PONTIFICIA STUDIORUM UNlVERSITAS

A S.THOMA AQ. IN URBE

Facultas Iuris Canonici

Rev. Pius Pietrzyk, OP

The Power of Orders and the Power of Jurisdiction:

A Theological and Juridical Examination

Dissertatio ad Licentiam in Iure Canonico assequendam

Moderator: Rev. Robert Ombres, OP

Rome MMXIV
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................................... i

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1: Authority in the Church, A Scriptural Overview ................................................................. 3

Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 3

Scriptural Sources of Authority ............................................................................................................. 3

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 11

Chapter 2: Power of Orders ..................................................................................................................... 13

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 13

St. Thomas Aquinas on the Power of Orders ................................................................................... 15

The Power of Orders and the Council of Trent ............................................................................... 25

The Power of Orders and the Second Vatican Council................................................................... 28

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 34

Chapter 3: The Church as societas perfecta ................................................................................................. 37

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 37

The Development of the doctrine of the Church as societas perfecta ................................................ 37

The Church as Societas Perfecta and the Second Vatican Council ..................................................... 48

The Continued Viability of the Church as Societas Perfecta ............................................................... 53

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 58

Chapter 4: Power of Governance ............................................................................................................ 61

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 61

The Power of Jurisdiction: A Brief Historical Overview ................................................................. 62

Exercising the Power of Jurisdiction .................................................................................................. 68

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 Power of Governance and the Second Vatican Council.................................................................. 74

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 80

Chapter 5: Relation of Power of Governance to Power of Orders ................................................. 81

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 81

The Relation Between the Potestas Ordinis and Potestas Iurisdictionis: A Post-Conciliar Summary 81

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 85

Chapter 6: A Proposed Resolution .......................................................................................................... 86

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 86

Potestates Ordinis et Iurisdictionis: A Proposed Synthesis ...................................................................... 86

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 89

Conclusion................................................................................................................................................... 90

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................ 92

Fontes ...................................................................................................................................................... 92

Ecumenical Councils ........................................................................................................................ 92

Canonical Collections ....................................................................................................................... 92

Codes of Canon Law ........................................................................................................................ 92

Papal Documents .............................................................................................................................. 92

Other Sources ......................................................................................................................................... 93

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INTRODUCTION

1917 Codex Iuris Canonici

Can. 196 — Potestas iurisdictionis seu regiminis quae ex divina institutione est in Ecclesia,
alia est fori externi, alia fori interni, seu conscientiae, sive sacramentalis sive
extra-sacramentalis.
Can. 197 — § 1. Potestas iurisdictionis ordinaria ea est quae ipso iure adnexa est officio…

1983 Codex Iuris Canonici

Can. 129 — § 1. Potestatis regiminis, quae quidem ex divina institutione est in Ecclesia et
etiam potestas iurisdictionis vocatur, ad normam praescriptorum iuris, habilis sunt qui
ordine sacro sunt insigniti. § 2. In exercitio eiusdem potestatis, christifideles laici ad
normam iuris cooperari possunt.

The question of power or authority within the Church is fundamentally a question of

ecclesiology. It is a question that bears directly on the Church’s own understanding of herself.

The science of ecclesiology has two different aspects, both of which bear on the question of

authority. The first is the question of revelation, that is those aspects of the Church that are

established by Divine positive law, whether as an ordination of her divine founder or as revealed in

history by the action of the Holy Spirit. The second aspect reflects upon the essential qualities of

the Church, given the fact of her existence. That is to say, given the makeup of the Church as

prescribed by divine positive law, what are the essential attributes that flow necessarily from that

fact? In terms of ecclesiology, this is especially true when dealing with the Church as it subsists in

the visible Catholic Church, the so-called “Church militant”. The Church is not merely a divine

idea in some abstracted form, but has a reality in the world. In this way, the nature of the Church

is influenced by human nature, and the subject of philosophical reflection as well as theological

inquiry.

The purpose of this Tesina is to examine the Church as to her governance, and especially

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the notion of power of governance.

Following that, this essay will attempt an analysis of the parallel development of what we

today would call the power of jurisdiction or governance. As will be discussed below, the power

of governance is best understood not simply as the effect of a power in the soul given in the

sacrament of ordination, but a necessary component of the Church as a society of men. The

power of order is not identical with this power, but forms a rather complex interrelation with it, one

that the Church continues to develop in both her theology and her legal theory. That is, to

understand the power of governance is to understand it within the context of the notion of the

Church as a societas perfecta.

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CHAPTER 1: AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH, A SCRIPTURAL OVERVIEW

Introduction

The question of authority in the Church is a long and complicated one, and is perhaps the

issue that has most divided Christendom, at least for the last millennium. This is a matter that has

been the subject of countless books, and no more than a cursory examination of the subject is

possible here 1. Nevertheless, it is helpful to provide some background for the Church’s claim for

the nature of the authority exercised. To that end, a brief survey of the Scriptural

foundations—and especially the New Testament foundations—that form the bases for the

Church’s claims of authority will provide a useful prelude to any more purely juridical discussion of

the nature of that authority.

Scriptural Sources of Authority

At the most fundamental level, the source of authority in the Church comes through the

person of Jesus Christ. The Gospel writers present Jesus as one possessed of both power and

authority. In the Gospel of Mark, Jesus speaks of himself being “seated at the right hand of

Power”. 2 His power is not simply in an eschatological future, but very much in the present. Not

only do his many actions evince his power, but so does his very presence, as, for example, the

power that left him when the woman with the flow of blood touched his garment. 3 Although

perhaps the greatest evidence of his power, at least in the broad sense, is his resurrection and the

power over death itself.

However, these are largely examples of spiritual or supernatural power, not strictly

1 This paper is not meant to provide an apologia for how the Church understands her authority. For a
helpful overview of a scriptural approach to power and authority in the Church, see Cunningham, Agnes.
“Power and Authority in the Church.” The Ministry of Governance. Ed. James K Mallett. Washington, DC:
Canon Law Society of America, 1986. 80–97. Volume 1 of the With Oars and Sails series.
2 Mt 26:64. Unless otherwise indicated, all Scriptural quotations in English are taken from the Revised

Standard Version, Second Catholic Edition.

3 See Mk 5:25-30 and Jn 8:43-50; see also Mk 6:56.

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gubernatorial. Even so, they are related to his authority. The Gospel of John, for example, often

refers to Jesus’ miracles as “signs”. 4 These signs are authoritative in that they lead others to believe

in him. This echoes the Old Testament in which miraculous acts serve as evidence of the authority

of the prophets. 5 In addition, the exorcism miracles provide concrete examples of the exercise of

authority in themselves in that they posit a freeing up of others to submit to discipleship with

Jesus. 6 That is, a possessed man is forced to serve the authority of a demonic power. The

casting out of those demons by Christ allows the man instead to choose to submit to Christ’s

authority as his disciple.

Thus, for the Gospel writers, Jesus’ power, even manifested in miracles, is linked to his

authority. This point should not be passed over lightly. Power and authority, especially the

manner of authority Jesus claims, are not completely independent notions. Luke in his Gospel

gives one of the clearest statements of this link. After an early miracle in which he casts out a

demon, the crowd reacts to Jesus as the one who commands “with authority and power”. 7 An

even more explicit example can be found in the reaction of the centurion of Luke’s Gospel. In

seeking Christ’s help, he creates an analogical link between his own authority (“and I say to one

‘Go,’ and he goes” 8) and Jesus’ power to heal by recognizing Jesus as a man of authority.

Moreover, Jesus’ power is linked to authority because it is directly related to his heavenly

Father and the mission received from him. This is one of the main conclusions of the so-called

farewell discourse of St. John’s Gospel. It is the Father who gives Jesus “all power over the

flesh”. 9 Nonetheless, Jesus insists that he speaks not “on his own authority” 10 but from the

Father who sent him. At the same time, there is a unity between Jesus and the Father, “I am in the

4 See, e.g., John 2:18, 4:54, 6:14, 6:30, 10:41, and 12:18.
5 Twelftree, Graham H. Jesus the Miracle Worker: A Historical and Theological Study. InterVarsity Press, 1999
at 226-227.
6 For a fuller account of this notion, see Kasper, Walter. Jesus the Christ. Paulist Press, 1977 at 97.
7 Luke 4:36. The linking of these is a particular favorite of St. Luke’s. He will use it at least twice more.

See Luke 9:1 and 10:19.

8 Luke 7:8.
9 Jn 17:2.
10 Jn 14:10.

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Father and the Father is in me”. 11 Thus, when he speaks of the duty of his followers he speaks of

their following “my own commandments” 12.

Note, too, that this is an authority outside of the established Jewish authority. Much of the

Gospel narrative sets up a conflict between the authority of the Temple officials and Jesus. 13 The

chief priests, scribes, and elders often question the authority by which Jesus acts. 14 Although Jesus

does not formally depose the Temple leaders, he does make them irrelevant. He does this not only

by his teaching, but especially in his death and resurrection. 15 The Temple officials, despite their

efforts to punish and kill him, are shown to have no authority over Jesus. His authority is such to

conquer even death, to say nothing of the Pharisees.

Even more, this is an authority whose exercise is in some way defined by its not being in

accord with the style of worldly government. In John’s Gospel, Jesus responds to Pilate’s question

about his kingship in spiritual terms. “My kingship is not of this world…” 16 This is not a debate

about a particular form of government that mediates authority. Rather, Jesus makes a moral point

about the essence of his own 17 mode of exercising authority. With an implicit criticism of Pilate’s

rule, Jesus indicates that he wields authority, but not for his own personal benefit, but for the sake

of others and for a definitive purpose that is not simply his own. Thus, in John’s Gospel, his

discussion of his own kingship continues with the assertion, “if my kingship were of this world, my

servants would fight, that I might not be handed over to the Jews.” 18

The Gospel stories on the handing down of authority by Jesus to the Apostles are also

notable for who is not included. The Gospels distinguish the Apostles as a group (often referring

11 Jn 14:11.
12 Jn 14:15.
13 For a fuller discussion of this, see Gray, Timothy C. The Temple in the Gospel of Mark: A Study in Its

Narrative Role. Mohr Siebeck, 2008 at 55ff.

14 See, e.g., Matt 21:23, Mark 11:28, and Luke 20:2.
15 See Kingsbury, Jack Dean. Conflict in Luke: Jesus, Authorities, Disciples. Fortress Press, 1991 at 102-103.
16 Jn 18:36a.
17 And therefore, as will be discussed, also his Apostles’ authority.
18 Jn 18:36b.

5
to this group simply as “the Twelve” 19) from all the other followers of Jesus. It is to them that he

gives special instruction and to them that he bestows authority. In other words, the “power and

authority” centered in Christ also has an ecclesial context in his extending it to the Christian

community by way of the Apostles. This is why they are called “apostles” 20. The very word

means “one who is sent” 21 and, in the context of the New Testament, “the apostle is consistently

presented as one sent and empowered to act in the name of another.” 22

Luke makes the case explicitly 23, at least in terms of having Jesus give to them a certain

power over evil and illness. Not only words, but also Jesus’ actions, emphasize this distinction

particularly in these discourses on their share in his own power and authority. 24 Jesus established

within his community of followers a subset to whom is given additional instruction, authority, and

power. 25

In the course of Christian history, the most important grant of authority is that from Jesus

19 There are those who disagree that the Apostles constituted a stable body invested, from the
beginning, with Christ’s own authority. See, e.g., Koester, Helmut. Introduction to the New Testament: History and
Literature of Early Christianity. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000 at 8. Koester believes that the limitation
of the term “Apostle” to the original 12 is a later “fiction”. This essay is not the place to refute his points,
other than to assert the constant teaching of the Church of the authority of the Bishops as the successors of
the Apostles. See, e.g., Second Vatican Ecumenical Council. Christus Dominus, AAS 58 (1966) 673-696.
(Episcopi autem et ipsi, positi a Spiritu Sancto, in Apostolorum locum succedunt ut animarum pastores...) See also Lee,
Peter. Authority Within the Christian Church. Gorgias Press LLC, 2006. For a fuller description on the use of
the term ‘apostle’ see Burton, Ernest DeWitt, “The Office of Apostle in the Early Church,” The American
Journal of Theology 16.4 (October 1912): 561-588.
20 It should be noted that the meaning and use of the term ‘apostle’ in the New Testament is not without

controversy. It has been called one of the most intricate and difficult problems in the scholarship of the
New Testament. See Roetzel, Calvin J. Paul: The Man and the Myth. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999 at 46.
21 The word was originally used in naval terminology. It meant “a kind of transport ship and came, in

turn, to indicate the dispatch of a fleet, the fleet itself, a naval expedition, the admiral of such an expedition,
a passport, a bill of lading, etc.” Agnew, Francis H. “The Origin of the NT Apostle-Concept: A Review of
Research.” Journal of Biblical Literature 105.1 (March 1986): 75 - 96 at 75 fn. 2.
22 Agnew at 84.
23 See Luke 9:1 and 10:19.
24 Such a setting-apart within the community is also made with the sending out of the seventy disciples

--a story found only in Luke’s Gospel. Jesus tells the seventy on their return, “Behold, I have given you
authority to tread upon serpents and scorpions and over all the power of the enemy; and nothing shall hurt
you.” (Lk 10:19) Here a broader group than merely the Apostles is given a share in Christ’s authority and
power. Nonetheless, it remains a limited group of disciples, and is not a sharing in of that same power and
authority by all the disciples, only a selection.
25 See Johnson, Luke Timothy. The Gospel of Luke. Vol. 3. Chicago: Liturgical Press, 1991. 18 vols. Sacra

Pagina New Testament Commentary, Harrington, Daniel J., series ed., at 149.
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to the Apostle Peter. Described by the Evangelist Matthew 26, it will eventually become the

Scriptural cornerstone of the theory of Papal authority. In that account, after asking the Apostles

who they believe he is and hearing Peter’s answer, Jesus declares Peter to be the rock on which the

Church is built. In addition, he gives him the “keys” to the kingdom of heaven, a sign of the

passing on of authority. 27 As Pope Leo XIII explained in his 1896 encyclical on Church unity, Satis

cognitum, on this text:

…everyone knows the keys to be the usual sign of authority. For

this reason, when Christ promised to give the keys of the kingdom
of heaven to Peter, he promised to give to him power and authority
[potestatem et ius] in the Church. 28

Jesus also speaks of this bestowal of his authority on the Apostles, at least implicitly, in both

Luke’s and Mark’s Gospels, 29 for example, in a story regarding the request of the sons of Zebedee.

In Mark’s account, the sons of Zebedee ask if they may sit at his right and left. Jesus first indicates

that the determination of such places of honor and authority are given only by the Father. Even

though he primarily distinguishes between the rule of the Gentiles and that which the Apostles will

be called to exercise, such a distinction is impossible without at least an implication of future

authority exercised by said Apostles. Thus, the authority of the Apostles is established in the

Gospels as flowing directly from the commission of Jesus himself.

The Acts of the Apostles presents an assembly of believers with The Twelve squarely in the

position of leadership. Recalling the specific grant of authority to him, more often than not in

Acts it is Peter who acts on behalf of this college of Apostles. Thus, they not only preach and

teach, but they issue mandates that are enforced, sometimes with rather startling consequences. In

one of the most striking passages of Luke’s Acts, the married couple Ananias and Sapphira are

26 Matthew 16:18-19.
27 Some have tied this handing of the keys to the bestowal of the house of David to Eliakim in the
prophecy of Isaiah. There, instead of language of binding and loosing, Eliakim is described as being able to
open and shut doors. For a further discussion of the similarity, see Ray, Stephen K. Upon This Rock: St. Peter
and the Primacy of Rome in Scripture and the Early Church. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999 at 272ff.
28 Pope Leo XIII, Satis cognitum ASS 28 (1895-96): 708-739 at 727 (...insigne usitatum imperii claves esse, nemo

nescit. Quapropter claves regni caelorum cum Iesus dare Petro pollicetur, potestatem et ius in Ecclesiam pollicetur daturum.)
29 See Lk 22:25-27; Mk 10:35-45.

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struck dead for their lying to Peter after refusing to turn over their possessions distributed to the

community through the Apostles 30. Scholars may disagree over whether they were punished

because of their failure to turn over their goods, or lying, or both. Whatever the reason, it serves

an example of the Apostles, and in particular St. Peter, as mediators of divine authority within the

Christian community.

These are marked not simply by having power as temporal authority, but a spiritual power 31

signifying that same authority. The Acts reveal the Apostles’ miraculous power to heal not simply

for the drama of it but to reveal how the Apostles are the true successors of Christ. They possess

his power and therefore his authority.

No one recognizes this more than the one who occasionally sets himself up as in tension

with the Apostles, namely St. Paul. As Luke relates in his Acts, when a dispute arose regarding the

question of adherence to Jewish ritual laws, it was to the Apostles in Jerusalem that Paul went32. Of

course, it is Peter who resolves the question. On an issue of adherence to the Mosaic Law, it is

Peter who speaks with authority in the Church. Even if Paul presents the episode in a light

somewhat more flattering to himself 33, he nonetheless submits to the authority of the Apostles in

Jerusalem. Moreover, it is precisely by identifying himself as an Apostle that Paul most

emphatically expresses his claim to authority within the Christian communities. 34 In defending

himself and his ministry to the Corinthians, Paul reminds them that he is an Apostle, and is one

with the same rights as “the other apostles and the brethren of the Lord and Cephas. 35“

Like the notion of authority presented by the Gospel writers, Paul’s understanding of

apostolic authority is largely in terms of service to the Christian community, specifically in the task

of preaching the gospel. In his letter to the Galatians, Paul includes one of his lengthier

30 Acts 5:1-11.
31 The Acts of the Apostles makes clear that the “many wonders and signs were done through the
apostles.” Acts 2:43.
32 See Acts 15.
33 See Galatians 2.
34 See Dunn, James D. G. The Theology of Paul the Apostle. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans

Publishing, 1998 at 571.

35 1 Cor 9:5.

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expositions on his apostolicity. There, he defines it precisely in terms of the mandate to preach the

Gospel: “I had been entrusted with the gospel to the uncircumcised, just as Peter had been

entrusted with the gospel to the circumcised.” 36 It is probably no accident that Paul attempts to

assert his authority not simply by tying it to the Apostles, but by making it parallel to the Apostle

with the greatest authority, Peter.

That authority found in preaching the gospel is not only about the truths of who God is.

Paul also deems it important to provide guidelines for proper Christian living in a way not found in

the Gospels. Where Jesus spoke in parables, Paul spoke in admonitions. Paul’s writing is replete

with such counsels, and perhaps most clearly in the final chapters of his letter to the Ephesians.

There, he warns the church in Ephesus against covetousness, idle talk, and immorality 37. He has

instructions for the relations between husbands and wives, 38 children and parents, 39 and servants

and their masters 40. This is not to say that it is presented in anything other than explicitly

Christological terms. For Paul, these directions on the moral life flow from the gospel kerygma.

The setting apart of the Apostles by Christ also reveals a pattern that continues in the

Church, namely the arrangement of persons according to particular functions within the

community. First, the calling together of disciples is in itself the creation of a community, begun

as a smaller community within the wider Jewish community. It is only in the post-resurrection

years that that community gains its own independent status as a community of faith. 41 Within that

increasingly independent post-Resurrection community come distinctions of role and

responsibility. That is, activity is expressed in a variety of different modes.

The earliest and clearest example is the setting aside, by the twelve, of a small contingent of

36 Gal 2:7. It should be noted, of course, that Paul is not speaking of the four canonical Gospels, but
more broadly of the preaching of the truths of the Christian faith, especially in the salvation brought about
by Christ’s death and resurrection.
37 See Eph 5:3-6.
38 Eph 5:21-33.
39 Eph 6:1-4.
40 Eph 6:5-9.
41 The statement in Acts that it is in Antioch that they go from disciples to being called Christians for the

first time (Acts 11:26) is no mere bit of historical trivia. Rather, the need to give them their own name
reflects the increasing distinctiveness of their identity.
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men to serve the Christian community, especially in care for the poor. The establishment of this

διακονίᾳ allows the Apostles free for “prayer and the ministry of the word.” 42 And likewise Paul

continually emphasizes the variation of sacred functions within the various Christian communities.

For him, the Church is an organized structure, a true body, with members acting in various

capacities as apostles, prophets, teachers, workers of miracles, and the like. 43 Most relevant for our

own purposes, it is in St. Paul especially that we find the office of priest (or presbyter) and bishop

delineated, even if not rigorously defined and systematized. His relatively late first letter to

Timothy makes a fairly clear distinction between presbyter 44, bishop 45, and deacon 46, especially as

compared to their somewhat looser use in Luke’s Acts 47.

Although the Scriptures do not provide a detailed scheme for the structure of the Church,

they do allow for some basic conclusions. First, it is important to note what the Scriptures do not

say. There is no established governmental structure in the modern sense. There is no legislature

established to pass laws and no court in place to interpret them. Jesus authored no code of laws

and issued no written decrees.

Thus, any discussion of power and authority in the Church must not reference a book. It

must acknowledge the person of Jesus Christ at its center. It is his own personhood that both

defines the Church and the action within the Church. Moreover, Jesus’ power and authority are

intimately related. The expression of his power is a sign of his authority and he has authority only

because he has divine power given by the Father. That authority is completely directed towards

his mission, his sacrificial act of salvation. His authority is primarily about freeing others to have

faith in him, and thereby to come to salvation.

Even so, Christ does issues certain commands—to love God and neighbor48, to “go and

42 Acts 6:4.
43 See 1 Cor 12:27-31.
44 1 Tim 5:17.
45 1 Tim 3:1.
46 1 Tim 3:8.
47 cf. Acts 2-:17, 28.
48 See, e.g., Mt 22:36-40.
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make disciples of all nations” 49, to be merciful, 50 etc. However, Jesus makes no effort to

systematize them. This is an authority expressed not so much in a set of binding codes, but in the

submission of mind and heart to the person of Jesus Christ.

Just as importantly, that authority is shared with his disciples, particularly the twelve.

Although Christ cannot be said to have set up a judicial system, he can be said to have created a

community of believers. He gathered followers to himself to be governed by a shared faith in him

and a way of living for others. Within that community he separated out a select few—the twelve

apostles—who would share in a deeper way his authority because they shared in a deeper way in a

relationship with him. To them he passed on his power and authority; they stand in his stead.

These two—spiritual power and governing authority—remain quite tightly integrated in this early

community, as they were in Christ.

With the Apostles at the center, and St. Peter at the center’s center, this community of

believers grows into a society, a Church. This comes much more to the fore in the Acts of the

Apostles and in the New Testament epistles, especially the Pauline epistles. In the period following

the Lord’s resurrection the structures inherent in society begin to emerge, particularly the most

fundamental, that being the distinction between leaders and followers. So, there is the setting

aside of people for certain functions, in imitation of the Apostles’ own having been set aside within

the body of disciples. This will set the stage for the gradual development of the Church’s thought

on the expression of authority, especially as to the power of those who are set aside, both their

spiritual power and their power of governance.

Conclusion

Any discussion of the exercise of power in the Church must begin with the person of Jesus

Christ. The Gospels present authority and power in Christ as complementary aspects, which are

49 Mt 28:19.
50 Lk 6:36.
11
meant to serve his fundamental mission of obedience to the Father. This serves as a stark contrast

with the exercised authority and power of the leadership, particularly the Temple leadership, of

those of his time, who use power to exult themselves. To his disciples, but most especially to his

Apostles, Jesus gives a share in this mutually interrelated power and authority. More importantly,

as St. Paul attests, it is precisely in this association with Apostleship that authority is exercised in the

growing communities of the early Church.

12
CHAPTER 2: POWER OF ORDERS

Introduction

From this early development of the community of believers into a Church, there begins a

centuries long development of theological self-understanding. Specifically with respect to sacral

power within the Church, 51 a distinction soon developed between the power inherent in the

sacrament of Orders and the power to govern. While a full accounting of this development is well

beyond the scope of this essay, a brief outline of some of its contours is necessary.

