The Humanistic Psychologist, 43: 160–172, 2015

Copyright # Division 32 (Humanistic Psychology) of the American Psychological Association

ISSN: 0887-3267 print/1547-3333 online
DOI: 10.1080/08873267.2014.990458

Beholding and Being Beheld: Simone Weil,

Iris Murdoch, and the Ethics of Attention

Mark Freeman
College of the Holy Cross

Although they would be unlikely to formulate their interests in these terms, Simone Weil and Iris
Murdoch are both extraordinary explorers of the relationship between psychology and the Other.
For Weil, the faculty of attention is a key condition for beholding what is there, in the world.
Murdoch, drawing significantly on Weil’s seminal insights, underscores the profound challenge
entailed in doing so: owing to the ever-present intrusion of the ego, the world often remains veiled,
obscured. Beholding the Other thus requires what Murdoch calls ‘‘unselfing,’’ divesting oneself of
ego and thereby letting world emerge (1970, p. 82). One path of unselfing is through developing one’s
powers of attention. Along these lines, it might be said that sharpening and developing one’s powers of
attention is a prerequisite for beholding the Other, whatever it may be. Another path of unselfing—or
another moment in the dialectical process being considered—is through encountering those ‘‘objects,’’
both human and nonhuman, that can serve to disrupt and displace one’s own egocentric energies.
Taken together, these two paths—beholding and being beheld—lead in the direction of an ‘‘ethics
of attention.’’

My primary aim in this article is to articulate what might be termed an ethics of attention, which,
for the time being, may be taken to refer to that quality of attentive beholding that allows the
Other, whether human or nonhuman, to stand forth in its otherness and difference. In doing so,
I draw especially on the work of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch, both of whom found in attention
an important vehicle for strengthening moral and ethical life. Of central concern in this context is
one’s attention to works of art, especially music, partly because Murdoch, in particular, found the
encounter with art to be of primary importance in the process of unselfing —that is, divesting one-
self of one’s ego-driven energies and fantasies—but also because Jeff Sugarman, who is offering
some commentary on what I have to say, has a long-standing passion for music and this seemed
like a good opportunity to engage him in dialogue about some issues of common concern. For
some, music, and works of art more generally, may seem like strange ‘‘participants’’ in forums
like this one, devoted to exploring the relationship between psychology and the Other. On the face
of it, these nonhuman Others seem to have little to do with how we relate to human Others and
little to do with the kinds of moral and ethical concerns that tend to be the main focus of interest.
But if Weil and Murdoch are right, there is actually a closer relationship between art and the

Brief portions of this article have been drawn from my book The Priority of the Other: Thinking and Living Beyond
the Self (2014).
Correspondence should be addressed to Mark Freeman, College of the Holy Cross, 1 College Street, Worcester, MA
01610. E-mail: mfreeman@holycross.edu
 BEHOLDING AND BEING BEHELD 161

ethical realm than meets the eye. At the heart of their thinking about this set of ideas is what I have
come to call the transfer issue. Here, I am referring to the idea that the kind of respectful, unself-
conscious attention that is frequently displayed when encountering works of art—or at least those
works of art that are powerful and commanding enough to engender this attention—may well bear
upon how we relate to people.
Before getting into Weil and Murdoch, let me take just a few moments to concretize this last
idea. In her book The Music of Our Lives (1991), Kathleen Higgins suggests that music is to be
considered a symbol or image of harmonious existence. She also suggests that in and through
its very otherness and presence, it can give listeners a sense of presence as well, ‘‘a sense of
fully ‘being there,’ with our faculties fully engaged’’ (p. 145). It can make one feel truly alive,
energized, connected. In addition, one can become aware of oneself ‘‘as a being who can relate
to the world non-defensively’’ (p. 147) and can therefore function ‘‘as a being whose powers are
coordinated and harmoniously functioning’’ and who is also ‘‘engaged with and responsive to
a larger world. Concern for something beyond oneself, a prerequisite for ethically good living,’’
she asserts, is thus ‘‘already present in the self-conception that we discover in our musical
experience’’ (p. 149). In sum, ‘‘Music facilitates a sense of oneself as a harmonious, noncon-
flicted vital being and a sense of intimate connection with the larger human world, both of which
characterize ‘the good human being’ on almost any ethical model’’ (p. 156).
Needless to say, Higgins is generalizing. For one, a lot of music isn’t harmonious and is there-
fore unlikely to provide an image of harmonious existence. For another, even if it is harmonious,
it may not produce in us either a sense of our fully being there with it or a sense of our harmonious
functioning. In fact, it sometimes does just the opposite: music’s own self-realization and har-
monious wholeness, set against our own possible dividedness and incompleteness, sometimes
serves as a tragic reminder that the life we are leading may be less than what it should be (see
Freeman, 2014). For another still—and here we get to the heart of the transfer issue—it is not
entirely clear that ‘‘concern for something beyond oneself’’ or ‘‘a sense of intimate connection
with the larger human world’’ is ‘‘already present’’ in musical experience. It seems questionable,
in other words, whether there is a necessary transfer between our encounter with a great piece of
music (or a painting or a poem) and our moral and ethical life. (There is little doubt that some
musical virtuosos and connoisseurs are less than ideal people.)
These qualifications are simply by way of saying that I don’t want to oversimplify things
here. Nor, however, should Higgins’s ‘‘hypothesis’’ be rejected out of hand. Encountering—
beholding—a great piece of music, she goes on to say, ‘‘involves one’s inward attitude and
one’s orientation toward what is outside one’’ (1991, p. 161), frequently manifested as a kind
of reverence. And this reverence

