LETTERS

Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been India’s premier journal for India’s Critical Mineral Regulation) Act of 1957 have simplified
comment on current affairs
and research in the social sciences.
Landscape the processes for obtaining exploration
It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949–1965), licences, mineral concessions, and min-
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
As editor for 35 years (1969–2004)
Krishna Raj
I magine a world without the glow of
LED lights, the hum of electric cars,
the grace of aerospace marvels, the
ing leases. Although the original act
does not provide a specific definition for
critical minerals, the 2023 report on
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. green promise of wind turbines and solar critical minerals states that
Editor panels, a day without batteries powering critical minerals are those minerals which
S Mahendra Dev our lives, fighter jets defending our skies, are essential for economic development
Deputy Editor smart televisions entertaining us, or and national security, the lack of availabil-
Pyaralal Raghavan ity of these minerals or even concentration
your trusty smartphone keeping you
of existence, extraction or processing of
SENIOR Assistant editors connected. None of these would exist these minerals in few geographical loca-
INDU K
Nachiket kulkarni without a remarkable group of minerals tions may lead to supply chain vulnerability
Assistant editor
known as “critical minerals.” The term and disruptions.
Sahba Fatima “critical minerals” has gained promi- In essence, energy transition and
editorIAL Assistant nence as countries recognise their stra- technological advancement hinge on
Ankit Kawade tegic importance, although the concept critical minerals. As a result, securing
Editorial Coordinator dates back to the Strategic and Critical the robustness of their supply chains has
Shilpa Sawant
Minerals Stock Piling Act, 1939 of the become a paramount priority for India
copy editor United States (US) government. Since to meet its energy transition goals and
jyoti shetty
then, many countries and regions, in- effectively achieve net-zero commitments.
production
suneethi nair cluding the European Union (EU), the The 2023 amendment act has also
United Kingdom (UK), the US, and now opened the doors for private sector in-
Chief Administrative and Finance Officer
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR India, have developed regulations and vestment and foreign direct investment
Advertisement Manager
strategies for these vital minerals. in India’s mining, particularly for atom-
Kamal G Fanibanda The mining industry is crucial to ic minerals once reserved for govern-
General Manager & Publisher India’s economy, serving as a corner- ment-owned entities. Deep-seated min-
Gauraang Pradhan stone for its energy, infrastructure, and erals, including lithium, beryllium, ti-
editorial: edit@epw.in manufacturing sectors. India has imple- tanium, niobium, tantalum, and zirco-
Circulation: circulation@epw.in mented significant developments in its nium, were removed from the list of
Advertising: advertisement@epw.in mining policy and trade activities to atomic minerals. These minerals, while
support this growth effectively, particu- non-radioactive, are crucial for clean
Economic & Political Weekly
320–322, A to Z Industrial Estate larly concerning critical minerals. energy and industries. Focusing on
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel First, in June 2023, India became a their exploration can reduce India’s
Mumbai 400 013
Phone: (022) 4063 8282 part of the Minerals Security Partner- mineral import dependence, thereby
ship, a coalition of 14 nations led by the enhancing economic self-sufficiency
EPW Research Foundation US. This exclusive group, which includes and reducing vulnerability to supply
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts
research on fi nancial and macro-economic issues in India. major economies like Australia, the US, disruptions caused by geopolitical un-
Director the UK, and the EU, is focused on secur- certainties.
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR ing critical mineral supply chains for a The union government will exclusively
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101
sustainable future. The second notewor- have the power to auction mineral con-
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41 thy development involves India’s identi- cessions and composite lease licences for
epwrf@epwrf.in fication of a comprehensive list of 30 critical minerals to ensure transparency,
Sameeksha TrusT critical minerals. This list was published accountability, and fair allocation of
(Publishers of Economic & Political Weekly) in the “Report of the Committee on Iden- resources. The union and the state’s
Board of Trustees
Deepak Nayyar, Chairman tification of Critical Minerals” released interests have collaborated through a
Shyam Menon, Managing Trustee by the Ministry of Mines in June 2023. bidding process for exploration licences,
André Béteille, D N Ghosh, Lastly, in August 2023, Parliament where the state will have the power to
Deepak Parekh, Romila Thapar,
Dipankar Gupta, N Jayaram, passed the Mines and Minerals (Devel- grant the licence and the union govern-
SUDIPTO MUNDLE opment and Regulation) Amendment ment will specify details of the licence
Printed and published by Gauraang Pradhan, for and Bill, 2023. This legislation marks a with regard to terms and conditions,
on behalf of Sameeksha Trust and printed at
Modern Arts and Industries, 151, A–Z Industrial Estate, strategic shift towards harnessing the manner of auction, bidding parameters,
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai–400 013
and published at 320–322, A–Z Industrial Estate, expertise of the private sector. etc. The exploration licence granted
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai–400 013
The 2023 amendments to the through the auction shall permit the
Editor: S Mahendra Dev (Editor responsible for
selection of news under the PRB Act) Mines and Minerals (Development and licensee to undertake reconnaissance
4 october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

and prospecting operations for critical
and deep-seated minerals.
The 2023 amendment act also out-
lines specific rules for those who obtain
mineral exploration licences. If someone
holds such a licence, they must submit a
report about their findings within three
months of completing the exploration or
when the licence expires. If valuable
minerals are discovered, the state gov-
ernment must conduct an auction for a
mining lease within six months of re-
ceiving the exploration report. However,
industry experts have expressed concerns
about how well the 2023 amendments
will work. In reality, this process could
take several years or may not occur at
all, potentially resulting in delays or the
absence of auctions due to clearance
and complexity issues. For instance, the
Ghorabhurhani–Sagasahi iron ore mine,
auctioned in 2016 but commencing pro-
duction only in late 2021, illustrates the
potential sluggishness of these auctions.
Additionally, the 2023 amendment act
also stops private explorers from directly
selling what they find. Instead, only the
government will handle the auctioning,
which has the rightful claim to monetise
them. The exploration licence holder is
entitled to a share of the proceeds from
this lease auction at some point, with the
exact portion determined by the union
government, although the timing remains
unspecified. These practices contrast
with global standards and might affect
the motivation of private investors.
The demand for critical minerals like
graphite, lithium, and cobalt is set to
surge over 450% by 2050 to meet the
global demand for renewable energy
technology. China’s dominant position
in the critical minerals market presents
challenges for India, especially as it strives
to achieve its low-carbon goals and
enhance self-reliance. To align with these
ambitions, India must employ climate-
smart mining practices. The extraction of
critical minerals poses environmental and
social risks, including habitat disruption,
pollution of water and air, human rights
violations, and labour issues. Evaluating
and minimising these adverse effects
on the environment, water sources, biodi-
versity, and front-line communities are
crucial. A robust environmental legislation
Economic & Political Weekly EPW june 17, 2023
october
is essential to protect the environment,
ensure human well-being, and support
sustainable growth derived from these
unsung minerals.
Harsh Vardhan Bhati
Uppsala
Parth Jain
Jaipur
In Search of Compassionate
Teachers
T eachers in every society have been
revered because their vocation de-
mands a deeper engagement with stu-
dents, which is important in the process
of making them rational and critical
thinkers. The lessons taught by a teacher
in a classroom are not limited to the
boundaries of the classroom anymore;
they also reflect in the lives of the stu-
dents in the larger social context. The
dedication of teachers towards rational
thinking and their unbiased engage-
ment with their students contribute to-
wards making a society a better place to
live. However, the recent incidents of
discrimination by teachers against stu-
dents from backward and marginalised
communities raise serious concerns about
the spirit of compassionate education
and educators in this country. The edi-
torial titled “Teachers Need an Educa-
tion in Compassion” (EPW, 2 September
2023) highlights the disturbing culture
of corporal punishment and discrimi-
natory practices against students in the
recent times.
It seems that the teachers who are
engaged in discriminatory practices
against students are driven by various
motives that range from re-establishing
their beliefs in social inequalities to cre-
ating a new culture of fear and exclu-
sion. Schools and universities that are
considered to be places of liberal educa-
tion are gradually being injected with
the notions of hierarchy and narrow na-
tionalism. In school, students look up to
EPW Engage
The following articles have been published in the past week in the EPW Engage section (www.epw.in/engage).
(1) Optimal Hybrid Schooling Strategies for Sustaining Skilling — Mousumi K Bhattacharjee
(2) Defending Digital Liberties: Changing Contours of an Old New Civic Activism — Ankita Pandey
7, 2023volvol
lViii
lViII
no no
24 40
LETTERS
their teachers not only as an authority
but also as a guiding force. However, the
students from marginalised backgrounds
find themselves amid individuals who
destroy their faith in the process of
learning because of their deep-rooted
social prejudice as reflected in their
behaviour in the classroom. In 2022, a
Dalit student was beaten up by a teacher
for drinking water from a pot in a school
in Rajasthan. The student succumbed to
his injuries later. The instances of dis-
crimination against students from mar-
ginalised communities also highlight
the public humiliation faced by them in
the institutions of higher education. In
2022, a Muslim student in a university in
Karnataka was called by the name of a
terrorist by his teacher in the classroom.
In his explanation, the teacher justified
his remark by saying that they meant it
as a joke. These incidents indicate the
lack of pedagogic sensibilities among
our nation’s educators. Moreover, the
intention to degrade and humiliate a
student for their social identity destroys
the culture of learning.
The deep-rooted practices of exclusion
and discrimination in schools and uni-
versities certainly create mental agony
and stress among students. Education
prepares individuals for the larger society
and a teacher is responsible for sharing
and introducing a flow of ideas in the
classroom. According to sociologist
Avijit Pathak, “teaching is an ethical act
because it is an act of sharing and not
possessing.” Therefore, the act of teach-
ing should not be influenced by preju-
dices and ill-conceived notions. Though
India has been dreaming of becoming
a vishwaguru (teacher of the world) by
projecting its cultural image around the
world, it should not remain aloof from
the humiliating experiences infl icted
by certain teachers upon their own stu-
dents in the country.
Swapnil Dhanraj
Sonipat
5
LETTERS

6 october
june 17,
7, 2023 vol lViII
lViii no 40
24 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

From 50 Years Ago
Vol VIII, No 40 OCTOBER 6, 1973
End of the Old IMF
Rajendra Kumar
The 28th Annual Meeting of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), held at Nairo-
bi from September 24 to 28, 1973, was ex-
pected to be important in three respects:
firstly, it was going to be held in a less devel-
oped country; secondly, the IMF was to
have a new Managing Director, H Johannes
Witteveen of the Netherlands; and, last, the
Bretton Woods IMF was to yield place to a
new one. […]
The Bretton Woods IMF was set up as a
United Nations agency to ensure interna-
tional financial discipline with the overall
objectives of full employment and maximum
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023
development of the productive resources of
all member countries. In its work, the Fund
was intended to serve as one of the legs of a
United Nations tripod on which would rest
the smooth working of the international
economic system. The other two agencies
were: the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, meant to assist
member countries obtain funds for long-
term investment; and the International
Trade Organisation, supposed to remove in-
ternational trade barriers like tariffs and
quotas. In fact, however, the International
Trade Organisation did not come into being;
instead the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) was established to super-
vise the removal of trade and import restric-
tions. In the circumstances, the structure of
the overall United Nations machinery for
international economic co-operation re-
mained incomplete from the very start and
this substantially retarded the smooth
working of the Fund.
vol lViii no 40
COMMENT
It is noteworthy that the old IMF and
other United Nations agencies were based
on the principle that the domestic economic
considerations of the LDCs and the world
objectives of international economic co-
operation were not only compatible but
even mutually reinforcing. As a result, the
Bretton Woods IMF, in its enforcement of
the rules of exchange rate stability and con-
vertibility, was not expected to assume any
direct responsibility towards its members.
Thus, the Fund did not recognise the spe-
cial problems and needs of its LDC mem-
bers, especially in achieving full employ-
ment and maximum use of their productive
resources. Subsequently, however, it was
increasingly realised, in economic theory
as well as in practice, that considerations of
full employment and economic develop-
ment in the LDCs require policies which
would usually run counter to the principles
of international economic co-operation,
free trade and exchange stability.
9

From 25 Years Ago
Vol XXXIII, No 41 OCTOBER 10, 1998
Memories of a Fragmented
Nation: Rewriting the
Histories of India’s Partition
Mushirul Hasan
Scores of writers reveal the other face of
freedom, the woes of divided families, the
agony and trauma of abducted women, the
plight of migrants and the harrowing expe-
riences of countless people who boarded the
train that took them to the realisation of
their dream, but of whom not a man, wom-
an or child survived the journey. A Zahidin
Attia Hosain’s Sunlight on a Broken Column
or a Saddan in Masoom Reza Rahi’s Aadha
Gaon (Half-a-Village) offer a vivid and pow-
erful portrayal of a fragmented and wound-
ed society. What political debate will never
fully do — and the reason we so badly need
the literature — is defeat the urge to lay
blame, which keeps animosity alive. Only
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023
the literature truly evokes the sufferings of
the innocent, whose pain is more universal
and ultimately a vehicle of more honest re-
conciliation than political discourse.
Board the Peshawar Express or the Train
to Pakistan to discover the implications of
what happened before and after the fateful,
midnight hour. Consider the exchanges be-
tween Choudhry Mohammad Ali, a well
known landlord of Rudauli in Barabanki dis-
trict (Uttar Pradesh) and his daughter who
left his father to settle in Karachi, or the cor-
respondence of Brahm Nath Dutt, father of
the historian V N Datta to capture the poign-
ancy of the moment. Turn to Rahi’s Gangauli
village — a world where people are seen to
be wrestling to come to terms with compet-
ing ideologies — in order to uncover how the
intricate and almost imperceptible way in
which the politics of partition worked its
way into the interestices of people’s con-
sciousness. Read Attia Hosain’s Sunlight on a
Broken Column or Phoenix Fled to discover
how the Pakistan movement split families
on ideological lines and created fears and
uncertainties in the minds of people. To read
her novel and collection of short stories is,
vol lViii no 40
COMMENT
‘as if one had parted a curtain, or opened a
door, and strayed into the past’.
Indeed, if the ‘histories’ of partition are to
be rewritten, there are several reasons why
we must judiciously draw upon the intellec-
tual resources made available to us by such
creative writers. They expose the inadequa-
cy of numerous narratives on independence
and partition, compel us to explore fresh
themes and adopt new approaches that have
eluded the grasp of social scientists, and pro-
vide a foundation for developing an alterna-
tive discourse to current expositions of a
general theory on inter-community rela-
tions. Their strength lies is representing a
grim and sordid contemporary reality with-
out drawing religion or a particular commu-
nity as the principal reference point. In their
stories, the experiences of each community
distinctly mirror one another, indeed reach
out to and clutch at one another. No crime,
no despair, no grief in exile belongs uniquely
to anyone. In the words of Krishna Sobti,
whose best known Hindi writings on parti-
tion are Sikka Badal Gaya and Zindaginama,
the fiction written about that cataclysmic
event preserved ‘essential human values’.
9
 OCTOBER 7, 2023
K-shaped Recovery Dents Growth of Worker Earnings
Improving labour market outcomes for disadvantaged social groups must get top priority.
H
ow has growth and structural change in the economy
affected the labour market outcome for the disadvan-
taged caste, gender, and religious groups? These are
some of the major issues dealt by the State of Working India
2023 report brought out by the Centre for Sustainable Employ-
ment at Azim Premji University. The report highlights the out-
come gaps that persist despite the gains made on various fronts
and notes the urgent need for remedial steps to push the econo-
my towards more inclusive growth.
At the outset, the report highlights some of the major macro
gains made on the employment front in the recent years. It notes
that in the four years between 2017–18 and 2021–22, the working-
age population has gone up by 53 million to 1,021 million, that is, it
increased by an annual average of around 13 million. However,
the numbers joining the labour force rose much faster at an annu-
al rate of 15 million per annum to 528 million during the period.
But what gives some comfort is that, despite these huge an-
nual additions, the size of the workforce expanded much faster
at 16.5 million per annum to touch 493 million. Consequently,
open unemployment fell both in nominal and percentage terms.
While the nominal numbers of the openly unemployed fell by
6 million to 35 million during this period, the unemployment
rate fell by 2.1 percentage points to 6.6%.
However, the good news ends there. When it comes to the im-
provements in real earnings, the gains were almost none or even
negative for the vast majority of the workers. While the real earn-
ings (adjusted for inflation) of self-employed workers, the largest
segment accounting for more than half the workforce, fell in real
terms, that of regular workers, constituting around one-fifth of the
workforce, remained stagnant. Only the earnings of casual work-
ers, who make up a little less than a quarter, registered an increase.
Thus, we find that the monthly earnings of self-employed workers
fell by 1.9% (`229) to `12,089, while that of regular workers re-
mained stagnant at `19,456. Only the earnings of casual workers
increased by 12.9% (`897) to `7,856 during the period.
So, it seems safe to conclude that, despite some macro level
gains on the employment front, with the workforce expanding
faster than the labour force and population in the employment
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40
age group, the earnings of a major segment of the workforce
either stagnated or declined. This is a major setback because it
will not only affect the poverty alleviation efforts but also derail
the efforts to usher in sustainable growth.
What makes this scenario more unacceptable is that this
stagnancy and decline in real wages happened even as corpo-
rate profitability soared to a decadal high in this period. More-
over, the economy has also grown by around 13.6% in real terms
over these years. So, this clearly attests to the K-shaped recov-
ery in the post-pandemic period with corporate profits and
workers’ wages moving in opposite directions. This also ex-
plains the current slump in consumption demand that con-
strains a steady pickup in growth.
But then what explains the increase in earnings of casual
workers? Casual workers are the most disadvantaged segment
of the workforce with their earnings only around two-thirds of
that of the self-employed and less than half that of the regular
workers. A major reason for the buoyancy in casual wage earn-
ings is the large expansion of the Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (MGNREGP) during
and after the pandemic. The numbers show that total employ-
ment under the MGNREGP, which was 7.9 crore in 2019–20, that
is, the pre-pandemic year, had shot up to a high of 11.2 crore
during the pandemic (2020–21) and remained at a high of 10.6
crore even in 2021–22. The MGNREGP not only provided an em-
ployment cushion for casual workers, especially to workers who
have migrated back to the villages, but also indirectly improved
their bargaining clout in urban areas from where a large num-
ber of workers fled during the pandemic. This has certainly
helped buoy up earnings of casual workers.
On the social front, a major gain has been the improvement
in the labour force participation and work participation rates
of female workers. This is surprising because the rates have
shown a steady deterioration in the earlier decades. However, a
closer analysis shows that the improvement in female work par-
ticipation rates were superficial as these gains were mainly due
to an increase in agriculture and self-employment. The growing
dependence of female workers on self-employment points to
7
COMMENT
increasing economic distress that forced women to shift from
household work to informal employment.
However, the worst labour market outcome was in the earn-
ings of the disadvantaged social groups. Gender disparities in
wages were the maximum, with earnings of self-employed
female workers just 40% that of males. Though this ratio im-
proved to 64% and 76% in the case of casual labour and regu-
lar employment, the disparities still remain too large to be
ignored. Among caste groups, the earnings of the Scheduled
8 OCTOber 7, 2023
Caste workers were only around three-fourths of the others in
both the self-employed and regular wage segments. However,
this ratio improved to 90% in the casual wage segment, proba-
bly due to the tightening of supply constraints. In the case of
minorities, the disparity was most visible in the regular wage
segment, with the earnings of Muslim workers just around
80% of the Hindu workers. However, their earnings were al-
most at par in the self-employed segment and even higher in
the casual wage segment.
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENT
Caste Survey in Bihar: A New Beginning?
The socio-economic data along with caste figures may lead to revisiting material questions underlying
caste–class inequality.
Awanish Kumar writes:
I
n his Untouchables or the Children of India’s Ghetto and other
writings, B R Ambedkar highlighted the historic signifi-
cance of the 1911 Census of India. It was for the first time
that the “depressed classes” were identified and counted sepa-
rately from the Hindu population. Caste numbers, especially
the population share of “depressed classes” derived from 1911
and consequently 1921 Censuses, were a major point of debate
during the Lothian Committee and Round Table Conferences.
According to Marc Galanter, this separate enumeration changed
the entire discourse around the “depressed classes” and their
political significance in the national movement. Would the re-
lease of the caste survey report in Bihar have the same conse-
quence in national politics almost more than a century later?
The specific caste numbers from the report should not come
as a surprise to any serious student of society in India. If we add
the population shares of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes, Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and Extremely Back-
ward Classes (EBCs), we obtain the figure of 84.5%—very close
to the 85% figure that appears in many slogans in social justice
movements since a long time. But the devil lies in the details. It
is important to note that the EBCs alone are about 36% of the
total population. This is where the specific context of Bihar poli-
tics becomes highly relevant to interpret the findings.
To begin with, the popular nomenclature of “Caste Census” is
a bit of a misnomer. A survey or census cannot be a caste-count-
ing exercise alone. A more appropriate nomenclature was used
for the unreleased “Socio Economic and Caste Census” of 2011.
Expectedly, the Bihar survey has, along with caste, collected
data on socio-economic characteristics. Mapping caste, espe-
cially jati numbers, onto these socio-economic characteristics
will reveal and perhaps intensify contemporary fault lines in
Bihar society. Commentators have already highlighted the over-
representation of Brahmins, Rajputs, Bhumihars, and Kayasthas
in the state assembly. More details about landholdings and as-
sets will even raise further questions about uneven deve-
lopment among various jatis among the OBCs. In the context of
Bihar, this discussion has a distinct political background. In the
last two decades, Nitish Kumar has successfully mobilised the
EBCs as part of what he himself has called “Annexure 1 politics”
8 OCTOber 7, 2023
(drawing from the Mungeri Lal Commission of the 1970s). Along
with this was his early intervention in the Pasmanda discourse.
According to various analyses of recent electoral data, however,
the EBCs seem to have moved away from the Janata Dal (United),
and towards the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Similarly, the BJP
has recently initiated a Pasmanda outreach. The caste survey
data brings the focus back on the EBCs and prevalence of caste
among Muslims. For the BJP, it may provide the opportunity to
reignite the Yadav-versus-non-Yadav dichotomy, whereas for Ni-
tish Kumar, it may be a final chance to demonstrate his commit-
ment to his well-cultivated constituency. At a broader level, the
socio-economic data along with caste figures may finally herald
Mandal II in its true sense, incorporating the agenda of funda-
mental reforms in land distribution, access to good-quality
education, and sociopolitical representation of neglected com-
munities with the larger umbrella of the OBCs.
This leads to the other long-standing binary of caste versus
development that needs to be figured out by the Mahagath-
bandhan in Bihar and the INDIA alliance nationally. Prime Min-
ister Narendra Modi has already criticised the opposition for
demanding a national-level caste census. In the liberal as well
as right-wing discourse, caste politics has often been under-
stood as standing against development. In the run-up to the Bihar
assembly elections in 2020, Tejashwi Yadav consistently raised
padhai (education), dawai (health), sinchai (irrigation), and
kamai (livelihood). Importantly, livelihood was clearly defined
as naukri (jobs) with specific assurance of 20 lakh government
jobs. At the normative and discursive levels, the detailed caste
survey may provide a historic and unique moment to highlight
the hypocritical and caste-discriminatory nature of neo-liberal
development and for the Mahagathbandhan to deliver a model
of development with social justice. Revisiting material questions
underlying caste–class inequality would be a potent reimagina-
tion of Mandal II in Bihar as well as nationally.
For the BJP, the release of the caste survey data poses a real
dilemma. The state unit of the party has supported the demand for
a caste survey and in fact was a part of the Nitish Kumar-led dele-
gation that met the Prime Minister in August 2021, when Nitish
Kumar was part of the National Democratic Alliance. Certain
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

prominent OBC leaders from the BJP, such as Gopinath Munde,
had made a passionate case for caste census when the United
Progressive Alliance was in power. More recently, union minis-
ters, such as Anupriya Patel, have explicitly supported the de-
mand for a nationwide caste census. After the release of the
caste survey data, former union minister Ravishankar Prasad
questioned its quality to which Tejashwi Yadav responded by
demanding a nationwide caste census. In the recent past, in
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the BJP has focused on mobilising the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40
COMMENT
EBCs. Most important perhaps is the fact that the Government of
India-appointed Justice Rohini Commission has submitted its
report on subcategorisation of the OBCs. How would this sub-
categorisation take place without any caste numbers? These
questions will need careful handling by the union government
in the run-up to the Lok Sabha elections of 2024.
Awanish Kumar (awanishkumar86@gmail.com) teaches at Azim Premji
University, Bengaluru and is consulting editor (Book Reviews) with
Economic & Political Weekly, Mumbai.
9
ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT
What Does a University
Logo Mean?
Dilip Chavan
Universities in any modern
society are expected to supply
knowledge, research, and skilled
human resources required for
industrial production, circulation,
and consumption of useful
commodities. However, a public
university in a welfarist–democratic
society is also expected to cherish
equality, freedom, justice, and
secularism. Do public universities
in India fulfil this function?
Debate over the logo of the
Savitribai Phule Pune University
has once again brought these
issues into sharp focus.
The author sincerely thanks Simon Barnabas
and Najeeb Yehia Ezzi Washaly for their
comments and suggestions on an earlier
version of this article.
Dilip Chavan (dilipchavan@srtmun.ac.in)
teaches at the Department of English, Swami
Ramanand Teerth Marathwada University,
Nanded.
10
W
hile moving from Fergusson
College to the Deccan Gym-
khana in Pune, one comes
across a multicuisine restaurant bearing
the name “Peshwa,”1 which is invariably
reminiscent of the bygone days of the
city. On a side of this restaurant is “W”
(W for Women), an outlet of a company
established by an indigenous capitalist,
and on another side is “Wildcraft,” a
showroom of a company receiving foreign
capital investment. Both the companies
have artistically carved logos and both
the showrooms also fall in favour of
affluent customers.
The word “restaurant” comes from the
French verb restaurer, and the word
“Peshwa” comes from the Persian lan-
guage. The linguistic blend called
“Peshwa Restaurant” suggests a cultural
hybrid of contemporary life in a city like
Pune, which had once earned the ill-
repute of being called a “Brahman city.”
Since this is a restaurant in the category
of fine dining, the general public is least
likely to dine here. The names, logos,
and interiors of these two establish-
ments are indicative of how the elitist
project of modernity is a site of hybridity
and appropriation as well as how easily
the Indian elite embraces modernity. For
exercising cultural dominance, it is nec-
essary for this class to adopt and benefit
from bourgeois modernity.
The acceptance of bourgeois modernity
by the Indian elite has been insincere and
symbolic, at best. Moreover, this elite
still cherishes outmoded symbols and a
feudal ethos in the public domain, lead-
ing to a peculiar kind of hybridity.
Modernity in India does not take shape
by rejecting tradition; rather, the for-
mer creates the space for a somewhat
awkward synthesis with the latter. The
Indian elite has appropriated modernity
for ensuring upward mobility, while
october 7, 2023
denying the same to a large chunk of
the population.
During the past few years, a contro-
versy has arisen over an image of the
Shaniwar Wada2 and some other sym-
bols in the logo of the Savitribai Phule
Pune University (SPPU). Sixteen organi-
sations have demanded the removal of
the images of the Shaniwar Wada and
Parvati temple from the SPPU’s logo.
Expectedly, this demand has been
opposed by some so-called “Brahmin”
organisations. Both the demand for and
opposition to the logo are in their
infancy; however, the invigorated cul-
tural politics implied by both is of utmost
importance for evaluating the politics of
the past as well as the contemporary
times in Maharashtra.
Semiotics of a Logo
When a picture or an image becomes a
symbol, it evokes feelings beyond the
visible object represented by it. Such an
object does not merely remain in its
physical form, as it assumes a new sym-
bolic form. In this process, it ceases to
exist as a visible object and emerges as a
symbol loaded with specific thoughts
and values marked by a certain ideology.
Some semiologists view ideology as a
value-free system, while others regard
signs as symbolic objects carrying a spe-
cific message into the public space and
having an implicit meaning. It was Karl
Marx (1818–83) who held that ideology
is influenced by the ruling structure in a
society and the prevailing thoughts, con-
cepts, and systems of ideas in any given
society are propagated by the ruling
class for its own interests. This vision
was further developed by Valentin
Voloshinov (1895–1936), Mikhail Bakhtin
(1895–1975), Roland Barthes (1915–80),
and Louis Althusser (1918–90).
Moreover, symbols are closely related
to thought systems. According to Bakhtin
and Pavel N Medvedev (1891–1938), “All
the products of ideological creation—
works of art, scientific works, religious
symbols and rites, etc—are material
things, part of the practical reality that
surrounds man” (Nöth 2004: 11). Voloshi-
nov (1973: 10) writes that every sign is
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT

subject to the criterion of an ideological
evaluation, and everything ideological
possesses a semiotic value.
Every university has a logo carrying a
specific meaning. The cultural politics
involved in the establishment of a uni-
versity and interests of various groups
related to it can be understood through
such logos. For example, the phrase
“Dominus Illuminatio Mea” (The Lord Is
My Light) in the logo of the University of
Oxford and three images of a crown are
symbolic of the influence and political
responsibility of the then religious sys-
tems on this university. Similarly, four
lions and the Bible on the cross in the
logo of the University of Cambridge indi-
cate political and religious patronage to
the university.
Emblems of various universities in
India also convey specific meanings. For
example, an image of goddess Saraswati,
the orange colour, and a symbol of Om
in the emblem of the Banaras (Kashi)
Hindu University and a crescent, a green
palm tree, and a book in the emblem of the
Aligarh Muslim University, respectively,
suggest Hindu and Islamic iconogra-
phies. Both these universities were
established during the colonial era to
cater largely to the Hindu and Muslim
elites, respectively. Debates about the
logo of the University of Mumbai eluci-
date how it is loaded with conflicting
connotations, how it is altered, how the
process of changing it is permeated with
the tension of cultural interests, and
how various stakeholders of a university
are conscious about the implications of
such a change (Tikekar 2007: 150–07).
SPPU Logo Controversy
The establishment of the University of
Poona in 1949 was one among the early
significant decisions taken in Maharashtra
after Indian independence. Recent initia-
tives of renaming various cities and rail-
way stations in India have created an
illusion of decolonisation. In this pro-
cess, “University of Poona” was renamed
as the “University of Pune.” Some Hindu
organisations in India believe that coloni-
sation or colonialism in India began with
Muslim rule and, therefore, after coming
to power, they advocated the replacement
of the medieval–Muslim names and
symbols by renaming the “Aurangzeb
Road” as “Dr A P J Abdul Kalam Road”
in New Delhi and, in Maharashtra,
Osmanabad as “Dharashiv” and Aurang-
abad as “Chhatrapati Sambajinagar.”
At the same time, the state has shrewdly
avoided the responsibility of decolonis-
ing various systems and institutions
which it had inherited as part of the
colonial legacy. Instead of initiating fun-
damental changes in the structures of
revenue, administration, education, nat-
ural resources, penal, and judicial systems
by making them people-centric, the ruling
classes in independent India chose to
preserve these structures’ primordial and
colonial form and content. However, an
illusion of decolonisation was created
by resorting to certain symbolic acts.
After independence, the Indian elite—
which was an outcome of the colonial
university system—decided to change
the emblem of the then Bombay Univer-
sity, which bore certain colonial traces.
However, the same “postcolonial” elite

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Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 11

ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT
unhesitatingly adopted the signs from
the Peshwa regime in the emblem of the
then University of Poona, which was
later renamed as the University of Pune.
Signs do not exist without a system of
thought accompanying them. If the SPPU
logo bears an image of the Shaniwar
Wada, it undoubtedly reflects specific
ideological politics and cultural inter-
ests. The Shaniwar Wada was the resi-
dence of the Peshwas and was not even
remotely related to the practice or dis-
semination of knowledge. During the
times of Bajirao II (1775–1851), people
were so ignorant that they mistook Cal-
cutta as being a part of England. For the
elite in Pune, the Shaniwar Wada is the
“signified” of a certain kind and it is
reminiscent of the so-called “glory” of
the Peshwa regime.
The image of Shaniwar Wada in the
SPPU logo bears a saffron/orange flag,
which is reminiscent of the Peshwa
regime. This flag used to adorn Shani-
war Wada only before 1818, and it was
replaced by the Union Jack soon after
the fall of the Peshwa regime. Since
independence, no flag has been hoisted
on the building.
The logo has a motto at its bottom. Like
the mottos of many other universities,
the motto of this university—Ya: Kri-
yaavaan Sa Pandit:—is in Sanskrit and is
taken from the Mahabharata. This verse
is excerpted from the “Vanaparva” of the
Mahabharata and the word “Pandit” in this
verse refers to the one who knows and
follows the “shastra,” that is, Vedic texts
and values. The official website of the
university has this to say about the
motto: “At the bottom of the emblem is
the motto of the University: Where Actions
Prove Knowledge.” The translation of
the motto overlooks the spiritual and
social connotations of the term “Pandit,”
which was traditionally used for some-
one who was expected to support and
promote the varna order. Thus, a sign or
a motto is not meaningless; it signifies
certain values. These values are not nec-
essarily consistent with the modern
times; hence, they merit a reconsideration.
The SPPU logo also bears an image of a
hill temple on it. The university’s assess-
ment of this is as follows: “The Parvati
Hill Temple: The Spiritual and Historic
12
Landmark of Pune.” The inclusion of this in 1960 as part of an opposition to
temple in the logo was not unintentional. the legacy of Bal Gangadhar Tilak6
This temple invariably symbolises the (1856–1920) in Pune.
Peshwa rule. Since the temple was not A symbol of the Parvati temple can be
open to the untouchables, B R Ambedkar accepted by neither the non-Hindu reli-
(1891–1956), N G Gore (1907–93), gious groups nor the lower castes and
Shirubhau Limaye (1907–96), S M Joshi Hindu women due to various gender and
(1904–89), P N Rajbhoj (1905–84), and caste discriminatory practices associ-
Shivram Kamble (1875–1940) had to ated with this temple in the past. More
undertake a satyagraha in 1929 to make its importantly, symbols such as temples or
access open to the erstwhile untouchables. the swastika on university logos are
Interestingly, Datto Vaman Potdar inconsistent with the long-standing
(1890–1979), one of the conservative policy of secularism. Hence, several
Chitpavan3 thinkers from Pune, had organisations, which are increasingly
suggested the site of the Parvati Ramna becoming aware of such semiotic politics,
for the University of Pune. are asserting their identity by challenging
During the month of Shravan,4 the such logos and symbols.
Peshwas used to distribute dakshina5 in
the form of gold coins to the Brahmins Brahminical Dominance and
gathered from all over India. Around Politics of the Logo
40,000 Brahmins used to gather to collect The foundation of the SPPU was an
the dakshina in the Ramana festival. attempt to reassert Brahminical domi-
Jotirao Phule (1827–90) had criticised nance, which the “Brahmins” in Pune
spending such a huge amount on these felt was undergoing a crisis in the wake
indulgences and condemned the Peshwas of increasing democratisation and mod-
for making a fortune out of the taxes col- ernisation. A growing sense of the loss of
lected from the peasants (Keer 2012: 276). power felt by the Pune “Brahmins”
The irony of Potdar’s choice of the site of prompted them to reassert their lost
the university is that, currently, at the ascendancy. Historians have recorded
foot of the Parvati hill exists the Shahu that public life in Maharashtra in the
Mandir College, which was established 19th century was shrouded in a fierce
Assistant Professor in the Department of English
Ashoka University
Location
Sonipat
Description
The Department of English at Ashoka University, in the Delhi Capital region of India,
is looking to make (two) tenure-eligible appointments in 2024. We are primarily
looking to hire active researchers, thinkers and passionate teachers whose areas of
specialisations may include (but are not restricted to) one or more of the following
subfields: long global eighteenth-century (including Romantic) literatures, global
ancient literatures, American literatures, digital humanities, literary theory, and South
Asian literatures. We are particularly interested in colleagues who are committed to
the ethos of liberal arts pedagogy at the undergraduate and graduate levels.
Application Instructions
Please upload a letter of application, along with CV on http://apply.interfolio.
com/132432
Deadline for applications: December 01, 2023. We hope to interview shortlisted
candidates over Zoom in January 2024.
For any queries please write to faculty.recruitment@ashoka.edu.in
october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

competition. After the decline of the
Peshwas, the Chitpavan Brahmins of
Maharashtra felt that they were suffering
a loss in their power. Just as they were at
the forefront of negotiating with the
British, they were also leading the actions
of armed uprisings against British rule in
the Pune–Nashik area. Processes that
seem contradictory at the surface
involve the unity of a politics of domi-
nance at an intrinsic level.
According to Donald Kurtz (2009: 622),
the British neither liked nor believed the
Chitpavan Brahmins. In the early phase
of the colonial rule, the British tried to
govern without them; however, after the
decline of the Peshwas, the Chitpavan
Brahmins had been overtaken by an
inferiority complex. This made them
occupy all areas of public life. Richard
Temple’s 1879 statement that “[The Chit-
pavans] will never be satisfied till they
regain their ascendency during the last
century,” indicates their discomfort as
well as ambition (Nanda 1977: 13). In the
meantime, the British also had to adapt
to the Chitpavan Brahmins, and the lat-
ter, in turn, also showed great resilience
towards the former. V K Rajwade (1863–
1926), one of the Chitpavan Brahmin
conservative intellectuals from Pune,
along with Datto Vaman Potdar, had estab-
lished, as early as 1928, the Maharashtra
University and College Librarians Asso-
ciation, which was a non-governmental
committee aimed at creating a favoura-
ble public opinion for a new university in
Pune (Goley 1974: 14).
According to Kurtz, the then University
of Poona was the last secular institution
that remained under “Brahmin” control
and it became an arena of political con-
flict as other Brahmins and Marathas
challenged the decades-long Chitpavan
Brahmin domination of the university’s
administration (Kurtz 2009: 611).
Reimagining the University
One of Jawaharlal Nehru’s (1889–1964)
famous but forgotten statements about a
typical university is:
A university stands for humanism, for toler-
ance, for reason, for progress, for the adven-
ture of ideas and for the search for truth. It
stands for the onward march of the human
race towards even higher objectives. If the
universities discharge their duty adequately,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023
then it is well with the nation and the
people. But if the temple of learning itself
becomes a home of narrow bigotry and petty
objectives, how then will the nation prosper
or a people grow in stature?
This statement of Nehru (2017) was
engraved on a stone in the Kher Literary
Bhawan of the SPPU. However, this
engraving has suffered negligence and
has now become faint. Does it imply that
the university feels uncomfortable with
this idealism now? It is hoped that the
university overcomes its oblivious nature
towards this vision. This overcoming is
most necessary today as public universi-
ties in India and the rest of the world are
increasingly losing their autonomy and
are being brought under a more stringent
control of the state.
Indian universities have been plagued
by multifarious crises in the recent times.
Universities around the world, including
in Europe and North America, are expe-
riencing the heat of globalisation. Once
centres of rationalism, enquiry, innovation,
and resistance, they are now unabashedly
becoming aligned with the industries
and market ideology. They are being
geared to be used to supply the skilled
human resources required by the mod-
ern economy. These universities, origi-
nally infected with elitism, have become
more corrupt after the adoption of neo-
liberal economic policies. J M Coetzee
(2016), a Nobel Prize-winning African-
Australian novelist, has painstakingly
argued that this kind of erosion is a uni-
versal phenomenon. However, the take-
over of the universities by the state has
more subtle dimensions in India. Coet-
zee has complained that the tone of the
universities is very weak against this
takeover. It is instructive to read his
opinion in his own words:
The fact is that the record of universities, over
the past 30 years, in defending themselves
against pressure from the state has not been
a proud one. Resistance was weak and ill
organised; routed, the professors beat a
retreat to their dugouts, from where they
have done little besides launching the inter-
mittent satirical barb against the managerial
newspeak they are perforce having to acquire.
Saving these dying universities is the
duty of everyone who holds the values of
democracy, justice, and equality as essen-
tial in a decent society. Any movement
vol lViii no 40
ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT
targeting symbolic politics also needs to
address such larger questions.
NOTES
1 The name “Peshwa” refers to the late-medieval
Brahmin ruling family from Pune, who initially
served as subordinates to the Maratha emperor
and, subsequently, became the de facto leaders
of the Maratha kingdom. After ascending to
power, they heavily patronised Sanskrit educa-
tion and Brahminical customs.
2 Shaniwar Wada (built in 1732) was the official
residence of the Peshwas in the 18th and 19th
centuries. According to some sources, an Untouch-
able person was sacrificed at the base of the
palace at the time of its construction. For this
and many other reasons, the palace has remained
an object of criticism and disdain in the anti-
caste movement in modern Maharashtra.
3 The Chitpavans, a sub-caste of Brahmins in
Maharashtra, are supposed to have originated
from the Konkaṇ region and it gathered cul-
tural and political clout after the political
ascendancy of the Peshwas.
4 Shravan, considered to be a holy month in Hin-
duism, is the fifth month of the lunar calendar.
5 The practice of dakshina, which literally means
gift, was initiated by Khanderao Dabhade
(1665–1729) for donating money in the form of
gold coins to the learned and other “Brah-
mins.” The practice was continued by the Pesh-
was and early British rulers. According to
Ravindra Kumar (1968), the practice repre-
sented an informal alliance between the Chit-
pavan Brahmins and the state.
6 Bal Gangadhar Tilak, a conservative Chitpavan
Brahmin political thinker and leader from
Pune, was a diehard critic of Shahu (1874–1922),
who had initiated social and educational
reforms in the Kolhapur state.
REFERENCES
Coetzee, J M (2016): “Universities Head for Extinc-
tion,” Mail & Guardian, https://mg.co.za/article/
2013-11-01-universities-head-for-extinction/.
Goley, W H (1974): The University of Poona 1949–
1964, Pune: The Registrar, University of Poona.
Keer, Dhananjay (2012): Mahatma Jotirao Phooley:
Father of the Indian Social Revolution, Mumbai:
Popular Prakashan.
Kumar, Ravindra (1968): Western India in the
Nineteenth Century: A Study in the Social
History of Maharashtra, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Kurtz, Donald V (2009): “The Last Institution
Standing: Contradictions and the Politics of
Domination in an Indian University,” Journal
of Anthropological Research, Vol 65, No 4,
pp 611–40.
Nanda, B R (1977): Gokhale: The Indian Moderates
and the British Raj, New Delhi: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Nehru, Jawaharlal (2017): “Universities Stand for
Tolerance,” https://www.thenehru.org/2017/11/
universities-stand-for-tolerance.html.
Nöth, Winfried (2004): “Semiotics of Ideology,”
Semiotica, No 148, pp 11–21.
Tikekar, Aroon (2007): The Cloister’s Pale: A Biog-
raphy of the University of Mumbai, Mumbai:
Popular Prakashan.
Voloshinov, V N (1973): Marxism and the Philosophy
of Language, Ladislav Matekja and I R Titunik
(trans), New York and London: Seminar Press.
13
COMMENTARY
Gaddar (1949–2023)
A Cultural Revolutionary in the
Struggle for Social Transformation
Sujatha Surepally
Gaddar was a remarkable artist
who used his music and literature
to transform society and raise
awareness about people’s rights.
His social background gave him a
deep insight into oppression of all
kinds and how to challenge
them effectively. By combining
art with a revolutionary ideology,
the impact of his life and work
will continue to resonate for
generations in the Telugu-speaking
regions and beyond.
Sujatha Surepally (ssurepally@gmail.com)
teaches sociology at the Satavahana
University, Karimnagar and researches on
caste, gender, and Dalit women. She is also an
activist based in Telangana whose focus is on
land, education, and human rights.
28
I
n the capacity of a Dalit female activ-
ist, I am compelled to write this piece
having closely observed Gaddar’s in-
volvement in the Telangana movement
since 2009. Gaddar, with his remarkable
artistic talents, has significantly contrib-
uted to social transformation, enlighten-
ing individuals about their rights through
his music and literature. His work has
stirred both the literate and illiterate
alike, motivating them to advocate for
their rights. While he faced criticism
for shifting his stance from advocating
armed struggle to supporting the Telan-
gana movement and engaging with is-
sues related to caste, it is my personal
belief that constructive criticism should
not overshadow one’s societal contribu-
tions. I hold the viewpoint that Gaddar
confronted discrimination stemming from
his untouchable caste background. How-
ever, I would argue that precisely be-
cause of his caste background and first-
hand experience with discrimination, he
possessed a deep understanding of op-
pression and was able to communicate
and address it effectively.
Presently, the reality is not confined
to theoretical critiques, but rather the
tangible impact of Gaddar’s influence as
people mobilise and organise in every
corner of the Telugu-speaking regions
and across India where his reach ex-
tends. The perspective through which I
view Gaddar’s role is not solely that of a
great singer but as an individual who
harmoniously combines artistry with a
profound ideology. He serves as a con-
necting force, allowing the message of
revolution to resonate with the masses.
A revolution remains incomplete unless
there exists a medium through which
it can engage and be understood by
the people.
In the pages of Indian history, there are
individuals who transcend the confines
OCTOber 7, 2023
of their time and place to become sym-
bols of resilience, agents of transforma-
tion, and embodiments of collective
strength. Such figures emerge from the
margins of society, their lives inter-
twined with the struggles of the op-
pressed. One such luminary is Gaddar, a
name that resonates with unwavering
commitment to social justice, folk artistry,
and the struggle against oppression. In
this comprehensive exploration, we delve
into the multifaceted persona of Gaddar,
tracing his journey from his humble be-
ginnings to becoming a renowned folk
singer-activist, his profound impact on
the social justice movement, his artistic
contributions, and the intricate relation-
ship he maintained with the Communist
Party of India (Maoist).
A Symbol of Resilience
In the context of a marginalised, illiterate,
and impoverished population enduring
the oppressive yoke of a colonial and
feudal state, Gaddar emerges not as a
mere name or individual but as a symbol
of resilience, a transformative force, an
organisation, a breath of fresh air, and a
life-force that beats in harmony with his
melodies. His artistic expression tran-
scends the realm of mere entertainment,
offering a beacon of hope and motiva-
tion to those ensnared in the throes of
an unjust society marked by systemic
oppression and glaring inequality. His
songs reverberate with a call to action,
inspiring a collective commitment among
the marginalised and the impoverished
populace to rise against the oppressive
forces that shackle them.
Gaddar’s journey is deeply rooted in
his own humble origins as a member of
the Dalit community, situated within the
very heart of the oppressive colonial and
feudal state. His father, Gummadi
Seshaiah, an unwavering Ambedkarite
who had direct contact with B R Ambedkar
during his time in Aurangabad, played a
pivotal role in this transformative narra-
tive. In addition to his labour as a ma-
son, Seshaiah was an educator not only
for his sons, whom he named as Narsing
Rao and Vithal Rao, but also for his
daughters. It is within this nurturing en-
vironment that Gaddar’s passion for ad-
vocating the rights and dignity of the
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