As the Scriptural analysis above indicates, the authority in the Church became associated

especially with the three Orders of the Church: bishop, priest, and deacon. 52 This seems to have

been a fairly stable arrangement at least as early as Clement of Rome and Ignatius of Antioch at the

turn of the first century. 53 This development was somewhat varied and there is a dearth of written

sources on the practice of the early church. Nevertheless, what can be said is that the distinctions

between the three orders became increasingly defined and solidified in the thought and practice of

the church. At first, this distinction is largely seen in context of the liturgical life of the Church, with

the priests serving as the assistants to the Bishop. 54 Increasingly, however, the Bishop takes

special prominence in his role in assuring the unity of the church. And it is more than a symbol, so

51 For a thorough discussion on the notion of sacred power in the Church, particularly after the Second
Vatican Council, see the exhaustive study done by Adriano Celeghin, Origine e Natura della Potestà: Posizioni
Postconciliari. Editrice Moecelliana (Brescia 1987).
52 Mention should also be made of the minor orders that existed in the early church. The so-called

“minor orders”, eventually abolished by Pope Paul VI, found their origin as far back as the second century,
at least in Rome. Special notice must also be paid to the sub-diaconate, which also had a liturgical function
far greater than the orders below it. Nevertheless, even as the minor orders came to be understood as an
important part of holy orders, from the beginning it is the orders of bishop, priest, and deacon that are
initially distinguished and made a part of the hierarchical structure of the church, going back even to biblical
times. In addition, the primacy of the three orders of priest, deacon, and bishop is given force not only in the
documents of the Second Vatican Council, but Pope Pius XII’s important encyclical, Sacramentum ordinis
(AAS 40 (1948) 40-45). See also, Ratzinger, Joseph. Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a
Fundamental Theology. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987 at 240-242.
53 Schwarz, Hans. The Christian Church: Biblical Origin, Historical Transformation, and Potential for the Future.

Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2007 at 95-96. See also Ignatius of Antioch, and Clement of Rome. The
Epistles of St. Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch. Trans. James Aloysius Kleist. Westminter, MD:
Newman Press, 1946.
54 Dix, Gregory. The Shape of the Liturgy. New York: Continuum, 2008 at 33.

13
much so that lack of communion with the bishop can be seen as lack of unity with the church. 55

That unifying role is linked to its apostolicity. The Bishop’s tie to the apostles by entry into holy

orders is a link to the faith of the apostles and to the authority that that faith confers. 56

At the same time, at least by the third century, 57 priests begin to have a function removed

from, and often in place of, the bishop. But that function is always understood in subordination to

the bishop if, for no other reason, than that it is only by the bishop’s hands that a man might find

entry into holy orders. Moreover, the activity of the priest removed from the bishop was largely

limited to the ritual function, especially the liturgy. Additionally, in the early Church, the conferral

of baptism often was reserved to the bishop. 58 So it really was the celebration of the Eucharist apart

from the bishop that marked the activity of the priest in the early church. It was still the bishop who

administered and governed a particular territory, and it was bishops who gathered together in

councils to discuss issues of theology and pastoral practice. 59

The development of the order of deacons, on the other hand, often showed the reverse.

Deacons often had great administrative duties in the early church, especially in Rome. 60 They

cared for the finances of the church, distributed aid to the widows and the poor, and often managed

the burial places. As much as they had more administrative duties, their sacramental ones were far

lesser. They had little or no independent ritual function, as priests did in their eventual celebration

of the Eucharistic liturgy even apart from the bishop. Deacons were understood as assistants to

the bishops, and eventually to the priests.

Given this historical development, the first section of this paper will be to give a brief

summary of the development of the Church’s understanding of the nature of the power of the

sacrament of orders. To do that, the paper will consider three major sources, namely the theology

55 De Lubac, Henri. Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988
at 77.
56 Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 244.
57 Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 34.
58 Hitchcock, James. History of the Catholic Church: From the Apostolic Age to the Third Millennium. San

Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012 at 109.

59 Hitchcock, History of the Catholic Church, 108.
60 Hitchcock, History of the Catholic Church, 43.

14
of St. Thomas Aquinas, its definitive statement at the Council of Trent, and finally its further

development at the Second Vatican Council.

St. Thomas Aquinas on the Power of Orders

To begin the inquiry into St. Thomas Aquinas’s approach to the power of orders is to begin

with ecclesiology. Aquinas’s theology of the sacraments is developed in light of his understanding

of the Church. This is perhaps easier said than done because, in all of his work, St. Thomas never

wrote a tractatus De Ecclesia. 61 Thus, Thomas never directly lays out explicitly and in a sustained way

his understanding of the nature of the Church. It is, rather, a matter of analyzing his various

theological tracts and fitting together these parts to put together the mosaic of his ecclesiology. In

doing so, one sees that the “Church pervade[s] his theology in all its parts.” 62 It is truly an ecclesial

theology. How does the Angelic Doctor understand the Church, then?

Aquinas’s approach to the Church can best be called mystical, but only and to the extent

that it is understood as Christological. 63 The Church is nothing less than man’s participation in the

mystery of Christ. At the same time, his theology is Christocentric precisely so that it may be

Theocentric. That is, he understands the Church within the mystery of man’s return to God, which

is accomplished in Christ. The Thomistic account of the Church is best understood in terms of his

overall theological approach of exitus and reditus. As the structure of the Summa Theologiæ evinces,

Thomas understands man in terms of his origin—his creation from God—and his final

61 DeBertolis, Ottavio. Origine ed esercizio della potestà̀ ecclesiastica di governo in San Tommaso. Roma: Pontificia
Universita Gregoriana (2005) at 98. Yves Congar argued that Aquinas’s failure to write such a treaty was
deliberate. Congar, Yves, “The Idea of the Church in St. Thomas,” The Thomist 1 (Oct. 1939) 331-359,
reprinted with revisions as Congar, Yves. The Mystery of the Church. Baltimore: Hellicon Press, 1960.
62 Congar, The Idea of the Church, 358. See also Dulles, Avery. “The Church According to Thomas

Aquinas” in A Church to Believe in. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company (1982), at 150.
63 This can be seen, for instance, in his treatment of the Church in the Summa Theologiæ, in which is seen

a movement of exitus and reditus. (See, e.g., Torrell, Jean-Paul. St. Thomas Aquinas. Vol. 1. Transl. by Robert
Royal. Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1996, at 150ff.) The Summa lays out a pattern of the exitus
of creation from God and a reditus of man to God following the Fall. For Thomas, it is the incarnation that
marks the turning point back to God, in the Tertia Pars. It is in the discussion of Christ, that Thomas takes
up especially the notion of the Church in his discussion of the grace of headship. Yet, the movement of the
Tertia Pars is towards God.
15
end—union with God. For Aquinas, while the body of Christ is the primary instrument of man’s

salvation, nonetheless it is through the Church that the saving power of Christ is made present.

There is a real union between Christ and the Church. The Church is the body and Christ is her

head, to use one of Aquinas’s primary ecclesiological images. 64

This underscores one of the fundamental principles of Aquinas’s ecclesiology, that the

Church is one. Aquinas speaks more often about the Church’s unity than he does of its diversity

or multiplicity. 65 This unity is not simply a moral one, the collection of like-minded friends, but an

ontological one, analogically similar to the way a living person is one. The Church’s unity flows

from the actions produced by the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. 66 Since man does

not acquire these virtues solely by his own actions, but by God’s grace, the ecclesial union formed

from them transcends his efforts. Of these three, it is the common faith of the people of God that

most especially gives rise to this unity according to Aquinas: “The unity of the Church requires that

all of the faithful agree on the faith.” 67 It is for St. Thomas the Roman Pontiff who is the

guarantor of the faith for “by a diversity of decisions the Church would be divided, unless

conserved in unity by the decision of one.” 68 The Roman Pontiff acts in this unifying capacity

most clearly when he draws up the symbols of faith. 69

As faith is, then, the formal cause of the Church’s unity, so salvation is the final cause.

Unlike some of his contemporaries, Aquinas argues for a strong relationship between the fall of

Adam and the coming of Christ—the O felix culpa of the Easter Exultet. 70 Christ came to redeem

man from his sins and it is through the sacraments uniquely—and above all the sacrament of the

64 Dulles, A Church to Believe in, 155.

65 DeBertolis, Origine ed esercizio, 98-99.
66 See especially Article 9 of Aquinas, Thomas. “Collationes de Credo in Deum.” Opuscula Genuina

Theologica. Vol. 4. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1927. 5 vols. Opuscula Omnia.

67 Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber Quartus. Vol. 15. Rome: Riccardo Garroni, 1930. 50 vols. Opera

Omnia Iussu Impensaque Leonis XIII P.M. Edita, , Book IV, ch. 76, no. 3. (Ad unitatem Ecclesiae requiritur quod omnes
fideles in fide conveniant.)
68 Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV, ch. 76, no. 3. (Per diversitatem autem sententiarum divideretur Ecclesia, nisi in

unitate per unius sententiam conservaretur.)

69 Summa Theologiæ, IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 10. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Summa Theologiæ

are taken from: Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiæ. 61 vols. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964.
70 See Summa Theologiæ IIIa, q. 1, a. 3.

16
Eucharist—that this is carried forward in time. The sacraments in turn find their origin in Christ.

Aquinas posits a marvelous convergence between these three—Christ, the Church, and the

Sacraments—in the image of the crucified Lord: “…from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross

flowed the sacraments—that is, blood and water—on which the Church was founded.” 71

For Aquinas, then, to state the matter in its broadest understanding, it is the sacraments that

make the Church. More precisely, it is the Eucharist that makes the Church. This understanding

forms the foundation for Aquinas’s development of his theology of holy orders. That inquiry

begins with asking the question: how does one confect a sacrament? At the basest of levels, one

must say that to confect a sacrament requires a power. This power is nothing more than the

principle by which one may act in furtherance of the end given to it. In the words of St. Thomas

Aquinas, “all operation proceeds from some power”. 72 The exercise of that power with regards of

the sacraments is what defines a particular order in the Church. Thus for Aquinas, “the power of

orders is ordained to the dispensation of the sacraments”. 73 Not, of course, that the sacrament of

orders is required to confect every sacrament, but the sacrament which is most fundamental to the

Church, namely the Eucharist, requires a special power.

Aquinas’s theological understanding of the nature of the Church, and the primacy of the

sacraments within that life, colors his understanding as to the effects of the sacraments themselves.

Aquinas’s own explication of the power of order develops out of the background of a long

theological discussion on their efficacy. More specifically, a question developed regarding the

actions of one in holy orders who had been separated from communion with the Church. This

was, of course, not uniquely asked by Aquinas. St. Augustine had previously taken up the question

of the re-baptism of the so-called lapsi who had denied the faith, in his controversies with the

71 See Summa Theologiæ I, q. 92, a. 3. (de latere Christi dormientis in cruce fluxerunt sacramenta, idest sanguis et
aqua, quibus est Ecclesia instituta.)
72 Aquinas, Thomas. Quaestiones Disputatae: De Potentia. Ed. Raimondo Spiazzi. Ed. 9., revisa. Vol. 2.

Taurini ; Romae: Marietti, 1953. 2 vols, q. 1 a. 1 sed contra 3. (omnis operatio ab aliqua potentia procedit)
73 Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV, ch. 74, no. 6. (potestas ordinis ad dispensationem

sacramentorum ordinatur.)
17
Donatists. 74 This led to his development of the notion of the sacred character imprinted by

baptism on the soul, like a military mark on a soldier that was retained even if he deserted. 75

At the same time, there was a sense that a priest who had removed himself or been removed

from communion with the Church could not exercise the sacred function anymore. There is a

certain attractive logic in this. The sacraments are not magic, and rely on a power that exceeds the

natural power of any individual priest. Sacramental effects come ultimately, not from man, but

from God through Christ and the Church. If a man cuts himself off from that power, how can he

be said to still retain its use and effect? To use an anachronistic example, an unplugged record

player cannot make music on its own.

The answer is precisely in this notion of the sacred character as it comes to be more fully

explained by Aquinas. In his Summa Theologiæ, St. Thomas picks up precisely on the analogy to the

ancient military mark that Augustine developed. 76 If, as Augustine explained, certain sacraments

imprint a character on the soul, how can we understand this character? In Aquinas’s Aristotelian

metaphysics, a character is not a physical impression—Augustine’s example is analogical, not

literal—as the soul has no physicality. Rather, the soul is understood by its spiritual activity,

namely the powers, habits, and passions which are in it. Anything within the soul must be one of

these three. As Aquinas explains, of them, a sacramental character must be a power in the soul, as it

is permanent or indelible (unlike the changeable passions) and because it is related to both good and

bad (unlike a habit, which must be either virtuous or vicious, and not both).

For Aquinas, the true sacrament, and therefore the imposed character, was in priestly

ordination. This is in part due to the way in which Aquinas approached the nature of what was

conferred in the sacrament. There is for Aquinas a tight relationship between order, character, and

74 Augustine. Writings in Connection with the Donatist Controversy. Trans. J. R. King. Vol. 3. Edinburgh: T. &
T. Clark, 1872. 15 vols. The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo.
75 See Augustine On Baptism, Against the Donatists, (Book I, chap. 4, para. 5). (“Let him also consider the

analogy of the military mark, which, though it can both be retained, as by deserters, and, also be received by
those who are not in the army, yet ought not to be either received or retained outside its ranks; and, at the
same time, it is not changed or renewed when a man is enlisted or brought back to his service.”)
76 See Summa Theologiæ IIIa, q. 63, ad 1.

18
sacrament. 77 Briefly, for Aquinas the sacraments are instrumental physical acts by which grace is

conferred, according to the mode of the sacramental significations, for the building up of the

Church. Sacramental character, which is given in only three sacraments, is a direct effect of these

sacraments, and imparts a permanent, spiritual effect. Order is a status conferred, in this case by a

sacrament.

Thus, a sacramental character is nothing other than a specific power of the soul. But a

power to do what, precisely? Sacraments exist to produce one or both of two effects. 78 First,

sacraments overcome sin. Second, sacraments relate to the divine cult, either for oneself or for the

sake of others. The sacrament of baptism produces both effects: it forgives sins and allows one to

participate in the cultus of divine worship. As the sacrament of baptism is about the grace given for

the subject of the sacrament for his own activity, so in a complementary way the sacrament of holy

orders is about the grace given to the subject for the sake of others.

The sacrament of orders is not about the removal of the priest’s own sinfulness nor,

primarily, his own suitability for divine worship. Rather, it is about the conduct of the divine

cult—principally, the Eucharist—for the sake of others and, in a secondary way, the preparation of

others for their participation in that same cultus. 79 A better way of stating Aquinas’s view is to say

that the “character” imposed in the sacrament of holy orders is simply a permanent change in the

soul of a man that gives him the power to act sacramentally, primarily in the Eucharist and

Confession, for the sake of the fuller participation by the faithful in the love and worship of God.

This is made most explicit in Aquinas’s discussion of the power of order and their use by

schismatics: de potestate schismaticorum. 80 There are, as Aquinas explains and would have been

77 It is not accurate to say that, for St. Thomas, these are interchangeable for all of the sacraments.
There is a tighter relationship for holy orders, but they are not identical even there. Cf. Dolan, George
Edward. The Distinction between the Episcopate and the Presbyterate according to the Thomistic Opinion.
Washington,DC: CUA Press (1950), at 82-83.
78 See Summa Theologiæ IIIa, q. 62, a. 5. (Gratia autem sacramentalis ad duo ordinari videtur: videlicet ad tollendos

defectus praeteritorum peccatorum, inquantum transeunt actu et remanent reatu; et iterum ad perficiendum animam in his quae
pertinent ad cultum Dei secundum religionem Chistianae vitae.)
79 Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV, chap. 74.
80 See Summa Theologiæ IIa-IIae, q. 39, a. 3.

19
commonly held in the medieval Church, two elements of spiritual power: sacramental and

jurisdictional. 81 The distinction in the origin of these powers evidences the difference in the

essence of these powers. The first, the sacramental power, is given in consecration. For Aquinas,

all consecrations within the Church endure with the existence of the thing consecrated. That is, in

the metaphysical language of Aquinas, a consecration is not merely an accident adhering to a

subject, but it affects the very nature of the thing. It is a change secundum essentiam. He gives the

example of the altar which, when consecrated, remains consecrated until its essence changes, i.e.,

until it is destroyed and no longer an altar. With regards the priesthood, it is the man who is

consecrated. Therefore, so long as he remains a being with a soul, the sacramental consecration

(or character) endures. 82

The moment at which Aquinas understands that a priest receives this sacramental character

gives an insight into his theological point of view. Although the Church would no longer so hold

today, 83 Aquinas argues that the priest receives the sacramental character during the point in the

ordination ceremony when he receives the chalice and paten. Given the previous discussion, this

conclusion should come as no surprise. As Aquinas insists,

the principle act of the order of the priest [sacerdos] is to consecrate

the body of Christ. He is given this power in the acceptance of the
chalice. Therefore, then character is imprinted. 84

Since the primary act of the priest is to consecrate the Eucharist, the outward symbol of the

sacrament must convey what it imparts. The reception of the chalice symbolizes this acceptance

of the new power, and therefore it sacramentally gives precisely what it signifies.

But what of the laying on of hands? Aquinas does not ignore this aspect of the sacrament

81 See Mansini OSB, Guy, “Episcopal Munera and the Character of Episcopal Orders.” Thomist 66
(2002): 369 - 394 at 375, citing Lecuyer, J. La sacrement de ‘Ordination: Recherche hisorique et theoologique.
Beauchesne (Paris 1983) at 248, 252. This distinction will be discussed at far greater length below.
82 Curiously, Aquinas never links this discussion of the consecrated altar back to his discussion on the

character imposed in the Sacrament. To say that sacramental consecration effects a permanent change in the
essence of a man is to say nothing else but that it grants a sacred character.
83 See Pope Pius XII, Sacramentum ordinis, AAS 40 (1948) 40-45.
84 Summa Theologiæ, Suppl., q. 37, a. 5. (principalis actus ordinis sacerdotis est consecrare corpus Christi. Sed ad hoc

datur sibi potestas in acceptione calicis. Ergo tunc imprimatur character.)

20
of holy orders. In the same question, Aquinas sees the laying on of hands as preparatory to the

reception of the power. The laying on of hands gives the fullness of grace which makes the priest

worthy of the office. 85 While the handing over the chalice gives the priest power in the sacrament, it

is the laying on of hands that qualifies him for ministry. 86 These must, for Aquinas, be understood

as related ideas, tied together in the one ritual act of ordination.

In addition to these distinctions, Aquinas also distinguishes between essence and use in the

sacrament of Holy Orders. That is, simply because a sacramental change results from ordination,

does not mean the individual so empowered has an unfettered right to its use. Thus, in the case of

a priest who has voluntarily removed himself from the governance of the Church by an act of

schism. Although he retains the sacramental power in its essence, he is juridically deprived of its

use precisely because of that separation.

Because an inferior power ought not to come into act except as it is

moved by a superior power, as is evident in natural things, so it is
that such [i.e., schismatics] lose the use of the power, so that it is not
licit for them to use their power. 87

In other words, while the power is given as to the essence, it is only legitimately used when it is

properly subordinated within the hierarchical structure of Christian society and governance. This

is what distinguishes it from the power of jurisdiction, which exercise flows solely from an office

granted by legitimate authority.

Furthermore, for Aquinas, the power of orders is largely limited to the priesthood, as

encompassing both the presbyterate and the episcopacy. For Aquinas, the episcopacy does not

85 Summa Theologiæ, Suppl., q. 37, a. 5. (“Sed per manus impositionem datur plenitudo gratiae, per quam
ad magna officia dunt idonei.”)
86 For the medieval Church, the notion of the exercise of power is strongly associated with the notion of

an office. Thus, Cardinal Ratzinger notes that, “The medieval rite [of ordination] is formed on the pattern
of investiture in a secular office. The rite that Pius XII decress represents a return to the form used in the
early Church... Accordingly, the key word is now ministerium or munus: service and gift...” While that may
have described the later development, in the case of Aquinas it is not a matter of one or the other, but of
both. While it is true that Aquinas emphasized the power given in the sacramental character, even this
power flows from the prepatory act for ministry given in the laying of hands. Moreover, Aquinas argues that
the plenitudo gratiae is given in this act prepatory to ministry.
87 Summa Theologiæ IIa-IIae, q. 39, a. 3. (Sed quia potestas inferior non debet exire in actum nisi secundum quod

movetur a potestate superiori, ut etiam in rebus naturalibus patet; inde est quod tales usum potestatis amittunt, ita scilicet quod
non liceat eis sua potestate uti.)
21
involve an additional imparting of the power of orders as it does not impose any additional sacred

character. Put simply, what can the Bishop do that a priest cannot? Or, to state it more precisely,

how does the Bishop’s relationship with the Eucharist change upon his episcopal consecration?

The answer is, for Aquinas, that it does not. Since the sacramental character is a permanent

instrumental power, it can only relate to those aspects of action that have permanency. In

addition, these are powers that relate to active or passive participation in divine worship. This

means primarily, as said above, the Eucharist. Baptism is a passive power 88 in relation to the

Eucharist, holy orders an active one. The primary change for the Bishop, at least sacramentally, is

his ability to ordain. This is a new ministerial role in the Church, not a relation to the divine cult.

Therefore, even if the Bishop’s ability to ordain is a permanent one, because it is only ministerial, it

is not a character. 89

For largely the same reason, Aquinas does not consider the episcopacy to be a separate ordo,

strictly speaking. 90 Aquinas asserts, together with much of medieval theology, that the sacrament

of holy orders consists of seven distinct orders, three major 91 and four minor 92. This same

division was also recognized by the Church in the 1917 Code of Canon Law. 93 It is for Aquinas

the priesthood that is the fullness of orders. Orders are distinguished by the various powers arising

from sacred character. For Aquinas, while the priesthood is sacramentally ordered, the episcopacy

is not. 94 Since it is not properly sacramental, it is not an order.

88 Not that the power is merely passive, but one’s that it permits one to have a passive orientation
towards the Eucharist. This should not be understood as saying more than it does. Even for Aquinas, the
Eucharist is best received by the full participation of the person into the liturgical rites, i.e., actively. Here is
meant simply that the baptized receive the sacraments, while the ordained act in a ministerial, and therefore,
active capacity vis-à-vis the sacramental action.
89 For a much fuller discussion, see Mansini, “Episcopal Munera and the Character of Episcopal

Orders,” 377-380.
90 Summa Theologiæ Suppl. q. 37, a, 2 and q. 40, a. 5.
91 These are priesthood, deacon, and subdeacon.
92 These are acolyte, lector, exorcist, and porter.
93 See CIC 1917 c. 949-950. Interestingly, the canons make clear that these are meant to define how the

Code uses these terms (c. 949: “In canonibus qui sequuntur, nomine ordinem maiorum vel sacrorum
intelligunture...”; c. 950: “In iura verba: ordinare, ordo, ordinatio, sacra ordinatio, comprehendunt...”) There
seems to have been a deliberate determination to make clear that these were on the order of techinical
juridical terms and did not thereby mean to imply a definitive theological statement.
94 For a discussion on some of the scholarly debate on this issue, particularly on whether the episcopacy

22
 Rather, Aquinas would call the episcopacy an order only secundum quid. It is called an order

only to the extent that it is in relation to some sacred action. 95 Moreover, what power the Bishop

does have in hierarchical action over the Mystical Body of Christ he has above the priests. This

hierarchical relationship creates a kind of order within the church. In other words, for St. Thomas,

the distinguishing feature of the consecration of the bishop is that it primarily allows him to govern,

not that it gives him additional sacramental power.

As Aquinas explains in the Summa Contra Gentiles 96, the episcopacy represents a higher order

than the priesthood, as priests are ordained by bishops. But this just serves to identify the relations

within the orders as they relate to hierarchy. This higher position serves in turn to define the

activity of the bishops: “So therefore it is clear that the highest rule of the people of faith belongs

to the episcopal dignity.” 97 And the highest of the Bishops is the Roman Pontiff. It is he alone

who rules the Church, as the Bishop rules his Diocese 98, as will be discussed further below in the

section on jurisdiction.

