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2019-373 Record 132884 rc02
2019-373 Record 132884 rc02
2019-373 Record 132884 rc02
SUPREME COURT
OF FLORIDA
APPELLANT,
RECEIVED, 03/15/2019 09:23:38 AM, Clerk, Supreme Court
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
APPELLEE.
RECORD ON
APPEAL
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
THE HONORABLE JAMES HANKINSON
1
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY FLORIDA
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
3.851
INDEX
DATE FILED INSTRUMENT PAGE NO.
SEP 10, 2013 MOTION TO INCUR COSTS FOR PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR 39-40
SEP 10, 2013 ORDER AUTHORIZING THE DEFENSE TO INCUR COSTS FOR PRIVATE 41-42
INVESTIGATOR
MAR 13,2014 ORDER APPOINTING EXPERT FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION AND 49-51
NOTICE OF HEARING
MAR 14,2014 ORDER APPOINTING EXPERT FOR COMPTENCY EVALUATION AND 52-54
NOTICE OF HEARING
2
MAY21,2014 ORDER AUTHORIZING PAYMENT OF EXPERT WITNESS 81-
JUN 9, 2014 INTERIM MOTION TO INCUR COSTS FOR FEES, COSTS OR RELATED 82-85
EXPENSES
JUN 9, 2014 ORDER ON INTERIM MOTION TO INCUR FEES, COSTS OR RELATED 86-
EXPENSES
JUN 30, 2015 MOTION FOR CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND FOR OTHER 265-278
RELIEF
JUL I, 2015 ORDER DENYING STATE'S MOTION FOR AN ADDITIONAL CASE 279-280
MANAGEMENT
JUL24, 2015 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND INITIAL POSTCONVICTION MOTION 285-326
AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
JUL 28,2015 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 327-328
INITIAL POST CONVICTION MOTION
JUL 29, 2015 MOTION TO INCUR COSTS FOR EXPERT WITNESS FOR FORENSIC 329-336
PSYCHOLOGIST AND/OR MOTION TO DECLARE 27.71 I FLORIDA
STATUES INCONSTITUTIONAL AS CONFISCATORY
3
WL29, 2015 WSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE TO MOTION 349-351
FOR LEGAL EXPERT AND/OR MOTION TO DECLARE 27.711, FLORIDA
STATUTES AS CONFISCATORY AND MOTION TO INCUR COSTS FOR
EXPERT WITNESS FOR FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST AND/OR MOTION
TO DECLARE 27.711, FLORIDA STATUTES AS CONFISCATORY
AUG 24,2015 ORDER AUTHORIZING THE DEFENSE TO INCUR COSTS FOR 425-426
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST
JAN 12,2016 MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING, MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 445-456
MOTION FOR BRIEFING SCHEDULE
JAN 20, 2016 ORDER ON MOTION TO CONTINUE EVIDENTJARY HEARING, MOTION 461-462
FOR REHEARING AND MOTION FOR BRIEFING SCHEDULE
APR20, 2017 SECOND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND INITIAL POSTCONVJCTION 478-558
MOTION AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
4
APR27, 2017 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 559-
AMEND INITIAL POSTCONVICTION MOTION
MAY 15,2017 STATE'S ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR POST- 560-591
CONVICTION RELIEF
JUL 14,2017 UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 593-595
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
JUL 17, 2017 ORDER ON UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 596-
JUL 20,2017 MOTION TO INCUR COSTS RELEATED TO DR. THOMAS HYDE, M.D., 597-627
PH.D.
JUL 21,2017 AMENDED CLAIM 6 OF SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR POST- 628-632
CONVICTION RELIEF
AUG 14,2017 GARY HILTON'S AUGUST 14, 2017 EXHIBIT LIST 648-653
SEP 19, 2017 STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE PUBLIC DEFENDER TO PRODUCE 654-
HIS FILES/RECORDS RELEVANT TO THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF
INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL
SEP 19,2017 ORDER COMPELLING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE PUBLIC 655-
DEFENDER TO PRODUCE HIS FULES/RECORDS RELEVANT TO THE
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL
5
OCT 25,2018 UNOPPOSED MOTION TO TAKE TESTIMONY BY CONTEMPORANEOUS 669-671
VIDEO COMMUNICATION
OCT 30, 2018 GARY HILTON'S OCTOBER 30,2018 WITNESS LIST 673-675
OCT 30,2018 GARY HILTON'S OCTOBER 30, 2018 EXHIBIT LIST 676-678
OCT 30, 2018 STATE'S EXHIBIT 1 - DVD- VIDEO DEPO OF PAULA SAUNDERS
NOV 6, 2018 MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING COURT REPORTER(S) TO TRANSCRIBE 1008-1009
NOV 29,2018 TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING VOL I (OCT 30, 2018) 1011-1276
NOV 29,2018 TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING VOL 2 (OCT 31, 2018) 1277-1461
FEB 5, 2019 ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 1709-
FEB 6, 2019 GARY MICHAEL HILTON'S RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S JANUARY 28, 1710-1723
2019 AND ORDER AND PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
6
FEB 12, 2019 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION 1724-1736
RELIEF
7
MANDATE
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Case No.: SCll-898 :<~~g
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Your Case No.: 08-CF-697
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YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion,
the rule of this Court and the laws of the State ofFlorida.
WITNESS, The Honorable Ricky L. Polston, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Florida and the Seal ofsaid Court at Tallahassee, the Capital, on this 31st day of
July, 2013.
~R~
erk oftlit!SUjjYeme Court of Florida
No. SC 11-898
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
PERCURlAM.
Cheryl Dunlap disappeared from the Leon Sinks Geological Area in Leon
Apalachicola National Forest on December 15, 2007. Gary Hilton, who had been
seen in the area during that time, and who was convicted in Georgia for a similar
crime, was charged with her kidnapping and murder. After trial, the jury convicted
Hilton. After hearing penalty phase evidence, the jury unanimously recommended
the death penalty. The court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced
Hilton to death, finding six aggravating factors, one statutory mitigating factor, and
eight nonstatutory mitigating factors. This case is before the Court on appeal from
9
a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b )( 1), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we affirm
FACTS
On February 28, 2008, a Leon County grand jury indicted Gary Michael
Hilton for the first-degree murder of Cheryl Dunlap between December 1 and
December 15, 2007, kidnapping, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and grand theft of
currency. Hilton pleaded not guilty on March 14, 2008. Hilton proceeded to a jury
Cheryl Dunlap, 46, was last seen alive on December 1, 2007. That morning,
Dunlap called a friend, Kiona Hill, and made arrangements to have dinner with her
that evening. That afternoon, Dunlap went to Leon Sinks to read, where she was
seen by Michael and Vikki Shirley at approximately 1:30 p.m. The Shirleys
described that Dunlap was wearing jeans and a sweater and carrying a hardback
book. Dunlap did not arrive for dinner that evening and was missed at church the
following morning by Tanya Land. Land went to Dunlap's residence and found
her dog, but noticed that her car was missing so she called the police. Steven
Ganey of the Wakulla County Sheriffs Office took the missing person report on
December 3, 2007.
-2-
10
Dunlap's car, a white Toyota Carnry, was found on December 3, 2007, on
the side of Crawfordville Highway parked near the woods. The car had deliberate
tire punctures in the sidewall that was later identified as a bayonet piercing. On
December 1, the car had received a disabled vehicle ticket from Florida Highway
Patrol Trooper Brian Speigner. Ganey testified that it appeared that someone had
driven into the woods with all four tires intact and punctured the tire after the car
had been parked. Dunlap's purse was recovered in her car, but no money was
found.
Dunlap's Ameris Bank account records revealed that Dunlap cashed a check
revealed that three cash withdrawals were made at the A TM at Hancock Bank on
two attempted withdrawals were declined because they exceeded the daily limit.
The video from the security camera at the bank showed that the person making the
transactions was wearing a blue and white patterned, long-sleeved shirt, glasses, a
was hunting in the Apalachicola National Forest. Dunlap's body was near a forest
road and had been covered with some brush and limbs. Additionally, her head and
hands had been removed. Dunlap's body was identified using a sample of thigh
- 3-
11
muscle. Dr. Anthony Clarke, an associate medical examiner, performed the
autopsy. Dr. Clarke opined that Dunlap's head and hands had been removed by an
instrument with a sharp blade and that the dismemberment occurred postmortem.
The cause of death was not able to be detennined, but Dr. Clarke opined that it was
likely to have been a violent homicide. Additionally, Dr. Clarke noted that there
was a significant pre-mortem bruise located on Dunlap's middle to lower back and
that the bruise was not consistent with a normal fall injury. Dr. Clarke estimated
that Dunlap's body could have been in the woods for seven to fifteen days. Dr.
Clarke testified that his best estimate was that Dunlap died between December 5
remains of Dunlap's head and hands in a fire pit at Joe Thomas campsite--
approximately seven miles from where her body had been found. The bone
fragments were charred. Because of the burn damage, no DNA was recoverable
from the fragments. Dr. Anthony Falsetti, a forensic anthropologist, opined that
there were two hands represented, that the bones were from an adult, and that the
- 4-
12
Hilton asked Ferguson for a jump start because his van, a white Chevrolet Astro,
would not crank. Ferguson testified that it did not appear to him that Hilton
actually needed the assistance. Ethan Davis provided similar testimony, that
sometime in late November 2007, Hilton stopped him and asked for help starting
his vehicle. Davis declined. Shawn Matthews also encountered Hilton in late
November near his LL Wallace Road camp. Hilton appeared to be familiar with
the area and told Matthews about a nearby sinkhole. On December 1, 2007,
Celeste Hutchins saw Hilton on Crawfordville Highway, not far from Leon Sinks.
Hutchins testified that Hilton was rummaging through a white Camry on the side
wearing a blue and white patterned shirt. Hilton was also wearing something on
his left side that looked like a large knife holder. Mayfield testified that the shirt
she saw Hilton wearing looked like the one in the ATM security video. On
December 11, 2007, Stephen Prosser saw Hilton in the Apalachicola National
Forest. On December 12, 2007, Michael Travis saw Hilton in the forest near the
Bloxham cutoff and then saw him again on December 14. On December 18, 2007,
Teresa Johnson saw Hilton in Bristol, Florida, where Hilton told her that she
looked like Dunlap and that it was "too bad" about that girl getting murdered.
-5-
13
)'
his way to Georgia where he kidnapped and murdered Meredith Emerson. Hilton
took Emerson from Blood Mountain and held her for four days before murdering
her. He cooperated with law enforcement in exchange for a life sentence. Hilton
was arrested in Georgia after Stephen Shaw saw Hilton walk to the back of a
convenience store in the direction of the store's dumpsters and called law
and sheath, Hi-Tee boots, some chain, a padlock, gloves, a jacket, a folding police
baton, and a blue backpack. Hilton gave Georgia officials information on where to
find his bayonet on a hiking trail on Blood Mountain in North Georgia. Later, Jeff
Foggy, an FDLE tool mark expert, matched the bayonet to the puncture marks in
Dunlap's tire. Georgia law enforcement also gathered items from Hilton's van.
Items recovered from the van included clothing, jackets, gloves, camping
equipment, duffel bags, two sleeping bags, Hi-Tee boots, a camera, tobacco rolling
papers, Hilton's Georgia driver's license, tape, paper towels, maps, two BB pistols,
On February 12, 2008, Sergeant David Graham and Detective Dawn Dennis
with the Leon County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant on Hilton while
-6-
14
he was in custody in Georgia. Hilton's DNA was collected and the entire
execution of the warrant was recorded. Portions of the recording were played for
the jury.
On June 6, 2008, Sergeant Graham and two other officers drove Hilton from
Georgia to Florida. Although Hilton was not questioned, he spoke for nearly the
entire five-hour drive, which was recorded. The State also played portions of this
I'm not all bad. I mean, you got to understand, I mean, I'm sure you
can see. I mean, I'm a [expletive] genius, man. I'm not a-I'm not
all bad. I just, you know, lost my mind for a little bit. Lost a grip on
myself, man. What can I tell you? FBI and everybody else is trying
to scratch their head, hey, guys don't get started doing my shit at 61
years old. It just don't happen, you know. Like there's a retired FBI
(indecipherable) named Cliff Van, Clifford VanZandt, that keeps
getting himself in the news, talking about me. And he said, this guy
didn't just fall off the turnip truck, he said. You know, in other words,
he's been doing this. But like I told you before, you know, when I
saw you before, I said, remember, I said I'd give you one for free.
Nothing before September, okay? I mean, I'm not joking, okay? I
just, I got old and sick and couldn't make a living and just lost, flat
lost my [expletive] mind for a while, man. I couldn't get a grip on it.
Jail that were overheard by Correctional Officer Caleb Wynn. Specifically, Hilton
told inmate Summers that he could answer all the State Attorney's questions if he
would give him a life sentence, that he would reveal where the head was located,
that his bayonet was used on Dunlap's tire, that he would explain how he "pulled it
-7-
15
off" on a busy highway, that he spent a few hours or a few days with Dunlap, and
The penalty phase began on February 17, 2011, during which the state called
which Hilton pleaded guilty. The State played Hilton's taped conversation with
law enforcement where he described kidnapping Emerson, holding her captive, and
stripping her body naked to remove DNA and fiber evidence. He also stated that
psychological condition: Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist and clinical director of the
Brain Imaging Center at the University of California, Irvine; Dr. Charles Golden, a
pharmacist and professor; and nine lay witnesses. The State then called Dr. Greg
Prichard in rebuttal.
On February 21, 2011, the jury recommended unanimously that Gary Hilton
-8-
16
The trial court held the Spencer 1 hearing on April 7, 2011. The State
presented three victim impact witnesses: (1) Ms. Emma Blount, the victim's aunt;
(2) Laura Walker, the victim's best friend; and (3) Gloria Tucker, the victim's
The trial court found that the State had proven six aggravators beyond a
reasonable doubt. Assigning weight to each aggravator, the trial court found: (1)
the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony (great weight); (2) the
murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping (great weight); (3) the murder
was committed to avoid arrest (moderate weight); (4) the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain (some weight); (5) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and (6) the murder was cold, calculated, and
proposed by Hilton and found one statutory mental mitigating factor-at the time
of the murder Hilton was under extreme emotional distress (some weight). Under
the catch-all provision, the trial court considered ten mitigating factors, finding that
Hilton established eight of them and rejecting two. The court found: (1) Hilton
specifically Ritalin (some weight); (3) Hilton was deprived of a relationship with
-9-
17
his biological father (moderate weight); (4) Hilton is already serving a life sentence
so society is protected (some weight); (5) Hilton served his country in the US
military (very little weight); (6) Hilton suffered maternal deprivation and lack of
bonding between mother and child (some weight); (7) Hilton was removed from
his home and put into foster care when he was a child (some weight); (8) Hilton
grew up in a financially poor family (not proven); (9) Hilton suffered a traumatic
brain injury as a child (some weight); and (1 0) Hilton suffers from severe mental
On April 21, 2011, the trial court followed the jury's unanimous
Hilton argues that his statements to law enforcement during his transport
from Georgia to Florida should not have been introduced at trial because they
constitute inadmissible Williams 2 rule evidence because the statements were only
relevant to show his propensity to commit crime. The State argues that the trial ,
judge did not commit error in admitting the statements because Hilton did not state
Dunlap. The State argues further that even if the statements constitute collateral
- 10- 18
crime evidence, they were still admissible to prove premeditation. Because the
statements did not constitute similar fact or collateral crime evidence and were
explained in McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 786-87 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 131
[a]n appellate court will not disturb a trial court's determination that
evidence is relevant and admissible absent an abuse of discretion.
Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless precluded by a
specific rule of exclusion. There are two categories under which
evidence of uncharged crimes or bad acts will be admissible-similar
fact evidence, otherwise known as Williams rule evidence, and
dissimilar fact evidence. The requirements and limitations of section
90.404 govern similar fact evidence while the general rule of
relevancy set forth in section 90.402 governs dissimilar fact evidence.