marginalised, illiterate, and impover-
ished masses may have found its origins.
During his early years, Gaddar faced
caste discrimination that left a profound
impact on him. When a schoolteacher re-
fused to allow him to inscribe his name as
Vithal Rao, instead insisting on inspecting
whether he possessed a sacred thread, it
served as a stark reminder of the preju-
diced hierarchy entrenched in society.
It was at this moment that Gaddar
resolutely embraced the name “Gaddar”
in place of Vithal, a name that would come
to symbolise his unwavering commitment
to challenging and dismantling the caste-
based discrimination that permeated eve-
ry facet of life.
Role as a Cultural Catalyst
In the fabric of revolution, can its threads
weave a lasting fabric devoid of song
and folk arts, especially in realms where
formal education, social equity, and the
reach of the social are scarce? Does this
revolution eclipse those who dedicated
their lives to its propagation? Yet, history
chronicles a chapter where songs and
performances, once the lifeblood of trans-
formation, become marginalised and
abandoned as they began to espouse the
tenets of constitutional rights.
Within this historical narrative, Gaddar
stands as a singular figure, unmatched
in his ability to mobilise countless peo-
ple towards the revolutionary cause,
transcending the intellectual realm of
speeches. It is Gaddar who breathed life
into the revolution, venturing into the
humblest of abodes and the farthest cor-
ners of the world. He relinquished his
wife, children, and personal life, becom-
ing the embodiment of the party’s mis-
sion, facing imminent threats, and etch-
ing his name into the annals of legend.
Even in the face of party suspension, he
did not falter. Instead, he imbued his red
flag with new hues, introducing the blue
symbol of Ambedkar bearing Buddhist
undertones, all the while remaining the
unwavering leader of the people.
Relationship with the Party
Typically, an individual’s character is mo-
ulded by their beliefs and principles, as
they embody the essence of an organisa-
tion, and that organisation thrives by
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023
witnessing its ethos resonate within the
collective consciousness of the populace.
When one’s mindset remains static and
fails to evolve with the changing times,
it resembles a stagnant pond that, with
the passage of time, emits an unpleasant
odour. Gaddar, on the contrary, adapted
to the evolving currents of time while
staying rooted in his foundational prin-
ciples. However, it appears that the or-
ganisation failed to grasp this evolution,
leading to accusation and misunder-
standings directed towards him.
Reflecting on Gaddar’s journey, one is
reminded of the common tendency to
celebrate the grandeur of architectural
marvels while overlooking the labourers
who crafted them. It is noteworthy that
certain decisions made by Gaddar drew
attention and disapproval from his own
political party. However, these decisions
should not overshadow his monumental
contributions, unwavering sacrifices, tire-
less efforts, or the physical scars he en-
dured from bullet wounds. Remarkably,
it was not his political party that shield-
ed him from the barrage of bullets, but
his wife, Vimala, and a close-knit circle
of individuals who knew him intimately.
Impact on Cultural Movements
With the Art Lovers Association chang-
ing its name to Jana Natya Mandali
(JNM), one observes a rich page within
the annals of revolutionary cultural
movements. It embraced musical instru-
ments like the tamboora (similar to
veena) and jamidika, a musical instru-
ment traditionally associated with the
untouchable castes. Gaddar’s pioneering
influence extended to the transforma-
tion of oggu katha, a traditional narra-
tive form previously popularised by
local artists like Chukka Sattaiah and
Midde Ramulu in Telangana through
the JNM. Gaddar reimagined the oggu
narrative, penning songs that delved
deep into the issues of exploitation, dis-
crimination, and oppression faced by
Dalits, Adivasis, and the marginalised.
Beyond the realm of his revolutionary
activities, Gaddar’s cultural prowess
shines through as a defining element of
his persona. His ability to create capti-
vating music, write poignant lyrics, and
employ theatre as a medium for raising
vol lViii no 40
COMMENTARY
awareness was instrumental in building
a powerful and lasting connection with
the masses. This connection transcend-
ed the confines of class, caste, and creed,
unifying people under the banner of so-
cial justice and revolution.
Gaddar’s use of folk music and the in-
corporation of traditional instruments
in his performances played a pivotal role
in his cultural influence. By infusing
modern sensibilities with age-old art
forms, he created a unique blend that
resonated with both the traditional and
contemporary aspects of his audience.
His music was not just a form of enter-
tainment. It was a call to action, a chan-
nel through which the grievances and
aspirations of the marginalised found
expression. In the realm of folk artistry,
Gaddar’s contributions extended beyond
music. He was a prolific writer and play-
wright, crafting powerful narratives
that addressed pressing social issues.
Through his plays, he tackled subjects
such as land reform, exploitation, and
caste discrimination, shedding light on
the harsh realities faced by the under-
privileged. These plays, often performed
by the JNM, were instrumental in raising
awareness and mobilising communities
for social change.
Art and Activism
The intersection of art and activism has
the potential to be a potent force for so-
cietal transformation, and Gaddar epito-
mised this synergy. His cultural activism
was a dynamic tool for engaging the
masses, articulating their struggles, and
fostering a sense of unity and purpose.
Through his songs, plays, and performanc-
es, Gaddar not only entertained but also
educated and empowered the people.
Gaddar’s music, infused with powerful
lyrics that addressed the issues of the mar-
ginalised, resonated deeply with the mass-
es. His songs became anthems of resist-
ance, sung by people from diverse back-
grounds who sought justice and equali-
ty. His ability to convey complex social
issues through music made his message
accessible to a wide audience. One of the
defining features of Gaddar’s music was
its ability to inspire action. His songs
were not passive reflections of injustice
but calls to arms. This proactive approach
29
COMMENTARY
to music made Gaddar a dynamic figure
in the realm of cultural activism.
The JNM, the cultural troupe founded
by Gaddar, played a pivotal role in dis-
seminating his message and mobilising
communities. This theatre group used the
power of storytelling to convey the strug-
gles of the marginalised, often perform-
ing in remote villages and underserved
areas where access to mainstream media
was limited. Through their performanc-
es, they were able to connect with the
people on a personal level, making them
aware of their rights and encouraging
them to take action against injustice.
Gaddar’s plays, written with a keen
understanding of the social issues at
hand, had a profound impact on the audi-
ences that witnessed them. These per-
formances were not just entertainment
but powerful tools for consciousness-
raising. They shed light on the harsh re-
alities faced by marginalised communi-
ties, particularly in rural areas, where
inhumanity, exploitation, and discrimi-
nation were rampant.
One of the key aspects of Gaddar’s
plays was their ability to instil a sense of
agency in the audience. Through com-
pelling narratives and relatable characters,
his plays showed that change was possi-
ble and that collective action could bring
about social transformation. This mes-
sage of empowerment resonated deeply
with those who watched his performanc-
es, inspiring them to become advocates
for social justice in their own right.
Cultural Landscape of
the Telugu States
To fully appreciate the significance of
Gaddar’s cultural activism, it is essential
to understand the sociopolitical context
of Andhra Pradesh during his time. The
state was grappling with a multitude of
issues, including land reform, caste-based
discrimination, and the exploitation of
labourers. These issues were deeply
entrenched in society, and challenging
them required a multifaceted approach.
Gaddar’s emergence as a cultural icon
coincided with a period of heightened
social and political activism in Andhra
Pradesh. The Telangana movement,
which sought to address and reforms the
rights of landless labourers, was gaining
30
momentum. At the same time, the Dalit
movement was also on the rise, advocat-
ing for the rights and dignity of the mar-
ginalised communities.
Telangana movement, which aimed to
address issues related to land distribu-
tion and the rights of landless labourers,
provided a fertile ground for Gaddar’s
activism. He became a prominent voice
in its discourse. Gaddar’s ability to con-
nect with the rural masses, many of
whom were directly affected by land-
lessness and exploitation, made him a
natural leader within the movement.
He was the chairperson of the Telan-
gana Praja Front and emphasised on the
importance of collective action. He be-
lieved that real change could only come
about when communities came together
and fought for their rights as a united
front. This philosophy was reflected in
his music and plays, which often por-
trayed stories of resistance and resil-
ience in the face of oppression.
Advocacy of Dalit Rights
Gaddar’s advocacy extended well beyond
the land distribution and labour rights, as
he passionately championed Dalit rights
as well, using his songs and plays to con-
front caste-based oppression and call for
social justice. His ability to bridge divides
between communities emphasised the
interconnectedness of oppression, fos-
tering solidarity among marginalised
groups. Gaddar’s cultural activism signi-
ficantly influenced the Dalit movement
in the Telugu-speaking states, empower-
ing Dalit communities and raising aware-
ness of their rights. Beyond his artistic
endeavours, he actively engaged with
Dalit organisations. His legacy endures
as a source of inspiration. Additionally,
Gaddar’s influence extended to advocat-
ing for Adivasi rights, environmental
conservation, and anti-globalisation eff-
orts, making him a unifying figure for
various social justice causes.
Gaddar’s unwavering dedication to
social justice defined his life’s work, em-
ploying his art as a potent instrument
for change. His remarkable ability to con-
nect with people of diverse backgrounds,
his emphasis on collective action, and
his fearless opposition to injustice estab-
lished him as a formidable advocate for
OCTOber 7, 2023
societal transformation. His enduring
legacy underscores the influence of art
and culture in catalysing social change,
with his music, plays, and writing con-
tinuing to inspire and educate new gen-
erations of activists. The issues tackled
by him, from land reforms to caste dis-
crimination and the rights of Adivasis,
remain pressing concerns in contempo-
rary India, serving as a reminder that the
pursuit of justice and equality demands
enduring commitment, resilience, and
the creative spirit exemplified by cultural
icons like Gaddar.
In Conclusion
In Indian history, Gaddar emerges as a
towering figure who used the transform-
ative power of art and culture to cham-
pion the cause of social justice. From his
humble beginnings in a marginalised
Dalit community to his role as a cultural
catalyst and advocate for the rights of
the oppressed, Gaddar’s journey is a tes-
tament to the enduring spirit of resil-
ience and resistance.
His music, plays, and writings contin-
ue to resonate with those who seek to
challenge the oppressive systems that
perpetuate inequality and discrimina-
tion. His legacy serves as a source of in-
spiration for activists, artists, and indi-
viduals committed to the ideals of equity
and justice. Gaddar’s life and work re-
mind us that the struggle for societal
transformation is an ongoing endeav-
our, and that the creative force of cul-
ture can be a powerful ally in this quest
for a more just and inclusive world.
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vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Reading ‘India Way’ in the
Neighbourhood First Policy
Moral Exceptionalism or
Strategic Pragmatism?
Shweta Singh
India’s Neighbourhood First
Policy is guided by ideas of
moral exceptionalism rooted in
particular civilisational framings,
but is not without strategic
pragmatism, and the case of
Sri Lanka is a case in point.
Shweta Singh (shwetasingh@sau.ac.in) teaches
at the Department of International Relations,
Faculty of Social Sciences-South Asian
University (a university established by the
SAARC nations).
24
A
gainst the backdrop of the visit
of the President of Sri Lanka,
Ranil Wickremesinghe, on 21 July
2023, India laid a renewed emphasis on
“India–Sri Lanka economic partnership
for maritime, energy and financial con-
nectivity” within the contours of India’s
Neighbourhood First Policy. It is impor-
tant to underline that in the recent
past, India was the first responder to Sri
Lanka in the wake of the economic cri-
sis, and did not wait for other bilateral
creditors to act. It was quick to send hu-
manitarian aid (wheat and medicines)
after the Taliban takeover of Afghani-
stan. In the wake of covid-19, Bhutan,
Maldives, Bangladesh, Nepal, Seychel-
les, Myanmar, and Mauritius were part
of India’s initial roll-out of vaccines as
grant assistance.
OCTOber 7, 2023
A narrative that cuts across each of
the moves was “India cares,” and has the
moral responsibility to lift up its neigh-
bours—an idea that is the cornerstone of
India’s Neighbourhood First Policy. The
Ministry of External Affairs (Economic
Diplomacy Division) brief states, “India’s
Neighbourhood First Policy rests on
India’s prime responsibility to lift up its
neighbours to establish a rules-based order
to preserve multilateralism and to estab-
lish peace and security in the Indian
ocean.”1 It is interesting to note that the
idea of neighbourhood first is not tied to
the geographical template of South Asia,
but is extended in normative and strategic
conceptualisation to include Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Bang-
ladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) and
even countries in central Asia.
There are differing readings of India’s
Neighbourhood First Policy, ranging from
classifying this as a case of strategic
pragmatism, given the China factor
in India’s neighbourhood, to a case of
India’s moral exceptionalism. While stra-
tegic pragmatism, in straightforward
terms, can be defined in terms of focus
on power and material interests (Miller
and de Estrada 2017), the term moral ex-
ceptionalism stands to much scrutiny. In
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

brief, moral exceptionalism is informed
by the supposedly universal values de-
rived from a particular “civilisational”
heritage or political history (Nymalm
and Palgemann 2019).
While the content of moral exception-
alism is subject to much debates, the
point is pertinent as non-Western states
like India and Turkey claim relevance in
global politics hinged on the politics of
civilisational exceptionalism (Haug and
Roychoudhury 2023). They argue, “while
there are clear differences in their re-
spective civilisational antecedents, both
countries draw on a combination of moral
superiority and responsibility—India as
vishwaguru (the world’s guru), and Turkey
as dunyanun vicdani (the world’s con-
science)—as the legitimising base for their
respective version of exceptionalism”
(Haug and Roychoudhury 2023: 532).
I examine this idea of moral excep-
tionalism, with its tetherings to Hindu
civilisationational imaginaries in the
discourse of the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) from the standpoint of India’s
Neighbourhood First Policy. The domestic
ramifications of this idea, its inclusion-
ary/exclusionary politics, are beyond
the scope of this article, but what I am
surely interested in is its ramification in
India’s neighbourhood.
I argue that India’s Neighbourhood
First Policy is guided by ideas of moral
exceptionalism rooted in particular civi-
lisational framings (drawn from the ide-
as of Hindutva, espoused by the BJP),
but is not without strategic pragmatism,
and the case of Sri Lanka is a case in
point. However, it is important to note
that this narrative of moral exceptional-
ism, rooted in the idea of civilisational
state, and scripted in the language of
Hindutva, is not without its pitfalls, and
is easily read as “civilizational chauvin-
ism” (Duara 2009) by small states, in
South Asia—a point that can limit India’s
strategic umbrage in the region.
The article proceeds in three parts:
Part 1 discerns the “India way” in India’s
Neighbourhood First Policy. In doing so,
it provides a brief overview of the con-
ceptual trope of moral exceptionalism,
and how and why it has been deployed
by postcolonial/rising power like India, in
differing phases of post-independence
India. In Part II, I elucidate this argu-
ment using the case of Sri Lanka against
the backdrop of the economic crisis and
the signing of the Trincomalee Oil Tank
Farm agreement. The concluding sec-
tion highlights the limits of civilisational
framings of Indian exceptionalism, and
why in most cases it falls into the trap of
civilisational chauvinism, or an inward-
looking nationalist ideology.
‘India Way’
Historically, for India, its claim to moral
exceptionalism was part of its fight against
colonial rule. Further in the post-inde-
pendence period, “The fashioning of In-
dia as a ‘moral power’ was aimed at both
changing global norms and at the same
time constructing a postcolonial Indian
identity” (Chacko 2011: 52–52). The point
of emphasis being that this gave rise to
“ethico-political project based on the no-
tion of Indian civilisational exceptional-
ism—the idea that India is equipped
with unique moral qualities that will

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Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 25

COMMENTARY
allow for the creation of ethical moderni-
ty” (Chacko 2011: 53). In terms of its
global outlook, this led to conceptualisa-
tion and support for coexistence, non-
alignment, multilateralism and a poly-
centric world order. However, while re-
spect for coexistence informed notions
of Indian civilisational exceptions, it was
rooted in differing framings of the idea
of civilisation itself. For instance, “Nehru
version was rooted in secularist intellec-
tual tradition, Gandhi turned to the
more syncretic version of Hinduism, and
Modi’s India towards Hindu internation-
alism” (Haug and Roychoudhury 2023).
This claim to exceptionalism, based
on seemingly paradoxical normative val-
ues of both universality and particulari-
ty, is interesting in ways in which it
translates into global, and regional out-
look. India, since 2014, has put forth this
claim to moral exceptionalism, rooted in
ideas of civilisational state, and has priv-
ileged the spiritual and ideational basis
of a glorified ancient Indian “Hindu”
past. The claim to moral exceptionalism
is neither new nor exceptional in India’s
foreign policy outlook, but rather what
is different is the privileging of a specific
religious imaginary of this civilisational
antecedent. Further, what is pertinent to
underline is that this claim to moral ex-
ceptionalism is not just instrumental in
terms of constituting a specific identity
for India, but has been deployed to fur-
ther India’s strategic interests both glob-
ally and regionally. This strategic fram-
ing can be easily classified as an act of
realpolitik, but which moves away from
the Western umbrage of the definitional
binary of ethics (care, generosity), and
interests (materiality).
Scholars argue that India’s claim to
moral exceptionalism is more than a
“straight forward, outward projection of
discrete civilisational ideas that operate
as a diplomatic lubricant in the pursuit
of interests, or constitute a repertoire of
norms that exert normative power (al-
though it may incorporate those ele-
ments, too)” (Basrur 2017 as cited in de
Strada 2023: 436). And, of course, this
pitches India as a rising global power but
with its unique brand of ethics and ma-
teriality, with the ability to lead globally
and regionally (vishwaguru). Ian Hall
26
(2019) in his study of Narendra Modi’s
approach to foreign policy, defines “world
guru India” as “the notion that India has
a unique mission in the world and
unique wisdom to convey,” and this of
course translates in India’s immediate
neighbourhood. However, the politics of
“care,” “order,” “responsibility” or “moral-
ity” is not without the realpolitik lubricant
of strategic interests and pragmatism.
So while India might be the first re-
sponder in the case of Sri Lanka, it also
strategically countered the Chinese foot-
print in terms of signing the Trinco-
malee Oil Tank Farm agreement. The
point of emphasis being that India, as a
rising power, is strategically leveraging
its neighbourhood, which surely is a wel-
come step, but what it needs to be mind-
ful of is an extra tinting in terms of civi-
lisational narratives impinging on histori-
cal fractures and complex postcolonial
anxieties in the region. The next section
outlines the case of Sri Lanka to demon-
strate how India has strategically lever-
aged its footprints in Sri Lanka.
The Case of Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka is an interesting case to test
how India’s Neighbourhood First Policy
has translated on ground, particularly in
the wake of the economic crisis. As a brief
backdrop, Sri Lanka and India share close
proximity in terms of their rich civilisa-
tional histories, but are also marred by
competing historical memories where
geographical proximity exacerbates,
what is classified by scholars, like Muni
(1993), as “pangs of proximity.” It goes
without saying that Sri Lanka, though a
small island nation, is of great strategic
value, given India’s maritime vision and
the Security and Growth for All in the
Region (SAGAR) doctrine. However, giv-
en the history of the ethnic conflict in Sri
Lanka, and the Tamil factor in Indo-Sri
Lanka relations, it can be stated that
when a “generous” India, with a claim
to moral exceptionalism, engages with
Sri Lanka, it also is confronted with the
burden of complex histories. So, the in-
teresting bit of analysis is: Has India
been able to break out of this spectrum
in the wake of economic crisis in Sri Lan-
ka? And how has India translated its
Neighbourhood First Policy on ground?
OCTOber 7, 2023
Furthermore, what are the signs of moral
exceptionalism and strategic pragma-
tism that one can discern from the trans-
lation of this policy on ground?
On the face of it, and rightly so, India,
has been the first responder in many ways
to Sri Lanka’s economic crisis. External
Affairs Minister S Jaishankar states,
“India did not wait for other bilateral
creditors but did ‘what is right’ for Sri
Lanka’s economic recovery” (Srinivasan
2023). As reported, the decision, Jais-
hankar said, was a reassertion of “India’s
belief in the principle of neighbourhood
first, and ‘not leaving a partner to fend
for themselves,’ which also drove the
nearly 4-billion-dollar assistance extend-
ed in 2022, by way of credits and roll
overs” (Srinivasan 2023). It is important
to take note of the language of reliabili-
ty, and commitment that is used, and he
states, India is “a reliable neighbour, a
trustworthy partner, one who is pre-
pared to go the extra mile when Sri Lan-
ka feels the need” (Srinivasan 2023). So
if one looks at the “India cares” and is
generous in their approach towards its
neighbours, Sri Lanka is case in point,
similar to India’s vaccine diplomacy with
Bangladesh, or humanitarian aid to Af-
ghanistan. However, this is only the par-
tial jigsaw piece that fits the template of
the Neighbourhood First Policy. As stat-
ed at the outset, India’s notion of moral
exceptionalism, and its strategic narra-
tive of Indias cares, is not without its
own imperative for strategic pragma-
tism. The case of Trincomalee Oil Tank
Farm agreement is a case in point.
Trincomalee, a town and a port on the
north-eastern coast of Sri Lanka, is situ-
ated on a peninsula in Trincomalee Bay
—the second deepest natural harbour in
the world. Given its strategic and com-
mercial value, it enjoyed the attention of
the colonial powers, including the Por-
tuguese, Dutch, French and British in
the past. It is important to highlight that
Trincomalee remains strategically im-
portant for competing powers like China
and India, given their maritime interests
in the Indian Ocean region. The Trinco-
malee Oil, also known as the China Bay
Oil Tank Farm, was built by the British
in the 1930s to supply fuel to Royal Navy
ships during World War II. The British
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

continued to control the oil farm com-
prising 99 tanks until the Sri Lankan
government took it over in 1957. Each of
the existing 99 tanks can contain 12,000
tonnes of fuel. With a total capacity of
over 1.2 million tonnes, the oil farm has
the potential to turn Sri Lanka into a pe-
troleum hub in the South Asian region.
However, out of 99, only 14 are in usable
condition and being used by the Lanka
Indian Oil Corporation (LIOC), a subsidi-
ary of the Indian Oil Corporation, since
2003. In January 2022, India and Sri Lan-
ka signed an agreement to develop the
Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm. As reported,
the two countries have agreed to jointly
develop 61 out of the 99 tanks. The Trinco
Petroleum Terminal (Private) Limited has
been set up for the joint venture project,
with 51% of stakes held by the Ceylon Pe-
troleum Corporation (CPC) and 49% by
the LIOC. Of the remaining 38 tanks, LIOC
would continue to use 14 tanks and the
CPC would run 24 tanks (Srinivasan 2022).
The Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm agree-
ment is a win-win for both India and Sri
Lanka. But for India, it takes its strategic
interest one step forward given the Chinese
footprint in the island nation. It is im-
portant to note this deal, in fact, finally
firms up India’s role since the time of the
Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987.
The case of Sri Lanka clearly demon-
strates how India leverages both its ma-
terial and ideational interests through the
framings of India’s Neighbourhood First
Policy. From the standpoint of realpolitik,
while this might take a step forward, it
also has the potential to be read through
the frames of civilisational chauvinism
by small states in South Asia, given the
contested history of the region.
In Conclusion
To conclude, it can be stated that India’s
pitch to transcend the binary of ethics
and interests, through the framing of its
ideas of moral exceptionalism and stra-
tegic pragmatism, is surely interesting
and builds a unique self-identity. While,
in the past, this self-identity was pitched
as a resistance to colonial umbrage, it
moved on to build alternative civilisa-
tional imaginaries, marked by versions
of Jawaharlal Nehru, M K Gandhi and
now Narendra Modi. However, India, as
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023
a rising power, needs to be watchful of
the imaginary of civilisational state spe-
cifically in South Asia. While India has
taken the right step forward in terms of
its Neighbourhood First Policy, with its
framing of moral exceptionalism, this is
not without its pitfalls. The strength of
this strategic move in the neighbour-
hood is that, first, it breaks India out of
the strategic complacency vis-à-vis its
neighbourhood. India’s neighbourhood
was not at the primacy of attention in
the post-independence arena, barring
the period marked by the “Gujral doc-
trine.” A small but important point is
that many leaders in the post-independ-
ence period did not even prioritise visit-
ing the neighbourhood. This surely is a
marked change since 2014, where even
the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Min-
ister Modi was marked by extending in-
vitations to leaders from across the
neighbourhood. Second, it helps counter
the growing Chinese footprint in South
Asia, and the case of Sri Lanka is a case
in point.
But the India way, and its claim to
moral exceptionalism, is not without
dangers of slipping into civilisational
chauvinism. Moral exceptionalism that
is rooted in philosophical underpinning
of Hindutva, or just privileges the “Indic
civilisational values,” surely stands on
slippery grounds, and can be/is read as
civilisational chauvinism with tints of
muscular nationalism. The challenge
then is, how does India, given its own
strategic imperative in the region, bal-
ance this? Many would argue that per-
haps India is already doing that given its
conceptualisation of neighbourhood has
moved much beyond South Asia, and it
is looking to regional groupings like
BBIN, BIMSTEC, Indo-Pacific to not only
advance its interest, but also get past the
territorial trap of South Asia. While this
is a welcome strategic move, given the
need for a polycentric axis of engage-
ment, South Asia still remains a key stra-
tegic pivot in India’s quest for global
leadership, and given India’s emphasis
on ideas of culture and connectivity.
Note
1 For details, see the write-up “Neighbourhood
First: Bolstering India’s Regional Relationships,”
24 June 2019, Ministry of External Affairs,
vol lViii no 40
COMMENTARY
Economic Diplomacy Division, https://indbiz.
gov.in/neighbourhood-first-bolstering-indias-
regional-relationships/.
References
Basrur, Rajesh (2017): “Modi’s Foreign Policy Fun-
damentals: A Trajectory Unchanged,” Interna-
tional Affairs, Vol 93, No 1, pp 7–26.
Campbell, David (1992): Writing Security: United
States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,
University of Minnesota Press.
Chacko, Priya (2011): Indian Foreign Policy; The
Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947-2004,
Routledge: India.
Duara, P (2009): “Civilization and Realpolitik,”
India International Centre Quarterly, Vol 36,
Nos 3/4, pp 20–33.
de Estrada, Kate Sullivan (2023): “What Is a Vish-
waguru? Indian Civilizational Pedagogy as a
Transformative Global Imperative,” Interna-
tional Affairs, Vol 99, No 2, pp 433–55, March,
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac318.
Hall, Ian (2019): Modi and the Reinvention of Indian
Foreign Policy, Bristol: Bristol University Press.
Haug, Sebastian, Supriya Roychoudhury (2023):
“Civilizational Exceptionalism in International
Affairs: Making Sense of Indian and Turkish
Claims,” International Affairs, Vol 99, No 2,
pp 531–49, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac317.
Miller, Manjari Chatterjee and Kate Sullivan de Es-
trada (2017): “Pragmatism in Indian Foreign
Policy: How Ideas Constrain Modi,” Interna-
tional Affairs, Vol 93, No 1, pp 27–49.
Muni, S D (1993): Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri
Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis, India: Sage Publications.
— (2020): “India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ Policy
and the Chinese Challenge: The Cases of Bang-
ladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka,” India’s Great
Power Politics: Managing China’s Rise, Jo Inge
Bekkevold and S Kalyanaraman (eds) (2020),
Routledge: India.
Nymalm, N and J Plagemann (2019): “Comparative
Exceptionalism: Universality and Particularity
in Foreign Policy Discourses,” International
Studies Review, Vol 21, No 1, pp 12–37, https://
doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy008.
Srinivasan, Meera (2022): “India Inks Deal with Sri
Lanka to Develop Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm,”
Hindu, 7 January, https://www.thehindu.com/
news/international/india-inks-deal-with-sri-
lanka-to-develop-trincomalee-oil-tank-farm/
article38162574.ece.
— (2023): “India Did Not Wait, Did What Was
Right to Help Sri Lanka: Jaishankar,” Hindu,
20 January, https://www.thehindu.com/news/
national/india-did-not-wait-for-others-did-
what-was-right-for-sri-lankas-recovery-eam-
jaishankar/article66412365.ece.
Thorsten, Wojczewski (2019): “Identity and World
Order in India’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy
Discourse,” Third World Quarterly, Vol 40, No 1,
pp 180–98, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2018.1552079.
available at
Gyan Deep
Near Firayalal Chowk,
Ranchi 834 001,
Jharkhand
Ph: 09470564686
27

Law Commission of India and
Uniform Civil Code
Looking Back, Looking Forward
Saumya Uma
In the contemporary discourse on
the uniform civil code and family
law reforms, an examination
of the 21st Law Commission of
India’s consultation paper on
family law reform, published
in 2018, becomes imperative.
Although the LCI’s 2018 paper had
progressive recommendations
on some issues, particularly in
foregrounding that the UCC was
neither feasible nor desirable in
the current context, it cannot
be considered as a radical or
futuristic document. It is hoped
that the shortcomings in the 2018
consultation paper and the legal
developments since then will
inform and shape the 22nd LCI in
its forthcoming report of 2023–24.
Saumya Uma (saumyauma@gmail.com)
teaches at the Jindal Global Law School,
O P Jindal Global University, Sonipat.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023
W
ith imminent elections in some
states in 2023 and general elec-
tions a stone’s throw away in
2024, the government has vociferously
advocated for a uniform civil code (UCC)
once again. While many of us are trying to
grapple with our collective and individual
responses to the 22nd Law Commission
of India’s (LCI) call for responses, a refer-
ence is made, time and again, to the 21st
LCI’s consultation paper of 2018. The
2018 consultation paper is analysed and
critiqued in this article, as the recom-
mendations made in 2018 continue to
remain relevant for the current dis-
course on the UCC and reforms in family
laws. It further takes stock of legal de-
velopments in family law since then,
and discusses the way forward.
Responses on the Proposal for
a UCC
The union Ministry of Law and Justice
had asked the 21st LCI in June 2016 to
“examine matters in relation to Uniform
Civil Code.” In response, the LCI conducted
its own research, analysed submissions
received in response to its question-
naire, and held wide consultations with
a range of stakeholders over the next
two years. This culminated in its consul-
tation paper of 2018 on the reform of
family laws in India (LCI 2018).
The LCI argued against forced uni-
formity in the form of a UCC in 2018.
While acknowledging that various family
laws deprivilege women, the LCI articu-
lated that it was discrimination, not dif-
ference, that lies at the root of inequali-
ty. This informed the LCI’s analysis of
each family law and recommendations
for gender-just reforms in the same
manner, along with highlighting the
need for the codification of certain
aspects of family law in order to elimi-
nate legal ambiguities.
vol lViii no 40
COMMENTARY
Even while reiterating the presence of
a desire for change, the LCI opined that
the law has to operate within the consti-
tutional framework, and foresaw hin-
drances to enacting a UCC. It highlighted
the fact that Articles 371(A) to 371(I) and
the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution
provide certain protections to Andhra
Pradesh, Assam, Goa, Mizoram, and
Nagaland with respect to family law. The
LCI further observed that there are many
variations in tribal customary practices
followed in the Sixth Schedule states.
For instance, the Garo and Khasi tribes
in Meghalaya are matrilineal and the
youngest daughter inherits the property
in these tribes. The Garos also follow
matrilocality, whereby the son-in-law lives
with the daughter and her natal family
after marriage, something pejoratively
referred to as the practice of ghar jamai in
other parts of India. Marriages are also
compulsorily registered under law in
Meghalaya. These hindrances that the
LCI highlighted in 2018 continue to re-
main relevant to the contemporary dis-
course on the UCC.
An issue that arises is whether a UCC
will necessarily uphold secularism, facili-
tate national integrity, and promote gen-
der justice. The LCI in 2018 emphatically
stated that secularism cannot be contra-
dictory to plurality and that secularism
only ensures the peaceful coexistence of
cultural differences (LCI 2018: 13). It fur-
ther opined that a united nation does not
need to have uniform laws; it is possible
to reconcile diverse laws with universal
principles of human rights (LCI 2018: 14).
Gender-just Family Law Reforms
As a logical corollary, the LCI discussed the
family laws pertaining to each religious
community at length, and made recom-
mendations for eliminating gender dis-
criminatory provisions in each of them.
On issues of marriage and divorce, the
LCI recommended a simplified procedure
for divorce which is free of discrimina-
tion and violence, including the ground
of irretrievable breakdown of marriage
(IBM) (LCI 2018: 28–29). In addressing the
concern raised by women’s rights groups
that the recognition of IBM may lead to
economic vulnerability and destitution
of the concerned women, it called for
21
COMMENTARY
the introduction of the concept of “com-
munity of property” of all self-acquired
property after marriage. This will be
considered to be owned by the couple
and divided equally upon divorce, it said
(LCI 2018: 30–31). It further recom-
mended the deletion of the matrimonial
remedy of restitution of conjugal rights
from the relevant statute books, as it
serves little purpose in independent In-
dia (LCI 2018: 39).1
The LCI further advocated for equal
guardianship rights to both parents, in-
cluding for adopted children (LCI 2018:
71, 77). It emphasised on the need for a
specific, full-fledged secular law on the
adoption of children (not merely as
wards), but in its absence, the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2015 must be made more comprehen-
sible and accessible (LCI 2018: 104–05).
The LCI’s recommendations for gender-
just reforms on issues of succession and
inheritance are somewhat pathbreaking.
It called for an abolition of Hindu copar-
cenary, which provides exclusive right in
a property by birth to male members of
the Hindu joint family, and to daughters
after the 2005 amendment to the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 (LCI 2018: 131). It also
called for the abolition of the concept of
Hindu undivided family (HUF) as it is not
conducive for the tax regime or corporate
governance (LCI 2018: 132–33). Further, it
questioned the rationale behind providing
a separate scheme of intestate succession
for Hindu men and women, and advocated
for a gender-neutral scheme instead (LCI
2018: 144–45).2 On the Muslim law of suc-
cession, it recommended a codification
with a common code for Shias and Sunnis,
and a scheme of intestate succession that
is based on the proximity of the heir to
the deceased and gender neutrality in the
classification of heirs (LCI 2018: 156–60).
It also recommended the elimination of
gender-discriminatory aspects in the
scheme of succession in Christian (LCI
2018: 168) and Parsi laws (LCI 2018: 176).
A highly significant recommendation
that the LCI made across the laws appli-
cable to all religious communities was
to fix a portion of the property of the
deceased for dependants that would de-
volve through a scheme of intestate suc-
cession, so that the entire property is not
22
willed away to defeat the rights of the
dependants (LCI 2018: 146, 170, 176).
The LCI especially focused on the
rights of children within family laws. It
recommended that the provisions in the
Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and the
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,
1956 that treat a minor husband as the
guardian for his minor wife and child
must be deleted, as it treats the wife as
his chattel, and does not take into con-
sideration the minority of the husband
as well (LCI 2018: 66, 75). It opined that
children from bigamous marriages that
are declared void must be eligible for the
same rights from parents, and the term
“illegitimate” must be removed from the
statute books (LCI 2018: 182). It further
recommended that children born out of
transient live-in relationships of their
parents must also be entitled to inherit
their self-acquired property; for this rea-
son, it opined that a secular law is war-
ranted which would confer legitimacy to
such children across all religious com-
munities (LCI 2018: 178–79, 181).
This bird’s-eye view of the LCI’s 2018
recommendations leads us to the follow-
ing question: Why did the government
not initiate gender-just family law re-
forms along the lines of the LCI’s 2018
recommendations in the years between
2018 and 2023, if it was sincere in its
proclaimed commitment to gender jus-
tice and equality?
Missed Opportunities
The LCI’s 2018 paper made some progres-
sive suggestions on certain matters, espe-
cially in highlighting the impracticality
and undesirability of the UCC in the pre-
sent situation. However, it was not a
radical or a futuristic document. One of
the biggest hurdles to gender-just family
law reforms is the perception that such
reforms in family law violate freedom of
religion and belief enjoyed by men within
each religious community. For this reason,
the LCI could have gone further to dis-
connect religion from family laws com-
pletely, which it failed to do. Further,
while the LCI recommended the codifi-
cation of uncodified aspects of family
law, codification is often a double-edged
sword, as it helps provide certainty and
clarity (if drafted well) while minimising
OCTOber 7, 2023
a judge’s discretion in applying the legal
principle and making the law more rig-
id. The consultation paper does not
show any indication of an effort to bal-
ance between these two factors.
Some of its reasoning is questionable
as well. For instance, its recommenda-
tion for the deletion of the restitution of
conjugal rights as a matrimonial remedy
was not because it is degrading or dehu-
manising for women who may be raped
within the duration of the marriage and
forced into an unwanted pregnancy,
but because “it serves no real purpose.”
Existing matrimonial laws protect con-
jugal rights of parties and the remedy is
being used to defeat women’s claims for
maintenance (LCI 2018: 39). It also con-
sidered 18 years as the age of majority to
be sacrosanct, and opined that all mar-
riages of minors are regressive as they
may not understand the consequence of
such marriages (LCI 2018: 80). While not
supporting child marriages, the distinc-
tion between a 10-year old and a 17.5-years
old opting for a marriage by choice seems
to have been lost on the LCI, which failed
to acknowledge the important concept
of “evolving capacities of the child.”3
Sheila Varadan (2019) argued that there
is an enabling principle, an interpretative
principle, and a policy principle within
the framework of the United Nations
(UN) Convention on the Rights of the
Child, which has been ratified by India.
Additionally, its silences are as conspic-
uous as its words. For instance, it did not
make any attempt to broaden the discourse
on marriage and family, to extend rights
and protection to trans and queer persons
who might aspire to be governed by family
laws. Though the plea for legal recognition
to same-sex marriages was made before
the Supreme Court and various other
courts after 2018, the discourse around
inclusive family laws has a longer history
that ought to have been engaged with
(Vanita 2005; Narrain and Gupta 2011).
Further, it is puzzling that the LCI paper
chose not to engage with the Portuguese
Civil Code and the Goa Succession, Spe-
cial Notaries, and Inventory Proceed-
ing Act, 2012 as though they were
non-discriminatory or the discriminato-
ry provisions embedded in them did not
matter. Since the argument in favour of a
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