In summary, for Aquinas the Church exists as the ongoing means of the salvation won

through Jesus Christ. It is the Eucharist principally that makes the sacrifice of Jesus continually

present in the world. Therefore, the primary activity of the Church is the worship of God through

the liturgical action of the Liturgy. But that cannot happen without those empowered to make

Christ present in the way God has decreed, which is sacramentally. This, then is the primary

manner by which we understand not only the life of the Church, but especially the sacramental life

of the Church which makes it possible.

was, in Aquinas’s view, a sacrament, see Sirilla, Michael G. St. Thomas Aquinas’s Theology of the Episcopacy in His
Commentaries on the Pastoral Epistles. Doctoral Thesis. The Catholic University of America, 2008 at 6-10.
95 Summa Theologiæ Suppl. q. 40, a. 5. (Alio modo potest considerari ordo secundum quod est officium quoddam respectu

quarundam actionum sacrum. Et sic, cum episcopus habeat potestatem in actionibus hierarchicis respectu corporis mystici supra
sacerdotum, episcopus erit ordo.)
96 See Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV, ch. 76. This chapter of the Summa Contra Gentiles is given the

title: De episcopali potestate: et quod in ea unus sit summus, referring to the Roman Pontiff.
97 Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV, ch. 76, no. 1. (Sic igitur manifestum est quod summa regiminis fidelis populi ad

episcopalem pertinet dignitatem.)

98 Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV, ch. 76, no. 2. (Sicut igitur in uno speciali populo unius Ecclesiae requiritur unus

episcopus, qui sit totius populi caput; ita in toto populo Christiano requiritur quod unus sit totius Ecclesiae caput.)
23
 The power to confect the Eucharist is a stable one which puts a man in a different

relationship to the Church’s primary act of cultic worship. This is the essence of the order within

the Church—a stable group with the primary role of making the sacrament of holy communion

available. Therefore the potestas sacra is, primarily, that power, stably given. That, in turn, is

nothing less than a sacred character imprinted on the soul permitting the exercise of the same

power. The priesthood has the fullness of orders because it is as a priest that one confects the

Eucharist. The lower orders are oriented to the Eucharist, but only in subsidiary and

non-sacramental ways. Conversely, episcopal consecration adds nothing to that relation to the

Eucharist, and therefore, in Aquinas’s view, adds no sacramental character and therefore is not,

properly speaking, an order. The bishop receives additional potestas iurisdictionis, but not potestas

sacra.

24
The Power of Orders and the Council of Trent

As the medieval understanding of the theological underpinnings elucidated by Aquinas and

others of the sacrament of holy orders continue to take hold in the Church, they begin to unravel

elsewhere. A driving force behind much of the rise of 16th century Protestantism is the belief in

the lack of distinction between the ordained priesthood and the lay faithful. Therefore, an

Ecumenical Council is called in that same century to confront some of the issues raised. The

Council of Trent is important not only as the Church’s initial definitive response to the challenge

posed by the reformers, but also because the theology and praxis of the council so dominated the

Church for the next 500 years.

While the Council focused on a variety of subject, its discussion of the sacrament of holy

orders is found towards the end of its time, in the twenty-third session in 1563. As with many of

its decrees, it contained both theological assertions and directions for reform. The theological

assertions of this twenty-third session are divided into only four short chapters: on the institution

of the priests of the new law; on the seven orders; orders is truly and properly a sacrament; and on

ecclesiastical hierarchy and ordination 99.

In most of its dogmatic pronouncements, the Council affirms the previous medieval

approach to understanding holy orders. Without much comment on their various meanings, the

Council of Trent endorses existence and use of the seven orders within the sacrament of holy

orders. 100 The Council divides them among the major and minor orders. To the first set belong

the priest and deacon. To the second belong the subdeacon, acolyte, lector, exorcist, and porter.

At the same time, in terms of the Church’s own hierarchy, the Council is just as emphatic that it is

three-fold: bishop, priest, and minister. 101

99 Tanner, Norman P., ed. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. 2 vols. Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 1990 at 741-753. These headings are provided by Lanfredini, Giacomo, ed. Canones et
Decreta Sacrosancti Oecumenici et Generalis Concilii Tridentini. 2nd ed. Rome: Mainardi, 1763. Session XXIII,
chaps. I-IV, pp. 173-77. (de institutione sacerdotii novae legis; de septem ordinibus; ordinem vere et proprie esse
sacramentum; and de eccesiastica hierarchia et ordinatione).
100 Tanner, Decrees, 741 (chap. II).
101 Tanner, Decrees, 744 (canon VI). (Si quis dixerit, in ecclesia catholica, non esse hierarchiam divinia ordinatione

25
 Thus, the Council also reaffirms the Augustinian notion of an indelible sacred character

together with its subsequent development in being applied to holy orders. 102 But that is essentially

all they commit to decree. There is no discussion on exactly what this sacred character is, except to

condemn those who argue that it is merely a temporary power. 103

In terms of power, the Council, together with Aquinas, ties the priesthood explicitly and

primarily to the Eucharistic sacrifice, both in preparing for it and administering it. Although it

never quite does so explicitly, this power seems to flow from the sacred character given in the

sacrament. Thus, the Council gives as the main purposes of the priesthood to consecrate, offer,

and minister Christ’s body and blood, and to forgive and retain sins. 104 Therefore, his main

powers are to confect the Eucharist and absolve sins.

The Council also distinguished the bishop, not primarily by his sacramental power, but by

his governance. In mentioning the bishop, the Council declares him to be principally part of the

hierarchical order, by which is meant especially governance. 105 They are made bishops to rule the

Church of God. Thus, they are set hierarchically above priests and, by implication, the lay

faithful. 106 Nevertheless, the Council also defines them in term of a sacramental power. Much

more than the Thomistic analysis, the Tridentine explication also identifies the bishop by his ability

institutam, quae constat ex episcopis, presbyteris, et ministris, a[nathema] s[it].) As will be seen below, this will make its
way verbatim into the 1917 Code of Canon Law in its description of the hierarchical order of the Church.
102 Tanner, Decrees, 742 (chap. IV). (in sacramento ordinis, sicut in baptismo et confirmatione character imprimitur,

qui nec deleri, nec auferri potest)

103 Tanner, Decrees, 743 (chap. IV). (temporariam tantummodo potestatem). The later Catechism of the

Council of Trent, issued by Pope Pius V, also includes the Thomistic understanding of adding a new
relationality to divine worship as well as that it distinguishes people from one another. Thus, sacred orders
gives the power of consecrating and administering sacraments as well as separating out clerics from the
baptized laity. See Pope Pius V. The Catechism of the Council of Trent. Trans. J. Donovan. Dublin: Richard
Coyne, 1829 at 154-155.
104 Tanner, Decrees, 742 (chap. I). (consecrandi, offerendi, et ministrandi corpus et sanguinem eius [i.e., Jesu Christi],

nec non et peccata dimittendi et retinendi) Despite this passing reference to the Bishops, the general impression
given is that governance is found especially not in the Bishops, but in one Bishop, namely the Bishop of
Rome. Again, this would parallel the general Thomistic approach, at least by implication.
105 Tanner, Decrees, 743 (chap. IV). (episcopus, qui in Apostolorum locum successerunt, ad hunc hierarchicum ordinem

praecipue pertinere; et positos…a Spiritu sancto regere ecclesiam Dei (emphasis in original))
106 This notion of distinction given in the sacrament of holy orders is made explicit in the 1917 Code,

which, when speaking on the sacrament of orders, provides the effects of ordination: it distinguishes the
cleric from the law in for the sake of governance and ministry in the divine cult. 1917 Code of Canon Law,
can. 948 (Ordo ex Christi institutione clericos a laicis in Ecclesia distinguit ad fidelium regimen et cultus divini ministerium.)
Again, this is taken largely from the Decrees of the Council of Trent.
26
to administer the sacraments of confirmation and holy orders. What the Council does not do is

state explicitly that this flows from a sacramental character, or that bishops even possess a

sacramental character different from or in addition to the priestly character.

Much of the Council’s focus with respect to governance is taken up with defending the

right and duty of the successor of St. Peter to rule the entire Church. This holds true also for the

so-called Roman Catechism, or The Catechism of the Council of Trent issued by Pope St. Pius V after the

conclusion of the Council. There, in the first part dealing with the creed, the Catechism addresses

the “one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church”. It is especially under the discussion of the Church

as one does the Catechism discuss the Church’s governance, and then largely through the unifying

office of the Supreme Pontiff. 107 That is, like Aquinas, not only does the Council see the

episcopacy largely in terms of governance, but they see governance in terms of one particular

bishop, the Bishop of Rome.

This approach to both governance and the hierarchy affects the Church’s own

self-understanding for the next several centuries. In many ways it adopts the scholastic thinking of

Aquinas, although not comprehensively. Thus, the one could assert that up to the time of the

Second Vatican Council the most that could be said as the definitive teaching of the Church

regarding sacramental character was:

1) there are sacramental characters; 2) three sacraments, Baptism,

Confirmation, and Holy Orders, imprint characters; 3) the character
is subjected in the soul; 4) the character is spiritual; and 5) the
character is indelible. 108

Even so, a number of questions, even if taught generally by theologians, remained open 109, as not

definitively settled by the Church’s Magisterium. The question of the extent of sacramental

character, the fullness of holy orders, and even the orders that compromised the sacrament of holy

107 See Catechism of the Council of Trent, Part I, Article IX.

108 Donahue, John M. “Sacramental Character: The State of the Question.” The Thomist 31:4 (1967):
445–464 at 448.
109 See Donahue, John M. “Sacramental Character: The State of the Question.” The Thomist 31:4 (1967)

at 461. Even Pope Pius XII’s 1947 encyclical Sacramentum Ordinis, on the sacrament of Holy Orders, did not
address the particular question of the character imprinted in epicopal consecration.
27
orders all waited fuller development.

The Power of Orders and the Second Vatican Council

The Second Vatican Council, in heeding the desire of Pope John XXIII to update the life

of the Church, addressed virtually every facet of ecclesial life. With regards to most of these issues,

including sacred orders, its approach was largely pastoral, and not primarily dogmatic. That it, it

sought not so much to settle theological disputes, but to provide a new direction to the Church’s

activities in light of the developments of the modern world. Even so, the Council issued a number

of explicitly dogmatic texts, with the approbation of the Holy Father, which must be accepted as

the definitive teaching of the Church. With regards to the sacrament of orders, its most important

documents were Lumen gentium 110, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church; Christus Dominus111,

the decree on the pastoral office of bishops; and Presbyterorum Ordinis 112, the decree on the ministry

and life of priests. For the most part, these are pastoral documents; they contain no lists of

dogmatic statements or attachments of anathemas. Nonetheless, there is some doctrinal

development in these documents, especially as related to the order of bishop.

Before coming to the Council’s teaching, one important theological development on the

power of orders was made in the decades prior to its opening. In 1947, Pope Pius XII issued the

Encyclical Sacramentum Ordinis 113, on the holy orders of deacons, priests, and bishops. Pope Pius’s

stated intent in the encyclical was to clarify the ritual so as to add greater certainty as to the elements

necessary for validly conferring sacred orders. Nonetheless, keeping in mind the adage lex orandi,

lex credendi, such clarifications to the ritual necessarily adds clarity to the theology behind it. Pope

Pius XII certainly also means to clarify some points of sacramental theology.

First, the very limiting of the Encyclical to the orders of deacon, priest, and bishop seems to

110 Sacrosanctum Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II, Lumen gentium, AAS 57 (1965) 5-75.
111 Pope Paul VI, Christus Dominus, AAS 58 (1966) 673-696.
112 Pope Paul VI, Presbyterorum ordinis. AAS 58 (1966) 991-1024.
113 Pope Pius XII, Sacramentum Ordinis, AAS 40 (1948) 5-7.
28
reflect the then growing theological consensus, contrary to Aquinas, that the sacrament of holy

orders includes essentially only these three. That would further imply that the episcopacy is a part

of the sacrament of orders, and not simply a kind of priesthood plus.

The main holding of Pius’s Encyclical, however, focuses on the matter and form of the

sacrament of holy orders. Specifically, as to these, the relevant ritual actions are the laying on of

hands and the words of ordination. The handing over the chalice and paten (the so-called traditio

instrumentorum), which for Aquinas was the ritual action through which power was conferred, are

not essential parts of the sacrament. It is the action of laying on of hands (together with the

appropriate words), that transmits the two primary effects of ordination, namely power and

grace 114. Interestingly, despite this concern for clarifying the sacramental power and the ritual

action through which it is imparted, nowhere in the Encyclical does Pope Pius mention sacramental

character.

While it is easy to point out the changes wrought by the Second Vatican Council, much of

their teaching on the sacrament of holy orders follows the tradition theretofore held. Thus, the

Council largely affirms the sacred character of the sacrament of holy orders as applied to priests,

which conforms him to Christ the allows him to act in place of Christ the head. 115 In addition, the

Council echoes the Thomistic understanding on the primary end of the power of orders. The

conciliar decree Presbyterorum ordinis states: “These ministers in the society of the faithful are able by

the sacred power of Orders to offer the Sacrifice [of the Mass], to remit sins, and to perform

publicly the priestly [sacerdotali] office for men in the name of Christ.” 116 This is not just one

description among many, but this is the very first duty mentioned in the decree on the life of priests,

and therefore the most central and important duty of the priest. This is, in its essence, the

114 Sacramentum Ordinis, 6 (potestas scilicet et gratia).

115 Presbyterorum ordinis, 2. (…Presbyteri, unctione Spiritus Sancti, speciali charactere signantur et sic Christo Sacerdoti
configurantur ita ut in persona Christi Capitis agere valeant.)
116 Presbyterorum ordinis, 2. (Quosdam instituit ministros, qui, in societate fidelium, sacra Ordinis potestate pollerent

Sacrificium offerendi et peccata remittendi, atque sacerdotali officio publice pro hominibus nomine Christi fungerentur.) Note
that, although the usual English word used is priestly, the Council intends this to apply to both priests and
bishops.
29
Thomistic-Tridentine summation of the character of sacred orders: ordination confers a power

related largely to the public cult.

Nevertheless, for the most part, the Council did not prefer to present the issue in terms of

potestas. Rather, the Conciliar Fathers develop the notion of the munera, or sacred functions of

teaching, governing, and sanctifying, associated with the hierarchical orders. For the Council, the

priesthood is not merely a sacred power or character, it is also an office. 117 This is made even more

explicit in Lumen gentium, where, in distinguishing between the priesthood of the faithful and the

ministerial priesthood, the Council describes the difference in terms of teaching, governing, and

making present the Eucharist (i.e., sanctifying). 118 That is, the priesthood involves not just a

sacred power, but also a sacred function, albeit exercised in subordination to that of the Bishops.

An even greater development may be found in the Council’s approach to the theology of

the episcopacy. It has been said that while the First Vatican Council focused on elaborating a

theology of the Papacy, the Second Vatican Council was focused on elaborating a theology of the

episcopacy. Even so, the Conciliar Fathers spend a great deal more words addressing the exact

nature and role of the Bishop within the Church rather than formulating any doctrinal statements

on par with previous ecumenical councils.

Nevertheless, the Conciliar fathers do make an important contribution to the Church’s

understanding to the episcopacy and Holy Orders. The Council seems to affirm that the rite of

episcopal ordination imprints a character on a Bishop, as does priestly ordination on the newly

ordained priest:

…by the imposition of hands and the words of consecration the

grace of the Holy Spirit is so conferred and the sacred character so
imprinted that the Bishop, in an eminent and visible way, may
sustain the functions [partes] of Christ, Teacher, Shepherd, and High

117 See Presbyterorum ordinis, 2. (Officium Presbyterorum, utpote Ordini episcopali coniunctum, partcipat auctoritatem

qua Christus Ipse Corpus suum exstruit, sanctificat et regit.) As will be discussed more fully below, this is quite
similar this will be to the elaboration of the munera of the Bishops found in Lumen gentium.
118 Lumen gentium, 10. (Sacerdos quidem ministerialis, potestate sacra qua gaudet, populum sacerdotalem efformat ac

regit, sacrificium eucharisticum in persona Christi conficit illudque nomine totius populi Deo offert.)
30
 Priest, and may act in his person. 119

Moreover, this involves the reception by the bishop of the “fullness of power”, 120 which they term

as, “the high priesthood, the supreme power of the sacred ministry.” 121 This is in contradistinction

to the office of teaching and governing which, although also imparted in ordination to the

episcopacy, nonetheless may only be exercised in hierarchical communion. This seems to suggest

that in the ordination of a Bishop an additional character is imprinted by the sacrament. 122

In addition, Pope Paul VI made significant changes to the traditional understanding of what

constituted the Sacrament of Holy Orders, and especially what was considered an order within it.

In 1972, Pope Paul VI issued a short Apostolic Letter motu proprio, Ministeria quaedam. 123 The

juridical effect of that document was to suppress the so-called minor orders and the major order of

the subdiaconate and replace them with two “ministries” unrelated to clerical status. While Paul

VI never delves into the theology of orders, a few conclusions can be drawn from his action. First,

the minor orders and subdiaconate cannot be called essential elements of holy orders, and it is

119 Lumen Gentium, 21. (…manuum impositione et verbis consecrationis gratiam Spiritus Sancti ita conferri et sacrum
characterem ita imprimi, ut Episcopi, eminenti ac adspectabili modo, ipsius Christi Magistri, Pastoris et Pontificis partes
sustineant et in Eius persona agant. (footnotes removed)) It is interesting to note that, at least in regards to the
imposition of a character, this is largely the same as the initial schema for the Constitution on the Church
presented to the Council, although perhaps it was a bit clearer in the initial schema. (See Acta Synodalia
Sacrocancti Concilii Oecumenici Vatican II, vol. I, per. I, pars IV, pp. 15 - 91 at 23.) (Praetereta Episcopus consecratus
ita charactere sacramentali ordinis ornatur...) Nevertheless, this schema follows more closely the traditional
approach to sacred character. It does so by first declaring first that episcopal ordination creates a
distinction within the Church (ut numquam simplex sacerdos vel laicus rursus fieri) and, in the same sentence, it
relates it to a saramental power, namely confirmation and ordination (vel postestatem valide conferendi sacramentum
confirmationis et ministros Ecclesiae ordinandi amittere possit.). By the time of the second schema, this link is gone.
(See Acta Synodalia Sacrocancti Concilii Oecumenici Vatican II, vol. II, per. II, pars I, pp. 215-281 at 233) The link
between the sacred character and the separation from the priesthood and laity remains. However, the
sacramental power is limited to calling men to participate in the priestly office, with no reference to
confirmation. (ad sacerdotale munus participandum vocant). By the time of the final Constitution, the focus on
the separation between the bishop and the priesthood and laity is completely removed. However, the power
to ordain others to the episcopacy remains, but with no link to the character given in ordination.
(Episcoporum est per Sacramentum Ordinis novos electos in corpus episcopale assumere.)
120 Lumen gentium, 21 (plenitudinem ... sacramenti Ordinis).
121 Lumen gentium, 21 (summum sacerdotium, sacri ministerii summa nuncupatur).
122 Although it might be possible to argue that the existing character of the priest is somehow expanded

or fulfilled, the better readings seems to be that an additional character is granted. Some of the confusion
was expressed by John Donohue in his article on sacramental character, published only three years after
Lumen gentium: “The role of the priestly character in a bishop is a topic that has not been brought up to date
with the decree of Vatican Council II.” Donohue, John M. “Sacamental Character: The State of the
Question” The Thomist 31:4 (1967) 445-464 at 461-2 (emphasis added).
123 Pope Paul VI, Ministeria quaedam, AAS 64 (1972) 529-534.

31
doubtful whether one could say they were sacramental or that a character was given. Second, the

newly created “ministries” cannot be said to be a part of holy orders, as Paul VI explicitly chose to

unlink them from preparation for priestly ministry.

As a result of this, it is necessary to clarify the understanding of order and character within

the sacrament. The Magisterial teaching seems to be that the sacrament of holy orders is made up

of three, not seven, distinct orders: the diaconate, the priesthood, and the episcopacy. 124 This is

made even more explicit in the current Code of Canon law: Ordines sunt episcopatus, presbyteratus et

diaconatus. 125 Moreover, it is reflected in an important shift in terminology. In the 1917 Code, the

rite by which a man is made a bishop is generally referred to as consecratione 126. By the 1983 Code,

one may speak of a bishop as ordinatur 127, even if the term consecratione 128 remains.

This has an implication on the understanding of sacred character as well. In at least two of

these (presbyterate and episcopacy), the teaching of the Council is that an indelible, non-repeatable

character is bestowed in and through sacramental ordination. Moreover, the Code of Canon Law

seems to indicate that all of the grades of holy orders have an indelible character, including the

diaconate. 129 The character is not the same in each of these orders, as each of them is distinct in its

activity. As a result of this distinction, the sacrament of holy orders can be said to comprise the

124 The potential theological problem with this is that the Council of Trent seems explicitly to assert the
existence of seven orders, as noted above. The resolution of this is two-fold. First, the mention of seven
is only in the heading, and therefore could be considered mere obiter dicta. In addition, when speaking of the
lower orders, the Council describes their existence is dignus, or suitable. That is, the Tridentine Council does
not assert that the minor orders are necessary, only that they are appropriate, and their use defensible by the
Church at the time. This is especially true when considering, as discussed in the previous section on Church
authority, only the orders of bishop, presbyter, and deacon are explicitly mentioned in the Scriptures.
125 Code of Canon Law, can. 1009 §1.
126 See, e.g., 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 953.
127 See, e.g., Code of Canon Law, can. 332 §1.
128 See, e.g., Code of Canon Law, can. 375 §2.
129 See Code of Canon Law, can. 1008, as amended by Pope Benedict XVI, Omnium in Mentem. AAS 102

(2010): 8–10. (Sacramento ordinis ex divina institutione inter christifideles quidam, charactere indelebili quo signatur...
(emphasis added)) While itself not a part of the teaching function of the Church, the Code of Canon Law is
certainly reflective of that teaching, or at least it should be. Even so, the full extent of the import of the
canon is unknown. Certainly, Thomistic metaphysics would understand a character primarily as a power
given. But what additional power if given to the deacon, such that he can be said to have a sacred character?
Or is it the case that the Council wished to alter the notion of a sacred character, in that it is more closely
linked with clerical status (i.e., a distinction within the people of God) than with power? These have not
been given sufficient attention by the Magisterium of the Church.
32
three of these separate orders within it.

But the Council also says that consecration as a Bishop gives not only a sacred character but

also the sacred functions [munera] of sanctifying, governing, and teaching. 130 Moreover, these

functions are not merely relational, but given ontological upon consecration. 131 Nonetheless, the

precise relationship between these sacred munera and the sacred character bestowed is not fully

explained by the Council.

Even so, at a minimum it means that the Church has rethought the notion that sacramental

character is directed principally with a power relating to the Holy Eucharist. In Aquinas’s

formulation the character of the deacon bestowed on him the power to dispense Christ’s blood in

the chalice. However, Ministeria quaedam makes clear that the new ministry shares in that same

power, in a stable, albeit extraordinary, way 132. The relationship between sacramental power and

the sacramental character imposed in holy orders is no longer clear. Although the fullness of this

issue cannot be addressed now, some general observations can be made. The theological notion

of the priestly power to consecrate the Eucharist as a stable power, flowing from the character

imposed, remains as paradigmatic of the relation between character and power in holy orders.

What is no longer manifest is how, or even if, the rite of ordination for the bishop and the deacon

bestows any additional powers. While it is true that we understand that there is a certain

ontological reality to the munera bestowed at ordination, their relation to sacred character and the

reason they must be considered ontological, at least in part, is not explained. Although one could

argue that the bishop’s power to ordain is evidence of this character for the bishop, such a

conclusion is never made by the Second Vatican Council or subsequent magisterial teaching. The

result is that the character creates a distinction within the body of the Church; it is not at all clear

130 See Lumen gentium, 21. (Episcopalis autem consecratio, cum munere sanctificandi, munera quoque confert docendi et
regendi, quae tamen natura sua nonnisi in hierarchica communione cum Collegii Capite et membris exerceri possunt.)
131 Lumen gentium, Nota explicativa praevia, 2. (In consecratione datur ontologica participatio sacrorum munerum, ut

indubie constat ex Traditione, etiam liturgica.) Although not clear in this sentence, the context suggest that this
statement is made explicitly about bishops. Nonetheless, an analogous claim can also be made about the
presbyter’s reception of these munera as an ontological reality.
132 Ministeria quaedam, 6.