Id.; see also McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2011) (internal citations omitted)
nonstop for the entire nearly five-hour drive. During this time, Hilton made
several statements that were played in front of the jury. At issue here, Hilton
stated, "like I told you before, you know, when I saw you before, I said, remember,
I said I'd give you one for free. Nothing before September, okay? I mean, I'm not
- 11 -
19
joking, okay?" Hilton also stated repeatedly that he had "lost his mind" for a
while. Hilton claims that these statements were evidence of collateral crimes.
Hilton's argument is without merit. The statements played for the jury did not
implicate Hilton in a collateral crime, nor did they constitute similar fact evidence.
Further, even if the statements constituted Williams rule evidence, they were
to law enforcement was ambiguous and did not directly implicate him in a
collateral crime. Hilton's statement that he began "hunting" in September did not
correlate with any known crime at the time of his trial. Nothing in Hilton's
statement implies that Dunlap was not his first victim or implicates Hilton in a
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. See
§ 90.404(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); see, e.g., Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543 (Fla.
Hilton argues that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Gregory Prichard to
testifY about allegations of Hilton's past criminal conduct during the penalty phase
- 12-
20
circumstances. The State argues that Dr. Prichard was called as a proper rebuttal
witness to dispute Hilton's claim that he had done nothing wrong prior to this
crime and that the change in his character was created by Ritalin. Because Hilton's
expert testimony opened the door for Dr. Prichard's testimony, we find that the
In~, we found that the State's "anticipatory rebuttal" was improper and
that nothing in the record supported the State's assertion that the defendant
"opened the door" to be questioned about specific acts of past violence. Id. at 90
(citing Hildwin, 531 So. 2d at 128). Here, however, Hilton's penalty phase
defense relied heavily on the assertion that Hilton was a law-abiding citizen prior
to his exposure to Ritalin. Dr. Prichard's testimony was provided in rebuttal to that
assertion. We therefore find that the testimony in this case when "[v]iewed in
- 13 -
21
context, ... was offered in rebuttal to the defense, not as a nonstatutory
aggravator." Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1208 (Fla. 2005). Accordingly, we
Witness §eqlllestration
Hilton argues that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Prichard to stay in
the courtroom, despite the sequestration rule. Because we find that the trial court
did not err in excluding Dr. Prichard from the sequestration rule, we deny relief on
this claim.
witnesses, but that the rule is not an absolute that must be invoked at the mere
request of counsel.· See Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1984) (citing
Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961)). Section 90.616(2)(c), Florida
party's attorney to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause, and the trial
court has wide discretion in making that determination. See Knight v. State, 746
Here, Dr. Prichard was permitted to stay in the courtroom upon the State's
request. Because the State was late filing its notice of intent to seek the death
penalty, Dr. Prichard was prevented from examining Hilton. The State requested
- 14-
22
that he be excluded from the sequestration rule to give Dr. Prichard a chance to
expert witnesses and did not serve as a fact witness. During cross-examination,
Dr. Prichard stated that he "sat through the entire penalty phase ... and handed
notes to Mr. Meggs." Accordingly, we find that Dr. Prichard's presence was
essential to the presentation of the State's cause and that the trial court did not
Aggravators
Hilton argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the HAC and
CCP aggravating circumstances and that the trial court erred in finding these
circumstances applied in Hilton's case. The State argues that the trial court
find competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's
'is to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of
law for each aggravating circumstance, and, if so, whether competent substantial
evidence supports its finding.' " Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1260-61 (Fla.
2004) (quoting Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997)); see also Heyne
v. State, 88 So. 3d 113, 122 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 574 (2012). In deciding
- 15-
23
'\
i
whether a lower court erred in its finding of an aggravator, we do not reweigh the
doubt but instead "review the record to determine whether the trial court applied
the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether
competent substantial evidence supports its finding." Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d
HAC
This Court has explained the meaning of the HAC aggravator as follows:
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973); see also Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d
1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998) ("The HAC aggravator applies only in torturous murders-
those that evince extreme and outrageous depravity as exemplified either by the
suffering of another."). This Court has also stated that"[ u]nlike the cold,
mind, intent and motivation of the defendant, the HAC aggravator focuses on the
- 16 -
24
means and manner in which death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances
surrounding the death." Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998) (citing
Stano v. State, 460 So. 2d 890, 893 (Fla. 1984)). Furthermore, we have held that
"[i]n determining whether the HAC factor was present, the focus should be upon
perpetrator." Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 369 (Fla. 2003); see also Heyne, 88
So. 3d at 122; McGirth, 48 So. 3d at 794. The victim's mental state may be
Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988). "[F]ear, emotional strain, and
terror of the victim during the events leading up to the murder may make an
otherwise quick death especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." James v. State, 695
So. 2d 1229, 1235 (Fla. 1997); see also Swafford, 533 So. 2d at 277; Hall, 87 So.
3d 671-72. Additionally, we have held that the actions ofthe defendant preceding
the actual killing are also relevant. Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1335 (Fla.
1997).
was held anywhere from 2 days to a week prior to her murder, and that she was
injured enough during that time to leave traces of her blood on several of Hilton's
items. The trial court's inferences that the victim was likely terrified, suffering
from emotional strain, or suffering during the time leading up to her murder are
- 17-
25
supported by our review of the record. Accordingly, we find that there is
competent, substantial evidence contained in the record to support the trial court's
finding of HAC.
OCP
state of mind, intent, and motivation of the defendant." Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d
277, 298 (Fla. 2009) (citing Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998)). The
trial court's determination of whether CCP is present in a case is based upon the
totality of the circumstances. Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 115 (Fla. 2008).
CCP can be proved by circumstantial evidence. Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561,
576-77 (Fla. 2004). CCP can be indicated by the circumstances showing such facts
277. It is the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder
was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an act of emotional frenzy or
- 18-
26
panic, or a fit of rage. Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 581 (Fla. 2007). " '[T]he
facts supporting CCP must focus on the manner in which the crime was executed,
matter of course.' " Id. (quoting Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 372). " 'Competent
assess[es] the record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its weight.'" McCoy v.
State, 853 So. 2d 396, 407 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922,
This Court has also found the heightened premeditation required to support
CCP where a defendant has a lengthy period of reflection and the opportunity to
abandon the plan but, instead, commits the murder. Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d
148, 162 (Fla. 1998). We explained in Alston that where the defendant had ample
opportunity to release the victim but instead, after substantial reflection, "acted out
the plan [he] had conceived during the extended period in which [the] events
704 So. 2d 500, 505 (Fla. 1997)) (citation omitted); see also Looney v. State, 803
- 19-
27
the manner of killing was not able to be established, the method of disposal of the
victim's body was calculated and carried out after a period of needed reflection.
Hilton's statements on the self-made video and to a fellow inmate describe being
with the victim for a long enough time for careful reflection. Accordingly, we find
that the trial court did not err in finding this aggravating factor.
Mitigatioltl.
Hilton argues that that trial court improperly rejected the lack of capacity
mitigating factor and failed to provide reasons why there is substantial, competent
evidence in the record to support the rejection of the mitigating circumstance. The
State argues that the trial court properly weighed the experts' testimonies and
In rejecting this mitigating factor, the trial court stated, "[t]he Court finds
that Dr. Prichard's testimony was more credible and more consistent with the other
evidence ih the case as to this point. The Court finds that this factor in mitigation
was not proven." A trial court may reject a defendant's claim that a mitigating
circumstance has been proven as long as the record contains competent substantial
evidence to support the trial court's rejection of the mitigation. See Spencer, 645
with the other evidence in the case. See Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1005 (Fla.
2006).
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Here, the testimony was not uncontroverted and, "[i]t is apparent from the ... trial
support of these factors but found this testimony unpersuasive." Roberts v. State,
519 So. 2d 885, 894 (Fla. 1987). Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.
Ring Claim
Hilton argues that this Court should re-examine its holdings in Bottoson v.
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002), and King v.
Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 657 (2002). Because Hilton
because Hilton had previously been convicted of a prior violent felony, we find his
request without merit. We have repeatedly rejected this argument when either
aggravating factor is present. See McMillian v. State, 94 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 2012),
cert. denied, 2013 U.S. Lexis 1305 (Feb. 19, 2013); Heyne v. State, 88 So. 3d 113,
120 n.2 (Fla. 2012); Kopsho v. State, 84 So. 3d 204, 220 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 190 (20 12); Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 540 (Fla. 201 0), cert. denied, 132
Sufficiency
Hilton does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
evidence to determine whether it is legally sufficient. See Crain v. State, 894 So.
- 21 -
29
2d 59, 72 (Fla. 2004) (" ... in capital cases, this Court independently assesses the
review of the record, we find that there is competent substantial evidence to sustain
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is
State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001) ("In determining the sufficiency of the
evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the
2007, and that on December 15, her decomposing body was found beheaded and
with her hands removed. Dunlap had been last seen on December 1, 2007, at Leon
Sinks National Park. Her car was located abandoned on Crawfordville Highway
on December 3 with a tire that had been punctured by an item later identified as
Dunlap's car and later identified that man as Gary Hilton. Witnesses spoke with
Hilton in surrounding areas during the time Dunlap was reported missing.
Witnesses identified the clothing Hilton was wearing during that time period. On
December 2, 3, and 4, a man matching Hilton's build and wearing clothing similar
- 22-
30
to that described by witnesses used Dunlap's ATM card and PIN at Hancock Bank
on Tennessee Street to remove a total of $700 from her bank account. In a self-
made video retrieved from a camera found in Hilton's possession, Hilton is shown
items and killing "those b*tches." Charred human bones, including a skull and
hand bones, were found in a fire pit near a campsite where Hilton was seen by
Shawn Matthews. In addition, this campsite also contained cigarette butts that
contained Hilton's DNA. Dunlap's DNA was found on articles recovered from
Hilton's van, including two sleeping bags, Hilton's duffel bag, some pants and on
the Hi-Tee boots Hilton was seen discarding. Hilton was overheard by law
enforcement telling a fellow inmate that he would tell them where the head was if
they would give him a life sentence. On the drive from Georgia to Florida, Hilton
told law enforcement that he had lost his mind, but hadn't done anything before
Proportionality
v. State, 869 So. 2d 1196, 1204 (Fla. 2004)); Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d 98 (Fla.
2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-8923 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2013). A review ofthe
- 23-
31
evidence demonstrates that the proportionality of Hilton's sentence of death is
proportionate.
Here, the jury's recommendation was unanimous. The trial court weighed
the six aggravators proven by the State against the mitigation proven by Hilton and
by competent, substantial evidence and the record "fails to reveal any indication
that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning little weight to the mitigation
that was established." Hampton, 103 So. 3d at 121. We find that the imposition of
the death sentence in this case is proportionate when compared to other death
sentences that this Court has upheld. See, e.g., Hildwin v. State, 727 So. 2d 193
(Fla. 1998) (four aggravators: HAC, prior violent felony, pecuniary gain, and under
mitigators); Johnston v. State, 841 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2002) (prior violent felony,
kidnapping, pecuniary gain, and HAC versus one statutory mitigator and twenty-
six nonstatutory mitigators); Suggs v. State, 923 So. 2d 419, 440 (Fla. 2005)
(sentence to death proportionate when the trial court found seven aggravating
factors and three mitigating factors, including one statutory mental mitigator and
this Court noted that the murder "particularly heinous and premeditated"); Owen v.
State, 862 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2003) (finding death sentence proportionate for 23 year
-24-
32
old defendant, despite the presence of three statutory mitigators, including both
mental mitigators and sixteen other mitigators where there was evidence of
multiple stab wounds and the presence of multiple aggravators, including HAC,
CCP, and a conviction for another murder); Rose v. State, 787 So. 2d 786 (Fla.
Conclusion
death. It is so ordered.
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender and William Carl McLain, Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
- 25-
33
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
-26-
34
~upreme C!Court of jfloriba
WEDNESDAY, JULY 31,2013
Appellant(s) Appellee(s)
A True Copy
Test:
~alf-tltdl
Clerk, Supreme Court
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.....
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Served: o,-,o
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HON. CHARLES A. FRANCIS, CHIEF JUDGE ---inzo
HON. WILLIAM N. MEGGS
:<SNcn
-,-tm
,-,..,::o
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GARY MICHAEL HILTON OC)
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WILLIAM CARL MCLAIN .C)_,
l> U1
CAROLYN M. SNURKOWSKI
HON. JAMES C. HANKINSON, JUDGE
HON. BOB INZER, CLERK
35
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Defendant.
------------------~'
ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT
Pursuant to the directive from the Supreme Court of Florida in Case No. SCll-898 issued
on Wednesday, July31, 2013, it is ORDERED that Robert Alex Morris, 1123 N. Bronough Street,
Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6007, an attorney on the registry for the Second Judicial Circuit who is
duly qualified to handle capital cases is hereby appointed to represent the Defendant, Gary M.
Hilton, in any postconviction proceedings in this case and any other matters related thereto.
CHARLES A. FRANCIS
Chief Judge
r-
Honorable William N. Meggs, State Attorney
Honorable Bob Inzer, Clerk of Courts, Leon County
Robert Alex Morris, Esq. m
ca CJ
U1
•.0
CD .
u
36
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Defendant.
I
Pursuant to the directive from the Supreme Court of Florida in Case No. SCII-898 issued
on Wednesday, July 31, 2013, it is ORDERED that the Honorable James C. Hankinson, a Circuit
Judge in and for the Second Judicial Circuit who is duly qualified to handle capital cases is hereby
assigned to the above-styled case to handle anypostconviction proceedings in said case and any other
DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida this 9th day of August, 2013.
CHARLES A. FRANCIS
Chief Judge
37
Sep. 3. 2013 !1:22AM T~r MORRIS LAW FIRM No. 0822 P. 2/2
STATE OF FLORIDA,
vs.
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
-..
COMES NOW, the undersigned attorney, and files this Notice Of Appearance
All future correspondence shall be addressed to: ROBERT A. MORRIS, Esquire, The
Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, 1123 North Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida
32303.
DELIVERY, to: State Attorney's Office, 301 S. Monroe Street, 4tl' Floor Leon County
Courthouse, Leon County, Florida, 32301 on this 3'd day of September, 2013.
~A.6
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
ll'-3 No1•th Rronough Stroot
Tallahassee, Florida 32303
(850) 792-1111 Facsimile (850) 792-1113
Attorney for Defendant
COURT APPOINTED
38
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through the undersigned counsel, and moves to
incur costs for a defense private investigator and in support thereof, shows the following:
1. The Defendant is indigent and the undersigned was appointed by the Court to
-&- r ~-)
represent the De,endant. "'-'-- ,,)
~b.;
.-·V
(f)
~- T"(
fJ :~·:·:: ·.-. ~--o
2. The defense requires the assistance of Jordan Research & Consultiiitito-assi&J,jn
. ! ' ) ·-·, ..:' '
:-< ~~;: I'• . -
preparing the defense of this matter including but not limited to intervie¥fli)g\ihd
§~;~:·;
locating witnesses, locating documents, performing background checks, i!ira:
researching factual issues.
WHEREFORE, the defense requests this Court enter an order authorizing the defense to
incur costs for a private investigator as set forth above at the rates established by law.
39
, ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
1123 North Bronough Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32303
(850) 792-1111 Facsimile (850) 792-1113
alex@ramlawyer.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served by
U.S. Mail: Office of the State Attorney, 4th Floor, 301 South Monroe St., Tallahassee, FL 32301
OOQ!b
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
40
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
13 SEP l 0 Pf1 2: 57
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FL
G-OG
BOB lt-IZER
CLERI\ CIRCUIT COURT
LED?~ COUNTY. FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
CASE NO.: 2008CF697 A
THIS CAUSE having coming before the Court upon the Motion to Incur Costs for
investigative services with Jordan Research& Consulting, Inc. in the above entitled cause; and
this Court having reviewed the Motion and the response of the Justice Administrative
Commission, the Court finds that the defense has shown that the assistance of a private
41
and researching factual issues. An investigator is not a substitute for a
4. Should Jordan Research& Consulting, Inc. desire direct payment from the
must comply with all policies and procedures of the Justice Administrative
5. The Defendant is liable to pay the amount of any due process costs
the Defendant.
+4.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County on this ( D day of September,
2013.
JAMES C. HANKINSON
CIRCUIT JUDGE
Copies:
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ
Attorney for Defendant
GEORGIA CAPPLEMAN
Assistant State Attorney
JORDAN RESEARCH & CONSULTING, INC.
