/vol7/iss3/10, ACC. 4-17-2015
Privacy is an essential element of a free society. Many commentators agree that without privacy,
freedom is not possible.' Without the ability to interact with one another in private, individuals cannot
exchange ideas freely. This "marketplace of ideas" is essential for a democracy to function properly and
give rise to a free society." Although no "universally accepted definition of the right to privacy" exists,
court opinions that address privacy issues often encompass three areas of privacy interests: autonomy,
intrusion, and information privacy.
This culminates in extinction

Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, December 1995,
“Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives.” A Report to the
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York,
[http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm, ACC. 2-22-2015
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the
former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs
intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian
regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly
endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the
weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
Democracy Extension
Their anti-liberal democracy criticism absconds real policymaking efforts and ignores
legal reflexivity. The alternative to democracy undermines agency
Richard Youngs, Dir. of FRIDE and Assoc. Prof. at the U of Warwick, January2011, “Misunderstanding
the maladies of liberal democracy promotion, No. 106, FRIDE,
http://www.fride.org/publication/884/misunderstanding-the-maladies-of-liberal-democracy-promotion,
ACC. 4-22-2015
There are different levels of critique, which risk elision. One thing is to argue that Western powers should support core liberal
democratic principles, then from this base work to build into their policies a concern with social equality, participation,
deliberation and religious identity. It would be entirely convincing to argue that, while democracy promoters have
advanced, they could and should be doing more in this direction. But it is quite another thing to suggest that
such aims should be supported against or instead of core liberal norms. In practice, what many critics appear to
advocate is not a cumulative combination, but a dilution of the liberal component in favour of other forms. They
betray a core inconsistency: they dislike democracy promotion for being overly intrusive, but then advocate
modifications that would make it more, not less, intrusive. This is because most suggested ‘alternative forms of
democracy’ breach the line between process and substantive policy outputs – they advocate particular ends, not
just a type of policy-making means. The concrete examples of European policies demonstrate that it is hardly credible to
‘accuse’ Brussels of being an unthinking citadel of blinkered liberalism. Indeed, in this author’s experience, conversations with
policy-makers reveal this to be akin to an almost unmentionable L-word. When so much doubt and ambivalence now
suffuses democracy support strategies, it is unconvincing to admonish the latter for being uniformly, heavily
prescriptive. Donors’ tendency to see democracy through the prism of their own political systems still
often surfaces.
Privacy incursions undermine the entire liberal democratic system

So described, privacy is anything but old-fashioned, and trading it away creates two kinds of large
systemic risk, which Parts III and IV describe. Privacy incursions can be episodic or systematic, but
systematic deprivations of privacy also facilitate episodic privacy incursions. In this Article, therefore, I
focus on the interplay between privacy and systems of surveillance. Part III argues that freedom from
surveillance, whether public or private, is foundational to the practice of informed and reflective
citizenship. Privacy therefore is an indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic political
systems. Freedom from surveillance also is foundational to the capacity for innovation; therefore, as
Part IV explains, the perception of privacy as anti-innovation is a non sequitur. Innovation occurs in
commercial and social contexts and is infused with particular commercial and social values. A
commercial culture that sees privacy as threatening its own valued practices of knowledge production
will register privacy regulation as a threat. But a society that values innovation ignores privacy at its
peril, for privacy also shelters the processes of play and experimentation from which innovation
emerges. In short, privacy incursions harm individuals, but not only individuals. Privacy incursions in the
name of progress, innovation, and ordered liberty jeopardize the continuing vitality of the political and
intellectual culture that we say we value.

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West Coast Publishing Surveillance 2015 AFFIRMATIVE Page 1

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Edited by Jim Hanson

Adam McKibben, Ben Menzies, Eric Robinson, Greta Stahl,

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Resolved: The United States federal

AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE FILE INTRO

Using the arguments in this File

Use West Coast Evidence as a Beginning

Copying West Coast Evidence

Ordering West Coast Materials

1. Visit the West Coast Web Page at www.wcdebate.com

Copyright 2015. West Coast Publishing. All Rights Reserved.

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Executive Order 12333 Undermines Separation of Powers.............................................................151

Racism / Orientalism internals.........................................................................................................191

2AC Legislative Rollback...................................................................................................................286

Crushes Freedom—Surveillance Specific.........................................................................................324

NU – Obama Won’t Act...................................................................................................................359

BIOPOWER KRITIK RESPONSES................................................................................................................398

Feminist criticism fails.....................................................................................................................442

SURVEILLANCE TOPIC OVERVIEW

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially

Contextually, surveillance is electronic, gathered for a purpose, typically to provide evidence of

Alternative Actors: Topic literature on domestic surveillance, American intelligence, and

Cybersecurity: Cybersecurity is important in ways that transcend terrorism prevention. Surveillance of

Feminism/Privacy Bad: Privacy, as constructed in traditional liberal discourse, relies on a distinction

CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACTS AFFIRMATIVE

Civil liberties key to democracy

Civil liberties are the essence of democracy—all else is frill

Civil liberties key to the economy

Violations of civil liberty can directly interfere with commerce

Lack of civil liberties can deter international investment

Utilitarian civil liberties bad

Answer to public health

Infringing civil liberties can harm public health efforts

Violating civil liberties doesn’t stop terrorism

Violating of civil liberties directly force people into terrorism

Answer to violations of liberties lead to rights

Violations of liberty only beget more violations

Answer to only affects criminals

Contention One: The Status quo

C. DNA inclusion of misdemeanors is inevitable and moving toward a national

D. CODIS is a federal database that incorporates federal and state DNA

Advantage One: Privacy

F. Privacy is essential to preserving the value to life. In the face of advancing

B. CODIS is another chapter is American Jim Crow-style racial segregation

C. Overrepresentation in CODIS means it effectively codes the entire African American

Privacy Advantage Extension

General privacy Extension

CODIS is a slippery slope

DNA collection stored in CODIS is a slippery slope of government intrusion

CODIS is a slippery slope

CODIS is a slippery slope

Minority Report Extension

The government can retain CODIS DNA data indefinitely

Minority Report Extension

DNA usage is approaching a genetic panopticon

Jim Crow Advantage Extension

African Americans & Latinos are disproportionately included in CODIS

African-American are disproportionately targeted by CODIS

African Americans & Latinos are disproportionately included in CODIS

Familial targeting bad / expanding now