Patriotism

Is Patriotism a Mistake?
Author(s): GEORGE KATEB

Source: Social Research, Vol. 67, No. 4 (WINTER 2000), pp. 901-924
Published by: New School
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Is Patriotism
a Mistake?* BYGEORGEKATEB
Is patriotisma mistake?I thinkthatit is a mistaketwiceover: It

is typicallya gravemoral errorand itssource is typically a stateof
mental confusion.But the mistakeof patriotismis an inevitable
mistake.It cannot be avoided; almost no one can help being a
patriotof some kind and to some degree. What is surprisingand
deplorable is thatthe mistakeof patriotismis elaborated theoret-
icallyand promotedby people who should knowbetter- thatis,
politicaltheorists,moral philosophers,and theologians.
The defenseofpatriotism bysome,perhapsmany,thinkers is sur-
prising.More surprisingly, however,thatdefenseshould probably
not be so surprising.One of the most pronounced tendenciesof
contemporary intellectuallifeis thedefenseofferedofwhatI fearI
mustcall moraland mentalobtuseness.I have in mind the general
abandonmentby intellectualsof a commitmentto theirown pre-
conditions, whichare some mainvaluesoftheEnlightenment: inde-
pendence of mind as an aspiration for all persons,rejectionof
fanaticism, and a fiercedislikeof idolatry,especiallygroupidolatry.
I am not sayingthat unless a philosopher followsthe French
philosophesin everyparticular, he or she betraysthe Enlightenment.
But thereis a profounddiscrepancybetweenthe values thatmake
the thinkinglifepossibleand the values thatsome recentthinkers
haveespousedas good forothers.Iftheseothersprevail,all thinkers
would be threatenedwithpersecution.Intellectualcondescension
wouldbe repaidwithanti-intellectual repression.
*Thispaperbeganas remarks on a panelatAPSA,1996,devotedto Maurizio
Viroli'sForLoveofCountry(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),and to thegeneral
themeofpatriotism. I wantto thankRoxanneEuben,SankarMuthu,and Nadia
Urbinati fortheirsuggestions.
Vol.67,No.4 (Winter
SOCIALRESEARCH, 2000)
902 SOCIAL RESEARCH
A defenseof patriotism is an attackon the Enlightenment; a

defenseofall groupphenomenarelatedor analogousto patrio-
tismis also an attackon theEnlightenment. Actually, thedefense
ofpatriotism is simplyone part,thougha majorone, ofa larger
particularist tendencyof thought, whichhonorsmembership in
all groupsthatoffer tohelppersonscarrytheburdenofselfhood,
ofindividual identity.The greatest partoftheburdenis thequest
formeaningfulness, whichis tantamount to receiving definition
fortheself.It is claimedthatthemostgratifying definition ofself
comesfromthelimitsimposedand permissions grantedbymem-
bershipin culturalor identity groups.A largenumberofintellec-
tualshaveundertaken to defend theclaimsofgroupidentity and
affiliationas such,becausetheunderlying idea is thatonlysuch
identityand affiliation can bestowa coherentmeaningon life(or
establisha purposeforlife).Onlywhenlifeis thoughtto have
suchmeaningfulness can lifebe endurableforpeople,especially
forthegreatmassofnonintellectual people.
Therefore, I puttoonesidethosecaseswhereintellectuals directly
ordisguisedly defendtheirownparticularism, be itbasedon religion,
ethnicity,race,nationality, or language.Thatis a different kindof
aberration fromtheone thatoccupiesmein thispaper.
Groupmembership and allegiancesimplify lifeby tyingthe
identityof each member to a structure ofinclusion and exclusion,
of questionsand answers, of ritesand ceremonies, of allowable
and censurable fantasies.
Supposedly, itis nonintellectual people,
people who do not do their own thinking, who crave meaningthe
mostandwhomustbe givenitbythosewhodo theirthinking for
them.Thus,we findtheoretical defensesofsuchgroupphenom-
ena as religious fundamentalism, ethnicpride,and linguistic and
ethnicseparatism. Multiculturalism, the new name forcultural
pluralism, is all therage.And then, course,thereis patriotism,
of
themostdeadlyformofgroupattachment, towhichI willturnin
shortorder.
One sourceof the defenseof groupattachment is postmod-
ernism.Postmodern defenders ofgroup-sustaining fictionsdon't
usuallytelltheirreadersexplicitly thattheyare defending beliefs
IS PATRIOTISM A MISTAKE? 903
thattheycouldeasilynegate.Rather, theyare- sometimes unwit-

-
tingly faithfulto theStraussian distinction between esoteric and
exotericwriting,without havingStrauss 's couragein announcing
thatsucha distinction exists.Straussletsthecat out ofthebag-
notthathe expectsmostpeople to notice.Postmodernists must
thinkthatall thatthegreaterpublicwilleverlearnaboutthemis,
at most,theirdefenseof group-sustaining beliefs,whichare
knownonlybythefew to be unwarranted
fictitious, beliefs.
Now,ifone oddityis thatpostmodern intellectualsdefendanti-
socialphenomena,thefurther
intellectual oddityis thatmanyof
theseintellectualdefendersare convincedthatthereis no tran-
scendentmeaningor purposein lifeand thatall valuesare arbi-
traryor subjective.Wefindthatmany,thoughbyno meansall,of
the defendersof tightgrouplife (of one kindor another)are
postmodernists or are sympathetic to postmodernism. That
meansthatthesethinkers combinea see-through-it-all radicalism
withan accept-it-allpermissiveness; they combine scepticism or
atheismforthemselves witha defenseof orthodoxy or funda-
mentalism forothers,withspecialfavornaturally conferredon
thosegroupswhosebeliefsgivethe selfa shape bygivinglifea
meaning,any meaning,preferably a systemof meaning,and
becauseofit,a coherence.I am notsayingthatpoliticaltheorists,
moralphilosophers, and theologians,originatethesebeliefs -
althoughsometimes theydo. Manyofthebeliefsareinherited, of
course. Rather,these kindsof thinkersprovidecomfortand
encouragement, providerationalization, forsubscribing tobelief,
forindulgingthewillto believe,forunitinga wishto havetruth
and a disinclinationto makea seriouseffort to ascertainit.
The postmodernists takeawaywithone hand whattheygive
withanother.Theydeconstruct theattempted meaningof intel-
lectualsystemsand ofsomerationalist aspectsofculture, butthey
simultaneously endorse thecraving for confident meaning.They
conveythemessage,butnotin so manywords,thatitis betternot
to tryto tellpeople thetruththatthereis no truth,of thesorts
peoplewant,to tell;instead,itis betterforintellectuals to defend
and promotefictions thattheseintellectuals knowto be fictions
904 SOCIAL RESEARCH
and to do so becausepeopleneed fictions and wouldlanguishor

