LABOR LAW CASES
What concerns
Part I – Introduction to Labor Law
1. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
OPAO
FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm "engaged principally
in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement."
It challenged the Constitutional validity of DOLE’s Department Order 1 (series of 1988), in
the character of "Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers," in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The measure is assailed (1) for "discrimination against males or females;" that it does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"
(2) for being violative of the right to travel, and (3) for being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
PASEI also invoked Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law as Department Order No. 1, as contended, was passed in the absence
of prior consultations.
It also claimed that it violated the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great
and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the POEA filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland.
In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the
police power of the Philippine State.
ISSUE:
Whether Department Order 1 (series of 1988) is a valid implementation of the police power
of the state.
RULING:
Yes.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as
the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
5 While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its
in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable
of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
6 petitioner Santos was undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute. It is
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone.
the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just,
and humane. The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately
made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition
with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The classification made —the preference for female workers — rests on substantial
distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape
and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling
motives for urgent Government action.
2. St. Luke’s Medical Center Employee’s Association-AFW v. NLRC, 517 SCRA
677 (2007)
PACATANG
Facts:
Private petitioner was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology Department of the
private respondent in 1984. In 1992, the Congress passed and enacted A No 7431
which requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or
x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of
registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology.
The private respondent issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic
Technology to comply with the requirement; otherwise, the unlicensed employee will
be transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if a slot is
available. This includes private petitioner. The Director of the Institute of Radiology
issued a memorandum to petitioner advising her that only a license can assure her of
her continued employment and the respondent is giving her the last chance to take
and pass the board examination.
Private respondent having not passed the said board examination, respondent
approved her retirement in lieu of separation pay which was refused by the
petitioner.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent.
Issue:
WON petitioner was illegally dismissed pursuant to RA 7431 exercising police power
of the State.
Ruling:
Petition denied.
exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to
safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the gen-eral welfare
of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned
professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an
examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.
No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of
undeniable that her continued employment without the required Board certification
exposed the hospital to possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to
operate. Certainly, private respondent could not be expected to retain petitioner
Santos despite the inimical threat posed by the latter to its business.
While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and
the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in
favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are
also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.Labor laws, to be
sure, do not authorize interference with the employer’s judgment in the conduct of
the latter’s business. Private respondent is free to determine, using its own discretion
and business judgment, all elements of employment, “from hiring to firing” except in
cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. None of
these exceptions is present in the instant case.
3. Magana v. Medicard Phil., Inc., 638 SCRA 606 (2010)
PATAGOC
Topic: Police power of the State
FACTS:
● Medicard Phil. (Respondent, a health maintenance org) hired Petitioner Magana as
company nurse and was detailed to Manila Pavilion Hotel.
● Medicard initially hired Petitioner Magana on probation, but it was eventually
converted to permanent status.
● There was another nurse who replaced petitioner Magana, so Medicard offered the
petitioner the position of liaison officer.
● Petitioner finds the offer unacceptable and with her continued non-assignment, she
sued Medicard and Manila Pav in NLRC for illegal dismissal and payment of
benefits and damages.
● LA: ruled in favor of petitioner Magana, finding Medicard as mere labor contractor
for Manila Pav which exercised control over petitioner Magana. Manila Pav should
reinstate her and pay jointly with Medicard backwages, 13th mo pay, damages and
atty’s fees.
● NLRC: Affirmed LA with modification, finding Medicard liable for constructive
illegal dismissal and hence, for the payment of separation pay, 13th month pay,
attorney's fees, and reinstatement wages.
● CA: deleted the award of reinstatement wages. Hence, Petitioner argues the legality
of her constructive dismissal and that CA erred in deleting the reinstatement of
wages.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner is entitled to draw wages under LA’s ruling even if such order
was subsequently reversed on appeal?
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it is statutorily mandated in Art. 223 of the Labor Code. Article 223. Appeal. - x
xx
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory,
even pending appeal The employee shall either be (1) admitted back to work under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, (2) merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall
not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. (Emphasis supplied)
This mandate is a police power measure, grounded on the theory – the preservation of
the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the preservation of
corporate profits. Then, by and pursuant to the same power, the State may authorize an
immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal
may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or
even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its family
4. Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940) (SOCIAL JUSTICE CLAUSE)
RAMIREZ
Facts:
The petition for a writ of prohibition alleged that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of
July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario
Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of
Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned.
The Secretary of Public Works and communication approved the recommendation of the latter that
Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and
during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be
enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-
drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues
Whether Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.:
Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.
Ruling:
No. Commonwealth Act No. 548 is not unconstitutional. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 law
does not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated
the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close
them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power
to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action
depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which
wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must,
therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."
No. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex. (The welfare, good, salvation, felicity of the people should be the
supreme law)
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
5. HFS Phil., Inc. v. Pilar, G.R. No. 168716, April 16, 2009
SAJIIN
Facts:
Pilar was engaged by IUM Shipmanagement and its Philippine manning agent, HFS
Philippines, as a crew member (electrician) of a Norwegian vessel. Four months after
he boarded, he complained of loss of appetite, nausea, vomiting, and severe
nervousness. His condition did not improve despite being given medical treatment.
He was diagnosed with depression and gastric ulcer. The physician declared him
unfit for work and recommended hospitalization and repatriation. He returned to
Manila on the same day. He was met by an HFS representative who brought him to
Medical Center where it was confirmed that he was suffering from major depression.
He was placed under continuous medical treatment for several months. He was later
on declared fit to work by the company designated physician. He sought the opinion
of other physicians. One said he was still depressed and the other with illnesses
(cholecystolithiasis, mild fatty liver and chronic gastritis) making him unfit to work. He
then filed a complaint for underpayment of disability and medical benefits and for
damages in the NLRC. NLRC referred the case to the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board because he was a registered member of the Seaman’s Union. Pilar
alleged that he was hit by an officer on the head. He was traumatized and from there,
all the symptoms started showing. He claimed to be entitled to disability
compensation under Art. 12 of the CBA between AMOSUP and the Norwegian
Shipowner’s Assoc. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that in the absence of
proof that his depression was caused by an accident, he is not entitled to disability
and medical benefits. Instead, he was only entitled to the 120-day sick pay as
provided in the CBA. NCMB decided that Pilar’s depression was a compensable
sickness since it arose out of his employment. In view of the principle of social
justice, that those who have less in life should have more in the law, he was awarded
disability compensation. In the CA’s decision, he was not entitled to disability
compensation granted by the CBA but is entitled to disability benefits granted by Sec.