33
that it also bestows a stable power. 133

This confusion is also reflected in the 1983 Code of Canon Law. If these three are in fact

the three orders of the sacrament of holy orders, and involve the reception of a sacred character,

one would expect them to be treated together, at least with regard to their imposition. However,

the Code of Canon law does not do this. Rather, it splits up holy orders and treats their conferral

in into two different books of the Code. The orders of priesthood and the diaconate are placed in

Book IV, 134 dealing with the munus sanctificandi of the Church, together with the other sacraments.

The episcopacy, as the subject of these canons, is found only in the introductory first two canons of

this section of Book IV. The canons on episcopal consecration 135 are found instead in Book II,

Part II 136, de Ecclesiae constitutione hierarchica. This certainly seems to reflect that the diaconate and

priesthood are primarily about a relation to the Church’s sanctifying function. The episcopacy, on

the other hand, is placed in the code to suggest that its primary distinguishing character is its

relation to hierarchy. This is akin to the Thomistic contention that the two orders of priest and

deacon have a character imposed which gives them a power in relation to the Sacratissimum

Sacramentum, but that what defines the episcopacy is not sacramentality, but governance.

Conclusion

In the classical theological account, the potestas ordinis was a term used to describe especially

the sacramental power of the priest given in his reception of the sacrament of orders. The primary

expression of that power was his ability to effect the transubstantiation of the bread and wine into

the body and blood of Christ. As such, the power to consecrate became the lens through which

the potestas ordinis was understood. Given that the consecrated Bishop had no additional power

133 Furthermore, this seems to be in some tension with the description given by Pope St. Pius V in the
Catechism of the Council of Trent, as mentioned above.
134 See Code of Canon Law, cann. 1008-1054.
135 It is somewhat curious that despite the development of doctrine in this area, that, especially in this

section, the canons continue to refer to episcopal consecration rather than ordination.
136 See especially, Code of Canon Law, cann. 375-80.

34
when it came to the Eucharist, the general view of the sacrament of orders was that its fullness was

received in the ordination to priesthood. The other orders—both major and minor—were in a

sense simply preliminary to and in anticipation of priestly ordination. Likewise, consecration as a

bishop was not a separate ordo within the sacrament as much as it was the fullness of the juridical

power given especially by at the Pope’s designation.

This was also closely connected with the understanding of the sacred character imprinted in

a number of sacraments, including holy orders. Since a character was a quality added to the soul, it

must be related to some aspect of the soul. For St. Thomas and the scholastic theologians, this

meant the granting of an additional power of the soul, and more specifically one that related to

divine worship. Again, St. Thomas saw in priestly ordination the removal of a man from the state

of the baptized lay faithful to a new ordo within the Church in a way precisely correlated to the

divine cult, moving him from the passive to the active role. As no additional power is given to the

Bishop vis-à-vis divine worship, so no additional character is granted in his episcopal consecration.

For Aquinas it the priesthood, equally shared by the presbyter and bishop, that reflects the fullness of

sacred orders, and therefore the potestas ordinis.

This basic understanding, although not formally adopted by the Church, provided some of

the fundamental assumptions about the power of orders until the Second Vatican Council. In that

Council, the Fathers set about reinvigorating the theology of the Bishop, seeking to move from a

largely juridical understanding to a more broadly pastoral. Thus, continuing to acknowledge the

earlier formulations established by the Council of Trent, the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council

preferred to speak of the Bishop not so much in terms not of character and power, but in the munera

given. Nevertheless, the Council gave no sustained discussion to the precise way in which this

notion of munera fit into the previous doctrine on character and sacred power. Nonetheless, the

Church did establish definitively that the sacrament of Holy Orders contains the three orders of

bishop, presbyter, and deacon, but that each possess and express the munere differently.

Moreover, the Church distinguishes between these orders in part based on relation to governance.

35
 A more fundamental question is how the power of orders, then, relates to power of

governance. What can be said is that the Second Vatican Council intended to provide some clarity

to the theology of the episcopacy. Although it could be fairly argued that they raised more

questions than answers. What does seem clear is that in the post-Conciliar Church, the notion of

holy orders refers to the priest, bishop, and deacon. The power of orders seems to mean primarily

that of the priest to consecrate the Eucharist, but likely has a much broader meaning, especially in

terms of participation in the sacred munera. Nonetheless, the relation of these to the sacrament of

holy orders is not entirely clear.

36
CHAPTER 3: THE CHURCH AS SOCIETAS PERFECTA

Introduction

Revelation teaches us not simply the sacramental means for man’s salvation within the

Church, but also the corporate nature of this means for salvation as a necessary corollary. The

salvation won by our divine Savior was not merely applied to individuals qua individuals, but is

meant to be experienced communally. While this idea is at the center of the Second Vatican

Council’s formulation of the Church as the Populus Dei 137 it is expressed just as much in the earlier

formulation of Pope Pius XII of the Church as the Mystici Corporis Christi. 138 In other words, the

Church is not merely a collection of people, but a union of persons as one people gathered as a body.

This has important implications on the way in which the Church is conceived, particularly in the

area of governance. To fully appreciate those implications for governing, they must be

understood in the background of the Church’s understanding of the community of the Church, and

especially the Church as societas perfecta, or as a “perfect society”.

In this section, this paper will trace the development of the notion of the Church as societas

perfecta. Beginning with its roots in pagan philosophy, the term develops in the field of

ecclesiology, especially in the Protestant controversies of the 16th century. The term gets its

greatest and clearest definition, however, in response to the rise of the secular state in the 19th

century, especially following the First Vatican Council. The term remains dominant in Catholic

juridical thought until the decades preceding the Second Vatican Council. This paper will then

examine its use—or lack thereof—by the Council and its continued viability in theological and

juridical discussions

The Development of the doctrine of the Church as societas perfecta

One traditional way of expressing the reality of the Church is to understand it as a societas, as

137 Lumen gentium, 9.

138 Pope Pius XII, Mystici corporis, AAS 35 (1943) 193-248, at para. 1.
37
‘society’. As Yves Congar has noted, 139 the idea of the societas finds is philosophical origins in

Western thought in the writings of Aristotle, especially in The Politics. For Aristotle, the

fundamental association of man is the family, which provides for his basic needs. 140. Society aims

for something more than mere subsistence, and requires the association and cooperation of

numerous families in the form of a village and eventually a state. More importantly, Aristotle

argues that the creation of a society is not some happenstance or accident to human living, but

exists according to the very nature of man. This leads to Aristotle’s oft-quoted statement that,

“the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal…” 141 Man’s nature

calls him to form and to live in a society, and thus society is an essential attribute of man’s living in

the world 142.

This societal element of the Church is reintroduced to the Christian world by St. Augustine.

In his work on The City of God, Augustine speaks of the two “cities or societies”. 143 However, these

are not the societies of the Church and the State. Rather, these are the societies of, one the one

hand, good angels and men, and, on the other, fallen angels and wicked men. At the same time, for

139 Congar, “Moving Towards a Pilgrim Church” in Vatican II: By Those Who Were There at 132.
140 Aristotle. Politics in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Trans. Jonathan
Barnes. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984, Book I, Part I. When approaching the use of
‘state’ in this translation, it is helpful to keep in mind the introductory note to the 1950 Oxford translation of
the Politics: “The word ‘state’ comes to us from the Latin status, in its sense of standing or position: it meant,
when we adopted it in the sixteenth century, the standing or position of the person (or persons) in authority,
so that Louis XIV was etymologically justified in saying L’Ètat, c’est moi!; and though it had widened in the
course of time to designate also the whole political community, it is still used to-day in its old sense (as when
we speak of ‘state interference’), and its overtones are still the overtones of authority. How different are the
suggestions of the word polis—the city: our city… The word polis…means a civic republic, or, more
particularly and especially, the city which is its heart… But … the word polis came in time to mean the whole
organized political community, including both the residents and the atsy [i.e., the place of residence] (with, of
course, any magistrates or others resident in the citadel) and the country-dwellers around the atsy who
frequented it for business and politics.” Aristotle. The Politics of Aristotle. Trans. Ernest Barker. Oxford: The
Clarendon press, 1950.
141 Aristotle, Politics, Book I, Part I, pg. 1987.
142 This statement is, of course, not without controversy. At the other extreme, it was a common

thread in the writings of the English philosophers of the Enlightenment to describe man in the state of
nature or to see pre-societal man as a kind of noble savage. For many of them, Society was more akin to a
social compact made by men and not a requisite to man’s inherently social nature. The purpose of this
paper is not to provide a philosophical justification for the Aristotlean view of society. It is sufficient to say
that man’s social nature is certainly assumed by the Church both in her anthropology and her ecclesiology.
143 Augustine. “The City of God.” St. Augustine. Vol. 18. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1952. 54 vols.

Great Books of the Western World, Book XII, chap. 1, at 342.

38
Augustine, the “city of God that sojourns in this world” 144 is none other than the Catholic Church.

Even so, this is not in contradistinction to secular society, per se, but only to the extent that it is

separated from Christ and the conduct of the good.

In the later medieval Church, this becomes expressed in the notion of the Church as societas

Christianae, 145 a term made particularly well-known by Pope Gregory VII. 146 This is not quite the

societas perfecta as will be subsequently developed. It is, rather, more an expansion of Augustine’s

Civitas Dei. It is the societas of the Christendom of Europe, with the Pope at its ruling apex and the

state decidedly beneath it. “In other words, the Hildenbrandine [i.e., Pope Gregory VII’s]

conception of the Church as a societas perfecta refers to the Church as the ultimate and all-embracing

society of redeemed mankind, of which what we call the state is only a function…” 147 There is

much more of a sense here of the connection between Church and State, although more as one of

master to student 148, with both in some position to rule the Christian people, and precisely as they

are Christian. Nevertheless, despite not being quite the modern notion, it will have some echo in

that later development.

This medieval understanding is further elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas, who re-inserts

Aristotelian notions of the state back into the understanding of societas. Thus, in his Summa

Theologiæ, the Angelic Doctor picks up the line quoted above from Aristotle when discussing the

nature of the state. There, he relies on the same relation that Aristotle establishes between the

family as the fundamental societal unit and its perfection in the state, which the Angelic Doctor

refers to as the communitas perfecta. 149 He is not applying this concept to the Church at this point,

144 Augustine, City of God, Book XVII, chap 51 at 503.

145 Other terms used by the medieval Church that attempt to express a similar idea are Pope Adrian II’s
populus Dei and Pope John John VIII’s respublica christiana. Ullmann, Walter. The Growth of Papal Government in
the Middle Ages. Routledge, 2013. Routledge Library Editions: Political Science 35, at 219.
146 For a through treatment of Pope Gregory VII’s use of the term see especially Ullmann, The Growth of

Papal Government, at 437ff.

147 Parker, Thomas M. “The Medieval Origins of the Idea of the Church as ‘Societas Perfecta.’” Miscellanea

Historiae Ecclesiasticae (1960): 23–31 at 28-29.

148 Figgis, John Neville. Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius, 1414-1625. Cambridge: University

Press, 1956, at 64.

149 Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Ia IIae, q. 90, a. 3, ad 3. (sicut homo est pars domus, ita domus est pars civitatis,

39
only to the state (specifically, its ability to make law), but does evince the continued viability of the

notion of ‘perfection’ being part of a fully formed community.

Moreover, he argues that the fact that a society is perfect effects the way in which that

power may be expressed. 150 With regards to the exercise of the coercive power, he contrasts the

power to punish in the imperfect society of the family to the same power to punish in the perfect

society of the city. He argues that precisely because the city is a perfect community (communitas

perfecta), it possesses the perfect coercive power (potestas coercendi perfecta). A father’s authority

within the family (potestas patris), however, is merely limited because the society is imperfect. In

other words, the more perfect the society, the more perfect the means at its disposal to govern and,

in as a result, coerce into obedience those who harm the common good.

The beginning of the modern concept of the Church as societas perfecta is not truly seen,

however, until the sixteenth century. It is in this time that the Jesuit polemicists 151, especially St.

Robert Bellarmine, 152 begin to develop the concept against the background of the rise of

Protestantism and the Protestant state in formerly Catholic Europe. Thus, in countering the more

individualistic Protestant view, which tended to disparage the need for an institutional Church,

Bellarmine argued that the visible institution was itself necessary by its very nature 153. For

Bellarmine the Church militant is a coetus hominum 154 or societas hominum 155, not merely a collection of

individuals joined together solely because of their common relationship with Christ. This

Bellarminian understanding of the Church continued to hold through much of the Catholic

civitas autem est communitas perfecta, ut dicitur in I Politic.)

150 Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, IIa IIae, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2.
151 Parker, Thomas M. “The Medieval Origins of the Idea of the Church,” at 24. See also Figgis,

Studies of Political Thought, at 64.

152 Murray, John Courtney. “St. Robert Bellarmine on the Indirect Power.” Theological Studies 9 (1948):

491–535 at 516.
153 See Gaillardetz, Richard R. “The Ecclesiological Foundations of Modern Catholic Social Teaching.”

Modern Catholic Social Teaching: Commentaries and Interpretations. Ed. Kenneth R. Himes and Lisa Sowle Cahill.
Georgetown University Press, 2005. 72–98 at 72.
154 Bellarmine, Robert. Quarta Controversia Generalis: De Conciliis, et Ecclesia Militante. Vol. 2. Venetiis: Apud

Societatem Minimam, 1599. 4 vols. Disputationes de Controversiis Christianae Fidei Adversus Huius Tempori
Haereticos at 1264.
155 Bellarmine, Quarta Controversia Generalis, 1309.

40
counter-reformation and the succeeding centuries.

This crystallization of the notion of the Church as a societas perfecta as a juridical matter

continues to develop and seems more or less to reach its height in the nineteenth century 156. With

the post-Enlightenment rise of states defining themselves independently from the faith of the

people, and therefore distancing the state from the church, the Catholic Church wished to

forcefully declare her independence of the state 157. That is, the rise of the secular state, especially

seen in post-Revolutionary France, wished to place the Church under the state, and treat the

Church simply as one of a number of other associations of people within the state. The most

vexing corollary of this view for the Church was its tendency to simply assume that the local

Church was bound by the superior jurisdiction and regulation of the state in all matters.

The clearest formulation of the Church as societas perfecta as a foil to the increasing definition

of the primacy of the State seems to have been made by the well-known 19th century Jesuit,

Camillo Cardinal Tarquini 158. In his very influential tract on the nature of ecclesiastical law, Iuris

Ecclesiastici Publici, first published in 1862, he addresses specifically the nature of the Church as a

law-making body and its relation, as such, to other institutions. There he argues at length: Ecclesia

Christi societas est perfecta. 159 What he means by that is that the Church “is in itself complete and has

precisely the means sufficient in itself for the obtaining of its own end.” 160 This in turn relies on

the assumption that, as a societas, it is a separate body of persons (i.e., unicity) united with their own

distinct end.

156 Hittinger, F. Russell. “The Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae.” Vatican II :

Renewal within Tradition: Renewal within Tradition. Ed. Matthew Levering and Matthew Lamb. Oxford
University Press, 2008. 359–381 at 371. See also Ragazzi, Maurizio. “Concordats Today: From the Second
Vatican Council to John Paul II.” Journal of Markets & Morality 12.1 (2012): 113–151 at 116. (“The key
concept developed by the writers on the ius publicum ecclesiasticum externum was that the Church is a societas
iuridice perfecta, a concept that was a helpful instrument against all attempts by the political authorities to
restrict the Church’s freedom.”)
157 There is some irony to the fact that the medieval development of the notion of societas is necessary

precisely to posit the notion of the State as autonomous from the Church, which comes full circle in the 19th
century need to assert the Church’s own autonomy as its own proper societas. See Parker, “The Medieval
Origins of the Idea of the Church,“ 30.
158 Hittinger “Dignitatis Humanae” 371-2.
159 Tarquini, Camillo. Iuris Ecclesiastici Publici. 3rd ed. Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1873 at 38.
160 Tarquini, Juris Ecclesiastici Publici, 38. (...est in se completa, adeoque media ad suum finem obtinendum sufficientia

in semetipsa habet.)
41
 This view eventually comes to be reflected in the official teaching of the Church’s

Magisterium. One of its earliest formulations is found only two years after Tarquini’s work in

Pope Pius IX’s 1864 syllabus of errors attached to the encyclical Quanta cura. In that document,

the Pope anathematizes anyone holding to the following view:

The Church is not a true, perfect, and wholly free society, nor does it
possess in its own unchanging rights conferred upon it by its divine
Founder; but it is for the civil power to define what the rights of the
Church are, and the limits within which it may exercise them. 161

Although this is by no means a specific definition of societas perfecta, it does give some important

insights into the contours of the idea, as well as the context in which it arises. It should be noted

that the above Encyclical was written between the second and third Italian wars for Independence,

at a time when the “Roman Question”, i.e., the status of the Papal States as a sovereign territory

outside a newly united Italy, was very much a question on the world stage. Thus, Pope Pius IX

seeks to assert the equality of the Church as a sovereign and self-governing entity, wholly separate

and apart from the civil State. She is so independent precisely because she is perfecta as well as

being possessed of inherent rights granted in her divine founding—and that this perfection and

those rights are related notions. This is no abstract theology, but was a threat with real and

pending implications for much of Pius IX’s papacy.

This continues as one of the dominant models of the Church’s own self-understanding, up

to and including the First Vatican Council. The notion is firmly established in the preparatory

schema of the Council 162. While the Council Fathers had intended to draft a document on the

nature of the Church itself, the onset of the Franco-Prussian War, and the removal of French

Troops protecting the Holy See from the Italian Republicans, caused the Council to end

161 Pope Pius IX, Quanta cura, Syllabus Prop. 19. ASS 3 (1867) 160-76. (Ecclesia non est vera perfectaque
societas plane libera, nec pollet suis propriis et constantibus iuribus sibi a divino suo fundatore collatis, sed civilis potestatis est
definire quae sint Ecclesiae iura ac limites, intra quos eadem iura execere queat.) Interestingly, the notion of the Church
as a sociatas pefecta does not appear in one of Pius IX’s earliest encyclicals touching on matters of Church and
State, Qui Pluribus (Nov. 9, 1846 (Acta Pii IX, Vol I, p. 13)).
162 See Granfield, Patrick. “The Church as Societas Perfecta in the Schemata of Vatican I.” Church History

48.4 (1979): 431–446. I am indebted to Granfield’s article for its detailed accounting of the use of the
concept of Church as societas perfecta in the thinking of the theologians involved in drafting the schema.
42
prematurely. Nonetheless, the schema for the document Supremi Pastoris, the never-adopted

Constitution on the Church, provides a useful insight into the thought of the major theologians of

the time as well as that of the pastors of the Church. As Patrick Greenfield notes, the notion of

the Church as a societas dominates the first schema. 163 While some of the Council Fathers

expressed reservations in the use of the term, nevertheless its fittingness in describing the Church

seems to have been generally understood and agreed upon.

The authors of the schema went into some detail in fleshing out their understanding of the

Church not simply as societas but as societas perfecta. The Complectitur decretum et canones de ecclesia

Chrisi, 164 the summary of the proposed second Constitution to be issued by the Council, which was

to be on the Church, organized its subject into two parts: first, on the church herself, namely her

nature, properties, and power; and second on the relation between the Church and civil society. In

describing the nature of the Church, the original outline describes her first as Corpus Christi mysticum.

It is only in her list of properties does this outline declare the Church “to be a society from the

beginning, out of a supernatural end and means.” 165

This is somewhat expanded in the eventual first schema that is given to the Conciliar Fathers.

As Grandfield notes, 166 the content is taken largely from Pope Pius IX’s important encyclical on

the matter, Quanta cura. In the schema, the Church is described first as the corpus Christi mystici to

emphasize her supernatural essence. 167 In the next section, the drafters of the schema offer the

following description: “Ecclesiam esse societatem veram, perfectam, spiritualem et supernaturalem.” 168 The

drafters go on to explain the Church has a concrete existence, given to her by her founder. As such,

163 Ganfield “The Church as Societas Perfecta,” 435.

164 Mansi, Giovanni Domenico. Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio: Synodi Occidentales,
1860-1867. Vol. 49 at 744ff.
165 Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Vol. 49, 744. (societatem esse ex principio, ex fine et mediis supernaturalem

(emphasis in original))
166 Granfield, Patrick, “The Church as Societas Perfecta” at 433, citing Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Vol. 49,

621.
167 There are some authors who insist that the First Vatican Council say the Church only through a

juridical lens. The fact of the primacy given here to the mystical nature of the Church will, one hopes, belie
that view.
168 From the “Primum Schema Constitutiones De Ecclesia Christi cum Animadversionibus in Illlud a Patribus

Scripto Exhibitis” in Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum, vol. 51, 539.

43
she is not simply a part of some other society or some confused combination. What marks her as

a society is that she is indeed perfect, distinguished from every other human society, and elevated

above them.

In subsequent chapters, 169 the drafters of the schema proceed to flesh out the nature of the

Church with a variety of characteristics, flowing from this initial description. Thus, the Church is

not simply a society, but a visible one. As a visible society, she is united as a body and therefore is

united with one Lord, one faith, and one baptism. That unity is also seen in the unity of end, as the

Church exists as the society of those in need of salvation. So that she may accomplish her end, the

Church is also indefectible and infallible. The end result is a fully elaborated understanding of the

Church, especially in her visible constitution, and explained largely in light of the teaching of societas

perfecta.

These notions continue in Pope Pius’s successor, Pope Leo XIII, who significantly expands

and makes this idea more concrete. In one of Pope Leo XIII’s most important Encyclicals on the

matter of relation between Church and state, Immortale Dei, 170 he introduces the notion of the

Church as societas perfecta, albeit somewhat indirectly. In his discussion, he both compares the

Church to the state as a perfect society and distinguishes Her from the state in Her constitution and

ends. Due to its importance in the development of the juridical notion of the Church as societas

perfecta, a full quotation is in order:

This society [i.e., the Church], although made up of men, just as civil
society is, yet is supernatural and spiritual, on account of the end for
which it was founded, and of the means by which it aims at attaining
that end. Hence, it is distinguished and differs from civil society,
and, what is of highest moment, it is a society chartered as of right
divine, perfect in its nature and in its title, to possess in itself and by
itself, through the will and loving kindness of its Founder, all
needful provision for its maintenance and action. And just as the
end at which the Church aims is by far the noblest of ends, so is its
authority the most exalted of all authority, nor can it be looked upon

169 See Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum vol. 51, 540ff.

170 Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, ASS 18 (1885), 169-181.
44
 as inferior to the civil power, or in any manner dependent upon it. 171

Although this statement is made in the context of distinguishing Church from civil society, and

emphasizing the autonomy and even superiority of the former, that is not the primary focus of the

Church as ‘perfect’, but merely a corollary.

Pope Leo XIII expands on this understanding, and explicitly uses the term societas perfecta,

five years later in his Encyclical on the Christian as citizen, Sapientiae Christianae. One can see the

same general point of view as he again speaks of the nature of the Church:

And since she not is not only in the mode of a perfect society in herself,
but is superior to every human other society, she vigorously refuses,
by right and by duty, to follow the zeal of party or be a slave to the
changing be a slave to the zeal of political parties or subject herself
to the mercurial exigencies of politics 172.