perish without them. The people naturally hold theirfictions as
truths, whereasmanyintellectuals see throughthemand still
promote them. These intellectuals maynotbelievein thepossi-
ofsystematic
bility truth,buttheysurelyappearnotto believein
truthfulness or honesty,either.The programof Nietzscheas
Lawgiver - the patheticand leastvaluableNietzsche - is carried
out,butwithouthis compunction, and withoutthetotalcandor
he establisheswithhisreaders.Noticethatwhatis involvedis not
theimmemorial practiceofdefending beliefsthatthinkers know
arefictions becausetheyfearthesubversive effects on morality of
explodedfictions, religiousor metaphysical. To thecontrary, the
beliefsthatmanycontemporary thinkers wanttodefendconduce
toimmorality (bythethinkers' ownstandard),and thesethinkers
knowingly defend them anyway. And thepostmodern relativism
ofsomeofthesethinkers makesitall tooeasytodisseminate ideas
thatworkwithimmoraleffects.Emersoncomplainsin "The
AmericanScholar"that"toooften,thescholarerrswithmankind
and forfeitshisprivilege" (p. 54). Thereis abundantreasonthese
daysto echo thatcomplaint.Group-based meaningfulness gives
to it
solace people,undeniably; helps give to closureto personal
identity.But if intellectuals cannot supply honest and truthful
meaning,theyshouldnotsupply or defend meaningthey know to
be unwarrantable. Perhaps,itwouldbe bestforthemto remain
silent,iftheydecidedthattheysimplycould notdeprivepeople
ofsolace.
I grantthattheoretical supportforgroupidentity and affilia-
tionand forthebeliefsthatsustainit does not come fromonly
postmodern unbelief;it mayalso come froma somewhatmore
complicatedmentalcondition.My pointpertainsespeciallyto
religiousand metaphysical beliefs.I mean thatsomewriters go
through motions, hoping that the result willbe their own adher-
ence or conversion, and theyrecommendtheprocessto others,
especiallytootherthinkers. Theyseemtobe sayingtothemselves:
"Letus writeas we believe,and thusimitatethosewho,as gen-
if
uinebelievers, maintained thetradition wenow,in thefaceofour
ownunbelief, wanttokeepgoing.Letus forget or puttoone side

or blurwhatwe once knewto be true,and contribute to theper-
petuationofwhatwewantto be trueand whatwe feelwe do not
knowenoughtocallfalse.Weshallpracticethetraditional modes
of thinking, eventhoughtheynecessarily lack theirold solidity.
Weconstruct simulacra thatwehopewillpassfor,orpassinto,the
realthing.Wewillconfuseourselvesand othersintoclarity." But
thismentalcomplication(or slow philosophicalsuicide) leads
only to thereturn of once tragic constructions as farcical:
farcical
becauseflimsy. Goingthroughthesemotionsis notexactlycover-
ing genuinedespairwitha simulated
a hopefulness; itismorelike
showingmisplacedsolicitudeforothersand thewrongkindof
careforoneself.This tendency is,however, lessprominent than
postmodernist connivance withsuperstition.
There is one more oddity.I have noticeda recenttendency
among some thinkers, who are non- or anti-postmodern, to
defendintensity of passionor emotion.These thinkersdo so
becauseofa fearthatcontemporary lifeis shallow,thatthepeo-
ple around us are averse to commitment and loyalty, havelostthe
abilitytocaredeeplyaboutanything outsidethemselves; and care
aboutwrong,superficial in to
things regard themselves. Thereis
a growing- shallwecallit- moralarchaismor conservatism, fairly
continuouswithcommunitarianism, but conceptually separable
fromit,thatvaluesstrongfeelingsofanysortor passionatecom-
mitment or attachment as such.Notall defenders ofthepassions
advocateindividual attachment to groups,butsomedo so explic-
Thiswayofmourning
itly. theperceivedlossofdepthis guidedby
theunexpressed surmise, I believe,thatpeople havedepthonly
whentheyhavestrongfathers, thatdepthgoes onlywithpatri-
archy reinforced by patriotism and monotheism(one divinity,
and picturedas father).For these conservatives, however,the
newly assertive religiousness is not likely to resurrect thefather
and withhim, depth of psyche.I call this developmentodd
becauseconservatives blametheironizing and scepticalelements
in postmodernism forjustifying thesupposedlossofpassionand
commitment. Despite the overt hostility,thereis thusan unrec-
906 SOCIAL RESEARCH
ognizedalliancebetweensomepostmodernists and someoftheir

enemies.Postmodernists offeran untruthful defenseof dogma;
the moralconservatives offera sometimesinsinceredefenseof
devotion.
The differencebetweenthesetwocampsis this:themoralcon-
talkothersand perhapsthemselves
servatives intocommitments,
whereasthe postmodernists solelydefendthe commitments of
others.The conservativessee thecorrosiveness inherentin post-
modernism, but failto observethe supportlentby some post-
moderniststo the passionatecommitments held sincerelyby
variousgroups.The conservatives also failto see theirownhol-
lowness,evenas theycomplainabouttheshallowness ofthepeo-
ple around them. I mean that the project urgingpassion,of
of
willingpassion,on oneselfand othersmustresultin an amazing
The sourcesof such passionin contrivance
self-deception. and
deliberateeffortis forgotten.If the postmodernists consecrate
thesincereespousalbyothersofcommitments thatthepostmod-
ernists
knowareunjustifiable, thepostmodernists areatleastfree,
forthemostpart,ofself-deception. Thatis an advantage,I sup-
pose.Butjudged fromtheperspective oftruthas wellas theper-
of
spective morality, both the particulargroup commitments
defendedbymanypostmodernists and the idea of groupcom-
mitmentas such defendedby some moral conservatives are
deservingofseriousscrutiny and,I believe,ofourreproach.
to patriotism
To turnspecifically as a formofgroupidentity and
affiliation:
Whyreally do I thinkthatpatriotism initselfisa mistake?
letus ask,Whatis patriotism?
First, It is loveof one's How
country.
ispatriotismmostimportantly shown? Letus notmincewords.The
answeris thatitis mostimportantly shown in a readiness, whether
reluctant socialor zealous,to die and to killfor
or matter-of-fact,
one's country. These twoanswerscomprisethe mostcommon
understanding of patriotism.Whatis one's country? Here the
answerI giveis not the one lodgedin commonunderstanding,