UCC is often buttressed by showcasing
Goa’s “uniform” family laws and the
need to replicate the same at a national
level, this was a missed opportunity for
the LCI. Relevant feminist scholarship
could have guided its response with re-
gards to family law reforms (Almeida
2013; Kohli 2016).
Moreover, the economic rights of
women have been given little importance
in the report. With the social security
benefits shrinking, their ramifications for
women in being financially dependent
on and pliant with their natal/marital
families even in the face of extreme
forms of violence, abuse, and discrimi-
nation is obvious. Thus, issues of land
rights, social security, and matrimonial
property ought to have been engaged
with rigour as key to women’s empower-
ment and equality, rather than merely
the issue of maintenance that allows
married women to survive and subsist,
albeit in a subservient manner.
The 22nd LCI has an opportunity to
address these shortcomings in its forth-
coming report of 2023–24.
Developments in Family Law
Jurisprudence
Since the 22nd LCI stated that it is examin-
ing the issue of the UCC afresh due to
changes in laws and judgments, it
becomes necessary to take stock of the
developments that took place in the in-
tervening years.
In Shayara Bano v Union of India (2017),
the practice of triple talaq was declared
to be unconstitutional and un-Islamic.
In July 2019, the pronouncement of tri-
ple talaq was made a criminal offence
through the Muslim Women (Protection
of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. In
2022, it was observed that Muslim hus-
bands are deserting their wives instead
of divorcing them, due to the fear of be-
ing imprisoned under the 2019 law, leav-
ing Muslim wives in a worse situation
than in the past (Khan 2022).
Additionally, anti-conversion legisla-
tions came to be passed in the state legisla-
tures of Uttarakhand (2018), Himachal
Pradesh (2019), Uttar Pradesh (2020), and
Haryana (2022)—all of which include
the prohibition of religious conversion
for marriage, and some of which declare
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023
COMMENTARY
such marriages to be void even if the and set out guidelines on the overlap-
marriage was entered into by consent- ping jurisdictions on maintenance caused
ing adults. Such laws violate the agency due to varied legislations, payment of
and decisional autonomy of parties to interim maintenance, criteria for deter-
such marriages (Uma and Saxena 2021). mining the quantum of maintenance,
In 2019, the Transgender Persons date from which maintenance orders are
(Protection of Rights) Act was enacted to be awarded and enforcement of main-
in pursuance of the judgment in the tenance orders, etc.
National Legal Services Authority v Union In X v the Principal Secretary, Health
of India and Others (2014). This statute and Family Welfare Department (2022),
provides for the rights and welfare of the Supreme Court indicated a broaden-
transgender persons but does not address ing of the concept of “family” beyond
their exclusion from family laws, which families formed by heteronormative, mo-
are couched in the gender binaries of man nogamous married couples and their
and woman. In a pathbreaking judgment children. It stated that “Familial relation-
of 2019, the Madurai bench of the Madras ships may take the form of domestic, un-
High Court decided that a trans woman married partnerships or queer relation-
was also a “bride” under the Hindu ships,” adding that the law “must not be
Marriage Act, 1955, and was similarly relied upon to disadvantage families
entitled to have her marriage to a cis-man which are different from traditional ones.”
registered under the same act (Arunkumar In Shilpa Sailesh v Varun Sreenivasan
v Inspector General of Registration). (2023), a division bench of the Supreme
In 2020, the government proposed to Court read that the irretrievable break-
raise the minimum age of marriage for down of a marriage may be dissolved by
women from 18 to 21 through an amend- the Supreme Court in pursuance of its
ment to the Prohibition of Child Marriage mandate under Article 142 of the Consti-
Act, 2006. This proposal, made in the tution to do “complete justice.”
name of gender equality, women’s em- Additionally, petitions related to the
powerment, women’s maternal health legal recognition of same-sex marriages
and education, has been critiqued as a and the rights of trans persons within
counterproductive measure (Mehra 2020; family laws (referred to cumulatively as
Pitre and Lingam 2022). the marriage equality petitions), peti-
In Rajneesh v Neha (2021), the Supreme tions challenging the constitutionality
Court clarified the law on maintenance of the restitution of conjugal rights and the
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vol lViii no 40 23
COMMENTARY
practice of nikah halala remain pending
before the Supreme Court as of Septem-
ber 2023.
Conclusions
This article aimed to achieve three objec-
tives: (i) examining the recommenda-
tions for gender-just law reforms in each
family law made by the 21st LCI in its
2018 consultation paper; (ii) identifying
the gaps and limitations in these recom-
mendations; and (iii) reviewing the
legal developments that have occurred
in family law since 2018. It is hoped that
the 22nd LCI, which is currently examin-
ing the issue of UCC afresh, will take a
leaf from its predecessor and take the
initiative of gender justice further by
providing holistic and inclusive recom-
mendations for gender-just family law
reforms in accordance with more recent
judicial pronouncements.
24
Notes
1 The matrimonial remedy of restitution of con-
jugal rights provides for the law to coerce an
unwilling party to the marriage to live with the
other party, in acknowledgement of the latter’s
conjugal rights/right to consortium. This pro-
vision is ostensibly gender neutral, but has spe-
cific ramifications for married woman.
2 Intestate succession refers to the devolution of
property of a deceased when they have not left
a valid will.
3 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(ratified by India) recognises evolving capaci-
ties of the child in Articles 5 and 14(2).
References
Almeida, Albertina (2013): “Vistas on the Road
from Portuguese Civil Code to Family Laws in
Goa,” paper presented at the conference “Goa:
1961 and Beyond,” 18–20 December.
Khan, Fatima (2022): “3 Years of Triple Talaq Law:
How It Has Left Many Muslim Women Aban-
doned,” Quint, https://www.thequint.com/gen-
der/triple-talaq-criminalisation-leads-to-aban-
donment-of-muslim-women.
Kohli, Namita (2016): “All in the Family: Goa Civil
Code a Model for the Rest of the Country?”
Hindustan Times, https://www.hindustantimes.
com/india-news/all-in-the-family-is-the-goa-
OCTOber 7, 2023
civil-code-a-model-for-the-rest-of-the-coun-
try/story-4ImvwP0OrAST2hUnsZxtiL.html.
LCI (2018): “Consultation Paper on Reform of Family
Law,” Law Commission of India, Government of
India, New Delhi, https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/
s3ca0daec69b5adc880fb464895726dbdf/up-
loads/2022/09/2022092674.pdf.
Mehra, Madhu (2020): “Eighteen and Over,” Indian
Express, https://indianexpress.com/article/opin-
ion/minimum-age-of-marriage-for-girls-eigh-
teen-and-over-6569480/.
Narrain, Arvind and Alok Gupta (2011): Law Like
Love: Queer Perspectives on Law, New Delhi:
Yoda Press.
Pitre, Amita and Lakshmi Lingam (2022): “Age of
Consent: Challenges and Contradictions of
Sexual Violence Laws in India,” Sexual and
Reproductive Health Matters, Vol 29, No 2,
pp 461–74.
Uma, Saumya and Niti Saxena (2021): “Rights and
Wrongs of Anti-Conversion Law(s): Juxtapos-
ing ‘Honour’ with Women’s Agency,” Economic
& Political Weekly, Vol 56, No 1, pp 15–18.
Vanita, Ruth (2005): Love’s Rite: Same Sex Marriage
in India and the West, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Varadan, Sheila (2019): “The Principle of Evolving
Capacities under the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child,” International Journal of
Children’s Rights, Vol 27, No 2, pp 306–38.
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY

the FTP 2023 aims to increase India’s total

The Foreign Trade Policy 2023 exports to $2 trillion by the end of 2030.
Though adequate incentives and program-
A Road Map towards $2 Trillion Exports mes are in place to enhance India’s ex-
ports, to meet this ambitious aim, the
goods and services sector must grow at
Nida Rahman, Krishan Sharma 10.86% and 17.15% per annum respective-
ly, from their 2021 level. This implies that

I
Analysing the prospects of ndia’s Foreign Trade Policy (FTP), 2023 the weighted growth of total exports must
achieving $2 trillion worth of is based on four key pillars: (i) incen- be 13.23% per annum from its 2021 level.
tive to remission; (ii) export promotion
exports by 2030 based on India’s India’s Export Performance
through collaboration; (iii) ease of doing
export performance from 2011–12 business and reduction in transaction During 2011–12 to 2020–21, India’s export
to 2020–21, the export value costs; and (iv) emerging areas like e-com- growth in both goods and services cate-
must grow at 13.23% per annum merce (Press Information Bureau 2023). gories remained robust. Total exports
The FTP 2023 is a step up from the earlier increased from $442.35 billion in 2011–12
starting from 2021–22. However,
trade policies as it moves away from five to $636.08 billion in 2020–21, with an
due to saving–investment years’ regime, and focuses more on conti- average growth rate of 4.38% per year
mismatch and currency nuity with in-built feedback mechanisms (Table 1). However, this growth rate has
depreciation, the actual volume to adapt to new and emerging challeng- been volatile, ranging from (11.60%) in
es. Furthermore, the policy effectively 2014–15 to 32.64% in 2020–21. This vola-
of exports should grow between
employs “nudge” by acknowledging ex- tility is largely due to swings in mer-
17.53% and 19.70% per annum. porters as partners in capacity building chandise exports, which have a much
and development. larger weight (around 67%–68%) in
In total, FTP 2023 is consistent with India’s export basket.
India’s long-term focus of becoming a The merchandise exports have gener-
manufacturing and export hub. In today’s ally been higher than services exports,
uncertain world, while some question but the gap has narrowed in recent
the export-led development model, it years (Table 1). Over the last 10 years,
still remains a tried-and-tested formula India’s exports had fallen twice, owing
for growth and employment generation. primarily to a drop in external demand.
The contemporary world demands sim- In 2020–21, India’s exports experienced
plicity of rules, leveraging technologies phenomenal growth; however, this growth
for compliance, defined role of exporters, may be attributed to base effect of lower
and addressing emerging avenues/areas exports in the previous year, that is,
of export promotion. The FTP (2023) com- 2019, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
prehensively addresses these issues in a Though merchandise exports contrib-
cogent manner. Among its key objectives, utes more to India’s total exports than
Table 1: Trends in India’s Exports (billion $)
Years Total Merchandise Services YoY Growth in YoY Growth in YoY Growth in Services
Exports Exports* Exports* Total Export (%) Merchandise Exports (%) Exports (%)
2011–12 442.35 296.82 (.67) 145.52 (.33) 0.21 -2.01 5.05
2012–13 464.01 314.84 (.68) 149.16 (.32) 4.90 6.07 2.50
2013–14 479.89 322.69 (.67) 157.19 (.33) 3.42 2.49 5.39
2014–15 424.23 267.95 (.63) 156.27 (.37) -11.60 -16.96 -0.58
2015–16 426.36 264.54 (.62) 161.81 (.38) 0.50 -1.27 3.55
2016–17 484.54 299.24 (.62) 185.29 (.38) 13.64 13.12 14.51
2017–18 529.73 324.77 (.61) 204.95 (.39) 9.33 8.53 10.61
2018–19 539.10 324.33 (.60) 214.76 (.40) 1.77 -0.14 4.78
Nida Rahman (nidarahman88@gmail.com) 2019–20 479.56 276.41 (.58) 203.14 (.42) -11.05 -14.78 -5.41
teaches at the School of Business, University 2020–21 636.08 395.42 (.62) 240.65 (.38) 32.64 43.06 18.47
of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun. Average – – – 4.38 3.81 5.89
Krishan Sharma (postkrishan@gmail.com) is a CAGR 4.11 3.23 5.74 – – –
research scholar at the Centre for Development Std dev – – – 12.01 15.84 6.66
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, CV – – – 274.44 415.53 113.14
Thiruvananthapuram. * Figures in parenthesis are share of merchandise and services exports in total exports.
Source: UNCTADstat.

14 OCTOber 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly


services exports, services exports have
been growing at a faster rate. In 2011–12,
services exports were valued at $145.52
billion, accounting for 33% of India’s total
exports. By 2020–21, India’s services ex-
ports had grown to $240.65 billion, acc-
ounting for 38% of India’s total exports.
While merchandise exports have experi-
enced significant fluctuations over the
years, with an average year-on-year (y-o-y)
growth rate of 3.81% and a compound
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.23%, ser-
vices exports have demonstrated a more
stable average y-o-y growth rate of 5.89%
and CAGR of 5.74% over the same period.
In total, India’s exports have been
growing at a moderate pace, with an av-
erage y-o-y growth rate of 4.38% and a
CAGR of 4.11%. The y-o-y growth rate has
been volatile over the years, with high
standard deviation (std dev) and coeffi-
cient of variation (CV).
This slow and variable growth rate of
India’s exports does not align with the
goal of reaching $2 trillion worth of ex-
ports by 2030. As mentioned earlier, to
achieve this target, the weighted growth
rate of both the export sectors should be
13.23% per annum from its 2021 level.
However, it seems difficult to material-
ise, if the previous decade performance
is used as a barometer of country perfor-
mance, as the global economy is also be-
set by a slew of new challenges.
Though the nominal growth of 13.23%
per annum is consistent with the target of
$2 trillion worth of exports, however, in an
open economy, there are other factors that
significantly affect the value of exports. In
general, it depends on price (exchange
rate) and export volume. Since the ex-
change rate fluctuates over time, it is the
Table 2: India’s Gross Saving and Investment as a
Proportion of GDP
Years India's Gross Savings India's Gross Capital S–I Gap
as a % of GDP Formation as a % of GDP
2011–12 34.6 39
2012–13 33.9 38.7
2013–14 32.1 33.8
2014–15 32.2 33.5
2015–16 31.1 32.1
2016–17 31.3 32
2017–18 32.1 33.9
2018–19 31.7 33.8
2019–20 29.9 30.7
2020–21 28.2 27.3
Average 31.71 33.48
Sources: Economic Survey, 2022–23.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023
adjustment in export quantities that is criti-
cal in achieving nominal growth of 13.23%
per year in export value. Besides, it is the
quantity of exports which signals real eco-
nomic activities, productivity, employ-
ment, and income. Therefore, it is impera-
tive to analyse the volume effect of export
associated with India’s FTP 2023 target of
$2 trillion worth of exports by 2030.
Decomposition of Changes in
Nominal Value of Exports
As discussed, the total nominal value of
exports should grow at 13.23% from its
2021 level. This reasoning, however, can-
not distinguish between the price and
quantity effects of total value of exports.
In an open economy, the value of exports
is determined by the nominal exchange
rate and the volume of exports. The
nominal exchange rate moves in propor-
tion to the real exchange rate and inter-
national prices, and in inverse propor-
tion to domestic prices. These variables
are subject to change, which affects the
volume of exports. Therefore, it is imper-
ative to understand how much exports
are required to reach the value of $2 tril-
lion by 2030. Overall, it is the quantity of
exports that indicates the productive ca-
pacity of an economy and is crucial for
job creation and economic development.
In addition to prices, the export volume
is an important factor that affects its val-
ue and is less recognised in the existing
literature. Therefore, we wish to under-
stand its dynamics and contribution in
detail. The total nominal value of ex-
ports can be written as follows:
Nominal value of exports (NVA)
= Price (e) × Quantities (Q) = e × Q ... (1)
where e is nominal exchange rate and Q
is quantities of exports.
‫כ‬
Nominal exchange rate (e)= ̀ ൈ ... (2)

where € is the real exchange rate, P* is
-4.4 world prices and P is domestic prices.
-4.8
Therefore, NVA becomes,
-1.7
-1.3
Nominal value of exports (NVA)
-1 ‫כ‬
= ൬̀ ൈ ൰ൈ ... (3)
-0.7  tional income, savings are determined
-1.8 Now after some algebraic manipulation,
-2.1
we can express growth rate in NVA as
-0.8
follows:
0.9
-1.77 % change in NVA = % change in
€ + (Π* – Π) + % change in Q ... (4)
vol lViii no 40
COMMENTARY
where Π * world’s inflation rate, Π is do-
mestic prices and Q can be said as quan-
tity index of exports with base year
equals to 2021(100). It can also capture
volume effect associated with saving–
investment mismatch and currency depre-
ciation. Therefore, we can say that value
effect in exports can be decomposed
into three: (i) real exchange rate effect,
(ii) price effect of currency depreciation,
and (iii) volume effect of exports.
(i) Saving–investment and real ex-
change rate effect: In an open econo-
my, a nation’s investable surplus is calcu-
lated as total production less domestic
consumption. This surplus can be ex-
ported or invested domestically, de-
pending on the needs of the nation.
More formally, we can write a country’s
GDP as
Y ≡ C + I + G + NX ... (5)
where Y is GDP, C is private consumption
expenditure, I is domestic capital forma-
tion, G is government expenditure, and
NX is net exports—excess of exports
over imports. We can write the above
identity as follows:
Y – (C – I – G) ≡ NX ... (6)
In particular, the above equation says
that total output minus domestic con-
sumption equals net export. We can fur-
ther tweak the above identity to show
that the international flow of funds to fi-
nance capital formation and cross-bor-
der flow of goods and services are fun-
damentally the same thing.
Y – C – G ≡ I + NX ... (7)
where Y – C – G is national savings.
Therefore, the above expression can be
written as,
S – I ≡ NX ... (8)
The above equation confirms the cru-
cial role of saving and investment gap in
determining the level of net exports in
an economy. For any given level of na-
by consumption function and fiscal poli-
cies, investment is determined by invest-
ment schedule and NX is determined by
real exchange rate. Since the preceding
equation is an identity (S – I ≡ NX),
15
COMMENTARY
Figure 1: Trends in Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)* in India during 2011–21 Table 3: Inflation Differential between India and
7 the US
6 Years CPI-India CPI-US Inflation Changes in
Differential Nominal Ex-
5 (US–India) change Rate*
4 2011–12 9.48 2.06 -7.41 14.50
3 2012–13 10.02 1.46 -8.55 9.66
2 2013–14 6.67 1.62 -5.04 4.15
1 2014–15 4.91 0.11 -4.78 5.12
0 2015–16 4.95 1.26 -3.68 4.74
-1 2016–17 3.33 2.13 -1.19 -3.09
-2 2017–18 3.94 2.44 -1.49 5.02
2018–19 3.73 1.81 -1.91 2.97
-3
2019–20 6.62 1.23 -5.39 5.22
-4
2020–21 5.13 4.69 -0.43 -0.24
-5
Average 5.88 1.88 -3.99 4.80
-6 * Increase (positive change) in value of nominal exchange
2011 12

2012 13

2013 14

2014 15

2015 16

2016 17

2017 18

2018 19

2019 20

2020 21
rate indicates depreciation of domestic currency.
Sources: CPI data, World Bank.

YOY changes
Changes in 4040 currency
currency
index
* Increase (positive change) in value of REER indices implies appreciation of domestic currency.
Source: Economic Survey, 2022–23.
changes in the saving and investment
gap have a proportionate impact on the
real exchange rate (€), which in turn has
a corresponding impact on net export.
Table 2 (p 15) presents India’s saving
and investment pattern during 2011–12
to 2020–21—a declining trend. Gross sav-
ings was at its peak in 2011–12 but it de-
clined continuously thereafter. Similar-
ly, gross investment has been continu-
ously declining from its peak in 2011–12.
However, the decline is more pronounced
in investment as compared to savings.
While savings declined by 6.4 percent-
age points, investments declined by 11.7
percentage points. The primary reason
for this steep decline is the economic
slump after global financial crisis (GFC),
high interest rate regime to curb inflation,
and subsequent domestic slowdown. More
recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, trade
tensions, and supply chain disruption
were responsible for the simultaneous
decline in savings and investment.
The S–I gap has remained negative dur-
ing the last decade, except in 2020–21.
This implies that we were investing more
than what we were saving. Three conse-
quences of this gospel are: one, the econo-
my is running continuous trade deficit;
second, the economy is relying on foreign
capital or borrowing to finance its excess
investment; and third, the appreciation of
real exchange rate is proportional to the
S–I gap. This has been true for the Indian
economy for the past 10 years. The S–I gap
is primarily the supply of domestic currency
16
Jndex
YOY changes
Changes in 6 currency
in 6 currency index index rate (REER) indices from 2011 to 2021.
Both the indices of REER depreciated
between 2011–12 and 2013–14 despite
in the international financial market, the S–I gap being negative, indicates
whereas NX is the demand of domestic some other factors at play in improving
currency. When supply falls short of de- the competitiveness of India’s external
mand, the home currency appreciates via sector. However, since 2014–15, REER
rate of interest and capital inflow, resulting moved as expected, barring 2018–19.
in a decrease in NX since domestic items Although, the appreciation in REER is
become more expensive relative to foreign not proportional to S–I gap but for the
goods. During the previous decade, the significant part, the two move in tan-
average S–I gap remained at a negative of dem during the preceding decade. The
1.77%. Therefore, the average appreciation S–I gap signifies excess demand for
in the rupee’s real exchange rate should capital in the economy, the external
have been of a similar fold barring the im- capital flows in response to this gap led
pact of other important factors. Hence, to to real exchange rate appreciation re-
unfold the volume effect of exports, the sulting in India losing its external com-
appreciation of real exchange rate of 1.77% petitiveness. In India, the average YoY
per annum should be considered alongside and compounded appreciation of REER
the price effect of currency depreciation. was 0.53% and 0.45% for 6 currency in-
Figure 1 depicts the movements in dex and 0.62% and 0.56% for 40 cur-
India’s trade-based real effective exchange rency index.
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Lucknow, U.P. offers a Two Weeks Capacity Building Programme
on “Public Policy and Governance in India” sponsored by
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OCTOber 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

(ii) Price effect of currency deprecia-
tion: Relative pricing differentials across
nations determine the nominal exchange
rate, with higher inflation resulting in
depreciation of domestic currency. Be-
cause dollar is the worldwide medium of
exchange, we must compare the infla-
tionary performance of both countries
to discern the relative price effect of cur-
rency depreciation. Table 3 (p 16) shows
that inflation in India consistently exceed-
ed that in the United States (US) during
2011–12 to 2020–21. The average infla-
tion rate in India was 5.88%, whereas it
was 1.85% in the US. Due to the successive
fiscal stimulus following the GFC, India’s
inflation was nearing double digits in
2011–12; however, it stabilised subse-
quently, evident in the narrowing gap in
inflation differential between the US and
India. However, the decadal average infla-
tionary disparity between the US and India
remains approximately 4% per annum.
In both nations, the inflation has risen
since 2019–20; however, inflation rate in
India has risen more dramatically than
that of the US (Table 3). Fiscal and mon-
etary stimulus, COVID-19-induced supply
chain disruptions, trade uncertainty,
and Russian–Ukraine war are the key
causes of this surge in inflation. All these
factors contributed to the domestic as
well as global inflationary trend.
Further, the last column in Table 3
shows India’s average annual nominal
exchange rate. The nominal exchange
rate depreciated continuously during
most part of last decade, barring during
2016–17. Though the Indian rupee is de-
preciating in line with expectations, it is
not proportional to the inflation differ-
ential between the US and India. In real-
ity, the Indian rupee depreciated more
than the inflation gap between the two
nations, showing that other variables in-
fluence nominal exchange rates between
the two countries. Nonetheless, at 0.84,
the correlation coefficient between nomi-
nal exchange rate depreciation and in-
flation differential remains strong.
Table 4: Decomposition of Nominal Value of Export (NVA)
Decades % Change in Q
2011–12 to 2020–21 8.41 - 10.68
2021–22 to 2030–31 17.53 - 19.80
** Range signifies lower (average REER appreciation) and upper (average S–I gap) limit of real exchange appreciation.
*** Range signifies lower (average nominal exchange rate depreciation) and upper (average inflation differential) limit.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023
During the previous decade, the aver-
age annual and compounded annual de-
preciation of the Indian rupee was
4.80% and 4.70%, respectively, while
the average decadal inflation differen-
tial was around 4%. Both, however, fol-
low predicted trends and are essential in
calculating the volume effect of curren-
cy depreciation associated with India’s
ambitious goal of attaining $2 trillion
exports by the end of 2030.
(iii) Volume effect of export: Having
analysed both the real exchange effect
and the price effect of currency depreci-
ation, we can now comfortably deter-
mine the volume effect of exports. The
nominal value of exports can be decom-
posed into real exchange rate effect, in-
flation differential, and quantities of ex-
ports. Therefore, the volume can be de-
rived as a residual. More formally, from
equation (4), we can write changes in
quantities of export as
% change in Q = % change in NVA
–% change in € – (Π* – Π) ... (9)
Q is quantity index of exports with base
year 2021(100). It can also capture vol-
ume effect associated with S–I mismatch
and currency depreciation.
To reach the goal of $2 trillion worth
of exports by 2030, the growth rate of
nominal value of exports should be
13.23% per annum, 2021–22 onwards. If
we consider previous decadal perfor-
mance as a guide for the future, we can
see that the rupee is losing its real com-
petitiveness in proportion to the S–I im-
balance. Furthermore, nominal exchange
rate depreciation is proportional to the
inflation differential between the US and
India. Table 4 decomposes the NVA into
its numerous components.
During 2011–12 to 2020–21, the vol-
ume of export grew in the range of
8.41% to 10.68% per annum, which is
higher than the growth rate of value of
exports. The difference accounts for the
savings and investment discrepancy as
well as the inflation divergence. If we
% Change in NVA % Change in €** (Π - Π)***
4.11 (.40 - 1.77) (3.9 - 4.8)
13.23 (.40 - 1.77) (3.9 - 4.8)
vol lViii no 40
COMMENTARY
assume that the changes in real ex-
change rate and inflation differential re-
main as was during 2011–12 to 2020–21,
then to achieve the target of $2 trillion
worth of exports, the growth of volume
of exports from 2021–22 to 2030–31
must be in the range 17.53% to 19.80%
per annum which is nearly double that
of previous decade.
In an open economy, two important
forces—real exchange rate and inflation
differential—are critical factors deter-
mining the quantity of export. Both
these factors are reducing India’s NVA.
Therefore, to achieve higher growth, we
need to export greater quantities of
goods and services. This has been the
case with India throughout the last dec-
ade, and if the same trend continues, the
country needs much larger quantities of
export to meet the goal set by the FTP
2023. Though it may seem difficult, in-
creasing savings through appropriate
incentives, sound public finance, and
stable prices can assist India in meeting
this ambitious target.
Conclusions
Though India’s new FTP 2023 is compre-
hensive in addressing the growing chal-
lenges, the country needs to focus on
strong macroeconomic fundamentals to
meet the target of $2 trillion exports. To-
wards this objective, focus must be on
savings rate and stability of prices. Great-
er fiscal discipline and suitable incen-
tives for private sector should be gauged
to enhance this key variable. Inflation
control, on the other hand, necessitates
prudent monetary policy as well as fiscal
restraint, because rising inflation exposes
the currency to additional depreciation.
Without any change in productivity, cur-
rency depreciation has little effect on
exports other than lowering the value of
exports. Diversification can assist India
in reducing its reliance on a few indus-
tries and markets while also making its
exports more robust to global shocks.
Reference
Press Information Bureau (2023): Foreign Trade
Policy 2023 announced, Ministry of Commerce
and Industry, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseI-
framePage.aspx?PRID=1912572#:~:text=The-
%20FTP%202023%20aims%20at,and%20Dis-
tricts%20for%20export%20promotion, viewed
on 14 September 2023.
17
COMMENTARY
Bringing ‘Identity’ Back In
Reviving Nativism in
Contemporary Jharkhand
Sujit Kumar
The Jharkhand statehood
movement was anchored in the
“Jharkhandi” identity acquiring
different dimensions over a
period of 65 years. However, with
the state formation in 2000, the
identity question was relocated
mostly to the civil society from
the political space. But, at least
since 2019, Hemant Soren has
reintroduced the Jharkhandi
identity back in the political
discourse of Jharkhand by
demanding a separate Sarna
religion for Adivasis, 1932 land
records as the basis of domicile
and reservation in state jobs
beyond “accepted” limits. A
possible implication of this
move is the consolidation of the
Moolvasi (Adivasi and Sadan)
votes for the Jharkhand
Mukti Morcha.
Sujit Kumar (sujit.kumar@apu.edu.in) teaches
at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru.
18
T
he Jharkhand Legislative Assem-
bly passed two bills in November
2022—the first bill is called the
Jharkhand Definition of Local Persons
and for Extending the Consequential
Social, Cultural, and Other Benefits Bill
and the second is called Jharkhand Res-
ervation of Vacancies in Posts and Ser-
vices (Amendment) Bill. The first bill
tends to define the meaning of local resi-
dent or domicile of Jharkhand by laying
down the criteria that only those people
whose ancestor’s name figures in the
land records of 1932 can be considered
as local residents. The law also mentions
that in the lack of required evidence for
landless people, the relevant gram sabha
will have the authority to verify the resi-
dence of the beneficiary. The second bill
proposes to increase the cap on reserva-
tion in government jobs from existing
60% to 77%, allowing 28% reservation for
Scheduled Tribes (STs), 12% for Scheduled
Castes (SCs), 27% for Other Backward
Classes (OBCs), and 10% for economical-
ly weaker sections. Given the fact that
the High Court of Jharkhand had earlier
objected to consider 1932 as the cut-off
date for identifying domicile, both these
bills are sent to the union government
with the request to put them under
Schedule IX of the Constitution, thus
saving them from judicial review.
In the succeeding paragraphs, we will
analyse the trajectory of the domicile is-
sue in Jharkhand and try to understand its
political implications. In constructing the
arguments, our approach is to critically
engage with some of the notions emerg-
ing from the more recent writings on
this topic. The attempt here is to provide
a historical account of domicile issue in
Jharkhand and understand its signifi-
cance for the Adivasis and Sadans.1 This
article argues that apart from its utility
for the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)
OCTOber 7, 2023
to consolidate its position among the
Moolvasis,2 the pending legislations will
also meaningfully address the question
of marginality of Jharkhandi people.
In a nutshell, these issues have helped
to recentre the political discourse in
Jharkhand by bringing back “Jharkhan-
di identity” through nativistic politics at
a time when communal and corporate
narratives overwhelm politics at both
national and regional levels.
The Rationale of Domicile Policy
The domicile issue in Jharkhand is a bone
of contention between the Jharkhandi
population of the state comprising the
Adivasi and the Sadan population, to-
gether referred as Moolvasi, on the one
side, and the outsiders settled in Jhar-
khand because of colonial and postcolo-
nial agrarian, forest, and industrial poli-
cies on the other. Writing about the nature
of the land revenue system in Jharkhand,
Ranendra (2019: 42) argues that the
people used to pay collective taxes be-
fore the Permanent Settlement of 1793
after which each cultivator had to pay
individual taxes (malguzari). In the case
of default, the land was taken away from
the cultivator and handed over to the
landlords. Growing awareness around
alienation from land and forest pro-
pelled several rebellions by the Adivasis
and Sadans of Jharkhand; noteworthy
among them are the Kol rebellion of 1832,
Santhal Hul of 1855 and Birsa’s Ulgulan
of 1895. It was due to these struggles led
by Moolvasis that the colonial government
started a land settlement operation in
Santhal Parganas between 1873 and
1910 and Chota Nagpur region between
1869 and 1935 with the purpose to pre-
pare land records. However, the revi-
sional settlements continued even in
post-independence India. In fact, in some
districts like Singhbhum, the initial land
settlement itself took place between
1958 and 1965. The question then arises:
Why do the Moolvasis want the 1932
land records as the basis for domicile?
Dayamani Barla et al (2023) try to
find an answer to this question by argu-
ing that the land settlements after 1932
do not provide an elaborate account of
community and forestland. In such a
situation, the Moolvasis consider the
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

1932 land records to be more authentic,
which provides extensive protection not
only to land under individual title but
also community as well as forestland.
But if we look at the issue of land dispos-
session from a historical perspective, it
seems that even the various types of set-
tlement operations proved to be insuffi-
cient in reducing the discontent among
the Adivasis and led to regular rebel-
lions throughout the 19th century. More-
over, some scholars argue that the multi-
ple settlements were based on the as-
sumptions that the Adivasi discontent is
mainly directed against the dikus.3 This
led to making of rules, which further di-
vided the Adivasis and outsiders rather
than addressing the real concerns of the
Adivasi community, that is, complete
control over land and forest. Therefore,
while it is wrong to assume that the land
settlements during the colonial rule
were agreeable to the Adivasi community,
it is certainly less deceitful when com-
pared with the settlement operations in
post-independence India. In addition to
this, it is also worth remembering that
the state government had passed the
Scheduled Areas Regulation Act way
back in 1969 to deal with the increasing
cases of fraudulent alienation of land be-
longing to the Adivasis and Sadans from
SC and OBC communities. Since land al-
ienation increased manifold after inde-
pendence, it looks quite reasonable for
the Moolvasis to consider the 1932 land
records for settling the domicile issue.
Moreover, the industrialisation spree
during the 1970s and 1980s affected the
Moolvasis adversely in an unprecedent-
ed way as land was acquired for various
projects. To accomodate the increased
inflow of people from outside the region,
particularly north Bihar, new industrial
towns were set up and expansion of the
existing municipal areas took place. In
such areas, protective legislations like
the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (CNTA)
and the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Act
(SPTA) were inapplicable, and thus it be-
came possible to openly sell or puschase
Moolvasi land. It is because of this that
many industrial cities of Jharkhand like
Ranchi, Dhanbad, Bokaro, and Jamshe-
dpur comprise predominantly of non-
Jharkhandi population. Talking about
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023
the recent history of domicile policy in
Jharkhand, Nirmal Sengupta (2014)
argues that during the 1980s, officers
working in the public sector units (PSUs)
of coal and iron industries realised the
need to hire local people in third and
fourth grade jobs. But in the absence of
any suitable definition of who is a “local”
person, people from north Bihar contin-
ued to grab the jobs in PSUs outnumber-
ing the Moolvasis. To overcome this situa-
tion and ensure maximum representation
of Moolvasis in PSUs, the then chief min-
ister of Bihar defined “local” as someone
whose ancestor’s name is mentioned in
the last land settlement conducted in the
relative districts. However, this proposi-
tion remained unimplemented.
After the creation of Jharkhand in
2000, Chief Minister Babulal Marandi
once again made a reference to the rule of
1982 in making the domicile policy and
said that the land records of 1932 will be
taken as the basis for domicile. This pro-
posal was severely criticised by the non-
Jharkhandi people and was challenged
before the High Court of Jharkhand
through a public interest litigation (PIL).
There is a widely circulated misinforma-
tion that the high court completely over-
ruled the decision to make the 1932 land
records as the basis of domicile. Nirmal
Sengupta (2014) argues that the high
court agreed to the making of a domicile
policy but, at the same time, instructed the
government to consider a more recent cut-
off date to determine the domicile status,
giving the reference of the High Court of
Uttarakhand ruling. In accordance with
this ruling, Chief Minister Raghubar Das
brought another domicile policy in 2014
which said that those who have settled in
Jharkhand before 1985 in pursuance of
jobs or businesses and have acquired im-
movable assets will be considered as the
domicile of Jharkhand. This domicile poli-
cy was opposed by the Moolvasi popula-
tion of the state.
Reinventing Identity
through Nativism
Myron Weiner (1978: 21) considers India
“a land of native peoples” with places of
cultural and linguistic heterogeneity as
“exception.” Migration plays an impor-
tant role in constituting these exceptional
vol lViii no 40
COMMENTARY
spaces and sometimes, in unwanted ways,
marginalising the original cultural groups
of the region. Adivasis in Jharkhand have
suffered due to their emigration from the
region and also the immigration of people
from various parts of India into Jharkhand
at least since the middle of the 19th centu-
ry. Drawing close relation between mi-
gration and nativism, Weiner (1978: 270)
identifies at least five theories of nativ-
ism4 which can be applicable exclusively
or in combinations to identify a nativist
movement. However, a nativist movement
in present Jharkhand seems to be unim-
aginable without the recovery of the
Jharkhandi identity through a narrative
of marginalisation which goes beyond the
Adivasis. While data on development-
induced displacement gives an objective
idea of affected Adivasis, it is not decon-
structed further to see how it affected
the communities living with the Adiva-
sis in the affected regions. Most of the SC
and backward class population who have
suffered dispossession of land also come
from Adivasi areas and share the memo-
ries of marginalisation. It is this common
memory of marginalisation that holds the
key to the success of the nativist move-
ment in Jharkhand and how the Adiva-
sis and Sadans reinvent their past to
make a claim upon the opportunities of-
fered by the state for which they fought.
At present, Moolvasis play a key role
in the state politics of Jharkhand and
constitute around 85% of the state popu-
lation with a majority in at least 17 out of
the 24 districts of Jharkhand (Kesari
2019: 174). Out of these 17 districts, at
least 12 districts are identified as Sched-
uled Areas and three districts are identi-
fied as partially Scheduled Areas with a
significant Adivasi population.5 The emi-
grant population is in majority in seven
districts and plays a key role in electoral
outcomes there. More than 50% of the
urban population of Jharkhand lives in
these seven districts. It is worth noting
that after the creation of Jharkhand, the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) succeeded in
forming a government in the state several
times. The BJP had a good footprint
among the Adivasis in some areas because
of the long presence of the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh. During the 1980s
and 1990s, the party further extended its
19
COMMENTARY
influence among the non-Jharkhandi pop-
ulation living in cities like Ranchi, Dhan-
bad, Jamshedpur, Bokaro, Hazaribagh
because of the Ram Janmabhoomi
movement. Some of the electoral issues
raised by the BJP are the issue of reli-
gious conversion among Adivasis and
providing backdoor support to the Kurmi6
community’s demand for ST status. In-
terestingly, the BJP has never explicitly
opposed the domicile policy based on the
land records of 1932 and maintains an
ambivalence around this issue.
The BJP had passed the Jharkhand
Freedom of Religion Act in 2017 on the
lines of certain other states to restrict the
religious conversion. According to this
law, the entire process of conversion has to
take place under the supervision of the
district collector, failing which the person
presiding over conversion will be arrested
and jailed for up to three years, making it
a criminal offence. This law has the poten-
tial to create serious rifts between the
Sarna and Christian Adivasis besides af-
fecting the social harmony and mutual
trust within the community. As a response
to this legislation, the Hemant Soren-led
govenment passed the Sarna Dharam
Code resolution in November 2020 de-
manding a separate religious column for
the Adivasis of Jharkhand in the census
operations. This move is aimed at uniting
the Adivasis as one religious group. In ad-
dition to this, the issue of domicile based
on the 1932 land records and increased
reservation in state jobs for Moolvasis
have provided a political edge to JMM-led
alliance. But what significance does the
domicile and Sarna code hold for the iden-
tity politics in Jharkhand?
Jharkhandi identity, in the post-state-
hood phase, had been narrowed down to
Adivasi identity as most of the issues
around autonomy in local governance
and resource grab were directly affecting
the community. This led to the develop-
ment of close ties between civil society
organisations (CSOs) with global linkages
and local organisations spearheading
movements. While support from Jhar-
khand-based political parties came for
such movements, particularly when they
dealt with resource grab, the CSOs prefer-
red to maintain a distance with political
parties. At the political front, the All
20
Jharkhand Students Union party with a
stronghold among the local backward
classes in certain areas went with the BJP.
Ever since the creation of Jharkhand, ten-
sion and conflict between the Adivasis
and Sadans, particularly Kurmis, as well
as among the Adivasis on the question of
religion, had made the question of
Jharkhandi identity politically non-feasi-
ble. But the recent manoeuvring through
legislations and resolutions by the current
state government, followed by the JMM’s
extensive Khatiyani Johar Yatra spread
over six months and led by Chief Minister
Soren, seems to have loosened the ten-
sions between the Moolvasis. This has the
potential to revive the Jharkhandi identi-
ty in the state’s political discourse.
In Conclusion
With the Jharkhand assembly elections
due in 2024, Soren’s political moves are
directed towards twofold goals. The first
objective is to further consolidate JMM’s
position in the coalition through a revival
of Jharkhandi identity in the state politics.
And the second goal is to increase the
overall electoral prospects for the opposi-
tion alliance with an eye on the general
elections also due in 2024. Attempts to in-
crease the size of JMM in the coalition are
also driven by the intention to exercise
more autonomy in governance and thwart
away threats of defection in the future. It
looks quite reasonable to assume now that
the assembly elections of 2024 are going to
be conducted under the shadows of the
Sarna code, domicile policy, and the issue
of reservation. One of the first steps after
Soren came to power was to withdraw the
cases against activists from the Pathalga-
di7 movement. However, in its new identi-
tarian politics, the JMM still encounters
long-term threats from the robust pres-
ence of right-wing groups. Besides that,
the further depletion in the support base
for parties like the Rashtriya Janata Dal
and the fragmentation of Lok Janshakti
Party will leave a lot of floating voters
from non-Jharkhandi lower castes to be
tapped by political parties.
Notes
1 The Sadans are those non-Adivasi people who
have lived with the Adivasis since ancient times
in mutually conducive ways and contributed to
the emergence of composite culture of Jharkhand.
OCTOber 7, 2023
2 Moolvasi is used as a category for both Adivasi
and the Sadans as original settlers of Jharkhand.
3 Diku is used by the Moolvasis of Jharkhand to
refer to the moneylenders and contractors who
came to Jharkhand during the colonial rule
and exploited the local population and grabbed
their land ever since the 19th century. In post-
independence India, the term includes all the
outsiders who came because of industrialisa-
tion and are considered responsible for cultur-
al marginalisation of the Moolvasis. More
broadly, it is also used for Adivasis who have
acquired non-Adivasi characteristics.
4 The five theories are: first, economic competi-
tive model when the native population fears
threat to employment by immigrants; second,
status mobility model when migrants threaten
the social status of the upper and middle class-
es; third, political interest model that stresses
the fears of certain social classes as threatened
by the migrants; fourth, psychological model
emphasising upon frustration and aggression
expressed by one minority group against an-
other; and fifth, demographic models suggest-
ing that the tolerance for migrant population in
the social space among the native population
would be soon over.
5 According to the Scheduled Areas (State of
Jharkhand) Order, 2007, 12 districts (Ranchi,
Lohardaga, Gumla, West Singhbhum, Saraike-
la-Kharsawan, Simdega, Latehar, East Sinb-
hum, Sahebganj, Dumka, Pakur, Jamtara) are
identified as Scheduled Areas and Rabda and
Bakoria panchayats of Satbarwa block in
Palamau district, Bhandaria block in Garhwa
district and Sundarpahari and Boarijor blocks
in Godda district are identified as Scheduled
Areas, https://tribal.nic.in/downloads/CLM/
CLM_Declare/2.pdf.
6 Kurmis are considered as a caste group in Hin-
du social order. However, they have been living
in Jharkhand for a long time and are indige-
nous to many places where they presently re-
side. Based on this fact, they demand a ST sta-
tus. The Adivasis of Jharkhand are opposed to
this demand by the Kurmis.
7 Pathalgadi movement started during Raghubar
Das’ regime in the suburbs of Ranchi district
with the Adivasi activists installing stone slabs
with major Panchayats (Extension to Sched-
uled Areas) Act (PESA) provisions inscribed on
them and asserting their rights of self-govern-
ance. It gained popularity and spread to many
other areas of Jharkhand demanding a much
due political rights. Unfortunately, Jharkhand
has still not made PESA rules defining the roles
and powers of the gram sabha in Scheduled Areas.
References
Barla, Dayamani, Varsha-Bhagat Ganguly, Rashmi
Katyayan, Antony Puthumattathil and Lotika
Singha (2023): “Jharkhand’s New Sthaniyata
(Local Resident) Policy: The 1932 Khatiyan,
Sociocultural Fabric, and Land Rights,” Econo-
mic & Political Weekly, Vol 58, No 18, pp 34–40.
Kesari, Biseshwar Prasad (2019): “Jharkhand ke
Sadano ka Itihaas,” Jharkhand Encyclopaedia
Volume I: Hulgulano Ki Pratidhwaniya, Ranen-
dra and Sudhir Pal (eds), New Delhi: Vaani-
Prakashan, pp 173–81.
Ranendra (2019): “Jharkhand: Madhyakaal (1200–
1765),” Jharkhand Encyclopaedia Volume I: Hul-
gulano Ki Pratidhwaniya, Ranendra and Sudhir
Pal (eds), New Delhi: Vani Prakashan, pp 34–53.
Sengupta, Nirmal (2014): “Through the Looking
Glass: The Domicile Debate of Jharkhand,” Eco-
nomic & Political Weekly, Vol 49, No 45, pp 23–26.
Weiner, Myron (1978) Sons of the Soil: Migration
and Ethnic Conflict in India, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
BOOK REVIEW
The Lettered Travelogue of the
Scholar Extraordinaire
The Evolution of Economic Reforms in India
Partha Ray
S
tructuralist macroeconomist Lance
Taylor once said that a macroecono-
mist should teach theory in the
morning, advise authorities in the after-
noon, and write serious academic papers
late in the evening. Dr C Rangarajan (CR)
belongs to this tradition of combining
the traits of a great teacher, an astute
policymaker, and a prodigious researcher.
In terms of coverage, this book is pri-
marily devoted to the second aspect of
his life as a policymaker and a states-
man. The chronicle, admittedly, spans
CR’s stints in the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) and beyond.
Policymaking at RBI
A large chunk of the book is about CR’s
two-stint (1982–97) association with
RBI, first as a deputy governor, focusing on
research and monetary policy (February
1982–August 1991) and then as gover-
nor, (22 December 1992–21 November
1997), with a one and a half-year gap
when he was with the Planning Com-
mission (Chapter 5).
As a young backroom boy of the eco-
nomic research department in the RBI,
the current reviewer has been fortunate
to have seen him once in a while during
the 1990s, from a distance, and looked
at him with awe and admiration. As
one looks back, the following spheres
emerge as CR’s major contribution to that
feeling of admiration. All these spheres
are covered in the book.
First, his contribution to Indian mone-
tary policymaking is enormous. He was
largely perceived to be the principal
architect of the Report of the Committee
to Review the Working of the Monetary
System (constituted under the chairman-
ship of Professor Sukhamoy Chakravarty)
in 1985. CR quotes at length from the
Chakravarty Committee Report explain-
ing the context and the nitty-gritty of
36
Forks in the Road: My Days in the RBI and
Beyond by C Rangarajan, Gurugram: Penguin Business
(Penguin Random House), 2022; pp 304, `699.
the monetary targeting in India (like the
money market reform, or establishment
of the Discount and Finance House of
India) that was initiated following the
report (Chapter 3: “Monetary Policy in the
1980s”). Later, in Chapter 11 (“Changing
Contours of Monetary Policy”), CR delved
into varied issues that shaped monetary
policy in India. The issues that became
relevant for monetary policy in India over
the years were: objectives, transmission,
trade-offs between growth and stability,
financial stability, and ability to control
inflation. He played a significant role in
shaping many of these issues and in that
sense, he emerged undisputed thought
leader of monetary targeting and the
father of modern monetary policy in
India, both in terms of laying its philo-
sophical foundation as well as praxis.
Second, he played a significant role as
one of the generals of the 1991 crisis
management team both in terms of im-
mediate measures (Chapter 4) as well as
the initiation of a more durable policy
regime of calibrated liberalisation in the
financial sector in the medium-run.
Events like the negotiation for an Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) loan, the
pledging of gold, or the two-stage deval-
uation of the Indian rupee bear testimony
to CR’s role as a lead crisis manager in 1991.
Third, CR brought the issue of inde-
pendence of monetary policy and cen-
tral bank autonomy to the forefront of
discussion. He recounted the context of
the creation of ad hoc treasury bills
(those can be created without any limit
with fixed coupons) and the deplorable
practice of automatic monetisation that
it had led to (Chapter 6: “The Beginning
of Autonomy”). He had played a key
october 7, 2023
role in getting the agreement between
the Government of India and the RBI
signed, in phasing out the unhealthy
practice of issuance of ad hoc treasury
bills. Thus, he effectively freed Indian
monetary policy from fiscal supremacy.
The monetary developments of the period
1992–93 through 1996–97 are discussed
in detail in Chapter 6. The chapter clear-
ly brings out the significant role that CR
played in asserting the independence of
the central bank.
Fourth, he was the architect of the
external sector liberalisation in India
(Chapter 7: “External Sector Management:
1992–97”). Chapter 7 has a detailed dis-
cussion of the balance of payments and
exchange rate movement of the 1990s.
CR played a critical role in the movement
towards market-determined rupee and
liberalisation of the balance of payments
(initially as Chairman of the High-Level
Committee on Balance of Payments,
Ministry of Finance, 1993).
Fifth, CR played an important role in
freeing interest rates in different segments
of the financial market in India and in
that sense, he had a significant part in
uncaging the Indian economy from
financial repression (Chapters 6 and 8).
Sixth, CR’s role in reforming the bank-
ing sector can hardly be missed. In
terms of liberalising the banking sector
and implementing many of the recom-
mendations of the Narasimham Commit-
tee, he has been a crucial protagonist
(Chapter 8: “Strengthening the Banking
Sector”). But banking sector reform was
not a one-way movement towards more
market orientation; a number of initia-
tives were there at the same time to-
wards making these banks socially more
responsible (Chapter 9: “Social Respon-
sibility of Banks”).
Seventh, these policy initiatives and
reform measures were not simply the re-
sult of astute policymaking, but were
backed by extensive research. There is
an interesting chapter on the role that
CR played in manpower development in
the RBI and the way computerisation
and banking technology progressed in
India (Chapter 10: “Widening the Know-
ledge Base”).
All these aspects of CR’s contribution
to policymaking are covered in detail
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

