In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No.

148311, 31 March 2005, 494

PHIL 515-528

FACTS:

Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He prayed that the child’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to
Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use
the surname Garcia as her middle name.

The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under
Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, uses the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name?

HELD:

Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article
365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189
of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
b. In re Lim, G.R. Nos. 168992-93, 21 May 2009, 606 PHIL 82-94

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor
children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of
DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately,
in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner
decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and
seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the
adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

RULING: Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In
case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall”
signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is
but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice
since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one
of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being. IN THE
MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG G.R. No.
148311. March 31, 2005 FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia,
her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. Trial court
granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of
the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for clarification
and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle
name. The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural
mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and
under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother. ISSUE: Whether or not an
illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name. RULING: Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of
the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent
on the matter.
vi. Local Autonomy

(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State
shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.

vii. Naturalization Laws

Be at least 18 years old. Have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least 10 years.
Possess good moral character and have no criminal record.

viii. Election Laws

a. Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 120295 & 123755, 28 June 1996, 327 PHIL 521-598

FACTS:

Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship.

He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of
allegiance as a Philippine citizen.

However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his previous
attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second
highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.

ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.

HELD:

The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of Presidential
Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for
governor.

The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are:

(1) filing the application;

(2) action by the committee; and

(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved.

It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship.

If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it
should not have explicitly provided otherwise.

He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

b. Rulloda v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154198, 20 January 2003, 443 PHIL 649-656

Facts:

Comelec denied petitioner’s request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay Chairman
Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents
wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election
Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido contended that it was only
right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and,
hence, the only candidate running.

Issue:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioner’s request that she
be allowed to run for elections.

Ruling:

There being no specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections, a

prohibition against said substitution cannot be said to exist.

Petitioner’s letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when COMELEC issued its resolution
denying the same. In the contested election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the
true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
c. Saquilayan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157249, 28 November 2003, 462 PHIL 383-391

The facts are not disputed.

Petitioner Saquilayan and respondent Jaro were candidates for the Office of Municipal Mayor of Imus,
Cavite in the May 14, 2001 local elections. After the votes were canvassed, Saquilayan was proclaimed
the winner for having received 27,494 votes against Jaro's 26,746 votes.

On May 28, 2001, Jaro instituted an Election Protest Case (EPC No. 01-02) before the RTC of Imus, Cavite
contesting the results in all 453 election precincts in the Municipality of Imus. Saquilayan filed his
Answer with Motion to Dismiss contending, among other things, that the election protest failed to state
a cause of action. The Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 31, 2001.

Saquilayan questioned the denial before the Comelec's Second Division through a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, which was docketed as SPR No. 19-2001. On January 22, 2002, the Second Division
ruled in favor of Saquilayan and ordered the dismissal of the election protest.

Jaro sought a reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the case was elevated to the Comelec en
banc. On February 26, 2003, the Comelec en banc issued the questioned resolution granting Jaro's
Motion for Reconsideration. Saquilayan's petition was thereunder dismissed and EPC No. 01-02 was
ordered to proceed.

Aggrieved, Saquilayan filed the present petition.

Issue: The whole controversy revolves around the following averments contained in Jaro's election
protest

Ruling

However, the Comelec en banc, voting 4-3,[4] ruled that what is applicable to the case is the ruling in
Miguel v. Comelec.[5] In the Miguel case, therein respondent Eladio Lapuz filed an election case against
James Miguel who defeated the former in the mayoralty race in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Lapuz questioned the
results in all the precincts on the following grounds:

No doubt, allowing the election protest to proceed would be the best way of removing any doubt as to
who was the real candidate chosen by the electorate. Barring the proceedings due to technicalities and
procedures accomplishes nothing except possibly to suppress the will of the majority.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the
Comelec en banc in SPR No. 19-2001 is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
ix. Constitutional Construction

Conflicting constitutional provisions, how construed

a. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. Nos. 191002, 191032, 191057, 191149, 191342, 191420 &
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, 17 March 2010, 629 PHIL 629-779

FACTS:

Several cases arouse from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17,
2010, or seven days after the presidential election. On January 18, 2010, JBC passed a resolution that
they will commence the process of application for a position of Chief Justice to be vacated by CJ Puno.
As a result, JBC published an announcement for that purpose. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC
resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the
public to le their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22,
2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales,
Associate Justice Leonardo-de Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval. The
announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of February
13,2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filing of the position of Chief Justice Puno in
accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of
nominees for the position due to the controversy before the Court being yet unresolved. The petitions
are for prohibition against JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to submit the shortlist and a
few question the power of the President to appoint Chief Justice during the election Ban period.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint Chief Justice during the election ban period.

RULING:

Yes. The prohibition under Sec. 15, Article VII in the Constitution does not apply to appointments to fll a
vacancy in the Supreme Court.

Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defnes the duties and qualifications of Members
of the Supreme Court, among others.
b. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, 20 September 2016

FACTS:

1.Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are
unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo.

2.Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. He later turned
her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar

3.On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the
Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces).

4.Poe ran for the Senate and was subsequently elected. David filed a petition with the electoral tribunal
saying that Poe should not be allowed to be elected as a Senator because she is not a natural born
citizen. The electoral tribunal decided in favor of Poe. Hence this petition for certiorari assailing the
decision of public respondent.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Grace Poe is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and may be elected as Senator

RULING:

1.Foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their
being foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must
consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains
unknown. Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need
for an express statement in the Constitution making her so.

2.The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the
contrary.

Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This means that private respondent never had to do
anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born.

Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying

the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225(a) taking the oath of allegiance (b) compliance with

Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (c) making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and

all foreign citizenship

. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.

3.Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently
discriminating against our foundling citizens and creating an inferior class of citizens who are made to
suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.

- Self-executing v. Non-self-Executing Provisions

a. Self-executing provision, defined Gutierrez v HR, G.R. No. 193459, 15 February 2011

Facts:

– 22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents Risa
Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint
against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao

– 27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on
August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business

– 3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos,
Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint
againsta herein petitioner endorsed by Representatives Colme nares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and
De Jesus

– HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th
Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August
9, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business

– 11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House Committee on Justice
(HCOJ for brevity)

– After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form

– 2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was
published

– After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two complaints, which both
allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance

– Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions of September 1
and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these violated the one -year bar rule on
initiating impeachment proceedings

Issue/s:

Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy

Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th
Congress denied due process to the Petitioner

Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the Constitution

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

Ratio:

1. NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

– Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary

– the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in
Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required
vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, “judicially
discoverable standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review

2. DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of promulgation the Rules of Procedure of
Impeachment Proceedings?

– (P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the impeachment complaints is
tainted with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJ’s, Rep. Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the
Sandiganbayan

– Presumption of regularity

– The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant of rule -making power
in the HOR

– the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that
there must be a “verified complaint or resolution”, and that the substance requirement is met if there is
“a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee”

– The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of promulgating the Rules.

– impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the
punishment of the offender

3. THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

– (P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on
July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that
within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to
public respondent.

– INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint (referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice)

– IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate

– Rationale of the one-year bar: “that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: 1)”to prevent
undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of]
legislation,”“…that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle
starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.” (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)

b. Self-executing provisions, enumerate TMCEA v CA, G.R. No. 167324, 17 July 2007

FACTS:

The case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision, promulgated by the Court of Appeals on 26 November 2004, denying a petition for the
nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of
Health (DOH), and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health,” which was issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on 24 May 1999.

Originally, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the
Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated 29 August 2001, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.

With regard to the general reforms set forth by the HRSA, the petitioners questioned the first reform
agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized
user fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals. Implementation of the
aforementioned reforms had allegedly resulted in making free medicine and free medical services
inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they purported that the HSRA is void for
being in violation of several constitutional provisions, including Section 10 of Article II. Consequently,
they also assailed the issuance of Administrative Order no. 172 entitled “Policies and Guidelines on the
Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals in Government Health Facilities, issued by the
DOH dated January 9, 2001.