42
IN Tl-IE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
v. DIY.: FELONY
for the defense investigator in this Capital Collateral case. Counsel has not exceeded the
$15,000 cap authorized in Section 27.711(5), Florida Statutes, for investigation expenses in this
case.
2. JAC notes that Counsel has indicated that he will soon meet the qualifications for
placement on the Capital Collateral Registry of attorneys eligible for appointment to capital
collateral postconviction cases, and has assured JAC that once he is placed on the registry he will
execute the JAC Agreement for Attorney Services for Private Capital Collateral Counsel (JAC
Agreement). No payments for fees or costs can be made until Counsel executes the JAC
Agreement.
3. JAC may only pay for investigation costs as provided by in Section 27.711(5), Florida
Statutes.
4. Pursuant to the uniform statewide rates, the rates for investigators cannot exceed $40 per
hour.
Page 1
43
5. As required by Florida law, any private investigator providing services in Florida must
have a Class C license from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and be
6. If any providers require direct payment, the JAC's procedures require the vendor to
execute the appropriate contract and follow JAC' s billing and audit procedures to obtain
payment.
7. Pursuant to the JAC Agreement, a11.y direct payment to a due process vendor is
contingent upon Counsel providing any and all necessary documentation in support of a billing
to JAC in an expeditious fashion. Counsel shall promptly review any billing for direct payment
to a due process vendor for accuracy and completeness and must certify that the work was
satisfactorily performed. In the event JAC issues a deficiency notice regarding any billing,
Counsel or the due process provider shall promptly resolve the deficiency so that JAC can
process the billing for payment. The order should reflect that Counsel must comply with all JAC
policies and procedures in the submission of billings to JAC for direct payment to a due process
vendor.
8. JAC does not request to participate in any hearing set on this motion. Should the Court
WHEREFORE, the JAC requests this Court, should it grant the Defendant's motion, also
include in its order the specific due process services authorized, as well as hourly or per unit
rates and maximum fees approved, and that the provider be paid in accordance with rates, terms
and conditions set forth by Florida Statutes, and the JAC Agreement, policies and procedures.
Page 2
44
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been sent by
th
facsimile, email and/or U.S. Mail on this Jj_ day of September, 2013 to:
Honorable Charles A. Francis
301 S. Monroe St. Room 365-K
Tallahassee FL 3230 I
Respectfully submitted,
Justic Administrative C m
P.O. Box 1654
Tallahassee, FL 32302
Tel.:850-488-2415
pleadings@justiceadmin.org
Florida Bar No.: 0714224
Page 3
45
Filing# 11124255 Electronically Filed 03/10/2014 10:18:47 AM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DIVISION: FELONY
GARY M. IDLTON,
DOB: 11/22/1946
Defendant.
------------~------~'
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Gary M. Hilton, and moves this Honorable Court to
appoint no more than three (3) and no less than two (2) mental health experts to examine the
1. The undersigned attorney has doubts that the Defendant has the ability to understand
the nature of the proceedings against him, to assist in the preparation of his defense
2. The undersigned has had personal interactions (face to face) with the Defendant as
Defendant's thinking is not concrete. He appears detached from reality. Some of his
expressions are irrational in nature. His thinking is often grandiose if not delusional.
46
currently being prescribed an uilknown regimine of medications for some of these
illnesses.
3. The Defendant has also disclosed certain generative medical conditions that impact
4. There will be factual matters in dispute that will require the Defendant's participation
and potential testimony. Among them will be his previous interactions with trial
counsel and the nature of those discussions as well as any input and advice he was
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays this Honorable Court will enter an Order to have
I HEREBY CERTIFY that this.motion is made in good faith and on reasonable grounds
47
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3rd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, tallahassee, FL, and Capital Appeals
Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on
48
FILED IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY,
14 MAR 13 AM 10: 42 FLORIDA.
STATE OF FLORIDA
C-06 SPN: 197149
BOBINZE:R
VS.
CL~ER!{ & COMP1"ROLL£R
~oN COUNTY. FLORIDA Case Number(s) 2008CF697 A
GARY HILTON
Division: A
Defendant
THIS CAUSE having come to be heard before this Court, and the competency of the
Defendant to proceed at any material stage of criminal proceeding, to wit:
having been raised in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3.210(b), Fla. R.Crim. P., and, further,
the court having reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendant may be incompetent to proceed
and that an evaluation should be scheduled to examine this Defendant, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The following individuals are hereby appointed as expert to examine the Defendant in
accordance with the requirements of law and this Order:
DR. WILLIAM OGLESBY PSYD
2. The expert appointed in Paragraph 1., above, shall examine the Defendant in accordance with
the provisions ofs. 916.12, Fla. Stat., and s. 916.13, Fla. Stat., Rules 3.211(a) and (b) and 3.212(3),
Fla. R.Crim. P., and report relative to the following issues:
(a) Whether the Defendant is competent to proceed for the purpose indicated above, pursuant to
the criteria set forth ins. 916.12, Fla. Stat., and Rule 3.211(a), Fla. R.Crim. P.; that is, whether the
defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings
against him. In considering the issue of the Defendant's competence to proceed, said experts shall
consider and include in their report the following factors and any others deemed relevant by the experts:
49
The defendant's capacity to:
[2] Appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties, if applicable, which may be imposed
in the proceedings against him;
(b) If the expert should find the Defendant is incompetent to proceed, then the experts shall report
on any recommended treatment for the defendant to attain competence to proceed, including the
least restrictive setting in which to receive the treatment. In considering the issues relating to treatment,
the examining expert shall report on the following factors:
(1.) The mental illness causing the incompetence;
(2.) The likelihood that the defendant is manifestly incapable of surviving alone or with the help of
willing and responsible family or friends, including available alternative services, and, without treatment,
the defendant is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for herself or himself and such neglect or
refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to the defendant's well-being; and whether
there is a substantial likelihood that in the near future the defendant will inflict serious bodily harm on
herself or himself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or
threatening such harm.
(3.) The treatment or treatments appropriate for the mental illness of the defendant, and an
explanation of each of the possible treatment alternatives in order of choices;
(4.) The availability of acceptable treatment. If treatment is available in the community, the
expert shall so state in the report;
(5.) The likelihood of the defendant attaining competence under the treatment recommended,
an assessment of the probable duration of the treatment required to restore competence, and the
probability that the defendant will attain competence to proceed in the foreseeable future.
(6.) An assessment of the Defendant's risk for being released into the community.
3. Any written report submitted by the experts shall contain the following:
(a.) The report shall identify the specific matters referred for evaluation.
(b.) The report shall describe the evaluative procedures, techniques and tests used in the examination
and the purpose or purposes for each.
50
(c.) The report shall state the expert's clinical observations, findings and opinions on each issue referred
for evaluation by the court, and indicate specifically those issues, if any, on which the expert could not
give an opinion.
(d.) The report shall identify the sources of information used by the expert and present the factual basis
for the experts' clinical findings and opinions.
4. The experts appointed above shall submit their written reports directly to this Court with copies to
the Attorney for the State, the Attorney for the Defendant, and the Court Mental Health Coordinator
.!!.!!..
or before the 1st day of April, 2014.
5. This cause is scheduled for a hearing on the issue of the Defendant's competency to proceed at
10:30 AM on the 18th day of March, 2014.
It is further ordered that Apalachee Center Inc., Prison Health Services, Tallahassee Memorial
Behavioral Health Care, Ability 1st, Agency For Persons with Disabilities, The Florida
Department of Children and Families, or any other treating agency shall provide the above
appointed expert/s with copies of the defendant's clinical, psychiatric, psychological, and/or medical
records within seven (7) days of receipt of this order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tallahassee Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of March, 2014.
James Hankinson
t Judge
Kendra Brown: Court Mental Health Coor, Rm 203, Leon County Courthouse
51
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FILED SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY,
FLORIDA.
14 MAR I 4 AM II: 24
STATE OF FLORIDA
SPN: 197149
C-OG
vs. BOBIHZER
CLERK 8, COMPTROLLER Case Number(s) 2008CF697A
GARY HILTON LEON COUIHY. FLORIDA
Division: A
Defendant
THIS CAUSE having come to be heard before this Court, and the competency of the
Defendant to proceed at any material stage of criminal proceeding, to wit:
~- pre-trial hearings
_..__ entry of a plea
-~- the trial of the case
_it_ sentencing
- - violation of probation or community control proceedings
having been raised in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3.210(b), Fla. R.Crim. P., and, further,
the court having reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendant may be incompetent to proceed
and that an evaluation should be scheduled to examine this Defendant, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The following individuals are hereby appointed as expert to examine the Defendant in
accordance with the requirements of law and this Order:
DR. WILLIAM OGLESBY PSYD and DR. BRADY LEE HUDSON PHD
2. The expert appointed in Paragraph 1., above, shall examine the Defendant in accordance with
the provisions of s. 916.12, Fla. Stat., and s. 916.13, Fla. Stat., Rules 3.211(a) and (b) and 3.212(3),
Fla. R.Crim. P., and report relative to the following issues:
(a) Whether the Defendant is competent to proceed for the purpose indicated above, pursuant to
the criteria set forth ins. 916.12, Fla. Stat., and Rule 3.211(a), Fla. R.Crim. P.; that is, whether the
defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings
against him. In considering the issue of the Defendant's competence to proceed, said experts shall
consider and include in their report the following factors and any others deemed relevant by the experts:
52
The defendant's capacity to:
[2] Appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties, if applicable, which may be imposed
in the proceedings against him;
(b) If the expert should find the Defendant is incompetent to proceed, then the experts shall report
on any recommended treatment for the defendant to attain competence to proceed, including the
least restrictive setting in which to receive the treatment. In considering the issues relating to treatment,
the examining expert shall report on the following factors:
(1.) The mental illness causing the incompetence;
(2.) The likelihood that the defendant is manifestly incapable of surviving alone or with the help of
willing and responsible family or friends, including available alternative services, and, without treatment,
the defendant is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for herself or himself and such neglect or
refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to the defendant's well-being; and whether
there is a substantial likelihood that in the near future the defendant will inflict serious bodily harm on
herself or himself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or
threatening such harm.
(3.) The treatment or treatments appropriate for the mental illness of the defendant, and an
explanation of each of the possible treatment alternatives in order of choices;
(4.) The availability of acceptable treatment. If treatment is available in the community, the
expert shall so state in the report;
(5.) The likelihood of the defendant attaining competence under the treatment recommended,
an assessment of the probable duration of the treatment required to restore competence, and the
probability that the defendant will attain competence to proceed in the foreseeable future.
(6.) An assessment of the Defendant's risk for being released into the community.
3. Any written report submitted by the experts shall contain the following:
(a.) The report shall identify the specific matters referred for evaluation.
(b.) The report shall describe the evaluative procedures, techniques and tests used in the examination
and the purpose or purposes for each.
53
(c.) The report shall state the expert's clinical observations, findings and opinions on each issue referred
for evaluation by the court, and indicate specifically those issues, if any, on which the expert could not
give an opinion.
(d.) The report shall identify the sources of information used by the expert and present the factual basis
· for the experts' clinical findings and opinions.
4. The experts appointed above shall submit their written reports directly to this Court with copies to
the Attorney for the State, the Attorney for the Defendant, and the Court Mental Health Coordinator
Q!!..
or before the 3rd day of April, 2014.
5. This cause is scheduled for a heariug on the issue of the Defeudaut's competency to proceed at
10:30 AM ou the 18th day of March, 2014.
It is further ordered that Apalachee Ceuter Iuc., Prisou Health Services, Tallahassee Memorial
Behavioral Health Care, Ability 1st, Ageucy For Persons with Disabilities, The Florida
Department of Children aud Families, or any other treating ageucy shall provide the above
appointed expert/s with copies of the defendant's clinical, psychiatric, psychological, and/or medical
records within seven (7) days of receipt of this order.
James Hankinson
it Judge
Appointed Experts: DR. WILLIAM OGLESBY PSYD and DR. BRADY LEE HUDSON PHD
Kendra Brown: Court Mental Health Coor, Rm 203, Leon County Courthouse
54
FILED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
14 MAR 18 PM 2: 58 IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY,
C-06
FLORIDA.
80BINZ£R
STATE OF FLORI1SW::R K& COMPJ'ROLLER SPN: 197149
. t:EtJ 11 COLIIHY. FLORIDA
VS. Case Nos.: 2008CF697A
Defendant
_______;
AMENDED ORDER APPOINTING EXPERT FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION
AND
NOTICE OF HEARING
THIS CAUSE having come to be heard before this Court, and the
proceeding, to wit:
pre-trial hearings
entry of a plea
sentencing
defendant is necessary
having been raised in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3.85l(g), Fla.
R.Crim. P., and, further, the court having reasonable grounds to believe that
55
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
examine the Defendant in accordance with the requirements of law and this
Order: Dr. Brady Lee Hudson PhD. and Dr. Salvatore Blandino PhD.
3.2ll(a), (b) and 3.212(3), and 3.85l(g), Fla. R.Crim. P., and report relative to
indicated above, pursuant to the criteria set forth ins. 916.12, Fla. Stat., and
Rule 3.2ll(a), Fla. R.Crim. P.; that is, whether the defendant has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
competence to proceed, said experts shall consider and include in their report
the following factors and any others deemed relevant by the experts:
56
(b) If the expert should find the Defendant is incompetent to proceed,
then the experts shall report on any recommended treatment for the defendant
incompetence;
surviving alone or with the help of willing and responsible family or friends,
is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for herself or himself and such
neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to the
near future the defendant will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or himself
in order of choices;
57
treatment required to restore competence, and the probability that the
(6) An assessment of the Defendant's risk for being released into the
community.
following:
(a.) The report shall identify the specific matters referred for evaluation.
(b.) The report shall describe the evaluative procedures, techniques and
tests used in the examination and the purpose or purposes for each.
(c.) The report shall state the expert's clinical observations, findings and
opinions on each issue referred for evaluation by the court, and indicate
specifically those issues, if any, on which the expert could not give an opinion.
(d.) The report shall identify the sources of information used by the
expert and present the factual basis for the experts' clinical findings and
opinions.
directly to this Court with copies to the Attorney for the State, the Attorney for
the Defendant, and~ Office of the Attorney General- Capital Appeals Bureau
58
5. This cause is scheduled for a hearing on the issue of the
agency shall provide the above appointed expertjs with copies of the
James Hankinson
Circuit Judge
Kendra Brown: Court Mental Health Coor, Rm 203, Leon County Courthouse
59
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
vs
GARY HILTON,
Defendant.
THIS CAUSE having come before the court on its own motion to pay expert fees, it is hereby
Dr. Brady Lee Hudson was appointed by the Court on March 18, 2014 to evaluate the above
defendant for competency. Accordingly, the State of Florida is hereby authorized to pay to the
above-named expert the sum of $1,650.00 for his services in this case. \A.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Tallahassee, Florida, this l ~* day of May,
2014.
Circuit Judge
·• ·':' ,; .:~
Copies to:
81
Filing# 14569373 Electronically Filed 06/09/2014 12:02:47 PM f
I ;
I.
GARY M. HILTON
Defendant.
------------------~'
INTERIM MOTION TO INCUR COSTS FOR FEES. COSTS
OR RELATED EXPENSES
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel, pursuant to §27.711 (4), Florida Statutes and
respectftill y requests the entry of an order authorizing interim payment of attorney's fees and
2. The above-styled case has reached such a point to §27.711 (4) (a), Florida
of $2500.00 for billable time between the appointment of counsel and the filing of
a notice of appearance.
undersigned provided services during that period of time in the form of attorney's
fees.
82
t~P J
\
.i
4. Exhibit A shows 19.9 hours of time billed at $100.00 per hour for a total of
$1990.00, in court cost of 1.0 hours of time billed at $100.00 per hour fortota1 of
$100.00 and costs incurred for delivery of 109 boxes of discovery files from
Public Defenders office, costs of ring binder and tabs for a total of $463.94.