but quite objectively in the book. The
book gives the reader a sense of the
woods without missing the trees; the
details in the form of long quotes from
official documents (like the RBI Annual
Report) or data, add to the context, au-
thenticity, and academic rigour to
the historical chronicle. What was
his basic philosophy of policymaking?
We can do no better than to quote from
the former RBI governor Dr Y V Reddy,
who commented,
Rangarajan believed that there was no prac-
tice without theory. He viewed all issues in
the light of a deep understanding of theory
and a careful analysis of relevant facts and
factors (Reddy 2017).
Beyond RBI
The chronicle is extended to CR’s experi-
ence beyond RBI. The storyline included
his roles as governor of a few leading
states like Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, and
Tamil Nadu (Chapter 13); chairman of
the Twelfth Finance Commission (Chap-
ter 14); Member of Parliament with a
brief spell in Rajya Sabha (Chapter 15);
and chairman of Economic Advisory
Council (EAC) of the Prime Minister
(Chapter 16). These chapters are slightly
more autobiographical in nature and
expose the reader to various twists and
turns in the life of a leading statesman
of our times.
The academic in CR did not rest even
during his days at Raj Bhavan and he
published three books during this period.
These chapters are full of some of the
profound observations about our politi-
cal system and statecraft. Illustratively,
his comment on the role of the governor
in the state is profound and quintessen-
tially apolitical:
Governors have to understand not only the
powers they have but also their limitations.
Purely political appointees have a problem
in dealing with chief ministers who do not
belong to their party. There is a tendency
to administer pinpricks. The idea that the
governor is an “agent of the Central Govern-
ment” is also repugnant. Quite clearly, two
centres of power in the state were not con-
templated in the Constitution. Furthermore,
individuals who are appointed as governor
have often held responsible positions in the
past. They were “hands-on” administrators
and were used to exercising power. The
“itch” to act is evident sometimes. This is
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023
BOOK REVIEW
what they must learn to control … A public sense of objectivity. In fact, there is only
spat between a governor and a chief minis- one chapter where CR’s interaction with
ter is undesirable. Whoever starts it makes
a serious mistake. If the governor disagrees
some of the people around him is dis-
with what the chief minister is doing, he or cussed (Chapter 12: “Men and Women and
she can discuss it with the chief minister or Matters”). Thus, the “I” is conspicuously
even write about it in their letter to the Presi- absent in the book, paving the way for
dent. Beyond that, he or she cannot make a the raconteur to delve into the zeitgeist of
public display of disagreement. (p 244)
Indian economic reforms. In effect, the
CR was back to his economic policy- book has turned out to be a chronicle of
making/advisory role as the Chairman the Indian reform process, its rationale,
of the Prime Minister’s EAC from 2005 to and its various twists and turns, offering
2014 (with a short break of little over a a feast for thought for the reader.
year when he was a Rajya Sabha mem- CR played a leading role in shaping the
ber). Apart from preparing an independ- course of the Indian economy from the
ent assessment of the economy (in line mid-1980s till date. His roles could have
with the US model of the Report of the been diverse but the actions of a personality,
Council of Economic Advisers to the Presi- who had been both a doer and a thinker
dent), his role during this spell was evi- at the same time, have always been
dent in his chairmanship of multiple there. Reading this book reminds one of
committees, like those on Pricing and what James Boswell wrote in his 1791
Taxation of Petroleum Products, Finan- classic about the life of Dr Samuel Johnson,
cial Inclusion, National Food Securities, His mind resembled the vast amphitheatre,
or Methodology for Measuring Poverty. the Coliseum at Rome. In the centre stood
All these works bear testimony to his his judgment, which like a mighty gladiator,
amazing skill of tiding through troubled combated those apprehensions that, like the
wild beasts of the Arena, were all around in
water and arriving at analytically sound
cells, ready to be let out upon him. After a
and yet practicable consensus among conflict, he drives them back into their dens;
diverse opinions. but not killing them, they were still assail-
ing him.
A Chronicle of Reforms
In its final take, the book is not a tradi- Views are personal.
tional autobiography. What makes the Partha Ray (raypartha1@gmail.com) is
book distinct and unique is that it is a director of the National Institute of Bank
combination of an analytical foundation Management Pune.
and a historical narrative, which is occa- reference
sionally buttressed by some personal Reddy, Y V (2017): Advice and Dissent: My Life in
anecdotes—all maintaining the classical Public Service, Noida: Harper Business, p 194.
EPW E-books
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vol lViii no 40 37
BOOK REVIEW
Towards a Theorisation of
Emerging New Sociality in Western
Uttar Pradesh
Rahul N
F
or Delhiites, the image of the loud-
mouthed uncouth (sub)urban men
showing off their posh sedan or
SUV with “Jat Pride” stuck in the rear
glass is as symbolic an image as Rashtra-
pati Bhavan. It is the immediate volatile
social power, often imagined, with which
one comes into regular and fleeting con-
tacts in stark contrast to the domineering
politico–administrative–diplomatic power
that is solidly fenced away and predicta-
bly indifferent. Stung by its power, one
unapologetically tends to stretch this
perception over the entire National Cap-
ital Region creating an unsettling image
of barbarous prosperity. And the urban
middle class and upper class of Delhi
had been ever ready to savour and sell
this image.
The short but comprehensive account
brought out by Satendra Kumar in his
Badalta Gaon, Badalta Dehat (Changing
Village, Changing Countryside) offers
a refreshing corrective to this urban
common sense by revealing the multi-
ple struggles, deprivations that actually
take place in the rural western Uttar
Pradesh (UP). Summarised from a re-
search carried for almost two decades
in Khanpur village near Meerut, the
monograph throws light on the evolving
caste, gender, property, and communal
relations in the region through multiple
case studies. Using a political economy
approach it shows how only a tiny ma-
jority have accrued most of the benefits
of the economic growth while most
have had to constantly struggle to main-
tain a decent life amidst growing con-
flicts of identity and morality. The book
argues for fresh concepts and perspec-
tives to understand the rural–urban
continuum and interdependence unfold-
ing in contemporary India. It provides a
timely critical overview into the socio-
political processes of a region that is the
34
Badalta Gaon, Badalta Dehat: Nayi Samajikta
ka Uday by Satendra Kumar, Oxford University Press,
2018; pp xxii + 156, `275 (paperback).
melting point of communal polarisation
and farmers’ protests.
Sweeping Changes in
Social Relations
The book is divided into six chapters,
each focusing on different facets of the
society undergoing sweeping changes.
Foregrounding the wage labour and
caste relations in the discussion, Chapter
1 deals with the plight of agrarian econo-
my in the wake of neo-liberalisation and
the attendant rapid expansion of non-
farm sector in the region. The tradition-
al jajmani relationship in labour relations
have given way to wage relations, such as
daily wage (dihadi), monthly wage (mahi-
nedar), and seasonal (fasli) labour. The
practice of leasing land for a fixed sum
has replaced most forms of sharecrop-
ping practised earlier. Overall, the stark
decline in agricultural income is accom-
panied by the (i) proliferation of small
and marginal farmers, (ii) expansion of
non-farm informal economy, and (iii) the
dependence of labourers and peasants
on the urban economy for living. More-
over, the agriculture that is practiced is
directed by big corporate pesticide and
fertiliser manufacturers, leading to rap-
id depletion of the soil productivity and
increased toxicity in the produce. Even
the practice of leasing land has led to un-
foreseen use of chemical fertilisers and
pesticides as the lessee sees no long-
term stakes in the leased-in land.
The changes in property relations
have also affected caste relations. More
than half of the land in the village is
owned by intermediate castes, namely
Yadavs and Gujjars (while the Jats domi-
nate the region). There are few Jatav
october 7, 2023
landholders too who have benefited
from the reservation policy. However,
the condition of the majority of Yadavs,
and the most backward castes, such as
Sainis, Gadariyas, Nais, and fakir Mus-
lims remain unenviable. While a small
section of Jatavs have benefited, the
majority of them are either marginal
farmers or landless labourers. The situa-
tion of the Valmikis is a case for serious
concern who have to depend fully on in-
formal sector. The study also shows that
with the Jatavs shifting from the out-
skirt to the mohallas of service castes
inside the village, the conflicts between
these castes have also acquired new
shape with lesser space to share. The
study shows that barring elites in the
upper and numerically larger castes,
the situation of service–artisan castes
and Valmikis is strenuous. The chapter
stands testimony to the fact that though
agriculture might be in decline, property
relations and ownership of land still
decide the prospects for advance under
the new economy.
Moving from economic and social ter-
rain to the political terrain, the author
narrates, quite lucidly, how a cocktail of
alcohol, money, caste arithmetic and re-
ligion preside over the results of the lo-
cal polls. It shows how even the local
body elections are fiercely fought with
direct support from state leaders. The
machinations through which communal
anti-Muslim stereotypes are buttressed
by invoking the lower caste memory
of the murder of a Muslim zamindar in
the 1940s are a must read for all those
grappling with communal question and
everyday politics. The minute details
behind the production of anti-Muslim
political mobilisation is revelatory of
the complex interactions of caste and
communalism. The electoral politics, in
short, translates into minimal say for
the Muslims and demographically dis-
advantaged lower castes.
Structural Limits to Aspirations
In the following chapter, the study
moves to the inner sphere of desires and
aspirations of the youth and the struc-
tural limits set by the economy. The dis-
like for agriculture, in the epicentre of
green revolution, is so widespread among
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

the youth that even those who have gradu-
ated in agricultural science do not want
to practise it. The situation is compounded
by the high premium set on government
jobs and the low quality of education
they are provided with. This has resulted
in the mushrooming of illegal English
schools across the region run mostly by
those who are yet to crack the competi-
tive exams. For an educated youth, the
wait to find a decent job could take more
than 15 years, while youth from the low-
er rung learn technical skills, such as
electrician, plumbing, and mobile repair-
ing to join the labour force sooner. While
men venture out to explore options, the
tight grip of patriarchy in the region
ensures that women are tied to the
village. The girls with less opportuni-
ties to pursue higher studies and lesser
opportunity to work can only wish to
marry a man working in the city to
escape the drudgery and monotony of
the farm life. However, with the growth
of private schools, some girls are find-
ing temporary low-paid jobs as teachers
and some have begun to join the police.
Contributing to the growing corpus of
work on the effect of technologies of
smart phones and motorbikes in Indian
society, the author provides compelling
anecdotes that strike both magical and
realistic tones. Through conversations
with the youth and elderly, the author
brings out how both the technologies are
increasingly rewriting the code of social
relations. People spend more time talk-
ing to their kin and friends outside than
with their neighbours. The politicians
contact their voters and commute them
by bikes and cars on the polling day. The
virtual world has led to unrealistic sexual
fantasies, objectification of women and
dislocation of moral compass leading to
different forms of violence and viola-
tions. All these developments lead to
further tightening of sexual relations
and gender norms on the one hand and
persecution of transgressions on the other.
The author notes that the society here is
in a constant flux where erstwhile moral
values are looked down upon and a new
morality has not yet taken shape.
From this sense of uncertainty that
characterises life in western UP, the author
draws the rationale for the growth of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023
phenomena of god-men and hoodlum
like kanwaria pilgrims which remained
largely personal and domestic affairs
earlier. While for the elderly, the reas-
suring god-men provide solace in the
midst of dissolution of the old order, the
younger generation finds socialising
spaces in religious gatherings to meet
with friends and family once in a while
in their otherwise anonymous life. For
some, these have simply become ave-
nues to gain recognition using violence
as is the case with kanwarias who ter-
rorise the streets and police with their
temporary religious impunity. Others
view these gatherings as means to make
money during a lean season. Though
still retaining certain taboos like not
sharing utensils or kitchens with Dalits,
many of these popular or bahujan reli-
gious gatherings have become spaces
for increasing inter-caste meetings and
transactions. The local politicians and
the larger right-wing forces are quick to
utilise these gatherings to augment their
chances. A new process of consolidation
of Hindu identity fraught with older and
newer tensions is identifiable here.
On the basis of the discussion above,
the author convincingly argues that the
region is witnessing the emergence of
new sociality that demands adequate
theorising and concepts to comprehend.
Throughout the book, there is a constant
criticism of mainstream academia for
failing to move beyond the dominant
rural–urban dichotomy model of the
West. While this criticism could be more
applicable to academia focused in north-
ern India, there are ethnographic works
emerging from the south by contempo-
raries like Geert De Neve and Isabelle
Guérin attempting to map these changes.
However, one has to admit that the au-
thor’s exploration of the electoral tactics,
desires and dreams of the youth and the
collapse of the moral economy provide a
fresh insight least explored by others.
Certain Limitations
The book acquires its lucidity and sump-
tuousness mainly by its focus on the
rich, middle and small farmers who call
most of the shots. And this is also an
area where it remains incomplete for
very little is informed about those in the
vol lViii no 40
BOOK REVIEW
extreme margins, namely the landless
labourers, Valmikis, women at the re-
ceiving end of the daily violence and the
women in agriculture probably pointing
to the negligible role they play in decid-
ing their own fate. Especially the explo-
ration of the Dalit perspective regarding
the rural–urban continuum would have
provided a ground for debate on the var-
ied effects of neo-liberalism on caste.
Also, more elaborate details about the
demographic characteristics and few
more basic statistics on the consumption
pattern of the village would have further
helped the reader. But none of these de-
ficiencies reduce the import of the book.
And the inclusion of these details could
have also made the book unpalatable
and heavy for the common reader to
whom it is primarily addressed.
The book singularly deserves to be
appreciated for connecting the threads
between farm distress, informalisation,
technologies, social dislocations, and
the rise of communal politics in a re-
gion that will continue to be the stage
for multiple battles to come. And for
presenting all these facts in a fashion
that appeals to both scholars and pub-
lic. It is a compelling reminder to the
fact that the much-touted hopes and
aspirations of the neo-liberal India are
built on shaky grounds of informalisa-
tion and the decline of agrarian economy.
This first Hindi monograph from OUP
deserves to be translated into other
Indian languages to facilitate better
comprehension of a complex reality
and engender informed dialogue.
Rahul N (Rahul.ncslg@gmail.com) is with
the Institute of Management in Government,
Thiruvananthapuram.
available at
Vidhi News Agency
RustomAli Dhal,
B/H KB Comm Centre
Near Gujarat Samachar, Kanpur
Ahmedabad 380 001
Ph: 2530064, 2530024
35
Naga Nationalism and Christianity
Vikas Kumar
I
t is widely believed that the Naga
political conflict is closely associated
with the spread of Christianity. Sever-
al hypotheses have been proposed in this
regard. First, the introduction of a com-
mon scripture and script helped the Nagas
to unite as a community. The communal
partition of India explains why the
emergent community was imagined in
(ethno)religious terms. Second, Christi-
anity (and the colonial state’s scalar poli-
tics) ruptured the bonds between the
hills and the plains and nudged the
Nagas to reimagine themselves as a
separate nation. Third, the ethnonation-
alists used the ethno-religious divide
between the hills and plains to rally
support. Fourth, the church actively aided
the insurgency.
A nuanced account of Christianity
among the Nagas is, however, lacking in
most of these discussions. G Kanato Cho-
phy’s Christianity and Politics in Tribal
India: Baptist Missionaries and Naga
Nationalism tries to fill in this gap. His
book is part of the new scholarship on
the North East that is questioning the
colonial–anthropological wisdom and
challenging the stereotypes that have
governed much of the postcolonial policy
and public debate.
Chophy suggests that “[t]he connection
of Naga ethnonationalism with Christi-
anity … is historically contingent” and
adds that nationalism “would have arisen
and persisted … even without the Amer-
ican Baptist faith, and its discourse then
would have taken a different form—as for
instance it has among … the Hindu-major-
ity Meitei and Ahom people” (p 105). He
argues that while “the Indian political
class” focused on the role of American mis-
sionaries (p 313), they are known to have
kept their flock away from politics (p 326).
Chophy uncovers the many strands
that constitute the complex relationship
between religion and insurgency. First,
ethnonationalists held varied views on
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023
book reviewS
Christianity and Politics in Tribal India: Baptist
Missionaries and Naga Nationalism by G Kanato
Chophy, SUNY Press, 2022; pp 478, $37.95.
the role of faith in politics. Leaders like
A Z Phizo did not allow their faith to
determine their politics, whereas Chris-
tianity was an end for the founder of the
Council of the Nagalim Churches, Isak
Chishi Swu. Second, while insurgents
have promoted conversions, certain fac-
tions are also known to have supported
cults that challenged the church. Third,
the church vehemently opposed the insur-
gency’s turn to communist China for sup-
port, while the insurgents did not appre-
ciate the church’s stand that “peacemak-
ing with the Indian state is the only vi-
able solution” (p 109). Fourth, there is
resistance within the church to “blend-
ing ethnonationalism and religious ide-
ology” because of the fear of “ethnic
identity becoming idolatrous” (p 107).
The book under review is, however,
not limited to the intersection between
faith and insurgency. It offers a fresh
account of how Christianity shaped and
was shaped by sociocultural and politi-
cal changes among the Baptist Nagas of
Nagaland. The book can be divided into
three parts. The first locates the 19th
century roots of Naga Baptists. The second
explores the encounter of the new faith
with different Naga communities. The
third part discusses the myriad changes
facing the Nagas, who are no longer iso-
lated from social and political change in
the rest of the country and the world.
New Heroes
Most Nagas “who critique the British Raj
as a manifestation of Western imperialism
perceive Christianity as if it were from a
different realm” (p 16), ignoring the fact
that “the Union Jack had to be foisted …
to secure peace … before the American
vol lViii no 40
missionaries could preach” (p 18). Chophy
suggests that this might be explained by
the fact that the American Baptist Mis-
sion (ABM) was, on the one hand, “not
directly involved in the project of Western
imperialism” (p 24) and, on the other, it
introduced the Nagas to modern orga-
nisational forms and strategies that
helped them face the tumultuous pro-
cess of decolonisation.
Long after their departure, ABM mis-
sionaries continue to enjoy “a heroic sta-
tus,” with “[t]heir busts and enlarged
portraits” adorning churches (pp 23–34)
and church and educational institutions
being named “after pioneering Ameri-
can [and native] Baptist missionaries”
(p 75). The book under review is, for
instance, dedicated to the pioneering
missionary Miles Bronson. Moreover,
the Nagas continue to understand their
encounter with the ABM through
“[received] metaphors like darkness and
light, barbarism and civilisation” and
“scores of seminary graduates write the-
ses and publish books on the ‘positive
impacts’ of these missions” (p 75).
Communities regret chance delays in
exposure to Christianity. An Angami
village rues missing becoming a pioneer
“not only in spirituality, educational but
also in all round development” because
of their failure to “be a good host to”
Christian soldiers of a British expedition
through their territory in 1832 (p 118).
The Konyaks feel they “would have been
the most advanced of all the Naga
tribes” if the ABM had sustained its short-
lived missionary effort in Namsang in
the late 1830s (p 120). The Lothas feel
they would have surpassed the Aos in
the field of education if Captain John
Butler had not been speared in their ter-
ritory and the ABM had sustained its mis-
sionary effort after the late 1880s (p 148).
Tentative Origins
Even in hindsight, “[i]t is remarkable
that the American Baptist mission found
a foothold in this inhospitable region”
and outlasted the British on both sides of
the Indo-Myanmar border (p 74) and
Christianity became “intrinsic to the
cultural expression of various ethnic
31
BOOK REVIEW
groups …” (p 73). Philip Jenkins quoted
in Chophy points out that for long “large-
scale missionary efforts were strictly” a
Catholic affair, but this changed in the
late 18th century due to “the evangelical
revival and … the unprecedented power
and reach of the British Empire” (pp 22–23).
The revival coincided with industrialisa-
tion, improvement in travel and commu-
nication and advances in medicine in
Protestant countries. “It was as if having
showered them with money, God now
wanted them to use it to save [souls]”
(pp 43–44). The Anglicans or the English
Baptists could not make use of the op-
portunities, though. Freedom of religion
at home and the absence of interference
from imperial exigencies abroad seem to
have helped the ABM.
But saving the Nagas was not the pri-
mary goal. The ABM needed launch pads
to penetrate China. The Indo-Myanmar
region that was a stop en route, though,
turned out to be the biggest success stories
of the ABM. Even here the success was
fortuitous. The ABM scraped through the
mid-19th century that was a tumultuous
period in the United States, where the
Baptist church was hit by financial crisis,
schism over slavery and tactical differences
over missionary strategies (pp 33–34).
This was also a difficult decade in India,
where the mutiny threatened the British
and natives made “no distinction be-
tween the agents of a British imperial
Company and those preaching a new re-
ligion” (p 31). In fact, in 1858, there was
only one missionary left in Assam (p 32).
Later, unlike in Burma, the post-inde-
pendence Indian state’s liberal language
policy and secular character helped the
church to flourish (pp 89–93, 181).
The Missionary and
the Political Agent
Initially, the East India Company was
against missionary activity and denied
entry to the ABM in 1812. However, by
the 1830s, it was open to preaching, at
least, in the North East. This shift is
attributed to the Clapham Sect that
affected a “moral transformation of the
British Empire” (p 24). While the ABM
had misgivings about the ulterior mo-
tives of the colonial administration, “the
benevolence … proved of great help”
32
insofar as it offered security among
other things (p 48).
The ABM followed the Union Jack into
the Naga Hills, but its relationship with
the colonial authorities was not neces-
sarily cordial. The ABM divided the Nagas
into Christians and non-Christians, where-
as the government made a distinction
between administered and non-admin-
istered tribes. As a result, “[t]he [cultural]
objectives [and the spatial scope] of the
two Western enterprises differed sub-
stantially with regard to “civilising” the
natives” (p 169). For instance, political–
economic exigencies forced the adminis-
tration to block attempts to save the un-
administered Nagas.
The “native” tradition was the bone of
contention. The ABM was “often at log-
gerheads with … political agents who
wanted to keep the indigenous cultures
intact” (p 24) and shield them from mar-
ket influences (p 117). Colonial judges
often favoured traditionalists against
converts (p 195). Yet, despite the ostensi-
ble chasm between the two, their unco-
ordinated interventions often contribut-
ed to the same end. For instance, “[t]he
Konyak tattoo tradition suffered a huge
setback as a result of the combined ef-
fect of the British government’s ban on
headhunting, the Baptist missionaries’
deterrents, and the determined reform-
ism of educated Konyak youth” (p 240).
Also, the differences notwithstanding,
the missionaries helped in mobilising
the natives for, say, the labour corps
during World War I. The missionaries
even helped conduct censuses.
In the end, “the political life of the
Naga tribes was anglicised,” while “their
religious [and even cultural] life came to
be Americanised” (p 24). In hindsight,
the colonial institutional framework
provided a stable basis for the native
church that outlasted both the colonial
administration and the ABM (p 82). “In
places like China, Japan, and Ministerial
Burma, the religious commitment of
converts could not be sustained without
durable Western institutions” (p 81).
A Diverse Lot
The timing of conversion accounts for a
large part of religious diversity in Naga-
land. When the Aos, the earliest among
october 7, 2023
the Nagas to convert, were celebrating the
centenary of the mission, some Khiamni-
ungan villages were still headhunting
(p 167) and the Konyak village of Long-
wa witnessed the first conversion (p 214).
The firstborns had begun to shoulder the
responsibilities of the mission during
the colonial period and later took over
from where the Americans left. However,
“[w]hen the so-called advanced Nagas
took the mission to the eastern Nagas,”
they saw in the latter “a reflection of
themselves before their own conversion”
(pp 170–71). A substantial part of the book
examines Christianity among the Eastern
Nagas, but we are unable to discuss it
here for want of space.
The other divide relates to the process
of conversion. The ABM worked with the
Aos for “eighty years—without leaving
the mission station unmanned” (p 141).
Easy success in mass conversion of tribes
with hereditary chieftainship was asso-
ciated with nominalism and backsliding
(pp 173, 242). Among the Konyaks, the
weaker villages and commoners were
one of the first to convert and took prec-
edence in the emerging order. Denomi-
national affiliation may also vary with
intra-village differences, for example, “In
Khonoma village, Merhema and Semoma
khels are largely Baptist while Thevoma
khel is largely Catholic” (p 164).
Further, the religious churning in the
1970s split the Baptists into charismatic
and conservative camps and led to the rise
of prayer houses and self-styled proph-
ets. The conservatives might already be
a minority among, say, the Sumis. “The
revival movement made divine interven-
tion and miracles more tangible … and
the Christian deity was brought within
the laity’s reach” (p 191). Chophy’s expla-
nation of why the traditionalist Baptists
may be ceding ground to a variety of
Christian and quasi-Christian challeng-
ers requires a separate discussion.
A few other strands of the diversity
uncovered by Chophy are notable. First,
“a new generation of seminary-trained
Naga Christians” is experimenting with
ecumenism (p 11), which contrasts with
the traditional Baptist belief in damnation
of others, including Catholics. Second,
there is a growing interest in the animistic
past among the educated youth (p 14), but
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

this is different from the syncretism in
the charismatic churches. The tradition-
al faith, though, poses no challenge to
the Baptist faith in Nagaland because un-
like in, say, Arunachal Pradesh, “the so-
cial conditions of Nagaland are not condu-
cive for a resurgence” (p 14). Third, there
is a divide between the richer churches
based in cities like Dimapur and the rest
(p 199). Fourth, traditional Baptist church-
es are losing “town-bred Naga Christians
from their pews” (p 429). Fifth, the trans-
lation of the Bible into additional lan-
guages is destabilising portmanteau tribal
communities such as the Chakhesangs.
The Rengmas alone seem to have found
a way to handle linguistic diversity.
Chophy suggests that despite the
diversity “there is a definable ‘[Naga]
Baptist culture’” (pp 25–26) that includ-
es, say, “[a] zeal for evangelism and mis-
sion” (p 6). Indeed, Naga evangelists
have fanned across the North East and
adjoining Myanmar and further beyond.
Even tribes that completed the switch to
Christianity only a few decades ago are
sending out missionaries. Chophy is even
optimistic that the missionary-minded
Baptist upland “may help invigorate the
time-worn and ‘tepid’ Christianity of
the West” (p 109).
Concluding Remarks
This book locates the Naga Baptists on a
large historical and geographical canvas
spread between Brahmaputra and Chind-
win rivers covering two centuries. It ef-
fortlessly criss-crosses between micro
details culled from personal interviews
and the big canvas populated by archi-
val material to offer novel insights into
doctrinal nuances and the everydayness
of Christianity in Nagaland. It also offers
interesting biographical accounts of Naga
leaders in a variety of fields.
The lack of substantive engagement
with other explorations of religion
among the Nagas is one of the major
gaps in the book. Notable contributions
include Arkotong Longkumer’s Reform,
Identity and Narratives of Belonging: The
Heraka Movement in Northeast India
(2010) and John Thomas’s Evangelising
the Nation: Religion and the Formation of
Naga Political Identity (2016). There are
a few other gaps in Chophy’s account.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023
First, Chophy rightly suggests that
“nineteenth-century Evangelicalism and
twentieth-century Pentecostalism” are
essential to understand the Naga Chris-
tianity (p 8). But he ignores how the his-
tory of Baptist engagement with the na-
tives in America shaped their forays into
the Naga Hills. Also, the Naga Baptist
story cannot be complete without a dis-
cussion of why Catholicism succeeded
among the Angamis and the Lothas, who
were among the first to be exposed to
the Baptist faith. Second, the intertwin-
ing of the church with state and non-state
structures of power is overlooked. For
instance, the focus is on the differences of
missionaries and colonial political agents
and not their cooperation. More recent
institutions such as the office of the state
chaplain or crucial documents such as
the Yehzabo (constitution) of the Naga
National Council are left unexamined.
Third, the interface between language
and church has not received adequate
attention. How did translation strategies
(say, the degree to which native nouns
were accommodated in translations of the
Bible) affect the growth of Naga lan-
guages and shape attitudes towards the
pre-Christian past? Or, what does the
delayed translation of the Bible into
Nagamese reveals about the relation bet-
ween the church and identity formation?
Fourth, by restricting the scope to the
the Nagas of Nagaland, Chophy sidesteps
the Nagas in other states who “are pulled
apart by numerous unapologetic Christian
missions, an effervescent traditional
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we seek to explore new and exciting possibilities of
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vol lViii no 40
BOOK REVIEW
reformed religion, and increasingly stri-
dent Hindu missions” (p 26). But Chophy
also ignores newer questions arising out
of interactions between Naga Baptists
and alleged Bangladeshi Muslims in the
disputed belt between Assam and Naga-
land, where intermarriages lead to situa-
tions in which children are “confused
about the religion.” Fifth, the question of
gender is left unexplored. The discus-
sion on the opposition to Gaidinliu in
Nagaland focuses on her association with
Heraka as a challenger to the Baptist
Church and differences with Naga na-
tionalists. It ignores the fact that the
Angami-dominated nationalist/Baptist
leadership would have viewed her chal-
lenge as illegitimate as she was doubly
feminine, a woman from a weaker/rela-
tively feminine tribe. These differences
between tribes were accentuated by the
colonial politics of masculinity. Sixth,
Chophy does not engage with the news
media and works of fiction that are in-
creasingly exploring everyday Christianity.
Sentilong Ozüküm’s Dreams & Chaos is a
case in point, which was adapted into a
web series with the support of Dimapur
Ao Baptist Church Youth Ministry. The
debates on the entanglement of the
church in politics in the run-up to last
few assembly elections, too, offer valuable
insights into the lived reality of Christi-
anity in an increasingly diverse society.
Vikas Kumar (vikas.kumar@
azimpremjifoundation.org) teaches at Azim
Premji University, Bengaluru.
33
PERSPECTIVES
Change in the Employment–
Unemployment Situation
Analysis Based on Panel Data
G C MANNA, D MUKHOPADHYAY
By taking into consideration five
different panels with each one
of them surveyed during four
consecutive quarters covering
the period most affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic in terms
of employment scenario, this
article examines the change in
the employment–unemployment
situation of the same persons
during the four consecutive
quarters. The study is confined to
urban India and uses the unit-level
data collected through the
Periodic Labour Force Survey.
The authors are grateful to the anonymous
referee and the editorial team for their
suggestions.
G C Manna (gc.manna1@gmail.com) is with
the Institute for Human Development, New
Delhi and the National Council of Applied
Economic Research, New Delhi. He was also
the director general of the Central Statistics
Office and the National Sample Survey Office.
D Mukhopadhyay (dmkjee@yahoo.com) was
the deputy director general in the National
Sample Survey Office.
38
T
he COVID-19 pandemic has caused
significant socio-economic disrup-
tions affecting the livelihood of a
large section of people across the globe.
In India, lockdown restrictions were an-
nounced on 23 March 2020 in Kerala and
subsequently on 25 March 2020 in the
rest of the country. As per the available
information, the daily number of cases
peaked mid-September 2020 in the first
wave. However, in the second wave be-
ginning in March 2021, the peaked num-
ber of daily cases observed during early
May 2021 was much larger. Thereafter,
another peak in the number of daily cases
was observed in mid-January 2022.
There have been quite a few articles fo-
cusing on the employment–unemploy-
ment conditions of Indians during the
pandemic period. However, the most
comprehensive database in this regard
giving statewise information separately
for rural and urban India is available in
the form of annual reports of the Peri-
odic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) re-
leased by the National Statistical Office
(NSO), Ministry of Statistics and Pro-
gramme Implementation. These apart,
quarterly bulletins of the NSO covering a
few important employment–unemploy-
ment indicators for the urban areas are
also available in the public domain.
A unique feature of the urban compo-
nent of the PLFS is its use of rotational
sampling design adopted in the survey.
And as per this design, every quarter of
the survey has four panels of first-stage
units—“urban frame survey blocks”—
where one panel has been introduced for
the first time in the quarter for survey as
a “first-visit” sample and the other three
panels which got introduced during the
preceding quarters are surveyed during
the current quarter as the “revisit” samples.
OCTOber 7, 2023
Each panel has nearly the same number
of sample blocks and three panels are
common between any two consecutive
quarters. Any given panel and the corre-
sponding sample block as well as sample
households in each of these blocks are
surveyed during the four consecutive
quarters and then the panel disappears
from the survey. After due stratification
of households, a random sample of eight
households per sample block is selected
for survey in the PLFS.1
Most of the studies focusing on quarter-
wise analysis, including the quarterly
estimates of employment and unemploy-
ment rates, published through the quar-
terly bulletins for the urban areas, have
taken into consideration all the house-
holds based on four panels surveyed
during any given quarter. Since there is
no complete overlap of the samples bet-
ween any two quarters, the observed
change in the estimates between two
quarters is likely to be partially affected
due to the change in the composition of
the samples.
We attempted to overcome this prob-
lem by deriving the quarterly estimates
based on the panel data of same house-
holds surveyed during four consecutive
quarters. Considering the fact that major
changes in the employment–unemploy-
ment rates in the urban areas were ob-
served during the quarters of April–June
2020 and April–June 2021 (Table 1, p 39),
we restrict our analysis to five different
panels covering the above two quarters,
with details given under data sets and
methodology. After describing the data
and methodology used in the estima-
tion, the article presents the major find-
ings of the analysis followed by the con-
cluding observations.
Data Sets and Methodology
We only analyse urban India and survey
five panels, each during four consecutive
quarters. Together, they cover eight quar-
ters (see Statement 1, p 39) starting with
July–September 2019 (Q1 of PLFS 2019–20)
and ending with the quarter April–June
2021 (Q4 of PLFS 2020–21). Appropriate
weights have been used to adjust the
sample data to derive the estimates of
vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 PERSPECTIVES

aggregates and ratios of employments members during the first visit and who presents the sample size based only on
and earnings. All the quarterly estimates remained as the household members P1 and P5 as per the first visit of the respec-
presented in the article, including the during the subsequent three visits have tive panels. Statewise figures are given
worker–population ratio (WPR), percent- been taken into consideration. New mem- (later in the article) only for those states
age employed or unemployed, percent- bers subsequently becoming the members where the number of sample persons in
age distribution of the unemployed/em- of the household, after the first quarter, the age group of 15 years and above in a
ployed, and average earnings of the em- have been excluded. As regards the esti- quarter is at least 500. It may be noted that
ployed, relate to persons in the age mates of average earnings per worker, at the all-India level, which includes other
group of 15 years and above. These esti- the reference period for earnings is last 30 states and union territories, the sample
mates of employment or unemployment days for the self-employed, the preced- size works out to be nearly 1,400 urban
are based on the “current weekly status” ing calendar month for the regular blocks and about 10,500 households.
(CWS) approach with the reference peri- wage/salaried (RWS) workers, and aver-
od of last seven days, which is more rel- age per day as per 7-day data for the Major Findings
evant in the context of quarter-wise casual labourers. The corresponding Before the major findings are presented,
analysis. For estimation purpose, only unit-level data, as they are in the PLFS, it will be useful to look at the quarterly
the sample households effectively sur- have been used. estimates of WPR and unemployment
veyed in all the four quarters have been For different reasons, like some sample rate as per the CWS among persons in the
considered to maintain the panel and blocks/households becoming casualty, age group of 15 years and above based on
accordingly the weights, that is, multi- the sample size is likely to vary marginally all the households surveyed in the PLFS
pliers have been duly adjusted. Further, over the panels at the state level and also (Table 1). It may be noted that there has
only such persons who were household for all India. For simplicity, Statement 2 been a significant decline in the WPR and
an increase in the UR during April–June
Statement 1: Description of Panels Considered for the Study 2020 and during April–June 2021 as
Panel Introduced for the First Time during the Four Consecutive Quarters during Which the Panel Has Been Surveyed (as a First-visit
No Quarter as a First-visit Sample in the PLFS Sample in the First Quarter and as Revisit Samples in the Succeeding Three Quarters)
compared with the corresponding esti-
P1 Q1, PLFS 2019–20 PLFS 2019–20: Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 mates during the previous three quar-
P2 Q2, PLFS 2019–20 PLFS 2019–20: Q2–Q4 and PLFS 2020–21: Q1 ters. This is one among the primary rea-
P3 Q3, PLFS 2019–20 PLFS 2019–20: Q3–Q4 and PLFS 2020–21: Q1-Q2 sons for restricting our analysis based on
P4 Q4, PLFS 2019–20 PLFS 2019–20: Q4 and PLFS 2020–21: Q1–Q3 the five panels only to study the employ-
P5 Q1, PLFS 2020–21 PLFS 2020–21: Q1–Q4
(Q1: July–September; Q2: October–December; Q3: January–March; Q4: April–June).
ment–unemployment situation among
Source: Authors’ estimation. the persons during the quarter beginning
July–September 2019 till the quarter of
Statement 2: Sample Size at the State Level
April–June 2021.
State Sample Size of P1 during the First-visit Sample Size of P5 during the First-visit
Number of Number of Number of Persons Number of Number of Number of Persons
At the outset, it may be highlighted
Blocks Households All Ages 15+ Blocks Households All Ages 15+ that the major thrust of our analysis is to
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) assess: one, the percentage of population
Andhra Pradesh 56 432 1,571 1,269 56 431 1,498 1,235 that became unemployed during the most
Assam 26 199 717 581 28 224 820 680
affected period of April–June 2020–
Bihar 42 330 1,476 1,041 39 310 1,406 1,041
Chhattisgarh 26 199 796 615 24 192 817 629 April–June 2021, out of those who were
Delhi 30 191 718 564 30 170 618 514 employed during all the three previous
Gujarat 57 384 1,534 1,252 55 418 1,644 1,353 quarters along with their status of
Haryana 40 293 1,253 977 39 297 1,160 898
Jammu and Kashmir 44 344 1,517 1,198 44 336 1,445 1,164 Table 1: Quarterly Estimates of WPR and UR as
Jharkhand 34 266 1,173 898 33 263 1,053 824 per CWS among Persons in the Age Group of 15
Karnataka 73 528 1,868 1,509 71 536 1,932 1,544 Years and Above for Urban India (%)
Kerala 76 573 2,130 1,673 76 601 2,154 1,722 Quarterly WPR UR
Madhya Pradesh 62 468 1,997 1,539 62 481 1,968 1,539 (1) (2) (3)
Maharashtra 137 875 3,524 2,779 109 798 3,001 2,388 July–September 2019 43.1 8.3
Manipur 39 306 1,234 945 40 320 1,319 1,008 October–December 2019 44.1 7.8
Mizoram 31 242 1,001 806 32 255 1,054 864 January–March 2020 43.7 9.1
Odisha 34 261 935 743 33 258 972 792 April–June 2020 36.4 20.8
Punjab 51 357 1,354 1,052 52 366 1,488 1,149 July–September 2020 40.9 13.2
Rajasthan 54 403 1,899 1,447 54 410 1,899 1,461 October–December 2020 42.4 10.3
Tamil Nadu 110 836 2,812 2,307 106 826 2,866 2,379 January–March 2021 43.1 9.3
Telangana 50 359 1,288 1,040 46 362 1,330 1,062 April–June 2021 40.9 12.6
Uttar Pradesh 102 796 3,744 2,727 102 795 3,614 2,725 July–September 2021 42.3 9.8
Uttarakhand 24 175 697 540 23 172 672 516 October–December 2021 43.2 8.7
West Bengal 92 719 2,510 2,118 85 663 2,400 2,044 January–March 2022 43.4 8.2
All India 1,424 10,543 41,522 32,527 1,375 10,528 41,072 32,630 April–June 2022 43.9 7.6
Source: Authors’ calculation. Source: NSO, Quarterly Bulletins, PLFS.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 39