involves an internal state that is incompatible with a hostile or defense-prone posture. In becoming
reverent, I put aside my usual opposition of self and the rest of the world; and if I kick the dog after
listening to Mozart, this suggests that I have not actually made the transformation that reverence
involves. (p. 162)

For Higgins, therefore, attentive and reverent appreciation, inspired by music, transfers more or
less automatically to the ethical realm, and when that doesn’t happen, it can safely be assumed
that the reverence in question has somehow been cut short, rendered incomplete. At this juncture,
then, I simply ask: Is she right about this? And if so, how might we understand it?
162 FREEMAN

SIMONE WEIL

In beginning to try to answer these questions, I turn now to the strange and fascinating world of
Simone Weil. Among other things, Weil was a philosopher, a political activist, and a mystic who,
at age six, swore off sugar in order to send her share to French soldiers fighting at the front (Perrin,
1953); at age 10, had become involved in labor union demonstrations; and, by age 14, had
developed what some have considered an ‘‘almost pathological receptiveness to the suffering
of others’’ as well as ‘‘a strong tendency to cultivate her own’’ (du Plessix Gray, 2001, p. 15).
She also suffered from extremely painful migraines and, as time wore on, a seemingly obsessive
preoccupation with eating issues—to the extent that some (for example, du Plessix Gray, 2001)
have become convinced of her anorexic status. And then there were Weil’s multiple attempts to
immerse herself in the experiential world of the afflicted, particularly through hard factory labor,
her ostensible goal in these endeavors being nothing less than reaching rock bottom, such that
misery would somehow pass over into clearest testimony to God’s presence. There is little doubt
but that she died at age 34 in such a state of misery, at least one of the known causes being
self-starvation that, not unlike her swearing off sugar as a 6-year-old, was apparently another
act of solidarity with the afflicted.
Weil was also a quite extraordinary and very provocative thinker (see Freeman, 2009).
Consider, for instance, her thoughts on writing, which are conveyed in a letter to her good friend
and confidant, Gustav Thibon:

In the operation of writing, the hand which holds the pen, and the body and soul which are attached to
it, with all their social environment, are things of infinitesimal importance for those who love the truth.
They are infinitely small in the order of nothingness. That at any rate is the measure of importance I
attach in this operation not only to my own personality but to yours and to that of any other writer I
respect. Only the personality of those whom I more or less despise matters to me in such a domain.
(1952=1997, p. xiii)

About herself, Weil writes, ‘‘My greatest desire is to lose not only all will but all personal being’’
(1951=1973, p. 59). The ‘‘virtuoso’’ or ‘‘genius,’’ she goes on to say—religious, artistic,
philosophical, whatever—is one who has succeeded in effacing his or her personality to such
a degree that Reality can shine through. This is Weil’s rendition of what was earlier referred to
as ‘‘unselfing,’’ and in her view it was the requisite condition for greatness, artistic and otherwise.
In certain important respects, her perspective is reminiscent of Jung’s (1933=1955) when he
discusses the ‘‘visionary’’ mode of poetic creation. It’s not that personality is irrelevant to the
processes at hand. Indeed, ‘‘No objection can be raised if it is admitted that this approach’’—
essentially psychobiographical—‘‘amounts to nothing more than the elucidation of those
personal determinants without which a work of art is unthinkable.’’ Nevertheless,

the personal idiosyncrasies that creep into a work of art are not essential; in fact, the more we have to
cope with these peculiarities, the less it is a work of art. What is essential in a work of art is that it should
rise far above the personal life and speak from the spirit and heart of the poet as man to the spirit and
heart of mankind. The personal aspect is a limitation—and even a sin—in the work of art. (p. 168)

For Jung, therefore, the challenge was to somehow move beyond one’s ‘‘idiosyncrasies’’ and
ego-driven energies and even, on some level, one’s will. ‘‘Art,’’ Jung (1933=1955) continues,
 BEHOLDING AND BEING BEHELD 163

‘‘is a kind of innate drive that seizes a human being and makes him its instrument.’’ As such,
‘‘The artist is not a person endowed with free will who seeks his own ends, but one who allows
art to realizes its purposes through him’’ (p. 169).
Weil herself had difficulty moving in this comparatively self-less direction. Despite her very
loud protests against the ego, her fervent wish to lose her personal being, and so on, she herself
remained ego-invested in her own self-effacing project in a big way. As Thibon (1953) has
noted, ‘‘On the one hand there was a longing for absolute self-effacement, an unlimited opening
to reality even under its harshest forms, and, on the other, a terrible self-will at the very heart of
the self-stripping’’ (p. 114). But that is not all.