whichunderstanding wouldrepeltheanswerI propose.Myanswer
-
isthatone'scountryanycountry - isbestunderstoodas an abstrac-
for
tion, itis a of
compound a few actual
and manyimaginary ingre-
dients.If the word imaginary is too disdainful,
then substitute
induced}A countryis nota discerniblecol-
or aesthetically
imaginative
lectionofdiscernible individuals likea teamor a faculty or a local
chapter ofa voluntary association. Ofcoursea country isa delimited
territory. It is also a a a
place, setting,geography; it has landscape,
cityscapes, perhapsseascapes;it has old buildingsas wellas new
ones;ithashistorical sites;ithasa light,an air,an atmosphere; ithas
a speciallook.Butitisalsoconstructed outoftransmitted memories
trueand false;a history usuallymostly falselysanitized or falsely
heroized;a senseofkinshipofa largely invented purity; and social
tiesthatare largely invisible or impersonal, indeedabstract, yetby
an act of insistent or of dream-like imagination made visible and
personal.
What,then,is patriotism, really?It is a readinessto die and to
killforan abstraction: nothingyoucan see all of,or feelas you
feelthepresenceofanotherperson,or comprehend. Patriotism,
then,is a readinessto die and to killforwhatis largelya figment
of the imagination. For thisfigment, one commitsoneselfto a
militarized and continuously politicized conceptionoflife,a con-
ception that is entirely masculinist. Patriotism is,fromitsnature,
a commitment tothesystem ofpremature, violentdeath,inflicted
and accepted,in whatever that
spirit suits one's temperament or
thatis currentin one's timeand place, and withvictoriesand
defeatscomingas theydo. The deathlypassionof patriotism
attainedan almostparodicformnot so long ago whenin the
country ofGeorgiaan official(Mrs.Shevardnadze, in fact)tried
to block the adoptionof Georgianorphansby U.S. citizens.
Accordingto NewYorkTimesreporterAlessandraStanley,Mrs.
Shevardnadze said,"AlltheGeorgianpeople are suffering hard-
ship.. . . Let our children suffer,too."As Stanleysaid, "she casts
theissueas one ofnationalidentity" (NYT,6/29/97,pp. 1, 12).
Such candorabout the bond betweenpatriotism and death is
908 SOCIAL RESEARCH
uncommonthesedays.In a wholebookofdefensesofpatriotism
againstMarthaNussbaum'scosmopolitanism, thereis scarcely
anyreferenceto the necessaryconnectionbetweenpatriotism
and militarizeddeath.2Anthony Appiahappearsto endorsehis
father'sbeliefthatGhana is worthdyingfor.And Elaine Scarry
toucheson internationalconflictoccasionedby tribalnational
Thatis all.
feelings.
I askus to noticethatan abstraction ofthesortthatI saypatri-

otismis,is notthesamethingas a principle. Thereis a verysharp
contrast betweena readinessto die and to killforan abstraction
and a readinessto do thesamefora principle.A principlemust
be universal,butan abstraction can haveanyscope.To embrace
a principle,whichis ofcourseabstract in somesense,is to pledge
oneselfto a ruleto guideone's perceptionof theworldand, if
one has sufficient to guideone's conductin it.A moral
integrity,
principle,even if a personusuallylackssufficient integrity to
remainactively faithful
to itin all the most or
tempting desperate
circumstances, governs one's conduct toward others,and the
expectations one has oftheconductofothers.A moralprinciple
mustbe conceivedas universalist, and asksforconsistent applica-
tion;and itaimsat respectforpersonsor individuals, notabstract
entitiesoftheimagination. Thereis also a sharpcontrast, on the
otherhand,betweenan abstraction likepatriotism and a tangible
personal interestlike or
beingprotected preserved in one'srights
oflife,liberty,and property, forwhichpurposeitmayalso some-
timesbe thought necessary riskdeathand to kill.
to
To be sure,patriotism is not onlyan abstraction, it is also an
ideal;butitis a verypeculiarone: itidealizesan entity - thecoun-
try- thatpeoplefeelis themor theirs. Patriotism therefore makes
a certainkindof self-love intoan ideal. It is a self-concern that
inevitablypasses into a licensedself-preference that, from the
natureofthings, must,in turn,attemptto be destructive toward
othercountries, and rarelyforthesakeofdefending people'stan-

gible interests.The moral is to
disposition respect others fortheir
ownsake,and even to tryto preferthemto oneselfand one's
own,thoughnot as a matterof courseto utterly self-sacrificing
lengths. (There mayperhaps be a moral duty preserveoneself
to
at a costto others,ifneed be.) But patriotism is inherently dis-
posed to disregardmorality, well short of regard for others.
Armedentitiescan neverthinkof anything but self-promotion;
theirleadersneverthinkfora momentofgivingequal consider-
ationto otherpeoples,muchlesspreferring them.None ofthem
does. The moraldisposition is whollyalien to international rela-
tions,because self-preservation, no matterhow defined,is per-
manently thoughtendangered. You can love particular persons
without havingto dislikeor hateothers;butyoucannotlovean
abstract entity likea country and notdislikeor hateothercoun-
tries,becausecountries are,fromtheirnatureas organizations of
and forpower,in actualor latentcompetition. The energiesof
groupanimosity awaitand oftenreceivethe mobilizationthey
desire.Those who lead the mobilization see theircountryas a
meansor base forstruggle.
The highestmoralprinciples teachrestraint of self-preference,
whether theselfisoneselfora group-self; on
while, theotherhand,
a person'sbasicrights and tangibleself-interest, in a tolerablesoci-
are
ety, supposed to be practiced or achieved without morally cog-
nizableharmtothesamerights and interests ofothers.In contrast,
patriotism is self-idealization;
itis groupnarcissism without anyself-
restraintexceptfora frequently unreliable prudence, andcarriedto
death-dealing lengths.Patriotism is one of themore radical forms of
group-thinking, or groupidentity and affiliation. Beingarmedis
whatmakesit radical.I don't findmuchdifference, at leastin
effects,between patriotismand nationalism.
A good patriotdoes notwantpeople in othercountriesto be
patriots.Onlywhena patriot is a theorist whois also an aesthete -
as,say,Machiavelli was- doeshe wantevery country tocontaingood
patriots,doeshispatriotism getuniversalized and henceconverted
intoa principle. The aestheticized patriot wants thegameof ani-
910 SOCIAL RESEARCH
mosity to be playedwellbyall sides.He desirestowin,so he wants