32 of the employment contract after proving that his illnesses impaired him.
Issue:
W/N Pilar is entitled to disability compensation.
Ruling:
YES, Pilar is entitled to disability compensation. Pilar is clearly entitled to sick pay
because he fell ill while on board the vessel as provided by the CBA. However, the
CBA does not cover all kinds of illnesses such as those suffered by Pilar. Neither the
NCMB nor the CA found that his illnesses were the result of an accident or a marine
peril. Nonetheless, under the Employment Contract, a seafarer may be entitled to
disability compensation if (1) he is shown to have contracted an illness or suffered an
injury in the course of his employment and (2) such illness or injury resulted in his
total or partial disability. The discrepancy between the findings of the company doctor
and Pilar’s doctor would make or break his claim. The Court, thus, adopts the
findings favorable to Pilar. The law looks tenderly on the laborer. Where the evidence
may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the other
favorable to him, the balance must be tilted in his favor consistent with the principle of
social justice.
6. PLDT v. NLRC, 164 SCRA (1988) (When is separation pay allowed in cases of
valid dismissal)
TAN
FACTS:
Abucay, a traffic operator of the PLDT, was accused by two complainants of having
demanded and received from them an amount in consideration of her promise to facilitate
approval of their applications for telephone installation. Investigated and heard, she was
found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service.
The decision of the labor arbiter declared that “Considering that Dr. Bangayan and Mrs.
Martinez (the people who paid Abucay) are not totally blameless… and that their act of
giving P3,800.00 without any receipt is tantamount to corruption of public officers, the
complainant must be given one month pay for every year of service as financial assistance.”
The private respondent accepted the validity of her dismissal. The petitioner (PLDT),
however, questions the granting of separation pay.
The petitioner contends that it is conceded that an employee illegally dismissed is entitled to
reinstatement and backwages as required by the labor laws. However, an employee dismissed
for cause is entitled to neither reinstatement nor backwages and is not allowed any relief at all
because his dismissal is in accordance with law. In the case of the private respondent, she has
been awarded financial assistance equivalent to ten months pay corresponding to her 10 year
service in the company despite her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effect rewarded
rather than punished for her dishonesty, and without any legal authorization or justification.
The award is made on the ground of equity and compassion, which cannot be a substitute for
law. Moreover, such an award puts a premium on dishonesty and encourages instead of
deterring corruption.
The public respondent claims that the employee is sufficiently punished with her dismissal.
The grant of financial assistance is not intended as a reward for her offense but merely to help
her for the loss of her employment after working faithfully with the company for ten years. In
support of this position, the Solicitor General cites the cases of Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa and Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, where
the employees were dismissed for cause but were nevertheless allowed separation pay on
grounds of social and compassionate justice.
ISSUE:
WON separation pay is proper
HELD:
No, no separation payment should be made.
Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where
the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example,
habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual
relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed
employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the
ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect of rewarding rather
than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment
is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has
committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted
separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar
offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again
found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as
it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and
concern of the Constitution.
The SC held that the grant of separation pay in the case at bar is unjustified. The private
respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by the labor arbiter and affirmed
by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly admitted. The fact that she has worked with the
PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken against her as it
reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of betraying
during all of her 10 years of service with the company. If regarded as a justification for
moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting
the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all
undesirables.
7. Toyota Motor Phil. Corp. Workers Association v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158786,
October 19, 2007
ALIETO
Facts:
● Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) is a
registered labor organization representing Toyota rank-and-file employees.
● A labor dispute arose, and the TMPCWA filed a petition for certification
election among Toyota rank-and-file employees. This petition was granted by
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary.
● Toyota challenged the DOLE Secretary's decision and refused to negotiate
with the union.
● TMPCWA filed a notice of strike based on Toyota's refusal to bargain. The
dispute escalated when a significant number of employees engaged in a
picket in front of Toyota's office, affecting production.
● Toyota issued termination notices to 227 employees for participation in the
strike, citing violations of its Code of Conduct.
● TMPCWA went on strike in protest of these dismissals.
● The DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute, directing the
striking workers to return to work.
● TMPCWA filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOLE Secretary's order.
● Toyota filed a petition for injunction to allow free access to its premises,
which the NLRC granted.
● TMPCWA went on another strike, and Toyota declared it illegal. The NLRC
upheld the declaration of illegality and ordered the payment of severance
compensation to the dismissed workers.
● TMPCWA's motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC.
● TMPCWA filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA)
challenging the DOLE Secretary's jurisdictional order, which was dismissed.
● TMPCWA failed to submit its position paper to the NLRC, resulting in the
declaration of the case as submitted for decision.
● The NLRC ruled the strikes as illegal, upheld the dismissal of the 227
employees, ordered severance compensation, and forfeited the employment
status of certain union officers.
Issue: Whether the strikes staged by TMPCWA were legal, the dismissals were valid,
and other related issues.
Held:
The NLRC correctly declared the strikes illegal based on substantial evidence.
The strikes were not conducted in accordance with legal requirements, and
the employees' participation in the concerted actions caused substantial
damage to Toyota.
The dismissal of the 227 employees was legal due to their participation in illegal
strikes.
Severance compensation was ordered as an alternative relief to continued
employment.
Certain union officers had forfeited their employment status for leading illegal
strikes.
The CA correctly dismissed TMPCWA's petition questioning the DOLE Secretary's
jurisdictional order.
Decision: The petition for certiorari is denied. The NLRC's decision and resolutions
are affirmed. The strikes were illegal, and the dismissals and other orders are upheld.
 8. Manila Electric Co. v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 127598, 27 January 1999.
ANDALAHAO
FACTS:
Meralco Workers Association (MEWA) and MERALCO renegotiated the CBA with 2 years left
before the original CBA expired. They could not reach an amicable settlement and the SOLE
resolved the issue granting several demands of MEWA. MERALCO states that the SOLE
committed GADALEJ when granting specified awards.
· On Sep. 7, 1995, Meralco Workers Association (MEWA) informed Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO) of its intention to re-negotiate the terms and conditions of their
CBA (1992 -1997) for the remaining 2 years (Dec 1995 to Nov. 30 1997).
-MERALCO expressed willingness through a letter. Parties formed a CBA
Negotiating panel.
-Parties failed to arrive at Terms and Conditions acceptable to both.
· April 23, 1996, MEW filed a Notice of Strike with the NCR Branch of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
-Grounds: Bargaining Deadlock, ULP
-Failed to come to an amicable settlement during conciliation.