5. The Justice Administrative Commission has reviewed Exhibit A and they have no
WHEREFORE, the undersigned would respectfully request this Court for entry an order
RESPECTFULL
«fl
OBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
1123 North Bronough Street
Tallahassee, Florida 3 23 03
(850) 792-1111 Facsimile (850) 792-1113
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
COURT APPOINTED
83
./
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served BY
HAND DELIVERY to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3rd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, and by ELECTRONIC
Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Capital Appeals Bureau,
RE
84
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION
Peat Office Box 1654 (32302)
227 North Bronaugh Street, Suite 2100
Tallahassee, Flortda 32301
LETTER OF NO OBJECTION
6/9/2014
Pursuant to s. 27.711, F.S., the Justice Administrative Commission (JAC) has reviewed your
intended billing, affidavit and documentation for completeness and compliance with contractual
and statutory requirements in the above matter. Your motion to the Court to approve
compensation must specify whether JAC objects to any portion of the billing or the sufficiency of
documentation.
JAC has no objection to your billing for attorney fees in the amount of $2,090.00 in that this
amount does not exceed the $2,500.00 cap set forth ins. 27.711(4)(a), F.S.
JAC does not object to reimbursement of $172.70 for payment to Quill and $14.60 for your
payment to Stapes, however your request for reimbursement for $288.69 for payment to Leon
County is supported by a copy of your check in the amount of $286.69, therefore JAC does not
object to reimbursement in the amount of $286.69 for a total reimbursable amount of $473.99.
JAC notes that this amount does not exceed the $15,000.00 cap for miscellaneous expenses
set forth ins. 27.711(6), F.S. JAC does not request a hearing on your motion, and if a hearing
is scheduled, JAC does not request notice and will not appear in court.
Pursuant to Section 27.711 (13), F.S., the fact that JAC has not objected to any portion of a
billing or to the sufficiency of the documentation is not binding on the court, which retains
primary authority and responsibility for determining the reasonableness of all billings for fees,
costs, and related expenses, subject to statutory limitations.
When you file your Motion for Compensation, specify that JAC objects to portions of the billing.
You must attach a copy of this letter for the Court's determination of your fee.
Once you have obtained your order awarding attorney fees, please forward it to JAC for
payment.
The Justice Administrative Commission administratively serves the offices of Slate Attorney, Public Defender,
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, the Statewide Guardian ad Litem Program, and the Criminal Conflict and ClvU
Regional Counsel; and provides compliance and financial review of court appointed attorney due process costs.
85
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECONDJUDICIALCIRCUIT IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FL
STATE OF FLORIDA,
THIS CAUSE having come before the Court upon the Defendant's Interim
Motion to Incur Fees, Costs or Related Expenses and good cause having been shown, it is
hereby,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Interim Motion to Incur fees, Costs or
Related Expenses is hereby GRANTED and the Defense is authorized to receive interim
ESC. HANKINSON,
RCUIT JUDGE
86
. \ IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
PH \2· 4 SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT.
--------------------------~'
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel pursuant to Rule 3.851, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and files this Motion for
Post-Conviction Relief and as grounds therefore would state and allege as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Defendant shall be referred to as the "Defendant." The State shall be referred to as
the "State." Any references to the Record shall be referred to by the designation "R" and the
appropriate volume and page number designations. In some instances, the volumes of the
Record are broken up and referred to by different stages of the proceedings (e.g. "Jury Selection,
Trial, Sentencing, etc ... ). In those cases, any references shall be referred to by the designation
"R" followed by the proceeding and the appropriate page number designation (e.g. R, Jury
Selection, 6). There will be references to documents and matters that will be made part of the
instant Motion without citation or reference. This is due to Rule 3.851, Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure proving to be an unworkable "rule." The demands of the "rules" invite the
87
assembly of a document (a motion for post-conviction relief) in a relative! y short period of time
without the benefit of having all of the available references. Some of this is due to the concern
of filing the appropriate pleading/s within the jurisdictional time periods required to preserve
state remedies as well as federal remedies. Nonetheless, the undersigned will do his best to
direct the Court's attention, and that of opposing counsel, to the appropriate references.
The Defendant was charged by Indictment on February 28, 2008 for First Degree
Murder, Grand Theft Motor Vehicle, Kidnapping and Grand Theft. (Ex. A). The Office of the
Public Defender for the Second Judicial Circuit filed a motion on March 5, 2008) seeking
appointment in the instant case. (Ex. B). An order granting the motion was entered on the same
date despite the State's somewhat dubious motion filed the next day asserting that the Defendant
didn't follow procedures or was not entitled to counsel. 1 (Ex. C). Nevertheless, the trial court
rectified the situation and entered an amended order of appointment. (Ex. D). The State filed
their Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty on July 28, 2008. (Ex. E). The matter was
called on for trial and Jury Selection was conducted between January 31, 2011 and February 2,
2011. (R, Jury Selection, 1-1083). The "guilt phase" commenced on February 4, 2011 and
concluded on February 15, 2011. (R, Trial-Guilt Phase, 1-1609). The jury returned a verdict of
guilty of First Degree Murder (interrogatory verdict of premeditation and felony murder),
Kidnapping (interrogatory verdict of proof of intent to facilitate a felony and to inflict bodily
harm or terrorize and Grand Theft. (Ex. F). The jury found the Defendant not guilty of Grand
1
It is troublesome that the genesis of our "adversarial" legal process contemplates that it is completely acceptable
for the prosecutorial body (the State) to attempt to deprive an accused of any representation while the State tties to
build and mount a case that involves the interrogation and confrontation of the defendant despite watershed holdings
such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
. 2-
88
Theft Motor Vehicle. (Ex. F). The "penalty phase" commenced on February 17,2011 and
concluded on February 21, 2011. (R, Jury Trial- Penalty Phase, 1-758). The jury returned an
advisory verdict of 12-0 recommending the imposition of the death penalty. (Ex. G). A
"Spencer Hearing" was conducted on April7, 2011. (R, Spencer Hearing, 1-48). The Defendant
was adjudicated guilty on April 21, 2011 and sentenced to Death for Count I. (R, Sentencing, 1-
6, Ex. H, Ex I). The Defendant was sentenced to Life on Count II and five (5) years on Count
IV; each sentence to run consecutively. (R, Sentencing, 1-6, Ex. H, Ex I). The Defendant timely
The Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida who rendered their opinion on
March 21, 2013 in Hilton v. State, 117 So .3d 742 (Fla. 2013) (not final until the period for
moving for re-hearing). See Rule 9.330, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure). In the opinion,
the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the convictions and death sentence and addressed the
5) HAC
6) CCP
7) Mitigation (Argument that trial court erred in finding lack of capacity nofproven)
8) Ring Claim
.3.
89
10) Proportionality (Independent duty by Court to review and finding of proportionate)
(Ex. K).
The Defendant filed a motion for rehearing on April 2, 2013 which was denied on July 2,
2013. The Mandate was issued on July 31,2013. The United States Supreme Court denied a
Petition for Certiorari on December 2, 2013. Hilton v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 686 (2013). (Ex. L).
ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of Florida has explained that for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims to be successful, two factors must be established: First, the claimant must identify
particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of
reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear,
substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and
reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. Bolin v. State, 41
So.3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927,932 (Fla. 1986)).
This articulation came based on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The deficiency prong of Strickland "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. There is a strong presumption that
counsel's performance was not ineffective, and it is up to the defendant to present evidence to
overcome this presumption. ld. at 689. "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
. 4.
90
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's
The prejudice prong of Strickland is established where a defendant shows that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
confidence in the outcome." Franqui v. State, 59 So.3d 82, 95 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Strickland,
Defense counsel undoubtedly has a duty to discuss potential strategies with a defendant.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,688, !04 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). It has
been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court that denial of responsibility or
commission of offenses during the guilt phase can compromise the defense's ability to persuade
the jury during the penalty phase. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct 551 (2004). It is
conceded counsel is not required to obtain the defendant's consent to "every tactical decision."
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,417-418, 108 S.Ct. 646,98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (an attorney has
authority to manage most aspects of the defense without obtaining his client's approval).
trial strategies, particularly where evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Prosecutors are more likely
-5-
91
to seek the death penalty, and to refuse to accept a plea to a life sentence, when the evidence is
overwhelming and the crime heinous. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 299, 329 (1983). In such cases, "avoiding
execution [may be] the best and only realistic result possible." ABA Guidelines for the
Where guilt is overwhelming, defense counsel must reasonably decide to focus on the
trial's penalty phase, at which time counsel's mission is to persuade the trier that his client's life
should be spared. Where defense counsel is unable to negotiate a guilty plea in exchange for a
life sentence, defense counsel must strive at the guilt phase to avoid a counterproductive course.
See Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different? 42 Mercer L.Rev.
695, 708 (1991) ("It is not good to put on a 'he didn't do it' defense and a 'he is sorry he did it'
mitigation. This just does not work. The jury will give the death penalty to the client and, in
essence, the attorney."); Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial
Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 Cornell L.Rev. 1557, 1589-1591 (1998)
(interviews of jurors in capital trials indicate that juries approach the sentencing phase
guilt-phase defense); id., at 1597 (in capital cases, a "run-of-the-mill strategy of challenging the
prosecution's case for failing to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" can have dire
implications for the sentencing phase). In this light, counsetcannot be deemed ineffective for
attempting to impress the jury with his candor and his unwillingness to engage in "a useless
charade." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-657, n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657
(1984).
- 6-
92
Justice Ginsburg, delivering the Opinion for the Court in Nixon, noted:
In Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037 (Fla. 2000), the Florida Supreme Court held that
"strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have
been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of
In the instant case, there were "strategic issues" that were incredibly problematic. They
were not strategic at all; they were without strategy. The "defense" apparently formulated a
"strategy" that the argument should be posited that the Defendant did not commit the crimes with
which he was charged in the face of the evidence. (R. Trial, Guilt Phase, 47-55, 1529-1560).
Thereafter, and upon conviction, it was determined (or predetermined) that the argument should
be asserted that Defendant should be the recipient of a life sentence due to mitigators and/or the
absence of aggravators. (R. Trial, Penalty Phase, 36-747). The conflicting defense theories
served to assure the rejection of counsels' arguments as well as any and all of the Defendant's
mitigation which may have served to avoid the recommendation of imposition of the death
penalty. This cannot be said to be strategy given the norms among advocates in death penalty
litigation. There is nothing strategic about the competing presentations. In fact, it is to the
contrary.
.7.
93
Compounding matters further, counsel did not have discussion with the Defendant about
the merits, positives and negatives about making arguments in the differing phases of the trial
that were "in the alternative." The Defendant would not have allowed the presentation of his
defense, in the manner presented, had he been afforded the opportunity to ascertain knowledge of
Given the foregoing, counsel was ineffective in representing the Defendant. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). There is a
reasonable probability that the outcome in the proceedings would have been different if counsel
had not embarked on their divergent defense. See Id. The Defendant's convictions and sentence
should be vacated.
"[M]any public defenders will be motivated by their ardent belief in the constitutional
values that the public defender upholds. At some point, however, abstract theoretical
justifications fall short in the face of reality. For example, defenders who are motivated by a
belief that no individual is guilty until proven so, soon find that such moral indeterminacy does
not comport with their daily experiences." Charles J. Ogletree, Jr:, Beyond Justification:
-8-
94
Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, April1993 Harvard L.Rev. 1239 (citations
omitted). 2
Pleading guilty without a guarantee that the prosecution will recommend a life sentence
holds little if any benefit for the defendant. See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases§ 10.9.2, Commentary (rev. ed.2003),
reprinted in 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 913, 1045 (2003) ("If no written guarantee can be obtained that
death will not be imposed following a plea of guilty, counsel should be extremely reluctant to
participate in a waiver of the client's trial rights."). Pleading guilty not only relinquishes trial
rights, it increases the likelihood that the State will introduce aggressive evidence of guilt during
the sentencing phase, so that the gruesome details of the crime are fresh in the jurors' minds as
they deliberate on the sentence. See Goodpaster, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev., at 331; supra, at 558-559,
560-561.
However, counsel for a defendant in a capital case certainly has the obligation to explain
acceptable even where that plea contains a "protestation of innocence when ... a defendant
intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the
judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt." See Florida Bar v. Levine, 571 So.2d 420, 421 n.
1 (Fla.1990) quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37,91 S.Ct. 160, 167,27 L.Ed.2d
162 (1970). Likewise, it is completely acceptable in the State of Florida for a defendant to enter
2 As this court is aware, the undersigned has served as conflict counsel representing the indigent for more than
sixteen (16) years and has the utmost respect for those who do. Invariably, the instant ground will be incorrectly
interpreted as an attack on those who defend the indigent. That simply is not the case. This pleading is filed on
behalf of an individual on Death Row who relies upon the undersigned to champion his rights and to protect the
sanctity of his life without deference to bias or prejudice .
. 9-
95
a guilty plea to first degree murder and move directly to a penalty phase proceeding. See Allred
In the instant case, the Defendant was not advised of his ability to enter a guilty plea and
proceed directly to a penalty phase whether with or without a jury. He was not advised of the
potential ramifications of a jury being exposed to overwhelming evidence of guilt during the
guilt phase and being re-exposed to much of the same evidence again in the penalty phase.
Similarly, he was not advised of the negatives associate with a decision to enter a guilty plea and
proceed in that fashion. In short, the Defendant was always of the belief that he had no choice
but to proceed to trial and was not advised of the options and alternatives available and any
professional advice associated therewith. The Defendant's understanding was that he must plod
forward to trial with no option but to fight against the crushing weight of evidence against him.
Had the Defendant been advised of his due process rights and options, he would have
elected a different course and there is a reasonable probability the election would have impacted
the outcome. The Defendant should have been afforded this opportunity. His right to trial is just
that; his. It appears that trial counsel deprived the Defendant of an election of rights because of
their personal disagreement with their perception of the viability of the option. The Defendant
was not incompetent to proceed, thus allowing counsel to make decisions in his stead. He should
have been afforded the very rudimentary and basic options and the legal advice associated with
those options? The Defendant contends that the outcome of the proceedings would be wholly
3 The options provided should have been: l) You may have a trial as it relates to your guilt. If found guilty, there
will be a penalty phase where a recommendation is made about tbe sentence being life or death. 2) You may waive
your right to the guilt phase and plea and then proceed to the penalty phase where the same recommendations will
be made. 3) You can waive your right to a jury trial as it relates to both tbe guilt phase and/or the penalty phase.
Discussion should have been held as it relates to each option. 4) We can concede guilt in the guilt phase in order to
retain credibility for the penalty phase.
. 10.
96
different had he been provided that information because the jury would not have been forced to
absorb days upon days of "defense" combatting the inevitable to only then be forced to a penalty
phase where the jury would be exposed to much of the same information on the heels of having
denied responsibility. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984).
Counsel should ensure that the workload of defense team members in death penalty cases
is maintained at a level that enables counsel to provide each client with high quality legal
representation in accordance with these supplementary Guidelines and the ABA Guidelines as a
whole. "All too often in defender organizations[,] ... attorneys are asked to provide
representation in too many cases .... Unfortunately, not even the most able and industrious
lawyers can provide quality representation when their workloads are unmanageable. Excessive
the adversary system. See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Peiformance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases§ 10.9.2, Commentary (rev. ed.2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra
L.Rev. 913, 1045 (2003) citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Providing Defense Services
Standard 5-5.3 cmt. (3d ed. 1992); see also Model Code of Prof'! Responsibility EC 2-30 (1997);
Model Rules of Prof'! Conduct Rule 1.3 cmt. 2 (2002) ("A lawyer's work load must be
controlled so that each matter can be handled competently."); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up
- 11 -
97
Gideon's Trumpet, 71 Fordham L.Rev. 1461, 1509 (2003) ("If a defense delivery system does
not at once identify and impose limits on the number of cases for which an individual lawyer will
be responsible, case pressures will inevitably overwhelm the lawyer and compromise the
representation.").
In the case of mitigation specialists on the staff of an institutional defender office, the
office should implement mechanisms to ensure that their workload is maintained at a level that
enables them to provide each client with high quality services and assistance in accordance with
these Guidelines. See ABA Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense
Teams In Death Penalty Cases (2008) § 6.1, reprinted in 36 Hofstra L.Rev. 677 (2008). It is the
duty of the defense team to aid counsel in coordinating and integrating the case for life with the
Guideline 4.1 of the ABA Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of
select one or more such persons whose qualifications fit the individual
needs of the client and the case. Applications to the court for the funding
seal.
