MOOT COURT
industrialized States
A) Kingdom of Ravis
Area: 703, 763 km2
- bigger than PH
Population: approximately 43M
- Coastline: 14.33M (1/3)
- Rest: Traditionally Nomadic groups (Freman
tribes); difficult to count in the census and
occupy the inland territory
- Freman Tribesindigenous tribes
: historically specialized in hunting, training the
majestic indigenous Raveen Eagle (largest species in
the world)
: Raveen Eagle hunts flocks of migratory goats and
other small mammals
Climate
- Harsh
Environment and Ecology
- Home to many unique species of flora and
fauna which rely on natural aquifers that
provide oases amongst the aridexcessively dry
Raveen hills and desert dunes
Employment
- Mining: forms 35% of the country’s GDP
- Large reserves of natural mineral resources
were discovered
- Cobalt: mineral used in the manufacture of
many new technologies, including mobile
phones and lithium batteries
>> forms most of these mining operations
NOTE: Freman are generally displaced by the industry
so over the last 30 years, their permanent settlements
have begun to form around the poorly regulated and
open-cut mining operations where they are employed,
often excavating cobalt by hand.
 Arravis
- Port city
- Seat of His Excellency Shaddam II
- Home to many business people from
neighbouring Sultanate of Caladan
 Sends raw Raveen materials for
refinement and global export to
Caladan and several other
- Ravis shares most of its land borders with its
wealthy neighbor Caladan and Republic of
Tleilax (Tleilax cultivates a smaller but
competing cobalt mining and refining industry)
Since early 1990s
- Increasingly harsh weather conditions
+ more frequent and severe drought conditions
= displaced Freman tribes from their traditional
lands in the harsher interior
= created increasing tensions over the
destruction of remaining grazing and hunting
grounds for mining operations
True Freman movement
- A political movement formed from a group of
loosely aligned tribes and displaced freman
- Opposed the mining operations and sought an
alternative to the conditions in the mining
communities
- Assisted by the NGOs in lobbying domestically
and internationally for World Heritage listing of
the unique Raveen aquifers and moratorium
expansion of mining operations, but without
success.
*1995 Silent Spring Declaration
- 10-point plan for the protection of the Raveen
wilderness and the Freman way of life
- presented to Shaddam II by True Freman leaders
2009: A team of researchers found that levels of
cobalt and chemical toxins in the urine and blood of
Freman living in close proximity to the cobalt mines
=
many times the levels of people living in Arravis
- Researchers claimed that the trace minerals
were responsible for the sharp rise in birth
defects, apparent rise of chronic health
condition and cancers amongst the Freman
population
- Levels of biodiversity, plant growth and
numbers of indigenous goats sharply declined
around aquifers polluted by industrial waste
from the mines.
 - A breakdown in traditional community
structures and a rise in criminality among
young men and unaccompanied children
 Main demographic of shanty
townssalusa on the fringe of mining
communities
** A shanty town, squatter area or squatter settlement
is a settlement of improvised buildings known as
shanties or shacks, typically made of materials such as
mud and wood.
 5 of the world’s top technology
companies, including Macrofirm
and Pearheadquartered in Caladan
- named in a lawsuit filed by
human rights lawyer
- on behalf of a dozen Freman
children and their parents
- alleging the use of child labor in
cobalt mines on Ravis
2010
- Some of the True Freman groups FORMED A
MILITIA called TRUE FREMAN RESISTANCE
ARMY (TFRA)
- TFRA was composed of “Units” generally
derived from tribal groups and commanded by
a tribal leader
- TFRA LACKED CENTRAL LEADERSHIP
 With the units coordinating,
BUT acting autonomously within their
traditional tribal lands and with the shared aim
of compelling Shaddam II to accept the Silent
Spring Declaration
NIAC: The non-State armed group be sufficiently
organized and pursue a clear military and political
objective
 "An armed conflict exists whenever there is a
resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organised armed
groups or between such groups within a State"
"organized military force"
Indicative factors:
 the existence of a command structure and disciplinary
rules and mechanisms within the group
 the ability of the group to gain access to weapons,
other military equipment, recruits and military training
 its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military
operations, including troop movements and logistics
 its ability to define a unified military strategy and use
military tactics;
 its ability to speak with one voice and negotiate and
conclude agreements
"overall control" test: play a
role in the organization, coordination
or planning of military operations
 ICJ: "effective control" test: give
specific instructions or directives
Article 8(2)(f) of the Statute defines “conflicts not
of an international character” for the purposes
of article 8(2)(e) of the Statute, and provides
that:
Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an
international character and thus does not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts
of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take
place in the territory of a State when there is protracted
armed conflict between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups.
- RED EAGLES
 largest TFRA Unit
 composed of multiple armed bands
 operated in the central western
region of Ravis – which is
particularly affected by mining
 Leader: Liet Kynes (former
outspoken and well-respected
leader of the True Freman
movement)
TFRA began conducting raids on overland shipment
of raw Raveen minerals
- Caladan and Ravis imposed trade sanctions on
the neighboring Republic of Tleilax
 “allegedly” supplying TFRA with
small and light weapons
- Firefights and mortar attacks on mine security
posts and transportation refueling stations
 resulted in significant casualties among security
personnel
 Subsequently reinforced by the
RAVEEN IMPERIAL FORCES (RIF)
- TFRA claimed responsibility for an attack on a
petrol tanker at a refueling depot on 4 April
2011admission
- The explosion killed more than 50 people
(workers, security personnel, and RIF)
and destroyed mine vehicles
- 40 truck drivers and personnel of the state-
owned Shaddam Mining and more than 300
Raveen police and RIF members providing
security for mining cargo were KILLED or
injured over the course of the rest of the year.
TFRA was joined by international “foreign fighters”
from a collection of at least 25 countries
 Foreign fighters fought with the TFRA
during the warmer months
 Return to their home countries before the
onset of the harsh Raveen winter
- A whole band of the Red Eagles Unit was composed
of the visiting fighters
 Foreign fighters posted on various social
media accounts, under #eco_warrior
 Typically posing in ripped jeans with
Kalashkinovs or mortars next to TFRA
members
 In the posts, TFRA members wore
traditional brown Freman robes for
protection from the elements with a sleeve
or chest partly bared to display a large,
stylized Raven Eagle tattoo.
 They often wore a traditional Freman
hunting blade through their belts
Violence reduced dramatically each year during
winter
- remotely detonated improvised explosive
devices used by the TFRA continued to be
damaging during these lulls in clashes
- raids + frequent sandstorms + very poor road
conditions in the Raveen interior = cross-border
overland transportation unfeasible evacuation is
impossible
- most cobalt and other mineral shipments were
diverted to Caladan and other processing hubs
via Arravis port from the late 2013
2014: Profits from the sale of Raveen cobalt suffered
a significant shutdown
- heavy disruption to raw supply by TFRA
activities
- Several mines in the interior were forced to
close
01 May 2014
- Shaddam II announced OPERATION DESERT
TEMPEST (ODT) on national television: an
official ground operation by the Raveen
Imperial Forces to put down those terrorists
During ODT
- RIF infantry platoons were sent into the interior
to fight the TFRA
- Platoons were required to operate remotely for
up to a fortnight at a time
- During sustained operations navigating in the
rough Raveen terrain and engaging in combat,
the troops became quickly fatigued
- Shaddam II approved the use of
pharmacological fatigue countermeasures to
enhance the performance of his troops under
these conditions
- “Go-pills”: issued to the medical officer
assigned to each remote platoon
**"Go-pills" is a term commonly used in military
contexts to refer to pharmaceutical substances that are
used to promote wakefulness and combat fatigue in
military personnel. These substances are typically
stimulants, such as amphetamines or modafinil, that
can help individuals stay awake and alert for extended
periods of time. Go-pills are primarily used in situations
where sustained wakefulness is necessary, such as
during long-duration missions or operations that require
heightened vigilance. They are intended to enhance
performance and combat the effects of sleep
deprivation. It is important to note that the use of go-
pills is subject to strict regulations and guidelines within
military organizations. Their use is typically closely
monitored and controlled to ensure the safety and well-
being of the personnel involved.
- Newly-developed go-pills were a trial drug,
highly effective at reducing fatigue, allowing
soldiers to function at a high cognitive level
WITHOUT sleep for around 36 hours
 - Cognitive function and reaction time was
noticeably improved in non-fatigued personnel
beyond normal abilities: confirmed trial results
from Raveen Pharmacological Association
ICRC NOTES
Medical officers: required to carry ID cards which
identified them as RIF medical personnelcombat medics
- Red crystal emblem on a white background was
sewn onto both upper arms of their uniforms
Go-pills
- had a tendency to cause an unpredictable
anaphylactic reaction in around 5% of recipients
without having had any adverse reaction to
previous doses
** Anaphylaxis is a severe allergic reaction that can be
triggered by foods, insect stings, drugs, or other
substances.
- RIF protocol>> required the medical officer to
dispense the go-pills to soldiers in field and to
clinically supervise them for adverse reactions,
particularly within the first half-hour
- They rapidly administered adrenaline and
treatment for anaphylaxis as necessary,
allowing affected soldiers to continue
performing their duties in the majority of cases
- The medical officers also maintained a log of
adverse reactions and individual reports of
performance for the drug trial
- These logs were submitted to the chief medical
officer of the RIF, who use them to refine the
go-pill in collaboration with the Raveen
Pharmacological Association
11 November 2015: whistle-blower website WikiDrips
published leaked documents on the drug trials and
copies of some RIF medical officer logbooks from a
source within the Raveen Pharmacological Association
Several True Freman leaders DENOUNCED on social
media the use of “unnatural” substances to aid the
oppression of the Freman
- Called on the TFRA to defend Ravis from this
new chemical scourge
- Chani Irulan, a True Freman leader, wrote that
the strict Freman taboo on the use of any
alcohol or mind-altering drugs extended to the
use of go-pills
- All traditional Freman believe that imbibing
such toxins is an insult to the Mother Earth
- Al-Jazeera phone interview broadcast: TFRA
COMMANDER KYNES expressed disgust that
doctors and pharmacists were collaborating
with the RIF on an unnatural chemical weapon
- Civs are protected against direct attack unless and for such time as
they directly participate in hostilities
1. Direct Harm
2. Proximate Cause
3. Belligerent Nexus
*need to have a mandate before one can directly participate in hostilities
Generic: Civs are those persons who are not members of organized armed
forces or groups belonging to a state/non-state army to an armed conflict
Regular Armed Forces
- Formal membership regulated in domestic law
Irregular Armed Forces functional membership based on CCF (e.g. SAF)
YOU NEED A NEXUS TO THE ARMED CONFLICT BEFORE YOU CAN BE A
LEGITIMATE TARGET
Participation
- Individual involvement in collective hostilities
Direct/Indirect Participation
- Indicates intensity and degree of individual involvement
3 CUMULATIVE ELEMENTS
1. Threshold of Harm – act in question must be likely
 To adversely affect the military operations/military capacity of a party
to the conflict; or
 To inflict death, injury or destruction on persons or objects protected
against direct attack
EXAMPLE: use of human shield
2. Direct Causation
- Direct causal link between the act in question and the harm likely to
result
EXAMPLE: civilian transporting weapon to a NSAG
3. Belligerent Nexus
- Act must be designed to directly cause the required threshold of
harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of
another
WHEN CIVILIANS LOSE PROTECTION
- For the duration of SPECIFIC ACT
 4 January 2016 : TFRA claimed responsibility on
social media for the killing of an RIF medical officer
- Posted a photo alleged to depict go-pills in a
pool of blood
- Over the next 6 months, TFRA killed 25 RIF
medical officers attached to RIF patrols across
the country
- Medical officers: only fatality in the attacktargeted
His Excelency Shaddam II and the Sultan of Caladan
both issued statements condemning the deliberate
targeting of protected medical personnel by the TFRA
27 April 2017
 - Several True Freman and TFRA leaders
(including LIET KYNES) signed the Arravis
Accord with Shaddam II
- The Accord provided for a total ceasefire from
the date of signing, with the undertaking to
consider the designation of some of the
aquifers in the interior of Ravis as World
Heritage sites.
- Combats dramatically decreased
- Shaddam II told the people of Ravis in a special
broadcast hat he welcomed the return of peace
and prosperity to the Kingdom of Ravis
The aquifers supplying large mining operations and
communities closer to the coast were excluded from
consideration as World Heritage under the Arravis
Accord
- The permanent settlements of Freman that had
been established around the cobalt mines were
very isolated and generally lacked basic public
facilities and services
- Inhabitants regularly faced food shortages and
the work in the mines was strenuous and
hazardous
- These communities had traditionally been a
fertile recruitment ground for the TFRA and
continued to discreetly support the roaming
Units with food and shelter after the Arravis
Accord
03 June 2017
- New York Times published an article by
Professor Corrino highlighting the hazardous
working conditions in the mines, and the
widespread use of child labour
- It was noted that children were often expected
to do the same work as adult labourers but
generally paid far less
- As a result, there was widespread practice of
falsifying identification documents (extremely
basic and easy to forge) in order to claim that a
person was over 18 years of age and so should
be entitled to a higher level of remuneration
- Workers spoke of laboring for 12 hours a day
with no protective clothing
- When asked about the future, one worker was
quoted as saying: “I’m not going to waste my
life here. I’m going to join the TFRA soon. My
cousin signed up last year with his friend,
they’re small so, apparently, they just get to
look after the eagles.
Professor Corrino expressed concern that the only
other option for many children was crime or the TFRA
- She wrote that TFRA were liberating children
from one terrible situation, to entice them into
a more violent and precarious one => child
soldiers
12 June 2018
- TFRA member published a video to his social
media called “training day”
- Showed a group of uniformed TFRA members,
armed with Kalashkinovs and traditionl Freman
hunting knives swingin in sheaths against her
thighs, and bearing red outlined tattoos of
eagles.
- TFRA members were feeding Raveen Eagles and
issuing various commands to which the eagles
would respond by picking up large objects
before dropping them on nearby marked
targets, before returning to perch on a soldier’s
arm
- In the background was a group of boys who
appeared to be young teenagers.
- The boys were not in TFRA uniform but all wore
red armbands bearing an image of a Raveen
Eagle
- Using Freman hunting knives drawn from
sheathes on their belts which dangled to below
the knee on some, the boys were busily
chopping up the meat which was being fed to
the eagles by the uniformed TFRA members.
- At the end of the video, the large birds were
taken away on perches held by two boys on
each side.
- The video was taken next to an aquifer, with the
sprawling shanty town of a salusa visible in the
background
Human rights groups picked up and shared the social
media video
- Claimed it provided evidence of the use of child
soldiers by the TFRA
- KYNES responded with a social media post: The
TFRA don’t use child soldiers to fight their
battles. I make all my commanders check
everyone’s documentation when they sign up.
- He announced he would conduct an internal
inquiry where he would visit the various bands
to check their records
- He said that the relevant local commanders
would be cautioned or punished where there
were not records kept

02 December 2018, a Raveen court filed a warrant for
the arrest of MR LIET KYNES under the IHL Act of Ravis
(RA 9851) in relation to war crimes during the Raveen
conflict
04 April 2019, Raveen authorities managed to arrest
KYNES when he tried to surreptitiously visit a Raveen
hospital to undergo a minor medical procedure
- Kynes was delivered into the custody of the
Raveen court that issued the warrant for his
arrest
any pharmacological performance-enhancing
technology introduced to the military must not degrade
a soldier’s mental capacity or ability to act according to
his/her own free will
Rule 30.
Persons and Objects Displaying the Distinctive
Emblem
Rule 30. Attacks directed against medical and
religious personnel and objects displaying
the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions in conformity with international
law are prohibited.
Practice
Volume II, Chapter 7, Section F.
Summary
State practice establishes this rule as a norm of
customary international law applicable in both
international and non-international armed
conflicts.
International and non-international armed
conflicts
Under the Statute of the International Criminal
Court, “intentionally directing attacks against
buildings, material, medical units and
transport, and personnel using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in
conformity with international law” constitutes
a war crime in both international and non-
international armed conflicts.[1]
The prohibition on attacking persons and
objects displaying the distinctive emblems is
contained in numerous military manuals.[2] It
is an offence under the legislation of many
States to attack persons and objects displaying
the distinctive emblems.[3] Furthermore, the
rule is supported by official statements and
reported practice.[4]
On numerous occasions, the ICRC has called
on parties to both international and non-
international armed conflicts to respect persons
and objects displaying the distinctive emblems.
[5]
No official contrary practice was found with
respect to either international or non-
international armed conflicts. Attacks directed
against persons and objects displaying the
distinctive emblems have generally been
condemned.[6]
Interpretation
As this rule indicates, respect for the distinctive
emblems is conditional on their proper use (see
Rule 59). Practice also shows that failure to
wear or display the distinctive emblems does
not of itself justify an attack on medical or
religious personnel and objects when they are
recognized as such. This is an application of
the general principle that the distinctive
emblems are intended to facilitate
identification and do not, of themselves, confer
protected status. In other words, medical and
religious personnel and objects are protected
because of their function. The display of the
emblems is merely the visible manifestation of
that function but does not confer protection as
such.
The Elements of Crimes for the International
Criminal Court stresses that the war crime of
“intentionally directing attacks against
buildings, material, medical units and
transport, and personnel using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in
conformity with international law” includes
attacks against persons and objects displaying
a distinctive emblem or other method of
identification, such as the distinctive signals,
indicating protection under the Geneva
Conventions.
Proving intent to commit a crime typically requires
evidence that demonstrates a person's state of mind
and their deliberate intention to engage in unlawful
behavior. While the specific requirements may vary
depending on the jurisdiction and the nature of the
crime, here are some general factors that can be
considered when establishing intent:
1. Direct evidence: This includes any explicit statements,
written or verbal, in which the individual expresses their
intention to commit the crime. For example,
confessions or recorded conversations.
2. Circumstantial evidence: Indirect evidence that can
be used to infer intent. This may include the person's
actions, behavior, or patterns leading up to the crime. It
can also involve evidence of planning, preparation, or
motive.
3. Prior knowledge or history: Past actions or behaviors
that indicate a person's familiarity with the criminal act
or their intent to engage in unlawful activities.
4. Motive: Understanding the underlying reason or
purpose behind the crime can help establish intent.
Motive alone is not sufficient to prove intent, but it can
be a supporting factor.
5. Expert testimony: In some cases, expert witnesses,
such as forensic psychologists or criminologists, may
provide insights into a person's mental state or intent
based on their professional expertise.
It is important to note that the burden of proof lies
with the prosecution in criminal cases, and they must
present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to
establish intent.
Proving attacks directed against medical and religious
personnel, as well as objects displaying the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions, in conformity
with international law typically involves gathering and
presenting evidence. Here are some steps that can be
taken:
1. Document and collect evidence: Gather any available
documentation, photographs, videos, or eyewitness
testimonies that provide evidence of the attacks. This
can include incident reports, medical records, or any
other relevant information.
2. Establish the context: Provide information about the
specific conflict or situation in which the attacks
occurred. This can include details about the parties
involved, the location, and the timeline of events.
3. Identify the distinctive emblems: Clearly demonstrate
that the attacked personnel or objects were displaying
the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions or
Additional Protocol III. This can be done through visual
evidence or testimonies from witnesses who can
confirm the presence of these emblems.
4. Consult international law experts: Seek guidance
from legal experts specializing in international
humanitarian law. They can provide insights into the
specific legal provisions and requirements for proving
attacks against protected personnel and objects.
5. Present the evidence to relevant authorities: Submit
the gathered evidence to appropriate authorities, such
as national law enforcement agencies, international
tribunals, or human rights organizations. They can
assess the evidence and take appropriate action based
on their mandates.
Today, I stand before you to present a compelling
argument regarding the protection of medical officers
during times of war.
It is a fundamental principle of international
humanitarian law that medical personnel, including
medical officers, are entitled to special protection and
must be respected and safeguarded during armed
conflicts.
Medical officers play a critical role in providing
essential medical care and support to both military
personnel and civilians caught in the midst of war.
Their primary duty is to alleviate suffering and save
lives, regardless of the side they serve. They are the
embodiment of compassion and humanity in the midst
of chaos and destruction.
The Geneva Conventions and other international legal
instruments explicitly recognize the importance of
protecting medical personnel. These conventions
establish clear guidelines and obligations for all parties
involved in armed conflicts to ensure the safety and
security of medical officers. They are considered non-
combatants and must be treated as such. By
deliberately targeting medical officers, those who
dispense care and healing to the wounded and sick, we
not only violate the principles of humanity but also
undermine the very fabric of international law.
Attacking medical officers not only inflicts harm upon
them but also jeopardizes the lives of countless
individuals who rely on their expertise and assistance.
The distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions,
such as the Red Cross or Red Crescent, serve as
universally recognized symbols of protection for medical
personnel. These emblems are intended to signal to all
parties involved in armed conflicts that medical officers
and facilities must be respected and spared from harm.
Any intentional attack against medical officers using
these distinctive emblems is a clear violation of
international law. It is an affront to the principles of
humanity, compassion, and the sanctity of life that
underpin the very essence of the Geneva Conventions.
We must remember that the protection of medical
officers during war is not a mere suggestion or a matter
of convenience. It is a legal obligation that all parties
involved in armed conflicts must adhere to. Failure to do
so not only undermines the credibility of the
international legal framework but also perpetuates a
cycle of violence and suffering. In conclusion, I implore
this court to recognize the importance of protecting
medical officers during times of war. Let us uphold the
principles of humanity, compassion, and respect for the
sanctity of life. Let us send a clear message that
deliberate attacks against medical officers will not be
tolerated and that those who perpetrate such acts will
be held accountable under the full force of the law.
Thank you.
ON DIRECT PARTICIPATION
Direct participation in hostilities refers to actions or
activities that directly contribute to the conduct of
hostilities in an armed conflict. It includes activities such
as:
- Engaging in combat operations: Physically
taking part in fighting, attacking, or defending
military targets.
- Carrying weapons openly: Wielding firearms,
explosives, or other military equipment.
- Acting as a lookout or spotter: Providing
intelligence about enemy positions or
movements.
- Attacking military targets: Participating in
offensive operations against enemy forces or
installations.
- Setting up or maintaining military equipment:
Erecting or operating artillery, tanks, or other
weapons systems.
- Gathering or relaying military intelligence:
Collecting or transmitting information about
enemy forces or military objectives.
- Participating in logistics support: Assisting in the
transportation, supply, or maintenance of
military resources.
- Engaging in sabotage or acts of sabotage:
Causing deliberate damage or disruption to
enemy military infrastructure.
Since the nineteenth century the red cross and red
crescent emblems have been used as universal symbols
of assistance for armed conflict victims. With the
adoption of an additional emblem – the red crystal – a
new chapter in their long history has just been written.
The original Geneva Convention, adopted on 22
August 1864, established the red cross emblem.
From the beginning, the emblem was a visible sign
of the neutral status and the protection granted by
international humanitarian law to armed forces’
medical services and volunteers belonging to relief
societies for wounded military personnel. At the
time, the adoption of a single distinctive symbol
appeared to be an essential condition for this
protection. By the end of the nineteenth century,
however, the red crescent and the red lion and sun
[1] were used by some States and relief societies
instead of the red cross. Taking note of the fait
accompli, the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armies in the Field of 27 July 1929 granted
international recognition to these two additional
emblems. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 subsequently confirmed all three emblems.
The Commentary on Article 38 of the First Geneva
Convention of 1949 clearly states that these emblems
are intended “to signify one thing only – something
which is, however, of immense importance: respect
for the individual who suffers and is defenceless,
who must be aided, whether friend or enemy,
without distinction of nationality, race, religion, class
or opinion.” [2] Despite this assertion, the emblems
are sometimes perceived in particular contexts as
having a religious or political connotation. This
perception is the cause of two major difficulties for
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement. First, it challenges the notion that
neutrality and impartiality serve as the basis for the
activities of all components of the Movement. As a
consequence, the emblems are not given the respect
they are due, which diminishes the protection
afforded those displaying them. Second, it has led
some States and relief societies to refuse to adopt
any of the existing emblems on the grounds that
none is suitable for them. Any such refusal prevents
the Movement from attaining true universality, since
its statutes lay down the use of one or the other of
these symbols as a necessary condition for a
National Society to be recognized and to become a
full member of the Movement.
In order to correct these two problems, the States
party to the Geneva Conventions adopted a third
protocol additional to the Conventions at a
diplomatic conference held in Geneva from 5 to 8
December 2005. This instrument recognizes an
additional emblem – composed of a red frame in the
shape of a square on edge on a white ground –
commonly referred to as the red crystal.[3] The
shape and name of this additional emblem were the
result of a long selection process, the goal of which
was to come up with a result devoid of any political,
religious or other connotation and which could thus
be used all over the world. The red crystal is not
intended to replace the cross and crescent but to
provide a further option.
The persons and entities authorized to display the red
crystal are the same as those entitled to use the
emblems recognized by the Geneva Conventions of
1949. These include in particular the medical
services of the armed forces of States, civilian
hospitals with explicit authorization and the various
components of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement – namely, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the National
Societies, and their International Federation. The
recognized emblems are equivalent in meaning.
They must be treated equally and receive equal
protection in the national legislation of States.
The emblems may be employed in two different
ways. As a protective device, an emblem is the
visible sign of protection conferred by the Geneva
Conventions. As an indicative device, an emblem
shows that a person or object is linked to the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement. Additional Protocol III provides for the
red crystal in its pure form to be used as a protective
device. If used as an indicative device, however, the
red crystal may have incorporated within it one of
the emblems recognized by the Geneva Conventions,
a combination of these emblems or another emblem
which has been in effective use by a State party to
Additional Protocol III and was the subject of a
communication to the other States Parties and the
ICRC prior to the adoption of the Protocol. It is
important to note that Additional Protocol III
authorizes not only the permanent substitution of the
red crystal for the red cross or red crescent as
described above, but also temporary use of the red
crystal in exceptional circumstances to enhance
protection of armed forces’ medical services or to
facilitate the work of National Societies.
Additional Protocol III is drawn up in such a way as
to prevent any future proliferation of other emblems.
[Opening Statement]
Your Honor, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury,
Today, we gather here to seek justice for the
senseless killing of John Doe, a person who, at the
time of his death, was wearing the Red Crystal
emblem. We will prove that the accused, Mr. John
Smith, committed a heinous act that went against the
fundamental principles of humanity and the law.
[Establishing the Red Crystal Emblem]
The Red Crystal emblem is an internationally
recognized symbol of protection and neutrality
during armed conflicts. It is meant to provide aid and
assistance to all persons affected by war, regardless
of their allegiance or nationality. Wearing this
emblem is a clear display of one's commitment to
humanitarian principles and a desire to help those in
need.
[Description of the Incident]
On the fateful evening of July 15th, 20XX, Mr. John
Doe, a dedicated humanitarian worker and a wearer
of the Red Crystal emblem, was providing assistance
to the wounded in a conflict zone. He was unarmed
and posed no threat to anyone. However, the
accused, Mr. John Smith, approached Mr. Doe and
engaged in a deliberate act of violence, shooting him
at close range without any provocation or justifiable
cause.
[Establishing the Defendant's Motive]
The evidence will clearly demonstrate that Mr.
Smith held a deep-rooted animosity towards
individuals who wore the Red Crystal emblem.
Statements made by Mr. Smith prior to the incident,
including social media posts, witnesses, and
intercepted conversations, will demonstrate his
disdain for humanitarian workers and his intent to
harm them.
[Presenting the Evidence]
We will present numerous pieces of evidence that
unequivocally link the accused to the killing of Mr.
Doe:
Eyewitness Testimonies: Multiple credible
witnesses, including fellow humanitarian workers
and victims of the incident, will testify to seeing Mr.
Smith approach Mr. Doe and shoot him without any
cause for self-defense.
Forensic Evidence: The ballistics report will
conclusively match the bullet recovered from Mr.
Doe's body to the firearm registered under Mr. 2. Commentary on Article 38 of the Geneva
Smith's name. This irrefutable evidence establishes Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the accused as the person responsible for pulling the the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
trigger. 1952, p. 305.

Surveillance Footage: Video footage obtained from
nearby security cameras will show Mr. Smith's
movements leading up to the incident, clearly
establishing his presence at the crime scene and
discarding any possibility of a mistaken identity.
Digital Trace: We will present social media posts
and online conversations where the accused
expresses his deep-seated hatred towards individuals
wearing the Red Crystal emblem, further reinforcing
his motive and intent to harm humanitarian workers.
3. Protocol Additional III refers to this additional
emblem as the “third Protocol emblem.” However,
paragraph 14 of the final act of the diplomatic
conference on the adoption of Protocol III specifies
in this regard: “Although Protocol III referred to the
additional emblem as the ‘third Protocol emblem,’
the ICRC and the [International Federation]
informed the Conference that the designation ‘red
crystal’ had gained currency and would be
introduced formally at the next International
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.”

[Conclusion]

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the evidence we

will present during this trial will undoubtedly
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused,
Mr. John Smith, killed Mr. John Doe solely because
he was wearing the Red Crystal emblem, signifying
his role as a humanitarian worker. The prosecution
seeks to hold Mr. Smith accountable for his
abhorrent actions and ensure justice is served for the
victim and his grieving family. The evidence will be
unequivocal, and we humbly request your careful
consideration of the facts presented in this case.

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran – the only State to

have employed the red lion and sun – has since
abandoned its use.
Introduction: The prosecution seeks to hold
accountable individuals who have been involved in the
recruitment and use of children during armed conflicts.
This heinous crime violates international humanitarian
law and various human rights conventions, placing the
lives and futures of children at great risk. The evidence
presented will demonstrate the culpability of the
defendants in the commission of these offenses and
highlight the need to secure justice for the affected
children.

Charge 1: Recruitment of Children During Armed

Conflict

The defendants stand accused of willfully recruiting and

enlisting children under the age of 15 into armed groups
or forces, a direct violation of Article 4 of the
International Criminal Court's Rome Statute. The
prosecution will present evidence that showcases the
defendants' active role in targeting vulnerable children
and coercing them to participate in armed conflict
against their will.

Evidence:

Testimonies of former child soldiers: Former child

soldiers who have escaped or been rescued from armed
groups will provide eyewitness accounts of their
recruitment experiences, detailing how they were lured
or forced into joining armed combat at a young age.
Documentation and records: The prosecution will
present official documents, including recruitment
orders, membership lists, and communication records,
obtained from the defendants' camps and leadership,
which demonstrate their systematic recruitment of
children.
Expert witnesses: Experts specializing in child
psychology and trauma will testify, shedding light on
the long-lasting impact of child recruitment on young
minds, emphasizing the defendants' responsibility for
inflicting severe emotional and psychological harm.
Charge 2: Use of Children in Hostilities
The defendants are further charged with the use of
children in armed conflicts, contrary to Article 8 of the
Rome Statute. The prosecution will present compelling
evidence to establish that the defendants exploited
child soldiers in combat situations, thereby subjecting
them to grave danger, physical harm, and psychological
trauma.
Evidence:
Battlefield testimonies: Conscripted child soldiers who
were directly involved in combat operations will provide
detailed testimonies explaining the defendants' role in
deploying and utilizing them during armed
confrontations.
Physical evidence: Medical reports, photographs, and
videos depicting injuries sustained by child soldiers
under the defendants' command will be produced to
demonstrate the direct impact of their actions on the
children's physical well-being.
Expert witnesses: Experts in international human rights
law will testify, explaining the applicable legal standards
and providing context for the violations committed by
the defendants, ensuring that their actions go beyond
the scope of permissible conduct during armed
conflicts.
Conclusion: Through the presentation of incriminating
evidence, the prosecution will demonstrate that the
defendants were actively involved in both the
recruitment and use of children during armed conflicts.
By holding them accountable, justice will be sought for
the affected children, preventing further exploitation,
and sending a clear message that such heinous crimes
will not be tolerated in any society.)
3. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or
more persons into the national armed forces or
used one or more persons to participate actively
hostilities
3.1. The perpetrator conscripted one or more
persons into the national armed forces; OR
3.2. The perpetrator enlisted one or more
persons into the national armed forces; OR
3.3. The perpetrator used one or more persons
to participate actively in hostilities.
Element:
3. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or
more persons into the national armed forces or
used one or more persons to participate actively
hostilities
ICC:
In Lubanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber held:
"The Rome Statute prefers the terms 'conscripting' and
'enlisting' to 'recruitment'. In light of the foregoing, the
Chamber holds the view that 'conscripting' and 'enlisting'
are two forms of recruitment, 'conscripting' being forcible
recruitment, while 'enlisting' pertains more to voluntary
recruitment."[1]
Also, Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber stated:
"the Chamber considers that the crime of enlisting and
conscripting is an offence of a continuing nature - referred
to by some courts as a 'continuous crime' and by others
as a 'permanent crime'. The crime of enlisting or
conscripting children under the age of fifteen years
continues to be committed as long as the children remain
in the armed groups or forces and consequently ceases to
be committed when these children leave the groups or
reach age fifteen."[2]
SCSL
The Fofana and Kondewa, the Appeals Chamber held that:
"the crime of enlisting children under the age of 15 years
into armed forces or groups and of using them to
participate actively in hostilities may be committed
irrespective of the number of children enlisted by the
accused person."[3]
Additionally, the Trial Chamber in Taylor held that there
must be:
"a nexus between the conscription, enlistment and/or use
and the armed conflict, that each of the victims was not
taking an active part in the hostilities at the time of
conscription, enlistment and/or use and that the
perpetrators knew this fact."[4]
3.1. The perpetrator conscripted one or more
persons into the national armed forces; OR
ICC:
"Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber held that "conscripting is
forcible recruitment"."[5]
Supporting the approach of SCSL Brima et al. Trial
Chamber, the Trial Chamber in Lubanga stated that:
"[i]t follows that the status of a child under 15 who has
been enlisted or conscripted is independent of any later
period when he or she may have been "used" to
participate actively in hostilities, particularly given the
variety of tasks that he or she may subsequently be
required to undertake. Although it may often be the case
that the purpose behind conscription and enlistment is to
use children in hostilities, this is not a requirement of the
Rome Statute."[6]
Additionally, the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber stated that:
"[t]he crime of enlisting or conscripting "is an offence of a
continuing character - referred to by some courts as a
continuous crime and by others as a permanent crime".
The crime of conscripting or enlisting children under the
age of 15 continues to be committed as long as a child
remains in the armed force or group and consequently
ceases to be committed when the child leaves the armed
group or reaches the age of 15 years."[7]
With regard to the term "national", the Lubanga Pre-Trial
Chamber defined it as follows:
"the Chamber recalls that the context of international
armed conflict is not restrcited solely to the use of force
b/w two states, but that it extends to certain situations in
which parties to the conflict may be organised armed
forces or grps.[...] Firstly, the ordinary meaning of the
adjective "national" does not necessarily lead to an
interpretation of the term as meaning gover'tal armed
forces. [...]Secondly, interpreting the term "national" to
mean "govt'al" can only undermine the object and
purpose of the Statute of the Court, which is none other
than to ensure that "the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole" must no longer
go unpunished."[8]
"In fact, on the basis of basic humanitarian considerations
and common sence, it would be absurd that Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo could incur criminal responsibility for the
crime of enlisting or conscripting children under the age of
15 yrs only in the context fo an internal armed conflict
solely because the FPLC, as an armed force, could not be
described as a "national armed force" within the meaning
of article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Statute. [...]thus, the
chamber consdiers that, under art 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the
Statute, the term "the national armed forces" is nto
limited to the armed forces of a State."[9]
SCSL
The Trial Chamber in Brima et al. held:
"'[c]onscription' encompasses any acts of coercion, such
as abductions and forced recruitment of children by an
armed group with the purpose of using them to participate
actively in hostilities."[10]
Furthermore, according to the Trial Chamber in Sesay et
al.,
"either the abduction of persons for specific use within an
organisation or the forced military training of persons is
independently sufficient to constitute conscription, as both
practices amount to compelling a person to join an armed
group. [...]Although not all the children abducted were
eventually subjected to military training, the Chamber has
found that the children who were not trained were used
for other purposes within the RUF. We therefore find that
notwithstanding their ultimate use, these abductees were
compulsorily enlisted as members of the RUF or AFRC
forces and therefore conscripted."[11]
3.2. The perpetrator enlisted one or more
persons into the national armed forces; OR
ICC:
Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga held:
"'It follows therefore that enlisting is a 'voluntary' act,
whilst conscripting is forcible recruitment. In other words,
the child's consent is not a valid defence."[12]
Furthermore, according to the Trial Chamber in Lubanga,
"[i]t follows that the status of a child under 15 who has
been enlisted or conscripted is independent of any later
period when he or she may have been "used" to
participate actively in hostilities, particularly given the
variety of tasks that he or she may subsequently be
required to undertake. Although it may often be the case
that the purpose behind conscription and enlistment is to
use children in hostilities, this is not a requirement of the
Rome Statute. The Chamber therefore rejects the defence
contention that "the act of enlistment consists in the
integration of a person as a soldier, within the context of
an armed conflict, for the purposes of participating
actively in hostilities on behalf of the group."[13]
Lastly, the Lubanga Trial Chamber confirmed that:
"the consent of a child to his or her recruitment does not
provide an accused with a valid defence."[14]
With regard to the term "national", the Lubanga Pre-Trial
Chamber defined it as follows:
"the Chamber recalls that the context of international
armed conflict is not restrcited solely to the use of force
b/w two states, but that it extends to certain situations in
which parties to the conflict may be organised armed
forces or grps.[...] Firstly, the ordinary meaning of the
adjective "national" does not necessarily lead to an
interpretation of the term as meaning gover'tal armed
forces. [...]Secondly, interpreting the term "national" to
mean "govt'al" can only undermine the object and
purpose of the Statute of the Court, which is none other
than to ensure that "the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole" must no longer
go unpunished."[15]
"In fact, on the basis of basic humanitarian considerations
and common sence, it would be absurd that Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo could incur criminal responsibility for the
crime of enlisting or conscripting children under the age of
15 yrs only in the context fo an internal armed conflict
solely because the FPLC, as an armed force, could not be
described as a "national armed force" within the meaning
of article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Statute. [...]thus, the
chamber consdiers that, under art 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the
Statute, the term "the national armed forces" is nto
limited to the armed forces of a State."[16]
SCSL
According to the Trial Chamber in Fofana and Kondewa:
"it is clear that voluntary enlistment is but one type of
enlistment. The Chamber therefore fins that the term
"enlistment" could encompass both voluntary enlistment
and force enlistment into armed forces or groups, forced
enlistment being the aggravated form of the crime. In the
Chamber's opinion however, the distinction between the 2
categories is somewhat contrived. Attributing voluntary
enlistment in the armed forces to a child under the age of
15 years, particularly in a conflict setting where human
rights abuses are rife, is, in the Chamber's view, of
questionable merit"."[17]
Moreover, the Taylor Trial Chamber held that:
" '[e]nlistment' entails accepting and enrolling individuals
when they volunteer to join an armed force or group.
Enlistment need not be a formal process, and may include
"any conduct accepting the child as part of the [armed
group]. Such conduct would include making him
participate in combat operations". Conscription and
enlistment are both types of recruitment, and while
conscription involves an element of express compulsion or
coercion, this element is absent in enlistment."[18]
"[t]he crime of enlisting or conscripting "is an offence of a
continuing character - referred to by some courts as a
continuous crime and by others as a permanent crime".
The crime of conscripting or enlisting children under the
age of 15 continues to be committed as long as a child
remains in the armed force or group and consequently
ceases to be committed when the child leaves the armed
group or reaches the age of 15 years."[19]
The Appeals Chamber in Fofana and Kondewa noted that:
"[i]n the context of this case, in which the armed group is
not a conventional military organisation, "enlistment"
cannot narrowly be defined as a formal process. The
Appeals Chamber regards "enlistment" in the broad sense
as including any conduct accepting the child as a part of
the militia. Such conduct would include making him
participate in military operations."[20]
"a nexus must be established between the act of the
Accused and the child joining the armed force or group in
order to constitute enlistment. 'Whether such a nexus
exists is a question of fact which must be determined on a
case-by-case basis'."[21]
The Appeals Chamber in Fofana and Kondewa illustrated
the scope of enlistment:
"on this occasion the initiates had taken the first step in
becoming fighters. Consequently, the Trial Chamber found
that when Kondewa was initiating the boys, he was also
"performing an act analogous to enlisting them for active
military service."[22]
3.3. The perpetrator used one or more persons
to participate actively in hostilities.
ICC:
The Trial Chamber in Lubanga confirmed that:
"[t]he prohibition against using children under the age of
15 to participate actively in hostilities is not dependent on
the individuals concerned having been earlier conscripted
or enlisted into the relevant armed force or group.
[...]Therefore, consistently with Article 22(2) of the
Statute, a child can be "used" for the purposes of the
Statute without evidence being provided as regards his or
her earlier "conscription" or "enlistment" into the relevant
armed force or group."[23]
The Trial Chamber in Lubanga held that:
"[t]he extent of the potential danger faced by a child
soldier will often be unrelated to the precise nature of the
role he or she is given.Those who participate actively in
hostilities include a wide range of individuals, from those
on the front line (who participate directly) through to the
boys or girls who are involved in a myriad of roles that
support the combatants. All of these activities, which
cover either direct or indirect participation, have an
underlying common feature: the child concerned is, at the
very least, a potential target. The decisive factor,
therefore, in deciding if an "indirect" role is to be treated
as active participation in hostilities is whether the support
provided by the child to the combatants exposed him or
her to real danger as a potential target. In the judgment
of the Chamber these combined factors - the child's
support and this level of consequential risk - mean that
although absent from the immediate scene of the
hostilities, the individual was nonetheless actively involved
in them. Given the different types of roles that may be
performed by children used by armed groups, the
Chamber's determination of whether a particular activity
constitutes "active participation" can only be made on a
case-by-case basis."[24]
"In this respect, the Chamber considers that this article
does not apply if the activity in question is clearly
unrelated to hostilities. Accordingly, this article does not
apply to food deliveries to an airbase or the use of
domestic staff in married officers' quarters."[25]
Furthermore, the Lubanga Trial Chamber stated that:
"an overly expansive definition of active participation in
hostilities would be inappropriate as its consequence
would be that children associated with armed groups lose
their protected status as persons hors de combat under
the law of armed conflict. Nonetheless, the Chamber finds
that the nature and purpose of the crimes committed
against civilians' warrants their characterization as active
participation in hostilities. The Chamber considers this
interpretation necessary to ensure that children are
protected from any engagement in violent functions of the
armed group that directly support its conflict against the
adversary and in which the child combatant would be a
legitimate military target for the opposing armed group or
groups."[26]
SCSL
According to the Taylor Trial Chamber:
" '[u]sing' children to participate actively in the hostilities
encompasses putting their lives directly at risk in combat,
but may also include participation in activities linked to
such carrying loads for the fighting faction, finding and/or
acquiring food, ammunition or equipment, acting as
decoys, carrying messages, making trails or finding
routes, manning checkpoints or acting as human shields.
Whether a child is actively participating in hostilities in
such situations will be assessed on a case-by-case
basis."[27]
In determining what activities constituted "active
participation", the Trial Chamber in Sesay et al. focused
on direct support and was:
"not satisfied that such conduct constitutes active
participation in hostilities, as these activities were not
related to the hostilities and did not directly support the
military operations of the armed groups."[28]
1. Age Requirement: The child involved must be under the
age of eighteen (18) years. This age limit is based on the
international standard set by the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement
of children in armed conflict.
2. Recruitment or Enlistment: The act of recruiting or
enlisting refers to the process of actively seeking or
persuading a child to join an armed force or group. This
can include various methods such as coercion, deception,
or offering incentives.
3. Armed Force or Group: The child must be recruited into
an armed force or group other than the national armed
forces. This can include non-state armed groups, rebel
forces, paramilitary organizations, or any other armed
entity distinct from the official military forces of a country.
4. Knowledge or Intent: There may be a requirement to
establish that the person responsible for the recruitment
had knowledge of the child's age or intended to recruit a
child. This element can vary depending on the specific
legal framework.
Today, we gather here to address a grave violation of
international humanitarian law - the crime of
conscripting, enlisting, or recruiting children under the
age of eighteen years into an armed force or group
other than the national armed forces. This heinous act
not only undermines the fundamental rights of children
but also strikes at the core principles of humanity and
justice.
International law, including the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict, unequivocally
prohibits the recruitment and use of children in armed
conflicts. It recognizes that children are vulnerable and
in need of special protection, particularly during times
of armed conflict.
The evidence before us paints a distressing picture of
innocent children being forcibly taken from their
homes, schools, and communities. They are subjected
to indoctrination, trained in the use of weapons, and
forced to participate in acts of violence that no child
should ever witness, let alone be a part of. These
children are robbed of their childhood, their education,
and their future prospects.
We have testimonies from former child soldiers who
have bravely come forward to share their harrowing
experiences. They recount tales of physical and
psychological abuse, forced participation in hostilities,
and the loss of their innocence. Their stories serve as a
stark reminder of the urgent need to hold those
responsible accountable for their actions.
The prosecution firmly asserts that the accused
knowingly and willfully conscripted, enlisted, or
recruited children under the age of eighteen into armed
forces or groups outside the national armed forces. The
evidence at hand includes eyewitness accounts,
documented cases, and expert analysis, all of which
point to the culpability of the accused.
We must remember that the recruitment and use of
child soldiers not only violates international law but also
perpetuates a cycle of violence and instability. It robs
children of their rights, disrupts communities, and
hampers the prospects of lasting peace and
development.
In light of the overwhelming evidence, we implore this
court to deliver a just and resolute verdict. Let it be
known that the international community stands united
against the recruitment and use of child soldiers. Let us
send a clear message that those who exploit the
innocence of children for their own nefarious purposes
will face the full force of justice.
Definition
“A child associated with an armed force or armed
group” refers to any person below 18 years of age who
is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force
or armed group in any capacity, including but not
limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters,
cooks, porters, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not
only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct
part in hostilities. (Source: Paris Principles on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 2007)
thwart the phenomenon of child soldiering.
Under Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, non-
international armed conflicts are armed
conflicts in which one or more non-State
armed groups are involved. Depending on the
situation, hostilities may occur between
governmental armed forces and non-
State armed groups or between such groups
only. As the four Geneva Conventions have
universally been ratified now, the requirement
that the armed conflict must occur "in the
territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties" has lost its importance in practice.
Indeed, any armed conflict between
governmental armed forces and armed
groups or between such groups cannot but
take place on the territory of one of the Parties
to the Convention.
Furthermore, two requirements are necessary
for such situations to be classified as non
international armed conflicts:
- The hostilities must reach a minimum
level of intensity. This may be the case, for
example, when the hostilities are of a
collective character or when the
government is obliged to use military force
against the insurgents, instead of mere
police forces.
 - Non-governmental groups involved in the distribution must first of all favour the most
conflict must be considered as "parties to dependent children, i.e., in general, the
the conflict", meaning that they possess youngest children - as common sense dictates
organized armed forces. This means for
example that these forces have to be under
a certain command structure and have the
capacity to sustain military operations.

Additional Protocol II to the Geneva

Convention of 12 August 1949 develops and
supplements common Article 3 without
modifying its existing conditions of
application, by introducing a requirement of
territorial control. It provides that non-
governmental parties must exercise such
territorial control "as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military
operations and to implement this Protocol".
Additional Protocol II expressly applies only
to armed conflicts between State armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organised
armed groups. Contrary to common Article 3,
the Protocol does not apply to armed conflicts
occurring only between non-State armed
groups.

COMMENTARY OF ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL I

As regards children, the age - limit of fifteen

is not specified here, unlike in Article 23 of
the Fourth Convention. It may be deduced
from Article 77 of the Protocol (Protection of
children) that the limit of childhood is set at
eighteen years of age. However, special
privileges are granted children under fifteen
years of age, 17 and others for newborn
babies (who fall in the same category as the
wounded). 18 The absence of a fixed age -
limit here therefore means that children up to
eighteen years of age should have priority in
receiving aid, but those responsible for