patriotic enemieswhohaveenoughprowessto makevictory over
themgratifying, eventhoughtheymustnotbe as goodas he andhis
sideare. He sees thisgamethatisnota gameas thepointoflifeand
wantsthegametogo on forever; he himselfmayonlyplayhispatri-
otismlikea role.Butthisaestheticized patriotism,ifitis a principle
at all,is an immoralone. Mostpatriots, however, are purelyavari-
ciousforvictory and mustpreferto contendwithadversaries who
areunpatriotic or muchlessso,andwhohavelessprowess, despite
theattractions ofdefeating a strongerenemy.
Patriotism is a jealous and exclusiveloyalty. Thisfact,however,
doesn'texcludecaseswhereenemieshavea commoninterest in
the
maintaining generalsystem patrioticof loyalty.States engaged
in warhavecooperatedin punishingmutiny in theranksofone
of them.Analogously, rulersmayrefuseto supportrebellionin
thedomainofone oftheirfellow-rulers, despiteenmity; and reli-
gionsthatdenyvalidity to one another may for a time supporta
generalreligiousness againstsecularism. Butall thiscooperation
and
acrossenemylinesis tactical temporary. The logicof exclu-
siveloyalty dictatesthatno stateor churchwantsanyothertosuc-
ceed in gainingand keepingloyalty. For the mostpart,then,
patriotism can't be a principle. Even if we could believethat
democraciesneverwagewaron otherdemocracies,imperialist
democraciesnevertheless have subvertedor preyedon other
democracies, whetherimperialist or not.So thatthereseemslit-
tle plausibility to thecontentionthatcitizensof one democracy
can alwayswantcitizensof otherdemocraciesto be patriots.In
anyevent,it'sodd tothinkthatas a matter ofprinciplepatriotism
can be reserved fordemocracies.
Now,MaurizioViroli,in a trulyfinetheoreticaldefenseofpatri-
otism,ForLoveofCountry, a workoflearnedoriginality,maintains
thatpatriotismis not love of countryas one's owncountry,but
rathera loveof country becausethecountry is theplace offree

republican institutions.The patriotismhe wishes to defendis,in
hisphrase,"thepatriotism ofliberty"(1995,p. 17). Thatis,Viroli
triesto makepatriotism notonlya principle, buta moralprinci-
ple. His patriotis committed to freedomabove all, but is espe-
cially concernedwith achieving,securing,or restoringthe
freedomof his own country. Freedomis the firstprincipleof
politicalmorality;patriotismis theenergybehindit.I takeViroli
to be suggesting thata highand moralprinciplelike freedom
cannotbe lovedunlessitis entwined withone's owncountry, with
one's wayoflifeand place ofmemory. A universal principlecan
be lovedonlythrough a definedparticularity.I am putin mindof
theCatholicviewthattheimmaterial and spiritual God cannotbe
lovedwithouteitherthe incarnation or withoutsuch devicesas
Maryolatry, or statues and of
paintings saints,or imposingand
gorgeoushousesofworship.But I thinkthattheradicalProtes-
tantcritiqueis right:theultimateGod getslostin hisrepresenta-
tions;so, for patriotslike the sort picturedby Viroli,moral
principlesriskgetting lost,musteventually getlost-displaced,or
forgotten,and oftenbetrayed.
To be fair,let us look more closelyat a case thatsupports
Viroli'sposition,butonlyto someextent.And thecase is a rare
exceptionto the rule.Duringthe timeof slavery in the United
States,did thehighpoliticalprincipleoffreedomelicita dedica-
tionforitsownsake,apartfromitsentwinement withpatriotism?
(One could substitutesome other politicalprinciplelike equal
humandignity orjusticeor socialequalityand askwhether itcan
be respectedforitsown sake apartfromits entwinement with
patriotismorsomeotherirrational ideal.) Itseemstome thatLin-
colnwaspersuadedfromthetimeoftheDred Scottcase (1857)
thatslavery couldbe abolishedonlybywar,butthatthefreestates
wouldneverbegina warforthe purposeof abolishingslavery;
theywouldfightonlyto preservethe Union. In the South,the
avowedpurposeof secessioncould not be primarily to defend
slavery:a majority ofwhitehouseholdsownedno slaves,though
we knowthat theycould not imaginethemselves livingwith
912 SOCIAL RESEARCH
4 millionfreedblacks.In anycase,themainavowedpurposehad
to be thefailureof theUnionto recognizestates'rights;or less
thepurposehad to be to asserta separatenational
legalistically,
identityand secureitbywar.Thus,in theNorthern case,patrio-
tismwas enlistedfora moralend thatotherwisecould not be
attained;in theSoutherncase,patriotism wasenlistedtopreserve
theradically unjustinstitution of slavery. In bothcases,thereal
-
moralissue at leastin theinstigation ofthewarand fora time
during the war itself-
was covered over bytheemotionofpatrio-
tism,whichwasreal:in theNorthon behalfoftheUnionand in
theSouthon behalfoftheSouth.Ifitwerenotforslavery, South-
ernpatriotism wouldnothavebeen tried.
Whatlessoncan be learned?Certainly, patriotism maybe mobi-
lizedfora good cause.Butmuchmoreeasily, itmaybe mobilized
foran unjustone. I thinkthatLincoln'smobilization of patrio-
tismis one of the bestinstancesof entwining patriotism and a
high moral end. What he had to contend with was equallystrong
Southernpatriotism. Forthesakeofa good cause,he felthe had
to actmanipulatively.The manipulation wasenormous:he could
not disclosethe springsof his policy,thoughthe Southunder-
stoodhimwellenough.As a candidate,he refusedcertaincom-
promiseson theissueofslavery. In hispublicpositionsbetween
Dred Scottand secession,he riskedtheUnionto containslavery.
Once president, he knewthatonlya minority feltas he feltabout
at leastup to 1862,partwaythroughthewar.He would
slavery,
notmakepeace fora restoredUnion,ifslavery wereto be pre-
served.He washimselfa patriotand reveredtheUnion.But he
hatedslavery morethanhe lovedhis country. So he playedthe
patriotismcardwhenhe had to.Thisis thehardesttestofmycon-
tentionthatpatriotism is a mistake.It is in itselfa mistake,butit
mayon occasionbe tactically usefulfora high,moralcause.Even
whentactically usefulforsucha cause,however, itssuccessmay
exacttremendous moralcosts;aboveall,thecostinherentin the
wagingofa bloodyand protracted war.In anyevent,howoftenin
the annalsof the love of countryhas a highmoralcause been
served?Perhapsmorethanonce. Butthencomparetheseoccur-
renceswithall theoccasionson whichloveof country has been