PERSPECTIVES

employment (that is, whether they were
self-employed, RWS, casual labourers)
and industry of work in the preceding
quarter (based on P1 and P5); two,
changes in the quarterly average earn-
ings and in the quarterly average number
of hours worked for the workers belong-
ing to each of the said three statuses of
employment (based on P1 and P5); three,
the percentage that became unemployed
during April–June 2020 and continued
to remain as unemployed thereafter
(based on P2 and P3); and four, among
the workers who were employed during
April–June 2020, the percentage be-
came unemployed during the succeed-
ing three quarters (based on P4).
Size of workforce becoming unem-
ployed during April–June 2020–21:
It has been noted earlier that as com-
pared to the preceding quarter (Janu-
ary–March), the unemployment rate in
urban India among the persons in the
age group of 15 years and above in-
creased sharply during the quarter of
April–June from 9.1% to 20.8% in 2020
and from 9.3% to 12.6% during 2021.
However, based on the panel data of
same individuals surveyed during the
four consecutive quarters, it will be of
interest to know the percentage that be-
came unemployed among the persons
who were employed in all the three pre-
ceding quarters. The corresponding fig-
ures are presented in Table 2 based on P1
and P5 where, along with the all-India
estimates, statewise estimates are also
provided. It is found that at the all-India
level, 18.9% of the persons who were
workers in the preceding three quarters
became unemployed during the quarter
April–June 2020. The states where the
impact was much higher in this quarter
include Maharashtra (38.6%), followed by
Rajasthan (32.2%) and Telangana (27.1%).
The north-eastern states of Mizoram
(4.8%) and Assam (5.1%) were the least
affected. At the all-India level, among
those who were workers during July–
September 2019 (being 45% of the per-
sons in the age group of 15+), the majority
continued as workers during October–
December 2019 (97%) and also during
January–March 2020 (93%). However,
only 75.4% continued as workers till the
quarter of April–June 2020.
A similar trend continued in the sub-
sequent four quarters at the all-India
level except that the impact of pandemic
on the employment situation was much
less severe—7.4% of those who were
employed during the previous three
quarters became unemployed during
April–June 2021 (as against 18.9% a year
before). At the state level, the impact of
this unemployment during April–June
2021 was relatively high in Chhattisgarh
(15.8%), Jharkhand (14.0%), Tamil Nadu
(12.1%), Kerala (11.0%), and Maharash-
tra (10.3%). In absolute terms, the esti-
mated number of persons becoming un-
employed among the persons who were
workers during the respective preceding
three quarters for the urban areas of the
country converts to about 28 million and
11 million during April–June 2020 and
April–June 2021, respectively.2

Table 2: Employment–Unemployment Situation during the Four Consecutive Quarters of July–June 2019–20 and July–June 2020–21 Using Panel Data
State Panel P1 Panel P5
Persons (15+) WPR: July– Among Workers in July–September 2019 Unemployed during Persons (15+) WPR: Among Workers in July–September 2020 Unemployed during
Surveyed: September Percent Remained as Workers during April–June 2020 Surveyed: July–Sep- Percent Remained as Workers during April–June 2021
July– 2019 (%) Next Qr Next Next Three among Those Who July– tember Next Qr Next Next Three among Those Who
September (October– Two Qrs Qrs up to Were Workers during September 2020 (October– Two Qrs Qrs up to Were Workers during
2019 December April–June Previous Three Qrs (%) 2020 (%) December April–June Previous Three
2019) 2020 2020) 2021 Qrs (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Andhra Pradesh 1,269 46.7 94.7 88.9 69.8 21.6 1,235 46.2 98.5 96.7 88.8 8.1
Assam 581 45.8 99.6 99.1 94.0 5.1 680 40.7 98.8 97.3 93.9 3.5
Bihar 1,041 35.5 99.4 92.8 82.9 10.6 1,041 34.7 98.5 97.6 97.6 0.0
Chhattisgarh 615 46.3 97.0 92.4 81.5 11.8 629 43.2 90.9 83.7 70.5 15.8
Delhi 564 43.5 98.1 95.3 85.6 10.1 514 43.5 99.8 96.6 95.1 1.6
Gujarat 1,252 46.2 97.3 93.7 85.5 8.7 1,353 44.8 98.3 97.0 95.8 1.3
Haryana 977 47.3 98.2 95.9 81.8 14.7 898 40.3 98.3 94.8 89.8 5.3
Jammu and 1,198 43.0 96.8 93.2 85.1 8.7 1,164 37.9 91.1 87.8 81.5 7.1
Kashmir
Jharkhand 898 38.8 98.6 97.4 76.6 21.4 824 37.8 93.7 91.9 79.0 14.0
Karnataka 1,509 43.6 99.0 96.5 84.7 12.2 1,544 48.6 98.2 96.7 89.5 7.4
Kerala 1,673 39.7 91.7 83.8 67.3 19.7 1,722 36.9 95.5 91.9 81.8 11.0
Madhya Pradesh 1,539 43.2 96.0 91.1 72.3 20.6 1,539 42.9 94.6 89.9 82.5 8.3
Maharashtra 2,779 46.9 97.7 95.6 58.7 38.6 2,388 39.1 97.2 92.5 83.0 10.3
Manipur 945 46.5 96.7 95.0 78.1 17.8 1,008 39.8 95.8 90.8 87.6 3.4
Mizoram 806 44.5 99.1 93.9 89.4 4.8 864 46.6 99.1 98.6 97.8 0.9
Odisha 743 44.5 96.8 91.0 76.7 15.6 792 46.7 89.8 79.3 72.5 8.5
Punjab 1,052 47.5 98.3 93.9 85.0 9.5 1,149 39.9 99.7 95.5 90.8 5.0
Rajasthan 1,447 44.0 95.2 88.5 60.0 32.2 1,461 36.9 97.7 94.3 88.0 6.7
Tamil Nadu 2,307 51.6 97.4 92.3 79.5 13.9 2,379 50.3 95.8 92.5 81.4 12.1
Telangana 1,040 48.4 97.3 94.4 68.9 27.1 1,062 46.0 98.9 93.2 90.1 3.4
Uttar Pradesh 2,727 38.6 97.2 94.2 81.2 13.8 2,725 37.6 96.5 94.1 88.1 6.3
Uttarakhand 540 40.8 97.4 93.0 74.8 19.5 516 48.6 97.9 87.5 83.5 4.5
West Bengal 2,118 48.6 96.3 90.4 78.6 13.1 2,044 45.6 96.4 95.0 87.1 8.3
India 32,527 45.0 97.0 93.0 75.4 18.9 32,630 42.7 96.9 93.7 86.7 7.4
Source: Authors’ estimation.

40 OCTOber 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

 PERSPECTIVES

Details of such unemployed by status/ were workers in the preceding three percentage that became unemployed in
industry of work in the preceding quarters) by their status and industry of the quarter of April–June 2020–21, for
quarter: Table 3 presents the percentage work in the preceding quarter (January– each status of employment and industry,
distribution of such unemployed (who March) for all India. It also gives the of the workers as in the previous quar-
Table 3: Details of the Workers Who Became Unemployed during April–June 2020–21 (by Their Status ter. The majority of those who became
and Industry of Work in the Preceding Quarter for All India) unemployed during April–June 2020
Panel Status of Employment in the Preceding Industry of Work in the Preceding Quarter worked as the RWS (40.7%) during the
Quarter
SE RWS CL All Agr Mfg Constr Trade TSC Acco/food Others All
preceding quarter. On the other hand, a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) year later, the majority (43.8%) worked
Percentage distribution of the unemployed by their status/industry of work in the preceding quarter: as casual labourers among those who
P1 29.6 40.7 29.7 100.0 3.9 22.8 18.5 14.3 8.0 4.6 27.8 100.0 became unemployed during April–June
P5 27.6 28.6 43.8 100.0 8.6 19.8 25.7 14.8 6.7 3.2 21.1 100.0 2021. In terms of industrial distribution
Percentage became unemployed for each status/ industry of employment during the preceding quarter:
of the unemployed by their industry of
P1 14.3 15.1 55.9 18.9 15.2 20.5 43.1 13.0 19.2 25.3 15.5 18.9
P5 5.1 4.5 27.1 7.4 10.0 7.5 18.8 5.0 6.9 8.2 5.0 7.4 work in the preceding quarter manufac-
TSC: Transport, Storage and Communication; Acco/Food: Accommodation and Food Services. turing, construction and trade together
Source: Authors’ estimation.
account for nearly 60% during both
Table 4: Changes in the Average Earnings by Status of Employment of the Workers for Urban India the periods.
Status of Quarter-wise Changes in the Average Earnings* per Worker for the Workers as per Their Status (`) As against the overall 18.9% of the
Employment of the P1 P5
Worker
workers becoming unemployed during
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
(July– (October– (January– (April–June (July– (October– (January– (April–June April–June 2020 and 7.4% a year later
September December March 2020) September December March 2021) (April–June 2021), this rate was maxi-
2019) 2019) 2020) 2020) 2020) 2021)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
mum (55.9% and 27.1%, respectively)
Self-employment 16,645 16,819 16,461 13,145 15,469 15,558 15,943 14,646 among the CL. At the industry level, this
RWS 19,787 19,786 19,965 19,536 20,834 20,740 21,008 20,955 rate/proportion was quite high for con-
Casual labourer 340 356 361 350 374 382 387 378 struction (43.1%) and accommodation
*Monthly earnings for self-employment and RWS, and daily earnings in the case of casual labourer with daily earnings
derived only based on the days worked; calculated by considering those workers whose status of employment as either
and food services (25.3%) in the first pe-
self-employment , RWS or casual labourer remained the same in all the four quarters. riod (P1). During the second period also,
Source: Authors’ estimation.
the proportion was quite substantial for
Table 5: Statewise Changes in the Average Earnings (by Status of Employment of the Workers)
State Self-employment RWS Casual Labourer
Avg Monthly Earn- Change in the Average Earning Avg Monthly Earn- Change in the Average Earning Avg Daily Earning Change in the Average Earning
ing during Time during the Time Period (over the ing during Time during the Time Period (over the during Time during the Time Period (over the
Period 1 Previous Time Period): Period 1 Previous Time Period): Period 1 Previous Time Period):
(`) 2 3 4 (`) 2 3 4 (`) 2 3 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Andhra Pradesh 15,446 0.87 1.01 0.99 18,340 0.95 1.08 1.04 353 1.01 1.15 1.02
Assam 14,840 0.98 1.13 0.89 21,271 1.03 1.10 1.03 359 0.93 1.14 0.98
Bihar 12,229 0.87 1.22 1.02 17,725 0.99 1.20 1.08 320 1.04 1.12 0.95
Chhattisgarh 14,238 0.84 1.33 0.91 24,707 1.00 0.77 1.01 238 1.10 1.09 0.90
Delhi 28,195 0.85 1.12 0.73 28,843 0.95 0.63 0.92 – – – 1.03
Gujarat 15,680 0.88 1.23 1.02 13,568 0.95 1.23 1.04 279 1.01 1.10 1.06
Haryana 20,122 0.72 1.20 0.89 25,833 0.86 0.95 1.04 387 1.02 1.05 1.09
Jammu and Kashmir 17,735 0.80 1.35 0.88 27,759 1.05 0.95 1.07 448 1.01 1.14 1.09
Jharkhand 14,918 0.79 1.16 1.01 20,917 1.05 1.44 0.98 287 1.08 0.82 1.06
Karnataka 16,855 0.70 1.53 1.13 21,383 1.01 1.04 0.97 353 1.00 1.09 1.02
Kerala 16,390 0.68 1.07 0.74 22,959 0.99 1.09 1.02 779 0.93 1.06 1.02
Madhya Pradesh 12,962 0.68 1.33 0.81 15,878 0.97 1.42 1.00 247 1.02 0.95 1.05
Maharashtra 23,157 0.74 1.19 0.96 23,521 0.99 1.16 1.02 290 1.01 1.04 1.07
Manipur 11,068 0.87 1.27 1.01 18,449 0.96 1.62 0.96 338 1.00 1.16 1.11
Mizoram 16,242 0.92 0.95 0.99 28,256 1.01 1.07 0.99 376 0.99 0.93 1.05
Odisha 11,999 0.83 1.67 0.82 22,837 1.01 0.84 1.00 252 0.88 1.10 1.04
Punjab 21,689 0.69 1.49 0.94 18,207 0.98 0.97 1.00 337 0.92 1.24 0.97
Rajasthan 19,208 0.82 1.01 0.94 18,230 1.06 1.19 1.00 343 1.01 1.08 1.09
Tamil Nadu 16,575 0.76 1.26 0.85 16,994 0.99 1.10 1.01 347 1.01 1.36 0.87
Telangana 17,273 0.87 1.04 0.94 19,338 0.92 1.17 1.00 421 1.01 0.93 1.04
Uttar Pradesh 13,617 0.85 1.05 0.95 16,934 1.05 1.17 0.98 343 1.01 0.98 0.98
Uttarakhand 14,370 0.72 1.48 0.85 18,439 0.98 1.12 1.00 200 1.00 1.57 1.14
West Bengal 11,303 0.74 1.32 0.95 17,060 0.99 0.95 1.01 338 0.99 0.90 1.03
All-India 16,642 0.79 1.19 0.94 19,846 0.98 1.07 1.00 352 0.99 1.09 0.99
Time period 1: July 2019–March 2020; time period 2: April–June 2020; time period 3: July 2020–March 2021; time period 4: April–June 2021. Change in the average earning during the
current time period is derived as the ratio of the average earning in the current period to the average earning in the previous time period.
Source: Authors’ estimation.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOber 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 41

PERSPECTIVES

the construction sector (18.8%) as against July–September 2019 in the case of preceding period. The main findings at
the overall proportion of 7.4% (P5). self-employed. the state level are the following:
State-level findings in the change in (i) For all the states, the average level of
Quarterly changes in the average the average earnings are summarised in earning during time period 2 is less than
earnings: During April–June 2020 (Q4 Table 5 (p 41). However, for easy compre- the level during time period 1 in respect
based on P1) earnings affected quite se- hension, instead of quarter-wise level of of self-employed, although a mixed pat-
verely in terms of a large proportion of actual earnings, we only present (i) the tern is observed in the case of RWS and
workers becoming unemployed; we also level of average earning during the first casual labour.
see some decline in the average earn- three quarters of analysis (July 2019– (ii) Barring a few states, for each of self-
ings of the self-employment, RWS, and March 2020) obtained as the simple av- employed, RWS, and casual labour the
casual labourer (Table 4, p 41). However, erage of the corresponding three quarterly average level of earning increased dur-
the self-employment appears to have estimates of average earnings (time peri- ing time period 3 as compared to the
been affected the most in terms of mag- od 1), and (ii) changes in the average earn- level during time period 2.
nitude of decline in earnings. A similar ings at three subsequent time periods, (iii) Over time period 3, change in the
trend is also noticed based on P5. Fur- namely April–June 2020 (time period 2); average level of earning during time pe-
ther, in nominal terms, even the level of July 2020–March 2021 (time period 3); riod 4 shows a mixed pattern.
average earning during April–June 2021 and April–June 2021 (time period 4) as
is found to be lower than the level during compared to the average level in the Change in the weekly number of
Table 6: Changes in the Average Number of Hours Worked per Week for All India hours worked: In comparison with the
Status of Employ- Quarter-wise Changes in the Average Number of Hours Worked per Week (Seven Days)* previous three quarters, the average num-
ment of the Worker P1 P5 ber of hours worked per week also de-
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
(July– (October– (January– (April– (July– (October– (Janu- (April–
clined sharply during the April–June 2020
September December March June 2020) September December ary–March June 2021) quarter across the status of employment
2019) 2019) 2020) 2020) 2020) 2021)
of the workers. However, the magnitude
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Self-employed 53 53 56 29 49 52 51 41
of decline was the sharpest (almost 50%)
RWS 53 53 59 31 50 51 51 44 for the self-employed and RWS at the all-
Casual labour 46 47 45 40 45 45 44 39 India level (Table 6). A somewhat simi-
* Obtained by taking into consideration those workers whose status of employment as either self-employed, RWS or casual lar pattern is also noticed at the state
labour remained the same in all the four quarters.
Source: Authors’ estimation. level (Table 7). The number of hours
Table 7: Statewise Quarterly Changes in the Average Number of Hours Worked per Week during July 2019–June 2020
State Changes in the Average Number of Hours Worked Per Week (P1)
Self-employed RWS Casual Labour
July– October– January– April–June July– October– January– April–June July– October– January– April–June
September December March 2020 2020 September December March 2020 2020 September December March 2020 2020
2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Andhra Pradesh 50 52 57 28 52 51 59 31 40 41 40 40
Assam 49 50 50 25 54 54 54 30 52 52 52 42
Bihar 56 54 51 45 56 56 56 49 55 54 49 49
Chhattisghar 48 46 48 34 52 52 58 33 47 43 48 38
Delhi 59 58 63 44 54 54 63 36 – – – –
Gujarat 55 57 58 35 57 57 61 35 60 61 60 57
Haryana 56 55 55 37 55 54 57 45 61 57 53 50
Jammu and Kashmir 49 47 54 28 49 46 55 35 39 30 38 42
Jharkhand 50 50 52 36 51 53 56 30 51 53 53 48
Karnataka 53 54 55 27 50 51 57 35 53 54 52 47
Kerala 43 46 53 23 46 47 57 26 32 32 30 26
Madhya Pradesh 49 51 57 22 49 48 57 21 48 47 42 40
Maharashtra 53 55 58 24 55 54 62 31 47 51 45 39
Manipur 53 53 53 43 53 51 54 45 57 55 56 54
Mizoram 52 53 61 46 43 45 57 28 48 47 52 40
Odisha 52 51 51 28 50 50 53 35 42 46 49 42
Punjab 56 55 58 30 53 54 59 35 53 59 59 37
Rajasthan 57 59 58 31 58 58 61 31 45 58 54 51
Tamil Nadu 49 50 55 27 49 48 58 25 39 37 37 33
Telangana 52 52 56 43 53 54 60 51 48 48 46 36
Uttar Prasdesh 55 55 56 25 55 56 58 24 53 54 52 44
Uttarakhand 55 59 59 22 54 50 56 31 42 42 42 56
West Bengal 50 52 53 24 53 53 56 25 46 46 49 35
India 53 53 56 29 53 53 59 31 46 47 45 40
Source: Authors’ estimation.

42 OCTOber 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly


Statement 3: Long-term Unemployment Situation among the Persons for All India
Panel Introduced as a First Visit in the
Quarter
P2 October–December 2019
P3 January–March 2020
P4 April–Junuary 2020
W indicates the persons were workers during the quarter and the percentage figures denote the percentage that remained
unemployed till the quarter under reference among those who were workers earlier.
Source: Authors’ estimation.
worked jumped significantly in the fol-
lowing quarter showed some sign of nor-
malcy of work during the period, which
continued till January–March 2021 and
again declined during April–June 2021.
Incidence of relatively long-term un-
employment: We also derive the inci-
dence of relatively long-term unemploy-
ment up to nine months extending be-
yond the most affected quarter of April–
June 2020 based on panels P2, P3, and
P4 and Statement 3 summarises the
broad findings at the all-India level. It
may be seen that among those who were
employed during January–March 2020
(and also during the previous quarter),
nearly 20% became unemployed during
the most affected quarter of April–June
2020. The extent of unemployment till
the next quarter, that is, July–Septem-
ber 2020 was of the order of about 8%
to 9% and the extent of unemployment
up to nine months till the quarter end-
ing December 2020 came down to about
6%. Quite importantly, among those
who were workers during April–June
2020, hardly a few, not exceeding 3%,
became unemployed in the succeeding
three quarters.
Concluding Observations
Based on the analysis of panel data, where
the same households and persons have
been surveyed in four consecutive quar-
ters, we find that out of all the persons in
the age group of 15 years and above, who
were workers in the preceding three
quarters, nearly 19% became unem-
ployed during the quarter April–June
2020 at the all-India level. The corre-
sponding percentage is about 7.4% dur-
ing April–June 2021. In absolute terms,
the number of such workers becoming
unemployed works out to be about 28
million and 11 million, respectively, dur-
ing the two quarters. The incidence of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW
PERSPECTIVES
lower sample size, may be subject to sig-
Employment–Unemployment Situation during the Quarters nificant sampling errors.
October– January– April– July– October– January–
December March 2020 Junuary 2020 September December March 2021
2019 2020 2020 Notes
W W 18.6% 7.5% – – 1 For further details, see sample design and esti-
– W 20.5% 9.4% 6.3% – mation procedure in the annual report of PLFS.
– – W 3.1% 1.9% 1.4% 2 We derive this number as [(estimated number
of workers in the age-group of 15+ during the
first quarter of the panel P1 or P5 as the case
may be) x (proportion continued as workers in
the next two quarters) x (proportion became
such unemployment was found to be the unemployed in the quarter April–June among
those who were workers during the previous
highest among the casual labourers dur- three quarters) x (correction factor for adjust-
ing both the periods (56% and 27%, re- ment of underestimation of population in the
PLFS)], where the correction factor is obtained
spectively). It was also highest among
as: (projected population as on 15 August 2020
those who worked in the construction or 2021, as relevant, corresponding to the mid-
sector (43% and 19% during the respec- point of the survey period with this mid-point
figure is taken as the simple average of the pro-
tive periods). Further, during both the jected populations as on 1 July and on 1 Octo-
quarters under reference, the average ber 2020 or 2021) divided by (estimated popu-
lation for all ages combined as per the data
earnings of the workers declined, with used). The projected population figures are
the self-employed workers found to have taken from the Report of the Technical Group
on Population Projections, July 2020, National
been affected the most in this regard. Commission on Population, Ministry of Health
We also find a significant decline in the and Family Welfare.
average number of hours worked per
week particularly during the quarter References
ending June 2020. In the case of self- Manna, G C (2022): “On the Adequacy of the Quar-
employed and RWS workers, their aver- terly Periodic Labour Force Survey: What
Do the Latest Estimates Reveal?” Economic &
age duration of work per week declined Political Weekly, Vol 57, No 17, pp 13–17.
by as high as 50% during this quarter National Statistical Office: Quarterly Bulletins, Pe-
riodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), July–Sep-
when compared with their duration of tember 2019, October–December 2019, Janu-
work in the preceding quarter. Although ary–March 2020, April–June 2020 and July–
all-India estimates are likely to be quite September 2020.
— Annual Reports, Periodic Labour Force Survey
robust, the statewise estimates, par- (PLFS); July 2019–June 2020 and July 2020–
ticularly for the states with relatively June 2021.
EPWRF India Time Series
Expansion of Banking Statistics Module
(State-wise Data)
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state-wise data to the existing Banking Statistics module of its online India Time
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also presented by bank group and by population group (rural, semi-urban, urban
and metropolitan).
The data series are available from December 1972; half-yearly basis till June 1989
and annual basis thereafter. These data have been sourced from the Reserve Bank
of India’s publication, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in
India.
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a range of macroeconomic and financial data on the Indian economy. For more
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OCTOber 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 43
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Does a Man’s Hardship Matter More Than
a Woman’s?
Reasons for Justifying Domestic Violence
Pritha Dev, Akshaya Vijayalakshmi, Jeemol Unni
COVID-19 led to increased economic distress, which is
usually associated with an increased justification of
domestic violence. Through causal methods of survey
experiments, the reasons for justification of domestic
violence are evaluated. The hypotheses are tested using
a survey experiment set in Ahmedabad, Gujarat with
500 participants (men and women) around the time of
the first wave of the pandemic. The results show that
hardships from the COVID-19-related lockdown were
associated with increased support for domestic violence
across genders. We also find that women justified
domestic violence more than men.
Pritha Dev (pritha@iima.ac.in) teaches economics at and
Akshaya Vijayalakshmi (akshayav@iima.ac.in) teaches marketing at the
Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad. Jeemol Unni (jeemol@
gmail.com) teaches economics at the Amrut Mody School of
Management, Ahmedabad University, Ahmedabad.
60
S
ocial acceptance of violence against women is an essential
driver of actual violence incidents (Biswas et al 2017;
Yount et al 2012; Koenig et al 2003; Cools and Kotsadam
2017). This paper investigates the attitudes towards domestic
violence and the causal impact of economic hardships on such
attitudes. The lockdown in India led to severe hardships for the
working classes with loss of regular earnings, food scarcity, and
widespread fear of COVID-19, impacting a large percentage of
the population. For this paper, data is collected by surveying
close to 500 participants from Ahmedabad, Gujarat, via a survey
experiment to understand the hardships the participants faced
during the lockdown and their attitudes towards domestic vi-
olence. The participants were randomly divided into one of the
three conditions, which highlighted either (i) the economic
difficulties men faced during the lockdown, (ii) the economic
hardships women faced during the lockdown, or (iii) a control
situation. The participants were first questioned about their
current economic conditions and stress caused by the lockdown;
next, they were given the treatment/control followed directly
by questions related to their domestic violence attitudes. The
paper focuses on the actual economic and psychological diffi-
culties the respondents faced during COVID-19 and under-
stands its influence on attitudes towards domestic violence.
The National Family Health Survey (NFHS) (2015–16) in India
has found that women justified domestic violence more than men.
Women’s justification of domestic violence is dependent on
how a scenario leading to violence is presented. For instance,
domestic violence is considered acceptable when there is wilful
transgression of norms by the woman (Yount et al 2013; Tsai et al
2017; Reitmann et al 2020). Moreover, men and women’s atti-
tudes are impacted differently by incoming information. That
is, men rather than women are more accepting of statistical
information on the prevalence of domestic violence (Reitmann
et al 2020). However, no one has tested how perceptions of
economic hardships can affect the justification of domestic
violence. COVID-19 in its wake created not just health but also a
financial crisis. This scenario is used to understand if the percep-
tion of economic hardship due to COVID-19 influences the justifi-
cation of domestic violence. Thus, the paper makes a theoretical
contribution with regard to understanding how macroeconomic
shocks affect attitudes towards domestic violence.
The findings from the survey experiment suggest that women
are more likely to justify domestic violence. Their support for
october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

domestic violence increases significantly when they are treated
with the prime that makes the economic hardship faced by men
more salient. Further, COVID-19-related hardships had a sig-
nificant effect of increasing domestic violence’s acceptability.
Together, the results suggest that adverse economic and social
conditions as caused by the pandemic or a macroeconomic
shock are related to greater acceptance of domestic violence.
This is particularly true for women respondents.
The research suggests that economic distress does have a
critical bearing on husbands acting violently against their
wives. The other contribution of this paper is that it showcases
the effect of the fear of COVID-19 and economic loss simultane-
ously on domestic violence justification.
Literature Review
Survey experiments and justification of domestic violence:
A critical factor that may work against the reduction of domestic
violence is when women justify the violence against them
(Jungari and Chinchore 2020). In the last few years, several
studies have pointed out that framing a question or a state-
ment in a specific way impacts people’s responses. Researchers
(Reitmann et al 2020; Tsai et al 2017; Masoud et al 2016; Yount
et al 2013) have shown that sentences framed in a manner fa-
vourable/unfavourable to women are likely to impact gender
attitudes and even responses to domestic violence. Essentially,
all these survey experiments suggest that framing can affect
attitudes, even if the attitude is just temporary. However, such
temporal shifts may, over time, help in changing attitudes
such as those towards domestic violence.
Women who bear the brunt of violence are likely to accept
violence when they believe domestic violence is normative
(Tsai et al 2017). Yount et al (2013) find that women were more
likely to justify domestic violence under scenarios of wilful
(versus unintended) transgressions. Another study set in
Bangladesh found that women from low-income and illiterate
households were more accepting of domestic violence (Biswas
et al 2017). Marrying young also contributed to the acceptance
of domestic violence (Biswas et al 2017). A study in Pakistan
(Akram 2021) found that educated and aware women with
better financial positions were less likely to accept domestic
violence. India’s falling female labour force participation,
especially after marriage, is a similar indicator of patriarchal
norms’ stronghold. Therefore, it is expected that specific economic
hardship-related framing will influence the justification of
domestic violence.
COVID-19-related economic distress: On 23 March 2020, the
Indian government announced that a 21-day complete nation-
wide lockdown would be implemented. At that time, the
official number of COVID-19-positive cases was around 500.
Public and private transportation facilities were shut entirely,
restricting mobility for the citizens. The lockdown was ex-
tended a few more times until June, with restrictions slowly
easing, starting at the end of April. However, even in June,
educational institutions, theatres, gymnasiums, etc, continued
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40
SPECIAL ARTICLE
to remain closed. Public transportation was not fully opera-
tional. In many states in India, curfew orders continued to be
implemented, restricting movement.
Nearly 122 million Indians lost their jobs in April 2020, with
75% being small traders and wage labourers (Hindu Data
Team 2020). Similarly, many small and medium businesses or
self-employed businesses had to wind up (Magazine 2020).
Another study pegged income lost by the vulnerable population
to be close to 2% of India’s annual gross domestic product
(Thomas 2020). Not only did people lose their jobs in April, but a
significant portion of the workers did not get paid for the work
they had done in March (Thomas 2020). In fact, the government
retracted its order, which had mandated businesses to pay for
the work completed in March (Week Web Desk 2020). During the
COVID-19 pandemic, an all-India survey in April 2020 revealed
that men lost jobs more than women during that period
(Deshpande 2020). Moreover, employed women were earning
less once the restrictions started easing (Agarwal 2021). Women’s
loss of wages/employment affected the family resources,
trapped the women in the abusive household, and made them
financially dependent on her spouse (Renzetti and Larkin 2009).
Loss of livelihood to men and reduced incomes for women
resulted in increasing cases of food insecurity, indebtedness,
and loss of assets (Agarwal 2021), exacerbating the risk of vio-
lence. Loss of income also meant losing other benefits such as
health insurance, provident fund support, daily transport, or
food benefits (Bright et al 2020).
Pandemics, epidemics, and natural disasters are suggested
to disproportionately impact women, and COVID-19 appears to
be no different (Bright et al 2020). Previous studies point out
that loss of livelihood resulting in scarce resources and deple-
tion of savings and assets is suggested to increase the gender
inequality gap (Agarwal 2021). The top-most and most likely
reason (in 60% of the cases) for domestic violence was financial
constraint (Pattojoshi et al 2020). Schneider et al (2016) found
that unemployment during the great recession increased men’s
abusive behaviour towards their wives. Further, low socio-
economic status families are suggested to be more vulnerable
to domestic violence (Bright et al 2020). Similarly, domestic
violence instances tend to drop when the family’s economic
status improves (Renzetti and Larkin 2009).
Income loss, economic pressure, and an unstable job creat-
ing conditions of economic strain could lead to increased hos-
tility towards the partner and reduced feelings of warmth
(Conger et al 1990). The researchers (Gebrewahd et al 2020)
found that women under 40, uneducated, unemployed, and in
an arranged marriage, were more likely to experience intimate
partner violence during the COVID-19-related lockdown. Further,
men in the age range of 31–40 were more likely to be violent.
Conceptual Framework
In this study, the attempt was to understand if the difficult
economic circumstances created by the COVID-19 lockdown
lead to increased justification for domestic violence. This is
done while controlling for various economic and psychological
reasons significantly impacting domestic violence attitudes.
61
SPECIAL ARTICLE
The conceptual model is inspired by Conger et al’s (1990, 1992)
family model for economic hardship and Young et al’s (2013)
study on justifying domestic violence. Conger et al (1990, 1992),
in their papers, suggest that economic pressure resulting from
unstable employment, debts, loss of personal or family income can
lead to depressed mood experienced by the couple, resulting in
marital conflict. The authors (Conger et al 1990) find that eco-
nomic hardships mainly affect men negatively since their role as
a provider is under threat. This then affects the quality of family,
especially marital relations. Notably, a man’s loss of employ-
ment or wages relative to his woman’s (that is, comparative loss
of resources) is also a predictor of domestic violence (Fox et al
2002). Consequently, it is expected that women may justify
domestic violence if they believe their husbands are experi-
encing stress because of the economic circumstances. However,
they may justify violence less if they think they are suffering from
COVID-19 hardships. And like previous studies, it is expected
that women, more than men, justify domestic violence.
Materials and Methods
Study design and setting: This study considers the impact of
the COVID-19 lockdown in Ahmedabad (Gujarat) and the result-
ing hardships faced by informal workers on the attitudes towards
domestic violence. Additionally, the effect on their employ-
ment and income status, access to basic food and healthcare
facilities, fear or stress of COVID-19 are considered as variables
impacting the attitudes towards domestic violence. A local
non-governmental organisation (NGO) helped us with the data
collection process. This NGO worked with the local community to
help them with issues related to housing, unemployment, and so
on. The thematic questions on the fear of COVID-19 and sensitive
domestic violence topics were developed through a collaborative
discussion process between the authors and the research team
led by the collaborating NGO. Based on all partners’ feedback,
the questions were modified and finalised. The questions related
to attitudes towards domestic violence were taken from the
NFHS. A pilot survey was conducted, which led to some minor
adjustments to the questionnaire. The local Institutional Review
Board approved the questionnaire. Further, participants’ consent
was sought before continuing with the survey.
Sampling and questionnaire: About 500 participants, main-
ly from working families, were surveyed. All the respondents
were working before the lockdown, many of whom suddenly
found themselves unable to work during the period of lock-
down and immediately after. The survey records the financial
hardships endured and the impact that COVID-19 had on their
employment. They were asked some basic questions about their
background and work, household situation, salary status, ration,
and how they managed as a family during the lockdown.
The final questionnaire had the following structure: a first
introductory section in which the interviewee was asked about
individual characteristics (gender, location of the residence).
In the section section, the respondents were asked about the
household’s work and income during the lockdown period. In
62
the third section, the respondents were asked about the food
availability (ration) and the benefits they received from different
sources in the form of cash, cooked meals, etc. In the fourth
section, the respondents were asked about their stress, their
household and their attitude towards COVID-19 and domestic
violence. At the end, a few open-ended questions were asked
about any additional information that the respondents would
want to provide. The final version of the questionnaire was
translated into Hindi and Gujarati languages.
Data collection: Our methodology involved randomisation
between subjects. The subjects themselves were not randomly
selected, though care was paid to get as varied a sample as pos-
sible. The NGO offices in Juhapura and Amraiwadi neighbour-
hoods of Ahmedabad served as the base. Given the ongoing
pandemic at that time and the government-imposed sanctions
on movement, interviews were conducted over the phone. The
interviews were done in June–July 2020, right at the end of
the first strict lockdown. The partner NGO contacted community
leaders from different parts of Ahmedabad that they worked
with and interviewed community members based on a sample
list received from the community leaders.
Since we were using a survey experiment, we randomly
allocated participants to the three conditions, thus reducing
validity concerns. Further, we aimed to have at least 150 partici-
pants per condition to meet statistical requirements (Table 1).
Due to the travel restrictions, Table 1: Treatments and Gender of
interviews were predominantly Participants
conducted over the phone and Treatment Male Female Total
recorded, checked and analysed Treat_Man 58 101 159
by the research team. The inter- Treat_Woman 74 96 170
views lasted between 30 and 45 Treat_Cont 73 98 171
Total 205 295 500
minutes. Back checks were
randomly undertaken to ensure the data was of good quality,
and then the responses were cross-checked with the original
data. Out of the 519 interviews completed, 19 were proble-
matic and had to be dropped. The final sample consisted of
500 respondents.
Questionnaire
Attitudes towards domestic violence and treatment: The
survey’s primary purpose was to understand the attitudes towards
domestic violence during the COVID-19-induced lockdown and
how the attitudes varied as the interviewer primed the respondent
with economic hardships faced by the man versus the woman.
There was also a third control situation. The respondents were
randomly assigned to one of three treatments. In the first treat-
ment (Treat_Man), respondents were primed with the following
statement, “In recent times because of lockdown, men have a lot
of stress or tension. Some men have lost their jobs, and some
do not have ration because of which they have a lot of stress/
tension.” In the second treatment (Treat_Woman), respondents
were primed with the following statement, “In recent times
because of lockdown, women have a lot of stress or tension.
Some women have lost their jobs, and some do not have
october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

ration because of which they have a lot of stress/tension.” In
the third treatment (Treat_Cont), there was no statement on
hardship. Table 1 shows the sample for each treatment overall
and by gender of the respondent.
Each of these conditions was followed by this statement,
“Now we will ask you some questions regarding the behaviour
of a man. In today’s period of lockdown, is it okay for a man to
beat his woman if.” The seven situations where violence is ac-
ceptable or not is as follows—if she goes out without telling
him, neglects the children, argues with him, does not cook
food properly, suspects her of being unfaithful, shows disre-
spect towards in-laws, and refuses to have sex with him. In
Table 2, summary statistics for the justification of domestic vi-
olence variables are provided. Note that the alpha for these
seven variables was .8123. The sum of these seven variables
was used to construct the variable “total.”
COVID-19 stress variables: The information about the individual
and the household in general as well as specifically related to
the lockdown was collected. Next, information on the fear of
COVID-19 was gathered by aggregating responses from three
different questions answered on the same five-point scale.
The questions were:
(i) Are you afraid of COVID-19?
(ii) Are you afraid that you or your family member will catch
COVID-19?
(iii) Are you afraid of going close to others for the fear that you
will catch COVID-19?
Table 2: Domestic Violence Variable Description and Summary Statistics
Variable Definition N Mean (Std Dev)
Goesout “Is it okay for a man to beat her woman if she 475
goes out without telling him?” Yes = 1, No= 0
Neglect “Is it okay for a man to beat her woman if she 478
neglects the children?” Yes = 1, No= 0
Argue “Is it okay for a man to beat her woman if she 476
argues with him?” Yes = 1, No= 0
Cookfood “Is it okay for a man to beat her woman if she 476
doesn’t cook food properly?” Yes = 1, No= 0
Unfaithful “Is it okay for a man to beat her woman if he 462
suspects her of being unfaithful?”Yes = 1, No = 0
In-laws “Is it okay for a man to beat her woman if she 467
shows disrespect for in-laws?” Yes = 1, No= 0
Sex “Is it okay for a man to beat her woman if 412
refuses to have sex with him?” Yes = 1, No= 0
Total This variable sums up all the previous variables 500
and varies between 0 and 7.
Table 3: COVID-19 Stress Variables
Variable Definition
Corofear Average of three variables capturing the fear of
COVID-19 with value ranging from 1 to 5 with
increasing values associated with higher fear.
Eating less Indicator variable taking value 1 if anyone in the
respondent’s household had to eat less during
lockdown and 0 otherwise.
Ration insuff Indicator variable taking value 1 if the
respondent’s household did not have enough
ration during lockdown and 0 otherwise.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40
SPECIAL ARTICLE
The answers were such that one indicated “Not at All”
and five indicated “Very Much.” The average of these three
responses were taken to construct the variable Corofear
(α = 0.8444). Two other vital variables capturing financial
distress during the lockdown include food sufficiency, which
was measured via an indicator checking if some respondent’s
household member had to eat less and another variable cap-
turing if the respondent’s household had enough dry rations
(Table 3).
Control Variables
Certain demographic factors that are likely to influence
domestic violence are men and women’s low educational
status (Jungari and Chichore 2020). In fact, a more educated
woman is less likely to justify violence against her (Jungari
and Chichore 2020). Further, women from lower economic
backgrounds or lower castes are likely to experience more
violence because of structural limitations, reducing their access
to help and support (Sharma and Borah 2020; Jungari and
Chichore 2020). Based on prior research, the authors Sharma
and Borah (2020) hypothesise that domestic violence may be
particularly high in poorer households as they are likely to be
more severely affected by the loss of livelihood. Higher educa-
tional levels and caste are suggested to be inversely related to
domestic violence (Koenig et al 2003).
Household size is also critical as it may explain how badly a
household is affected by the loss of livelihood (Fox et al 2002).
One suggested reason is the lack of sufficient space in homes
since lockdown forced everyone to stay indoors (Aguero 2020).
The long duration of stay at home without any intent may have
0.143158 resulted in various stresses, including those related to household
(0.3506) work, parenting, media viewing, etc (Gebrewahd et al 2020).
0.292887 The accumulation of stresses furthers the scope of violence.
(0.455564) High-stress levels are suggested to increase domestic violence
0.191177 by 3.5 times (Sharma and Borah 2020).
(0.393641) Therefore, the above control variables and other variables
0.170168 related to stress during the lockdown were collected. It includes
(0.376176) socio-economic variables such as age, number of years of educa-
0.246753 tion, employment type, caste, household income, number of
(0.431589) household members, religion, loss of income during the lock-
0.35546
down period, individual’s contribution to the household in-
(0.479166)
come, and housing information. Stress-related variables were
0.184466
help received from different quarters, perceived stress, informa-
(0.388335)
tion from the government, whether the participant witnessed
1.472
any fights and any mortgage payment details.
(1.899588)
Model
The dependent variables capturing attitudes were binary, and
Mean (Std Dev)
hence a logistic regression model was used. The dependent
3.396
variable was one of the questions related to woman-beating atti-
(1.1745) tudes, which were coded as 0 and 1. The baseline model was:
0.6575
‡ିሺ୶ஒሻ
(0.4751) ”ሺ›୧ ൌ ͳȁšሻ ൌ 
ͳ ൅ ‡ିሺ୶ஒሻ
0.4200
xβ = β0 + β1 * TreatMan + β2 TreatWoman + β4 Female * TreatMan
(0.4940)
+ β5 Female * TreatWoman + β6 Female * TreatControl
63
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 1: Attitudes by Treatment and Gender
Wife Goes Out without Telling Wife Neglects the Children
0.21 0.39
.2 .4
0.34
0.17 0.33