-Strike was imminent so MERALCO filed an Urgent Petition for the SOLE to take over
jurisdiction and enjoin striking respondents to go back to work.
· The Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) resolved the issue by granting several
Economic Demands of MEWA
-MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the Secretary of
Labor committed GADALEJ
-In the meantime, SOLE adjusted the ruling given MERALCO's motion for
reconsideration
· The Union argues on behalf of the SOLE:
-He acted within the scope of the powers granted him by law and by the
Constitution.
-Any judicial review is limited to an examination of the Secretary's decision-
making/discretion was attended by whimsical acts that would constitute grave
abuse.
ISSUE:
WON the SOLE committed a GADALEJ in granting the benefits assailed? - YES (Partly)
RULING:
The court rule that the Secretary did commit GADALEJ in (1) determining the Wages, (2)
Granting 4 of the Economic Benefits and 5 of the Political Demands.
MEWA's 2nd Premise - no reversible abuse of discretion attended the Secretary's decision
because the Secretary took all the relevant evidence into account, judiciously weighed
them, and rendered a decision based on the facts and law.
We find, based on our consideration of the parties' positions and the evidence on
record, that the SOLE disregarded and misappreciated evidence, particularly with
respect to the wage award. The SOLE apparently also acted arbitrarily and even
whimsically in considering a number of legal points; even the Solicitor General
himself considered that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion on at least three
major points: (a) on the signing bonus issue; (b) on the inclusion of confidential
employees in the (Rank and File) R&F bargaining unit, and (c) in mandating a union
security "closed shop" regime in the bargaining unit.
WAGES
MERALCO projected that the net operating income for 1996 was 14.7% above the 1999 level
or a total net operating income of 4.171 Billion, while the union placed the 1996 net
operating income at 5.795 Billion.
-MERALCO based its projection on the increase of the income for the First 6 months
of 1996 over the same period in 1995.
-The union, on the other hand, projected that the 1996 income would increase by
29% to 35% because the "consumption of electric power is at its highest during the
last two quarters with the advent of the Yuletide season.
SOLE gravely abused his discretion in making this wage award because he disregarded
evidence on record. While the SOLE is not expected to accept the company-offered figures
wholesale in determining a wage award, we find it a grave abuse of discretion to completely
disregard data that is based on actual and undisputed record of financial performance in
favor of the third-hand and unfounded claims.
The "middle ground" approach employed by the Secretary in this case which we do not
necessarily the best method of resolving a wage dispute. Merely Finding the midway point
between the demands of the company and the union, and "splitting the difference is a
simplistic solution that fails to recognize that the parties may already be at the limits of the
wage levels they can afford. The record shows that MERALCO, throughout its long years of
existence, was never remiss in its obligation towards its employees.
On Economic Benefits
CHRISTMAS BONUS [DENIED] - MERALCO: Secretary erred when he recognized that there
was an "established practice" of giving a two-month Christmas bonus based on the fact that
bonuses were given on or about Christmas time .
RICE SUBSIDY and RETIREMENT BENEFITS for RETIREES [REMANDED]
The company alleges that a separate and independent trust fund is the source of retirement
benefits for MERALCO retirees, while the union maintains that MERALCO controls these
funds and may therefore be compelled to improve this benefit in an arbitral award. The
issue requires a finding of fact on the legal personality of the retirement fund. In the
absence of any evidence on record indicating the nature of the retirement fund's legal
personality, we rule that the issue should be remanded to the Secretary.
EMPLOYEES' COOPERATIVE [GRANTED]
MERALCO: Secretary erred requiring them to provide the employees covered by
the bargaining unit with a loan of 1.5M as seed money for the employees formation of a
cooperative under the Cooperative Law, R.A.6938.
Nothing in this law - whether expressed or implied - that requires employers to
provide funds, by loan or otherwise, that employees can use to form a
cooperative. The formation of a cooperative is a purely voluntary act under this
law, and no party in any context or relationship is required by law to set up a
cooperative or to provide the funds therefor
Furthermore, we do not see the formation of an employees cooperative, in the
absence of an agreement by the CB parties that this is a bargainable term or
condition of employment, to be a term or condition of employment that can be
imposed on the parties on compulsory arbitration.
GHSIP, HMP BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS and HOUSING EQUITY LOAN [DENIED]
MERALCO: MERALCO contends that it is not bound to bargain on these benefits because
these do not relate to "wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment"
The GHSIP, HMP benefits for dependents and the housing equity loan have been the
subject of bargaining and arbitral awards in the past. We do not see any reason why
MERALCO should not now bargain on these benefits.
SIGNING BONUS [GRANTED]
On the signing bonus issue, we agree with the positions commonly taken by MERALCO and
by the OSG that the signing bonus is a grant motivated and justified by the goodwill
generated when a CBA is successfully negotiated and signed between the employer and the
union. In the present case, this goodwill does not exist.
RED-CIRCLE-RATE ALLOWANCE [DENIED]
RCR allowance is an amount, not included in the basic salary, that is granted by the company
to an employee who is promoted to a higher position grade but whose actual basic salary at
the time of the promotion already exceeds the maximum salary for the position to which he
or she is promoted. As an allowance, it applies only to specific individuals whose salary
levels are unique with respect to their new and higher positions.
SICK LEAVE RESERVE OF 15 DAYS [DENIED]
No compelling reason to deviate from the Secretary's ruling that the SL reserve
is reduced to 15 days, with any excess convertible to cash at the end of the year. The
employee has the option to avail of this cash conversion or to accumulate his SL credits up
to 25 days for conversion to cash at his retirement or separation from the service. This
arrangement is, in fact, beneficial to MERALCO.
40-DAY UNION LEAVE (GRANTED]
MERALCO: objects to the demanded increase in union leave because the union leave
granted to the union is already substantial. It argues that the union has not demonstrated
any real need for additional union leave.
The (30) days union leave granted by the Secretary, to our mind, constitute
sufficient time for the union to carry out its union activities.
HIGH VOLTAGE/HIGH POLE/TOWING ALLOWANCE (DENIED]
MERALCO: no justification for the increase of these allowances. The personnel concerned
will not receive any additional risk during the life of the current CBA that would justify the
increase demanded by the union.
The increase in the high-voltage allowance (from P45.00 to P55.00), high-pole
allowance (from P30.00 to P40.00), and towing allowance is justified considering the
heavy risk the employees concerned are exposed to.
The high-voltage allowance is granted to an employee who is authorized by the
company to actually perform work on or near energized bare lines and bus, while
the high-pole allowance is given to those authorized to climb poles on a height of at
least 60 feet from the ground work thereat.