In other words, for Pope Leo XIII, the concept of the Church as societas perfecta was useful in

asserting her autonomy over the increasing demands of the secularized State. Even so, it is

important to recall that this is merely a conclusion from the concept described by the Church as

societas perfecta. For Pope Leo, to say the Church was a societas perfecta meant first that by the divine

will of her Founder, the Church is no mere collection of individuals, but a united whole, a body that

flows from the incarnational body of Christ himself. 173 That unity exits for Pope Leo not simply

for the sake of unity as an end, but rather to fulfill the divine purpose given to her, namely the

sanctification of the world. The Church is therefore a societas perfecta because she uniquely has “all

171 Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, 10. (Haec societas, quamvis ex hominibus constet, non secus ac civilis communitas,
tamen propter finem sibi constitutum, atque instrumenta, quibus ad finem contendit, supernaturalis est et spiritualis: atque idcirco
distinguitur ac differt a societate civili : et, quod plurimum interest, societas est genere et iure perfecta, cum adiumenta ad
incolumitatem actionemque suam necessaria, voluntate beneficioque conditoris sui, omnia in se et per se ipsa possideat. Sicut finis,
quo tendit Ecclesia, longe nobilissimus est, ita eius potestas est omnium praestantissima, neque imperio civili potest haberi inferior,
aut eidem esse ullo modo obnoxia.)
172 Pope Leo XIII, Sapientiae Christianae, ASS 22 (1889/90), 385-404 at para. 28. (Eadam que cum non modo

societas perfecta sit, sed etiam humana quavis societate superior, sectari partium studia et mutabilibus rerum civilium nexibus
servire iure officioque suo valde recusat. (emphasis added))
173 See Pope Leo XIII, Sapientiae Christianae, 15. See also Pope Leo XIII. Satis cognitum. ASS 28 (1895):

708–739, para. 10: (Quapropter mortales Iesus Christus, quotquot essent, et quotquot essent futuri, universos advoca vit, ut
ducem se eumdemque servatorem sequerentur, non tantum seorsum singuli, sed etiam consociati atque invicem re animisque iuncti,
ut ex multitudine populus existeret iure sociatus; fidei, finis, rerum ad finem idonearum communione unus, uni eidemque subiectus
potestati. Quo ipse facto principia naturae, quae in hominibus societatem sponte gignunt, perfectionem naturae consentaneam
adepturis, omnia in Ecclesia posuit, nimirum ut in ea, quotquot filii Dei esse adoptione volunt, perfectionem dignitati suae
congruentem assequi et retinere ad salutem possent.)
45
things necessary to realize her end, she has her fixed laws, certain offices, and a certain method,

fixed and conformable to her nature, of governing Christian peoples.” 174 The point here is that,

while Pope Leo XIII uses the concept of the Church as societas perfecta to assert the rights of the

Church in the world, the deeper underlying point is that the Church’s very nature is as a societas

perfecta, and that includes by definition certain juridical structures and features.

Perhaps the clearest enunciation of the notion of the societas, especially as it relates to

matters ecclesiological, is found in the writings of Pope Pius XI. In an encyclical 175 ostensibly

about the nature of education, Pope Pius XI goes into detail on the various societies into which

man finds himself. He delineates these as three: the family, civil society, and the Church. The

first and second of these are natural, the third supernatural. He also distinguishes them as being

perfect and imperfect. As he relates, the family imperfecta est societas. It is imperfect not because it

is in every degree less than these other societies. In fact, Pope Pius XI insists that the family has a

certain natural priority over civil society because it is the locus of generation and upbringing. What

makes the family imperfect is that it cannot attain its ends by itself. The Church, on the other

hand, is a perfect society—albeit a society according to the supernatural order—precisely because it

“has in itself all the means required for its own end, truly the eternal salvation of men; as a

consequence it is supreme in its own sphere.” 176 Just as importantly, this discussion of the Church

as societas perfecta is not raised in the context of the conflict of Church-State relations. Rather, it is

used in a far broader context, following as a logical consequence upon the principles already

established.

This allows the notion of a Church as a societas to have a further flexibility of applicability

outside its original Church-State milieu. In fact, it allows it to become the dominant idea guiding

the Church’s self-understanding even when, as in the case of Pope Pius XII’s encyclical Mystici

174 Pope Leo XIII, Sapientiae Christianae, 25. (…res ad id necessarias divino munere sola possideat, certas habet leges,

certa officia, atque in populis christianis moderandis rationem viamque sequitur naturae suae consentaneam.)
175 Pope Pius XI, Divini illius Magistri, 12.
176 Pope Pius XI, Divini illius Magistri, 13. (…in se perfecta, cum sibi omnia suppetant ad finem suum, sempiternam

nempe hominum salutem, consequendum, ideoque in suo ordine suprema.)

46
corporis 177, the Church uses other imagery to express her ecclesiology. In that Encyclical, as the

name suggests, Pope Pius XII wishes to expound upon the doctrine of the mystical body of Christ.

He explains that doctrine precisely in terms of the Church as a societas perfecta: “Hence, this word in

its right meaning recalls that the Church, which should be considered a perfect society of its kind, is

not made up of solely of moral and juridical elements and aspects.” 178 It is important to note here

that Pope Pius XII does not explain this doctrine solely within the context of asserting the

legitimate autonomy of the Church. While he does continue to assert the Church’s superiority as a

society, the polemical defense of the Church against the state is largely absent. Instead, the notion

of the Church as a societas is meant to counter the increasingly prevailing view of the Church as

merely a moral union of persons which rejects the juridical notion of the Church. 179 That is to say

that Pope Pius XII in insisting upon the Church as societas, understands that the legal/juridical

nature is thereby directly implied. We have seen then the development of the notion from a

narrow polemical argument to forming one of the primary lenses through which ecclesiology is

read.

What, then, can we conclude about what is meant by calling the Church a societas perfecta?

The Jesuit Joseph Kleutgen offered the following definition in his relatio to a proposed (but never

adopted) Constitution de fide presented to Vatican Council I:

[T]he church has good reason to be called a societas perfecta: which

means it tends to its own proper end by its own ways and reasons,
distinct from every distinct assembly of men, which is in itself
absolute and compete, so being sufficient in itself for the attaining of
its ends, in those things which pertain to it, and which is neither
subject to, joined as a part, or mixed and confused with any other
society. 180

The first element is that it is a societas, that is a community of persons or, in the words of

177 Pope Pius XII. Mystici Corporis. AAS 35 (1943) 192–248.

178 Pope Pius XII, Mystici corporis, 63. (Recta igitur vocis huius significatio non mentem revocat, Ecclesiam, quae
perfecta genere suo societas haberi debet, non ex socialibus solummodo ac iuridicis elementis rationibusque constare.)
179 Pope Pius XII, Mystici corporis, 65.
180 Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum vol. 53, 315. (ecclesia etiam iure merito societas perfecta dicta est: quippe quae ad

finem proprium propriis viis et rationibus tendens, a quovis alio hominum coetu distincta, atque ita in se absoluta et completa est,
ut sibi ad finem consequendam sufficiens, in iis, quae eo pertinent, nulli alii societati sive subiecta sive tanquam pars innexa sive
permixta et confusa est.)
47
Kleutgen hominum coetus. But it is not merely any association of men, but one that is bound

together for its own proper end. Moreover, it is precisely that common end that distinguishes this

particular societas from any other. The end of a family is the growth and flourishing of its members.

The end of a state is the common good of its citizens. The end of the Church is salvation for its

members.

But the Church is not any society, it is a perfect one. The underlying Latin perfecta (perfectus)

here stems from two Latin words per and feci, that is ‘to be made through’ or ‘to be finished’. To

describe something as perfectus means that is finished or complete. A family is not a perfect society

because, by itself, it cannot achieve its ends, modest though they may be. It needs the support of

other families in a community. The Church, on the other hand, must be perfect theologically.

God established the Church for the purpose of salvation, and therefore must have given to it all the

tools necessary to achieve that salvation, and to achieve it precisely as a societas.

The Church as Societas Perfecta and the Second Vatican Council

Over the course of the last several centuries, the Church has seen the development of the

concept of itself as a societas perfecta, and all that entails for the Church’s own self-understanding of

her own essence. Nonetheless, with the advent of the Second Vatican Council and its emphasis

on resourcement and the return ad fontes, this notion is, somewhat curiously, almost completely lost.

None of the major documents issued by the Second Vatican Council specifically mentions the

term. Thus, the American canonist John Huels, in noticing this shift of emphasis, argues, “At

Vatican II the Church no longer defined herself as a perfect society but as a mystery, as a people of

God, as mystical body of Christ, as Sacrament.” 181 Furthermore, Avery Dulles claimed in his

popular book on ecclesiology, “this societal model [of the Church] has been displaced from the

181 Huels, John. “Another Look at Lay Jurisdiction.” The Jurist 41.1 (1981): 59–80 at 61.
48
center of Catholic theology since 1940.” 182

This may be due in part to an uncertainty over what the term actually means. A typical

trope in modern theology is to contrast the “People of God” ecclesiology of the Second Vatican

Council with an ossified “societas perfecta” ecclesiology of the post-Tridentine era. By this latter term

is meant, not strictly the juridical aspect of the Church, but a way of defining the Church solely as

“an institution in possession of changeless, divine truth in its doctrinal and moral

proclamations.” 183 The leaves open the question of whether the term continues to have relevancy

in any ecclesiological or juridical discussion of the Church.

There are very good reasons to conclude that it does. It is necessary first to examine the

way in which the concept of the Church as societas perfecta develops during the course of the Council.

In Aternus Unigeniti Pater, 184 the original schema for the Constitution on the Church, the term societas

perfecta is explicitly used. However, it is not in the initial characterization of the Church, as it was in

the schema for the Constitution drafted by the First Vatican Council. Rather, the document

returns it to its more classical location, namely regarding relations with the state. 185 Thus, the term

does not appear in the first chapter on the nature of the Church Militant, but rather in the ninth

chapter on the relations between Church and state. The schema also defines what it means by this

perfection, which reveals a two-fold nature. 186 First, it means that within its own order it is

supreme and not subject to any other. Second, it means that the Church is fashioned with

legislative, judicial, and executive power. By the time of the second schema, this entire section in

182 Dulles, Avery. Models of the Church. New York: Random House, 2002 at 21.
183 Parrella, Frederick J. “Conclusion: A Clash of Ecclesiologies.” From Trent to Vatican II : Historical and
Theological Investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 321–328 at 322.
184 Acta Synodalia Sacrocancti Concilii Oecumenici Vatican II, vol. I, per. I, pars IV, pp. 13-91
185 Acta Synodalia Sacrocancti Concilii Oecumenici Vatican II, vol. I, per. I, pars IV, pp. 13-91 at 65 (Utraque haec

societas ditata est facultatibus ad propriam cuisque missionem rite explendam necessariis; utraque perfecta est... (emphasis
added))
186 Acta Synodalia Sacrocancti Concilii Oecumenici Vatican II, vol. I, per. I, pars IV, pp. 13-91 at 65 ([H]aec

societas...perfecta est, id est in suo ordine suprema ideoque alii non subiecta, instructa potestate legifera, judiciaria et exsecutiva.)
In doing so, the schema cites as authority for this statement, inter alia, Pope Pius IX’s Quanta Cura, Pope Leo
XIII’s Immortale Dei, Pope Pius XI’s Divini illius Magistri, and canon 109 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law.
49
the relation between Church and state is removed as a separate chapter 187 and does not appear in

the final draft of the Constitution approved at the Council.

Nonetheless, even in the initial schema for the Constitution de Ecclesia, the Church as societas

remains prominent. The heading for the sixth paragraph of the document refers to the Ecclesia

societas. 188 This is joined to the recognition of the Church, at the same time, as the mystical body of

Christ. By this the Council points to two facets of the Church, namely her visible and her invisible

aspects. The Church is analogous to the Incarnate Word, which is a union of divine and human

nature. In her visible nature, the Church is a society of men on earth and yet has a divine mission to

pursue. To do that, she has various offices and ministries for the building up of Christ’s body.

With regards to the final documents of the Council, the nature of the Church was discussed

most especially in two of them. These two documents are Lumen gentium 189, the Pastoral

Constitution on the Church, and Dignitatis humanae190, the Declaration on Religious liberty. In

some ways, these discuss the Church in terms quite similar to the tradition established in the 19th

century Magisterium. But just as importantly as what is said, is what does not appear.

The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen gentium, begins with the title de ecclesiae

mysterio. 191 This seems to echo the preliminary schemata on the Church prepared by the First

Vatican Council, which had the same initial focus. The Constitution on the Church then proceeds

to describe the Church in a number of different ways—first, of course, as the lumen gentium. 192 In

addition, the Council Fathers consider the Church as the regnum Christi 193. They also point to the

great Biblical imagery for the Church, including as ovile, agricultura, aedificatio, sursum Ierusalem, Mater,

sponsa immaculata, and Agni immaculati 194. Picking up from Pius XII’s earlier description, the Church

187 Acta Synodalia Sacrocancti Concilii Oecumenici Vatican II, vol. II, per. II, pars I, pp. 215-281.
188 Acta Synodalia Sacrocancti Concilii Oecumenici Vatican II, vol. I, per. I, pars IV, pp. 13-91 at 15 (The full
title of the paragraph is: “Ecclesia societas est mysticum Christi Corpus”)
189 Sacrosanctum Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II. Lumen gentium, AAS 57 (1965) 5-75.
190 Sacrosanctum Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II. Dignitatis humanae, AAS 58 (1966), 929-946.
191 Lumen gentium, 5.
192 Lumen gentium, 1.
193 Lumen gentium, 3.
194 Lumen gentium, 6.

50
is the corpus Christi 195. It is only after this that the Council describes the Church in the way that has

become most famous, as the populus Dei 196. This notion of the Church as populus Dei then proceeds

to be the primary image guiding the document’s description of the Church.

Even though the Council never uses the term societas perfecta, nevertheless, the notion

behind the term is taken up. For example, the Council does refer to the Church as a societas:

“This Church, constituted and ordered in this world as a society, subsists in the Catholic Church...” 197

And the Council speaks of the Church in explicitly social terms: “The New Israel... is called the

Church of Christ for indeed she was acquired by his blood, filled with his spirit, and provided with

means suitable to it as a visible and social union.” 198 This last statement is particularly instructive in

that it emphasizes both the social nature of the Church and that the Church was given the means to

live according to that same social nature.

Perhaps somewhat closer to the traditional elucidation of societas is found in the Council’s

document on religious liberty, Dignitatis humanae. In there, as in Aristotle and Aquinas, the family is

mentioned as the fundamental form of society. The family is “a society by its own proper and

primordial right”. 199 However, it is only in a larger society, concerned with the common good of

its various members, that “men can pursue their own perfection fully and expeditiously” 200. This is

simply another way of asserting the fact that the human family is a society, although an imperfect

one, but that the larger collection of families united politically—i.e., a state—is a perfect society.

What makes it perfect is not the indefectibility of its members, but the fullness of the ability of the

group to bring about its own proper end.

Building on this, the Council further asserts that the Church, too, is a society, analogous to

civil society. The Church equally claims her freedom as a society of men who enjoy the right to

195 Lumen gentium, 7.

196 Lumen gentium, 9.
197 Lumen gentium, 8. (Haec Ecclesia, in hoc mundo ut societas constituta et ordinata, subsistit in Ecclesia

catholica…) (emphasis added)

198 Lumen gentium, 9. (Novus Israel … Ecclesia Christi nuncupatur quippe etiam Ipse sanguine suo acquisivit suo Spiritu

replevit aptisque mediis unionis visibilis et socialis instruxit.)

199 Dignitatis humanae, 5. (societas proprio ac primordiali iure gaudens)
200 Dignitatis humanae, 6. (homines suam ipsorum perfectionem possunt plenius atque expeditius consequi)

51
live in civil society according to the requirements of the Christian faith. 201 Here the Council seems

to go back to the very intellectual source of the notion of the Church as societas perfecta, namely

within the context of claiming her autonomy over and against the claims of the state. Although

the Council Fathers again stop short of referring to the Church as societas perfecta, nonetheless the

insistence of the Church’s autonomy in carrying out her divine mission suggests that same fullness.

The term then reappears in the post-Conciliar papal Magisterium. For example, Pope Paul

VI explicitly relies on the term and the ideas behind it in his 1969 Apostolic Letter Sollicitudo omnium

ecclesiarum 202. The purpose of the document was to give instruction to the Papal legates. In it, the

Pope directly compares the two societies, and explicitly in juridical terms. Thus, he remarks,

Nor is it to be denied that the end of the Church and the State
belong to different orders, and so the Church and State in their own
orders being perfect societies [societates perfectas], therefore flourish by
their own proper means and systems of justice, to make use of their
laws, and whatever is evident to the province of each. On the other
hand, it is also true that both act for the good of a common subject,
namely man, called by God to obtain eternal salvation, and placed
on earth so that, aided by divine Grace, he might obtain it for
himself by his own work, by which he might also provide for his
own prosperity, and the prosperity of his fellow man, in the peaceful
common life of all. 203

As a society, the Church has the right and need for a functioning system of laws and the judicial

apparatus to interpret and apply those laws. This right is complementary to the state’s

acknowledged right to the same in its own sphere. Moreover, although the Church acts within the

realm of religion and the state in the realm of the secular, the Pope emphasizes that the two have are

complementary in that they both operate in light of the man’s final end, namely salvation.

201 Dignitatis humanae, 13. (Libertatem pariter sibi vindicat Ecclesia prout est etiam societas hominum qui iure gaudent
vivendi in societate civili secundum fidei christianae praescripta.)
202 Pope Paul VI, Sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum, AAS 61 (1969), pp 473 - 484. This should not be

confused with the more famous 1814 bull of Pope Pius VII of the same name that re-established the Society
of Jesus.
203 Pope Paul VI, Sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum, AAS 61 (1969) at 476 (Neque est infitiandum finem Ecclesiae et

Rebus Publicis propositum diversi esse ordinis, atque Ecclesiam et Civitatem, in suo cuiusque ordine, esse societates perfectas, ac
propriis inde pollere iuribus et mediis, suisque uti legibus, quacumque uniuscuiusque patet provincia. At verum est etiam
utramque ad communis subiecti utilitatem agere, scilicet hominis, a Deo vocati ad salutem adipiscendam aeternam, et in terra
collocati ut illam, divina adiutus gratia, sibi comparet opere suo, quo etiam suae suorumque similium prosperitati consulat, in
pacifico omnium convictu.)
52
 Finally, this concept is, unsurprisingly, elucidated, in idea if not exactly in words, in Pope

John Paul II’s Apostolic Constitution Sacrae disciplinae leges 204. This is the document by which the

new Code of Canon Law for the Latin Church was officially promulgated. In it, the Pope

discusses the need for a Code of Canon Law precisely in terms of the social nature of the Church:

“And in fact the Code of Canon Law of the Church is entirely necessary. Since, indeed, it is

constituted as a social and visible structure, it requires such norms...” 205 The Church, precisely

because it is a societas, requires law.

The Continued Viability of the Church as Societas Perfecta

As these documents attest, despite the apparent turn away from describing the Church as

societas perfecta, the term continues to have an important place in the Church’s own

self-understanding, particularly in a juridical mode. This was emphasized by one of the most

important theologians of the Second Vatican Council, Yves Congar, who wrote:

It should not be forgotten that these ideas [i.e., the Church as a

society and as societas perfecta] have not been eliminated by Vatican II
and that they continue to be valid in Catholic ecclesiological
teaching. 206

The Second Vatican Council’s failure to directly reference the term does not negate the magisterial

development of the concept and its importance for the Church’s own theology.

In the history of the life of the Church, Ecumenical Councils have almost universally been

called to deal with some crisis that has arisen. In the early Church especially, as various conflicting

theological claims arose, a Council was called to provide guidance on the issue and, just as

importantly, to correct mistaken views. The history of Ecumenical Councils is, more than

anything, a history of the Church’s corrective theological action, done with authority. While it is

204 Pope John Paul II, Sacrae disciplinae leges, AAS 75/II (1983), vii - xiv.
205 Pope John Paul II, Sacrae disciplinae leges, xii-xiii. (Ac revera Codex Iuris Canonici Ecclesiae omnino necessarius
est. Cum ad modum etiam socialis visibilisque compaginis sit constituta, ipsa normis indigent…)
206 Congar, Yves. “Toward a Pilgrim Church.” Vatican II: By Those Who Were There. Ed. Alberic

Stacpoole. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1986. 129–152 at 130.

53
true that the Second Vatican Council differed in that it was not called to settle a specific theological

issue or counter a specific theological heresy that had arisen, nonetheless, the Council was indeed

intended as a corrective. As Pope John XXIII explained in his elocution to open the Council, the

purpose of the Ecumenical Council was to bring the Church “up to date” so as to strengthen the

faith of the people. 207 The Council was called less to combat a particular mistaken theology than it

was to address the accumulation of practices and attitudes that were perceived to be inhibiting the

fullest expression of the Church’s life in the world.

For this reason, one can look at the Council’s non-use of the term not as a rejection of the

idea, but more as a corrective against its overuse. That is to say, there was the view of some that

the Church as societas perfecta was the primary lens through which ecclesiology was understood. In

that view, the Church was conceived primarily in juridical terms—her essence defined by the Code

of Canon Law—rather than in a more theological understanding. 208 The intended effect of

deliberately avoiding the term was to remove the societas perfecta from his position as the dominant

ecclesial model, so that it might better serve its function of properly explicating the juridical

function of the Church. As later teaching shows, it was not to remove it entirely from theological

or juridical discourse.

In addition, the misunderstanding of the modifier perfectus runs counter to the Council’s

clear desire to present a less triumphalistic Church, particularly so as to foster a stronger ecumenical

environment. 209 Even some of the bishops of the First Vatican Council were wary of the term

societas perfecta, publicly voicing the worry that the term was equivocal and could be taken to be

referring to excellence rather than its intended meaning of completeness. 210 It would be a gross

misunderstanding of the term to state that the Church, in conceiving of herself as societas perfecta,

207 Pope John XXIII, Gaudet Mater Ecclesia, AAS 54 (1962) 786-96, at 788. (...opportunis inductis
emendationibus ac mutua auxiliatrice opera sapienter instituta, Ecclesia efficiet, ut homines, familiae, nationes reapse ad ea, quae
supra sunt, mentes convertant.)
208 Huels, John. “The Role of Canon Law in the Light of Lumen Gentium.” Ministry of Governance. Ed.

James K. Mallett. Washington, DC: Canon Law Society of America. 98–120. With Oars and Sails, Book 1.
209 See Pope John Paul II, Redemptor hominis, AAS 71 (1979), pp. 257-354 at 262. Although Pope John

Paul II is referencing Pope Paul VI’s Encyclical Ecclesiam Suam, the sentiment applies equally to the Council.
210 See Granfield, The Church as Societas Perfecta, 437.

54
offers herself as the form of society to which all other societies aspire. Nor is it an attempt to

assert that the visible Church is incapable of error in the decisions of her leaders 211 or their conduct

of life. “This term [i.e., societas perfecta] never meant that the Church was without fault.” 212 The

very recognition of the state as societas perfecta should allay any fear of a triumphalistic notion to the

term.

There is, then, a concept of societas perfecta that is understood by the Second Vatican Council,

but understood within the broader context of its purpose as a Council. Thus, Yves Congar argues

that:

The term societas perfecta had two meanings for Vatican II. The first is
that the Church has of itself everything that it needs to achieve its
end. Vatican II speaks in a very discreet way about mission, care and
duties and, without insisting on it, as the official texts and the
manuals used to, about the right to coerce and punish. The second
meaning refers to the theme of the libertas Ecclesiae and the demands
made by it. This second sense in which the term is used by Vatican II
is all the more important in view of the freedom taken by the
Council with regard to the rules of ‘Christianity’ or the ‘Catholic
state’. 213

This is quite similar, at least in substance, to the understanding that Kleutgen had a century earlier,

although perhaps even a bit broader. Congar sees the Church’s fullness of means to go beyond a

largely juridical understanding, but to include all the means at her disposal. Moreover, for Congar

this meant changing this definition from a negative to a positive one. By understanding the

Church as a wholly self-contained entity, there was a tendency to regard that as a kind of guiding

principle rather than as a defining feature. To be a societas perfecta meant, in other words, precisely

that the Church not only could, but in fact must, be completely independent from any secular

society. This was a Church that, “thought that the world was conspiring against them and were

therefore closed to everything that came from outside.” 214 This was, in essence, to confuse the

211 Setting aside, of course, the notion of the infallible teaching authority of the Church, and especially
the Roman Pontiff, which is not a conclusion drawn from the Church as societas perfecta, but from revelation
itself.
212 Congar, “Moving Towards a Pilgrim Church,” 138.
213 Congar, “Moving Towards a Pilgrim Church” 138.
214 Congar, “Moving Towards a Pilgrim Church” 139.

55
Church’s self-sufficiency with the need for self-enclosure. For Congar, the teachings of the

Council with respect to societas perfecta maintained the former, and freed the Church from the latter.