Percent of respondents who agree

Percent of respondents who agree

.15 0.14 .3
0.24
0.12 0.21
0.09 0.10 .2
.1
0.15

.05 .1

0 0
Man Woman Control Man Woman Control Man Woman Control Man Woman Control
male female male female
Wife Argues with Him Wife Does Not Cook Food Properly
.3 0.29 0.22
0.19
Percent of respondents who agree

Percent of respondents who agree

.2
0.17 0.17
0.22
.2 .15
0.16 0.18 0.13
0.14 0.11
.1
.1 0.09
.05

0 0
Man Woman Control Man Woman Control Man Woman Control Man Woman Control
male female male female
He Suspects She Is Unfaithful Wife Refuses to Have Sex
0.31 .25
.3 0.23 0.22
Percent of respondents who agree
Percent of respondents who agree

0.25 0.25 .2 0.20

0.24
0.20 0.20 0.14
.2 0.14
.15 0.13

.1
.1
.05

0 0
Man Woman Control Man Woman Control Man Woman Control Man Woman Control
male female male female
Total Instances of Agreement
justification of domestic violence varied for female respondents
1.89 by treatment. For instance, the coefficient ꞵ1 captures if all
2
respondents who were in the TreatMan had different levels of
1.64
justification of domestic violence as compared to the TreatControl.
Average number of Instances

1.52
1.5 On the other hand, the coefficient ꞵ4 captures if all female
1.27
respondents who were in the TreatMan had different levels of
1.05 1.08
1 justification of domestic violence as compared to the TreatControl.
Note that the excluded group is male respondents in the
TreatControl. The inclusion of the interaction coefficients ꞵ4, ꞵ5, ꞵ6
.5 allows us to capture the differential impact of the treatments
by gender. Even if the treatments have no impact on male re-
spondents, the interaction terms and their coefficients allow
0
Man Woman Control Man Woman Control us to capture if female respondents reacted differently under
male female
different treatments. An expanded version of the baseline
The baseline model captured how attitudes varied with the model with COVID-19-related economic stress variables and all
treatment, and it also allowed the impact to vary by gender. other controls was analysed. Simple linear regressions with
Coefficients ꞵ1, ꞵ2 capture the effect of the treatment type. The the same specifications as above in terms of controls but which
next set of coefficients ꞵ4, ꞵ5, ꞵ6 captured how the levels of used the combined variable total were also conducted.
64 october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

Figure 2: Attitudes and Ration Insufficiency Figure 3: Attitudes and Fear of COVID-19
.4

Proportion of Respondents Who Agree

0.43 0.37
Proportion of Respondents Who Agree

.4
0.33
0.33 0.31
.3
0.30 0.30 0.27
.3 0.25
0.26 0.24
0.24 0.22
0.18 0.20
0.21 .2
0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17
.2 0.15
0.15
0.17 0.14 0.15 0.14
0.11 .1
.1

0 0
0 1 Low corofear (<=3) High corofear (>3)
Goesout Neglect Argue
Goesout Neglect Argue
Cookfood Unfaithful In-laws
Inlaws In-laws
Cookfood Unfaithful Inlaws
Sex Sex

Results related to Corofear were measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with five

indicating high levels of fear. To graphically represent the rela-
Model-free results: First, a graphical representation of the tionship, the composite Corofear variable is divided into two re-
data is presented. Figure 1 (p 64) shows how responses to each gions, with the cut-off value being three. Only 37% of the re-
question on attitudes towards domestic violence varied with spondents had Corofear which was low, classified as the varia-
treatment and gender. The bars represent the proportion of ble taking values below the cut-off of three, while 63% had
respondents in that subgroup who agreed that domestic violence high fear of COVID-19. The graph in Figure 3 shows that the at-
was justified. Two critical observations can be made from the titudes are more supportive of domestic violence for those
graphs. One, females (versus males) are more likely to justify with high levels of fear.
domestic violence. This trend of women supporting domestic
violence more than men is also seen in previous studies from Model Results
the subcontinent (Yount et al 2013). Two, there is a marked Next, it was tested to see (i) if the respondent’s attitudes towards
difference in how men and women respond to the different domestic violence changed with the beliefs about who experi-
treatments. Women, in particular, are more likely to justify enced hardships; and (ii) how the attitudes were impacted by
domestic violence when they feel that there is stress for the the ongoing crisis. Table 4 presents the results of the baseline
man versus stress faced by the woman. On the other hand, in regression where only the treatment conditions and interac-
general, men are less likely to support domestic violence in tions with gender are regressed on attitudes towards domes-
either of the treatment conditions versus the control. tic violence. From the Table 4 results, it can be seen that,
Next, how the attitudes towards domestic violence vary with while the treatments themselves do not have a significant ef-
other explanatory variables related to stress caused by the fect, the treatment variables that interacted with the gender
COVID-19-induced lockdown is explored. Figure 2 shows how of the respondent does have a significant effect on the justifi-
ration insufficiency (= 1) affected attitudes towards domestic cation of domestic violence. The insignificant coefficient on
violence. The pandemic-induced lockdown caused people to the treatment dummies indicates that while considering both
lose jobs. Food supply chains were also severely disrupted. These men and women together, the treatments did not have an
two together led to many families facing food insufficiency to impact on the justification of domestic violence. On the other
the extent that they faced shortages of dry Table 4: Logistic Regressions Results with Treatment and Gender
rations in this period. In this sample, 42% of Goesout Neglect Argue Cookfood Unfaithful In-laws Sex
the respondents had to cope with insufficient Treat_Man -0.580 -0.298 -0.693 -0.413 -0.192 -0.266 -0.0465
ration during the lockdown. The graph in (0.581) (0.436) (0.574) (0.544) (0.421) (0.407) (0.558)
Figure 2 shows how the attitudes of those Treat_Woman -0.490 -0.688 -0.199 -0.285 -0.425 -0.0426 -0.0364
with sufficient ration (0) varied from those (0.526) (0.427) (0.475) (0.485) (0.415) (0.371) (0.524)
with inadequate ration (1). There is a clear Female×Treat_Man 0.693 0.873** 1.409*** 0.785 0.378 0.879** 0.640
trend where those with insufficient ration (0.543) (0.398) (0.522) (0.499) (0.391) (0.373) (0.484)
were more likely to support domestic vio- Female×Treat_Woman 0.180 1.020*** 0.285 0.372 0.307 0.134 0.567
(0.511) (0.394) (0.434) (0.450) (0.392) (0.342) (0.452)
lence across all individual questions.
0.377 0.396 0.336 0.179 -0.379 0.379 0.390
Finally, in Figure 3, it is examined if the Female×Treat_Cont
(0.429) (0.350) (0.412) (0.421) (0.378) (0.340) (0.473)
fear of COVID-19 correlated with domestic
Constant -1.723*** -1.041*** -1.609*** -1.645*** -0.981*** -0.784*** -1.792***
violence attitudes. As described earlier, the
(0.343) (0.274) (0.330) (0.329) (0.276) (0.263) (0.382)
variable Corofear captures the respondent’s 475 478 476 476 462 467 412
Obs
fear of COVID-19 and is calculated as the
R-sq 0.0165 0.0276 0.0250 0.00947 0.00783 0.0143 0.0111
mean of three questions eliciting responses Standard errors in parentheses.
related to COVID-19 fear. All the questions *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40 65
SPECIAL ARTICLE

hand, the significant coefficient of the interaction of gender of Argue (β = 0.552; p < 0.05) and In-laws (β = 0.517; p < 0.05).
the respondent with the treatment dummies indicates that it The results also suggest that the fear of COVID-19 is positively
was only the women respondents whose justification for do- correlated with domestic violence attitudes. For the dependent
mestic violence changed with treatment type. In fact, we find variable Neglect, the impact of COVID-19 fear can be seen.
that female respondents in the treatment with male stress are When the respondent exhibits medium or high levels of
more likely to justify domestic violence. The interaction of COVID-19 fear, they are more likely to support domestic
Female respondent and Treat_Man had a positive and signifi- violence in the case of neglect by wife. This result indicates
cant effect in three of the seven logistic regressions—Neglect that greater fear of COVID-19 leads to a higher propensity to
(β = .873; p < 0.05), Argue (β = 1.409; p < 0.01) and In-laws condone domestic violence.
(β = .879; p < 0.05). The positive coef- Table 5: Logistic Regressions Results with Treatment and Gender
ficient on this interaction reflects that Variables Goesout Neglect Argue Cookfood Unfaithful In-laws Sex
female respondents in Treat_Man (man Treat_Man -0.590 -0.0240 -0.541 -0.588 -0.169 -0.336 0.0566
(0.635) (0.501) (0.649) (0.596) (0.474) (0.457) (0.635)
stress condition) are more likely to show
Treat_Woman -0.269 -0.184 0.348 -0.179 -0.309 0.257 0.306
attitudes justifying domestic violence. In (0.588) (0.485) (0.560) (0.544) (0.479) (0.421) (0.605)
other words, women exposed to the idea Female×Treat_Man 0.334 0.809* 1.483** 0.518 0.377 1.128*** 0.331
of a man suffering due to the COVID-19- (0.609) (0.445) (0.581) (0.562) (0.431) (0.422) (0.543)
induced lockdown were more likely to Female×Treat_Woman -0.118 0.747* 0.205 0.0172 0.363 0.111 0.325
support domestic violence than other (0.575) (0.432) (0.482) (0.516) (0.439) (0.381) (0.501)

respondents. It is also important to notice Female×Treat_Cont 0.215 0.635 0.623 0.0306 -0.354 0.517 0.270
(0.513) (0.416) (0.509) (0.477) (0.438) (0.388) (0.567)
how the coefficients of interactions of Corofear_Med 0.354 1.245*** -0.350 0.119 -0.133 -0.102 0.121
females with different treatments are all (0.512) (0.450) (0.421) (0.478) (0.393) (0.367) (0.514)
positive, which is in line with the fact Corofear_High 0.311 1.351*** -0.387 0.734 -0.0235 0.276 0.776
that women are more supportive of do- (0.493) (0.441) (0.403) (0.454) (0.377) (0.352) (0.488)
mestic violence than men. Eating Less 0.577* 0.408 -0.0386 0.418 -0.0999 0.158 0.262
(0.336) (0.262) (0.289) (0.312) (0.263) (0.245) (0.328)
Next, the results of the treatment
Ration insuff 0.723** 0.262 0.552** -0.107 0.379 0.517** 0.00893
and control variables on the dependent (0.307) (0.242) (0.276) (0.294) (0.252) (0.227) (0.308)
variables when all the stress variables Constant -3.707 -4.076* -1.803 -5.303* -2.081 -3.494 -7.462**
are included is presented. Table 5 shows (3.322) (2.355) (2.746) (2.834) (2.477) (2.206) (3.061)
the logistic regressions with all socio- Other socio-demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
demographic controls and highlights the
Observations 443 443 442 439 430 433 384
results for COVID-19 stress-related variables
Log-likelihood -163.9 -238.9 -192.6 -177.8 -223.6 -258.8 -164.1
Eating_less, Ration_Insuff, Corofear_Med Pseudo R2 0.0864 0.0967 0.0978 0.128 0.0460 0.0856 0.0998
and Corofear_High. The main variables Standard errors in parentheses.
capturing the impact of the treatments *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
themselves as well as treatment’s interaction with the gender of Table 6: Linear Regression for Total
the respondent show similar results in terms of sign and sig- Total Total (w controls)
nificance as in Table 4. There is a significant and positive coef- Treat_Man -0.277 -0.224
(0.332) (0.343)
ficient for the interaction of females with Treat_Man for the
Treat_Woman -0.248 0.0594
same dependent variables as in Table 4; Neglect (β = .809; p (0.311) (0.330)
< 0.10), Argue (β = 1.483; p < 0.05) and In-laws (β = 1.128; p < Female×Treat_Man 0.839*** 0.752**
0.001). In other words, even after including other controls, we (0.311) (0.323)
see that female respondents react differently when they are in Female×Treat_Woman 0.440 0.302
(0.292) (0.308)
Treat_Man (the man stress condition). This reiterates the re- Female×Treat_Cont 0.314 0.385
sult from Table 4 that it is the female respondents whose atti- (0.292) (0.307)
tudes change by treatment while male respondents do not Corofear_Med 0.0890
show the impact of the treatments. The inclusion of other (0.291)
Corofear_High 0.407
controls helps to demonstrate that the attitudes towards do- (0.286)
mestic violence are also influenced by COVID-19-specific stress Eating Less 0.215
variables captured by insufficient ration and COVID-19 fear. The (0.198)
respondents who have suffered from the COVID-19-induced Ration insuff 0.346*
(0.186)
lockdown are more likely to support domestic violence. An Constant 1.329*** -1.084
important source of suffering was the unavailability of dry (0.221) (1.768)
ration due to disruptions in the supply and lack of income. Other socio-demographic controls No Yes
The respondents who reported that they did not have enough Observations 500 461
R-squared 0.024 0.112
ration during lockdown (Ration Insuff) are more likely to Standard errors in parentheses.
support domestic violence—Goesout (β = .723; p < 0.05), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
66 october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

In the final regression, all the domestic violence items are
combined into one dependent variable, that is, the total number
of times the respondent said yes to domestic violence out of a
total of seven (Table 6, p 66). It is a simple linear regression
where several previously discussed results are supported. The
first column contains only the treatment dummies and interaction
with whether the respondent was female, whereas the second
column contains all the other socio-demographic controls. As
in the two previous tables, the treatments have an impact on
female respondents only. The coefficients for the treatments
alone are insignificant while the coefficients of treatment in-
teracting with female respondents show a positive and significant
coefficient. In the first column, with no other controls, it can be
seen that women in Treat_Man (β = .839; p < 0.05) are more
supportive of domestic violence, and this result continues to hold
even after introducing other controls (β = 0.752; p < 0.05).
The results additionally suggest the impact of COVID-19-related
financial stress on attitudes. It can be seen that households
with insufficient ration (β = 0.346; p < 0.1) were more likely
to justify domestic violence against women.
Discussion and Conclusions
COVID-19 has wreaked not just a health-based havoc across
nations, but in its wake, it has severely affected the economic
stability of countries and hence its citizens. Globally, individuals
have experienced loss of loved ones, loss of health status, job loss,
or reduced wages. Indians have not just witnessed rising COVID-19
infections but also a record rise in unemployment figures. The
toll of that is not only borne financially and physically but also in
the quality of relationships. Families’ financial status dropped
drastically while helplines received an increased number of calls
reporting and seeking help against domestic violence.
In this study, the focus is on the indirect toll of COVID-19 on
women. The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal
number five aims to eliminate violence against women. Of all
forms of violence, domestic violence is the most prevalent form of
abuse women in developing countries experience (Koenig et al
2003). Domestic violence has several downstream adverse
effects, including affecting a woman’s confidence, workforce
participation, and children’s growth and development (Koenig
et al 2003; Schneider et al 2016).
Loss of livelihood is likely to result in a loss of self-esteem
and increased feelings of insecurity in men. Violence is used as
a compensatory mechanism to regain belief in one’s powers
(Jungari and Chichore 2020). Financial success is heralded by
society as the ultimate demonstration of success for men, and
when chances of the same are reduced, masculine egos tend
to be hurt (Renzetti and Larkin 2009). The loss of control and
security has a significant negative impact on self-esteem and
violence provides an opportunity to reassert some of the
control (Melzer 2002). Further, feelings of anxiety and uncer-
tainty need to be assuaged. This can be achieved by asserting
control in another domain of life, here against the partner
(Schneider et al 2016). Moreover, the husband’s loss of employ-
ment while the wife continues to remain employed increased
her chances of being abused (Schneider et al 2016). Restrictions
of leaving home further reduce the chances of seeking help
(Bouillon–Minois et al 2020).
The findings in this study suggest that women are more likely
to accept these societal norms and justify domestic violence.
Further, women’s support for domestic violence increases signifi-
cantly when the economic hardships faced by men are made
more salient. The results suggest that adverse economic and social
conditions lead to greater acceptance of domestic violence. The
financial stress resulting from the lockdown is experienced dur-
ing other macroeconomic shocks also. Thus, the findings from
this study hold true beyond pandemic conditions as well.
Studies have shown that macroeconomic shocks, such as
demonetisation, negatively impact work participation, parti-
cularly for women (Unni and Dev 2021). Other studies showed
that this was true for the shock of the lockdown due to the
pandemic (Agarwal 2021) and that it led to an increase in do-
mestic violence against women (Deshpande 2020). This study’s
added value is that women are more likely to condone domes-
tic violence than men when primed with economic hardship.
Policy Implications
The results suggest that economic distress does have a critical
bearing on attitudes towards domestic violence. To a large extent,
the economic conditions can be alleviated by timely support
from the government and NGOs. To assuage the problematic
situation, the Indian government made provisions to transfer cash
and access to free ration. Prior research has suggested that cash
transfers to households reduces intimate partner violence
(Buller et al 2018). However, with public transport being shut,
many women found it difficult to access ration shops (Agarwal
2021). Further, not all eligible women received the cash transfer
due to various issues, including inactive bank accounts. There-
fore, policymakers need to also focus on how rations can be
made accessible and not just being made available to people.
The study also finds that educated women are less accepting of
domestic violence. This emphasises the need for increased educa-
tion for girls and women, which may automatically lead them to
be less accepting of domestic violence. In fact, researchers
Renzetti and Larkin (2009) advocate for the need for anti-poverty
advocates and anti-harassment advocates to work together.

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68 october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

SPECIAL ARTICLE
Does Competition Increase Bank Risk in India?
Pradyot Kumar Das
Using a sample of commercial banks in India, we
examine the effect of competition on bank risk and then
assess whether this effect is influenced by equity capital
ratio and deposit share. Two main results emerge. First,
greater competition increases insolvency risk, earnings
volatility, net non-performing loan ratio, and gross
non-performing loan ratio. However, competition does
not affect total return risk, systematic risk, or
unsystematic risk. Second, greater equity capital ratio
reduces the effect of competition on insolvency risk,
while greater deposit share increases it. Thus, policy
changes should focus on enhancing overall financial
stability, and enabling banks to operate with greater
equity capital ratio.
Pradyot Kumar Das (pradyot.das@tcgcrest.org) is a postdoctoral fellow
at the Institute for Advancing Intelligence, TCG Centres for Research
and Education in Science and Technology, Kolkata.
52
P
olicymakers in India often suggest measures to increase
competition in the banking sector. For instance, one of
the major objectives of the banking sector reforms since
1991 is to enhance competition. Some examples of competition-
enhancing measures initiated in the 1990s are granting opera-
tional autonomy to government-owned banks, reducing govern-
ment ownership in government-owned banks by allowing them
to raise equity capital from the market, transparent norms for
entry of domestic private and foreign banks, permission for
foreign investment in the financial sector, or allowing banks
to diversify their product portfolios and business activities
(Mohan 2004). Another major objective of the reforms in India
since 1991 is to enhance financial stability through prudential
norms. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, policymakers
have reoriented their focus on financial stability, with stability
enhancement being at the top of their agenda.
In this context, understanding the effect of competition on
bank risk is important. Commenting on the relation between
competion and bank risk, the Economist (2009) notes that
[t]here is clearly some tension between financial-stability goals and the
tenets of competition … many policymakers seem to think that some
curbs on competition may be a price worth paying to improve stability.
While the research on the effect of competition on bank risk is
an active academic and policy debate, it is theoretically contra-
dictory and has conflicting empirical results (Beck et al 2013).
In this paper, we, therefore, assess the effect of competition on
bank risk in Indian banking. Then we assess whether this
effect is influenced by two key bank characteristics: equity
capital ratio and deposit share.
Theory suggests that there are three perspectives about the
effect of competition on bank risk. First, competition and bank
risk are related in a linear manner. Under the traditional “com-
petition-fragility” view, more competition increases bank risk
(Keeley 1990; Hellmann et al 2000; Jimenez et al 2013; Marsh
and Sengupta 2017; Jiang et al 2018). The explanation is that
more competition may reduce profitability ratio, capital ratio,
or chartered value, which induces banks to take more risks.
Alternatively, the “competition-stability” view implies that
more competition reduces bank risk (Petersen and Rajan 1995;
Boyd and De Nicolo 2005; Zarutskie 2006; Schaeck et al 2009;
Boyd et al 2010; Anginer et al 2014; Akins et al 2016). The
explanation is that less competition may lead to more risk-taking
if the banks are too important to fail or enjoy subsidies from
government safety nets or if the banks charge their borrowers
higher rates (more defaults). Second, competition and bank
risk are related in a non-linear manner (Martinez-Miera and
Repullo 2010; Tabak et al 2012; Liu et al 2013; Brei et al 2020).
october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

One explanation is that more competition may lower loan
rates (fewer defaults) and reduce revenues from performing
loans. Third, competition and bank risk are not related
(Ijtsma et al 2017).
The production of information is important for the business
of banking. A bank’s two information production activities—
screening and monitoring—solve the problem of information
asymmetry in loan markets. As a result, screening and moni-
toring shape the risk profile of a bank. To understand the impact
of competition on bank risk, we find it useful to emphasise the
role of banks as producers of information. Banks’ competitive
environment can influence the role of banks as information
producers. More competition may reduce loan margin and,
therfore, may make screening and monitoring less attractive
(Vo 2010). Hence, greater competition can substitute for costly
screening and monitoring. We, therefore, hypothesise that
greater competition increases bank risk.
Insights and Gaps in Literature
The influence of equity capital ratio or deposit share on the
relation between market power (competition) and insolvency
risk can also be explained by the role of banks as information
producers. Better capitalised banks may internalise some por-
tion of the costs of reduced screening and monitoring. Greater
equity capital ratio can enhance screening and monitoring
effort (Mehran and Thakor 2011; Altunbas et al 2022). This implies
that equity capital ratio can influence the relation between
market power and insolvency risk. If greater competition in-
creases insolvency risk, we would expect that equity capital
ratio mitigates the effect of competition on insolvency risk.
Greater deposit share reduces liquidity risk and “run” risk. As a
result, it can reduce market discipline and may lead to lower lend-
ing standards. Moreover, most of the deposits are insured up
to a certain extent in India. This deposit insurance can create a
moral hazard for excessive risk-taking by banks in response to
a greater inflow of deposit (Keeley 1990). Therefore, greater
deposit share can lower screening and monitoring incentives.
This implies that deposit share can influence the relation between
market power and insolvency risk. If greater competition increases
insolvency risk, we would expect that deposit share exacer-
bates the effect of competition on insolvency risk.
In order to perform an empirical investigation, we use a sample
of 103 commercial banks in India for 1999–2020. Does competi-
tion amplify bank risk? We find that greater competition
increases insolvency risk, earnings volatility, net non-perform-
ing loan ratio, and gross non-performing loan ratio. The differ-
ence in insolvency risk between a monopolist bank and a bank
which is a price taker is 45.920, which is 75.41% of the mean of
a Z-score (an insolvency risk measure) of 60.897. However,
competition does not affect total return risk, systematic risk,
or unsystematic risk. These results are robust to an alternative
estimation method, alternative competition measures, inclusion
of additional variables, spurious correlation concern, and an
alternative functional form. We find that higher equity capital
ratio reduces the effect of competition on insolvency risk, while
higher deposit share increases it. One standard deviation
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40
SPECIAL ARTICLE
increase of equity capital ratio reduces (that is, deposit share
increases) the difference in insolvency risk between a monopolist
bank and a price taker by 705.39% (4,282.76%).
We contribute to the literature on competition and risk. For
the case of India, Sarkar and Sensarma (2016) document the
effect of concentration on bank risk; Kanoujiya et al (2022)
document the effect of competition on financial distress; Khan
and Ahmad (2023) document the effect of competition on
insolvency risk; and Rakshit and Bardhan (2022) document
the effect of competition on bank profitability. Our findings
complement and extend the results obtained by the above-
mentioned scholars, but our paper differs from these studies in
at least three ways. First, these studies employ some accounting-
based risk measures. In contrast, we use both accounting-based
and market-based risk measures, which is critical from a policy
perspective because we show that competition affects accounting-
and market-based risk measures differently. Second, compared
to these studies, we use a larger data set in terms of longer
sample period and significantly more number of banks. Third,
to our knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature to
investigate the extent to which equity capital ratio and deposit
share affect the relation between Lerner index (a competition
measure) and insolvency risk. This investigation is important
because it has useful policy implications.
Data and Variables
Sample: We collect annual data from the “Statistical Tables
Relating to Banks in India,” a publication by the Reserve Bank
Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition
Z-score Ratio of sum of RoA and equity ratio to volatility
RoA Ratio of net income to assets
Equity ratio Ratio of equity capital to assets
Volatility Standard deviation of RoA
NNPA ratio Ratio of net non-performing loans to loans
GNPA ratio Ratio of gross non-performing loans to loans
Total risk Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the period
of one year
Beta Sensitivity of a stock’s daily excess return to S&P CNX
500’s daily excess return
Idiosyncratic risk Standard deviation of residuals from the regression of a
stock’s daily excess return on S&P CNX 500’s daily excess return
Loan GRate Annual percentage change in loans
Non-interest ratio Ratio of other income to sum of net interest income and
other income
Efficiency ratio Ratio of operating expenses to income
Loan ratio Ratio of loans to assets
Deposit ratio Ratio of deposits to assets
Liquidity ratio Ratio of liquid assets to liabilities
Size Natural logarithm of assets
Lerner Ratio of price over marginal cost to price
C5 Ratio of five largest banks’ assets to all banks’ assets
H-statistic Sum of the elasticities of output price with respect to
input prices
Boone indicator Sensitivity of a bank’s profitability ratio to natural logarithm
of marginal cost
GDP rate Growth rate of GDP
Inflation rate Consumer price index-based inflation rate
Risk-free rate Yield of 364-day Government of India treasury bills
Source: Collated by the author.
53
SPECIAL ARTICLE

of India (RBI 1999–2020b). We include commercial banks with idiosyncratic risk is defined as the standard deviation of
at least five consecutive years’ data. Our final sample has 103 residuals from the regression of a stock’s daily excess return
banks and covers the period 1999–2020. The variables used on S&P CNX 500’s daily excess return.
in the study are defined in Table 1 (p 53). We use annual
frequency because data at higher frequency are not available. Competition measure: We use Lerner index (Lerner) as our
We collect stock prices of 35 listed commercial banks from the primary measure of competition because it can be computed at
Prowess database maintained by the Centre for Monitoring the bank level for each year and has been widely used in prior
Indian Economy (CMIE nd). We obtain data on implicit yield studies (Brei et al 2020). Lerner is defined as the ratio of price
of treasury bills from the “Handbook of Statistics on Indian over marginal cost to price and described in Appendix (p 59).
Economy,” another publication by the RBI (1999–2020a). Lerner index represents pricing power. Competition decreases
Finally, we collect the gross domestic product (GDP) and infla- (pricing power increases) as Lerner increases.
tion data from “World Development Indicators,” a publication
by the World Bank (1999–2020). Control variables: We construct a number of control variables.
First, loan GRate is defined as the annual percentage change
Risk measures: Our primary risk measure is Z-score, which in loans. Second, non-interest ratio is defined as the ratio of
is defined as the ratio of the sum of RoA and equity ratio to other income to sum of net interest income and other income.
volatility. RoA is defined as the ratio of net income to assets; Third, efficiency ratio is defined as the ratio of operating
equity ratio is defined as the ratio of equity capital to assets; expenses to income. Fourth, loan ratio is defined as the ratio
and volatility is defined as the standard deviation of RoA of loans to assets. Fifth, deposit ratio is defined as the ratio of
over the previous three years. The Z-score indicates insolvency deposits to assets. Sixth, liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio
risk (Laeven and Levine 2009): insolvency risk decreases as of liquid assets to liabilities. Seventh, size is defined as the
Z-score increases. We use two variables to measure loan natural logarithm of assets. And finally, we control for equity
portfolio quality. The NNPA ratio is defined as the ratio of net ratio (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2010).
non-performing loans to loans, while the GNPA ratio is defined
as the ratio of gross non-performing loans to loans. We use Elementary Analysis
three market-based risk measures: (i) total risk is defined as Table 1 presents the variable definitions. Appendix Figure 1 (p 59)
the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the period presents the evolutions of mean bank risk and mean Lerner
of one year. (ii) Beta is defined as the sensitivity of a stock’s index over the sample period. The graphs generally indicate
daily excess return to Standard and Poor Credit Rating Infor- that competition is positively related with insolvency risk, net
mation Services of India Limited National Stock Exchange non-performing loan ratio, and gross non-performing loan ratio.
Index 500’s (S&P CNX 500) daily excess return. (iii) Finally, However, competition is not related with total return risk,
Table 2: Sample Summary Statistics systematic risk, or unsystematic risk. Table 2 provides the
Variable Number of Mean Standard 25p Median 75p summary statistics for the variables. For instance, a commercial
Observations Deviation bank has a mean Z-score of 60.897, a mean NNPA ratio of
Z-score 1,687 60.897 79.723 17.031 36.074 72.316
0.039, a mean GNPA ratio of 0.092, and a mean Lerner of 0.213.
RoA 1,707 0.007 0.020 0.003 0.008 0.013
Equity ratio 1,707 0.132 0.139 0.053 0.074 0.148
In unreported results, we estimate correlations between
Volatility 1,692 0.006 0.011 0.001 0.002 0.006 variables. We find that Lerner is positively correlated with
NNPA ratio 1,659 0.039 0.091 0.003 0.015 0.048 Z-score, but negatively correlated with NNPA ratio and GNPA
GNPA ratio 1,681 0.092 0.236 0.017 0.041 0.105 ratio. This means that greater competition is assciated with
Total risk 650 0.028 0.009 0.021 0.027 0.032 greater insolvency risk, higher net non-performing loan ratio,
Beta 650 1.132 0.369 0.876 1.111 1.364
and higher gross non-performing loan ratio. Furthermore, we
Idiosyncratic risk 650 0.023 0.008 0.017 0.022 0.027
Loan GRate 1,694 0.181 0.442 0.046 0.163 0.273 find that Lerner is positively correlated with RoA and equity
Non-interest ratio 1,706 0.344 0.185 0.250 0.320 0.408 ratio, but negatively correlated with volatility.
Efficiency ratio 1,707 0.246 0.142 0.177 0.221 0.275
Loan ratio 1,707 0.482 0.157 0.399 0.512 0.604 Effect of competition on risk: In order to understand the ef-
Deposit ratio 1,707 0.705 0.213 0.562 0.811 0.867
fect of competition on risk, we estimate the following regres-
Liquidity ratio 1,705 0.471 0.416 0.317 0.377 0.477
Size 1,707 14.036 2.389 12.371 14.351 15.853
sion for the sample of all banks.
Lerner 1,704 0.213 0.183 0.129 0.199 0.282 Riskit=α+βRiskit-1+γLernerit-1+δControlsit-1+ηt+θi+εit ... (A)
H-statistic 1,707 0.343 0.203 0.211 0.247 0.445
Boone indicator 1,707 -0.023 0.017 -0.033 -0.018 -0.012 Note that i denotes a bank and t denotes a year. Risk is a risk
C5 1,707 0.422 0.027 0.399 0.421 0.440 measure, Lerner is the Lerner index, controls is the vector of con-
GDP rate 1,707 0.065 0.017 0.052 0.074 0.079
trol variables, η denotes year fixed effects, θ denotes bank fixed
Inflation rate 1,707 0.064 0.030 0.040 0.049 0.090
Risk-free rate 1,707 0.072 0.015 0.059 0.071 0.083 effects, and ε is the error term. We use the two-step system
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of commercial banks. Variable generalised method of moments (GMM) adopted by M Arellano
definitions are provided in Table 1.
Source: Calculated by the author based on data from CMIE (nd), RBI (1999–2020a,
and O Bover (1995) and R Blundell and S Bond (1998) with
1999–2020b) and World Bank (1999–2020). F Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction for estimation.
54 october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

This is because this approach can use endogenous explanatory statistics for both autoregressive of order two [AR(2)] test and
variables. For estimation, we use D Roodman’s (2009) “xtabond2” the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions. Moreover,
command in Stata. The results are reported in Panel A of the number of groups is greater than the number of instru-
Table 3. In each regression, the diagnostic tests indicate that ments in each model. Models (1)–(6) in Panel A of Table 3 rep-
the model is well fitted with statistically insignificant test resent results from regressions of Z-score, RoA, equity ratio,
Table 3: Competition and Risk volatility, NNPA ratio, and GNPA ratio,
Dependent Variable Z-score RoA Equity Ratio Volatility NNPA Ratio GNPA Ratio respectively.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) In model (1), the coefficient estimate
Panel A: sample of all banks on Lerner is positive and statistically
Dependent variable, lag 0.332 *** 0.889 *** 1.261 *** 0.430 *** 0.670 *** 0.008 ***
(0.083) (0.285) (0.311) (0.096) (0.100) (0.002)
significant at the 1% level. This means
Lerner, lag 45.920 *** -0.026 -0.048 -0.011 ** -0.064* -0.516 ** that greater competition increases in-
(15.805) (0.020) (0.043) (0.004) (0.034) (0.249) solvency risk. This result is also eco-
Constant -2.706 -0.000 -0.028 0.020 0.018 0.130 nomically significant. The difference in
(30.821) (0.011) (0.155) (0.006) (0.030) (0.150) insolvency risk between a monopolist
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
bank and a bank which is a price taker
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
is 45.920, which is 75.41% of the mean
F stat 18.12 *** 40.14 *** 634.04 *** 37.91 *** 1604.00 *** 35.53 ***
of Z-score of 60.897. Models (2)–(6) im-
AR(1) test stat -1.91 * -2.60 *** -2.42 ** -2.19 ** -1.91 * -0.93
AR(2) test stat -0.85 1.45 0.52 -0.42 1.09 0.99
ply that greater competition increases
Hansen J stat 1.31 [0.52] 2.94 [0.23] 1.25 [0.74] 14.47 [0.15] 0.05 [0.83] 2.81 [0.25] earnings volatility, net non-performing
Number of instruments 33 33 33 41 32 33 loan ratio, and gross non-performing
Number of groups 100 100 100 100 98 99 loan ratio. These results are also eco-
Number of observations 1,587 1,595 1,595 1,587 1,547 1,575 nomically material. The difference in
Panel B1: sample of listed banks earnings volatility between a monopo-
Dependent variable, lag 0.145 * 0.362 * 0.699 * 0.198 0.744 *** 0.817 *** list bank and a bank which is a price
(0.075) (0.193) (0.367) (0.470) (0.196) (0.129) taker is 0.011, which is 183.33% of the
Lerner, lag 314.587 *** 0.026* 0.024 -0.048 -0.010 -0.034
mean of volatility of 0.006.
(99.744) (0.013) (0.043) (0.042) (0.025) (0.050)
Constant -65.278 -0.017 0.092 0.019 -0.032 -0.010
The difference in net non-perform-
(179.386) (0.016) (0.124) (0.019) (0.024) (0.058) ing loan ratio between a monopolist
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes bank and a bank which is a price taker
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes is 0.064, which is 164.10% of the mean
F stat 18.28 *** 261.13 *** 592.08 *** 20.26 *** 694.16 *** 1,097.46 *** of NNPA ratio of 0.039. Finally, the dif-
AR(1) test stat -2.07 ** -2.43 ** -2.39 ** -0.99 -2.50 ** -2.56 *** ference in gross non-performing loan
AR(2) test stat -1.03 0.02 1.37 -1.10 0.16 -0.77 ratio between a monopolist bank and a
Hansen J stat 0.13 [0.72] 2.00 [0.37] 5.35 [0.15] 0.64 [0.73] 3.96 [0.14] 1.91 [0.39]
bank which is a price taker is 0.516,
Number of instruments 32 33 33 33 33 33
which is 560.87% of the mean of GNPA
Number of groups 35 35 35 35 35 35
ratio of 0.092. The results support the
Number of observations 708 710 710 708 697 710
Dependent Variable Total Risk Beta Idiosyncratic Risk
“competition-fragility” view in terms of
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) insolvency risk, earnings volatility, net
Panel B2: sample of listed banks non-performing loan ratio, and gross
Dependent variable, lag 0.452 0.259*** 0.497 non-performing loan ratio. The results
(0.371) (0.082) (0.475) are consistent with our hypothesis that
Lerner, lag -0.007 -0.201 -0.004 more competition reduces screening
(0.008) (0.281) (0.009)
and monitoring effort. However, com-
Constant 0.012 -0.966* 0.021
(0.029) (0.528) (0.034) petition does not affect profitability
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes ratio or equity capital ratio. In unre-
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes ported results, we also find that compe-
F stat 391.00 *** 68.79 *** 432.54 *** tition does not affect chartered value.
AR(1) test stat -2.18 ** -5.14 *** -1.89 * In order to understand the impact
AR(2) test stat 1.46 0.88 1.30 of competition on market-based risk
Hansen J stat 0.18 [0.67] 1.83 [0.18] 0.14 [0.70] measures, we estimate the equation (A)
Number of instruments 32 32 32 for the sample of listed banks. For
Number of groups 35 35 35
completeness, we estimate regressions
Number of observations 614 614 614
This table presents results from estimations using the two-step system GMM. One period lag of each of the bank controls—loan
of Z-score, RoA, equity ratio, volatility,
GRate, non-interest ratio, efficiency ratio, loan ratio, deposit ratio, liquidity ratio, size and equity ratio—is included. NNPA ratio, and GNPA ratio for the
However, equity ratio is not included in model (3) of Panel A and Panel B1. Corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
sample of listed banks. The results re-
Source: Same as Table 2. ported in Panel B1 of Table 3 imply
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 55
SPECIAL ARTICLE

that the findings are qualitatively similar. Next, we estimate qualitatively similar except the result that greater competition
regressions of total risk, beta, and idiosyncratic risk for the increases total return risk and unsystematic risk.
sample of listed banks. The results reported in Panel B2 of Third, we employ Boone indicator as an alternative competi-
Table 3 imply that competition does not affect total return risk, tion measure, which is defined as the sensitivity of a bank’s
systematic risk, or unsystematic risk. profitability ratio to the natural logarithm of marginal cost
and is described in the Appendix. Competition increases as the
Robustness Tests absolute value of Boone indicator increases. We replace Lerner
We perform several robustness tests. First, we employ the ordi- by Boone indicator in equation (A) and then estimate by the
nary least squares (OLS) with bank fixed effects, year fixed two-step system GMM. In unreported results, we find that the
effects, and clustering of the errors at the bank level. The re- results are qualitatively similar except the result that greater
sults reported in Table 4 indicate that the findings are qualita- competition reduces systematic risk.
tively similar. Second, we employ Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic Fourth, the literature suggests that both “competition-
(H-statistic) as an alternative competition measure. H-statistic fragility” view and “concentration-fragility” view can coexist
is defined as the sum of the elasticities of output price with (Fu et al 2014). To test this coexistence for India, we include
respect to input prices and is described in the Appendix. Com- market concentration C5 as an additional explanatory variable
petition increases as H-statistic increases. We replace Lerner in the equation (A). C5 is defined as the ratio of five largest
by H-statistic in equation (A) and then estimate by the two-step banks’ assets to all banks’ assets. One period lag of each of the
system GMM. In unreported results, we find that the results are controls—loan GRate, non-interest ratio, efficiency ratio, loan
Table 4: Competition and Risk—OLS ratio, deposit ratio, liquidity ratio, size,
Dependent Variable Z-Score RoA Equity Ratio Volatility NNPA Ratio GNPA Ratio equity ratio, GDP rate, inflation rate, and
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) risk-free rate—is included. However,
Panel A: sample of all banks
equity ratio is not included as a control
Lerner, lag 101.805 * 0.034 *** 0.091 ** -0.012 ** -0.065 -0.431 **
(61.241) (0.010) (0.039) (0.006) (0.058) (0.210) variable in the regressions of equity ratio.
Constant -479.763** -0.001 0.789 *** 0.012 0.001 -0.182 We employ the two-step system GMM. In
(224.165) (0.031) (0.140) (0.017) (0.157) (0.720) unreported results, we generally find
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes that the results about the competition–
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes risk relation are unaltered and market
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes concentration does not affect accounting-
R-squared 0.145 0.503 0.846 0.533 0.369 0.354 based risk measures. However, greater
Number of clusters 100 100 100 100 100 100
market concentration increases total
Number of observations 1,595 1,595 1,595 1,595 1,565 1,579
return risk and unsystematic risk but
Panel B1: sample of listed banks
Lerner, lag 530.265 0.055 *** 0.075 ** -0.015 *** -0.101 *** -0.253 ***
decreases systematic risk.
(378.703) (0.009) (0.030) (0.005) (0.025) (0.057) Fifth, one concern in our empirical
Constant -1,059.338 ** -0.049 0.085 0.032 *** 0.168 0.432 ** analysis is that Lerner includes the ratio
(461.610) (0.029) (0.069) (0.009) (0.105) (0.199) of total income to assets and Z-score
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes includes the ratio of net income to assets
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
in the numerator and, therefore, any rela-
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
tionship between Lerner and Z-score may
R-squared 0.202 0.612 0.754 0.381 0.712 0.722
be mechanical rather than economically
Number of clusters 35 35 35 35 35 35
Number of observations 710 710 710 710 701 710
meaningful. We rule out this possibility
Dependent Variable Total Risk Beta Idiosyncratic Risk of spurious correlation due to the follow-
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) ing reasons. (i) Following T Beck et al
Panel B2: sample of listed banks (2013), we consider the evolution of mean
Lerner, lag 0.000 0.316 0.000 Z-score and mean Lerner index over the
(0.010) (0.455) (0.009)
sample period (reported in Appendix
Constant 0.068 ** 2.449 ** 0.070 **
(0.031) (1.087) (0.029)
Figure 1) and the evolution of mean vol-
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes atility and mean Lerner index over the
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes sample period (unreported). Note that
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes volatility is the denominator of Z-score.
R-squared 0.401 0.559 0.325 Both the graphs produce a similar insight.
Number of clusters 35 35 35 (ii) Equation (A) includes one period lag
Number of observations 634 634 634 of Lerner. (iii) Following Beck et al
This table presents results from the OLS regression estimates of the relation between competition and risk. One period lag
of each of the bank controls—loan GRate, non-interest ratio, efficiency ratio, loan ratio, deposit ratio, liquidity ratio, size
(2013), we redo the entire analysis using
and equity ratio—is included. However, equity ratio is not included in model (3) of Panel A and Panel B1. Standard errors are volatility as the risk measure. In unre-
clustered at the bank level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
ported results, we find that the regres-
Source: Same as Table 2. sions still produce a similar insight.
56 october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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Sixth, we test whether competition is related with risk in a two-step system GMM. In unreported results, we find that the
non-linear manner. For this, we include Lerner × Lerner as an coefficient estimates on Lerner × Lerner are insignificant.
additional variable in equation (A) and estimate using the Therefore, there is no non-linear relationship between com-
Table 5: Impact of Equity Capital Ratio on Competition–Risk Relation petition and risk in India.
Dependent Variable Z-score RoA Volatility NNPA Ratio GNPA Ratio
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Other Impacts
Sample of all banks In order to understand the impact of equity
Dependent variable, lag 0.332 *** 0.885 *** 0.380 *** 0.486 *** 0.007 *** capital ratio on the relation between compe-
(0.083) (0.278) (0.117) (0.071) (0.002)
tition and risk, we estimate the regressions
Equity ratio, lag 13.144 0.034** -0.002 0.059 1.074 *
(38.349) (0.016) (0.006) (0.074) (0.543)
of risk on (lagged) equity ratio, (lagged)
Lerner, lag 70.018 *** -0.016 -0.015 ** -0.045 * -0.289 *** Lerner, (lagged) Lerner × equity ratio, and
(24.313) (0.017) (0.006) (0.026) (0.101) other variables. We employ the two-step
Lerner, lag × equity ratio, lag -92.716 ** -0.040 * 0.019 * -0.088 -1.137 system GMM. The results are reported in
(45.698) (0.023) (0.011) (0.133) (0.850) Table 5. Model (1) indicates that the coeffi-
Constant -11.087 -0.003 0.021*** 0.025 -0.047
cient estimate on (lagged) Lerner × equity
(31.493) (0.010) (0.007) (0.039) (0.190)
ratio is negative and statistically significant.
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This means that equity capital ratio reduces
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F stat 14.10 *** 32.56 *** 40.77 *** 1,939.56 *** 34.45 ***
the effect of competition on insolvency risk.
AR(1) test stat -1.91 * -2.61 *** -1.96 ** -2.02 ** -0.93 This result is economically significant. One
AR(2) test stat -0.85 1.42 -0.32 0.89 0.99 standard deviation increase in equity capital
Hansen J stat 1.34 [0.51] 2.80 [0.25] 15.01 [0.13] 0.73 [0.70] 3.02 [0.22] ratio reduces the difference in insolvency risk
Number of instruments 34 34 42 34 34 between a monopolist bank and a price taker
Number of groups 100 100 100 98 99 by 705.39% (= (92.716*0.139)/(13.144*0.139)).
Number of observations 1,587 1,595 1,587 1,547 1,575 Therefore, greater equity capital mitigates
This table presents results from regression estimates of the relation between Lerner × equity ratio and risk for the
sample of all banks. The results are from estimations using the two-step system GMM. One period lag of each of the
the potential effect of competition on insol-
bank controls—loan GRate, non-interest ratio, efficiency ratio, loan ratio, deposit ratio, liquidity ratio and size—is vency risk.
included. Corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
In robustness tests, we employ OLS with
Source: Same as Table 2. bank fixed effects, year fixed effects and
Table 6: Impact of Deposit Share on Competition–Risk Relation clustering of the errors at the bank level to
Dependent Z-score RoA Equity Ratio Volatility NNPA Ratio GNPA Ratio estimate the regressions of risk on (lagged)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) equity ratio, (lagged) Lerner, (lagged) Lerner ×
Independent
Variable equity ratio, and other variables. In unreported
Sample of all banks results, we find that the results are qualita-
Dependent 0.332 ** 0.897 *** 1.296 *** 0.414 *** 0.667 *** 0.007 *** tively similar. In order to assess the impact of
variable, lag (0.082) (0.270) (0.324) (0.110) (0.096) (0.002) deposit share on the relation between com-
Deposit ratio, lag 1.595 -0.011 0.052 -0.005 -0.078 -0.106 petition and risk, we estimate the regressions
(13.519) (0.012) (0.078) (0.008) (0.057) (0.162)
of risk on (lagged) deposit ratio, (lagged)
Lerner, lag 9.755 -0.044 -0.129 -0.007 -0.207 -0.808 *
(17.607) (0.033) (0.109) (0.013) (0.133) (0.446) Lerner, (lagged) Lerner × deposit ratio and
Lerner, lag × deposit 68.310 ** 0.032 0.131 -0.007 0.251 0.495 other variables. We employ the two-step sys-
ratio, lag (32.308) (0.034) (0.133) (0.017) (0.182) (0.422) tem GMM. The results are reported in Table 6.
Constant 5.699 0.004 -0.022 0.018 * 0.042 0.163 Model (1) indicates that the coefficient esti-
(30.842) (0.012) (0.152) (0.009) (0.029) (0.159) mate on (lagged) Lerner × deposit ratio is
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
positive and statistically significant. This
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
means that deposit share increases the effect of
F stat 15.19 *** 39.21 *** 429.15 *** 35.26 *** 1,303.57 *** 29.60 ***
competition on insolvency risk. This result is
AR(1) test stat -1.91 * -2.67 *** -2.35 ** -2.13 ** -1.94 * -0.93
also economically significant. One standard
AR(2) test stat -0.85 1.42 0.56 -0.36 1.05 0.99
deviation increase in deposit share increases
Hansen J stat 1.35 [0.51] 2.74 [0.26] 0.88 [0.83] 13.98 [0.17] 0.06 [0.81] 2.78 [0.25]
the difference in insolvency risk between a
Number of 34 34 34 42 33 34
instruments monopolist bank and a price taker by
Number of groups 100 100 100 100 98 99 4282.76% (= (68.310*0.213)/(1.595*0.213)).
Number of observa- 1,587 1,595 1,595 1,587 1,547 1,575 Therefore, greater deposit share exacerbates
tions the potential effect of competition on insol-
This table presents results from regression estimates of the relation between Lerner × deposit ratio and risk for the
sample of all banks. The results are from estimations using the two-step system GMM. One period lag of each of the
vency risk.
bank controls—loan GRate, non-interest ratio, efficiency ratio, loan ratio, liquidity ratio, size and equity ratio—is In robustness tests, we employ OLS with
included. However, equity ratio is not included in model (3). Corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
bank fixed effects, year fixed effects, and
Source: Same as Table 2. clustering of the errors at the bank level to
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 57
SPECIAL ARTICLE

estimate the regressions of risk on (lagged) deposit ratio,
(lagged) Lerner, (lagged) Lerner × deposit ratio, and other
variables. In unreported results, we find that the results are
qualitatively similar.
Conclusions
Using a sample of 103 commercial banks in India for 1999–2020,
we investigate the effect of competition on risk. Univariate
and regression results consistently indicate that greater com-
petition increases insolvency risk, earnings volatility, net
non-performing loan ratio, and gross non-performing loan
ratio. However, competition does not affect total return risk,
systematic risk, or unsystematic risk. We also find that equity
capital ratio reduces the effect of competition on insolvency
risk, while deposit share increases it.
Our results have important policy implications. First, great-
er competition should be accompanied by policies that en-
hance financial stability. Excessive competition may not be
desirable in Indian banking if we care about insolvency risk or
loan portfolio quality. However, competition does not matter
if we only care about market-based risk measures. The Econo-
mist (2009) notes that “[i]f competition in banking leads to
too much risk-taking, the right remedy is better supervision.”
Second, banks should operate with greater equity capital
ratio because it may mitigate the adverse effect of greater
competition on insolvency risk.

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58 october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Appendix

Lerner Index Computation as interest expense divided by deposits, personal expense divided by as-
Following A N Berger et al (2009), we compute Lerner index for the bank sets, and other operating and administrative expense divided by assets,
i at time t: respectively. Our estimate for marginal cost:
୧୲ െ ୧୲ ଷ
‡”‡”୧୲ ൌ  ‘•– ୧୲
୧୲ ୧୲ ൌ ൥Ⱦଵ ൅ Ⱦଶ ‫  Ž כ‬୧୲ ൅ ෍ Ԅ୩ ‫ Ž כ‬୩୧୲ ൩
 ୧୲
where Pit is the price of total output Qit (= total assets) and is defined as ୩ୀଵ

the total income divided by assets. MCit is the marginal cost and is de-
H-Statistic Computation
rived from the following translog cost function:
In order to estimate Panzar and Rosse’s H-Statistic, we estimate the fol-
ଷ
Ⱦଶ lowing regression for each year t:
Ž ‘•–୧୲ ൌ Ƚ ൅ Ⱦଵ ‫ Ž כ‬୧୲ ൅ ‫ כ‬ሾŽ ୧୲ ሿଶ ൅ ෍ ɀ୩ ‫ Ž כ‬୩୧୲
ʹ ln (Pit)=α+β1 ln (W1it )+β2 ln (W2it)+β3 ln (W3it )+γ ln (Zit)+δi+εit
୩ୀଵ
ଷ
where Z is the vector of three variables: equity capital divided by assets,
൅ ෍ Ԅ୩ ‫ Ž כ‬୧୲ ‫ Ž כ‬୩୧୲ loans divided by assets, and ln(assets). Then, H-Statistic equals β1+β2+β3,
୩ୀଵ
ଷ ଷ the sum of the elasticities of output price with respect to input prices.
൅ ෍ ෍ Ʉ୩୨ ‫ Ž כ‬୩୧୲ ‫ Ž כ‬୨୧୲ ൅ ɂ୧୲  Boone Indicator Computation
୨ୀଵ ୩ୀଵ
In order to compute Boone indicator, we estimate the following re-
where Cost it is the total cost. W1it, W2it, and W3it are the input prices of gression for each year t: RoAit=α+β ln (MCit )+εit, then β is the Boone
fund, labour, and fixed assets, respectively. W1it, W2it, and W3it are defined indicator.

Figure 1: Competition and Risk

-FSOFS
BOE
;

4DPSF
-FSOFS
BOE
//1"
3BUJP











;4DPSF

-FSOFS

-FSOFS


//1"
3BUJP
 















         
:FBS
:FBS
//1"
3BUJP -FSOFS
;4DPSF -FSOFS
-FSOFS
BOE
(/1"
3BUJP
-FSOFS
BOE
5PUBM
3JTL











5PUBM
3JBL

-FSOFS
-FSOFS
(/1"
3BUJP

















         
:FBS :FBS
(/1"
3BUJP -FSOFS 5PUBM
3JTL -FSOFS
-FSOFS
BOE
#FUB
-FSOFS
BOE
*EJPTZODSBUJD
3JTL










*EJPTZODSBUJD
3JTL
-FSOFS



-FSOFS
#FUB
















         
:FBS :FBS
#FUB -FSOFS *EJPTZODSBUJD
3JTL -FSOFS
Source: Same as Table 2.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 59

SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic Efficiency of the Primary Healthcare
System in India
A Study Based on Facility Survey
amlan majumder
The primary healthcare system in India is funded by
both the union and state governments. Initially, the part
of central funding was largely programmatic. Recently,
there has been a shift of focus to link allocations with the
achievements on the demographic front and usage rate
of some basic healthcare facilities. The prime question is
that whether the central funding should be based on
economic efficiency of the healthcare system or
demographic performance of the states. This paper
proposes a strategy based on stochastic frontier
analysis, which appears to be free from any biasness and
random disturbances.
A part of this work was carried out under the UGC Minor Research
Project bearing Reference No F PHW-136/15–16, dated 1 February 2017.
The author is thankful to Tamash Ranjan Majumdar for encouraging
him on the subject matter. He also acknowledges the valuable comments
and suggestions provided by the anonymous reviewers of EPW.
Amlan Majumder (amlan@amlan.co.in) teaches economics in
the Department of Economics, University of North Bengal, Raja
Rammohunpur, Darjeeling, West Bengal.
44
T
he primary healthcare system in India is funded by both
the union and state governments with the major share
borne by the latter. During the financial year 2013–14,
the shares of the union and state governments in the total gov-
ernment health expenditure have been 34% and 66%, respec-
tively. Out of the total union government health expenditure,
51% was allocated for primary healthcare (mohfw 2017). The
National Rural Health Mission (nrhm) (mohfw 2005) envis-
aged increasing the share of the union government gradually
to 40% in the long run. Initially, the part of central funding has
been largely programmatic. For example, the nrhm began its
journey to provide effective healthcare to rural population
throughout the country with a special focus on 18 states (17 of
which are included in the paper as per the availability of data
and marked with asterisks in Tables 2, 4, 5, and 7), which have
weak public health indicators and/or weak infrastructure
(mohfw 2005). However, at a later stage, there has been a shift of
focus from programme-based financing to performance-based
financing, where allocations are linked to achievements of
specified indicators on the demographic front with the usage
rate of some basic healthcare facilities, which are to be assessed
by independent evaluations (mohfw 2011). There are also
plans now to rank the primary healthcare institutions on the
basis of infrastructure, service delivery, and patient feedback
(mohfw 2019). In spite of all these developments, the issue of
measuring performance through a systematic examination of
the relationship between inputs used to the system and output
produced remains, by and large, neglected. If the country ulti-
mately goes with the differential scheme of financing based on
performance indicators, one may obviously raise the question:
Why is the phenomenon of functioning of the healthcare sys-
tems across states and union territories absent in the list or in
the whole discussion?
Although the nature of the problem warrants an analysis of
the economic efficiency of the primary healthcare system, such
studies, in the Indian context, are less extensive and less known.
In order to draw empirical evidences and substantiate the dis-
cussion, the paper assesses the performance of the states by
examining the relationship between the inputs used to the system,
such as human power, plant, equipment, drugs, etc, and the out-
put produced as expressed in terms of utilisation of health ser-
vices. The primary health centre (phc) is chosen in analysis, as it
constitutes the main pillar of the primary healthcare system.
october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

It may be comprehended that given the level of input, an effi-
cient system or a phc will produce higher output, as compared
to others. Technically, in order to examine the relationship
between inputs and output, at the first stage, the Cobb–Douglas
type production function is estimated, and at the second stage,
the study goes for the stochastic production frontier analysis
for measuring the technical efficiency of the healthcare system
across 29 states and union territories at the phc (4,453),
district (479), and state levels.
The study utilises data on availability of various facilities
and their use from the Facility Survey 4, which was conducted
during 2012–13 and published in 2015 by the International
Institute for Population Sciences (iips), Mumbai and which
was sponsored by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
(mohfw), Government of India.
phcs have sheer importance in the rural healthcare delivery
system of the country, which has been developed to provide
health and family welfare-related services to the vast majority
of rural people. A phc remains at the middle of the three types
of primary healthcare institutions. At the bottom peripheral
line, sub-centres are there, each of which serves as a first point
of contact between a village community and the rural health-
care system. One sub-centre is manned by few paramedical
staff only. A phc is the first point of contact between a village
community and a doctor. It works as a referral centre for six
sub-centres. It is manned by a doctor supported by 14 para-
medical and other staff. Under the nrhm, there is a provision
for two additional staff nurses at phcs on a contract basis. It
should have at least one operation theatre and one labour
room with four to six beds for patients. According to the na-
tional norms of population coverage, there should be one phc
for 30,000 population in plain areas and 20,000 in hilly and/
or tribal areas. The Rural Health Statistics 2014–15 (mohfw
2015) reports that there were 25,308 phcs in the country with
27,421 doctors. At the upper end, community health centres
(chcs) are there with more medical and other facilities, each
of which acts as a referral centre for four phcs.
Economic Analysis of Healthcare System
Economists began to turn their attention to the matters con-
cerning efficient allocation of resources in the health service
sector around the end of the 1950s (Culyer 1971). However,
there was no consensus in literature on the application of
positive economics on the welfare aspects of medical care.
Much of the controversies waned when Fuchs (1966) defined
the health service sector as a healthcare industry, which pro-
vides different types of medical and other services to people
utilising different inputs. These services are the output of the
healthcare industry measured in terms of utilisation of health
facilities; for example, number of cases treated, hospital
admission, etc. The inputs of the healthcare industry as cate-
gorised by Fuchs (1966) are: labour input (human power),
physical capital (plant and equipment), and intermediate
goods and services (drugs, bandages, etc). Empirical studies
within this framework began with the work of Feldstein
(1967), who estimated the Cobb–Douglas type production
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40
SPECIAL ARTICLE
function of hospitals for the British National Health Service
(nhs). Such a framework has been found very useful for plan-
ning purposes and many studies have replicated it, as it could
explain the variation in output levels as a result of variation in
different inputs. The paper will move forward from this basic
framework to stochastic production frontier analysis in
search of efficiency scores.
Stochastic frontier analysis for knowing efficiency of
healthcare system: Stochastic frontier analysis (sfa) requires
estimation of production function of a specific type. Following
Feldstein (1967), as it is planned to estimate the Cobb–Douglas
production function for the primary healthcare system in
India, the study goes for a Cobb–Douglas type stochastic pro-
duction frontier analysis. Mathematically, a Cobb–Douglas
production function takes the following form:
Ž ‫ݕ‬௜ ൌ Ƚ୧ ൅ σ୩୨ୀଵ Ⱦ୧୨ Ž š୨ ൅ ˜୧ ǡ ... (1)
where i (number of firms) = 1, 2, 3, …, N; j (number of input
variables) = 1, 2, …, k; y and x stand for the output and inputs
respectively; β is coefficient of input and I is the intercept,
which are to be estimated; vi are error terms, which are
assumed to be independent and identically distributed
(iid) ܰሺͲǡߪ௩ଶሻ . When estimated say, through the method of or-
dinary least squares (ols):
ෝ୧ ൅ σ୩୨ୀଵ Ⱦ෠୧୨ Žš୨ ሻǤ
›ෝప ൌ ‡š’ሺȽ ... (2)
In the above model, a β coefficient (elasticity coefficient)
measures percentage change in output due to 1% change in the
respective input.
A stochastic frontier production function, which was originally
and independently developed by Aigner et al (1977) and Meeu-
sen and van den Broeck (1977) and which was much discussed
by Coelli (1996) and Coelli et al (2005) in the context of Cobb–
Douglas type production frontier, may be expressed as follows
(using previously used notations):
Ž ‫ݕ‬௜ ൌ Ƚ୧ ൅ σ୩୨ୀଵ Ⱦ୧୨ Žš୨ ൅ ˜୧ െ —୧ Ǥ ... (3)
We may rewrite equation (3) as follows:
‫ݕ‬௜ ൌ ‡š’ሾȽ୧ ൅ σ୩୨ୀଵ Ⱦ୧୨ Žš୨ ሿǤ ‡š’ሾ˜୧ ሿǤ ‡š’ሾെ—୧ ሿǡ ... (4)
where ui are introduced as non-negative random variables to
measure technical inefficiency, which are often assumed to be
iid ܰሺͲǡߪ௨ଶሻ. While vi are normal random variables, ui are half-
normal random variables, probability density function (pdf) of
each of which is a truncated version of a normal random vari-
able with zero mean and variance ߪ௨ଶ.
Technically, a stochastic production frontier consists of a
“deterministic component” (the first segment of the right-hand
side expression of equation [4]) followed by the “statistical
noise” and “inefficiency” components, respectively. Efficiency
analysis based on the first component is referred to as the de-
terministic frontier analysis (dfa). It considers the firm with
the highest level of output as the most efficient. Any deviation
from this level of output is considered inefficiency. Under ols
on the other hand, which fits line through the average points,
45
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 1: A Simple Illustration of Different Production Frontiers Table 2: Average Inputs Used and Output Produced by the Primary
Health Centres
:
States/Union Territories x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 y DPSR
Andaman and 3.94 13.5 0.85 1.38 12.56 10.75 2002 4.2
%'
Nicobar Islands
Y
Andhra Pradesh 2.25 16.31 0.86 1.89 6.53 12.43 1,984 7.3
4'
Arunachal Pradesh* 1.9 7.21 0.8 1.24 8.14 8.41 446 2.0
Assam* 2.84 6.58 0.73 1.02 5.58 8.07 1,374 4.0
Y Y
0-4

Bihar* 6.12 7.49 0.79 1.83 6.34 10.45 5,457 7.4




*OFGGJDJFODZ Chhattisgarh* 1.54 3.77 0.78 1.22 6.33 8.22 476 2.6



Y

Goa 6 15.64 0.76 1.45 14.82 13.27 1,982 2.8
Y

Y
Y
4UBUJTUJDBM
OPJTF
Haryana 1.96 8.65 0.82 1.14 5.68 10.77 1,480 6.3
Y
Himachal Pradesh* 1.65 4.27 0.88 1.65 6.22 9.3 1,049 5.3
Y
Y
Jharkhand* 1.76 4.84 0.72 1.12 6.04 5.76 673 3.2







Y
Karnataka 1.51 10.16 0.84 1.76 6.59 11.32 763 4.2
Kerala 2.19 8.48 0.91 1.57 13.38 8.81 567 2.2
Madhya Pradesh* 1.72 4.4 0.75 1.45 6.92 9.8 638 3.1
Maharashtra 1.87 6.92 0.89 1.95 6.63 11.58 1,171 5.2
9
Manipur* 5.87 11.73 0.53 1.2 10.6 4.4 502 0.7
Source: Majumdar (2017) and authors’ compilation. Meghalaya* 3.42 10.54 0.92 1.66 10.57 8.57 820 2.0
any deviation from the fitted line is due to statistical noise. If Mizoram* 1.15 7.72 0.87 1.77 10.79 6.74 405 2.9
Nagaland* 1.68 9.16 0.67 1.43 7.51 6.46 111 0.6
only deterministic component is considered, there may be an
Odisha* 1.35 4.32 0.65 1.44 4.85 7.56 1,143 7.1
overlapping of inefficiency and statistical noise in a deviation. Puducherry 10.31 27.94 0.85 1.38 7.06 13.06 4,943 4.0
Following Majumdar (2017), the idea is presented with a sim- Punjab 2.59 10.33 0.81 1.36 9.09 8.8 1,066 3.4
ple illustration (Figure 1). Three different lines from the top Rajasthan* 1.74 5.24 0.85 1.28 6 10.65 1,029 4.9
represent the deterministic frontier (df), stochastic frontier Sikkim* 1.5 8.55 0.83 1.45 10.5 9.6 667 3.7
Tamil Nadu 13.24 35.44 0.91 1.1 9.7 12.39 3,879 2.4
(sf), and the ols curve respectively. The df passes through the
Telangana 2.57 16.77 0.91 1.97 8.37 12.43 2,165 7.0
highest level of output. If we take the vertical distance be- Tripura* 4.73 11.94 0.77 1.18 10.82 7.48 712 1.3
tween the df and an observation, the whole amount of devia- Uttar Pradesh* 1.65 3.16 0.76 1.55 4.13 7.5 844 4.3
tion is due to inefficiency according to the dfa. However, Uttarakhand* 2.61 7.64 0.81 1.78 4.54 10.27 894 2.9
according to the ols method, part of the deviation is due to West Bengal 2.04 7.07 0.69 1.21 9.39 9.46 2,568 10.5
statistical noise. In order to avoid this computational fallacy, India 3.23 10.20 0.80 1.46 8.13 9.46 1,442 3.7
*Received special status under the NRHM (2005–12) as per weak public health indicators and/
two error terms are considered in the sfa—one is for “statisti- or weak infrastructure; Variable description: as per Table 1; DPSR: doctor–patient session rate.
cal noise” and the other is for “inefficiency.” So, the sfa may be Source: Authors’ compilation from Facility Survey 4 data.

viewed as a mix of ols and deterministic production frontiers Although there are various ways to estimate the inefficiency
(Majumdar 2017). component of equation (4), a specially designed software is
Table 1: Specification of the Variables Based on Facility Survey 4 used, namely “Frontier Version 4.1: A Computer
Type Variables* Components Specifications Value Program for Stochastic Frontier Production and
Input Medical officers: x1 Medical officer (male) Actual number Aggregate of Cost Function Estimation” written by Coelli (1996).
variables (contractual and Lady medical officer Actual number the three
regular) AYUSH medical officer Actual number
Specification of the variables is shown (Table 1).
Paramedical staff: x2 Staff-nurse Actual number Aggregate of Average level of inputs used and output produced
(contractual and Pharmacist Actual number the seven by the phcs at the state level is also displayed
regular) Health assistant (female) Actual number (Table 2).
Health assistant (male) Actual number
The exercise is done at three levels considering:
Laboratory technician Actual number
Auxiliary nurse midwife Actual number (i) actual level of inputs used and output produced
Additional staff-nurse Actual number by 4,453 phcs (as per completeness of information
Plant (A): x3 Present condition of the 1: Good; 0.67: Actual score and after taking care of some missing values),
building Satisfactory; 0.33:
Needs repair
(ii) average inputs used and output produced by
Plant (B): x4 Labour room available 1: Yes; 0: Otherwise Aggregate of each of the 479 districts, and (iii) average inputs
Operation theatre (OT) 1: Yes; 0: Otherwise the two used and output produced by each of the 29 states
available
and union territories. Frontier Version 4.1 output,
Equipment: x5 Bed available Actual number Actual
number such as ols and maximum likelihood (ml) estimates
Drug: x6 14 types of essential drug 1: Yes; 0: Otherwise Aggregate of of the models and efficiency scores are also dis-
available the 14 played (Tables 3 and 4, pp 47, 48). Efficiency scores
Output Patients treated: y Out-patient department Actual number Aggregate of
(OPD) patients (last month) the two
of the first two categories are aggregated (at their
In-patient department Actual number mean value) at the state level.
(IPD) admissions (last Table 2 shows the inputs used and outputs pro-
month)
* Before taking natural logarithm.
duced by the system, where x and y stand for the in-
Source: Authors’ compilation. puts and outputs, respectively. Technical relationship
46 october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

between inputs and output, at the state level, is based on this phc in West Bengal, on an average, visits 10.5 patients per
data. Similar data sets for 4,453 phcs and 479 districts, based hour. The values for all the states and union territories are cal-
on the specifications in Table 1, are not shown. However, tech- culated and presented in Table 2 in the same way. One may
nical efficiency scores are displayed in Table 4 after aggregat- comprehend such information to understand the extent of in-
ing them (at their mean value) at the state level. teraction of the primary healthcare system with the local
In the final column of Table 2, with some simple assump- community. Also, it may be used as a proxy measure of so-
tions, it tried to display the doctor in patient session rate called usage rate of some basic healthcare facilities.
(dpsr) from the available data. It is assumed that a doctor ren-
ders five hours of medical services (excluding administrative Method of comparing demographic indicators and effi-
or other services) per day for five days and three hours at the ciency scores: In order to compare the performance of the
weekend in a month. It will lead to approximately four hours states in terms of demographic indicators and technical effi-
of work per day for rendering medical services. As in the case ciency scores of the primary healthcare system, we have con-
of West Bengal, there are 2.04 doctors per phc (x1), it will lead sidered the following demographic indicators in rural parts of
to 2.04*4 = 8.16 doctor-hour per day. A phc in West Bengal, on the country: crude birth rate (cbr) and crude death rate (cdr).
an average, serves 2,568 patients in a month (y), which leads Percentage changes for the said rates are computed by utilis-
to 2568/30 = 85.60 patients per day. So, the dpsr in a phc in ing data for 2011–13 from the respective SRS Bulletins. As the
West Bengal is 85.60/8.16 = 10.5. It implies that a doctor of a efficiency scores are based on Facility Survey 4, which was
Table 3: Parameters of the Cobb–Douglas Production Frontier for Primary conducted during 2012–13, periods of demographic indicators
Health Centres
are also chosen covering the same period. The states and
Model Variables Parameters OLS Estimates MLE
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
union territories are ranked according to the performance of
I: PHC-level Intercept Α 4.7451 49.068 5.3851 54.305 demographic indicators and technical efficiency scores, re-
analysis x1 β1 0.3951 19.966 0.3981 20.476 spectively, and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients are
(N=4453) x2 β2 0.0961 5.158 0.0941 5.165 obtained to examine whether there exists any relationship
x3 β3 0.1201 3.218 0.1091 2.964 between demographic performance and technical efficiency
x4 β4 -0.021 -0.564 -0.039 -1.062
of the primary healthcare system. Results are presented in
x5 β5 -0.0701 -2.682 -0.0582 -2.272
x6 β6 0.7841 19.494 0.7701 19.825 Tables 5 and 6 (p 49).
γ – – 0.5841 16.25
log- -5420.288 -5391.430 – Results of Efficiency Analyses and Discussion
likelihood
function
likelihood - - 57.72 –
Goodness of fit of the models: Before proceeding to the
ratio (LR) efficiency analysis, some preliminary exercises are per-
test formed to understand the data. For example, collinearity sta-
II: District- Intercept Α 4.9011 17.174 5.4831 20.690
tistics are examined to find out if there exists any multicol-
level x1 β1 0.6821 9.931 0.6941 10.518
x2 β2 -0.039 -0.597 -0.029 -0.467
linearity among independent variables. However, results
analysis
x3 β3 0.2992 2.284 0.159 1.317 show that all the three sets of data are not seriously affected
(N=479)
x4 β4 -0.043 -0.333 -0.083 -0.680 from such a problem.
x5 β5 -0.1882 -2.049 -0.140 -1.606 It can also be seen that R square of the models increases
x6 β6 0.8561 7.694 0.8121 7.902 gradually from 0.248 in the phc-level model to 0.351 in the
γ – – 0.7221 11.97
district-level model to 0.673 in the final state-level model.
log- -507.710 – -495.001 –
likelihood These values are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. It
function indicates that a very high degree of variability in output is
L – – 25.417 – explained by the inputs at the state level. It is known that
R test
such an analysis with Cobb–Douglas type production func-
III: State- Intercept Α 3.8982 2.548 2.0031 7.738
level x1 β1 0.9521 3.379 0.6591 7.710 tion belongs to the supply-side economics of healthcare.
analysis x2 β2 -0.228 -0.743 -0.2872 -1.827 Factors in the demand-side are absent in the model. Output
(N=29) x3 β3 0.017 0.016 -1.9501 -6.645 of a phc simultaneously can also be comprehended as a utili-
x4 β4 -0.116 -0.188 0.012 0.043 sation of services from the perspective of patients. In gener-
x5 β5 -0.552 -1.533 -0.123 -1.334
al, utilisation of healthcare is influenced by these character-
x6 β6 1.6671 3.130 2.3211 14.763
γ – – 0.9991 681386.5
istics: (i) disorder—type of illness, etc, (ii) subject—back-
log- -19.680 – -14.924 ground characteristics of patient, etc, and (iii) service—
likelihood health service system-related factors (Kroeger 1983). The
function above-mentioned models have considered the third-category
LR test – – 9.512
Dependent variable (y): Total number of patients treated in last one month; x1: Medical
factors only, that is, input variables. Factors in the first two
officers; x 2: Paramedical staff; x 3: Plant-A (building condition); x4: Plant-B (availability of categories belong to the demand side, which are absent. So,
labour room and OT); x 5: Equipment (availability of bed); x6: Availability of essential drugs;
1p<0.01, 2p<0.05, and 3p<0.10. deviations in the output levels may be due to the statistical
Source: Authors’ compilation from Facility Survey 4 data. noise caused by missing variables, etc. However, such effects
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 47
SPECIAL ARTICLE

are nearly absent in the state-level model as discussed subse- Some elasticity coefficients (under mle) become negative
quently (Table 3). and statistically significant. For example, the coefficient of
paramedical staff in the state-level model appears to be nega-
Results of Frontier Version 4.1—its uses and implications: tive and in the phc-level model, positive (with comparatively
In continuation with the above discussion, one may try to con- stronger effect in the former). In such a situation, instead of
firm whether variations in the output levels in the models are fresh recruitments, state governments may reshuffle or make
due to inefficiency or statistical noise (Table 3). transfer of paramedical staff on the basis of surplus and short-
The Frontier Version 4.1 computes one variance ratio γ to age at the phc level as compared to average level of the coun-
answer the question. As discussed in Battese and Coelli (1995), try (at least in the short run, till we resonate to another round
ߛ ൌ ߪ௨ଶ Ȁߪ ଶ ǡ where ߪ ଶ ൌ ߪ௨ଶ ൅ ߪ௩ଶ such that Ͳ൑ߛ൑1. When of survey), so that the absolute number does not increase at
γ = 0, the difference between an observed output and the effi- the state level. Alternatively, the union and state governments
cient output is solely due to the statistical noise caused by mea- should take appropriate measures to make the association
surement errors, missing variables, etc. On the other hand, when between paramedical staff and patients treated at the state
γ = 1, the deviation is completely due to less-than-efficient utili- levels positive.
sation of inputs, that is, technical inefficiency. The hypothesis At the PHC level, the coefficient of beds becomes negative.
that may be tested in this context could be H0: γ = 0; H1: γ > 0. This is because while computing output, we have clubbed pa-
If the null hypothesis (which says that there is no inefficiency tients from ipd and opd together. In all the cases, the number
effect in a model) is rejected, the alternative one will be accepted, of patients in the latter is several times higher than in the for-
which confirms the existence of inefficiency. mer. As visit of opd patients is independent of the availability
The value of γ in the first model is 0.584, which is statisti- of beds, the coefficient becomes negative. In order to confirm
cally significant at the 0.01 level. This is because the computed the matter, we estimated a separate model with ipd patients
t-ratio (16.25) is greater than the critical t-ratio (table value:
Table 4: Technical Efficiency of the Primary Health Centres Based on Facility
2.326) at 0.01 level (1-tailed test). The null hypothesis is thus Survey 4
rejected. This phenomenon is true for all the three models. States/Union Territories N % K % Efficiency Score
These results confirm that technical inefficiency of the primary PHC-level District-level State-level
Analysis Analysis Analysis
healthcare system exists in all the models. Alternatively, one
Andaman and 16 0.4 3 0.6 0.644 0.625 0.771
may also go for the likelihood ratio (lr) test for testing the above- Nicobar Islands
mentioned hypothesis. It is a simple matter to verify that the Andhra Pradesh 247 5.5 13 2.7 0.639 0.687 0.753
computed lr statistic values in all the three models are greater Arunachal 29 0.7 14 2.9 0.460 0.389 0.287
than the Kodde and Palm (1986) critical value at the 0.01 level Pradesh*
(5.412). Hence, all the null hypotheses are rejected. It reconfirms Assam* 45 1 19 4.0 0.642 0.649 0.740
the existence of inefficiency in the primary healthcare system. Bihar* 92 2.1 16 3.3 0.737 0.720 0.999
Chhattisgarh* 253 5.7 16 3.3 0.514 0.508 0.360
The γ value in the first model is 0.584 (Table 3). It tells that
Goa 11 0.2 2 0.4 0.544 0.453 0.194
58.4% variation of output at the phc level is due to technical 166 3.7 21 4.4 0.653 0.688 0.780
Haryana
inefficiency of the system. If we look at the second model, we Himachal Pradesh* 37 0.8 12 2.5 0.592 0.585 0.608
see that more than 72% of variation in output at the district Jharkhand* 25 0.6 13 2.7 0.611 0.620 0.992
level is due to technical inefficiency. Surprisingly, at the state Karnataka 485 10.9 30 6.3 0.536 0.557 0.394
level, nearly all variations in output (99.9%) are due to techni- Kerala 21 0.5 3 0.6 0.495 0.543 0.591
cal inefficiency. Statistical noise, which may be caused by Madhya Pradesh* 264 5.9 44 9.2 0.511 0.488 0.245
Maharashtra 728 16.3 33 6.9 0.596 0.609 0.493
missing explanatory variables, etc (demand-side factors in the
Manipur* 15 0.3 6 1.3 0.505 0.465 0.519
present context), is nearly absent in the state-level model.
Meghalaya* 74 1.7 7 1.5 0.544 0.535 0.672
Mizoram* 39 0.9 8 1.7 0.517 0.579 0.996
Ordinary least squares and maximum likelihood esti- Nagaland* 37 0.8 9 1.9 0.273 0.183 0.108
mates, and their implications: In the third model, the elas- Odisha* 34 0.8 20 4.2 0.676 0.712 0.724
ticity coefficients of medical officers and essential drugs be- Puducherry 16 0.4 2 0.4 0.674 0.618 0.767
come significant at the 0.01 level. The results say that 1% in- Punjab 85 1.9 16 3.3 0.540 0.527 0.539
crease in each of these inputs will increase output by 0.952% Rajasthan* 594 13.3 32 6.7 0.578 0.593 0.465
and 1.667%, respectively. So, the availability of doctors and Sikkim* 20 0.4 4 0.8 0.534 0.552 0.485
Tamil Nadu 410 9.2 31 6.5 0.680 0.673 0.992
essential drugs appear to be very important determinants of
Telangana 158 3.5 9 1.9 0.643 0.689 0.832
output (that is, patients treated) in phc from the perspective of
Tripura* 33 0.7 4 0.8 0.503 0.421 0.420
the state level. Results at the phc and the district levels also Uttar Pradesh* 432 9.7 69 14.4 0.615 0.623 0.609
put forward a similar message. This result has further implica- Uttarakhand* 59 1.3 13 2.7 0.541 0.516 0.336
tions. For example, in the case of medical officers, as elasticity West Bengal 28 0.6 10 2.1 0.719 0.787 1.000
coefficient is positive at the phc, district, and state levels, state India 4,453 100 479 100 0.590 0.590 0.609
* Received special status under the NRHM (2005–12) as per weak public health indicators
governments running with less than the national average may and/or weak infrastructure; n: number of PHCS; and k: number of districts.
go for fresh recruitment of the same in the phcs. Source: Authors’ compilation.