BENEFITS FOR COLLECTORS [PARTLY GRANTED]
MERALCO: grossly unreasonable both in scope and on the premise it is founded.
Retained: (a) lunch allowance; (b) disconnection fee for delinquent accounts; (c)
voluntary performance of other work at the instance of the Company; (d) bobcat
belt bags; and (e) reduction of quota and MAPL during typhoons and other force
majeure events reasonable considering the risks taken by the company personnel
involved, the nature of the employees' functions and responsibilities and the
prevailing standard of living.
Non-Economic Benefits
SCOPE OF THE BARGAINING UNIT GRANTED]
MERALCO: Assails this on the ground that it violates the rules already laid down by the SC on
Confidential Employees.
Union Demands that the scope be ALL R&F Employees hired by the company in all
its offices and operating centers through its franchise and those it may employ by
reason of expansion, reorganization or as a result of operational exigencies
ISSUE OF UNION SECURITY [GRANTED]
We agree with MERALCO's contention. An examination of the records of the case shows that
the union did not ask for a closed shop security regime; the Secretary in the first instance
expressly stated that a maintenance of membership clause should govern; neither MERALCO
nor MEWA raised the issue of union security in their respective motions for reconsideration
of the Secretary's first disputed order; and that despite the parties clear acceptance of the
Secretary's first ruling, the Secretary motu proprio reconsidered his maintenance of
membership ruling in favor of the more stringent union shop regime.
THE CONTRACTING OUT ISSUE [GRANTED]
Miguel Employees Union-PTGWO vs Bersamira (where we recognized that
contracting out of work is a proprietary right of the employer in the exercise of an inherent
management prerogative) the issue we see is whether the Secretary’s consultation
requirement is reasonable or unduly restrictive of the company's management prerogative.
Contracting out is not unlimited; rather, it is a prerogative that management enjoy
subject to well-defined legal limitations.
A balance already exists in the parties' relationship with respect to contracting out;
MERALCO has its legally defined and protected management prerogatives while
workers are guaranteed their own protection through specific labor provisions and
the recognition of limits to the exercise of management prerogatives. From these
premises, we can only conclude that the Secretary's added requirement only
introduces an imbalance in the parties' CB relationship on a matter that the law
already sufficiently regulates.
UNION REPRESENTATION IN COMMITTEES [DENIED]:
No merit in MERALCO's contention that the above-quoted ruling of the Secretary is an
intrusion into the management prerogatives of MERALCO. It is worthwhile to note that all
the Union demands and what the Secretary's order granted is that the Union be allowed to
participate in policy formulation and decision-making process on matters affecting the Union
members' rights, duties and welfare as required in Article 211 (A) (g) of the Labor Code.
INCLUSION OF ALL TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN THE CBA [GRANTED]
MERALCO: Inclusion of the old provisions not contrary with the new provisions shall subsist
is in violation of the Employee's right to contract.
We agree with MERALCO. The Secretary acted in excess of the discretion allowed
him by law when he ordered the inclusion of benefits, terms and conditions that the
law and the parties did not intend to be reflected in their CBA.
RETROACTIVITY OF THE CBA [GRANTED|
Effectivity of the new CBA shall retroact to the date of the commencement of the last 2
years of the effectivity of the existing CBA.
MERALCO: assails that it is contrary to the ruling of this Court in Pier 8 Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Roldan-Confessor where it was held that it is counted from the
date of the SOLE's Resolution.
ART 253-A is the guiding basis:
"All other provisions of CBA shall be renegotiated not later than 3 years after its execution.
Any agreement on such other provision of the CBA entered into within 6 months from the
date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in such CBA shall retroact to the
day immediately following such date. If such agreement is entered into beyond 6 months
the parties shall agree on the duration of the effectivity thereof.
If no agreement is reached within 6 months from the expiry date of the 3 years that follow
the CBA execution, the law expressly gives the parties -not anybody else - the discretion to
fix the effectivity of the agreement.
9. Cebu Royal Plant v. Hon Deputy Minister of Labor, 153 SCRA 38 (1987)
ANGELES-CALANTAS
CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION), petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-58639 August 12, 1987
FACTS:
Ramon Pilones, a private respondent, was employed on a probationary period of
employment for six months and after said period, he underwent medical examination for
qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering from PTB
minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his employment by
respondent.
Pilones complained against his termination before the Ministry of Labor which dismissed the
same. The dismissal was reversed by the public respondent who ordered the reinstatement
and payment of back wages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal was proper
RULING:
No, the dismissal was not proper. Pilones was already a permanent employee at the time of
his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure.
We are satisfied that whether his employment began on February 16, 1978, or even earlier
as he claims, the private respondent was already a regular employee when he was dismissed
on August 21, 1978. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him
by the Constitution and the Labor Code.
The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book
VI, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code reading as follows:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. — Where the employee suffers
from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or
prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer
shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a
competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at
such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even
with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within
the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the
employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his
former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.
The record does not contain the certification required by the above rule. The medical
certificate offered by the petitioner came from its own physician, who was not a "competent
public health authority," and merely stated the employee's disease, without more. We may
surmise that if the required certification was not presented, it was because the disease was
not of such a nature or seriousness that it could not be cured within a period of six months
even with proper medical treatment. If so, dismissal was unquestionably a severe and
unlawful sanction.
We agree that there was here an attempt to circumvent the law by separating the employee
after five months' service to prevent him from becoming a regular employee, and then
rehiring him on probation, again without security of tenure. We cannot permit this
subterfuge if we are to be true to the spirit and mandate of social justice. On the other
hand, we have also the health of the public and of the dismissed employee himself to
consider. Hence, although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement, this must be
conditioned on his fitness to resume his work, as certified by competent authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order of November
18, 1981, is LIFTED. The Order of the public respondent dated July 14, 1981, is AFFIRMED,
but with the modification that the backwages shall be limited to three years only and the
private respondent shall be reinstated only upon certification by a competent public health
authority that he is fit to return to work. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED
10. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation v. NLRC, 155 SCRA 301(1987)
DELATADO(Gregorio)
Labor; Illegal Dismissal; Retrenchment; Failure of employees to file their
courtesy resignations cannot automatically result in their dismissal or inclusion
in the retrenchment; Reason.—The failure of the private respondents to file
their courtesy resignations cannot automatically result in dismissal or inclusion
in the retrenchment. We agree with the NLRC that such courtesy letters of
resignations
FACTS:
The petitioners seek to annul the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ordering the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation to
reinstate the private respondents to their former positions, with full backwages under
the new terms and conditions of employment in the university as re-organized, and to
pay them separation pay or retirement pay and other accrued benefits under the
existing laws or the university's policy whichever is higher.