She, who when her pleasure or her needs were involved would not have allowed anyone to make the
slightest sacrifice on her behalf, did not seem to realize the complications and even sufferings she
caused in the lives of others as soon as there was a question of her vocation to self-effacement. (p. 117)

‘‘In a sense,’’ Thibon adds, ‘‘she remained all her life the inflexible child who sat down in the
snow and refused to go on because her parents had given the heaviest baggage to her brother to
carry’’ (p. 126).
Weil’s own personal issues notwithstanding, she has some very provocative and important
things to say both about the effacement of the self and, in turn, about the power and priority of
otherness. In Gravity and Grace (1952=1997), Weil speaks early on of the necessity, first, to
adopt an ‘‘attitude of supplication.’’ ‘‘I must necessarily turn to something other than myself since
it is a question of being delivered from self’’ (p. 3). ‘‘Grace,’’ she continues, ‘‘fills empty spaces
but it can only enter where there is a void to receive it, and it is grace itself which makes this void’’
(p. 10). The aim is thus ‘‘to strip ourselves of the imaginary royalty of the world’’ (p. 12) and, in
turn, to recognize the fantasy of our own originary power. ‘‘Humility,’’ therefore,

consists in knowing that in what we call ‘I’ there is no source of energy by which we can rise.
Everything without exception which is of value in me comes from something other than myself,
not as a gift but as a loan which must be ceaselessly renewed. (p. 27)

As a first step in the process about which Weil is speaking, the self somehow needs to be
emptied, made void. For her, the experience of affliction was one significant way for this self-
emptying to occur; through suffering, degradation, even humiliation, it would be possible to carve
out the necessary space. Indeed, she writes, ‘‘Relentless necessity, wretchedness, distress, the
crushing burden of poverty and of labour which wears us out, cruelty, torture, violent death,
constraint, disease—all these constitute divine love’’ (Weil, 1952=1997, p. 28) insofar as they
pave the way to the operation of grace. This is Weil’s notion of ‘‘decreation’’:

It is God who in love withdraws from us so that we can love him. For if we were exposed to the direct
radiance of his love, without the protection of space, of time and of matter, we should be evaporated
like water in the sun. (p. 28)

Following this line of thinking, Weil maintains that we, as selves, need to withdraw in much the
same way. ‘‘He emptied himself of his divinity. We should empty ourselves of the false divinity
with which we were born. Once we have understood we are nothing, the object of all our efforts is
164 FREEMAN

to become nothing.’’ Weil goes on to suggest that there is a deep connection, even a
‘‘resemblance,’’ as she puts it, between the ‘‘lower’’ and the ‘‘higher.’’ ‘‘Hence slavery is an
image of obedience to God, humiliation an image of humility, physical necessity an image of
the irresistible pressure of grace.’’ The implication? ‘‘On this account it is necessary to seek
out what is lowest.. . . May that which is low in us go downwards so that what is high can go
upwards’’ (p. 30).
The preliminary aim for Weil, therefore, is nothing short of disappearance: ‘‘May I disappear
in order that those things that I see become perfect in their beauty from the very fact that they are
no longer things I see.’’ To clarify, ‘‘I do not in the least wish that this created world should fade
from my view, but that it should no longer be to me personally that it shows itself.’’ Strictly
speaking, of course, this is impossible: ‘‘When I am in any place, I disturb the silence of heaven
and earth by my breathing and the beating of my heart.’’ But the aim remains: ‘‘to see a landscape
as it is when I am not there’’ (Weil, 1952=1997, p. 37)—in short, to ‘‘unself’’ oneself to the
greatest possible extent in order to behold, and be beheld by, what is other.
With these words, we have in hand the first moment of the ethics of attention: The self must be
radically reduced, taken down to size, dissolved. What Weil has presented thus far, however, is
only part of the equation. Alongside the dissolution of the self, there again needs to be attention
directed outward, toward the other-than-self; only then will one receive the existential
nourishment and inspiration required for true creation to come forth. And ‘‘attention, taken to
its highest degree, is the same thing as prayer. . . . Extreme attention,’’ therefore, Weil insists,
‘‘is what constitutes the creative faculty in man and the only extreme attention is religious.’’
As such, ‘‘the amount of creative genius in any period is strictly in proportion to the amount
of extreme attention and thus of authentic religion at that period’’ (Weil, 1952=1997, pp.
105–106). Weil makes an interesting move at this point by noting that not only is the dissolution
or dispossession of the self a prerequisite for the work of attention but that attention, in turn,
is itself instrumental in the dissolution of the self: ‘‘Attention alone—that attention which is so
full that the ‘I’ disappears—is required of me’’ (p. 107). It is this dialectic of decreation and
attention that is constitutive of the ‘‘creative faculty’’ in art, religion, and personal being alike.
The dialectic is tied to moral life as well. ‘‘The poet,’’ for instance, Weil continues, ‘‘pro-
duces the beautiful by fixing his attention on something real. It is the same with the act of love.
To know that this man who is hungry and thirsty really exists as much as I do—that is enough,
the rest follows of itself’’ (Weil, 1952=1997, p. 108).
And so, ‘‘The authentic and pure values—truth, beauty and goodness—in the activity of a
human being are the result of one and the same act, a certain application of the full attention
to the object’’ (Weil, 1952=1997, p. 108).
On the face of it, Weil’s perspective may appear overly and problematically objectifying: empty
yourself, let the object be what it is, and the pristine power of its realness will wash over you. But
the process is actually more complicated than this. Weil, in fact, offers a hermeneutical corrective
of sorts to this notion of self-emptying. On the one hand, ‘‘Attention consists in suspending our
thought, leaving it detached, empty, and ready to be penetrated by the object.’’ But it also means

holding in our minds, within reach of this thought, but on a lower level and not in contact with it, the
diverse knowledge we have acquired which we are forced to make use of. Our thought should be in
relation to all particular and already formulated thoughts, as a man on a mountain who, as he looks
forward, sees also below him, without actually looking at them, a great many forests and plains.
 BEHOLDING AND BEING BEHELD 165

Above all our thoughts should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to receive in its
naked truth the object that is to penetrate it. (Weil, 1951=1973, pp. 111–112)

There are three points I want to emphasize at this juncture. The first, tied to this hermeneutical
corrective Weil has offered, is that the process of self-emptying, rather than requiring the full-scale
annihilation of the self, requires instead a kind of holding-in-abeyance. The musician—the blues
or jazz musician, for instance—who is most able to improvise freely, to really venture forth, is the
one who has most thoroughly mastered his or her craft and is able to draw on his or her ‘‘diverse
knowledge’’ and run with it. Likewise with the historian or the literary critic or the therapist:
in order to truly discern what is there before one, one must bring to bear anything and everything
one knows about the phenomenon in question but do so in such a way as to let it emerge on its own
terms. We might thus speak here of a kind of full emptiness, that is, a dimension of beholding
that sees in the fullness of one’s hermeneutical preparedness the very condition for achieving
the emptiness needed to truly be beheld by what is Other.
Second, Weil’s formulation offers a quite different perspective on creativity than what is
generally found in the contemporary literature. Rather than seeing it either as a mysterious
visitation from without or as a product of some special faculty or personal characteristic,
Weil, in a distinct sense, sees depersonalization as the requisite condition. ‘‘Gregorian chant,
Romanesque architecture, the Iliad, the invention of geometry were not, for the people through
whom they were brought into being and made available to us, occasions for the manifestation
of personality.’’ When personality dominates in the process of creation, she acknowledges,
wonderful achievements remain possible. ‘‘But above this level, far above, separated by an
abyss, is the level where the things are achieved,’’ and these are ‘‘essentially anonymous’’
(Weil, 1986, p. 55). It is for this reason that

every time that a man rises to a degree of excellence . . . we are aware of something impersonal and
anonymous about him. His voice is enveloped in silence. This is evident in all the great works of art
or thoughts, in the great deeds of saints and in their words. (Weil, 1952=1997, p. 179)

Bearing in mind once again the notion that the kind of attention required for the emergence
of these impersonal and anonymous dimensions must itself pass through one’s biography,
including all the knowledge that has been acquired, it seems that what Weil is calling
for is a kind of personalized depersonalization, a process that draws upon the energy and
movement of one’s own unique history even as one seeks to purge oneself of it (see
Freeman, 2009).
The third point I want to emphasize is that, for Weil, there is an intimate connection between
the kind of process we have been considering and the fabric of moral life. The poet, she says,
produces the beautiful by fixing his or her attention on something real. The requisite condition of
this attention-fixing process is the poet’s immersion in poetry—that is, in tradition; this immer-
sion, this hermeneutical preparedness, is the very condition of possibility for his or her capacity
to create, freely and unselfconsciously. This process, Weil had added, is akin to the act of love; it
too involves fixing one’s attention on something real, beholding it, or him, or her. It is this that
allows us to see that the Other—she refers to the person who is hungry and thirsty—really exists
as much as I do. That’s enough, she said; the rest follows of itself. I ask again: Is it so? And if it
is so, why would it be?
166 FREEMAN

IRIS MURDOCH

It is exactly here that the novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch enters the picture, drawing
on Weil not only to flesh out her thoughts on attention but to draw forth their implications
for ethics. Regarding attention, Murdoch speaks essentially of ‘‘the idea of a just and loving gaze
directed upon an individual reality’’ (1970, p. 33). Following Weil, the ideal is the extinction of
choice and is to be ‘‘represented as a kind of ‘necessity.’ This is something,’’ Murdoch writes,

of which saints speak and which any artist will readily understand. The idea of a patient, loving
regard, directed upon a person, a thing, a situation, presents the will not as unimpeded movement
but as something very much more like ‘‘obedience.’’ (p. 39)

Murdoch’s perspective here is not unlike that which we encountered earlier in both Weil and
Jung: Contra those who would find in agentic will a key condition for the exercise of creativity,
we see once more that it is precisely the inverse that is required, a giving-over-to the Other,
whatever it may be. Along these lines, it might be noted, Murdoch sees freedom quite differently
than it is often seen. Rather than ‘‘the sudden jumping of the isolated will in and out of an
impersonal logical complex, it is a function of the progressive attempt to see a particular object
clearly’’ (p. 23). Attention is again key.
Assuming this attentive mode is easier said than done. ‘‘The chief enemy of excellence in
morality (and also in art),’’ Murdoch continues,

is personal fantasy: the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents
one from seeing what is there outside one. . . . We can see in mediocre art, where perhaps it is even
more clearly seen than in mediocre conduct, the intrusion of fantasy, the assertion of self, the
dimming of any reflection of the real world. (1970, pp. 57–58)

Indeed, ‘‘Art presents the most comprehensible examples of the almost irresistible human
tendency to seek consolation in fantasy and also of the effort to resist this and the vision of
reality which comes with success’’ (pp. 62–63). Success is rare and difficult: ‘‘To silence and
expel self, to contemplate and delineate nature with a clear eye, is not easy and demands a moral
discipline’’ (p. 63). But, she adds,

The appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only (for all its difficulties) the easiest available
spiritual exercise; it is also a completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life,
since it is the checking of selfishness in the interest of seeing the real. (p. 63)

Along with Weil, Murdoch goes on to note that

Of course great artists are ‘‘personalities’’ and have special styles; even Shakespeare occasionally,
though very occasionally, reveals a personal obsession. But the greatest art is ‘‘impersonal’’ because
it shows us the world, our world and not another one, with a clarity which startles and delights us
simply because we are not used to looking at the real world at all. (Murdoch, 1970, p. 64)

Also important in this context is the idea that

great art teaches us how real things can be looked at and loved without being seized and used,
without being appropriated into the greedy organism of the self. This exercise of detachment is
 BEHOLDING AND BEING BEHELD 167

difficult and valuable whether the thing contemplated is a human being or the root of a tree or the
vibration of a colour or a sound. Unsentimental contemplation of nature exhibits the same quality of
detachment: selfish concerns vanish, nothing exists except the things which are seen. (Murdoch,
1970, p. 64)

It is a short step from here to the ethical plane, for ‘‘it is also clear that in moral situations a similar
exactness is called for.’’ Murdoch calls this capacity ‘‘realism,’’ by which she means an ability to
perceive reality—or, if one prefers, an ability to truly behold what is other. ‘‘In thus treating
realism, whether of artist or of agent, as a moral achievement,’’ she continues, ‘‘there is of course
a further assumption to be made in the fields of morals: that true vision occasions right conduct.’’
The evidence? ‘‘The more the separateness and differentness of other people is realized, and the
fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own, the harder it
becomes to treat a person as a thing’’ (p. 64).
Notice what is being said here. Our encounter with great art—including, especially, in my
view, music—teaches us something, namely, and again, a kind of reverence or respectful regard
for what is other. ‘‘I’’ am unseated, even if only momentarily. There is just music, moving in
me, moving me. As noted earlier, I may feel quite alive and energized. But this ‘‘I,’’ this Self,
is quite different than the somewhat inattentive, preoccupied one I may have brought to the
encounter. ‘‘We are anxiety-ridden animals,’’ Murdoch reminds us.

Our minds are continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying
veil which partially conceals the world. . . . And if quality of consciousness matters, then anything
which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism is to be
connected with virtue. (1970, p. 82)

As for how this transfers, or at least may transfer, to the realm of human relations, what Murdoch
is claiming here is that the kind of reverential respect for otherness that frequently emerges
in one’s encounter with art transfers to a recognition of the ‘‘separateness and differentness
of other people,’’ which, in turn, makes it that much harder to objectify them, that is, ‘‘to treat
a person as a thing.’’
So it is that Murdoch introduces the idea of unselfing, considering beauty as a prime
instigator. Here is a passage I have always loved:

I am looking outside my window in an anxious and resentful frame of mind, oblivious of my

surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then suddenly I observe
a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has
disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter
it seems less important. And of course this is something which we may also do deliberately: give
attention to nature in order to clear our minds of selfish care. (p. 82)

In this scene, there is a wounded ego, disconnected from reality, living exclusively in the
mind-made world. The person in this state of mind cannot possibly care for what is other because,
for a time, there is no other, only self, wrapped in its own preoccupied cocoon. The kestrel breaks
the spell of this ego-driven oblivion, and with it, world emerges, which in turn dissolves and dis-
mantles her concerns. Will this result in increased care for the Other? No, not necessarily. But it
does open a possibility that had heretofore been closed, for care for the Other can only emerge
168 FREEMAN

when the Other is beheld in its separateness and differentness, divested of what had veiled it.
In this case, the process unfolded by accident; had no kestrel happened upon the scene, the spell
of oblivion might well have remained. Bearing this in mind, it may be important, at times, to
locate those objects that can perform the needed work of unselfing. We can intentionally behold
and, in beholding, be beheld.
Returning to the sphere of art, this idea of being beheld—and the potentially salutary effects
of being beheld—very much depend on the nature and quality of the objects we are beholding.
‘‘A great deal of art, perhaps most art,’’ Murdoch reiterates, ‘‘actually is self-consoling fantasy,
and even great art cannot guarantee the quality of its consumer’s consciousness.’’ This is surely
the case with music. Much of it is self-consoling fantasy. Plus, some of it—certain strands
of contemporary music, especially—far from leading to reverence, may lead instead to violence,
to the negation or annihilation of the Other. We therefore need to be very cautious about
generalities in this context. ‘‘However,’’ Murdoch continues, ‘‘great art [including music] exists
and is sometimes properly experienced and even a shallow experience of what is great can have
its effect.’’ It

affords us a pure delight in the independent existence of what is excellent. Both in its genesis and its
enjoyment it is a thing totally opposed to selfish obsession. It invigorates our best faculties and, to
use Platonic language, inspires love in the highest part of the soul. It is able to do this partly by virtue
of something which it shares with nature: a perfection of form which invites unpossessive contem-
plation and resists absorption into the selfish dream life of the consciousness. (1970, p. 83).

For Murdoch, this mode of being and knowing, unpossessive and unselfish, moved by the
‘‘independent existence,’’ the otherness, of the work, remains with us, plays itself out in how
we relate to the world, including the world of other people.
This is an extraordinary idea and has important implications for, among other things, the nature
of education. If you really want to increase respect for others, particularly different others, then
skip the didactic sermons and skits and make sure students encounter great works. Elaine
Scarry’s book On Beauty and Being Just (1999) suggests, or at least implies, something similar:
‘‘Beautiful things give rise to the notion of distribution, to a lifesaving reciprocity, to fairness not
just in the sense of loveliness of aspect but in the sense of ‘a symmetry of everyone’s relation to
one another’’’ (p. 95).
Following Levinas (e.g., 1995=1999), this notion of symmetry, or the idea of reciprocity
(which he associates with Buber), may be insufficient in dealing with the ethical realm. As he
explains, the concept of reciprocity had bothered him

because the moment one is generous in hopes of reciprocity, that relation no longer involves gener-
osity but the commercial relation, the exchange of good behavior. In the relation to the other, the
other appears to me as one to whom I owe something, toward whom I have a responsibility. (p. 101)

Levinas thus insists on the ‘‘gratuitousness’’ of the for-the-other, the idea again being that I am
responsible to and for the other before any commitment has been established, before there has
come to be a pact of ‘‘exchange’’ between me and the other person: ‘‘In the alterity of the face,
the for-the-other commands the I’’ (p. 103). And so, to make a quite long and complicated story
short, Levinas, in contrast to Buber and presumably Scarry (and probably Murdoch), wants to
 BEHOLDING AND BEING BEHELD 169

speak not of reciprocity or symmetry but, rather, of ‘‘the dissymmetry of intersubjective space’’
(Levinas, 1987=1994, p. 45).
This is an important qualification. Beholding the ‘‘independence existence’’ of the Other,
seeing that ‘‘another man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own’’ (as Murdoch
had put it), may not quite suffice when it comes to moral life (Murdoch, 1970, p. 64). The Other,
Levinas insists, comes before me, has priority. This qualification notwithstanding, the basic idea
we have been considering—that the encounter with great works of art and with the beautiful more
generally may somehow transfer to the ethical realm—still seems very much worth entertaining.
If Weil is right, we need not restrict this state of affairs to the relationship between art and
ethics, either. According to Weil (1951=1973),

If we concentrate our attention on trying to solve a problem of geometry, and if at the end of an hour
we are not nearer to doing so than at the beginning, we have nevertheless been making progress each
minute of that hour in another more mysterious dimension. Without our knowing or feeling it, this
apparently barren effort has brought more light into the soul. The result will one day be discovered
in prayer. Moreover, it may very likely be felt in some department of the intelligence in no way con-
nected with mathematics. Perhaps he who made the unsuccessful effort will one day be able to grasp
the beauty of a line of Racine more vividly on account of it. But it is certain that this effort will bear its
fruit in prayer. There is no doubt whatever about that. (pp. 106–107)

I ask again: Is this true?