Given the continued viability of the term, what does the concept of societas perfecta tell us

about the nature of the Church? The answer to the question is not self-evident, and must be

approached with some caution. As John Courtney Murray warns:

The concept of the Church as a perfect society is not an a priori

concept, to be laid down forthwith as the premise of deductive
argument: “Because the Church is a perfect society, therefore it has
such-and-such a power.” The question must always be raised,
whether that power is part of the perfection of the Church,
consistent with its nature as a kingdom not of this world, and
proportioned to its supernatural and transcendent end? 215

This perhaps states things a bit too strongly, nevertheless the warning is one that ought to be

heeded. While it is certainly the case that many of the specific powers of the Church can be

learned only from Sacred Scripture or as they relate to her proper end, nonetheless one can certainly

deduce that at least some powers are necessary. Moreover, the notion that the Church is a perfect

society means that any theory of the Church which does not see her as containing within herself

everything she needs to attain that end must, ipso facto, be an incomplete description. That means,

at the very least, that one can draw some negative conclusions about the nature of the Church from

her status as a perfect society.

To make positive deductions does, as Murray suggests, require an understanding of how

precisely this society is perfect. That is, for any society one must recognize the relationship

between the ends and the necessary means to that end. Thus, while we can say that both the state

and the Church are perfect societies, they are so in different ways precisely because they have

different proximate ends. Although the final end of man is always his supernatural well-being, the

State approaches the matter through the more immediate end of the common good of its members.

That being said, some initial conclusion may be drawn. First, it must be understood from

Murray, John Courtney. “St. Robert Bellarmine on the Indirect Power.” Theological Studies 9 (1948):
215

491–535 at 516.
56
the context from which it was developed, namely the polemical arguments against the increasing

claims to power of the secular State. Thus, we can say, “The conception of the Church as societas

perfecta, then, is primarily that of a body furnished with all that is necessary to its internal life,

including, first and foremost, the means of autonomy.” 216 This autonomy is important most

especially in the Church’s own governance. The Church must be free for self-directed rule of her

own members in the achievement of their common end. Moreover, that autonomy is at its height

especially when dealing with spiritual matters. The Church exists primarily not for the material

prosperity of her members, but their spiritual prosperity. The Church must be free to decide for

herself those activities and practices that best tend to the spiritual common good of the faithful.

A necessary corollary to this is that there must be organs in place to allow for the proper

governing of the Church. The Church must be able not only to discern for herself her common

good, but the proper means to get there. That means she must have a body of people who can

authoritatively make these practical decisions for the common spiritual good of the people of God.

This is exactly what government is and does. Even if the Scriptures do not establish all the

contours of a specific system of governance, we can nonetheless deduce from Christ’s will that the

Church be a community that such system is necessary. To have autonomy of action, the Church

must have autonomy of governance. This is precisely the reason for the Church’s ancient battle

against practices like lay investiture, which sought to submit the Church’s own governance to the

secular state.

This autonomy of governance is necessary both formally and materially. Formally, it

means that the structure of government the Church adopts is based on her own internal principles,

in this case revelation, and not imposed by any outside force or influence. The method by which

the Church chooses to govern herself is an integral part of her autonomy. Materially, it means that

not only is she responsible for the structure, but is also responsible for seeing that structure

properly and practically carried out. She has the right to determine for herself who will fill the

216 Parker, Thomas M. “The Medieval Origins of the Idea of the Church as ‘Societas Perfecta.’” Miscellanea
Historiae Ecclesiasticae (1960): 23–31 at 24.
57
positions of governance according to her own structure.

This has important repercussions for the way in which the Church conceives of her own

governance. This, in turn, ought to affect the way in which one approaches the power of

governance and, by implication, its relation to the power of orders. How this is so will be

discussed at further length in the chapter that follows.

Conclusion

The Church from its outset saw herself not simply as a religious movement but as a

community of persons united in Christ. With the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West, the

Church became not simply a community but took on many of aspects of the territorial governing

power of a city-state. The heights of this temporal power in the middle ages correlate with the rise

of classical canon law in the 12th century. As the Popes took on greater responsibility to govern in

the realm of the profane, as well as the holy, they needed an increasingly sophisticated foundation

in law and a juridical system. In this time, the Church understood herself, and especially Christian

Europe, as the societas Christiana, whose unity was found principally in a common faith joined under

the Pope as its universal temporal head. Moreover, the Church resisted the attempts of secular

authorities to their claims of superiority in governance of the local dioceses and the local religious

life.

The secular power of the Church began to wane, however, with the onset of both the

Protestant Reformation of the 16th century and the rise of secular republican governments in the

18th and 19th centuries. By the end of the 19th century, with the unification of Italy, the Papal States

were a mere memory of history. The revolutions against the monarchs of Europe were also

revolutions against religious influence in civil government, and often permeated with deep

anti-clericalism. In the midst this sea change in the governance of the Church arose an

understanding of government as a societas perfecta, as a society complete (or perfect) in its ability to

attain its ends. Just as the secular states, which were now becoming the fashion in Europe, were

58
perfect societies unto themselves, so was the Church. Moreover, the Church exemplified the

perfect society in a better and higher way because her end—her mission—was a more exalted one

in that it existed for the salvation of souls. Contrary to the arguments of many civil governments,

the Church was not reliant on the State for her mission, and therefore could resist the attempts to

subsume many of her actions under state control.

This increasingly sophisticated theory of the Church as societas perfecta undergirded the entire

juridical understanding the Church had of herself in the 19th century. It was adopted and praised

by the Popes of the era, and was a prominent part of the unfinished Constitution on the Church

considered by the aborted First Vatican Council.

However, following the re-alignment of Europe after the Second World War, and the

Church’s desire to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the secular states of Europe and the

West, the notion of the societas perfecta completely drops from the scene. Although presented in

early drafts of the Council’s Constitution on the Church, the references are all revised out, to

present a more pastoral and far less juridical approach to ecclesiology.

Even so, while the term may not have been used, the ideas behind it remained (and remain)

viable parts of the Church’s doctrinal patrimony. The Church is a societas perfecta, even if she allows

the local Churches a greater reliance on the civil law of the nation in which they are located. Thus,

the force of the Church’s teaching on the Church as societas perfecta remains, even if for prudential

reasons she chooses to present herself in a more pastoral and less juridical light.

Yet that juridical nature is essential to the life of the Church, and is what is principally

implicated in the concept of the societas perfecta. As a perfect society the Church has both unity and

unicity. Her unity maintains its foundation to not only the common faith handed down from the

apostles, but also from the governance that remains in the hands of their successors. Moreover, in

that independent governance is found the protector of the Church’s unicity. The Church isn’t

unique because she has a system of governance, but her own proper structure of internal

governance makes it possible for her to pursue her mission independent from any other society,

59
including the state. These concepts not only remain viable in the Church but help to illuminate

more fully the power of governance and its relation to the power of orders.

60
CHAPTER 4: POWER OF GOVERNANCE

Introduction

In the history of the Church, the sacrament of holy orders has been associated with two

distinct powers. 217 The first, as discussed above, is the power of orders (potestas ordinis), related to

the sacramental character imposed and oriented towards the confection of the sacraments,

particularly the Eucharist. As the Church’s own understanding of the sacramental power

developed in the understanding of the power of holy orders, a different but somehow related

notion of governance also developed alongside it.

This notion of the separate power governance was necessitated in large measure precisely

for the reasons developed in the notion of sacred character, discussed previously, only in reverse.

That is, with regards the power of orders, the Church affirmed that, even those who were in schism

with the Church could validly place sacramental acts. A schismatic layman was still baptized; a

schismatic priest could still confect the Eucharist. The Church has never called into question, for

example, the validity of the sacrament of holy orders received by men in the Orthodox Churches,

even after their excommunication a millennium ago. At the same time, the Church has historically

denied to those separated from the Church the right to claim authority over her members.

Particularly with regard to bishops, canonical penalties like excommunication existed precisely to

deny them position within the hierarchical function of the Church. Therefore, the thought runs,

there must be a difference between the sacramental power and the governing power exercised by

one in holy orders. Thus, linked to the sacrament of holy orders, and separate from the potestas

ordinis, has developed what has generally come to be known as the power of jurisdiction (potestas

iurisdictionis). 218 This portion of the paper shall consider all too briefly this notion of power of

217 For a classical discussion of the relation of the two, see Wernz, Franz Xaver. Ius Decretalium Ad Usum
Praelectiones in Scholis Textus Canonici Sive Iuris Decretalium. Tertia editio recognita. 6 vols. Prati: ex officina
libraria Giachetti, filii et soc, 1911. Although, as will be seen, some might refer to them as two expressions
on the same sacred power.
218 As will be discussed below, the Second Vatican Council largely preferred to refer to this as the potestas

regiminis, largely to distinguish it from the more narrow civil use of the term ‘jurisdiction’. Viana, Antonio.
61
jurisdiction in the Church, and especially its relation to the sacrament of orders.

The Power of Jurisdiction: A Brief Historical Overview

The notion of governance in the Church goes back to the Scriptures themselves. As

discussed in the first Chapter, Jesus not only acts with power, but with a clear authority. That

authority is transmitted to the Church, and especially to the Apostles. Thus, in addition to

Scriptural authority, by the first Century, St. Ignatius of Antioch can say to the Smyrneans: “You

must all follow the lead of the bishop, as Jesus Christ followed that of the Father, follow the

presbytery as you would the Apostles; reverence the deacons as you would God’s

commandment.” 219 In other words, not only has authority been transmitted to the Church, but

that authority is especially associated with the hierarchical orders. Moreover, these various degrees

of orders evidently do not exercise authority in the same way.

The understanding of governance in the Church is eventually expressed not only in moral

and theological terms, but especially juridical ones. It is in the eventual establishment in the 12th

century of the law of the Church as its own field of knowledge that the notion of iurisdictio becomes

firmly established in the Church. 220 That canonical development has its origins especially in

Roman law. 221 Therefore, the beginning point for any canonical inquiry into the concept of

iurisdictio is its use in Roman law.

In Roman law, the term iurisdictio had a variety of meanings, narrow and broad in scope. In

“Title VIII: De Potestate Regiminis, Introduction.” Vol. 1. Chicago: Midwest Theological Forum, 2004. 5 vols.
Exegetical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, 815–818 at 815.
219 Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Smyrneans, in Clement of Rome and Ignatius of Antioch. The Epistles

of St. Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch. Trans. James Aloysius Kleist. Westminter, MD: Newman Press,
1946 at 93
220 Brundage, James A. The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession: Canonists, Civilians, and Courts. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 2008, at 76-125.

221 Ernest, Matthew. “The Mitre and Crozier in the Post-Conciliar Liturgy in Light of a Renewed

Theology of the Episcopacy a Diachronic and Contextual Analysis.” Ph.D. Thesis (Liturgical Studies). The
Catholic University of America, 2010, at 14.
62
the narrow sense, it meant one who could speak authoritatively on the law—dicere ius. 222 It was the

“power of setting out the legal principles upon which legal disputes were decided.” 223 This was by

far the more common use, a term simply to indicate the judicial function224. In a broader sense,

however, the term meant anyone who had public power granted by the imperium, i.e., the highest

grant of authority possible. 225 In the development of canon law beginning in the 12th century, it

is this broader use that becomes the more common usage. Thus, in canonical tradition, the term

usually refers broadly to the governing power and authority of the Church and her leaders.

As the Roman system would say that envision authority as flowing from the directive of

higher civil authority, the Church understood it as flowing from Christ through the Apostles. As

described above, in the early Church this tended to incorporate a single grant of power and

authority. The sacramental (and supernatural) power of the Apostles was bound together with

governance. As the theology of sacred character developed, so too did its distinction from the

authoritative power. This leads eventually to the bifurcated understanding of holy orders itself.

Thus, holy orders comes to discussed in terms of the distinction between two powers: the potestas

ordinis and the potestas iurisdictionis. As a fully formed doctrine in the Church, this distinction seems

to originate from Gratian, 226 although his authorship of the distinction is somewhat disputed. 227

Whatever its origin, its patrimony in the field of canon law goes back almost to the inception of the

field. This understanding of the power of jurisdiction, and its distinction from the power of

orders, while being associated with consecration (especially episcopal consecration), remains the

dominant view of governance in the Church.

222 See Berger, Adolf. “Iurisdictio” Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law. American Philosophical
Society (Philadelphia 1953) at 523.
223 Mousourakis, George. The Historical and Institutional Context of Roman Law. p. 80.
224 de Bertolis, Ottavio, Origine ed Esercizio della Potestà Ecclesiastica di Governo in San Tommaso. Rome (2005)

p. 17.
225 Although this seems the generally accepted view, there is some doubt on the precise relationnship

between iurisdictio and imperium. See Berman, Harold Joseph. Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western
Legal Tradition. (1983) Vol. 1. p. 209.
226 Dameron, George Williamson. Episcopal Power and Florentine Society, 1000-1320. Cambridge, Mass:

Harvard University Press, 1991, at 186-187.

227 Chodorow, Stanley. Christian Political Theory and Church Politics in the Mid-Twelfth Century: The Ecclesiology

of Gratian’s Decretum. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, at 155ff.

63
 What then, precisely, is this power of jurisdiction? As the fruit of the juridical though of the

Church, the Jesuit canonist Francis Xavier Werner formulates it as follows:

True ecclesiastical jurisdiction is the public ruling power over

baptized men precisely in the order of supernatural sanctity and
blessedness by Christ or the Church by some concession of a
command or canonical mission. 228

The power has an origin: it is grounded in the action of the hierarchy of the Church in granting

canonical mission. It has its own proper end, which guides its use, namely the sanctification of the

baptized. Since it relates to the common good of men, it must also be public, rather than the

private ruling power found, for example, in the home.

Here we can begin to see not only the contours of the definition of the power, but also how

it could be distinguished from the potestas ordinis. Generally speaking, the commentators had

developed a systemization whereby there were posited three ways to differentiate between these

two potestates. They could be differentiated by their purposes, modes of transmission, and

natures. 229 In his 1972 book, Stanley Chodorow succinctly explains these differences, especially as

understood by the medieval Church:

Power of Order has for its object sanctification of men through

performance of the sacraments. Power of Jurisdiction gives
prelates authority to govern their flocks. Power of order is received
through ordination, while power of jurisdiction is granted by
ecclesiastical authority. … Finally, power of order is immutable and
stable since it comes directly from God, while power of jurisdiction
can, once granted, be taken away, extended, or contracted at the
pleasure of the higher authority. 230

The power of jurisdiction, then, is nothing other than the authority held by a prelate that is granted

by legitimate ecclesial authority, and can also be removed by that same authority. Like the power

of orders, it is geared towards the spiritual health of the individual, but even more importantly to

the common good of the Church.

Somewhat related to this is the question not only of what the power is, but who could wield

228 Werner, Francis Xavier, Ius Decretalium, Book II, part I, at 5.

229 Journet, Charles. L’Eglise du verbe incarné: La hiérarchie apostolique. Editions Saint-Augustin, 1998, at 67.
230 Chodorow, Christian Political Theory, 156.
64
it. On this, Church authorities largely held a unanimous view, that authority belonged to the

Church’s hierarchy, defined loosely as those in holy orders. This was at the heart of the entire “lay

investiture” crisis of the 11th century. 231 The Church fought against the notion that the authority

of local bishops flowed from the local princes. If the Church granted that governance flowed

from secular leaders, it would be tantamount to an admission that the Church relied on the state in

matters related to her own governance. In other words, if jurisdiction is possible because of a

grant of a higher authority, than the import of lay investiture is to say that the king is that higher

authority. This runs entirely counter to the long-held view that the Church’s authority is of

apostolic origin, and the legitimacy of ecclesial governance is found precisely in apostolic

succession.

Although, at least until the Protestant reformation, there was widespread agreement on the

link between apostolicity, episcopal consecration, and the exercise of jurisdiction, the contours

have been subject to great controversy in the life of the Church. One need only recall the Great

East-West Schism, also in the 11th century, and the break between the Bishop of Rome and the

Eastern Churches. Similarly, the rise of Conciliarism in the Church brought to the fore deep

questions about the nature and exercise of authority in the Church. In some ways, the theological

approach to the question of authority could be phrased as a question of Scriptural interpretation:

to whom did Christ grant authority, to St. Peter alone or to all of the Apostles? 232

On this question there is some doubt, even up and through the Council of Trent. 233 As

Marek Sygut argues, by the end of the 16th century, there are two basic approaches to this issue.

One group would hold that the power is immediate, and the other that it is mediated by some other

power. Thus, according to the first view, the Bishops govern in their own right, as a direct result

231 See Stagaman, David J. Authority in the Church. Chicago: Liturgical Press, 1999, at 93.
232 See Van Liere, Katherine Elliot. “Vitoria, Cajetan, and the Conciliarists.” Journal of the History of Ideas
58.4 (1997): 597–616. JSTOR. Web. 28 Jan. 2014, at 604ff. The Protestants would, of course, reject the
entire premise of this question, arguing that authority was given to the Church as a whole.
233 Sygut, Marek. Natura e originie della potestà dei vescovi nel Concilio di Trento e nella dottrina successive

(1548-1869). See also Celeghin, Adriano. Origine e natura della potestà sacra at 235-238.
65
of their ordination. 234 This view, favored by the conciliarists in the Church, argued in favor of an

understanding of a collegial grant of power to the apostles as a whole. The other, far more

commonly held, view was that Christ granted power exclusively to St. Peter, and from him all

power is given. This view would favor the authority of the Pope above all others. It tended to see

the bishops as exercising power only through the mediation of the Bishop of Rome. 235

The dominant view in the Church through the medieval period and the post-Tridentine

counter-reformation fell strongly on the side of the uniqueness of papal authority. For the

medieval Church, this notion of Papal primacy found its origin in Scripture itself. It was to Peter

that the authority of Christ was given, symbolized in the giving of the keys:

And I tell you, you are Peter and on this Rock I will build my
Church, and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it. I will
give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven and whatever you bind
on earth shall be bound in heaven and whatever you loose on earth
shall be loosed in heaven. 236

This applies also to the successors to Peter, who stands in his place in the handing over of authority.

The idea is that the Pope receives his power not simply as Peter’s successor, but, as Peter’s

successor, he receives his authority directly from the same grant of Christ. To put it in plainer

terms, the Pope is not simply the Vicar of Peter, but the Vicar of Christ.

Thus, for theologians like St. Thomas Aquinas, governance is expressed by the bishops

solely in strict hierarchical relation to the bishop of Rome. Therefore, when Aquinas speaks of

governance, he means primarily the Supreme Pontiff. Bishops, while they participate in

governance, do so subordinate to the power of governance inherent in the papal office. For

example, in speaking of the power to grant indulgences, the Supplement to the Summa Theologiæ

describes ecclesial governance in this way: “The Pope has the fullness of pontifical power, as a

king in his kingdom. But bishops are appointed a share in his solicitude, like judges put in charge

234 Sygut raises the point that the weakness of this approach is that it either rather avoids entirely the
question of the relationship between the bishop and the Supreme Pontiff or simply eliminates it, contrary to
the weight of history and the teaching of the Church.
235 But this seems to run against the weight of the scriptural evidence. Even with the primacy of Peter,

the Scriptures do not seem to describe the other eleven Apostles to be merely his subordinates.
236 Matt 16:18-19.

66
of singular cities.” 237 While this is offered specifically in the case of indulgences, it can also be

understood more broadly of the Bishop’s authority, as understood by the scholastic theology of

Aquinas’s own time. While Bishops exercise authority, they do so in a manner fixed by the Roman

Pontiff. As one author has formulated Aquinas’s thought: the episcopal ministry “is inconceivable

without, outside of, or against” the Pope just as “it is unthinkable in a healthy body that a vital organ

does not respond to the impulses of the brain.” 238

In its most extreme form, advocates of papal power saw the Bishops as mere functionaries

of the Pope. This position would see Bishops not even as vassal Lords under a common king, as

Lords continued to exercise power in their own right. 239 There are merely the instruments of the

Pope’s own governance. In other words, while the Bishop has his own potestas ordinis, the potestas

iurisdictionis belongs only and properly to the Pope himself, and the Bishop shares in it only to the

extent that he remains faithful to the commands of the Roman Pontiff. 240 Thus, Brian Tierney

quotes the fourteenth century author Hervaeus Natalis, “If you want to know how much power a

bishop has, it is as much as pleases the pope.” 241

Nonetheless, The sixteenth century prelate Thomas Cajetan would offer a third alternative

between the papalists who argued that all power flowed from the Pope and the conciliarists who

held that all power was held collegially by the bishops. Using the symbolism of the power of the

keys, Cajetan argues for a via media. 242 He makes the explicit argument that the keys are symbolic of

237 Summa Theologiæ, Suppl. q. 26, a. 4. (Papa habet plenitudinem pontificialis postetatis, quasi rex in regno. Sed
episcopi assumuntur in partem sollicitudinis, quasi iudices singulis civitatibus praepositi…)
238 De Bertolis, Ottavio. Origine ed esercizio della potestà ecclesiastica di governo in San Tommaso. Roma: Pontificia

Università Gregoriana, 2005, at 114 (“Dunque il romano Pontefice è veramente capo dei Vescovi, e lo stesso
ministero episcopale non è concepibile senza, fuori, or tantomeno contro di lui, proprio come non è
pensabile, in un corpo sano, che un organa vitale non risponda agli impulsi del cervello…”)
239 See Tierney, Brian. “Chuch Law and Alternative Structures: A Medieval Perspective.” Governance,

Accountability, and the Future of the Catholic Church. Ed. Francis Oakley and Bruce M Russett. New York:
Continuum, 2004. 49–61, at 55.
240 Greenaway, James. The Differentiation of Authority: The Medieval Turn Toward Existence. Washington,

D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2012 at 207-208.

241 See Tierney, “Chuch Law and Alternative Structures,” 55.
242 For a thorough discussion of his position, see von Liere, Katherine Elliot. “Vitoria, Cajetan, and the

Conciliarists” citing Cajetan’s Tractus primus de comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii in his Opuscula Omnia. This
discussion is taken largely from con Liere’s treatment of the subject. As she notes, whether Cajetan’s view
was noval or even a true via media is not altogether clear. Nonetheless, it elucidates in very clear terms the
67
the two different types of potestates in the Church, namely the potestas iurisdictionis and the potestas

ordinis. For Cajetan, Christ has given this first key—representing governance—only to the Pope.

However, the second key—representing the sacramental power—was given to the apostles in

common. Thus, by ordination priests and bishops receive the full and immediate sacramental

power. On the other hand, the ability to govern is given immediately only to the Supreme Pontiff,

which he in turn mediates to the bishops in union with him.

This more traditional view of governance, by which bishops exercised authority

derivatively, is reflected in the 1917 Code of Canon Law. In the opening canons on the clergy, the

1917 Code emphasizes that the hierarchy of the Church is not subject to either the consent of the

faithful nor to any secular power. 243 Rather, the hierarchy is established according to the various

levels of ordination itself. In terms of governance, the Supreme Pontiff has his power immediately

by his proper election and acceptance. All other grades of order exercise jurisdiction only through

canonical mission. That is to say, while sacred ordination incorporated one into the hierarchy, and

gave the power of ordination, the power of governance could only be exercised by the grant of

higher authority, flowing ultimately from the Supreme Pontiff who alone has jurisdiction upon the

valid reception of his office, ipso facto.

Exercising the Power of Jurisdiction

A second-level question now presents itself more directly: what allows one to receive this

grant of the power of jurisdiction? In the classical theology of the potestas ordinis, it emanates from

the sacred character imposed in the sacrament. The whole reason for the developed distinction of

the potestas iurisdictionis was that, unlike the potestas ordinis, it could be lost. Since sacred character

cannot be lost, but potestas iurisdictionis may, it must have a different proximate source. Canonical

thinking that would greatly influence the Church’s view of the matter in the centuries to follow.
243 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 109. (Qui in ecclesiasticam hierarchiam cooptantur non ex populi vel potestatis

secularis consensu aut vocatione adleguntur; sed in gradibus potestatis ordinis constituuntur sacra ordinatione; in supremo
pontificatu, ipsomet iure divino, adimpleta conditione legitimae electionis eiusdemque acceptationis; in reliquis gradibus
iurisdictionis, canonica missione.)
68
tradition established two different theories. 244 The first, more widely accepted, was that it was an

“ontologically personal” 245 power. That is not to say that it was a permanent power of the soul

akin to potestas ordinis, but rather that it was more akin to a stable capacity to act, if activated by

higher competent authority. This has been by far the dominant canonical view in the Church. It

is ontological, at least for the bishop, in that he comes to stand in place of the Apostles. The

apostolicity is what grants authority.