On March 15, 1983, the president of Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, Mr.
Cesar A. Mijares wrote to the Minister of Labor Blas Ople soliciting his opinion on a
proposed retrenchment and reorganization program made necessary by the
University's financial difficulties.
In a letter reply to Mijares, dated March 29, 1984, Minister Ople found "no serious
objection to the program" but advised him that "it should be implemented without
prejudice to whatever benefits that might have accrued to the employees concerned at
the effective date of reorganization."
Petitioner Gregorio Araneta University Foundation (GAUF) implemented a
retrenchment and reorganization program due to its financial difficulties.
The Private Respondents, faculty members of the Petitioner (composed of deans and
department heads), were affected by such program and were eventually dismissed.
1) Victor Reyes, institute dean and concurrently department head and a farm
administrator who has served the university for 23 years;
2) Rosario Reyes, wife of Victor Reyes, head of the department of food technology
and concurrently manager for food processing who has served the university as full-
time faculty member for 22 years;
3) Billy T. Vicario, head of the department of soil science, and assistant dean of the
institute of agriculture who has served the university for 19 years;
4) Corazon Vicario wife of Billy Vicario, dean of the institute of arts and sciences
who has served the university for 25 years;
5) Luis Almazan, head of the department of biology who has served the university for
28 years and
6) Remigio Perez, full-time associate professor and department head of Spanish who
has served the university for 18 years. The private respondents did not submit their
courtesy resignations.
Hence, the Private Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice before the NLRC. They alleged that there was no notice and the
retrenchment program was without any established criteria.
The Petitioner denied their allegations. It argued that the 30-day notice envisioned in
BP 130 was substantially complied with because in their letters of termination it was
stated that "It is understood that your name shall still be included in the payroll for
one month after said date" and that actually the Private Respondents received the
terminal 30-day pay whose operative effect is to put them in estoppel to question
their dismissal.”
The Labor Arbiter upheld the dismissal. However, the NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether or not the private respondents were dismissed within the context and spirit
of the retrenchment program adopted by the university. (NO)
RULING:
The Private Respondents are not estopped from questioning their dismissal by mere
acceptance of their 30-day termination pay. The private respondents cannot waive
their rights protected by no less thanthe Constitution. Section 18, Article 11 of the
1987 Constitution provides that "The state affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare." This
constitutional protection to labor has been carried through all our three (3)
constitutions since 1935.
The appeal to the Court about saving a noble institution from collapse has no basis.
Retrenchments are allowed for all unnecessary positions based on the petitioner's
own reorganization program. However, the re- organization cannot be used as a
convenient device to get rid of existing personnel in order to replace them with new
ones. For this purpose, the regular rules and procedures on dismissal of employees
will have to be followed.
11. Quitoriano v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc., G.R. No. 179868, January 21, 2010
EROY
FACTS: Respondent Jebsens Maritime, Inc. (represented by Ma. Theresa Gutay), hired
petitioner Quitoriano as 2nd Officer aboard the vessel M/V Trimnes for a period of six
months with a basic monthly salary of US$936. Petitioner, who was assigned as navigating
officer from 12:00 midnight to 4:00 a.m. and port watcher from 12:00 midnight to 6:00 a.m.,
complained of dizziness with severe headache, general body weakness, chest pains, easy
fatigability, weak grip strength, and numbness on the left side of his body and was observed
to be dragging his left foot, his mouth slightly down to one side, and his speech slurred. When
the vessel berthed at Port Huelva, Spain, petitioner was brought to a hospital where he was
diagnosed as suffering from hypertension arterial or mild stroke. Since his health condition
did not improve, petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines on May 30,2001toundergo
further medical examination and treatment. Upon arrival in Manila, petitioner underwent
several tests at the Medical Center Manila under the care of Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr.
Cruz), the company-designated physician. 169 days after petitioners repatriation, Dr. Cruz
issued a medical report declaring him fit to work. Petitioner later sought the opinion of an
independent internist-cardiologist, Dr. Sharon A. Lacson of the Philippine Heart Center, who
diagnosed him as suffering from hypertension cardiovascular disease and hyperlipidemia. Dr.
Abdias V. Aquino of the same hospital also found him to have cerebral infarction, R, basal
ganglia area. Petitioner thus filed a complaint to recover permanent total disability
compensation of US$80,000, as provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
forged with respondents. Respondents disclaimed petitioners entitlement to any disability
benefits in view of the company-designated physicians certification that he is fit to work.
Petitioner countered, however, that the "fit to work" assessment did not reflect his real health
condition; and that his illness, given its delicate nature, could recur anytime once he resumes
sea duties. The LA dismissed the complaint as it found that petitioner has already recovered
from illness. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision but ordered respondents to allow
petitioner to resume sea duty. Petitioner filed a certiorari petition before the CA, but the CA
denied the same and its subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to disability benefits?
HELD: Yes. Petitioner is entitled to the disability benefits. A total disability does not require
that the employee be absolutely disabled or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the
injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn there from. In
accordance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and full protection to
labor, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to Filipino
seafarers, it holding that the notion of disability is intimately related to the workers capacity
to earn, what is compensated being not his injury or illness but his inability to work resulting
in the impairment of his earning capacity; hence, disability should be understood less on its
medical significance but more on the loss of earning capacity.
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. Total disability, on the
other hand, does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the
injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of one’s earning capacity. WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals were REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents were held jointly and
severally liable to pay petitioner 1) permanent total disability benefits of US$80,000.00 at its
peso equivalent at the time of actual payment; and 2) attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of
the total monetary award at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.
12. Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, 17 November 2004
ESPINOSA
FACTS:
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum board and cornice installers
from January 1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment
of work. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and it was decided in their
favor by the Labor Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the NLRC contending just cause for
the dismissal because of petitioner’s abandonment of work. NLRC ruled there was
just cause and petitioners were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The CA
in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal because they have abandoned their
work but ordered the payment of money claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a just and valid
cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the right to be heard and to
defend himself. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee
to resume his employment. For a valid finding or abandonment, two factors are
considered: failure to report for work without a valid reason; and, a clear intention to
sever employer-employee relationship with the second as the more determinative
factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employees has no more intention to work.
Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the
due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be
penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil
Doctrine of the Belated Due process Rule.
Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not for any of the justifiable or
authorized by law. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal but the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to
discourage the abhorrent practice of “dismiss now, pay later” which we sought to
deter in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees’ rights warrants the payment of
nominal damages.
13. Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot, G.R. No. 151378, 28 March 2005
ESPIRITUSANTO (RAMIREZ)
Facts:
Respondents Darwin Pacot, Robert Parohinog, David Bisnar, Marlon Domingo, Rhoel
Lescano and Jonathan Cagabcab were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing
Corporation (JAKA, for short) until the latter terminated their employment on August 29, 1997
because the corporation was "in dire financial straits". It is not disputed, however, that the
termination was effected without JAKA complying with the requirement under Article 283 of
the Labor Code regarding the service of a written notice upon the employees and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date of
termination.
In time, respondents separately filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages
and nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay against JAKA and its HRD
Manager, Rosana Castelo. After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision 3
declaring the termination illegal and ordering JAKA and its HRD Manager to reinstate
respondents with full backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is not possible.
Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where an employee is dismissed for
cause but such dismissal was effected without the employer's compliance with the notice
requirement under the Labor Code.
Ruling:
In the very recent case of Agabon vs. NLRC, 8 we had the opportunity to resolve a similar
question. Therein, we found that the employees committed a grave offense, i.e.,
abandonment, which is a form of a neglect of duty which, in turn, is one of the just causes
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code. In said case, we upheld the validity of the
dismissal despite non-compliance with the notice requirement of the Labor Code. However,
we required the employer to pay the dismissed employees the amount of P30,000.00,
representing nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process. The difference
between Agabon and the instant case is that in the former, the dismissal was based on a just
cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code while in the present case, respondents were
dismissed due to retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes under Article 283 of
the same Code. A dismissal for just cause under Article 282 implies that the employee
concerned has committed, or is guilty of, some violation against the employer, i.e. the
employee has committed some serious misconduct, is guilty of some fraud against the
employer, or, as in Agabon, he has neglected his duties. Thus, it can be said that the
employee himself initiated the dismissal process.
On another breath, a dismissal for an authorized cause under Article 283 does not
necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the
dismissal process is initiated by the employer's exercise of his management prerogative, i.e.
when the employer opts to install labor saving devices, when he decides to cease business
operations or when, as in this case, he undertakes to implement a retrenchment program.
Accordingly, it is wise to hold that: (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article
282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed
upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an
act imputable to the employee; and (2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under
Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should
be stiffer because the dismissal, process was initiated by the employer's exercise of his
management prerogative.
It is, therefore, established that there was ground for respondents' dismissal, i.e.,
retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes enumerated under Article 283 of the
Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to comply with the notice requirement
under the same Article. Considering the factual circumstances in the instant case and the
above ratiocination, we, therefore, deem it proper to fix the indemnity at P50,000.00
 14. Abbot Laboratories v. Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571, 23 July 2013
FLORES
Facts:
Alcaraz, herein respondent, signed an employment contract on a Probationary basis (P110,000/month
salary) with Abbott Laboratories, herein petitioner, for the position of Medical and Regulatory Affairs
Manager; which entailed responsibilities for drug safety surveillance operations as well as the staffing
and budgeting of the same, leading the development of operational procedures for drug safety, and to
interact with internal and external customers, among other things. Alcaraz was to be on probation for 6
months, Feb 15 – Aug 14, 2005. This contract was also signed Abbott’s Manager. Shortly after, she
was briefed of her responsibilities. She received copies of the company’s Code of Conduct, office
policies, Probationary Performance Standards and Evaluation (PPSE) and Performance Excellence
Orientation Modules (Performance Modules) which she has to apply in her task of evaluating the staff.
Abbott’s PPSE policy states that the performance of a probationary employee must be formally
reviewed and discussed at least twice.
In light of the disciplinary problems of the staff, Alcaraz would reprimand them strictly for their
unprofessional behavior. It was noted however by Alcaraz’s supervisor that her heavy-handed methods
were too strict. In May, Alcaraz received an email stating that she failed to meet company
regularization standards and that she had to tender her resignation, or else her services would be
terminated. Alcaraz filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the Labor Arbiter who dismissed the
complaint on lack of merit. She then filed an appeal to the NLRC which reversed, annulled and set
aside the ruling of the LA, on the grounds that there was no evidence showing that Alcaraz had been
apprised of her probationary status and the requirements which she should have complied with in order
to be a regular employee. NLRC also found that her failure to meet company regularization standards
remained unsubstantiated which brought doubt to the valid cause behind her dismissal.
Herein Petitioners filed for a Motion to Reconsider, but were denied, hence the present petition in this
Court.
Issue/s:
1. Whether Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment with Abbott Laboratories;
Ruling/Held:
1. YES. A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure.
The services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any
of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer. Article 295 of the
Labor Code.
The employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements when dealing with a probationary
employee: first, the employer must communicate the regularization standards to the probationary
employee; and second, the employer must make such communication at the time of the probationary
employee’s engagement. If the employer fails to comply with either, the employee is deemed as a
regular and not a probationary employee.
Keeping with these rules, an employer is deemed to have made known the standards that would qualify
a probationary employee to be a regular employee when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the
employee of what he is expected to do or accomplish during the trial period of probation. This goes
without saying that the employee is sufficiently made aware of his probationary status as well as the
length of time of the probation.
In this case, petitioners contend that Alcaraz was terminated because she failed to qualify as a regular
employee according to Abbott’s standards which were made known to her at the time of her
engagement. An examination of the records reveals that Abbott had complied with the above-stated
requirements. Alcaraz was well-informed of her duties from the very start until the end of her time in
the company, manifested in the job description during application, the details of her employment
contract, training, the Code of conduct, and her past job experience in a similar line of work.
It must be noted however that Abbott did not uphold their own procedures by failing to evaluate
Alcaraz as an employee thru the PPSE to properly gauge her with company standards. While there lies
cause to terminate Alcaraz’s probationary employment for her failure to meet the regularization
standards, the fact that Abbott violated its own company procedure renders the termination of
Alcaraz’s employment procedurally infirm, warranting the payment of nominal damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The CA decision is reversed and set-aside, and the decision of
the LA is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that petitioner, Abbott Laboratories pay respondent
Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz nominal damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 on account of its breach of its
own company procedure.
15. International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, 1
June 2000
GEDUQUIO
FACTS:
Private respondent, International School (IS), hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its
faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four
tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire.
1. one’s domicile?
2. one’s home economy?