. 12.
98
members to determine that they are competent; and to supervise and direct
the work of all team members. Counsel must conduct such investigation of
the background, training and skills of the team members as will determine
that they are competent and must ensure on an ongoing basis that their
C. All members of the defense team are agents of defense counsel. They
of the defense team have a duty to maintain complete and accurate files,
the necessary legal knowledge for each individual case, including features
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99
litigation; applicable evidentiary rules, procedural bars and "dooropening"
protections.
assigned to, among and within the Office of the Public Defender for the Second Judicial Circuit.
Lead counsel in the case expressed inability to properly represent the Defendant with effective
result, the Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Counsel asked for relief and
opportunity from the employer for the Defendant to have effective assistance of counsel. That
relief did not come in a manner that afforded the Defendant effective assistance of counsel. The
employer's decision about making a transfer of the lawyer among the Defendant's "trial ranks"
as well as within the office, upon complaint, cannot be said to have afforded the Defendant with
The Defendant did not receive effective assistant of counsel due to the high volume of
cases and the workload assigned to counsel. The outcome would have been differ~nt had the
Defendant not been placed in a circumstance where the foregoing situation transpired. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
- 14 -
100
B. COUNSEL WAS INEFECTIVE BECAUSE THE
ENITRE DEFENSE TEAM WAS REASSIGNED
TO DIFFERENT ROLES WITHIN DAYS OF THE
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL LEAVING THEM EACH
INDIVIDUALLY IN CAPABLE OF BEING
EFFECTIVE IN THEIR NEW AREA OF
ASSIGNMENT.
Defense counsel was ineffective for not presenting a cogent and consistent argument.
Counsel was "re-shuffled" to meet the emotional, psychological and physiological demands of
the defense team on the "eve of trial" and at the "eleventh hour." Each member of the team was
re-organized into a role that they had not previously been properly familiar with. This came as a
result of those matters addressed above in Argument III, Paragraph A. There is no question that
each defense attorney involved was familiar with the case, but counsel was rendered deficient
and ineffective due to the case being very specific in terms of role and function of counsel.
Essentially, the lawyers stopped being effective in their respective areas and hoped to do their
best going forward without the requisite familiarity with the facts specific to their role. 4
Lead counsel viewed the matter through one lens and asked for help or reassignment in
the case. The mitigation specialist viewed it through a different lens and resigned (emphasis
supplied) due to her work and advocacy not being utilized on behalf of the Defendant when it
should have been utilized. The youngest lawyers were zealous advocates and one felt so
disenfranchised and in such disagreement with the defense team that they resigned or were
terminated due to insubordination. 5 While each lawyer assigned to the case has "tried cases" in
4
The undersigned has over ISO banker's boxes of documents and dozens of "Gigs" of data in this case and it is
difficult to imagine people being able to "brush up" on all of this in the final moments of trial preparation.
5 What is evident is that the lawyer filed a pleading styled "Notice of Withdraw" in the midst of a trial; which is
arguably bizarre and best characterizes the fracture in the defense team.
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101
the past, the re-shuffling process resulted in lawyers who do not regular! y try jury trials doing
exactly that. The effort in this trial was inconsistent, incongruous and ineffective.
In this instance the Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel due to the
fracture, discord, disagreement and disharmony among defense counsel. Defense counsel was
incapable of rendering effective assistance of counsel due to the combativeness within. The
Defendant was an audience member to the trial within his trial team. Had this circumstance not
occurred, the outcome in the trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
humanize the Defendant and would have served to have a meaningful impact on the jury's
recommendation of life versus death. More specifically, the mitigation expert developed Power
Point presentations on the life history of the Defendant. 6 Likewise, the mitigation expert
developed a chronological history of the Defendant's medical and mental health history. 7 The
mitigation expert prepared an extensive list of witnesses that could provide an excellent
chronology of the Defendant's life and circumstances. The mitigation expert developed
6
The Power Point presentation tracks the Defendant in a very poignant manner.
7 This included history of his doctor who was over-prescribing medication to the Defendant on which the defense
was incredibly reliant and the State sought to. But, it included important information that the Defendant didn't
simply "self-diagnose" himself with Multiple Sclerosis. The records reflect that the doctor actually believed that the
Defendant had "relapsing remitting Multiple Sclerosis" and the doctor also wrote a note to a federal court seeking to
excuse him from jury duty opining that the Defendant had a "form of Multiple Sclerosis."
- 16 -
102
mitigation and evidence that would provide a jury with a very visceral view of the Defendant.
Instead, defense counsel opted for a very clinical and sterile approach in seeking to avoid
the death penalty. The defense called a few "clinicians" to testify about the Defendant's
diagnosis and/or problems. More specifically, counsel relied upon Dr. Wu 8 to "carry the day"
with his PET scan analysis in conjunction with psychologists and neuro-psychologists who had
little or no familiarity with the history of the Defendant other than the documents they were
provided to review. The defense also called a couple of friends and family in support of his
character.
The Defendant's trial may well have been one where counsel "ground through" the guilt
phase and felt hopeless at the conclusion. Counsel is entitled to those feelings, but that is not
acceptable as it relates to the Defendant. First, defense counsel made the ineffective decision to
combat everything during the guilt phase. Second, defense counsel is required to be effective in
the penalty phase irrespective of whether they feel "bleak or blue" about the prospects and the
potential outcome. 9 The Defendant's penalty phase presentation reads "on a cold record" as one
In sum, the mitigation specialist assigned to the case prepared an extensive and massive
amount of mitigation evidence and testimony with witnesses who were able to testify about the
8 Dr. Wu has gained a dubious and questionable reputation as it relates to his credibility and testimony in death
penalty cases; particularly in Florida. See http://www. voiceofoc.org!oc south/article ca05b81 e-b794-l 1 e3-b723-
00 19bb2963(4.html. A review of his Power Point presentation to the jury contains slides of that have absolutely no
relevance or bearing on the Defendant's case whatsoever.
9 If counsel thought or had the premonition that "we have lost this jury," is it not wiser to throw the entire weight of
the defense's mitigation over the jury rail and for the purposes of hoping to get a division in the recommendation
and/or preserving the record?
• 17 .
103
Defendant's life circumstances, mental health, physical health, character, etc ... Virtually none
of it was used. The mitigation expert resigned her long-held position as a result of this
The Defendant, after having established a relationship with the mitigation expert,
believed, desired and expected that significant mitigation developed and acquired would be
presented to the jury during a penalty phase. It was not presented. Counsel was ineffective for
failing to present the mitigation evidence. Had counsel presented the mitigation evidence there
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The general rule is "(a]n attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation.
Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 570 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 571
(Fla.1996)).
On March 31, 2009, Chris Ellrich forwarded a memorandum for the Office of the Public
Defender for the Second Judicial Circuit by facsimile to the Miami-Dade County Clerk of
Courts. This memorandum requested records related to the Defendant's arrest "around
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104
September 1961 for attempted murder." No effort was made to physically go to obtain those
Ms. Kimberly Stevens, Esq. was court-appointed to represent the Defendant in United
States v. Gary Michael Hilton, 1:11-cr-00049-MR-DLH-1, in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina. Ms. Stevens has been a civil and criminal litigator in the
trial and appellate courts of the State of North Carolina since 1993, and was a law clerk to United
States District Judge Patrick J. Duggan, Eastern District of Michigan, Detroit Division, in 1992.
Ms. Stevens has provided direct trial and post-conviction representation in approximately 35
death penalty cases. She has been appointed by the federal courts as learned counsel in capital
cases in North Carolina, Virginia, Nevada and Puerto Rico. She is also a consulting capital
attorney in conjunction with the Trial Assistance Unit at the North Carolina Office of Indigent
Defense Services for trial counsel in capital cases throughout the State of North Carolina. She
served as an Assistant Capital Defender for the State of North Carolina in recent years.
Ms. Stevens and her staff directly communicated with the Miami-Dade County Clerk of
Court and Juvenile Services and physically went to attempt to obtain documents. During that
effort, Ms. Stevens and her defense team learned that the records related to the Defendant had
recently been destroyed and would have been available had the Defendant's trial counsel gone to
obtain them during the pendency of the instant case. This related to both court records as well as
medical records.
September 6, 1961. He was placed in the care and custody of a Mrs. Ruth Heller on or about
September 13, 1961. On September 15, 1961, the following entry appears, "Order: Gary com. to
- 19 •
105
psychiatric in patient services of Jackson Memorial for observation evaluation and possible
treatment; authorities to advise Court when child ready to be discharged." It does not appear that
he was released approximately one month later. On May 7, 1962, the Defendant was removed
from Ms. Heller's care and custody and transferred to that of Mr. and Mrs. Frank Capuzzi. On
January 25, 1963, the Defendant was removed from the care and custody of Mr. and Mrs.
Had this information been investigated and properly presented it would have enabled the
defense to paint an entirely different picture of the Defendant during the penalty phase and to
combat the State's aggressive contention by their own expert. (R. Penalty Phase, 568-684).
Defense counsel would have been able to adequately portray and describe the Defendant from a
very young age to the point of the offense that is the subject of this case. That would have
young age, the psycho-social reasons of the crime for which he was incarcerated at a young age,
his rape by an attorney at a very young age, etc ... The defense was ineffective in their failure to
start at the beginning of the Defendant's life and to explain sequentially and chronologically how
During the testimony of the State's expert, he was essentially reliant upon what he heard
in the courtroom during testimony as well as historical documents he was afforded the
opportunity to review. He concluded and opined on several occasions that the Defendant had
certain psychological features and defects without the benefit of knowing the Defendant's full
psychological development history. This served as a powerful tool for the State to rebut and
. 20.
106
Defense counsel was ineffective in their failure to properly investigate matters related to
the Defendant's early childhood development, brain trauma, injury, cognitive impairment and
mental health both before and after the evidence presented at trial. Had counsel been effective,
the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
The general rule is "[a]n attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation,
Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 570 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 571
(Fla.1996)).
In the instant case, there is evidence the Defendant was diagnosed with Multiple
repeated episodes of inflammation of the nervous tissue in the brain and spinal cord, causing loss
of the insulating myelin sheath. It is documented science that MS can create lesions on the brain
neurologist as an expert witness in the defense case, but that was to generically testify about
observed abnormalities in the brain function based on analysis of a PET scan. The Defendant
was never properly evaluated for his neurological condition to discern whether there was an
- 21-
107
arguable and contributing defense that would serve in mitigation. Instead, the State was enabled
to argue that the Defendant "self-diagnosed" himself with MS and utilized this point through
The Defendant asserts that he does in fact have a neurological condition that impacts his
cognitive capacities. Had defense counsel taken the time obtain a proper evaluation and
diagnosis, the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel was ineffective for failing to do so
Courts identify "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society," Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion), in order to determine which
punishments "are forbidden," Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879), by the Eighth
Amendment. Evolving standards can be identified via "objective indicia," Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551,572 (2005), and by "the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the
Court's own understanding of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose."
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011,
2021 (2011). Because of his mental illness, brain damage, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder,
depression and multiple sclerosis at the time of the offense, Defendant's execution would violate
. 22.
108
"The concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment." Graham, 130 S.Ct.
at 2021 (2011). Our evolved standards of decency limit the death penalty to "those offenders
who commit 'a natTOW category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability
makes them 'the most deserving of execution,"' Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2650 (quoting Roper, 543
U.S. at 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,319 (2002)). An offender must
truly be the "worst of the worst," Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2650, to be eligible for execution; and to
be the worst, a defendant must be the most "culpable" of offenders. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 ("the
lesser culpability of the mentally retarded"); Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (relying on "the diminished
culpability of juveniles").
engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses ... [which] make[s] it less likely that they can
process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their
conduct based upon that information." Atkins, 536 U.S., at 320, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Retributive
values are also ill-served by executing those with intellectual disability. The diminished capacity
of the intellectually disabled lessens moral culpability and hence the retributive value of the
punishment. See id., at 319, 122 S.Ct. 2242 ("If the culpability of the average murderer is
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of
the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution")." Hall, 134 S.Ct.
10 On its face, much of the reasoning in Hall seem logically to apply to persons with mental illness:
If Defendant's doctors and medical history are correct, Defendant's mental deficiencies are comparable in
severity to mental retardation. In Hall, the Court held that to have a rigid test defining what constitutes
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109
Given the evidence in the Defendant's case of mental illness, brain damage, bipolar
disorder, anxiety disorder, depression and multiple sclerosis, he does not qualify for "the worst
of the worst" and his death sentence is disproportionate punishment under the Eighth
Amendment The Defendant suffered a brain injury at a young age, has manifested
psychological and mental impairment from a very young age forward, suffered depression the
entirety of his life, has been diagnosed as bi-polar, has suffered anxiety, has malformations in
crucial functioning areas of his brain and was diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis.
the worst of the worst For example, the mentally retarded are not the most culpable because
they have "disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses" and "do
not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct" Atkins, 536 U.S. 306-307. A person who has diminished capacities to understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
control impulses and to understand the reaction of others," Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, is not the
most culpab!e_ll
mental retardation because the test in Florida failed to take into account the error implicit in the test's own
design, but it also precluded the court from considering deficits in the defendant's adaptive functioning
over his life.
II On its face, much of the reasoning in Atkins seems logically to apply to persons with mental illness in the same
manner as described in Hall.
People v. Danks, 82 P.3d !249, 1285 (S.Ct. Cal 2004) (Kennard concurring/dissenting); see also Bryan v. Mullin,
335 F.3d 1207, 1237 (IO"' Cir. 2003) (dissenting op.; Supreme Court's logic applies to those with severe mental
deficiancies"); Corcoran v. State, 774 NE 495 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker J., dissenting) (Atkins rationale is "just as
compelling" for prohibiting the execution of the "seriously mentally ill"); State v. Nelson, 803 A2d I (NJ 2002)
(Zappala, J., concurring)("Lesser culpability" of seriously mentally ill defendant is indistinguishable from mentally
retarded defendant).
. 24.
110
Similarly, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment ban on excessive and
cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the execution of juveniles because of their "diminished
culpability," their developing brains, and their propensity for "'ill-considered actions and
decisions."' Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. The Atkins and Roper categorical bans on executions ought
to apply to the seriously mentally ill, and to persons with brain impairment. 12
In the instant case, the Defendant presented extensive evidence of mental health issues,
defect, injury and impairment. As such, the execution of the Defendant is violative of the Eighth
because it poses a risk of arbitrary enforcement based on non-unanimous juror death sentence
Eddings v. Oklahoma the criminal justice system must go "to extraordinary measures to ensure
that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is
humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or
mistake." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
arbitrary nature of Florida's use of the death sentence, in this case, is in violation of the Eighth
12
Several state courts have refused to recognize that Atkins and/or Simmons require that seriously mentally ill
and/or brain damaged individuals, with their reduced culpability, cannot be executed under the Eighth Amendment.
See, e.g., Reese v. State, 14 So.3d 913 (Fla. 2009); State v. Hancock, 840 N.E.2d 1032 (Ohio 2006); Lewis v. State,
620 S.E.2d 778 (Ga. 2005).
- 25-
111
Amendment of the Consitution and the corresponding provision of the Florida Constitution. U.S.
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires the courts consider "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574;
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). Florida's jury recommendation system in capital
cases is not in accord with the evolving standards of decency because juries are neither required
to issue a unanimous death sentence on punishment, nor is their recommendation binding on the
trial court. Pursuant to Graham v. Florida, the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause analysis requires that a court make two determinations on a "sentencing
practice at issue." 560 U.S._, S.Ct. 2011 (2010). Courts are first to take into account
practice." !d. See also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ("[T]he 'clearest and most reliable objective
Perry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). Second, courts consider whether the punishment at bar
comports with "the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court's own
understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and
purpose." !d.