Another, less widely held view, was that the power should not be considered ontologically,

but relationally. 246 That is, the power operates only in relation to a specific community or group.

In this view, a person has power of governance not because of some ontological capacity, but

because he is placed in a relation of headship to a determined community. In the end, the answer

is probably a mixture of both of these. That is, one needed both an ontologically personal capacity

to receive the power of governance, which could then be exercised only in reference to a particular

group, understood as the reception of an office.

This synthesis is reflected in the prior Code of Canon Law. In its discussion of episcopal

power, the canon notes only that as successors of the Apostles, bishops are placed in authority over

particular churches. 247 It then immediately qualifies that power by making clear that they exercise

their power under the authority of the Pope. Nonetheless, the ontological view is evidenced in

that governance, at least at the episcopal level, is associated with the bishop’s status as a successor

the apostles, which he has qua bishop. In addition, the 1917 Code specifically mentions that, by

divine institution, the hierarchy of the Church in regards jurisdiction consists of the Pope and

subordinate bishops. 248 At the same time, before his ordination a man to be ordained a bishop

244 See Huels, John. “Another Look at Lay Jurisdiction.” The Jurist 41.1 (1981): 59–80 at 64ff.
245 See Huels, “Another Look at Lay Jurisdiction,” 64.
246 As emblematic of this view, Huels cites the classical canonist Francis Xavier Wernz, Jus Canonicum II:

De Personis, 3rd ed. (Roma: Apud aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1943), pp. 58-59.
247 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 329 (Episcopi sunt Apostolorum successores atque ex divina institutione

peculiaribus ecclesiis praeficiuntur quas cum potestate ordinaria regunt sub auctoritate Romani Pontificis.)
248 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 108 §3. (Ex divina institutione sacra hierarchia ... ratione iurisdictionis,

pontificatu supremo et episcopatu subordinato...)

69
required canonical provision or institution, which only the Pope could provide. 249 Moreover, a

bishop has no power of governance in his diocese until he is in relation to it by taking possession of

the see. 250 In other words, exercising power of governance over a diocese requires the reception of

episcopal consecration, but those powers are not exercised in the abstract, but only towards a

particular group given to the bishop by the Supreme Pontiff.

The foregoing discussion is largely concerned with the exercise of authority by a bishop

vis-à-vis the Pope. In the history of the Church, the notion of governance is usually associated

with the power of the bishop. Yet, the 1917 Code of Canon Law does not discuss jurisdiction

under the section on Bishops, but rather on the first part of Book II, de clericis. The section de

episcopis speaks not so much of the power of jurisdiction, but the potestas espiscopalis. In other words,

although the archetype for the exercise of governance in the Church is the Pope and the bishops,

the power of jurisdiction is nonetheless broader, so as to include others who participate in

ecclesiastical governance. This is especially through the provision of an office. In an analogous

way the Supreme Pontiff is so only because he has been elected to and accepts the office of Bishop

of Rome, and likewise for the diocesan bishop who is ordained and takes possession of his see.

The 1917 Code of Canon Law provides a particular insight into the way in which this was

treated in a practical way. 251 That in turn helps to provide some insight on the source of the power

of jurisdiction. That begins with an understanding of the relationship between orders, clerical

status, and governance through an office.

In its discussion of holy orders, the 1917 Code explicitly mentions that orders is given to

create a distinction between clerics and the lay faithful. The reason for the distinction is two-fold:

249 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 332 §1 (Cuilibet ad episcopatum promovendo, etiam electo, praesentato vel
designato a civili quoque Gubernio, necessaria est canonica provisio seu institutio, qua Episcopus vacantis dioecesis constituitur,
quaeque ab uno Romano Pontifice datur.)
250 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 334 §2. (In regimen tamen dioecesis neque per se neque per alios, nec ullo sub

titulo sese ingerere possunt, nisi prius eiusdem dioecesis possessionem canonice ceperint; sed si ante suam ad episcopatum
designationem vicarii capitulares, officiales, oeconomi fuerint renuntiati, haec officia etiam post desigantionem retinere et exercere
possunt.)
251 For a discussion on the development of the notion of governance in the period before the Second

Vatican Council, see Sygut, Marek, Natura e origine della potestà dei vescovi nel Concilio di Trento e nella dotrrina
successiva (1545-1869). Pontificà Università Gregoriana (Rome 1998)
70
governance over the faithful (ad fidelium regimen) and to provide the sacramental ministry (cultus

divini). 252 Of course, the 1917 Code had a broader understanding of ‘cleric’ than does the current

Code. In the current Code of Canon law, one is considered a cleric only upon the reception of the

sacrament of orders, namely the diaconate. 253 For the previous code a man was made a cleric with

the reception of first tonsure. This occurred as a necessary prelude to the reception of the major

and minor orders. 254 At the same time, unlike the ordination of a priest, the giving of tonsure was

not considered a properly sacramental act. 255

In regards the exercise of governance, the prior Code generally conceives of it in relation to

the possession of an office. Strictly speaking, such an office, stably constituted, requires

participation in ecclesiastical power (potestas ecclesiasticae). 256 The Code says further that

participation in ecclesiastical power means participation in either (sive) the power of orders (ordinis)

or of jurisdiction (iurisdictionis). As a preliminary observation, this does seems to suggest

equivalence between them in that these are both pre-existing powers in the person that permit the

exercise of ecclesiastical power, but which comes into effect only upon reception of an office. 257

That is, it seems to assume an ontologically prior state in which one already has either the power of

jurisdiction or the power of orders. Thus, tonsure (and by implication entry into the clerical state)

did not give jurisdiction, but only made one capable for it. The canons are clear that only clerics can

252 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 948 (Ordo ex Christi institutione clericos a laicis in Ecclesia distinguit ad fidelium
regimen et cultus divini ministerium.)
253 See Code of Canon Law can. 266 §1. (Per receptum diaconatum aliquis fit clericus...)
254 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 108 §1. (Qui divinis ministeriis per primam saltem tonsuram mancipati sunt,

clerici dicuntur.)
255 In this way, it tacks the Thomistic understanding, at least with regard to the priest, of the difference

between the traditio instrumentorum and the laying on of hands. The first is the properly sacramental symbol
through which the power of orders is conveyed. The second, although affixed to the sacrament, is not
properly sacramental, and only disposes one for ministerial power. There is a parallel here to the 1917
Code’s understanding of tonsure as the mark of jurisdiction, which is itself not a sacramental act, but affixed
to orders, which is sacramentally oriented. This is reinforced by the Thomistic view that tonsure did not
convey an order. See Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ Suppl. q. 40, a. 2. This understanding of the Sacrament
was, as referenced above, definitively altered by Pope Pius XII some decades after the promulgation of this
1917 Code.
256 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 145 §1. (...participationem ecclesiasticae potestatis sive ordinis sive iurisdictionis.)
257 A better opinion might be that this is simply a poorly conceived statute. What the provision seems

to be trying to elucidate is that some ecclesiastical offices may be held by those without the power of orders,
i.e., the lay faithful.
71
obtain (possunt obtenere) the powers of orders and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 258 implying that simply

being a cleric does not entail the automatic reception of these powers. Moreover when it comes to

the provision of an office that touches upon the cura animarum, such offices are reserved only to

clerics who have at least been ordained as priests. 259 This implies that the exercise of jurisdiction

related to the ultimate end of the Church (i.e., the cura animarum) is tightly linked to the sacramental

power (potestas ordinis) of the priest.

It also highlights the foregoing discussion of jurisdiction’s link to, but difference from,

sacramental ordination. Much of the previous discussion of jurisdiction in the Church linked it to

episcopal consecration. That is, the power of governance is seen at its height in the Supreme

Pontiff, who receives it precisely by being the bishop of Rome. It thus assumes the reception of

the sacrament of orders, and is linked to its expression in a particular office. The same is true of

bishops, who may only exercise their jurisdiction upon ordination and the possession of their

diocese. In fact, episcopal consecration is understood largely entirely in the potential for

jurisdiction that it gives. It is not a direct result of the proper sacramental act of

ordination—which would be the priesthood—but the super-added capacity for governance that it

presupposes.

However, the appointment of other ecclesiastical offices suggests a somewhat different

formulation. Here, the former canons seem to link the power of governance not explicitly to

ordination, but to the various orders. 260 As a preliminary note, one must be attentive to the variety

of ways in which the term ordo is treated both in canon law and in theology. As said above, in the

Thomistic account, the episcopacy was not considered a separate ordo, properly speaking, but was a

part of the priesthood. Yet, the 1917 Code of Canon Law provides at least two different accountings

for orders. The first speaks of orders with respect to the hierarchy of the Church, which is

258 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 118. (Soli clerici possunt potestatem sive ordinis sive iurisdictionis ecclesiasticae et
beneficia ac pensiones ecclesiasticas obtinere.)
259 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 154.
260 Or at least, it means the capacity to receive orders made by first tonsure. As classical Thomistic

theology would not have understood the giving of first tonsure as its own separate order, only an orientation
towards it.
72
describes as being limited to “bishops, priests, and ministers.” 261 This is, appropriately enough,

also the same canon which refers to the hierarchy, in regards jurisdiction, as composed of the

Supreme Pontiff and subordinate bishops. And yet, when speaking of ordo in relation to the

sacrament of ordination, the Code delineates the traditional seven orders, from porter through

priest. 262 Thus, the 1917 Code conceives of ordo differently depending on whether it discusses

hierarchy and jurisdiction and when it discusses sacramental orders. Nevertheless, they are linked.

What links them is the clerical status. In the theological tradition, the various grades of

holy orders are linked together by their orientation to the celebration of the divine cult. It is one’s

status as a cleric that allows one to advance up the chain of those orders. Moreover, clerical status,

given in first tonsure, is generally given only by a bishop, thus associating his ministry with the

apostolicity of the Bishop. 263 That is, the exercise of the power of jurisdiction requires a bishop to

set a man apart from the lay faithful 264 by entry into the clerical state. Like the Apostles whom

Christ separated out from the rest of his disciples, so clerics are separated out from the body of the

faithful for the work of ministry. This serves as the necessary ontological preparedness for that

exercise, which is only realized on the provision of an office, which again is provided by an exercise

hierarchical authority.

261 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 108 §3. (divina institutione sacra hierarchia ratione ordinis constat Episcopis,

presbyteris et ministris) This is, of course, taken nearly verbatim from the twenty-third session of the Council of
Trent.
262 See 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 977 and 978 §2. (Ordines gradatim conferendi sunt ita ut ordinationes per

saltum omnino prohibeantur.) (Interstitia primam tonsuram inter et ostiariatum vel inter singulos ordines minores prudenti
Episcopi iudicio committuntur; acolythus vero ad subdiaconatum, subdiaconus ad diaconatum, diaconus ad presbyteratum ne
antea promoveantur, quam acolythus unum saltem annum, subdiaconus et diaconus tres saltem menses in suo quisque ordine
fuerint versati, nisi necessitas aut utilitas Ecclesiae, iudicio Episcopi, aliud exposcat.)
263 However, the 1917 Code does allow non-bishops to give first tonsure, provided they are equivalent

in law to a bishop. See 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 957 §2. (Si episcopali charactere careant, possunt nihilominus
in proprio territorio et durante tantum munere, conferre primam tonsuram et ordines minores tum propriis subditis saecularibus
ad normam can. 956, tum aliis qui litteras dimissorias iure requisitas exhibeant; ordinatio extra hos fines ab eisdem peracta
irrita est.)
264 See 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 107. (Ex divina institutione sunt in Ecclesia clerici a laicis distincti, licet non

omnes clerici sint divinae institutionis…)

73
Power of Governance and the Second Vatican Council

The idea of the power of jurisdiction changes rather significantly with the Second Vatican

Council. The shift is seen not only in a change of terminology, but in a whole change of approach.

As with the changes to the approach to the power of orders some of the changes are meant as

substantive statements on theology. More than that, the change, as in the case the Church as

societas perfecta, is meant to express doctrine in a new way.

The most obvious change in approach by the Council is the complete absence of the term

in the Council’s Constitution on the Church. Nowhere does the Council speak of the governance

of the Church in these juridical terms. The closest the Constitution on the Church comes to

speaking of the Bishop’s power in relation to governance is that is a potestas sacra. The Council

declares that “Bishops govern the particular churches united to them as vicars and legates of Christ

by means of councils, persuasions, examples, and even by true authority and sacred power…” 265

This turn away from the traditional term is seen especially in canon law with the change in

preference of the term potestas regemini over that of potestas iurisdictionis. When speaking of the

exercise of ordinary power, the 1917 Code speaks of “the power of jurisdiction or governance” 266.

The 1983 Code inverts that order, and gives a clear preference for the latter term. Thus it speaks

of, “the power of governance . . . which is also called the power of jurisdiction” 267. Even the

section of the Code that addresses the subject, Title VIII of Book I, is entitled De Potestate Regiminis.

Even so, this change in terminology is likely not meant as a change in theological perspective as

much as it is an attempt at greater juridical precision. 268 As discussed above, even in Roman law,

the term iurisdictio was ambiguous, with both a broad and narrow meaning. While the Church

tended to adopt the broader meaning, civil governments tended to adopt the narrow meaning.

265 Lumen gentium 27. (Episcopi Ecclesias particulares sibi commissas ut vicarii et legati Christi regunt, consiliis,
suasionibus, exemplis, verum etiam auctoritate et sacra potestate...)
266 1917 Code of Canon Law, can. 196. (Potestas iurisdictionis seu regiminis...)
267 Code of Canon Law, can. 129 §1. (Potestatis regiminis...et etiam potestas iurisdictionis vocatur...)
268 Viana, Antonio. “Title VIII: De Potestate Regiminis, Introduction.” Vol. 1. Chicago: Midwest

Theological Forum, 2004. 5 vols. Exegetical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, 815–818 at 815.
74
Thus, for example, in American law, jurisdiction generally means “the power to hear a case.” 269

That is, the term is limited to the judicial function and would be more equivalent of the concept of

a judge’s competence by reason of title in the current Code of Canon Law. 270

More significant, of course, is the change in theological approach by the Council. This is

true from the beginning of its discussion of the episcopacy. Thus, in regard to governance, the

Constitution on the Church begins with the notion not of sacred ordination but with apostolicity.

In its initial paragraph on the episcopacy, the Council refers to the bishops as, “the successors of

the apostles, who together with the successor of Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the visible Head of the

whole Church, govern the house of the living God.” 271 This reference to apostolicity is, at the

same time, a specific reference to governance. In addition to the link between governance and

their status as successors to the Apostles, there is also a change of relationship. No longer are the

bishops defined merely in subordination to the Supreme Pontiff, rather he too is referred to in

explicitly apostolic terms, although with reference to Peter as chief of the Apostles.

Most importantly of all, this authority for governance is shifted from the more traditional

reference to the power of jurisdiction. Instead, as discussed in the chapter above on the potestas

ordinis, the Conciliar Fathers use the term munus, or sacred function, to describe the essential

activities of the hierarchy in teaching, governing, and sanctifying the lay faithful. For the Council,

consecration as a Bishop gives not only a sacred character but also the sacred functions [munera] of

sanctifying, governing, and teaching. 272 Moreover, these are not merely relational, but given

ontological upon consecration. 273

Nonetheless, for the Council, these two are related. Although continuing to distinguish

269 Gifis, Seteven H. “Jurisdiction.” Law Dictionary 1991 : 259–60.

270 See Code of Canon Law, cann. 1407-1414.
271 Lumen Gentium, 18 (successoribus Apostolorum, qui cum successore Petri, Christi Vicario(38) ac totius Ecclesiae

visibili Capite, domum Dei viventis regunt, coram omnibus profiteri et declarare constituit.)
272 See Lumen gentium 21. (Episcopalis autem consecratio, cum munere sanctificandi, munera quoque confert docendi et

regendi, quae tamen natura sua nonnisi in hierarchica communione cum Collegii Capite et membris exerceri possunt.)
273 Lumen gentium, Nota explicativa praevia, 2. (In consecratione datur ontologica participatio sacrorum munerum, ut

indubie constat ex Traditione, etiam liturgica.) Although not clear in this sentence, the context suggest that this
statement is made explicitly about bishops. Nonetheless, an analogous claim can also be made about the
priest’s reception of these munera as an ontological reality.
75
them, the Council relates them specifically to potestates that flow from episcopal consecration 274.

Although the Council makes some distinctions between these three munera, they are generally

conceived of together as a whole. Thus, the Council insists:

However, episcopal consecration, along with the munus of

sanctifying, confers also the munera of teaching and governing,
which nevertheless by its very nature may be exercised only in
hierarchical communion with the Head and members of the college.

In other words, the Council seems to link the sacred character to the bishops newfound ability to

act in the place of Christ as teacher, shepherd, and priest, i.e., according to the functions [munera] of

teaching, governing, and sanctifying. 275 At the same time, these are exercised in a different way.

For the Council explicitly limits the teaching and ruling functions to those in hierarchical

communion with the Church. For the sanctifying power, however, no such limit exists, and the

bishops enjoy it in its fullness from the moment of their ordination.

There is an analogous treatment of the matter with regard to the sacred priesthood. As

discussed previous in the chapter on potestas ordinis, the Council links the exercise of the sacred

power with an office: “The office of the Priesthood, inasmuch as it is joined to the episcopal Order,

participates in the authority by which Christ builds up, sanctifies and rules His Body.” 276 Note

how similar this is to the elaboration of the munera of the Bishops found in Lumen gentium. The

triple munera of the episcopacy, namely teaching, governing, and sanctifying, could be expressed,

with some qualification, as building up, sanctifying, and ruling. Moreover, it is precisely in this

274 This was made much more explicit in the original schema of the Constitution on the Church, which

asserted that there was a close link between the powers of teaching and governing and the sanctifying power
given in the sacrament of orders. (See Acta Synodalia Sacrocancti Concilii Oecumenici Vatican II, vol. I, per. I, pars
IV, at p. 23. (“Pastor et Episcopus animarum nostrarum, potestatem authentice docendi et gubernandi in
Ecclesia its instituit ut natura sua arcto viinculo coniungeretur cum potestate sanctificandi quae in
Sacramento Ordinis confertus.”)) This same sentence is carried over verbatim in the second schema, but
eliminated in the final version. (See Acta Synodalia Sacrocancti Concilii Oecumenici Vatican II, vol. II, per. II, pars
I, at p. 233)
275 This is made explicit in the commentary to the second schema for the Constitution on the Church.

See Acta Synodalia Sacrocancti Concilii Oecumenici Vatican II, vol. II, per. II, pars I, at p. 253. (Quia, ut ex traditione
praesertim liturgica patet, potestas docendi et gubernandi arcte connectitur cum potestate sanctificandi, sacramento Ordinis collata,
docetur explicite, quaestione iam maturata, Episcopatum ad hoc sacramentum pertinere, tamquam gradum supremum
sacerdotii.)
276 Presbyterorum ordinis, 2. AAS 58 (1966) 991-1024 at 992. (Officium Presbyterorum, utpote Ordini episcopali

coniunctum, partcipat auctoritatem qua Christus Ipse Corpus suum exstruit, sanctificat et regit.)
76
exercise of the triple munera that the ordained priesthood is distinguished from the priesthood of

the lay faithful. “Indeed, the ministerial priest, by the sacred power that he enjoys, forms and

governs the priestly people; confects the Eucharistic sacrifice in the person of Christ, and offers it

to God in the name of all the people. 277 Thus, the Council expresses a preference for looking at

the priesthood not simply in terms of ontological power bestowed, but the outward functions he

performs as a sacred minister.

The same cannot be said of deacons who, while they share in the same sacrament of holy

orders, do not share in the same exercise of the triple munera. This was not always made clear,

however. In the original promulgation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, in the section on holy

orders, Canon 1008 asserted that all of the levels of sacred orders—deacons, priests, and

bishops—were consecrated to fulfill the sacred functions of teaching, sanctifying, and governing. 278

However, an important change was made to this canon in Pope Benedict XVI’s 2009 Apostolic

Letter Omnium in mentem. 279 In that document issued motu proprio, the references to acting in the

person of Christ the Head and the triple munera were removed and replaced with a more general

reference to the three grades of orders receiving a somewhat generic title to serve the people of

God. The document then clarified the three grades by adding a new section to Canon 1009, 280

making clear that only the bishop and priest act in the name of Christ the Head, and not the deacon.

This new section, however, does not contain any references to the munera bestowed in holy orders,

even though Canon 1008 continues to assert that an indelible sacred character remains, presumably

277 Lumen gentium, 10. (“Sacerdos quidem ministerialis, potestate sacra qua gaudet, populum

sacerdotalem efformat ac regit, sacrificium eucharisticum in persona Christi conficit illudque nomine totius
populi Deo offert.”)
278 Code of Canon Law, can. 1008. (Sacramento ordinis ex divina institutione inter christifideles quidam, charactere

indelebili quo signantur, constituuntur sacri ministri, qui nempe consecrantur et deputantur ut, pro suo quisque gradu, in persona
Christi Capitis munera docendi, sanctificandi et regendi adimpletes, Dei popuum pascant.) Note a slight change in
emphasis here. Before the Second Vatican Council, entry into the clerical state would have been considered
the ontological change that would have differentiated the Church’s ministers from the common priesthood
of all the baptized. This paragraph suggests that the difference is related to the activity is what distinguishes
these two parts of the Church.
279 Pope Benedict XVI, Omnium in mentem, AAS 102 (2010) 8-10.
280 Code of Canon Law, can. 1009 §3. (Qui constituti sunt in ordine episcopatus aut presbyteratus missionem et

facultatem agendi in persona Christi Capitis accipiunt, diaconi vero vim populo Dei serviendi in diaconia liturgiae, verbi et
caritatis.)
77
for all three orders.

Thus, there is a difference between the character bestowed in orders and the sacred

functions exercised by priests and bishops. In contrast to the Thomistic understanding of sacred

character, the munera are not permanent powers fully in act. Although not a part of the official

Constitution on the Church, the Nota explicativa praevia found in the notificationes by the Secretary

General of the Council, attempts to make this clear. The Conciliar Constitution, it explains,

explicitly chose the word functions [munera] over power [potestas] precisely because it is not, in itself,

a fully realized power. 281 Rather, these sacred functions require a further juridical act by the

Church’s own hierarchy (or by the law itself) in order to grant the power. 282

At the time, the Nota praevia recognizes that this involves an inherent historical and

theological tension. This is the same theological tension that Augustine tried to ease in his debates

with the Donatists. One the one hand, the Church wants to understand the sacramental life not as

the actions of individuals, but as the actions of Christ through the Church, meditated by

individuals. At the same time, the long-standing teaching of Augustine still holds, namely that

certain sacramental effects are indelible, and therefore the power associated with those effects is

permanent. The sacramental power must, in some way, transcend the purely juridical definition.

This combination is seen juridically, in that privation of the power of orders cannot (nequeo) be

given as a penalty, only a prohibition against their exercise. 283

At the same time, the juridical determination must, at some level, inform the sacramental

power. So we see that this note to Lumen gentium ends with a further note of its own: “Without

hierarchical communion the sacramental-ontological munus, which ought to be distinguished from

the canonical-juridical aspect, cannot be exercised.” 284 There is a more complicated relationship

281 Lumen gentium, Nota explicativa praevia, AAS 57 (1965) 72-75 at 73. (Consulto adhibetur vocabulum
munerum, non vero potestatum, quia haec ultima vox de potestate ad actum expedita intelligi posset.)
282 Lumen gentium, Nota explicativa praevia, 2 (canonica seu iuridica determinatio per auctoritatem hierarchicam)
283 Code of Canon Law, can. 1338 §2. (Potestatis ordinis privatio dari nequit, sed tantum prohibitio eam vel

aliquos eius actus exercendi...)

284 Lumen gentium, Nota explicativa praevia, Nota Bene (Sine communione hierarchica munus sacramentale-ontologicum,

quod distinguendum est ab aspectu canonico-iuridico, exerceri non potest.)

78
between the juridically dependent aspects of sacred power and the sacramentally independent

aspects of sacred power than the text of the Dogmatic Constitution might otherwise suggest.

How is this apparent tension to be resolved? The solution of the Nota praevia is to simply

acknowledge the tension exists, and leave its resolution to theologians. 285 “However, the

Commission has determined that it ought not enter into questions of liceity or validity, which are

left to the discussion of theologians, specifically as it pertains to the power which is de facto exercised

by the separated Oriental [churches], and of which various explanations of opinion exist.” 286 That

is to say, the Church seems willing to let this tension—even this apparent contradiction—continue

to exist.

What we are left with is an understanding of the power of jurisdiction that is not terribly

much clearer than it was before the Council. The Church continues to teach that the exercise of

the power of jurisdiction is limited to clerics, even if the laity may cooperate in that exercise. 287

There seems to be some ontological basis for this exercise of governance, although the Council

deliberately seems to avoid defining precisely how that might be. Instead, the Council prefers to

shift the discussion away from the notion of the power of the hierarchy, to concentrate instead on

their function within the Church. That leaves the potestas iurisdictionis or regiminis to be defined

largely by canonical elaboration. In this way, although reflecting somewhat the innovations of the

285 It is an unfortunate, although not terribly serious, lacunae to this note within a note that this
theological-juridical problem is left solely to theologians, and not to both theologians and jurists.
286 Lumen gentium AAS 57 (1965) 5-75 at 75. “Sine communione hierarchica munus

sacramentale-ontologicum, quod distinguendum est ab aspectu canonico-iuridico, exerceri non potest.

Commissio autem censuit non intrandum esse in quaestiones de liceitate et validitate, quae relinquuntur
disceptationi theologorum, in specie quod attinet ad potestatem quae de facto apud Orientales seiunctos
exercetur, et de cuius explicatione variae exstant sententiae.”
287 Code of Canon Law, can. 129. Here, the Code makes clear that only those in sacred orders (i.e., clerics)

are capable (habiles) of exercising the potestas iurisdictiones. Immediately after, the Code indicates that
non-clerics are able to cooperate (possunt cooperari) in the exercise of the potestas iurisdictionis, but without ever
defining what precisely that entails. It is apparently a reference to Lumen gentium, 33. (Praeter hunc
apostolatum, qui ad omnes omnino christifideles spectat, laici insuper diversis modis ad cooperationem magis immediatam cum
apostolatu Hierarchiae vocari possunt, ad modum illorum virorum ac mulierum, qui Paulum apostolum in Evangelio
adiuvabant, multum in Domino laborantes.) That section goes on to indicate that the laity may assume certain of
the ecclesiastical munera from the bishop. (Praeterea aptitudine gaudent, ut ad quaedam munera ecclesiastica, ad finem
spiritualem exercenda, ab Hierarchia adsumantur.) The only way this can be made sense of is if one takes munera
in the broad sense to mean the work of the Church. It is difficult otherwise to reconcile the understanding
of the munera as what separates the clergy from the lay faithful if somehow the lay faithful can exercise these
same munera.
79
Council, remains remarkably similar to the previous canonical elaboration.

Conclusion

As with the potestas ordinis, the potestas iurisdictionis is generally associated with the sacrament

of Holy Orders. Unlike the potestas ordinis, however, it was not associated with the imposition of

the ontological character upon ordination, but generally with an office bestowed upon a cleric.

Historically, Christian theologians associated the potestas iurisdictionis most especially with the Bishop

and with the, as it were, bishop of bishops, the Supreme Pontiff. If the potestas ordinis was the

fullness of the powers of the priest, potestas iurisdictionis was the fullness of the power of the Bishop

locally and the Pope universally.

As the Second Vatican Council elaborated more fully on the theology of the episcopacy, so

too did the Conciliar Fathers help to develop the teaching on the governing power of the bishop.

Here the Conciliar Fathers moved away from the legalistic term iurisdictionis to the more general

term of regiminis. This also comported better with the shift towards the understanding of Holy

Orders in terms of the interrelated gifts of the sacred functions of sanctifying, governing, and

teaching. Nevertheless, at least in its exposition, the Council continued to present the

long-standing theological distinction between the ontological nature of the munus of sanctifying and

the more hierarchically established nature of the munus of governing. The ultimate effect is to

both equate the two powers in the munera of ordination, yet insist upon the very different nature of

each as they are exercised. Moreover, there was no real attempt by the Conciliar fathers to

reconcile the tension inherent in these approaches.

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CHAPTER 5: RELATION OF POWER OF GOVERNANCE TO POWER OF ORDERS

Introduction

Given this understanding of the power of the Church as expressed in the two potestates of

order and jurisdiction, a final question presents itself. That is, how are we to understand the

relation between these two? The history of both the theological and juridical interplay, hinted at in

the discussions above, is far too lengthy and complicated for anything but the most cursory

discussion. Even so, given the definitive statements on the matter, especially in its resolution of

certain open questions, the starting point must be with a resolution grounded in the Council’s

approach. Nevertheless, the more traditional teaching, given its endorsement in many aspects by

the Council, must still inform any resolution of the matter.

By far the most common approach to understanding the relation to these powers of the

Church is to posit them as the common outflow of a singular higher power. Generally, speaking,

the preferred term of reference is that used by the Council, the potestas sacra. In Lumen gentium, the

Council uses the term only three times: once to refer to the actions of teaching, governing, and

sanctifying that distinguish the ministerial priest 288; once to describe the means by which the

Church’s ministers serve the faithful; 289 and once to describe only the governing power of bishops

over their dioceses. 290 Nevertheless, in the theological-juridical approach that follows, it seems to

rise as the preferred way of approaching these concepts.

The Relation Between the Potestas Ordinis and Potestas Iurisdictionis: A

Post-Conciliar Summary

The history of the relationship between the potestas sacra and the potestates iurisdictionis et ordinis

288 Lumen gentium,10.

289 Lumen gentium, 18.
290 Lumen gentium, 27.
81
following the Council was given its most complete summation in the lengthy work by Adriano

Celeghin. 291 Ultimately, the appeal to the unifying ability of the concept of the potestas sacra is its

source, namely that of the unity found in Christ. 292 One of the goals of the Council was to better

express the way in which the ecclesial hierarchy acted in the name and person of Christ. The

potestas sacra is possible only because of the potestas Christi, transmitted in the sacrament of holy

orders. Even so, there are a number of ways in which to account for the role of the potestas sacra in

the two related powers of jurisdiction and orders.

One way is to use the will of Christ as the ultimate guiding principle. 293 As Celeghin

explains, this is a somewhat classical view, which sees power in the Church ultimately as deriving

from the will of Christ. Christ desires for the Church both unity and unicity. That is, the Church

is both united in itself and is distinct from any other institution. At the same time, Christ formed

the Church as both an invisible and visible reality. Thus, the one sacred power is expressed in two

forms (order and jurisdiction) to address these two aspects of the Church’s reality. For the sake of

unity of action, this power must have a unified origin as well. That origin is not only in the will of

Christ, but the action of Christ being made present in the sacrament of ordination. Since the

power of jurisdiction is addressed to the visible life of the Church, it cannot function when it lacks

this external mandate of hierarchical authority, which is the visible symbol of the Church’s unity.

291 For a complete account, see his in-depth work, Origine e Nature della Potestà Sacra. (Celeghin, Adriano.
Origine E Natura Della Potestà Sacra : Posizioni Postconciliari. Brescia: Morcelliana, 1987.) A discussion of the
power of jurisidiction and its relation to the power of orders has been the subject to intellectual pursuit in the
Church for nearly a millennium. It has only intensified since the Council. Celeghin’s work on the relation of
the two as a part of the potestas sacra--which simply addresses the issue since the Second Vatican
Council--alone runs more than 500 pages. In addition, there is a long theological history which links the
teaching authority of the Church with her governing authority, distinguishing them both from the
sacramental power. In a subject so vast, one may either, as it were, dip in a toe or plunge in head long. The
nature of a tesina makes the latter impossible. The best that can be done is a very brief, and in many ways,
very incomplete, overview. For this reason, for the discussion here will summarize the major themes found
in Celeghin’s work.
292 See Celeghin, Origine e Nature, 77. In addition, as described above, the 1917 Code of Canon Law, also

has a term to describe these powers jointly, namely the potestas ecclesiae. The advangate of potestas sacra over
that term is that it emphasizes more clearly the transcendental source of the power, rather than more
tautological positioning of them within the Church itself.
293 On this view, Celeghin largely summarized the work of W. Bertams, which summary informs the

discussion that follows. See especially Bertrams’s monumental work, Quaestiones fundamentales juris canonici.
Pontificia Università Gregoriana (Rome 1969).
82
The power of orders, however, is directly related to the interior life of the Church, not her exterior

visible structure, and therefore has no need of a separate canonical mission. In other words, while

these powers flows from the same source and directed to the same end, they are distinguished

precisely because the Church is herself distinguished between her visible and invisible aspects.

The other major view that Celeghin offers claims a patrimony more directly from the

thought of the Second Vatican Council. 294 In this view, the Council makes clear that these powers

should not be understood as independent of each other, but rather as complementary. While they

do have distinct functions, the Council also teaches that there is a profound coordination between

the two. The relationship between these powers was much debated at the Council, and its final

formulation not achieved easily. In this view, the potestas sacra can be found both as a result of the

nature of the Church and from its origin in Christ. Christ is the source of power, which he

transmits to the Church. Since that is the case, the sacra potestas must be one power, without

division. Nevertheless, it admits of some diversity of function. The sacras potestas has two elements,

one relating to the power of orders and one to canonical mission, or the power of jurisdiction.

While the power of orders is related to the life of the Church, the power of jurisdiction is the

principle that establishes order. Thus, while there are two sources for this sacred power, namely

consecration and canonical divine mission, they are united in a single office. It is this office, made

possible by episcopal consecration, which serves as the deep core of their unity. Thus, this

distinction should never overpower their fundamentally complementary nature.

Rejecting these, Celeghin proposes his own solution, focused on the notion of economia. 295

By this he does not mean the notion of the Father’s plan of salvation. Rather what he means is an

economy related to the Church’s own proper activity. Here, he deliberately invokes the juridical

notion of economia, more familiar to Oriental Christianity, and that influenced the preparation of the

Eastern Code of Canon Law. It is similar to what the Anglo-American judicial tradition would call

294 See Celeghin 142-148. Here Celeghin argely looks to the writing of Klaus Mösrsdorf. See
Mörsdorf, Klaus, and Stefano Testa Bappenheim. Fondamenti del diritto canonico. Marcianum Press (Venezia
2008).
295 The following paragraphs are largely a summary of Celeghin. See Celeghin at 474ff.

83
equity. That is, it is a notion that the proper end of the law is justice but, at times, the actual

application of the law, given particular events and circumstances, is seen to be unjust and actually

counter to the purpose of the law. Principles of equity or economia would permit activity, within the

law, but that would temper its effect in particular cases. It is an attempt to ensure the proper end

of the law, which is not simply fidelity to statutes, but justice.

As applied to the Church, economia relates to her primary duty as the administrator of the

gifts of Christ to her. He looks at this especially in the light of the church’s historical approach to

the liturgy. The liturgy reveals two different sorts of activity by the Church. On the one hand,

there is the Church as mediator of the grace of Christ. Here the Church is entirely subject to the

will of Christ as expressed in revelation and tradition. The second part is the rituals and rubrics,

about which Christ has said almost nothing. His silence is taken to mean a free hand by the

Church to organize these things freely. These two are always at play in the liturgical life of the

Church—the constancy of grace offered in the Sacraments, and the variability of the ritual practices

across times and cultures. Yet they are not completely separated. The ritual element of the

Church exists precisely so that the grace element may be better and more fruitfully received.

It is precisely this interplay which Celeghin argues must inform the Church’s own approach

to ministry. It is a double fidelity. One the one hand, the Church must be faithful to Christ for

what she has received. On the other hand, the Church must be faithful to mankind for that which

she must dispense. Thus, for example, the action of Christ in the person of the priest is most total

in the valid consecration of the Eucharist. The Eucharist is never celebrated in the name of the

Church, but always in the person of Christ. 296 There are, however, other actions of the Church

outside the sacramental arena in which a minister acts not so much in the person of Christ but

according to canonical mission. Here the minister’s action flows both from Christ and from the

296 The weakness here, of course, is that the same might be said of the Sacrament of Confession. Here

the priest also acts in persona Christi. (See Pope John Paul II, Allocutiones III: Ad Paenitentiarium maiorem aliosque
coram admissos. AAS 93 (2001) 522-527 at 525. (Il sacerdote, come ministro del Sacramento [della riconciliazione], agisce
in persona Christi, al vertice dell’economia soprannaturale.). Nonetheless, his sacramental act, unlike that with
regards to the Eucharist, may be denied validity by a lack of canonical mission, i.e., canonical faculties.
84
Church.

Thus, for Celeghin, the touchstone for understanding the potestas sacra is not so much office,

but ministry. For it is in ministry that the united sacral power is individuated. It is ministry that

“expresses its essential and interior reality and places in act the end for which it was instituted by

Christ.” 297 It is in ordination especially that this ministry is understood and attached.

Conclusion

Celeghin’s in-depth treatment of the post-Conciliar attempts to understand the relationship

between these two potestate reveals the depth of theological and juridical uncertainty that remains. 298

The powers certainly have a unity of origin, in that they flow from Christ himself. The sacerdotal

character is defined primarily in that it creates a man as an alter Christus, an understanding that

certainly resonates with the Scriptural accounts of the work of the Apostles in the early Church.

They are also united in their end. That is they are directed primarily towards the salvation of the

souls, as was the mission of Christ. Finally, they are linked in their context, in that they are situated

not simply in the person but in the creation of a relationship with in the community of the Church.

These powers flow within the communion of the Church, by members of the Church, for the sake

of the Church. In this way, they are ministerial, serving the baptized community.

297 Celeghin at 485. (esprime la sua realtà interiore ed essenziale e mette in atto la finalità per la quale è stata istituita
da Cristo.)
298 Although perhaps a bit speculative, it nonetheless seems justifiable to hypothesize that some of the

confusion has been brought about by the particular post-Conciliar preoccupation within the Church with
the role of the baptized faithful in positions of leadership. Once can certainly question the sometimes
single-minded desire to formulate a theory of ecclesial governance that would permit the nonordained lay
faithful to participate in governance at the expense of the long history of theology and juridical tradition
which pre-dated the Second Vatican Council.
85
CHAPTER 6: A PROPOSED RESOLUTION

Introduction

While any approach to the law and theology of the various powers of the Church must

address the developments made by the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council, it should not do so

at the expense of the weight of previous doctrinal authority. When approaching these two powers

there are a few theological imperatives that cannot be forgotten and, even if not emphasized by the

Second Vatican Council, must be observed. At the same time, one must reckon with the shift in

approach offered by the Council. In this final section, we will attempt to briefly tie together some

of the threads of the discussion of theology and law as regards the nature of the Church and the use

of the powers of orders and jurisdiction. The goal will be to try to understand how these two are

related in their origin, nature, exercise, and end.

Potestates Ordinis et Iurisdictionis : A Proposed Synthesis

There are fundamental theological notions, constantly taught by the magisterium, that must

be taken account in any theory of these powers. With regards to the power of orders that means,

above all else, the understanding of the sacred character imposed with ordination. As the

explanatory note to Lumen gentium took pains to point out, in some sense the ordination must be

understood as an ontological event. That is, it does more than simply separate a man outside of

the realm of the lay faithful, but confers some change to his very being, a change which is unique to

those who have received this sacrament. This change is not only ontological, but also indelible.

A better way to understand that is to say that although the Church acts as the medium through

which a man is ordained, it is Christ who does the ordaining. The Church cannot undo what

Christ has done. In a similar way, no properly Catholic understanding of the Eucharist would

admit the possibility that a priest could somehow “unconsecrate” it and return it to ordinary bread.

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 Another constant teaching that must be born is mind is the social nature of the visible

Church. This social nature is an essential part of her being and, therefore, her activity. Christ, in

his work of salvation, began by first forming a community in which that salvation was revealed and

made effective. This is where the notion of the Church as societas perfecta plays a critical role. Of

course, simply because the notion of societas perfecta properly entails a structure of governance, it

does not mean that any one particular structure is mandated. Both the Church and state are

societates perfectae but do not necessarily have the same structure or approach to governance. 299 For

the Church, the structure is determined in part by revelation, her divine origins and supernatural

mission, and in part by her very nature as a societas. The history of the Church’s approach to

governance is, in many ways the history of the relation of power in the Church. In the Church of

the New Testament, as mentioned above, the power of the Apostles over spiritual matters and their

power in terms of governance are largely not distinguished. These are related both in their

exercise and their transmission. In time, however, especially with the rise of the Church’s own

internal legal system, a distinction would begin to emerge and then solidify. This distinction would

be the difference between the power of orders (potestas ordinis) and the power of governance or

jurisdiction (potestas iurisdictionis). The Fathers of the Second Vatican Council seem to desire a

return to the more ancient synthesis, to speak of these not simply as special powers but as

components of the one sacred function of hierarchical orders.

The key aspect of the Church as societas perfecta is that she holds within herself all the

necessary means to attain her proper end. That proper end transcends her own nature, as it

involves the union with God. Those means—grace—must be given in her very creation by her

299 For a contrary view, see Tierney, Brian in “Chuch Law and Alternative Structures: A Medieval
Perspective” in Governance, Accountability, and the Future of the Catholic Church, at 59. “Nowadays we are often
told that, while the best form of government for the state is to be determined by natural reason, the right
ordering of the church is a matter of faith and based on divine revelation. But Aquinas’s whole vast
enterprise of reconciling Greek philosophy with Christian theology was based on a rooted conviction that
reason and faith could not conflict with one another. In such a way of thinking, a form of government
favored by both divine law and rational argument might well seem the one best suited for the rule of the
Christian church.” The fundamental problem with this view is that it fails to appreciate the distinct natures
of the two societies. Governance is a means to an end, and its suitability as such a means must be
determined in relation to that end, a fact of which Tierney does not fully appreciate.
87
creator. At the same time, the Church as having the means to attain her proper end does so in the

manner in which she finds herself, namely a visible, human society. She must possess not only the

means of grace, but the internal order and unity to bring all the members of the church to their

proper end. Thus, the Church must, by definition, have a functioning system of rules and laws,

and the means necessary to enforce them. That, in turn, requires a group of people tasked with

formulating those rules—as Christ left no code of law—, applying those rules, and enforcing them

as necessary, even through acts of punishment. That is, there must be a group of people within the

Church whose primary task is governance.

With regards to governance, the Church has always taught that its fullness and universality

is expressed by the Supreme Pontiff. Although the Church would no longer see bishops as having

power only from the Pope, nevertheless even their ordinary power can be and is limited by the

Supreme Pontiff. The simple fact that there exists a universal ecclesiastical law (the Code of Canon

Law) promulgated by the Supreme Pontiff and which, by definition, limits the power of bishops, is

sufficient enough proof for that limitation. In other words, when the Church speaks of

governance, and hence the power of jurisdiction, she speaks especially of the Supreme Pontiff and

the bishops who act through a proper canonical mandate. This finds its origin in the apostolicity

of their office. The Supreme Pontiff succeeds St. Peter as the Vicar of Christ, and the bishops

succeed the other Apostles as those chosen by Christ to exercise his own power and authority.

At the same time, while governance is important part of the visible structure of the Church,

that too is subordinated to the Church’s primary end, namely the salus animarum. The Church has

one primary mission, one overriding finality, by which all other things are governed. Governance

is not merely a super-added reality to the Church, but an integral and essential means by which her

supernatural end might be attained. There must always be understood to be a tight relationship

between the governance function of the Church and her supernatural activity, especially in the

sacraments.

That nexus is seen especially in the Church’s apostolicity. That apostolicity is not merely a

88
title that is bestowed and kept for a time. Men are not simply given the title of Apostle. Rather,

they become apostles—or at least their successors—by the sharing in their ministry. It is precisely

the action of the laying on of hands—as a sacramental act—that transforms a man into a successor

to the Apostles. One can think of orders as receiving the character of an apostle, received fully in

the Bishop as his successor, and in priests and deacons to a lesser degree as their assistants. And

what is this character of an Apostle? To act in the name of Christ in the ongoing mission entrusted

to him by his heavenly Father and which he continues to perform through his body the Church.

Conclusion

In the end, it is certainly the case that the power of orders and the power of jurisdiction are

united in that they flow from the one power of Christ. They flow from not simply from the

salvific act of the cross, but especially in the act of entrusting his mission to the Apostles. At the

same time, they relate to different realities both of Christ and the Church. The power of orders

reflects explicitly the Apostle as the inheritor of the power of Christ, to act in his name for the

salvation of souls. The power of jurisdiction, on the other hand, reflects the Apostle as established

by Christ within the new perfect society which is the Church, and to rule in his name. This

requires a more perfect relationship—the canonical mission—between the Church and the one

exercising this authority. For this reason, the more these two powers are related—especially in the

salus animarum—the more necessary it is that the one who wields such power wields them together

as a result of sacred ordination.

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CONCLUSION
The Gospels teach that the Second Person of the Holy Trinity became man and dwelt

among us so that, through his sacrificial act of loving obedience to the Father, humanity might be

redeemed. In the humanity of Christ is found the fullness of authority and power, flowing from

his divine personhood. At the same time, it not an authority and power of radical autonomy and

self-direction, but one of service to a mission. Jesus acts with authority and power not to exalt

himself, but to save fallen man.

This mission of Jesus culminates in the crucifixion, and at the same time must continue to

be perpetuated among mankind. From the crucified and resurrected body of Christ comes his

mystical body, which is the Church. Yet, within that body it is especially to his closest disciples,

the chosen twelve, that he extends in a unique way his own authority and power. Principally

among these is St. Peter, but in the history of the Church all of the Apostles are in some way

associated with the ancient foundations of the Church as she began to spread from Jerusalem.

From these arose their successors, the bishops of the Church, who in turn called to themselves

helpers—presbyters and deacons—to share in that mission of the Church.

They are made such not simply through election or designation, but through a sacrament

which conforms them more closely to Christ and which, in the case of sacerdos, makes him an alter

Christus. This sacrament is more than merely relational, it is ontological. It changes the soul of a

man and by doing so gives him the ability to so act in furtherance of the Christ’s mission. This has

been traditionally understood especially as the power to effect the transubstantiation of bread and

wine into the body and blood of Christ.

While the power to consecrate the sacred species has always been at the center of the power

of orders, it is not the totality of ordained ministry. So, too, the cleric, and especially the bishop,

has also traditionally been associated with the power to govern in the name of Christ. Unlike the

power of orders, this power of governance cannot be ontologically based, but is relational. One

may refer to the potestas iurisdictionis, but only if one also recognizes that its nature is markedly

90
different than the potestas ordinis. Despite this distinction, the Church has generally limited is

exercise to those legally recognized as clerics, and thus ordered to sacred ordination.

The Second Vatican Council added significantly to the understanding of Holy Orders and

especially their episcopal exercise. Rather than being simply the addition of jurisdiction, episcopal

consecration—or ordination—is the fullness of the sacrament of Holy Orders. Moreover, the

fullness is not understood only in a power bestowed, but as the gift of a sacred function—a true

munus in both senses of the term—or perhaps more precisely the gift of a triple munera of

sanctifying, teaching, and governing.

Moreover, the very existence of the sacrament of Holy Orders can only be comprehended

within the context of the community of believers in which it is placed. The Church is both made

up of her members and transcends them. The Church carried forward in time the eternal salvific

act of Christ. While the Church may be, in a certain sense, of men, she is made by God to carry out

his purpose. As such, she must be endowed with all that is necessary to fulfill that purpose.

It is precisely this notion of the completeness of the Church—the Church as societas

perfecta—that provides the framework to understand best the grant and exercise of the powers of

orders and jurisdiction. Like Christ, whose links together both supernatural power and divine

authority, so the Church through the Apostles and their successors continues to exercise—albeit in

a different way—supernatural power and divine authority. They have a common origin in Christ,

a common end in the salvation of souls, a common exercise through Holy Orders, and a common

nature as actions of the one same Church.

91
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