3. one owe economic allegiance?
4. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
Should the answer to any of four tests queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified
as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The
School justifies the difference on two “significant economic disadvantages” foreign-hires have to
endure, namely: (a) the “dislocation factor” and (b) limited tenure.
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, “a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining
representative of all faculty members” of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local-hires. This issue eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. Petitioner filed a
notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a
compromise prompted the DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. DOLE Acting Secretary,
issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School.
Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires is an
invalid and unreasonable classification and violates the Equal Protection Clause.
RULING
Yes, Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. The foregoing
provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of “equal pay
for equal work.”
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort, and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its “international character”
notwithstanding. The School contends that the petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires
perform work equal to that of foreign-hires.
The employer, IS, in this case has failed to show evidence that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities,
which they perform under similar working conditions. In this case, the court finds the point-of-hire
classification employed by the respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of the Court.
The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,” “to
afford labor full protection.” The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common
good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not
hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
16. Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome, G.R. No.
162994, 17 September 2004
GREGORIO
Facts:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995.
Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he
agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to
management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with
co- employees or employees with competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to
resign from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the
same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another
department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment
outside of the company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an
employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting married, Tecson's
District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but
marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed
him of conflict of interest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition
(that either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply
with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan
del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought
the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to
act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that
Glaxo's policy was valid. Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision. On May 19, 2003, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the ground
that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held
that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships
with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives.
marry.
In its Comment
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of
pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its employees
avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict with their
responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having
personal or family interests in any competitor company which may influence
their actions and decisions and consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits.
The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining
access to its secrets, procedures and policies. It likewise asserts that the policy
does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes existing or future
relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is therefore not
violative of the equal protection clause. It maintains that considering the nature
of its business,
the prohibition is based on valid grounds.
Issue: Is Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee of
a competitor company is valid?
Ruling:
Yes.
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that
Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo
only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be
denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt
and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to
give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor,
it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers.
The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
17. Yrasuegui v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 168081, 17 October 2008
KARANAIN

Yrasuegui v. Philippine Air Lines (G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008, 569
SCRA 467) [Definition] --- RAMIREZ
Facts:
Armando Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, who stands at 5'8"
with a large body frame (the ideal weight for his size is 166 Ibs). In 1984, due to weight problems of
the petitioner, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 1984 to March
1985 to address his weight concern. In many instances, the petitioner did not meet the weight standards
which prompted several leave without pay. After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed
to return to work but petitioner's weight problem recurred which made his off duty status retained. He
was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks but he refused to do so.
PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on
weight requirements. Petitioner in his answer claimed that PAL discriminated against him because "the
company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated."
In 1993, PAL terminated the petitioner "effective immediately due to to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, considering the utmost leniency extended to him which spanned for almost five years.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL
• The LA ruled that Yrasuegui was illegally dismissed. It ruled that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable but it shouldn't be the reason for dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance
of his duties.
• NLRC affirmed the ruling of LA.
• CA held that the weight standards of NRC are meant to be a continuing qualification for an
employee's position.
ISSUES:
(a) WON the obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
(b) Whether the dismissal of Yrasuegui for obesity can be predicated on the"bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) defense"?
Ruling:
(a) YES. obesitinder Article 282(e) 44 of the Labor
Code. In theat attendant, it becomes an analogouscause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that
justified his dismissal fromthe service. His obesity is voluntary, which means that the cause is
solelyattributable to the employee without any external force influencing orcontrolling his actions.
Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a),(c),(d).
(b) YES. The Constitution, Labor Code, and Magna Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions
similar to BFOQ. The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. The business of PAL is air
transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. The primary objective
of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the whims
and caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of
passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the
core of the job of a cabin attendant. The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the
possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job
of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft safely.
Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility.
18. Manuel v. N.C. Construction Supply, G.R. No. 127553, 28 November 1997
LAWAMA
FACTS:
N.C Construction Supply (Respondents) Security guards caught a company driver and his
helper stealing two rolls of electrical wire from the Company premises. During Investigation,
the helper identified petitioners as among the perpetrators of the series of thefts at the
company. Petitioners Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and Joel Rea were
employed as drivers at N.C. Construction Supply owned by private respondents Johnny Lim
(a.k.a. Lao Ching Eng) and Anita Sy.
The petitioners were invited to Pasig Police Station for investigation, respondent’s lawyer
Atty. Reyes was sent to interrogate them. Petitioners admitted their guilt and offered to resign
in exchange for the withdrawal of any criminal charge against them. The resignation was
accepted by the counsel of the respondents. Petitioners then filed a case against
respondents for illegal dismissal claiming that their admission was coerced by the lawyer and
without their own counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners were illegally dismissed without valid cause.
RULING:
No. Petitioners were dismissed with valid cause. They were found guilty of stealing company
property as identified by the witness and not just coerced by the respondents Lawyer. Under
Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employer is authorized to terminate the services of an
employee for loss of trust and confidence, provided that the loss of confidence arises from
particular proven facts. The law does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
employee’s misconduct. Substantial evidence is sufficient. Substantial evidence has been
defined as such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a
criminal case under custodial investigation. The investigation was merely an administrative
investigation conducted by the employer, not a criminal investigation. The questions were
propounded by the employer’s lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the investigation
was conducted at the police station did not necessarily put petitioners under custodial
investigation as the venue of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions
made by petitioners during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify their
dismissal.
19. Punzal v. ETSI Technologies Inc., G.R. No. 170384, 9 March 2007
NAGDAR
 FACTS:
Lorna Punzal, an employee of Etsi Technologies, Inc., sent an email to her
officemates announcing the holding of a Halloween party that was to be held in the
office. However, the petitioner’s immediate superior, Remudaro, advised Punzal to
first secure the approval of the Senior Vice President, respondent Werner Geisert, for
the holding of the party in the office.
The VP did not approve the Halloween party which prompted Punzal to send
another email informing that the VP did not agree to the idea and expressed her
disappointment, particularly saying:
“he was so unfair, para bang palagi syang iniisahan sa trabaho. Bakit most of the
parents na magjoin ang anak ay naka VL naman. Anyway, solohin na lang nya ang
bukas ang office”
The HR required her to explain in writing within 48 hours why she should
not be given disciplinary action for improper conduct or acts of discourtesy
concerning a company officer. Punzal replied by letter stating that she never expected
that such kind of words can be considered as acts of discourtesy or disrespect.