With respect to the societal standards, thirty-two out of thirty-four death penalty states
require unanimous death sentences and do not allow judges to override the jury. Unanimous
legislation/2012/. Only in the two remaining death penalty states, Florida and Alabama, is
unanimity not required. Moreover, in these two states, the jury's recommendation is non-binding
on the judge, meaning that the court can override a life recommendation and sentence the
. 26-
112
defendant to death. § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. Finally, Florida is the only state in the union that
allows juries to recommend a death sentence by a simple majority. 13 See Whitfield v. State, 706
It is acknowledged that the recommendation of the jury in the Defendant's case was
unanimous. However, it is also acknowledged that Florida is an outlier that does not comport
with societal norms where the structure calls for the jury to make a "recommendation" that need
The second reason Florida's death sentencing scheme is out of step with the Eighth
Amendment's evolving standards of decency is because it is the only state that allows a judge to
override a jury's recommendation of life without parole. That is, a Florida jury's "sentence" is
recommendation is an outlier among the standards elaborated by the controlling norms. Thirty-
two other states have determined that a jury of one's peers, not a single judge, who may be
subject to pressures of retention or election, must decide whether a citizen should be executed by
the state.
Florida's high death sentencing rates, which seem only to climb as other states' rates
decline, demonstrate an arbitrary effect of a system that does not require juror unanimity and
only contemplates a recommendation. Florida has the fourth largest population in the nation.
13 Alabama requires that at least I 0 jury members recommend death. Unanimous Death Sentences in Florida?,
- 27-
113
http://www.dc.state.tz. us/activeinmates/deathrowroster.asp. It has one and a half times the
Florida's percentage of annual death sentences are stunning. In 2012 and 2013, seventy-
nine individuals nationwide were sentenced to death in each year, the second lowest number
in 2013 and twenty of those in 2012 were in Florida. Florida accounted for 18% of nationwide
death sentences in 2013 and 25% in 2012. It is no surprise with these growing numbers and
Florida's outlier structure, Florida has the highest number of death row exonerations in the
country- twenty-three, or 16.5% of the nation's 139 wrongful capital convictions. DPIC,
person charged with first degree murder is significantly more likely to be sentenced to death in
Florida than if that crime was committed in any other death penalty state in the country.
Second, courts consider whether the punishment at bar comports with "the standards
elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court's own understanding and interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose." Id. The Supreme Court's
precedent emphasizes that the Eighth Amendment "cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of
death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., concurring). Florida's death
penalty system is a complete anomaly among the other thirty-three death penalty states.
Because Florida's death penalty system is not in step with the "evolving standards of
decency," the death penalty in this case is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
- 28-
114
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Florida
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason the Defendant's sentence of death should be vacated due to
. 29.
115
STATE OF FLORIDA )
)
COUNTY OF 'l':>r ... o~..f'<>.,..:J )
Before me, the undersigned authority, this day personally appeared Gary Michael Hilton
who first being duly sworn, says that he or she is has read the foregoing motion for post-
conviction relief and has personal knowledge of the facts and matters there-in set forth and
alleged and that each and all of these facts and maters are true and correct.
NO~~LIJ/:{,
authorized to administer and oath (print,
type or stamp commissioned name or notary
public) ••'''""
,, ....,., BRIAN J. PAUL
*M'
. ~ MY COMMISSION IFF 129579
EXPIRES: June 4, 2018
""~,.eoFf'-rF~~ BondedThru Bui!get Notary Services
- 30-
116
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served, BY
HAND DELIVERY to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3rd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, and by ELECTRONIC
Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Capital Appeals Bureau at:
Florida 32399-1050, and by US MAIL to: Gary Michael Hilton, 7819 N.W. 228th Street
- 31 -
117
118
In the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the State
of Florida in and for LEON County FALL Term, 2007
vs.
INDICTMENT FOR
First Degree Murder, Grand Theft Motor Vehicle
Kidnapping and Grand Theft
A TRUE BILL
m./~
Forepers n of the Grand Jury
Deputy Clerk
119
120
....·~ r·:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
0J t' ':;· ·- r; i , :: · §ECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
v.
SPN: 197149
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
attorney, and requests this Court appoint the Public Defender in the above-numbered case. As
I. The Defendant has been indicted for First Degree Murder, Kidnapping, Vehicle
Theft Grand Motor Vehicle and Grand Theft. It is anticipated that the State will
serving a life sentence for First Degree Murder. Prior to his incarceration, the
indigency.
3. The Defendant remains indigent and immediately prior to his arrest by the
Georgia officials, the Defendant did not have a residence, was homeless, and was
unemployed. The Defendant has no money and no assets other than an used
NANCY A. DANIELS
PUBLIC DEFENDER
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy hereof was sent to William N. Meggs, State
Attorney, Leon County Courthouse, 301 South Monroe Street, Ste. 475, Tallahassee, Florida
32301, on this 5th , day of March , 2008.
~~k~~
MARIA INES SUBER
-2- 122
123
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
v.
SPN: 197149
'~
Defender, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Office of the Public Defender for the Second
Judicial Circuit for Leon County, Florida, is appointed to serve as counsel for the Defendant.
The attorney appointed is ordered to file a notice of appearance within I 0 days of this Order, a
copy of which shall be served to the Office of the State Attorney.'i=..
DONE and ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida this __!2_ day of March, 2008.
CIRCUIT JUDGE
124
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORJDA
SPN: 197149
V.
and
COMES NOW, the State of Florida, by and through the undersigned Assistant State
Attorney, and files this State's Response to the Motion For Appointment of Public
Defender, previously filed in this case, and Request to Revoke Appointment, and says as
follows:
1. The Defendant has been indicted for First Degree Murder, Kidnapping, Grand Theft
4. There is no allegation in the Motion to Appoint Public Defender that the Defendant
personally has requested that the Public Defender in the Second Judicial Circuit be appointed to
represent him. It appears the motion is simply a request by the Public Defender in Leon County
~~
\:.:_;)
125
to be appointed to the case.
5. There is no evidence that the Defendant has completed an affidavit for determination
of indigent status. There is no copy attached to the Motion to Appoint Public Defender, and
"JIS" does not reflect that said affidavit has been filed with the clerk.
Statutes "must (emphasis added) apply to the clerk of the court for a determination of indigent
7. The clerk of the court "shall (emphasis added) determine whether an applicant seeking
appointment of a public defender is indigent based upon the information provided in the
8. Pursuant to Section 27.52(3), Florida Statutes, if the "clerk of the court has not made a
determination of indigent status at the time a person requests appointment of a public defender,
the court shall (emphasis added) make a preliminary determination of indigent status, pending
further review by the clerk, and may, by court order, appoint a public defender."
9. Because there is no documented request by the Defendant for the appointment of the
public defender, no determination by the clerk of the court that the Defendant meets the criteria
of indigent status in the State of Florida, and no sworn testimony presented to the Court for a
10. The State of Florida was not contacted prior to the filing of the motion. William N.
Meggs, State Attorney and the prosecutor assigned to the case, was not in the office on the day
the motion was filed and will not return until Monday, March 10, 2008.
11. Although the State of Florida has not yet received a copy, in "JIS" there is a reference
in this case that an Order Appointing the Public Defender was entered.
126
WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests the Court revoke its appointment of the
Public Defender for Leon County in this cause until the statutory requirements have been met and
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM N. MEGGS
STATE ATTORNEY
~
Assistant State Attorney
Florida Bar No.: 0019460
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent to Maria
Ines Suber, Office of the Public Defender, Leon County Courthouse, 301 S. Monroe Street,
Tallahassee, Florida, 32301, this 6th day of March, 2008.
ee Fulford
Assis t State Attorney
127
128
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Defendant.
----------------------~/
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon "State's Response to Motion for Appointment
of Public Defender and Request to Revoke Appointment," filed on March 6, 2008. The Court
having considered the motion, having reviewed the court record, and being otherwise fully
On February 28, 2008, Defendant was indicted on charges ofFirst-Degree Murder, Grand
Theft Auto, Kidnapping, and Grand Theft. To date, Defendant has not been served with or
arrested on the Florida charges, and is serving a life sentence in Georgia for First-Degree Murder.
On March 5, 2008, the Leon County Public Defender moved to be appointed in this case.
The motion asserted that Defendant was homeless at the time of his arrest in Georgia, was
declared indigent in his Georgia case, and that his financial situation has not improved. No
financial affidavit or application by Defendant was attached or filed at the time. The order of
On March 6, 2008, the State filed a response to the Public Defender's motion for
appointment, arguing that the appointment be revoked because 1) it was not notified and its
- 1-
129
objections to the appointment were not heard, 2) the motion fails to comply with the statutory
requirements, and 3) Defendant is not entitled to counsel because he has not been arrested or
served.
him. The application is on the standard form and shows Defendant is indigent.
However, the order of appointment entered by this Court on March 5, 2008, was in error
because the application and affidavit of indigency did not accompany the motion. See Smith v.
State, 699 So. 2d 629, 637 (Fla. 1997). However, the defect has now been cured by Defendant's
As to the remaining claims by the State, Section 27.52, Florida Statutes (2007) does not
require that the State be provided notice or an opportunity to be heard on whether or not a
criminal defendant is deemed indigent. No case law interpreting the statute has created such a
requirement. Generally, the appointment of the Public Defender is a proper ex parte procedure.
the Clerk of Courts under section 27.52(2), Florida Statutes, without a specific signed order by a
judge.
Also, the constitutional right to counsel clearly attached when the indictment was filed.
Arrest, extradition, etc. are not necessary prerequisites to the application and appointment.
Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 970 (Fla. 1992)(holding that "a defendant is entitled to counsel
at the ~o·arliest of the following points: when he or she is formally charged with a crime via the
appearance."). See also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); Smith, 699 So. 2d at 639;
-2-
130
Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Court does not address any issue as to the State's standing to raise these questions.
The Court acknowledges the first order was made in error because the proper application and
affidavit signed by Defendant was not attached to the motion or already filed in this case. Tllis
deficiency is now cured. The Court welcomes the information which revealed this error,
Any further hearing shall be on this Amended Order of Appointment, which is currently
set for Thursday, March 13, 2008, unless the State cancels the hearing.
IT IS THEREFORE,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Office of the Public Defender for the Second
Judicial Circuit for Leon County, Florida is hereby appointed to serve as counsel for the
Defendant.
~~
KATHLEEN F. DEKKER
Circuit Judge
Copies to:
Defendant
-3-
131
f~. £ 132
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND
nJDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA.
vs.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the State of Florida is filing notice pursuant to Rule
3.202, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, that it intends to seek imposition of the death penalty
against the defendant in the above-styled cause. Further, pursuant to Rule 3.202, the State makes its
demand for the defendant to give notice of intent to present expert testimony of mental mitigation.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM N. MEGGS
STATE ATTORNEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to Gary Michael
Hilton, Leon County Jail; Maria Ines Suber, Defense Attorney; and the Honorable Terry Lewis,
Circuit Judge, Leon County Courthouse, this,2-:;;-/'1(ay of July, 2008.
vs.
FILED IN
OPEN COURT
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant. Date2-15-ll
--------------------~!
VERDICT
135
State of Florida vs. Gary Michael Hilton
2008 CF 697
__v<_
We find that guilt was established by
proofof intent to facilitate a felony and to
inflict bodily harm or terrorize.
2
136
State of Florida vs. Gary Michael Hilton
2008 CF 697
~(!4& L2t~a
~.......---.. /
~~ec
/''-·' 1 ..
I
Presi'ding Juror
3
137
138
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
vs. '
FilED IN
Of'EN COURT
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Oete C)_:J- )-/ {
Defendant.
_______________________,/
ADVISORY VERDICT
Presiding Juror
139
&. r\ 140
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
Defendant.
Date:~
----------------------~/
SENTENCING ORDER
indicted for one (I) count of First Degree Murder of Cheryl Dunlap,
occurring between December I, 2007, and December I5, 2007, one (I)
count of Kidnapping, and two (2) counts of Grand Theft. He was tried
before a jury on January 3I, 20 I1, through February 15, 20 II. The jury
found the Defendant guilty of First Degree Murder (both premeditated and
Grand Theft (personal property). The Defendant was found not guilty of
Grand Theft (motor vehicle). On February I7, 20II, the jury reconvened for
(12-0) that the Defendant be sentenced to death for the murder. On March
141
31, 2011, the State filed its Memorandum In Support Of Recommendation
Of Jury. Although invited to do so, the Defense did not file a sentencing
hearing during which both sides were allowed to present further evidence
This Court heard the evidence presented in both the guilt and penalty
phases, had the benefit of the State's legal memoranda and heard argument
in favor of and in opposition to the death penalty. This Court accords great
beyond a reasonable doubt (See Reynolds v. State, 934 So.2d 1128 (Fla.
AGGRAVATING FACTORS
The evidence presented during the penalty phase establishes that the
2 142
arrested at a convenience store by Georgia authorities on January 4, 2008.
Based on defendant's statements it was later determined that Ms. Emerson was
led authorities to Ms. Emerson's body. Ms. Emerson's nude body was covered
by brush, decapitated and had been burned with bleach. Her head was located
had kept Ms. Emerson chained by the neck in the van. Defendant further
admitted having sexually battered Ms. Emerson. Defendant admitted that his
purpose in abducting Ms. Emerson was to obtain money from her using her
guilty to the charges, the State presented a certified copy of judgment and
after the murder of Ms. Dunlap, the conviction still qualifies under this
aggravator since the plea and sentencing as to that charge occurred prior to
the sentencing for the instant case. Elledge v. State, 346 So.2d 998, 100 I
(Fla. 1977).
egregious given the similarities with the instant offense, the closeness in time
3 143
with the instant offense and the Defendant's statement that these murders
were part of a calculated course of conduct to find victims that he had started
KIDNAPPING.
The evidence during the guilt phase of the trial showed that Cheryl
Dunlap was last seen by witnesses at an area known as Leon Sinks, located in
2007. Ms. Dunlap was seen walking on a hiking trail in the park. She had
made plans earlier in the day to meet and have dinner with a friend. She never
made the dinner date and was never heard from again. Her abandoned
vehicle was found that evening on Highway 319. One of the tires had been
punctured. The puncture wound was later linked to the defendant's bayonet.
an extensive search, Ms. Dunlap's body was found on December 15, 2007, in
a remote area of the forest several miles from Leon Sinks. Ms. Dunlap's nude
body has been covered by brush. Her head and hands had been removed from
4 144
her body and were not found at that location. The severely charred remains of a
human head and hands were found in a burn pit at a nearby campsite which
cigarette butt. Upon Defendant's arrest, Ms. Dunlap's DNA was found on
indicated that after he took Ms. Dunlap, he kept her alive for "hours or days."
Defendant's statement that he did not kill Ms. Dunlap right away is
Emerson in Georgia, to wit: holding the victim for several days to terrorize
and/or to ensure he had the correct infonnation to obtain money from the
from the jury's verdict whereby Defendant was found guilty of Kidnapping.
Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1994) and Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484
5 145
U.S. 231 (1988). The jury further found that the kidnapping was committed
little weight should be given to this aggravator, because but for the felony, the
homicide would not be first degree murder. However, in this case, the jury
specifically found that the murder was both premeditated and felony murder.
weight.
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court accepts the jury's finding as to the
kidnapping and the underlying bases for the kidnapping and the murder. The
enforcement officer, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
sole or dominant motive for the murder was the elimination of a witness."
Serranno v. State, 36 FLW S108a (Fla. March 17, 2011). The evidence
6 146
presented by the State established this to be the case. In the Defendant's own
words, " ... once you've take someone, you either kill them or you get
caught." 1 His actions and words show that killing his victim was part of his
the dominant motive for the murder was to eliminate a potential witness this
1981); Vaught v. State, 410 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1982); Remeta v. State, 522
So.2d 825 (Fla. 1988); Swafford v. State, 533 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1988); and
Wike v. State, 698 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1997) ("Evidence that a victim knew the
Defendant and could later identifY him is sufficient to prove this aggravating
circumstance.").
weight.
1
The defense has repeatedly argued that the State cannot use collateral crime evidence to establish an
aggravating circumstance. Although these statements were made to Georgia investigators, the statements
are not evidence of a collateral crime. These statements are direct evidence of the defendant's course of
conduct starting in September 2007, which includes the murder of Ms. Dunlap.
7 147
In order to establish this aggravating factor, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was motivated, at least in part, by
a desire to obtain money, property, or other financial gain. Clark v. State, 609
that during the time leading up to the murder he needed money; and when he
needed money he would go hunting for a victim to rob and kill. The evidence
is clear that Defendant kidnapped Ms. Dunlap with the intent to obtain her
A1M card and PIN number; and ultimately, killed her to avoid arrest for the
kidnapping and theft. The evidence shows that Defendant did use Ms.
Dunlap's card to withdraw $700 from her bank account while he was holding
her against her will. The jury convicted Defendant of Grand Theft for these
actions. The subsequent murder of Ms. Dunlap was part and parcel of
Defendant's modus operandi for theft. Hence, she was murdered to facilitate
the theft. Although the theft was not the primary motive for the murder itself,
this aggravating factor still applies pursuant to Hildwin v. State, 727 So.2d
193 (Fla. 1998). It is not improper doubling for the court to find the
aggravators of felony murder, pecuniary gain and avoid arrest, where the
victim was kidnapped in order to steal her car, which was needed for a get
away vehicle, and the motive for the murder was so the victim could not
identify the defendant. Spann v. State, 857 So.2d 845 (Fla. 2003). Here the
8 148
victim was kidnapped to facilitate stealing from her bank account and was
murdered to keep her from being able to identify the defendant in the theft
and kidnapping.
weight.
ATROCIOUS, OR CRUEL.
It should be noted that "[t]he intention of the killer to inflict pain on the
victim is not a necessary element of the aggravator." Guzman v. State, 721 So.2d
1155, 1160 (Fla. 1998). "[T]he HAC aggravator may be applied to torturous
murders where the killer was utterly indifferent to the suffering of another." Id. at
calm and callous way he describes his method of killing to the Georgia
authorities. It is clear from those statements that he views his victims as nothing
more than prey to be hunted, used to suit his purposes, and then simply
discarded.
The Florida Supreme Court "has held that the actions of the defendant
preceding the actual killing are relevant to this aggravator.... [T]he fear and
emotional strain of the victim from the events preceding the killing may
contribute to its heinous nature [cites and internal quotation marks omitted].
9 149
Accordingly, the HAC aggravating circumstance has been repeatedly upheld
where the victims were acutely aware of their impending deaths [cites and
internal quotation marks omitted]." Hertz v. State, 803 So.2d 629, 651-652 (Fla.
2001); and Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 680 (Fla. 2001). Great weight
should be given this aggravating circumstance because of the length of time the
victim was bound and because of her cognition of impending death. Swafford
vs. State, supra.; Melendez v. State, 498 So.2d 1258, 1261 (Fla. 1986);
Lightboume v. State, 438 So.2d 380, 391 (Fla. 1983); Vaught v. State, 410
So.2d 147, 151 (Fla. 1982); Lucas v. State, 376 So.2d 1149, 1153 (Fla. 1979);
and James vs. State, 695 So.2d 1229, 1235 (Fla. 1997).
that she was alive for an extended period of time. The medical examiner was
uncertainty about the time of death. However, his best estimate was that she
died between December 5, 2007, and December 8, 2007 (This would be four to
telling another inmate that he kept Ms. Dunlap alive for "hours or days." The
"home video" seized from the Defendant's camera dated December 3, 2007,
comments that suggest that the Defendant just committed the murder and is
10 150
in the process of hiding the evidence of his crime. Since the Defendant's
motive in kidnapping Ms. Dunlap was to gain access to her bank account
with her ATM card, it is certainly reasonable to believe that he would have
kept her alive long enough to make sure she had given him the correct PIN
number. The bank account was not accessed until December 2, 2007, about
!O:OOp.m.
We also do not know a great deal about under what circumstances she
was held in captivity. However, we do know that she suffered some abuse
during this time. The medical examiner testified to a large, deep bruise to
Ms. Dunlap's back which shows she suffered some type of painful trauma
factor in the murder for which the Defendant is to be sentenced, the Court
11 151
and murders his victims. It is reasonable to believe that Ms. Dunlap and
great fear and emotional strain for an extended period of time before the
So.2d 973 (Fla. 1983), Cook v. State, 542 So.2d 964 (Fla. 1989), Preston v.
weight.
aggravator requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was the
12 152
This aggravator was clearly established by the State. Nothing
and calm reflection. His approach to these crimes was very matter of fact. He
to kill. There was no anger, panic, or emotion associated with his actions. And,
ready; including zip ties, duct tape, chains, and BB guns. He fashioned a
He dismembered the body and burned the head and hands to prevent
13 153
In Swafford v. State, 533 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1988), the court stated: "The
and the appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of course." 533 So.2d
at 277. The murder of Cheryl Dunlap was a senseless act for which no moral
or legal justification of any kind has been offered to this Court. The
circumstances and evidence show that this murder was calmly planned and
weight.
MITIGATING FACTORS
follows:
14 154
The defense presented the testimony of Dr. Charles Golden, a board
opined that Defendant's ability to conform his conduct to the law was
Prichard, a psychologist, who opined to the contrary. The Court finds that
Dr. Prichard's testimony was more credible and more consistent with the
other evidence in the case as to this point. The Court finds that this factor in
Doctors Golden and Strauss also both opined that this mitigating
Defendant's "baseline" with these disorders, the use of Ritalin "triggered" the
murders in this 'case. Dr. Golden never made a very specific diagnosis of
Defendant, but did opine that the combination of brain damage (Dr. Joseph Wu),
"disorders" and the drug usage (William Norton) caused Defendant to have a lack
of emotional control resulting in the murders. Dr. Prichard was never specifically
asked his opinion as to this mitigator, but the essence of his testimony was that
15 155
the only thing wrong with Defendant was that he suffered from a personality
disorder, was a psychopath and chose to break the law because that was what
suited Mr. Hilton. The Court does not feel it necessary to enter into an
does accept Dr. Prichard's testimony that defendant did not suffer from a major
commit these horrendous acts. The Court does not accept the defense's "Ritalin
did it" theory. Five different statements by the defendant have been presented in
evidence from January 7, 2008, through August 28, 2008. The defendant was not
on Ritalin at the time of any of these statements. In each of these statements the
Defendant displays a callous disregard for human life. As recently as August 28,
2008, more that nine moths after this murder and after at least eight months
without Ritalin, the Defendant indicated that he was only sorry that he got caught
and would murder again. The Court finds that this mitigating circumstance has
16 156
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE THAT WOULD MITIGATE
Court will title them as presented by the defense. However, this is not a
factual determination that the factor as alleged has in fact been proven.
home.
mitigating circumstance.
17 157
c. Mr. Hilton was deprived of a relationship with his biological
father.
adequately protected.
18 158
military training. He stated in June 2008 that his military
mitigating circumstance.
husband and let Defendant stay with a friend from work. This
g. Mr. Hilton was removed from his home into foster care as an
adolescent.
him and his wife in 1960- 1961. Although it was never clearly
19 159
chose to support her husband. Mr. Perchoux appeared to be a
mitigating circumstance.
make that assumption. The testimony was that Ms. Cleo Debag
proven.
conduct in 2007. The Court finds that it has not been proven
20 160
criminal conduct in this case. Accordingly, the Court gives
The Court does not find that this mitigating circumstance has
CONCLUSION
The Court has very carefully considered and weighed the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances found to exist in this case, being ever mindful
that human life- is at stake. The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt, as
21 161
did the jury by a twelve to zero ( 12-0) recommendation, that the aggravating
Accordingly, it is
Dunlap.
provided by law.
imprisonment.
22 162
Defendant is given credit for all jail time served in this case on Count
The Defendant is hereby notified that he has thirty (30) days to file an
appeal to this judgment and sentence and that this sentence is subject to
=~ ~ 7 0 /J I A (} c::
. t LZ_'--::::2..- C . WJCL(e._j:'(--0L4.8?L~
JAMES C. HANKINSON
Circuit Judge
cc:
William N. Meggs, State Attorney
Georgia Cappleman, Assistant State Attorney
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender
Maria Ines Suber, Assistant Public Defender
Robert Friedman, Assistant Public Defender
23 163
164
In the Circuit Court, Secoud Judicial Circuit,
in and for Leon Connty, Florida fileD IN
O"'EN COURT
vision: Felony Recorded in the Official..Records
Oat<a: 4--.91 -II
State of Florida of Leon Coumy
v.
GARY M. HILTON
Defendant --~Probation Retrial
___Community Control Violator _ _Resentence
t/ and no cause being shown why the defendant should not be adjudicated guilty, IT IS ORDERED that the
defendant is hereby ADJUDICATED GUILTY as to all counts or as to count(s) - - - - - - - - - -
V and being a qualified offender pursuant to s. 943.325, the defendant shall be required to submit DNA samples
as required by law.
and good cause being shown; IT IS ORDERED that ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BE WITJlliELD as to all
counts or as to count(s) - - - - - - - - - -
Page _ _
\ of \\ Rev. 06/01/2010
165
State of Florida
GARY M. HILTON
Defendant
FINGERPRINTS OF DEFENDANT
5.
I 0. Left Little
.,,_
Fi"""""'"'"'""by'~~; Ma>/~,,
I CERTIFY that these are the fingerprints of the defendant, GARY M. HILTON, and that they were placed
hereon by the defendant in my presence in open court this date.
DONE AND ORDERED in open court in Leon County, Fl~a, on af2!41 d}_f ! d- 0 (/ .
\f)-\~H~ {! _\]1[Jyv\}_<J_J:--
) Judge.
J
166
Defendant GARY M. HILTOI\ Case Number~. - CF 697 A
(As to Count )
The defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record,
L)YY\QJ'::du <l.. , <J, 1 tJ/.!:-u-L ,
and having been given an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in
mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law; and no cause
being shown
_ _ The defendant pay a fine of$ , pursuant to section 775.083, F.S., plus$ as the
5% surcharge required by section 938.04, F.S
V The defendant is committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
_ _ The defendant is directed to the custody of the Sheriff of County, Florida.
_ _ The defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, F.S ..
VDeath
___For a term of natural life.
For a term of months I years.
Said SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ subject to the
conditions set forth in this order.
In the event the defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied before
the defendant begins service of the supervision terms.
167
Defendant GARY M. HILTOJ Case Number_ >!! CF 697 A
OBTSNumber
(As to Count ~ )
The defendan~, being pe~fonally before this court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record,
YO'lCVu CL J . 0u...Curt , and having been given an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in
mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law; and no cause
being shown
_ _ The defendant pay a fine of$ , pursuant to section 775.083, F.S., plus$ as the
5% surcharge required by section 938.04, F.S
~The defendant is committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
The defendant is directed to the custody of the Sheriff of County, Florida.
_ _ The defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, F.S ..
Death
--v-For a term of natural life.
For a term of months I years.
_ _ Said SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ subject to the
conditions set forth in this order.
In the event the defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied before
the defendant begins service of the supervision tenus.
168
Defendant GARY M. HILTOJ'I Case Number_;._ n CF 697 A
OBTS Number
The defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by the defendant's attorney of record,
'--·YY\Ci1J\..{c_,__ '<]) . >A<..tl.<-U·c_ , and having been given an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in
mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law; and no cause
being shown
_ _ The defendant pay a fine of , pursuant to section 775.083, F.S., plus$ as the
5% surcharge required by section 93 8.04, F .S
~The defendant is committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
_ _ The defendant is directed to the custody of the Sheriff of County, Florida.
_ _ The defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, F.S ..
Death
--~For a term of natural life. .
5
1.--·--For a term of _ _ _ _ _ _--:c-='-----.,.--:---c'-·~
Said SENTENCE SUSPENDED for a period of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ subject to the
conditions set forth in this order.
In the event the defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarceration portions shall be satisfied before
the defendant begins service ofthe supervision terms.
169
Defendant GARY M. HILTON Case Number 08 CF 697 A
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
(As to Count I J !)_ 1j )
By appropriate notation, the following provisions apply to the sentence imposed in Ibis count:
Controlled Substance w/in It is further ordered that the 3-year minimum imprisonment provision
1,000' of School, Public Park, pursuant to 893.13(1 )(c), F.S., is hereby imposed for the sentence
Comm.Center or Rec. Facility specified in this count.
Habitual Felony Offender The defendant is adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced
to an extended term in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a),
F.S .. The requisite fmdings by the court are set forth in a separate order or stated
on the record in open court.
Habitual Violent The defendant is adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender and has been
Felony Offender sentenced to an extended term in accordance with the provisions of section
775.084(4)(b), F.S .. A minimum term of year(s) must be
served prior to release. The requisite fmdings of the court are set forth in a
separate order or stated on the record in open court.
Prison Releasee Reoffender The defendant is adjudicated a prison releasee reoffender and has been
sentenced to serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence in accordance with
section 775.082(8)(b).
Law Enforcement It is further ordered that the defendant shall serve a minimum of
Protection Act years before release in accordance with section 775.0823, F.S ..
Capital Offense It is further ordered that the defendant shall be ineligible for Parole in
accordance with the provisions of section 775.082(1), F.S ..
Short-Barreled Rifle, It is further ordered that the 5-year minimum provision of section
Shotgun, Machine Gun 790.221(2), F.S., is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.
Continuing Criminal Enterprise It is further ordered that the 25-year minimum sentence provision of section
893.20, F.S., is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.
170
Defendant GARY M. HILTON Case Number 2008 CF 697 A
Dangerous Sexual Felony It is further ordered that the minimum imprisonment provision of section
Offender 794,01 15{2)(e), F.S. is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count.
The defendant shall be imprisoned for a minimum of years; or,
_ _ _ _ for a term of life.
Taking a Law Enforcement It is further ordered that the 3-year mandatory minimum imprisonment
Officer's Firearm provision of section 775.0875(1), F.S., is hereby imposed for the sentence
specified in this count.
Sexual Offender The defendant meets the criteria for a sexual offender as set forth in section
943.o435(l)(a)la, b, c, or d.
Age of Victim The victim was _ _ years of age at the time of the offense.
Age of Defendant The defendant was _ _ years of age at the time of the offense.
Sexual Activity [F.S.800.04(4)] The offense _ _ did _ _ did not involve sexual activity.
Use of force or Coercion The sexual activity described herein _ _ did _ _ did not involve the use of
[F.S.800.04(4)] force or coercion.
Use ofForce or Coercion The molestation _ _ did _ _ did not involve unclothed genitals or
Unclothed Genitals [F.S. 800.04(5) ............ .. genital area.
The molestation did did not involve the use of force or coercion.
Other Provisions
(e.g., see Ch. 775, F.S.)
171
Defendant GARY M. IDLTON Case Number~ '- CF 697 A
i)
"ther Provisions as to connt(s)_ __:cA.:._:._ _.
Retention of Jurisdiction The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section
947.16(4), F.S. (2002).
Jail Credit It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of
\ 1 0 50 days as credit for time incarcerated before imposition of
this sentence.
(Check as applicable)
*************************************************************************************
*************************************************************************************
The Court deems the unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count
forfeited under section 948.06(7).
The Conrt allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded in this case/count. (Gain
time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section
944.28(1) ).
-,-,--...,-IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be allowed days time served between
date of arrest as a violator following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of
Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served only
pursuant to section 921.0017, Florida Statutes, on count(s) -='"""'==-------
(Offenses committed between January 1, 1994 and May 29, 1997).
*************************************************************************************
-,-,--...,-IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be allowed days time served between
date of arrest as a violator following release from prison to the date of resentencing. The Department of
Corrections shall apply original jail time credit and shall compute and apply credit for time served only
pursuant to section 921.0017, Florida Statutes on count(s) ·
{Offenses committed after May 30, 1997).
172
Defendant GARY M. KaTON Case Number 200!. . ~ '197 A
'-'onsecutive/Concurrent
as to Other Counts It is further ordered that the sen_\l}nce imposed as to count( s) d +t-f
shall run (check one) V consecutive to ~---concurrent
with the sentence set forth in count of this case.
Consecutive/Concurrent
as to Other Convictions It is further ordered that the composite term of all sentences imposed for
the counts specified in this order shall run (check one)
V consecutive to concurrent with the following
_ _ _ specific s e n t e n c e s - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In the event the above sentence is to the Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Leon County,
Florida, is hereby ordered and directed to deliver the defendant to the Department of Corrections at the facility designated
· ., the Department together with a copy of this judgment and sentence and any other documents specified by Florida
.atutes.