48 october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

 SPECIAL ARTICLE

only as output (not included in this paper). In that, the coeffi- Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Puducherry, Andhra Pradesh,
cient of beds became positive and statistically significant. Assam,* Odisha,* Meghalaya,* Uttar Pradesh,* and Himachal
Pradesh.* As stated above, there are eight states (with asterisk),
Efficiency scores of the primary health centres: As nearly which received special status under the nrhm (2005–12) as
all variations of output in the third model come from technical per the weak public health indicators and/or weak infrastruc-
inefficiency, we will discuss the efficiency scores mostly in the ture. However, there remain seven states, beyond the said spe-
context of the third (that is, the state level) model (Table 4). In cial category, which performed very well in terms of economic
that, West Bengal becomes the most efficient state with a score efficiency of the primary healthcare system. Performances of
of 1.000 (in terms of the functioning of the phcs) followed by these seven states are distinctive ones, as they did not receive
Bihar (0.999), Mizoram (0.996), Tamil Nadu (0.992), Jharkhand any special favour from the nrhm.
(0.992), Telangana (0.832) and others. From the results, we There are 14 states with an efficiency score value of less than
may assert that Bihar and West Bengal perform almost identi- 0.608. These states are (in descending order of efficiency score):
cally. Poorly performed states are Nagaland (0.108), Goa Kerala, Punjab, Manipur, Maharashtra, Sikkim, Rajasthan,
(0.194), Madhya Pradesh (0.245), Arunachal Pradesh (0.287), Tripura, Karnataka, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Arunachal
and some others. Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Goa, and Nagaland. We may assume
The median efficiency score value (at the state level) is 0.608 Table 6: Results of Spearman’s Rank Correlation Measure
and with it, Himachal Pradesh divides the 29 states and union Level Criteria Rank as per Technical EfFiciency Score Sig (2-tailed)
territories into two groups, whose rank is 15th, as shown in PHC Rank as per % change in CBR -0.355 0.064
Rank as per % change in IMR -0.302 0.119
Table 4. It may be assumed that phcs with an efficiency score of District Rank as per % change in CBR -0.324 0.093
0.608 or more in these 15 states performed well. These 15 states Rank as per % change in IMR -0.282 0.146
(in descending order of efficiency score) are: West Bengal, State Rank as per % change in CBR -0.313 0.105
Bihar,* Mizoram,* Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand,* Telangana, Haryana, Rank as per % change in IMR -0.380 0.046
Each figure on the third column means rank correlation coefficient between a technical
efficiency score and criterion mentioned in the second column.
Table 5: Ranks According to Technical Efficiency and Demographic Source: Authors’ compilation.
Performance
Table 7: Four Groups According to Economic Efficiency and NRHM
States/Union Territories 2011 to 2013 Rank as per Efficiency Score Rank as Rank as
(2005–12) Status
Change Change PHC District State per % Rank as
CBR % IMR % Level Level Level Change per % States/Union Territories Efficiency Group Criteria
in CBR Change Score
in IMR (State
Level)
Andaman and -2.68 3.57 7 9 8 11 27
Nicobar Islands West Bengal 1.000 I Performed well in terms of economic
Tamil Nadu 0.992 efficiency of the PHCs (scored above the
Andhra Pradesh -0.56 -6.38 10 6 10 25 17
Telangana 0.832 median value 0.608) and which did not
Arunachal Pradesh* -2.80 10.00 28 28 26 10 23
Haryana 0.780 come under the NRHM
Assam* -2.08 -3.45 9 8 11 19 20
Bihar* -0.35 -6.67 1 2 2 27 16 Andaman and 0771
Nicobar Islands
Chhattisgarh* -1.90 -4.08 23 23 24 20 19
Puducherry 0.767
Goa -0.80 33.33 17 26 28 23 28
Andhra Pradesh 0.753
Haryana -2.18 -8.33 6 5 7 17 13
Bihar* 0.999 II Performed well (scored above the median
Himachal Pradesh* -3.51 -7.89 14 15 15 4 14
Mizoram* 0.996 value 0.608) and received special assistance
Jharkhand* -1.52 -7.32 12 11 4 22 15
Jharkhand* 0.992 under the NRHM
Karnataka -3.05 -12.82 20 17 23 7 5
Assam* 0.740
Kerala -2.60 0.00 27 19 16 12 24
Odisha* 0.724
Madhya Pradesh* -2.08 -9.52 24 24 27 18 10
Meghalaya* 0.672
Maharashtra -0.58 -3.33 13 13 19 24 21
Uttar Pradesh* 0.609
Manipur* 2.11 -9.09 25 25 18 28 11
Himachal Pradesh* 0.608
Meghalaya* -0.38 -11.11 16 20 13 26 8
Kerala 0.591 III Performed poorly as economic
Mizoram* -2.91 2.33 22 16 3 9 26
Punjab 0.539 efficiency scores lie below the median
Nagaland* -4.91 -14.29 29 29 29 2 3
Maharashtra 0.493 value (0.608) and which did not come
Odisha* -2.38 -8.62 4 3 12 15 12 under the NRHM
Karnataka 0.394
Puducherry -3.05 -4.76 5 12 9 6 18
Goa 0.194
Punjab -2.98 -15.15 19 21 17 8 2
Manipur* 0.519 IV Performed poorly in terms of economic
Rajasthan* -2.55 -10.53 15 14 21 13 9
Sikkim* 0.485 efficiency of the PHCS (scored below the
Sikkim* -3.39 -17.86 21 18 20 5 1
Rajasthan* 0.465 median value 0.608) and received special
Tamil Nadu -1.88 0.00 3 7 5 21 25 assistance under the NRHM
Tripura* 0.420
Telangana – – 8 4 6 – –
Chhattisgarh* 0.360
Tripura* -5.30 -12.90 26 27 22 1 4
Uttarakhand* 0.336
Uttar Pradesh* -2.43 -11.67 11 10 14 14 7
Arunachal Pradesh* 0.287
Uttarakhand* -4.06 -12.82 18 22 25 3 6
Madhya Pradesh* 0.245
West Bengal -2.21 -3.03 2 1 1 16 22
* Received special status under the NRHM (2005–12) as per weak public health indicators and/ Nagaland* 0.108
* Received special status under the NRHM (2005–12) as per weak public health indicators
or weak infrastructure; Percentage changes in CBR and IMR are computed from SRS Bulletin
2012 and 2014; Demographic data of Telangana, prior to its formation in 2014, are not available. and/or weak infrastructure.
Source: Authors’ compilation. Source: Authors’ compilation.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 49

SPECIAL ARTICLE
that these states did not perform well in terms of the function-
ing of the phcs, as their efficiency scores lie below the median
value. However, out of these poor performers, five states, such
as Kerala, Punjab, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Goa, did not
receive any special attention from the nrhm.
Based on the above discussion, we may classify the 29 states
and union territories into four broad groups (without attaching
any value or priority to any state or union territories or group).
In Group I, one may accommodate the states which performed
well in terms of economic efficiency of the phcs and which did
not come under the nrhm: West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Telangana,
Haryana, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Puducherry, and
Andhra Pradesh. Group II may accommodate the states which
performed well and received special assistance under the
nrhm: Bihar, Mizoram, Jharkhand, Assam, Odisha, Meghalaya,
Uttar Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh. Group III may consist
states whose economic efficiency scores lie below the median
value (0.608) and which did not come under the nrhm: Kera-
la, Punjab, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Goa. All the other
remaining states will come under Group IV, which performed
poorly in terms of economic efficiency of the phcs and received
special assistance under the nrhm: Manipur, Sikkim, Rajasthan,
Tripura, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Arunachal Pradesh,
Madhya Pradesh, and Nagaland. Details of the above-men-
tioned four groups are summarised in Table 7 (p 49).
Results of comparison of efficiency scores with demo-
graphic indicators: It will now be checked whether the rank
of the states according to some demographic indicators meas-
ured in terms of reduction in cbr or infant mortality rate (imr)
match with that of the economic efficiency (Tables 5 and 6).
Tripura experienced the highest level of decline in cbr and
secured the first rank. However, in terms of technical efficiency
of the phcs, its rank is 22nd (in the state-level model). The
rank of Nagaland is second in terms of decline of cbr. However,
its rank is 29th in terms of efficiency score of phcs. Similar re-
sults can be observed in the case of Uttarakhand, Himachal
Pradesh, Sikkim, and some others. As far as decline in imr is
concerned, Sikkim secures the first position. However, in
terms of economic efficiency of the phcs, its rank is 20th. West
Bengal, Bihar, and Mizoram perform very well in terms of the
functioning of the primary healthcare system. Nevertheless,
these three states remain at the bottom in terms of demo-
graphic performance. As the initial level of the demographic
indicators varies sharply across states, it is very difficult to
judge the performance of the healthcare system from the de-
mographic achievements. In general, we did not find any sig-
nificant rank correlation between demographic performance
of the states and union territories and economic efficiency of
the primary healthcare systems (Table 6).
Summary and Conclusions
This paper, at the first stage, examines the technical relation-
ships between the input and output of a healthcare system in
India through the estimation of the Cobb–Douglas type produc-
tion function for phcs. The input of one healthcare system
50
consists human power (medical and paramedical staff), plant,
equipment, etc. The output of such a system is measured in
terms of utilisation of services (such as number of patients
treated). At the second stage, it performs sfa to obtain effi-
ciency scores of the states and union territories in terms of the
functioning of the phcs. It may be comprehended that given
the level of input, an efficient system or a phc will produce
higher output as compared to others. The context of doing
such technical exercises needs to be explained. The primary
healthcare system in India is funded by both the union and
state governments where the major share is borne by the lat-
ter. Initially, the part of central funding has been largely pro-
grammatic. However, gradually, there has been a shift of focus
to performance-based financing, where allocations are linked
to achievements of specified indicators on the demographic
front with usage rate of some basic healthcare facilities. As
stated above, the paper raises a question: Why will economic
efficiency of the primary healthcare system not come under
consideration in the strategy of channelising fund, or resourc-
es to the primary healthcare system, or for rewarding the
states and union territories?
Econometric analyses are done at three levels, considering a
phc as a production/service unit, and utilising average input
and output at the district and state levels. Results are interest-
ing and noteworthy for all the concerned provincial govern-
ments as well as the union government. At the first stage, tech-
nical relationships are explored between inputs used in the
system and output produced. Output varies sharply across
phcs, districts, states, and union territories. As discussed in
Table 3 under the sub-section “Results of Frontier Version 4.1,”
nearly 58% variation of output at the phc level is due to
economic inefficiency (very often also termed as technical in-
efficiency) of the system. The rest of the 42% variation arises
due to statistical noise, which may be caused by missing ex-
planatory variables, etc. Similarly, nearly 72% and 99.99%
variations at the district and state levels come from technical
inefficiency respectively. As statistical noise is almost absent in
available at
Skandaa Distributors
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Near Sai Vidya Vihar, RK Puram Post, Malkajgiri,
Hyderabad 500 056, Telangana
9908074973
october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

the state-level model, policy recommendations are based on
results of this final model only. However, results of district-
and phc-level models are also important for policy formations
(with regard to fresh recruitments of mos and reshuffling or
transfer of paramedical staff) at the local level or within the
states as discussed in the sub-section, “ols and ml estimates,
and their implications.”
Results of SFA have sheer importance towards formulating a
funding strategy for maintaining and further strengthening of
the rural healthcare system across the states and union territo-
ries of the country. If the priority of the union government is to
maintain the spirit of the well-performers at high, fund,
resources, or rewards should start to flow to the seven states
listed in Group I (as discussed in the sub-section, “Efficiency
scores of the phcs” and in Table 7) with very high technical
efficiency scores in terms of functioning of the phcs: West Bengal,
Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Haryana, Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, Puducherry, and Andhra Pradesh. These seven states
and union territories did not receive special attention under
the nrhm. The eight states under Group II also performed
well, but they were enlisted under the nrhm (Bihar, Mizoram,
Jharkhand, Assam, Odisha, Meghalaya, Uttar Pradesh, and
Himachal Pradesh). Funds should continue to flow to these
eight states too. Special consideration is needed for the states
and union territories in Group III, which are to improve their
level of efficiency in terms of functioning of the phcs: Kerala,
Punjab, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Goa. A revitalisation of
attention is needed for the states in Group IV (Manipur, Sikkim,
Rajasthan, Tripura, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Arunachal
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Nagaland), as they performed
very poor in spite of receiving special favour under the nrhm.
The main spirit of the paper was to initiate a discussion on
funding or rewarding strategy of the union government
towards sustainability of the rural healthcare system, where the
point of economic efficiency of the healthcare system will come
under consideration. Strategies based on achievements of
specified indicators on the demographic front or on the usage
rate of some basic healthcare facilities can never be uniform (as
discussed in the sub-section, “Results of comparison of efficiency
scores with demographic indicators”). As the initial level of the
demographic indicators varies sharply across states, it is very
difficult to judge the performance of the states or the health-
care system from the demographic achievements. If the usage
rate is considered, as reflected in dpsr and discussed in relation
to Table 2, both West Bengal and Bihar have high figures. It is to
be noted that efficiency scores of Bihar and West Bengal are
almost similar (1 or close to 1). However, the two states received
attention differently from the policymakers. The application of
or reliance on frontier analysis is thus warranted. The conclusions
drawn in this paper are based on results which are technically
free from any biasness and random disturbances (as discussed
in the sub-section, “Results of Frontier Version 4.1”).
Theoretically, frontier analysis in healthcare is gradually
gaining importance for a number of reasons. As per Lovell
(2006), frontier techniques can be of immense use in estab-
lishing the best practice benchmarks against which the perfor-
mance of healthcare providers can be evaluated. According to
Cylus et al (2016), the pursuit of efficiency is one of the central
preoccupations of health policymakers and managers, and it is
justifiably a cause for such concern. When the question of effi-
ciency or inefficiency of the system is considered, it allows
money to be spent more effectively towards its sustenance.
This may sustain and increase the willingness of governments
and their citizens to pay for universal health coverage through
their taxes. On the contrary, a lack of evidence that a system or
a provider is performing efficiently or inefficiently may dam-
age confidence in these institutions, and compromise the
social solidarity on which modern health systems depend. The
paper thus adds a new dimension to the evaluation mecha-
nism of the publicly funded healthcare system in a country like
India, where trade-off with regard to financing exists under
the federal structure.

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Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 51

CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation

Wholesale Price Index Foreign Trade

The year-on-year WPI infl ation rate declined to -0.5% in August 2023 The trade deficit stood at $24.2 bn in August 2023 compared to $24.9 bn a
from 12.5% reported a year ago and -1.4% a month ago. The index year ago. Exports contracted by (-)6.9% to $34.5 bn and imports by (-)5.2% to
for primary articles grew by 6.3% compared to 14.7% a year ago. The $58.6 bn from $37.0 bn and $61.9 bn, respectively, recorded a year ago. Oil imports
rate of infl ation of food articles was down to 10.6% from 12.6% a stood at $13.2 bn compared to $17.3 bn and non-oil at $45.4 bn compared to $44.6 bn.
year ago. The index for fuel and power decreased by (-)6.0% against During April–August 2023–24, cumulative exports declined by (-)11.9% to $173.0 bn
35.0% a year ago and that for manufactured products declined by (-)2.4% and imports by (-)12.1% to $271.8 bn compared to $196.3 bn and $309.2 bn,
against 7.5%. respectively, reported in the corresponding period last year.

Consumer Price Index Index for Industrial Production

The CPI-inflation rate decreased to 6.8% in August 2023 from 7.0% reported a year
ago and 7.4% a month ago. The consumer food price index stood higher at 9.9%
compared to 7.6% recorded a year ago. The CPI-rural inflation rate was down to 7.0%
and the urban inflation rate to 6.6% from 7.2% and 6.7%, respectively, registered
a year ago. According to Labour Bureau data, the CPI for agricultural labourers
(CPI–AL) stood at 7.4% in August 2023 compared to 6.9% a year ago and the CPI for
industrial workers (CPI–IW) at 6.9% against 5.9%.
The y-o-y IIP growth rate increased to 5.7% in July 2023 from 2.2% registered a year
ago with growth in manufacturing segment rising to 4.6% from 3.1%. Growth rate of
the mining segment rose to 10.7% from -3.3% a year ago and electricity generation to
8.0% from 2.3%. As per use-based classification, production of capital goods grew by
4.6% and infrastructure goods by 11.4% compared to their respective growth rates of
5.1% and 4.8% a year ago. Growth rate of consumer durables segment declined to
-2.7% and that of non-durables increased to 7.4% from 2.3% and -2.9% a year ago.

Movement of WPI Inflation January–August 2022 and 2023 Merchandise Trade August 2023
August 2023 Over Month Over Year April–August
Year-on-year WPI Inflation in % ($ bn) (%) (%) (2023–24 over 2022–23) (%)
20 Exports 34.5 6.9 -6.9 -11.9
2022
Imports 58.6 10.8 -5.2 -12.1
15
Trade balance -24.2 16.9 -2.8 -12.4
12.5%
10 Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

5 Components of Trade August 2022 and August 2023

$44.6 billion
0 Non-oil Imports $45.4 billion
2023 -0.5% $37.0 billion
40 Exports
-5 $34.5 billion
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug*

* Data is provisional; Base: 2011–12 = 100. $17.3 billion

Oil Imports
$13.2 billion

Trends in WPI and Its Components August 2023* (%)

0
Financial Year (Averages)
Weights Over Month Over Year 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
All commodities 100 0.3 -0.5 1.3 13.0 9.4
Primary articles 22.6 -0.5 6.3 1.7 10.2 10.0
-27 $24.9 billion $24.2 billion
Food articles 15.3 -1.5 10.6 3.2 4.1 7.3
Trade Balance
Fuel and power 13.2 3.0 -6.0 -8.0 32.5 28.1 2022 AUGUST 2023 AUGUST
Manufactured products 64.2 0.1 -2.4 2.8 11.1 5.6 Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.
* Data is provisional; Base: 2011–12=100. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Movement of IIP January–July
IIP Index Value
Movement of CPI Inflation January 2022–August 2023
Year-on-year CPI Inflation in % 160
2023
9
150
Rural 7.0% 142.0
140
6 6.8% 2022 134.4
CPI (Combined) 6.6% 130
Urban
120
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun* Jul*
3
* July 2023 are quick estimates; Base: 2011–12=100.

Industrial Growth: Sector-wise July 2023* (%)

0 Weights Over Over Financial Year (Avgs)
Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M J J Aug* Month Year 2021–22 2022–23
2022 2023
General index 100 -1.0 5.7 11.4 5.2
* August 2023 is provisional.
Source: National Statistical Office (NSO); Base: 2012=100. Mining 14.4 -8.5 10.7 12.2 5.8
Manufacturing 77.6 0.1 4.6 11.8 4.7
Inflation in CPI and Its Components August 2023* (%) Electricity 8.0 -0.6 8.0 7.9 8.9
Latest Month Over Over Financial Year (Avgs) Industrial Growth: Use-based
Weights Index Month Year 2021–22 2022–23
Primary goods 34.0 -3.4 7.6 9.7 7.5
CPI combined 100 186.2 -0.1 6.8 5.5 6.7
Consumer food 39.1 192.5 -0.7 9.9 3.8 6.6 Capital goods 8.2 -4.6 4.6 16.9 13.1
Miscellaneous 28.3 177.4 0.3 4.9 6.7 6.3 Intermediate goods 17.2 -1.0 1.9 15.4 3.8
Infrastructure/Construction goods 12.3 -1.1 11.4 18.8 8.4
CPI: Occupation-wise
IIndustrial workers (2016=100) 139.2 -0.4 6.9 5.1 6.1 Consumer durables 12.8 1.0 -2.7 12.5 0.6
Agricultural labourers (1986-87=100) 1224 0.7 7.4 4.0 6.8 Consumer non-durables 15.3 4.0 7.4 3.2 0.7
* Provisional; *July 2023 are quick estimates; Base: 2011–12=100.
Source: NSO (rural and urban); Labour Bureau (IW and AL). Source: NSO, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 69

 CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation
India’s Quarterly Estimates of Final Expenditures on GDP
2021–22 2022–23 2023–24
` Crore | At 2011–12 Prices Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Private final consumption expenditure 1822102 (17.6) 2121839 (14.2) 2426098 (10.8) 2333501 (4.7) 2182357 (19.8) 2298123 (8.3) 2478700 (2.2) 2399515 (2.8) 2312601 (6.0)
Government final consumption expenditure 403808 (-2.1) 346501 (11.7) 350565 (5.8) 474406 (11.8) 411243 (1.8) 332450 (-4.1) 348329 (-0.6) 485284 (2.3) 408300 (-0.7)
Gross fixed capital formation 1077836 (61.0) 1209609 (12.4) 1179221 (1.2) 1412108 (4.9) 1297588 (20.4) 1325580 (9.6) 1273453 (8.0) 1538071 (8.9) 1400832 (8.0)
Change in stocks 28895 (974.6) 31402 (655.9) 29902 (618.9) 33964 (613.8) 31050 (7.5) 30591 (-2.6) 29868 (-0.1) 35954 (5.9) 32256 (3.9)
Valuables 22035 (481.3) 134378 (156.6) 73595 (44.5) 48751 (-51.7) 34959 (58.7) 108206 (-19.5) 45595 (-38.0) 37330 (-23.4) 27633 (-21.0)
Net trade (Export–Import) 15631 -46285 -91258 -65580 -86460 -146624 -97506 -6264 -258496
Exports 765031 (46.1) 826729 (25.1) 825929 (27.8) 888144 (22.4) 915111 (19.6) 927872 (12.2) 917492 (11.1) 994047 (11.9) 844252 (-7.7)
Less imports 749401 (44.8) 873014 (26.6) 917188 (19.7) 953723 (6.7) 1001571 (33.6) 1074495 (23.1) 1014998 (10.7) 1000311 (4.9) 1102748 (10.1)
Discrepancies -59256 (-173.6) -145787 (-293.2) -117350 (-388.8) -124790 (-758.1) -126452 (113.4) -70326 (-51.8) -55812 (-52.4) -128375 (2.9) 114019 (-190.2)
Gross domestic product (GDP) 3311050 (21.6) 3651659 (9.1) 3850772 (5.2) 4112360 (4.0) 3744285 (13.1) 3878000 (6.2) 4022625 (4.5) 4361515 (6.1) 4037144 (7.8)

India’s Overall Balance of Payments (Net): Quarterly

2022–23 ($ mn) 2023–24 ($ mn) 2022–23 (` bn) 2023–24 (` bn)
Item Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Current account -17964 -30902 -16832 -1356 -9214 -1387 [-2.1] -2466 [-3.8] -1384 [-2.0] -111.6 [-0.2] -757 [-1.1]
Merchandise -63054 -78313 -71337 -52587 -56596 -4867 -6249 -5864 -4326.1 -4652
Invisibles 45090 47411 54505 51231 47382 3480 3783 4481 4214.5 3895
Services 31069 34426 38713 39075 35125 2398 2747 3182 3214.5 2887
of which: Software services 30692 32681 33541 34370 33928 2369 2608 2757 2827.4 2789
Transfers 22874 24773 28467 24762 22866 1766 1977 2340 2037.1 1880
of which: Private 23065 24991 28641 25080 23073 1780 1994 2354 2063.2 1897
Income -8853 -11788 -12675 -12606 -10609 -683 -941 -1042 -1037.1 -872
Capital account 22055 1461 28887 6540 34374 1702 [2.6] 117 [0.2] 2375 [3.4] 538.0 [0.7] 2826 [4.0]
of which: Foreign investment -1238 12741 6641 4691 20812 -96 1017 546 385.9 1711
Overall balance 4595 -30379 11069 5579 24432 355 [0.5] -2424 [-3.7] 910 [1.3] 459.0 [0.6] 2008 [2.8]
Figures in square brackets are percentage to GDP.

Foreign Exchange Reserves Variation

22 September 23 September 31 March Month Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
Excluding gold but including revaluation effects 2023 2022 2023 Ago Ago 2022–23 2023–24 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
` crore 4489294 4006994 4340297 -19133 482300 -230623 148997 68050 668976 590416 302585 102680
$ mn 541375 494806 528083 -4068 46570 -64809 13292 -14168 56831 94535 21435 -31532

Monetary Aggregates Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
` Crore 2023 2022–23 2023–24 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
Money supply (M3) as on 8 September 23477171 146915 (0.6) 2348675 (11.1) 634767 (3.1) 1133411 (5.1) 2044615 (12.2) 1649151 (8.8) 1850031 (9.0)
Components
Currency with public 3209232 -5815 (-0.2) 136548 (4.4) 36995 (1.2) -67204 (-2.1) 402080 (17.1) 283860 (10.3) 240747 (7.9)
Demand deposits 2334419 13758 (0.6) 225111 (10.7) -103684 (-4.7) 13821 (0.6) 257428 (14.8) 217872 (10.9) 107606 (4.9)
Time deposits 17861719 139002 (0.8) 1976813 (12.4) 698302 (4.6) 1192754 (7.2) 1376262 (10.9) 1136326 (8.1) 1482361 (9.8)
Other deposits with RBI 71801 -30 (-0.0) 10203 (16.6) 3154 (5.4) -5960 (-7.7) 8844 (23.0) 11093 (23.4) 19317 (33.1)
Sources
Net bank credit to government 7416974 61609 (0.8) 833528 (12.7) 105817 (1.6) 251442 (3.5) 890012 (17.9) 627255 (10.7) 687903 (10.6)
Bank credit to commercial sector 15177625 167316 (1.1) 1880349 (14.1) 680756 (5.4) 747989 (5.2) 629822 (5.7) 948054 (8.1) 1813116 (14.4)
Net foreign exchange assets 5085525 5316 (0.1) 600690 (13.4) -369228 (-7.6) 173760 (3.5) 777810 (20.5) 275217 (6.0) 57702 (1.2)
Banking sector’s net non-monetary liabilities 4234353 87578 (2.1) 968501 (29.7) -216644 (-6.2) 40894 (1.0) 253594 (8.4) 202475 (6.2) 710963 (20.4)
Reserve money as on 22 September 4395920 -59394 (-1.3) 343752 (8.5) -16719 (-0.4) 9161 (0.2) 570276 (18.8) 468905 (13.0) 317872 (7.8)
Components
Currency in circulation 3301863 -7950 (-0.2) 134789 (4.3) 33357 (1.1) -76658 (-2.3) 406451 (16.6) 279954 (9.8) 244804 (7.8)
Bankers’ deposits with RBI 1021317 -52297 (-4.9) 198766 (24.2) -54176 (-6.2) 90840 (9.8) 154979 (28.5) 177860 (25.4) 53750 (6.1)
Other deposits with RBI 72741 854 (1.2) 10197 (16.3) 4100 (7.0) -5020 (-6.5) 8844 (23.0) 11093 (23.4) 19317 (33.1)
Sources
Net RBI credit to Government 1010573 -174673 (-14.7) -49974 (-4.7) -390049 (-26.9) -440552 (-30.4) 107495 (10.8) 350910 (31.9) 529 (0.0)
of which: Centre 997136 -171683 (-14.7) -56938 (-5.4) -394898 (-27.3) -453240 (-31.2) 106606 (10.8) 352626 (32.2) 1404 (0.1)
RBI credit to banks and commercial sector 126421 128302 (-6820.9) 133808 (-1811.4) 536315 (-98.6) 220863 (-233.9) -168464 (83.9) -174345 (0.0) 449260 (0.0)
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI 4735054 -16121 (-0.3) 538314 (12.8) -245739 (-5.5) 147698 (3.2) 608998 (17.0) 243079 (5.8) 144877 (3.3)
Govt’s currency liabilities to the public 31400 252 (0.8) 2609 (8.2) 778 (2.8) 1114 (3.7) 565 (2.1) 1100 (4.1) 2273 (8.1)
Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI 1507527 -2847 (-0.2) 281004 (22.9) -81977 (-6.3) -80038 (-5.0) -21682 (-1.6) -48160 (-3.5) 279065 (21.3)

Scheduled Commercial Banks’ Indicators ( ` Crore) Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
(As on 8 September) 2023 2022–23 2023–24 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
Aggregate deposits 19382899 146504 (0.8) 2326572 (13.6) 591014 (3.6) 1338985 (7.4) 1546019 (11.4) 1351801 (8.9) 1578601 (9.6)
Demand 2194405 13854 (0.6) 225870 (11.5) -104212 (-5.0) 13974 (0.6) 244190 (15.1) 211554 (11.4) 107684 (5.2)
Time 17188494 132650 (0.8) 2100702 (13.9) 695226 (4.8) 1325011 (8.4) 1301831 (10.9) 1140246 (8.6) 1470917 (10.2)
Cash in hand 99284 -8132 (-7.6) -9759 (-8.9) 23117 (26.9) 9021 (10.0) 3487 (4.0) -4822 (-5.3) 4337 (5.0)
Balance with RBI 992546 80506 (8.8) 213360 (27.4) 95749 (14.0) 182639 (22.6) 6507 (1.2) 140744 (25.9) 126470 (18.5)
Investments 5982861 68144 (1.2) 880702 (17.3) 373212 (7.9) 567713 (10.5) 715177 (19.1) 266421 (6.0) 686201 (14.5)
of which: Government securities 5982086 68122 (1.2) 880692 (17.3) 373216 (7.9) 567765 (10.5) 722935 (19.3) 266546 (6.0) 686143 (14.5)
Bank credit 15038165 162535 (1.1) 2486880 (19.8) 659972 (5.6) 1362930 (10.0) 578649 (5.6) 1044025 (9.6) 1783922 (15.0)
of which: Non-food credit 15019094 163394 (1.1) 2496401 (19.9) 686390 (5.8) 1363765 (10.0) 569159 (5.6) 1050269 (9.7) 1819026 (15.4)

Capital Markets 29 September Month Year Financial Year So Far 2022–23 End of Financial Year
2023 Ago Ago Trough Peak Trough Peak 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 1978–79 = 100) 65828.41 (16.7) 65075.82 56409.96 (-5.1) 59106.44 67838.63 51360.42 63284.19 49009 (63.7) 57362 (18.4) 58992 (0.7)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 1983–84 = 100) 20123.30 (16.3) 19828.50 17303.76 (-3.7) 17644.91 20666.08 15562.65 19137.18 14689 (68.2) 17423 (20.1) 17602 (-0.7)
S&P BSE-200 (1989–90 = 100) 8613.00 (16.3) 8452.68 7406.24 (-3.1) 7406.09 8819.05 6602.62 8144.55 6211 (71.1) 7412 (20.9) 7389 (-2.0)
CNX Nifty-50 (Base: 3 November 1995 = 1000) 19638.30 (16.8) 19342.65 16818.10 (-5.0) 17398.05 20192.35 15293.50 18812.50 14507 (67.9) 17153 (19.7) 17360 (-0.6)
CNX Nifty-500 17292.60 (18.4) 16927.30 14602.50 (-3.2) 14601.95 17665.80 12950.75 16003.95 12149 (73.7) 14652 (22.2) 14558 (-2.3)
Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year. | (-) = not relevant | - = not available | NS = new series | PE = provisional estimates
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

70 october 7, 2023 vol lViii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

 POSTSCRIPT
CULTURE, RELIGION

Pahela Baishakh
A New Discourse of Social and Political Practices
The celebration of Pahela Baishakh in Bangladesh and the debates surrounding it serve to reinforce a new
discourse of Bengali culture and identity that works in favour of those in power.

Md Abu Salek Khan

A
fter 9/11 and the US’s “global war on terror,” Islam and activists, it has become the centre of debate on cultural iden-
Muslim identity became crucial issues of dialogue and tity and history in the public sphere. Besides various kinds
debate in the public sphere amid rising hatred, racism, of Islamists, a significant portion of public intellectuals and
and Islamophobia. In Bangladesh, laws, policies, socio-economic commentators in Bangladesh think that the politically exclu-
and political practices, and different aspects of national identity sive way in which Pahela Baishakh is depicted and celebrated
formation were directly and indirectly shaped by the aftermath today is a recent cultural formation. Further, Islamists are of
of 9/11. Amid the predominant nationalist narrative and the the opinion that the rites and importance attached to the current
debates surrounding national identity (whether Bengali or celebration are contradictory to the majority of Bengali
Bangladeshi), the uncritical adoption of the anti-terrorism Muslims’ faith and their values.
policy and various other projects by the government and its This year, the festival saw a transformation in the way it
allied entities have resulted in new dynamics of identity politics. was celebrated. In Dhaka, several (leftist) political activists
Hence, it becomes interesting to see how this identity poli- participated in the rally with placards displaying the demand
tics plays out especially in the context of the Pahela Baishakh for fundamental rights, freedom of expression, lowering of
celebrations. Pahela Baishakh, the first day of the It is believed food prices, and the right to free and fair elec-
Bengali calendar, is celebrated across the country that the Bengali tions. The rallies turned into a space for demand-
as a festival for all Bengalis regardless of their re- calendar was ing the assurance of fundamental and civil rights,
ligious identity. Every year, it is commemorated echoing the 1960s when the festival was used as a
inaugurated by
with a rally called Mangal Shobhajatra (first symbol of political and cultural resistance when
Mughal Emperor
organised by the Fine Arts Faculty of the University the Pakistan government banned the playing of
of Dhaka in 1989), along with cultural events,
Akbar in 1584 CE to Rabindranath Tagore’s songs on Radio Pakistan
concerts, and fairs. The major attractions of the streamline the land and later in the 1980s against the military regime
rally, a part of the United Nations Educational, tax system (1983–90) of President Hussain Muhammad
Scientific and Cultural Organization’s tangible cultural herit- Ershad. This can be understood when taking into account
age list, are animal-shaped carnival floats, replicas of native that the current Awami League government (in power since
species of flora and fauna, dolls, costumes, masks, and face 2009) and its institutions have been accused of severe human
paintings. It is believed that the Bengali calendar was inaugu- rights violations and the suppression of dissent by numerous
rated by Mughal Emperor Akbar in 1584 CE to streamline the national and international rights organisations.
land tax system, and that the celebration of Pahela Baishakh Another interesting yet severely under-reported development
also started during his reign. As a customary practice of that of the celebration in 2023 was how some Islamists also attempt-
time, all dues were supposed to be settled by the last day of the ed to appropriate it to suit their own narrative and push forth
month of Chaitra, and the landlords were supposed to treat their voice and views through social media campaigns and
their tenants to sweets on the first day of the new year. The comments. From an anthropological point of view, this can
main event of the day involved closing old account books be seen as a case of prioritising and selecting particular as-
and opening new ones (called halkhata) by traders and pects of a tradition to suit one’s needs and make a space for
businesspersons. Later, fairs called Baishakhi Melas became oneself, thereby transforming the meanings attached to the
important, which included kite-flying, bull racing, wrestling, tradition itself—one that requires a critical investigation.
boat racing, and the singing and performing of folk tales. The French philosopher Michel Foucault introduced the
Today, the celebration of Pahela Baishakh is portrayed as one concept of discourse (which is an important tool to investigate
of the secular symbols of the Bengali cultural tradition by a narratives) to depict a historically contingent process of pro-
majority of secular progressive intellectuals and cultural activists ducing and reinforcing knowledge, meaning, and power created
of the country. The patrons and organisers of the festival by those in power for specific reasons of social control. By
see it as a symbol of progressiveness, anti-fundamentalism, employing this Foucauldian lens, it becomes interesting to
and anti-religious extremism. With the patronisation of the see how Pahela Baishakh has been transformed into its pre-
festival by the ruling government, intellectuals, and cultural sent form. Taking a cue from Foucault, anthropologist Talal
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CULTURE, RELIGION | TOURISM, TRAVEL
Asad further introduced the concept of a discursive tradition
to show how tradition allows for debates and reinterpretation,
and how those are in turn shaped by the power relations ex-
isting within a particular tradition. According to Asad, mo-
dernity presupposes “tradition” as something fixed and op-
posed to reason that needs to be denounced for the sake of
the future, but ends up turning into a form of tradition itself,
with the purpose of establishing itself as the “way to be.”
In contemporary Bangladesh, Pahela Baishakh is not a
mere celebration of Bengali culture and tradition. The cele-
bration, and the debates surrounding it, serves to reinforce a
new discourse of Bengali culture and identity that works in
favour of those in power, allowing them to control the socio-
political dynamics and possibilities of the imagined nation.
By taking an age-old tradition and imbuing it with renewed
meanings and importance, the state as an aspect of modernity
has appropriated it in a way that befits its political agenda
and the interest of the capitalist market. Ultimately, the dis-
course around Pahela Baishakh manages to generalise its po-
litical interest, leading to an institutionalisation of the tradition
72
to such an extent where it is no longer possible to outrightly re-
ject it, making it necessary to negotiate with it. This is why
Islamists find the need to appropriate the festival to further
their claims, moving away from an earlier position of opposing
the celebration altogether, and political activists, realising
the power of the festival as a platform to amplify their own
voices, use it to represent key political issues and demands
while keeping within the limits of the regime-defined norms.
The current debates around Pahela Baishakh are mostly
limited to the binary opposition between Islam and secularism,
failing to look at how various aspects of the tradition are ap-
propriated and transformed in relation to power, political
interest, liberal political discourse, and global warfare. It is
important to enquire how a reinterpretation of meaning, re-
claiming of space, and newer debates, negotiations, and criti-
ques are taking place around Pahela Baishakh within the power
dynamics of the current sociopolitical context of Bangladesh.
Md Abu Salek Khan (skhan1512@outlook.com) is a researcher and activist, currently
working as a senior officer (research and evaluation) at the Centre for Research and
Development in Dhaka.
october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

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TOURISM, TRAVEL | ENVIRONMENT, ECOLOGY
Bird Brothers of Delhi
for Ecological Equity
Shaunak Sen’s All That Breathes tells the story of all
living beings that share space in the urban ecology
of Delhi through the rehabilitation of the black kite.
Asrarul Haque Jeelani, Sreekumar.NC
E
cology, though it has always been a concern of human
civilisation, is a late discipline of science. In the mod-
ern, Western knowledge system, Ernest Hackel initiated
the scientific discourse of ecology, followed by many others.
In India, the Bombay Natural History Society (BNHS) pursued
systematic scientific studies on the subject. Salim Ali, the
birdman of India and a pioneer of BNHS, had a deep interest
in birds in the natural, physical surroundings of his child-
hood, so much so that he devoted his life to ornithology. Ali’s
scientific efforts in India pioneered the discipline of ornithol-
ogy in particular and ecology in general.
Since then, ecology has diversified its knowledge systems
into many subfields, with the language too changing according
to the context. The staunch vegetarianism of some communities
in India and the religious or social superstitions attached to
certain “non-vegetarian” birds are some of the sociocultural
practices that are at the root of ecological injustice. The world
view that inspires such ideas reflects the entrenchment of
caste practices that separate not only human beings from one
another but also humanity from nature.
Amid the expansion and evolution of ecological studies,
modelling-based research and computational integration
sometimes push the discipline towards reductionism. How-
ever, a recent Oscar-nominated documentary film, All That
EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40 73
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ENVIRONMENT, ECOLOGY

Breathes (2022), has attempted to depict a multidimensional theme of the fi lm. The fund crunch they face is in no small
ecological challenge on the screen through a story that part because the birds they care for are “non-vegetarian.”
breaks the divide between human and non-human beings. The philanthropists in Indian society are, either due to religion
The fi lm tells the story of brothers Nadeem Shehzad and or superstition, reluctant to extend a helping hand towards
Mohammad Saud’s efforts to protect the black kite, a majestic the rescue of the so-called “lower-caste” birds like black
bird of prey and a crucial element in New Delhi’s ecosystem. kites, eagles, barn owls, vultures, and falcons.
A denial of treatment to injured “non-vegetarian” birds at a Beyond this, the film explores the scope of a holistic ecology, in
Jain bird hospital inspired them to establish Despite the peacock opposition to reductionist ecology, which has many
Wildlife Rescue, a veterinary and rehabilitation being omnivorous, colours of thought, actions, and subsystems. From
centre where they provide care to wounded micro to macro realities, a sense of ecological aliena-
the bird has an
birds, nurse them to strength, and release them tion defines the lives of human–animal beings. In
elevated status while
back into the urban ecology. terms of the film’s expression, the urban ecology of
the black kite has no
The caste system is primarily based on the no- Delhi exhibits all the colours emerging from contra-
tion of purity and pollution, and is maintained such privilege, dictory emotions of love and hate, and purity and
through endogamous marriages and eating habits. though both have pollution. The human–animal relations shown in
This is extended to birds too, viewing some as “pure” mythological this film broaden one’s horizon in prioritising com-
and some as “polluted” based on what they eat. Car- importance passion and cooperation against conflict, discrimina-
nivorous birds are perceived as impure and symbolise bad luck. tion, violence, and hierarchy that defines these relations in India.
The superstitions attached to these birds, like the black kite, the The divide between man and nature is embedded in our
barn owl, the vulture, and the crow, make them vulnerable to understanding, and man dominates and controls nature.
stigma and discrimination. The black kite is among those However, the debate in philosophy concerning human beings’
birds that have faced discrimination in getting treatment in relation to ecology has a long history of contradictory ideas.
the bird hospitals of Delhi, as the two bird brothers explain in The stratification one sees in human–animal interactions
the film. Given that black kites eat meat, a Jain bird hospital and in our differing attitudes to different animals is not only
refused treatment to wounded birds brought in by the brothers. a sociological concern but also an ecological one. The con-
In contrast, birds like peacocks and pigeons, and animals like cept and dimensions of ecological justice and equity need
cows and monkeys are seen as pious and pure. Despite the to be re-examined to include justice for non-human actors
peacock being omnivorous the bird has an elevated status, while too. It must include all those living in the water, residing on the
the black kite has no such privilege, though both have myth- land, and breathing in the sky. This becomes more evident
ological importance. The care of animals that are considered when the environmental philosophy of ecocentric develop-
sacred or pious, particularly cows, receive immense support ment and holistic ecological understanding are integrated in
in the form of government, non-government, and religious theory and praxis. Our knowledge systems need to realise
efforts. Though service to cows stems from the belief of sewa that there is a broader reality to an ecology that unifies all
(service) and punya (virtue, or the opposite of sin), today it has beings than just the social stratification that divides us.
stretched to violence targeting one particular community. Like-
Asrarul Haque Jeelani (asrarhj@gmail.com) and Sreekumar.NC (sreekumarnc12@gmail.
wise, the Muslim brothers too ground their work in the belief com) are researchers at the Centre of Social Medicine and Community Health,
of khidmat (service) and sawaab (virtue). The cows and the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
black kite receive human service with the same intention, but
one faces violence and discrimination while the other does not.
With its slow-motion cinematic visuals showing the sublime
beauty of crawling creatures in the night to floating feathered
friends in the deep blue sky, the documentary film captures the
broader story of all living beings that share space in the urban
ecology of a metropolis. The story of Nadeem and Saud, with
the help of a committed volunteer at Wildlife Rescue, Salik
Rehman, is entangled with Delhi’s urban ecology where kites
fly in the sky, prey on the debris, breathe in the polluted city,
and thrive in the hateful social and stratified ecosystem. The
film encapsulates the interactions of “all that breathes” in the
urban ecology through the specific case of the kite, referred
to as the gut microbiome in urban ecology. Its survival is
crucial to the survival of other organisms in the ecology. The
challenges faced by the brothers in sustaining, maintaining,
and expanding the bird hospital are the central running
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CULTURE, RELIGION | TOURISM, TRAVEL

The Karaikal Train Chronicles

Embarking on a Living Museum Expedition
What if the Karaikal–SMVT Bengaluru Express, one of the longest day trains in South India, was turned into
an immersive museum?

Vishnu Achutha Menon

T
he Karaikal railway station bustles with activity as lively negotiations over prices form a backdrop of transac-
passengers eagerly await the departure of a train. The tional energy.
salty breeze carries the scent of the sea, creating a re- As the train chugs along, making its way through the heart of
freshing atmosphere as travellers find their seats and settle the countryside, small clusters of makeshift stalls emerge along-
in for the journey. Painted in bold hues of red and yellow, the side the tracks. Enterprising locals have turned this passing
train exudes an air of excitement, ready to transport its pas- train into a marketplace, showcasing their wares to eager trav-
sengers on a memorable expedition. The bustling atmosphere ellers. One of the first vendors I notice is a cheerful lady with a
immediately catches my attention as I step into an unre- vibrant display of fresh beans. The earthy aroma of the beans
served compartment. Entering the lively and vibrant car- enticingly permeates the air. As the train slows down, she nego-
riage, I find myself among a diverse mix of passengers, each tiates deftly with passengers interested in her farm fresh pro-
with their own story to tell. Families, groups of Sometimes, the duce. Next to her, a group of artisans display colour-
friends, and solo travellers occupy the seats, most remarkable ful bangles. Each bangle seems to reflect the re-
forming an eclectic tapestry of humanity. The gion’s rich cultural heritage and the craftsmanship
adventures unfold
rhythmic sound of the engine fills the air, intensify- of the local artisans. Intricate designs adorned with
on the humble
ing my sense of anticipation and adventure, and the shimmering stones and delicate patterns beckon
tracks of a train
convoy on track starts its descent. Finding my seat the passers-by. The vendors passionately explain
by the window, I settle in and gaze outside. As the train gradu- the significance of each design, highlighting the connection be-
ally pulls out of the station, the scenery begins to unfold, and tween their craft and the traditions of the Cauvery delta. But it
moving down the aisle, the distinct aroma of freshly brewed is not just the tangible products that are being shared on this
chai wafts through the air. Skilful vendors navigate the narrow unique train ride. A group of musicians and storytellers board
aisles, carrying trays loaded with steaming cups of tea, snacks, and the train next. They are custodians of the region’s folklore, pass-
delicious treats. The clinking of coins, exchange of goods, and ing down stories and melodies from generation to generation.
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TOURISM, TRAVEL | ENVIRONMENT, ECOLOGY

Their music fills the air, transporting passengers to a world countryside to the urban jungle is swift but mesmerising.
where historic legends and tales come alive. Enthralled by the Skyscrapers reach for the heavens, while the city’s energy
vibrant ambience created by these local entrepreneurs, an idea infuses the atmosphere with vibrance. The Cauvery delta
begins to form in my mind. What if this train, with its living train journey leaves an indelible mark on one’s heart, forever
museum of rural entrepreneurship, were transformed into a etching memories of the captivating landscapes, the warmth of
flagship tourism attraction at the state or national level? It could the local communities, and the profound connection between
become a symbol of the region’s rich heritage and offer visitors a nature and humanity. It is a reminder that, sometimes, the most
truly immersive experience. remarkable adventures unfold on the humble tracks of a train,
The Karaikal–SMVT Bengaluru Express runs between Karaikal taking us on a captivating journey that transcends mere
and Bengaluru, connecting three distinct regions—Puducherry, transportation and connects us to the essence of a place.
Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka. It makes 56 stops and is one of the As the train pulls into the station, I cannot help but feel
longest day trains in South India, covering a distance of approxi- inspired by the endless possibilities that lie before us. The
mately 516 km. Imagine the train adorned with traditional art- Cauvery delta has more to offer than just scenic beauty; it holds
work, showcasing the customs and traditions of the Cauvery the key to a transformative experience that could educate,
delta. Each coach could be dedicated to a specific aspect of rural entertain, and bring people closer to the roots of rural India.
life, such as agriculture, handicrafts, folklore, and culinary de-
Vishnu Achutha Menon (vishnuachuthamenon@gmail.com) teaches at the Department
lights. Moving on, one of the carriages would transform into a of Media Studies, Kristu Jayanti College (autonomous), Bengaluru.
moving art gallery, displaying exquisite art like Thanjavur paint-
ings, leather crafts, or Ilkal textiles. Skilled artisans would offer
live demonstrations and opportunities for visitors to try their
hand at these art forms. Further along, the train would immerse
passengers in the enchanting world of music and dance. Folklore
groups and classical musicians would bring melodies and
rhythms alive, showcasing traditional performance arts like
Bharatanatyam and Karakattam. A dedicated dining carriage
would complete the experience, offering mouth-watering delica-
cies from the delta. Local chefs would prepare traditional dishes
using the region’s bountiful produce and aromatic spices, allow-
ing every bite to be a celebration of the region’s gastronomic her-
itage. This living museum train could also act as a platform to
promote sustainable practices and ecotourism. Farmers could
highlight their organic-farming techniques, while artisans could
emphasise the use of locally sourced materials and natural dyes,
highlighting the strength of local, circular economies. It would
be a celebration of the region’s rich biodiversity and a call to pre-
serve it for future generations.
Continuing its journey, the train crosses the border into the
bustling state of Tamil Nadu, embarking on a captivating
passage through the heartland of the region. Windows offer
glimpses of ancient temples adorned with intricate sculptures,
their towering gopurams standing tall against the sky. Devotees,
dressed in vibrant attire, throng the temple precincts, immers-
ing themselves in their faith and spiritual pursuits. Leaving the
flat countryside behind, the train ventures into the enchanting
hills of the Eastern Ghats. Lush forests carpet the slopes, envel-
oping the landscape in various shades of green. Cascading
waterfalls tumble down rocky cliffs, creating crystalline streams
that merge with the rivers below. The air turns cooler and
fresher, invigorating the senses and providing respite from the
summer heat. The ever-changing vistas, the vibrant atmos-
phere within the train, and the sense of exploration combine
to create an immersive experience.
Finally, the train approaches its destination—the bustling
metropolis of Bengaluru. The transition from the idyllic
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 7, 2023 vol lViII no 40 73