As for the issued Executive Order No. 102 of President Estrada which is aimed at setting changes in the
roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. The petitioners contented that such law,
which affects the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress to exercise its legislative
function. They argued that said order is void, as this was enacted in excess of the President’s authority.
The CA denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved fatal. It was also ruled
that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating the various sections and articles of the Constitution.

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A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed by the petitioners but the same was denied in a
resolution dated March 7, 2005.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violate various constitutional provisions, including
Section 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which could be grounds for their nullification

HELD: The Court finds the petition to be without merit.

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self -executing, and do not require
future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self -executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have
already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing. Some of the constitutional
provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution — specifically,
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non
self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara, wherein the Court specifically set apart the
sections as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before
they can be implemented.

Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are
unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in
annulling the HSRA. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners,
they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the
compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of
Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000.

Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process
provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such
appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would,
nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes
invalid, although they may be abused or disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the
manner of application.

The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, clearly states: “The president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative
Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of control over the executive
department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and
consistently affirmed by this Court. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of
the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office “to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.”

c. Non-self executing provisions Pamatong v Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or not nominated by a political party or are not supported by registered political party with a
national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” undersection 26, Article II of the
1987 constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates (he
possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organization under his leadership, he also
has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in the other countries,
and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the petitioners interpretation of the Constitutional provision under Section 26,
Article II gives him a constitutional right to run or hold for public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision, which suggests such thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II
of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the
Article are not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to
the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does
not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action
before the courts. Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the
provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It
is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under
this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The
privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody
equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one
who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person
is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. The rationale behind the prohibition
against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of

candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The state has
a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.
Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the
election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To
add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would
actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae
covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. The question of whether a
candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to
determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
d. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions, distinguished. Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS, G.R. No.
122156, Feb. 3, 1997

FACTS:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program under Proclamation No. 50 decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual ―strategic
partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding
only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad.

Apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE(S):

WON the disposition of 51% of Manila Hotel falls under the application of Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution.

WON Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

HELD:

Yes. Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an
earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. Since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government -owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
1987 Constitution, applies. Hence, since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched
the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has
been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and
duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution is usually not self -executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self -executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that – x x x x in case of doubt, the
Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non self-executing x x x x Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self -executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
- Administrative Construction

a. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bicolandia Drug Corp., G.R.

No. 148083, 21 July 2006, 528 PHIL 609-622

FACTS:

Bicolandia Drug Corporation, a corporation engaged in the business of retailing pharmaceutical products
under the business style of "Mercury Drug," granted the 20% sales discount to qualified senior citizens
purchasing their medicines in compliance with R.A. No. 7432

It then alleged error that they should have tax credit so it claimed for refund.

CTA: Rev. Reg. No. 2-94 is null and void for being inconsistent with Sec. 4 of RA 7432 that states the
discount is claimed as credit

But, it computed the tax credit as cost of sales / gross income x 20%

It also excluded those sales without pre-marked cash slips.

Both CIR and petitioner appealed.

CTA modified its decision to issue a certificate of tax credit to petitioner.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the discount granted is based on the acquisition cost rather than actual discount granted

2. W/N petitioner can claim its refund

HELD: Petition is hereby DENIED

1. Yes. Cost refers to the amount extended to senior citizens. It shall be applied as tax credit and may be
deducted from tax liability. If no current tax due or nnet loss for the period, the credit may be carried
over to the succeeding taxable year.

2. No. The words of statute are clear and free from ambiguity. It must be given literal meaning. Thus,
can only claim as tax credit.
Words with restricted and general meanings, which prevail

a. Gutierrez v. HR Committee on Justice (see previous)

b. People v. Ting, G.R. No. 221505, Dec. 5, 2018

Facts:

In an Information dated May 30, 2011, respondents City Mayor Randolph S. Ting and City Treasurer
Salvacion I. Garcia, both of Tuguegarao City in the year 2004, were charged with violation of Section 261
(w)(b) of Batas Pambansa Bilang R81, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, for issuing a
treasury warrant during the forty-five (45)-day election ban period as payment for two (2) parcels of
land to be used as a public cemetery for the city.