The management considered her reason “unacceptable” and decided to terminate
Punzal immediately for violating Article III (8) and Article IV (5) of ETSI’s Code of
Conduct and Discipline.
Petitioner then filed before NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against
ETSI, Geisert and Remudaro. The petitioner alleged that she was deprived of her
right to counsel during the conference with Geisert and Remudaro.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the petitioner’s complaint, finding that she was
legally dismissed for serious misconduct and that she was accorded due process. The
NLRC also ordered that petitioner be awarded separation pay. Both parties thereupon
filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the CA. The CA held that the
petitioner's dismissal was in order. However, the petitioner believes that the appellate
court erred when it ruled that her statement was discourteous and that she was
accorded due process, hence this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a just cause to dismiss Punzal
HELD:
Yes. Hence, having been dismissed for just cause, petitioner is neither
entitled to reinstatement nor to backwages. A cordial, at the very least, civil attitude,
according to deference to one’s superiors, is still observed, especially among high-
ranking management officers. The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipino values
of pakikisama and paggalang which are not only prevailed among members of a
family and community but within organizations as well, including work sites. An
employee is expected to extend due respect to management, the employer being
“proverbial hen that lays the golden egg”, so to speak.
An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his
disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his immediate superior
would normally approach said superior directly or otherwise ask some other officer
possibly to mediate and discuss the problem with the end in view of settling their
differences without causing ferocious conflicts. No matter how the employee dislikes
his employer professionally, and even if he is in a confrontational disposition, he cannot
afford to be disrespectful and dare to talk with an unguarded tongue and/or with a bileful
pen.
20. Lopez v. Alturas Group of Companies, G.R. No. 191008, 11 April 2011
NICOLAS
FACTS: Quirico Lopez (petitioner) was hired by respondent Alturas Group of
Companies in 1997 as truck driver. Ten years later or sometime in November 2007,
he was dismissed after he was allegedly caught by respondent’s security guard in
the act of attempting to smuggle out of the company premises 60 kilos of scrap
iron worth P840 aboard respondents’ Isuzu Cargo Aluminum Van with Plate Number
PHP 271 that was then assigned to him. When questioned, petitioner allegedly
admitted to the security guard that he was taking out the scrap iron consisting of
lift springs out of which he would make axes.
Petitioner, in compliance with the Show Cause Notice dated December 5, 2007
issued by respondent company’s Human Resource Department Manager, denied the
allegations by a handwritten explanation written in the Visayan dialect.
Finding petitioner’s explanation unsatisfactory, respondent company terminated
his employment by Notice of Termination effective December 14, 2007 on the
grounds of loss of trust and confidence, and of violation of company rules and
regulations. In issuing the Notice, respondent company also took into account the
result of an investigation showing that petitioner had been smuggling out its
cartons which he had sold, in conspiracy with one Maritess Alaba, for his own
benefit to thus prompt it to file a criminal case for Qualified Theft against him
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol. It had in fact earlier filed another
criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner arising from the theft of the
scrap iron.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was not afforded procedural due process.
RULING: This Court has held that there is no violation of due process even if no
hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of
the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be
heard.
Petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side when he was informed of
the charge against him and required to submit his written explanation with which
he complied.
The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer may provide an
employee with ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
assistance of a representative or counsel in ways other than a formal hearing. The
employee can be fully afforded a chance to respond to the charges against him,
adduce his evidence or rebut the evidence against him through a wide array of
methods, verbal or written.
After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the
employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a letter,
memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in support thereof,
like relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time records) and the
sworn statements of his witnesses. For this purpose, he may prepare his
explanation personally or with the assistance of a representative or counsel. He
may also ask the employer to provide him copy of records material to his defense.
His written explanation may also include a request that a formal hearing or
conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a formal hearing or conference
becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist substantial evidentiary disputes
or where company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of
employment pretermination procedure.
The right to counsel and the assistance of one in investigations involving
termination cases is neither indispensable nor mandatory, except when the
employee himself requests for one or that he manifests that he wants a formal
hearing on the charges against him.
21. Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, L- 25018, 26 May 1969
OPAO
FACTS:
This case stemmed from an administrative case filed against herein petitioner Arsenio
Pascual, Jr. for alleged immorality being heard by the respondent Board of Medical
Examiners (BEM). In this administrative case against petitioner, he was asked to be
the first witness for the complainants – thus compelling him to be a witness against
himself. Petitioner objected to the said act of the complainants, hence the BEM
required Pascual to secure a restraining order from a competent authority so as he
cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call
petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-
incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating
answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-
incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled
to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by the respondent Board.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right against self-incrimination may be invoked in administrative
proceedings.
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner citing the case of Cabal v.
Kapunan. In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge
Kapunan, it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having
been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act, the complainant requested the
investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which
request was granted. Upon petitioner’s refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge
for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion
to quash and upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner
in accordance with the well-settled principle that “the accused in a criminal case may
refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness
stand.”
It was noted in the opinion penned by the then Chief Justice that while the matter
referred to an administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act
authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or employee may
acquire, manifestly out of proportion to his salary and his other lawful income, there
is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while
administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before
us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not
the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as medical practitioner, for
some an even greater deprivation.
22. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, G.R. No. 157870, 3 November 2008
PACATANG
23. Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011
RAMIREZ
Facts:
Petitioner Pollo is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No.
IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD)
under the “Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na” program of the CSC. On January 3. 2007,
CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an unsigned complaint letter which was
marked “Confidential” and was sent through a courier service (LBC) from certain Allan San
Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The letter contains allegations stating that the
petitioner has been helping a number of individuals who have pending cases in the CSC. The
letter sender’s intention was that the CSC should investigate this anomaly to maintain the
clean and good behaviour of their office. Chairperson David immediately formed a team of
four personnel with background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing
them to conduct an investigation and specifically “to back up all the files in the computers
found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
After a briefing, the team went to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The
backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division
(LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who
closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to
petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time, informing them
of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.
Issue:
Whether or not the search conducted in the petitioner’s office computer and the copying of
his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression of his
constitutional right to privacy is justified
Ruling:
Yes. The search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope,
there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield
incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by the CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject to the anonymous complaint. The fact that
these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he
was the author thereof.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of
work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the
Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly “lawyering” for individuals
with pending cases in the CSC. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office
is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the
complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources
in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search
was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they
could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action.
Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the work-related investigation.

Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an
open and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who
happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In
addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and
the concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.

Pollo’s claim that the search was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy must
necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and
correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable
considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of
employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities.