AGUSTIN VS.

EDU 88 SCRA 195

FACTS: A presidential letter of instruction (LOI) prescribing the use of triangular reflectorized
early warning devices to prevent vehicular accidents was assailed for the lack of a legislative
enactment that would authorize the issuance of said LOI. The petition quoted two whereas
clauses of the assailed LOI: [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic
have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government
under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of
road safety signs and devices.

ISSUE: Whether or not a legislative enactment is necessary in order to authorize the

issuance of said LOI based on the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and
the United Nations Organization (U.N.).

RULING: The petition must be dismissed for lack of merit. It cannot be disputed that this
Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land,."
The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is,
moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ 101 PHIL. 1155

FACTS: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business”
was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as
corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country.

Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, on the premise that it
violated several treaties which under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted
principle of international law, should be observed by the Court in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is unconstitutional for it is in
conflict with treaties which are generally accepted principles of international law.

RULING: The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason given by the Court was that
the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot
be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.

The law in question was enacted to remedy a
economy posed by alien dominance and control
and country from such dominance and control;
scope of the police power of the State, thru
personality and insures its security and future.
real actual threat and danger to national
of the retail business and free the citizens
that the enactment clearly falls within the
which and by which it protects its own

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to
remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and
control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control;
that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the state, through
which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the
law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of occupation
regulated, nor the due process of the law clause; because the law is prospective in operation
and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary - and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
legislature, with whose power and discretion the judicial department of the Government may
not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers
from no duplicity and has not misled the legislature of the segment of the population
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may
not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS 262 US 390

FACTS: The State of Oregon passed a law requiring parents/guardians of children ages 8-
16 to send their child to public school. The manifest purpose is to compel general
attendance at public schools by children 8-16 who have not completed their 8th grade.

Society of Sisters operates a private school. It owns valuable building, especially constructed
and equipped for the school purposes. The law has already caused the withdrawal from its
school of children, who would other wise continue attending the same school. Society then
filed a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the law contending that the same unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the State require children to attend only public schools before they
reach a certain age

RULING: The fundamental theory of liberty upon which the government under the
Constitution reposes excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
enforcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.

DECS v San Diego 180 SCRA 233

FACTS: The petitioner disqualified the private respondent who had actually taken and failed
four times the National Medical Admission Test from taking it again under its regulation. But
the private respondent contends that he is still entitled and hence, applied to take a fifth
examination based on constitutional grounds: right to academic freedom and quality
education, due process and equal protection. He filed a petition for mandamus. The
respondent judge declared the said rule invalid and granted the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power. (YES)

RULING: The police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Thus, the subject of the
challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. While every
person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times and this is sufficed to say that
he must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. The Court
upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to
medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for
a medical education. The decision of the respondent judge is reversed.

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC 73 SCRA 333 (1976)

FACTS: On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16
Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the
issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement,
the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No.
1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter
alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033,
stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October
16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition
to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of
October 16.

On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite
on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033,
insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No.
1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976. Petitioners contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take
cognizance of it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution. (YES)

RULING: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the
period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso
facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI,
1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments through
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the
very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force
and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees
is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2
Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty,
executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and
no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members.” The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and
hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The
President at that time also sits as the legislature.