Upon arraignment, respondents entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After the pre -trial,
the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence on October 23, 2013. But instead of presenting their
evidence, respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence and, subsequently, a
Demurrer to Evidence. In an Order dated December 16, 2013, the RTC granted the same and acquitted
the respondents. According to the RTC, while it is uncontested that the treasury warrant or the
Landbank check in issue bears the date “April 30, 2004,” which is well within the prohibited period, the
date of the instrument is not necessarily the date of issue. The Negotiable Instruments Law provides
that an instrument is issued by “the first delivery of the instrument, complete in form, to a person who
takes it as a holder.” But the prosecution failed to prove that the subject check was delivered to the
vendors of the lots within the prohibited period. In fact, the dorsal side of the instrument bears “May
18, 2004” as the date of payment as annotated by the drawee bank, which is beyond the said period.
The RTC added that just because the title was issued in favor of the City Government of Tuguegarao on
May 5, 2004, it does not follow that payment was in fact made on the same day. The Law on Sales
provides that payment of the purchase price is not a condition tor the transfer of title, in the absence of
stipulation to the contrary.

In a Decision dated June 16, 2015, the CA denied the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and affirmed
the RTC’s Order. Aggrieved by the CA’s denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the OSG filed the
instant petition on January 7, 2016.

Issues:

1. Whether the Rule on Double Jeopardy sets when the grant to Demurrer to Evidence was attended
with Grave Abuse of Discretion.
2. Whether the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence of the
respondent.

Held:

1. No, The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. It has been held in the past that
the only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is
when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its
case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1)
where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence and
forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and (2) where the case was dismissed
at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.

In the instant case, the Court finds that the elements of double jeopardy are present herein. A valid
information was filed against respondents for violation of Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election
Code resulting in the institution of a criminal case before the proper court of competent jurisdiction.
Subsequently, respondents pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and were acquitted; the dismissal
of the case against them being based on a demurrer to evidence filed after the prosecution rested its
case.

2. No, It must be noted, moreover, that while an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence may be
subject to review via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by a petition for
review under Rule 45 like in this case, there is no showing that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. “Grave abuse of
discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the
trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense j ustice.”

A review of the records of the instant case reveals no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court so
grave as to result in the reversal of its judgment of acquittal. While the law provides certain exceptions
to the application of the rule on double jeopardy as when a trial court prematurely terminates the
prosecution’s presentation of evidence, the Court finds these exceptions inapplicable to the case at
hand. It must be noted that the RTC herein duly gave the prosecution ample opportunity to presen t its
case by allowing the latter to submit the pieces of evidence necessary for conviction. It cannot,
therefore, be gainsaid that the prosecution was deprived of due process of law. In fact, in its petition
before the Court, the OSG made no mention of any objection as to the manner by which the RTC
conducted the proceedings. Neither did it particularly allege a denial of its right to due process. Instead,
the OSG merely argued that the RTC granted respondents’ demurrer to evidence without any clear and
factual basis, failing to make a careful consideration of its evidence and merely focusing on the highly
technical provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law. To the Court, however, this cannot result in a
complete reversal of the judgment of acquittal. Even if we are to assume that the RTC had overlooked
certain facts in arriving at its conclusions, this supposed misappreciation of evidence will, at most, be
considered only as a mere error of judgment, and not of jurisdiction or a manifestation of grave abuse of
discretion. It is, therefore, not correctible by a writ of certiorari.

To reiterate, for an acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there must be a
showing that the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged errors in the interpretation of the applicable law or
appreciation of evidence that the RTC and the CA may have committed in ordering respondents’
acquittal, absent any showing that said courts acted with caprice or without regard to the rudiments of
due process, their findings can no longer be reversed, disturbed and set aside without violating the rule
against double jeopardy. Indeed, errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity,
will not defeat a plea of autrefois acquit. We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have
been committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea
of double jeopardy. “[I]t bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose
and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.