enlistedforan unjustand oftenirrational orstupidpurpose.How
does thecomparison come out?Is notthepreponderant tactical
use of patriotism to serveunjustcauses?Wouldn'tit be right -
impossibly -
right ifno one werea patriot?
Furthermore, ifpoliticalprinciplecan be defendedonlywhen
itis mixedwithpatriotism, so thattheprincipleis defendedonly
becauseitis oursand notbecauseitis rightor primarily because
or ifwe calla principlerightbecausewe insistthatour
itis right,
own commitment mustbe to the right,then whereare we?
Should we followand imitateLincolnand theorizemanipula-
tively?No: don'tsomepeople haveto tryto be honest?
I thought thatwascrucially thevocationofteachers. Theyshould
defendmoralprinciples and accordthemthesupremacy
directly,
they deserve. They should not be disguised tacticians.
Leavethatto
others.To repeat,itis betterto be silentthanto be a tactician. (I
knowthatI preach.)I finditimpossible to swallow
Rousseau'sdic-
tumthattowilltheend is towillthemeans.I willtheend and may
havetouse themeans,butdo notwilltouse them.I wishI didnot
havetousethem:theystaintheendtowhichtheyareputatively the
indispensable means.AndI shouldrefuseto praisethemor hide
thetruthaboutthem.If patriotism is evergood,it is onlyinstru-
mentally good,nevergood in itself. I also knowthatthethoughts
and passionsthatcalledmodernconstitutional freedom intobeing
andsustained itwerenotpatriotic, butuniversalist,
as weretheideas
oftheLevellers, and
Jefferson, Paine,among others.
Patriotism needsexternalenemies.Devotionto a freeconstitu-
tionforitsownsakeis notpatriotism; ithas no use forenemies;
^thateshavingthem;and whenpatriotism mustbe mixedin with
such devotionto giveit strength, thenwe can be surethatthe
devotionis grossly imperfect. Evendevotionforthesakeofone's
ownnarrowpersonalinterest wouldbe a lessimpureand much
moreconsonantwayofattaching oneselfto a freeconstitution.
Typically enough, a moral personoftenhas to choosebetween
attachment to country and adherenceto moralprinciple,espe-
ciallywhen patriotism mostdemanded;namelyin thoserecur-
is
914 SOCIAL RESEARCH
rentsituations whenpatriotism is mobilizedforenterprises of

international tensionandwar.Patriotism is, ifitis a
anything,pas-
sionto forsakemoralprinciplewithan easyconscience.We mis-
understand patriotism ifwe see it as givento moraldoubt.The
Corinthians getthepointofpatriotism rightwhentheypresume
to remindtheSpartansofwhatneithertheSpartansnoranyone
elseeverforgot: "Peacestayslongestwiththosewhoarenotmore
carefultouse theirpowerjustlythanto showtheirdetermination
not to submitto injustice"(Thucydides, 1:71,p. 41). That is, a
patriot must unhesitatingly preferinflicting injusticeto suffering
it,ifthatis thechoicein anygivensituation. The patriotalways
giveshissidethebenefitofeverymoraldoubt.Patriotism is on a
permanent moral holiday,and once it is made dynamic, invari-
it
ablybecomescriminal. The meansofactivist patriotism are crim-
inal and itsends are at bestsemi-criminal. A persondevotedto
moralprinciplemayfight forhiscountry, butdoes so forthesake
ofuniversal moralprinciple, whenitsmandateshappento coin-
cide withhis country'sinterest - as theymay,but usuallyonly
partly.I grantthata fewcountriesshowa developedpatriotism
thatis unwarlike, at least,forthetimebeing- saythepatriotism
oftheSwiss.Sucha conditionisso rare,however, as tobe unhelp-
fulin theanalysis ofa generalphenomenon.
The vicissitudes ofpatrioticfeelingrarely followwhatisperhaps
theirbestpattern. Webeginbyhelplessly acquiringloveofcoun-
try;we cometo loveitsprinciples becausetheyare thecountry's;
gradually, withincreaseddiscernment, we lovetheprinciples for
theirown sake; then,if reluctantly, we acceptthe countryas a
grossly imperfect embodiment oftheprinciples, whileweareever
moresensitive to thegrossness oftheimperfection, yetapprecia-
tive,also,ofthe spasmodic effortsmade by some fellow-citizens to
reducetheimperfection or retardfurther imperfection; and we
remainunable,perhapsunwilling, to purgeourselvescompletely
of theoriginal,unreasoned,instilledlove or attachment. There
are limits, to outgrow
afterall,to theability one's earlyyears.
I thinkthatAlasdairMaclntyreis right(in "Is Patriotism a

Virtue?")to indicatethatthoughpatriotism maybe a virtue,a
kindofcourage,itsexerciseis oftenincompatible withuniversal
moral principle.But I don't share Maclntyre's allowancefor
virtuesin theserviceofpracticesthatare onlyaccidentally moral
and are morenaturally unjust.The practicesare interwoven with
vices,and thevicesmayeveninspireor call forththevirtues.So
used,orso implicated, thevirtuesceasedoingtheworkofvirtues,
even thoughI wouldnot wishto saythattheytherebybecome
vices.Theybecomequalitiesthatone cannothelp admiring, but
wishesthatone did not have to admire.The admirationis aes-
thetic,thoughnot completely so. One is temptedto wishthem
out of existencein orderforone's conscienceto be easier.But,
no, thattemptation shouldbe questioned.It shouldbe sufficient
tokeepon remembering thatvirtuesmatternotonlyas actualiza-
tionsofhumanpotentiality and self-overcoming butalso as nec-
essarymeansto rightconduct.
An extremeversionofMaclntyre's positioncomesto this:it is
moreimportant to preservecertainvirtuesor qualitiesthanto
achievea greatoutcomelikepeace orjustice,iftheseoutcomes
do not require-cannot use- those virtuesand qualities,and
wouldspelltheend ofneed forthem.Aristotle wantsto preserve
privateproperty(in part)so thatthevirtueofgenerosity can exist,
and to preservemarriage(in part)so thatthevirtueofavoiding
adulteryand henceshowingtemperance towardwomencan exist
(11:5,1263b;11:6,1265a). But these are mildcasesin comparison
to thosewherethinkers and otherswantwarto existso thatthe
virtuesorqualitiesofcourage,manliness, self-sacrifice, sin-
loyalty,
gle-minded dedication, and extravagant expenditure and self-
expenditurecan continue to exist with the greatestpublic
Patriotism
intensity. is a singlename forall thesequalities.The
motivationsbehindthispositionareaesthetic tosomedegree,but
also haveto do withan idea ofhumanstaturethatis necessarily
916 SOCIAL RESEARCH
tiedto heroismand adventure, and imprudencein