THE ETHICS OF ATTENTION

I appreciate Weil’s lack of doubt. ‘‘Every school exercise, thought of in this way,’’ she adds, ‘‘is
like a sacrament’’ (1951=1973, p. 112). Teachers might want to share this with their students.
I still don’t know whether to completely share it, however. Is there really transfer from geometry
to prayer, and, as Murdoch proposes, from the encounter with art to the encounter with people?
Does listening attentively to music or playing it really make me a better person—more attentive,
respectful, other-directed? The answer is clear: Yes, sometimes; but no, not always. On the one
hand, there is little doubt that being attentive to both the human and the nonhuman worlds can,
and sometimes does, lead a greater measure of care. To truly see the face of the other person,
Levinas (e.g., 1995=1999) has suggested, is at one and the same time to recognize one’s responsi-
bility to and for that person. On the other hand, there is equally little doubt that one can be quite
attentive to the world without this attentiveness automatically translating into care and responsi-
bility. Levinas (1982=1985) recognizes this as well. ‘‘The face,’’ he says, ‘‘is what one cannot
kill, or at least it is that whose meaning consists in saying: ‘thou shalt not kill.’’’ None of this,
however, means that one cannot kill. ‘‘Murder, it is true,’’ he continues, ‘‘is a banal fact: One
can kill the Other; the ethical exigency is not an ontological necessity’’ (pp. 86–87).
Weil and Murdoch are both fond of the language of necessity, even obedience. ‘‘The most
beautiful life possible,’’ Weil (1951=1973) writes in her ‘‘Spiritual Autobiography,’’ has
‘‘always seemed to me to be one where everything is determined, either by the pressure of cir-
cumstances or by impulses . . . and where there is never any room for choice’’ (p. 63). Murdoch
(1970) had conveyed a related idea when she noted that ‘‘the ideal situation . . . is . . . to be
represented as a kind of ‘necessity’ ’’ and that ‘‘the idea of a patient, loving regard, directed upon
170 FREEMAN

a person, a thing, a situation, presents the will not as unimpeded movement but as something very
much more like ‘obedience’ ’’ (p. 39). Levinas (1995=1999), too, uses the language of obedience
at times. In considering the ethical relation, he says, ‘‘It is not a question of receiving an order by
first perceiving it and then obeying it in a decision, an act of the will. The subjection to obedience
precedes . . . the hearing of the order’’ (p. 33).
I am sympathetic to some of this language. But it does run counter to much of the language
used in humanistic quarters. It is not the language of agency or will or consciousness. What’s
more, the primary locus of energy is not the self. For Weil, Murdoch, and Levinas alike—albeit
in different ways and for somewhat different reasons—moral life operates Otherwise. That is,
there is a very real sense in which it issues from the Other, both human and nonhuman, creating
a demand, even a command. This seems at least partially right to me. At the same time, knowing
that this command either goes unheard or unheeded, I have to wonder about how far to take the
language they use.
As captivated as I might be by the extraordinary music I am hearing or by the face of the Other,
as spontaneous and direct as my response may be, I must still exercise my freedom, my will to
responsibility; I must consent to the call. This is surely one reason that I sometimes do not heed
the call of the Other—why, despite my being captivated by this person before me, disrupted and
even moved, he or she remains untouched, my responsibility having been directed elsewhere.
Furthermore, this captivation itself is not without competition from other Others as well as from
the ego, which frequently issues its own commands. This is simply by way of saying that my
response to the Other is never entirely pure and unalloyed but is always, to a greater or lesser
extent, a complex composite of the multiple strands of my being. In beholding the wondrous
otherness of a great piece of music, I may well strengthen my moral muscles, so to speak, and
become that much more attuned to the otherness of others, their wishes and needs. I may even
see them as having a kind of priority over me. But whether this translates into compassion or
action is going to be a function of what else is competing for my attention. And the competition
is sometimes fierce.
The challenge of moving in the direction of what I have here called an ‘‘ethics of attention’’ is
a large one. As Murdoch (1970) puts the matter, ‘‘The problem is to accommodate inside moral
philosophy, and suggest methods of dealing with the fact that so much of human conduct is
moved by mechanical energy of an egocentric kind. In the moral life,’’ she says succinctly,
‘‘the enemy is the fat relentless ego’’ (p. 51). Fortunately, she continues, ‘‘It is . . . a psycho-
logical fact, and one of importance in moral philosophy that we can all receive moral help by
focusing our attention upon things which are valuable: virtuous people, great art, perhaps . . . the
idea of goodness itself’’ (pp. 54–55).
These serve to displace, to overrule, one might say, the ego’s dominion.
But attention alone may not do the job. For Weil, as noted earlier, self-effacement, indeed
a kind of self-destruction, must take place as well. Only this, she insists, will quiet the ego’s
appetite enough to let the world emerge and call forth our care. I am not sure how far to go with
these ideas either. But I have come to find them very useful in thinking against the grain
of some of my own, and psychology’s own, theoretical and philosophical commitments. And
for this reason alone, I find them very attractive.
There is one additional idea, found in Murdoch especially, that I want to make contact
with in closing, and music is particularly pertinent to it. I am thinking here about the idea of
transcendence—which, in the present context, may be taken to refer to the intimation or
 BEHOLDING AND BEING BEHELD 171

experience of a unifying otherness that somehow signals that there is more to the world than
meets the eye. ‘‘The ‘there is more than this,’ ’’ Murdoch (1970) writes,

if it is not to be corrupted by some sort of quasi-theological finality, must remain a very tiny spark of
insight, something with, as it were, a metaphysical position but no metaphysical form. But it seems
to me that the spark is real, and that great art is evidence of its reality. (p. 71)