to gallantry
thefaceof dreadedbutwelcomedchallenges.I do not despise
thesemotivesor the positionto whichtheymaylead, but their
moralcostis oftenprohibitive.
Allowme to digressand saythatevenlessacceptable,however,
is the consequentialistidea thatwe can call a qualityor traita
virtueor a viceonly aftera givendisplayofithas led to a morally
desirableoutcome.Whatsupposedly countsas a virtueor a vice
can neverbe knownapartfromtherole thequalityor traithas
playedin a particular outcome.Everyqualityor traitwillsome-
timesbe calleda virtueand sometimes a vice;and thesealternat-
ing contradictory appraisalsmustbe made indefinitely intothe
future.In response,I wouldsaythatat leastwhenMachiavelli
holds thatcertainvirtuesare oftennot politically appropriate,
and thattheyproduce immoral results(thegreaterevil),he does
not stopseeingthesequalitiesas virtues.His positionis thatin
publiclifevirtueshave the effectof viceswithoutturninginto
them.He sees privatelifeas the appropriatearena forcertain
virtues.And,indeed,dailylifeoftenrequiressuchqualitiespre-
ciselyformoralpurposes:to showloveofpersonsor loveofprin-
ciples. He thoughtthat daily life would provide enough
opportunity forthesevirtues,even if hiddenfromthe public.
(This is notto deny,ofcourse,thathe madecomedyoutofwhat
wewouldcall theMachiavellism ofsexualrelations.)
I do nothold,ofcourse,thatanydemocracy - or probablyany
country, whetherdemocraticor not- is merelywickedness. All
- -
democracies to confineourselvesto those do good thingsas
wellas quitea numberofbad ones.In manysectors, a democracy
decentin someofitsdomesticpolicy,
isfairly and itremainsfaith-
ful,despiterepeatedfailuresin hard cases,to the principlesof
But such good tendenciesgo veryeasilywith
constitutionalism.
wickednessto, even despotismover,neighbors;and when a

democracyis an empire,as is the case withthe UnitedStates,
decencyat home goes veryeasilywithquite a largeamountof
wickedness abroad.How can one lovesucha mottledor hybrid
as a
entity country, when,as in a democracy,
particularly thecoun-
try'speople are (alwaysby imputationand sometimesin fact)
directlyand indirectly responsibleforthecountry's wickedpoli-
cies?Politicalinstitutions thatembodyhighmoralprinciplesin
theirproceduresand processestoo oftendo notpreventterrible
results.One does and sometimesshouldlove persons"beyond
good and evil,"so to speak;but to love a country, an abstract
entitycapable of so muchharm,especiallyto thoseoutside,to
thosewhoarenotfellow-patriots, butratherpatriots oftheirown,
-
iftheyare patriotsat all thatis an unacceptableidea. Love of
country becomesloveofleviathanor behemoth,evenwhen,and
sometimes when,one's country
especially is a modernrepublic-
-thatis,a constitutionaldemocracy. ButI am certainly notclaim-
ingthat one shouldstoploving one's own country in order tolove
othercountries, or thatone shouldloveall countriesequally.If
love of manycountriesbesidesone's own is cosmopolitanism,
thenI see littlevaluein cosmopolitanism. Worldliness is a better
outlook:a nontouristic and nonanthropological appreciationof
different ingredientsof numerous cultures, includingone's own.
One shouldnotlovewholecountries, at leastas a patriotis sup-
posed to. The onlymorallyacceptablelove is of personsor of
moral principles,or principlescompatiblewithmorality - to
leave aside love of things,humanand natural.Unfortunately,
sometimes loveofpersonsconflicts withloveofprinciples.
I also wishto maintainthatevennarrowself-loveis vastlyless

thantheself-inflating
egotistical yetparadoxically
self-sacrificing
love of country.Self-love
can be boundlessonlywhenone has
918 SOCIAL RESEARCH
absorbedan abstract entity likea country intooneselfbyidentify-

ing with an
it, entity that seems to haveno beginning or end,and
no limitson whatitsleadersand membersthinkitwantsor think
itmusthaveor do. The worstdegreeofegotismis,ofcourse,self-
worship.But the mostintenseself-worship mustcommonlybe
indirect.People tendto be somewhatashamedof worshipping
themselves directlyand overtly. The mosteffective indirectness is
to identifywitha group,and whiledoingso, manageto forget
thatone is absorbingitintooneself,so thatone maymorepalat-
ablyworshiponeself.One enlargesoneselfby thisprocessof
alienationthroughidentification becausea groupis not merely
somethingexternalto oneselfbut rathersomethingthatone
alreadyimaginesas one's own.One's groupidentity and affilia-
tion,certainlyin theformofpatriotism, is thuswhatpermitsthe
fullestegotism.
This indirectself-worship can, however,exact a directself-
sacrificewhen the group a person identifieswith suddenly
becomesunmistakably, literally,a forceexternalto oneselfthat
commandsoneselfto riskone's life.Withtheprospectofsucha
sacrifice,one maylose sightof one's self-worship: one nicely
becomes conscientiously dutiful,almostselfless.Ratherthan
absorbingone's countryintooneself,one is- at least,initially-
absorbedby,dissolvedinto,a superperson,
gratefully thecountry
imaginedas one person,butmuchgreaterthanone personor all
personstogether. The I becomesa We,and theWebecomesan It.
Bythiswholeprocessof identification, one traffics betweenthe
mostunconsciously shamelessegotismand the mostcostlyself-
One traffics
sacrifice. betweenthemostactivefantasy lifeand the
mostpassivesubmission. Suchmaybe thecareerofindirectself-
worship. The upshot is that it tendsto be morallysaferto love
yourselfmorethanyourcountry, ifthathas to be thechoice.
I am notsayingthat indirect self-worshipcannotbe individually
resisted.
or culturally The democratic individualitythatmaygrow
out of rights-based individualism can be cultivated, preciselyin
orderto restrain or deflectself-worship. Buttheprojectofdemo-
craticindividualityisverydifficult
to sustain,individually and cul-
turallyThe fact that
remains,however, only when the meanings
of rights-based individualism are takento heart,and thereby,
democratic individualitystrengthened, can an attempt be made,
in modernconditions, to withstand thatdestructive egotismthat
confusedly mixes one's ego and the group'sego.
Now,itispossiblethatforsomepeople,theattraction ofpatriotism
ismainly theabjectionofselfitimposes, ratherthananyindirect self-
it
worshipmay make Patriotism
possible. (and some other group affil-
iations)signifythata person,as oneselfand in oneself, is notvery
much.Yetbygivingoneselfto thegroup,one does one's sharein
keepingalivean entity thatcan be or become,as itselfand in itself,
something thatmatters greatlyand is worthwhile.Patriotism,more
thanalmost allothergroupaffiliations,
isa wayofacquiescing inone's
What
inferiority. Emerson saysabout popularloyalty kingsand
to
heroescanbe transferred toan impersonal entitylikea country.He
in
says, "The American Scholar":
All the restbehold in the hero or poet theirown green

and crudebeing- ripened;yes,and are contentto be less,
so thatmayattainto itsfullstature.
. . . Theysunthemselves
in thegreatman'slight,and feelittobe theirownelement.
Theycastthedignityofmanfromtheirdowntrodselvesupon
theshoulders ofa hero,and willperishto add one dropof
bloodtomakethatgreatheartbeat,thosegiantsinewscom-
batand conquer.He livesforus,andwelivein him(p. 66).3
I believenevertheless thatthe more salientconsideration is

indirectself-worship ratherthanself-abjection.
I concedethatmyproposedanalysis ofpatriotic
groupfeeling as
individualself-worship maybe tenuousor inaccurate (and myrefer-
ence to self-abjectiontoo underdeveloped). Allowme to proposea
somewhat different approach.Letusleaveasideself-worship (andself-
abjection)and see love ofcountryas rathermore substantially other-
regarding. I stillwantto askwhether loveof country is loveat all.
Perhapslove ofcountry isan imitation
oflovebecauseitisloveofa false
920 SOCIAL RESEARCH
object,an objectthatis not an object,but one of those"dreamsub-

stances,mock realities"to whichAugustinerefersin his Confessions
(III: 6,p. 61) . In anycase,loveofcountry isnotcontinuouswithloveof
persons. What is it like?It is more likecheeringor rooting(to use a
good piece ofAmericanslang)fora teamthanitis likebeinga mem-
ber ofa teamand havingteam-spirit. Patriotism is a kindofvicarious-
a
ness, living outside oneself and throughsomethingelse thatone
partly imposeson oneself, whilepretending thatone hasno choicebut
tolendorgiveoneselftoit.To be sure,livingvicariously can havedirect
effects on theperson,to leaveaside risksand sacrifices. One does not
havetobe a player, an actualmemberoftheteam,tobe affected invar-
iouswaysbythefortunes oftheteamforwhichone roots.Ifmyteam,
mycountry I
wins, gainan inflated confidencein myownlife-a confi-
dence thatfrequently collapses,however,aftera shortwhile.If my
team,mycountry, loses,I getdepressed.Such habitsof themindare
inevitable: we all haveteamsor something liketeamsthatwe rootfor.
Butpatriotism isa deadlysortofrooting.Evenwhenpersonsare not
merefansor spectators, but activeparticipants, members,say,of the
armedforces,theyare morelikepawnsthanlikemembersofa sports
team.It is thenthatpatriotism, theoriginalpassion,oftengiveswayto
concernforone's littleplatoon,a groupof personsthatone can see
and careforas persons,apartfromanyabstract passionlikepatriotism.
Certainly such concern for persons bring admirablequalities.
can out
But,to sayit again,we shouldnoticehow such admirablesentiment
and conduct- platoon loyaltyand bravery - are enclosed withina
largerpatternofactivity, whichcan be preponderantly immoral.Also,
thislargeractivity sometimes appears tobe the game ofthefewwhoare
able tomakeeveryone elseintotheirtoolsor theirmaterial. Patriotism
thustendsto be voluntary self-exploitation,usuallyin a dubious cause.
The stakesare veryhigh in any discussionof love of country.

Indeed, I thinkthatsuch a discussionmustreach to thebasic ques-
tionsofpoliticaltheory,whichare,letusassume,Is government nec-

essary?And ifthe answer is yes,then, What form and of
spirit gov-
ernmentbestconduceto achievingthe purposesthatallegedly
makegovernment necessary? (Thereare, to be sure,otherpro-
foundquestionsthatappearin thewakeof thesetwo;aboveall,
What,ifanything, mayarisethatis morallyadmirableor thatis
and
admirable compatible withmorality, whenthenecessities are
placated?)I believethatpatriotism leads in one direction, even
whenpatriots embracetheformofconstitutional democracy, while
a principledcommitment to rights-based individualism leads in
anotherdirection.Patriotsand defendersof patriotismmay
embracethe formof constitutional democracy, but theydo not
accept,muchlessembrace, itsspirit.
The politicaloutlookthatderivesfromrights-based individu-
alismholdsthata politically organizedcountry exists for thesake
of codifying and protectingindividualpersonaland political
rights;thatgovernment, theprotector of rights, is theprincipal
entityagainst which rights must normally protected;thata
be
country's boundariesexistin ordertomaketheexerciseofrights
fruitfuland also tofacilitatethestruggle againstscarcity through
sensiblelawsand policiesthatcan be administered properly only
in territorially
delimitedconditions;thatterritorial boundaries
are a wayof effectively establishing butalso placingsome limits
on an individual'spositiveduties of minimalsamaritanism
towardoutsiders, whilekeepingin forcethefullrangeof nega-
tivedutiestowardthem,especiallydutiesofabstaining fromvio-
lationofindividual rights;and thata country is onlya temporary
and contingent stoppingpoint on the way federatedhuman-
to a
ity.The rights-minded socialcontractleads notonlyto constitu-
tional,democratic government but also to limitedgovernment.
Indeed,theguidingUtopianpreceptis: thelessgovernment the
better,thelesspoliticsthebetter.Since themoralcenterofthis
outlookis equal rights, whatone claimsforoneselfas a matterof
right,one mustacknowledge in or claimforothers:at home in
regard to one's fellowadherents to thesocialcontract(otherwise
922 SOCIAL RESEARCH
knownas a constitution)and to the fullestextentpossible,

abroad.
One mustlearntolivewiththeparadoxthatbyproviding secu-
rity,government makes possibletreating other personsmorally
(and fortheirownsake),whilethe existenceof numerousgov-
ernments, evenrights-based ones,guaranteesthatgovernments
willalwaysfindopportunities forimmoralbehaviorthattheywill
rationalizeas notimmoralbutnecessary to preservesocietyand
government. These latter are, afterall,the preconditions ofindi-
vidualmorality. Whatfavorssuch rationalization is seeingeach
as a
politicalsociety person with all the of a
rights person,espe-
ciallyself-preservation. Adherentsof rights-based individualism
confront thisanalogywithscepticism.
The foregoingelementshelp to makeup a politicaloutlook
thatkeepsmorality at thecenter.
Contrastthis with the outlook of patrioticrepublicanism.
Accordingto thisview,thegroup,thenation,nottheindividual,
is theirreducible unit.Patriotism is dedicatedto preserving and
expressing or asserting in
thegroup'sidentity agonisticor com-
or
petitive antagonistic politicaldeedsthatareviolentor threaten
to becomeso. We thepeopleare one unitmatchedagainstother
units.A group'sidentity is sustainedbya distinctive wayof life
witha quitenarrowtoleranceforor patiencewithinternalhet-
erogeneity. The wayoflifenurtures activism at homeand abroad.
One kindofactivism inspiresor facilitates or providesa coveror
excusefortheother.Politicalpowercreatedbya stronggovern-
mentis perceivedas an opportunity for continuousinitiative
abroad.The republictendsto becomea powerbase forthepur-
poses of international rivalry.At home,republicanpatriotsside
with, when they are not promoting, continuouspoliticization of
thepeople:mobilization forconcertedaction,a tasteforinvent-
or
ing exacerbating problems, a desireto multiply officesso as to
encourageparticipation, and a corresponding desireto multiply
politicaldeeds. Democracy needs patriotism, Charles Taylorsays,
for "commonenterprisesin self-rule"(Taylor,in Nussbaum,
p. 120). Thisis a mythbecausetherecan be no popularself-rule
in a moderndemocracy, even withall the referendums in the

world.Furthermore, patriotism needs enemies. Democracy, how-
ever,is supposedto practiceenoughdomesticjusticeas not to
need thedistraction offoreignadventures. Statism iswhatrepub-
licanismcomesto in modernconditions, and perhapsin some
pre-moderncircumstances as well, mutatismutandis. All this
energy and commitment emanating from love of country
strengthens some of the worst aspects of modern politicallife
in this
and, itself, love, this patriotism, sacrifices
universal moral
principlein worshipof a falsegod. Patriotism is not onlydis-
guisedself-worship, notonlyeagerself-abjection, notonlyvolun-
taryself-exploitation; above all it is As
idolatry. with manyidols,
theworshipis destructive and self-destructive. The essentialtie
betweenpeople and societybecomessacrifice: sacrificeof one-
self,ofone's fellows, ofone's adversaries. Wouldit notbe better
forthinkers to encouragepeople to learnto cultivate or tolerate
a bitmoretheartoflivingwithoneselfratherthanalwaysmoving
outsideoneself?
Let me end withThoreau'swordson patriotism fromWalden:
"Every manis thelordofa realmbesidewhichtheearthly empire
oftheCzarisbuta petty state,a hummock leftbytheice.Yetsome
can be patriotic whohaveno s^respect,and sacrifice thegreater
to theless.Theylovethesoilwhichmakestheirgraves,buthave
no sympathy withthe spiritwhichmaystillanimatetheirclay.
Patriotism is a maggotin theirheads"("Conclusion," p. 286).
Notes
Compare BenedictAnderson(1983).
2Martha Nussbaumand others(1996).
" 268.
3Seealso Emerson's"Self-Reliance,
p.
References
Anderson,Benedict. ImaginedCommunities: on theOriginsand
Reflections
SpreadofNationalism. London: Verso, 1983.
Aristotle.Politics.New York:Modern Library,1943.
924 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Augustine. Confessions.Trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin.New York: Penguin,

1961.
Emerson,Ralph Waldo. "The American Scholar" and "Self-Reliance."
Essaysand Lectures.NewYork:LibraryofAmerica,1983.
Maclntyre,Alasdair."Is Patriotisma Virtue?"LindleyLecture,University
of Kansas,PhilosophyDepartment,1984.
Nussbaum,Marthaet al. ForLoveofCountry. Boston: Beacon, 1996.
Thoreau. Waldenand OtherWritings. NewYork:Modern Library,1937.
Thucydides.ThePeloponnesian War.Trans. Crawley,revisedbyT. E. Wick
NewYork:Modern Library,1982.
Viroli,Maurizio.ForLoveofCountry. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1995.

Patriotism

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Patriotism

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Is Patriotism a Mistake?

Author(s): GEORGE KATEB

Is patriotisma mistake?I thinkthatit is a mistaketwiceover: It

A defenseof patriotism is an attackon the Enlightenment; a

thattheycouldeasilynegate.Rather, theyare- sometimes unwit-

and to do so becausepeopleneed fictions and wouldlanguishor

ownunbelief, wanttokeepgoing.Letus forget or puttoone side

ognizedalliancebetweensomepostmodernists and someoftheir

answerI giveis not the one lodgedin commonunderstanding,

I askus to noticethatan abstraction ofthesortthatI saypatri-

othercountries, and rarelyforthesakeofdefending people'stan-

mosity to be playedwellbyall sides.He desirestowin,so he wants

rathera loveof country becausethecountry is theplace offree

renceswithall theoccasionson whichloveof country has been

rentsituations whenpatriotism is mobilizedforenterprises of

I thinkthatAlasdairMaclntyreis right(in "Is Patriotism a

tiedto heroismand adventure, and imprudencein

wickednessto, even despotismover,neighbors;and when a

I also wishto maintainthatevennarrowself-loveis vastlyless

absorbedan abstract entity likea country intooneselfbyidentify-

All the restbehold in the hero or poet theirown green

I believenevertheless thatthe more salientconsideration is

object,an objectthatis not an object,but one of those"dreamsub-

The stakesare veryhigh in any discussionof love of country.

tionsofpoliticaltheory,whichare,letusassume,Is government nec-

knownas a constitution)and to the fullestextentpossible,

in a moderndemocracy, even withall the referendums in the

Augustine. Confessions.Trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin.New York: Penguin,

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