Concerning some of the work by Bach, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, George Steiner (1989)
has written, there are ‘‘felt intimations of open horizons, of well-springs of recuperation and
self-surpassing for a constricted and worn humanity’’ (p. 63). These kinds of works, he asserts
(I would more likely be talking about great rock music or blues or jazz), bring us ‘‘closer to
the border-crossing into ‘otherness,’ into the terra incognita of a humanity beyond itself than,
perhaps, any experience else. Song leads us home to where we have not yet been’’ (p. 75).
For Steiner, this ‘‘home’’ cannot be wholly earthly or, for that matter, wholly human; its very
beyondness signals the existence of something else, something more. ‘‘The energy that is music,’’
Steiner adds, ‘‘puts us in felt relation to the energy that is life; it puts us in a relation of
experienced immediacy with the abstractly and verbally inexpressible but wholly palpable,
primary fact of being.’’ And ‘‘this energy of existence lies deeper than any biological or psycho-
logical determination’’ (Steiner, 1997, p. 196). Indeed, it ‘‘mocks analytic rationalization’’ and
‘‘rebukes the arrogance of positivism, of the demand for a quantifiable, for a psychologically evi-
dential or sociologically mapped explanation of things’’ (p. 217). This is Steiner’s version of
Murdoch’s (1970) idea that ‘‘there is more than this.’’ I find it powerful. It is also provocative,
not least because it casts into question not only the scientific explainability of such experience
but its very source; for, if Steiner is right, there is something patently ‘‘inhuman’’ about it—which
is to say, there is something about it that defies any and all attempts to trace its effects to a purely
human origin.
This claim is, of course, contestable. It may in fact be the case that, in due time, we will
succeed in providing just that sort of ‘‘psychologically evidential or sociologically mapped expla-
nation of things’’ that Steiner and others reject. But it may also be the case that this naturalism—
and, one might (cautiously) add, humanism—finds its limits in the kinds of experiences we have
been considering. This doesn’t mean rejecting naturalism or humanism entirely. As I have
suggested elsewhere (Freeman, 2014), it may be that the nature of human nature goes beyond
nature as ordinarily conceived. Moreover, it may be that the humanism that emerges in the wake
of rethinking human nature in this way is one that is inescapably tied to the Other.
We do in any case have the contours of a ‘‘model’’ before us, a kind of scheme for how all this
might work. As with all models and schemes, there is some simplifying going on. But let me offer
it anyway. To behold reality—in this case the reality of a work of art—a certain measure of
detachment may be required. Following Weil, discrete practices may be needed for such detach-
ment to occur; otherwise, the needy ego will intrude. Insofar as this detachment results in drawing
one nearer to reality, it creates the possibility for this reality providing a greater measure of mean-
ing and nourishment than it had before, which, in turn, serves to unself oneself that much more.
Of particular importance in this moment of the process is the quality of the object at hand. Not all
works of art will call forth the kind of self-forgetful reverence that Murdoch had posited; only
some will. To the extent that they do, one may be lucky enough to experience that ‘‘tiny spark’’
of transcendence Murdoch referred to. What’s more, one will have moved that much closer to
172 FREEMAN

recognizing and respecting the separateness and difference of other people, seeing them either as
fellow travelers with wishes and needs akin to one’s own or as ‘‘higher than’’ and ‘‘prior to’’
oneself in the Levinasian sense. There will have been unselfing, through both beholding and
being beheld, as well as a kind of reselfing, such that a larger, more capacious mode of
being—let us call it a Self (Freeman, 2014)—emerges. This Self will be unbounded and will know
and feel its kinship with the world. The Other is its fundamental source.

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AUTHOR NOTE

Mark Freeman is Professor and Chair of the Department of Psychology, as well as Distinguished Professor of
Ethics and Society at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts. He is the author of Rewriting the
Self: History, Memory, Narrative (1993), Finding the Muse: A Sociopsychological Inquiry into the Conditions of Artistic
Creativity (1994), Hindsight: The Promise and Peril of Looking Backward (2010), The Priority of the Other: Thinking
and Living Beyond the Self; and numerous articles on topics ranging from memory and identity to the psychology
of art and religion. Fellow in Divisions 24 and 32 of the American Psychological Association, he is also Editor for
the Oxford University Press series ‘‘Explorations in Narrative Psychology.’’
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