The defendant in open court was advised of the right to appeal from this sentence by tiling notice of appeal
within 30 days from this date with the clerk of this court and the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel in taking
the appeal at the expense of the State on showing ofindigency.
173
Defend~nt GARY M. HILTON Case Number-"-"-~ CF 697 A
IS THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF THE COURT THAT DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR AND SHALL PAY THE FOLLOWING:
I. $ as a fine pursuant to §775.083, F.S.
J. If checked, the defendant shall pay the following as additional statutorily mandated surcharges:
D $201.00 as a surcharge and condition of supervision pursuant to §938.08, F.S. (Domestic Violence Trust Fuod).
D $151.00 as a surcharge and condition of supervision pursuant to §938.085, F.S. (Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund).
D $151.00 as costs pursuant to §938.10, F.S. (Children & Family Services Child Advocacy Trust Fuod).
16. $100.00 (mandatory), or the higher of documented costs of$ for prosecution pursuant to §93 8.27(8), F.S.,
pay'J]:>Ie to the Leon Couoty Clerk's Office. To be paid pursuant to the terms of the Clerk's collection program; or if checked,
Cir'iieduced to a Civil Judgment.
17. ifrF CHECKED, $100.00 (mandatory) or the higher costs of$ ; for indigent legal assistance pursuant to
§938.29(1), F.S. To be paid within days or if checked ilYl.'ieduced to a Civil Judgment.
174
Defendant GARY M. HILTON Case Number 2008 CF 697 A
The defendant is ordered to pay the court ordered fine, court costs, fees and surcharges imposed in this case.
Payment is due in full today .ru:_make payments of a minimum of$75.00 per month. A $25.00 administrative fee will be
added to the balance. If you are in custody on this charge, your first payment will be due 30 days from the date of your
release. ·
Failure to comply with your payment schedule will result in the suspension of your driver's license pursuant to
FS 322.245 and issuance of an Order to Show Cause requiring your appearance in court. Failure to appear in court will
result in a Writ of Attachment (warrant) being issued for your arrest.
The defendant must immediately notify the Clerk of Court, in writing, of any change in the defendant's
maJing_address.
All fines, costs, fees and surcharges must be paid in cash or by money order, travelers check, personal check or
credit card payable to: Clerk of Court, Leon County Courthouse.
175
Name: Gary M. Hilton
Case No.: 2008 CF 697 A
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the judgment/disposition order
rendered on April21, 2011, has been hand delivered to counsel for the State XX.
Defendant XX. Public Defender's Office at 4th Floor, Leon County Courthouse on this
21" day of April, 2011.
176
177
GARY MICHAEL HILTON, IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
Defendant/Appellant, AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
Plaintiff/Appellee.
_________________ !
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Article V, Section 3(b)(l) of the Florida Constitution and Rule 9.030(a)(l), Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure, appeals tot he Florida Supreme Court the Judgment and Sentence of
Death by the Circuit Court for Leon County rendered on April21, 2011, by Circuit Judge
James Hankinson. The nature of the appeal is a final judgment and sentence imposing a death
sentence.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished by delivery to
Willie Meggs, State Attorney, Leon County Courthouse, Tallahassee, FL, and by U.S. mail to
Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Counsel for the State of Florida, The Capitol,
' u<--- t!l fA.i/J
PL-01, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050, on this _>-r_ day of1'1:pri1, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
NANCY A. DANIELS
PUBLIC DEFENDER
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
178
179
MANDATE
en
<:>
I
:::0:
-m
r
rCJ::::o
r
Your Case No.: 08-CF-697
oo
::uc
-;;u
0
~--< U1
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED thatforther proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion.
the rule of this Court and the laws of the State ofFlorida.
WITNESS. The Honorable Ricky L. Polston, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Florida and the Seal ofsaid Court at Tallahassee. the Capital, on this 31st day of
July, 2013.
~£?tl&a
erk oft/ieSUpreme Court ofFlorida
No. SC11-898
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Cheryl Dunlap disappeared from the Leon Sinks Geological Area in Leon
Apalachicola National Forest on December 15, 2007. Gary Hilton, who had been
seen in the area during that time, and who was convicted in Georgia for a similar
crime, was charged with her kidnapping and murder. After trial, the jury convicted
Hilton. After hearing penalty phase evidence, the jury unanimously recommended
the death penalty. The court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced
Hilton to death, finding six aggravating factors, one statutory mitigating factor, and
eight nonstatutory mitigating factors. This case is before the Court on appeal from
181
a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death. We have
jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(l ), Fla. Con st. For the following reasons, we affirm
FACTS
On February 28, 2008, a Leon County grand jury indicted Gary Michael
Hilton for the first-degree murder of Cheryl Dunlap between December 1 and
December 15, 2007, kidnapping, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and grand theft of
currency. Hilton pleaded not guilty on March 14, 2008. Hilton proceeded to a jury
Cheryl Dunlap, 46, was last seen alive on December 1, 2007. That morning,
Dunlap called a friend, Kiona Hill, and made arrangements to have dinner with her
that evening. That afternoon, Dunlap went to Leon Sinks to read, where she was
seen by Michael and Vikki Shirley at approximately 1:30 p.m. The Shirleys
described that Dunlap was wearing jeans and a sweater and carrying a hardback
book. Dunlap did not arrive for dinner that evening and was missed at church the
following morning by Tanya Land. Land went to Dunlap's residence and found
her dog, but noticed that her car was missing so she called the police. Steven
Ganey of the Wakulla County Sheriff's Office took the missing person report on
December 3, 2007.
- 2-
182
Dunlap's car, a white Toyota Camry, was found on December 3, 2007, on
the side of Crawfordville Highway parked near the woods. The car had deliberate
tire punctures in the sidewall that was later identified as a bayonet piercing. On
December I, the car had received a disabled vehicle ticket from Florida Highway
Patrol Trooper Brian Speigner. Ganey testified that it appeared that someone had
driven into the woods with all four tires intact and punctured the tire after the car
had been parked. Dunlap's purse was recovered in her car, but no money was
found.
Dunlap's Ameris Bank account records revealed that Dunlap cashed a check
revealed that three cash withdrawals were made at the ATM at Hancock Bank on
two attempted withdrawals were declined because they exceeded the daily limit.
The video from the security camera at the bank showed that the person making the
transactions was wearing a blue and white patterned, long-sleeved shirt, glasses, a
was hunting in the Apalachicola National Forest. Dunlap's body was near a forest
road and had been covered with some brush and limbs. Additionally, her head and
hands had been removed. Dunlap's body was identified using a sample of thigh
-3- 183
muscle. Dr. Anthony Clarke, an associate medical examiner, performed the
autopsy. Dr. Clarke opined that Dunlap's head and hands had been removed by an
instrument with a sharp blade and that the dismemberment occurred postmortem.
The cause of death was not able to be determined, but Dr. Clarke opined that it was
likely to have been a violent homicide. Additionally, Dr. Clarke noted that there
was a significant pre-mortem bruise located on Dunlap's middle to lower back and
that the bruise was not consistent with a normal fall injury. Dr. Clarke estimated
that Dunlap's body could have been in the woods for seven to fifteen days. Dr.
Clarke testified that his best estimate was that Dunlap died between December 5
remains of Dunlap's head and hands in a fire pit at Joe Thomas campsite-
approximately seven miles from where her body had been found. The bone
fragments were charred. Because of the bum damage, no DNA was recoverable
from the fragments. Dr. Anthony Falsetti, a forensic anthropologist, opined that
there were two hands represented, that the bones were from an adult, and that the
-4- 184
Hilton asked Ferguson for a jump start because his van, a white Chevrolet Astro,
would not crank. Ferguson testified that it did not appear to him that Hilton
actually needed the assistance. Ethan Davis provided similar testimony, that
sometime in late November 2007, Hilton stopped him and asked for help starting
his vehicle. Davis declined. Shawn Matthews also encountered Hilton in late
November near his LL Wallace Road camp. Hilton appeared to be familiar with
the area and told Matthews about a nearby sinkhole. On December 1, 2007,
Celeste Hutchins saw Hilton on Crawfordville Highway, not far from Leon Sinks.
Hutchins testified that Hilton was rummaging through a white Carmy on the side
wearing a blue and white patterned shirt. Hilton was also wearing something on
his left side that looked like a large knife holder. Mayfield testified that the shirt
she saw Hilton wearing looked like the one in the ATM security video. On
December 11, 2007, Stephen Prosser saw Hilton in the Apalachicola National
Forest. On December 12, 2007, Michael Travis saw Hilton in the forest near the
Bloxham cutoff and then saw him again on December 14. On December 18, 2007,
Teresa Johnson saw Hilton in Bristol, Florida, where Hilton told her that she
looked like Dunlap and that it was "too bad" about that girl getting murdered.
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Sometime between December 18, 2007, and January 1, 2008, Hilton made
his way to Georgia where he kidnapped and murdered Meredith Emerson. Hilton
took Emerson from Blood Mountain and held her for four days before murdering
her. He cooperated with law enforcement in exchange for a life sentence. Hilton
was arrested in Georgia after Stephen Shaw saw Hilton walk to the back of a
convenience store in the direction of the store's dumpsters and called law
and sheath, Hi-Tee boots, some chain, a padlock, gloves, a jacket, a folding police
baton, and a blue backpack. Hilton gave Georgia officials information on where to
find his bayonet on a hiking trail on Blood Mountain in North Georgia. Later, Jeff
Foggy, an FDLE tool mark expert, matched the bayonet to the puncture marks in
Dunlap's tire. Georgia law enforcement also gathered items from Hilton's van.
Items recovered from the van included clothing, jackets, gloves, camping
equipment, duffel bags, two sleeping bags, Hi-Tee boots, a camera, tobacco rolling
papers, Hilton's Georgia driver's license, tape, paper towels, maps, two BB pistols,
On February 12, 2008, Sergeant David Graham and Detective Dawn Dennis
with the Leon County Sheriffs Office executed a search warrant on Hilton while
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he was in custody in Georgia. Hilton's DNA was collected and the entire
execution of the warrant was recorded. Portions of the recording were played for
the jury.
On June 6, 2008, Sergeant Graham and two other officers drove Hilton from
Georgia to Florida. Although Hilton was not questioned, he spoke for nearly the
entire five-hour drive, which was recorded. The State also played portions of this
I'm not all bad. I mean, you got to understand, I mean, I'm sure you
can see. I mean, I'm a [expletive] genius, man. I'm not a-I'm not
all bad. I just, you know, lost my mind for a little bit. Lost a grip on
myself, man. What can I tell you? FBI and everybody else is trying
to scratch their head, hey, guys don't get started doing my shit at 61
years old. It just don't happen, you know. Like there's a retired FBI
(indecipherable) named Cliff Van, Clifford VanZandt, that keeps
getting himself in the news, talking about me. And he said, this guy
didn'tjust fall off the turnip truck, he said. You know, in other words,
he's been doing this. But like I told you before, you know, when I
saw you before, I said, remember, I said I'd give you one for free.
Nothing before September, okay? I mean, I'm not joking, okay? I
just, I got old and sick and couldn't make a living and just lost, flat
lost my [expletive] mind for a while, man. I couldn't get a grip on it.
Jail that were overheard by Correctional Officer Caleb Wynn. Specifically, Hilton
told inmate Summers that he could answer all the State Attorney's questions if he
would give him a life sentence, that he would reveal where the head was located,
that his bayonet was used on Dunlap's tire, that he would explain how he "pulled it
- 7- 187
off" on a busy highway, that he spent a few hours or a few days with Dunlap, and
The penalty phase began on February 17, 2011, during which the state called
which Hilton pleaded guilty. The State played Hilton's taped conversation with
law enforcement where he described kidnapping Emerson, holding her captive, and
stripping her body naked to remove DNA and fiber evidence. He also stated that
psychological condition: Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist and clinical director of the
Brain Imaging Center at the University of California, Irvine; Dr. Charles Golden, a
pharmacist and professor; and nine lay witnesses. The State then called Dr. Greg
Prichard in rebuttal.
On February ;21, 2011, the jury recommended unanimously that Gary Hilton
- 8- 188
The trial court held the Spencer 1 hearing on April 7, 2011. The State
presented three victim impact witnesses: (1) Ms. Emma Blount, the victim's aunt;
(2) Laura Walker, the victim's best friend; and (3) Gloria Tucker, the victim's
The trial court found that the State had proven six aggravators beyond a
reasonable doubt. Assigning weight to each aggravator, the trial court found: (1)
the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony (great weight); (2) the
murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping (great weight); (3) the murder
was committed to avoid arrest (moderate weight); (4) the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain (some weight); (5) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and (6) the murder was cold, calculated, and
proposed by Hilton and found one statutory mental mitigating factor-at the time
of the murder Hilton was under extreme emotional distress (some weight). Under
the catch-all provision, the trial court considered ten mitigating factors, finding that
Hilton established eight of them and rejecting two. The court found: (1) Hilton
specifically Ritalin (some weight); (3) Hilton was deprived of a relationship with
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his biological father (moderate weight); (4) Hilton is already serving a life sentence
so society is protected (some weight); (5) Hilton served his country in the US
military (very little weight); (6) Hilton suffered maternal deprivation and lack of
bonding between mother and child (some weight); (7) Hilton was removed from
his home and put into foster care when he was a child (some weight); (8) Hilton
grew up in a financially poor family (not proven); (9) Hilton suffered a traumatic
brain injury as a child (some weight); and (10) Hilton suffers from severe mental
Hilton argues that his statements to law enforcement during his transport
from Georgia to Florida should not have been introduced at trial because they
constitute inadmissible Williams 2 rule evidence because the statements were only
relevant to show his propensity to commit crime. The State argues that the trial
judge did not commit error in admitting the statements because Hilton did not state
Dunlap. The State argues further that even if the statements constitute collateral
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crime evidence, they were still admissible to prove premeditation. Because the
statements did not constitute similar fact or collateral crime evidence and were
explained in McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 786-87 (Fla. 20 10), cert. denied, 131
[a]n appellate court will not disturb a trial court's determination that
evidence is relevant and admissible absent an abuse of discretion.
Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless precluded by a
specific rule of exclusion. There are two categories under which
evidence of uncharged crimes or bad acts will be admissible-similar
fact evidence, otherwise known as Williams rule evidence, and
dissimilar fact evidence. The requirements and limitations of section
90.404 govern similar fact evidence while the general rule of
relevancy set forth in section 90.402 governs dissimilar fact evidence.
I d.; see also McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2011) (intemal citations omitted)
nonstop for the entire nearly five-hour drive. During this time, Hilton made
several statements that were played in front of the jury. At issue here, Hilton
stated, "like I told you before, you know, when I saw you before, I said, remember,
I said I'd give you one for free. Nothing before September, okay? I mean, I'm not
- 11 - 191
joking, okay?" Hilton also stated repeatedly that he had "lost his mind" for a
while. Hilton claims that these statements were evidence of collateral crimes.
Hilton's argument is without merit. The statements played for the jury did not
implicate Hilton in a collateral crime, nor did they constitute similar fact evidence.
Further, even if the statements constituted Williams rule evidence, they were
to law enforcement was ambiguous and did not directly implicate him in a
collateral crime. Hilton's statement that he began "hunting" in September did not
correlate with any known crime at the time of his trial. Nothing in Hilton's
statement implies that Dunlap was not his first victim or implicates Hilton in a
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. See
§ 90.404(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); see, e.g., Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543 (Fla.
Hilton argues that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Gregory Prichard to
testify about allegations of Hilton's past criminal conduct during the penalty phase
- 12-
192
circumstances. The State argues that Dr. Prichard was called as a proper rebuttal
witness to dispute Hilton's claim that he had done nothing wrong prior to this
crime and that the change in his character was created by Ritalin. Because Hilton's
expert testimony opened the door for Dr. Prichard's testimony, we find that the
In~' we found that the State's "anticipatory rebuttal" was improper and
that nothing in the record supported the State's assertion that the defendant
"opened the door" to be questioned about specific acts of past violence; Id. at 90
(citing Hildwin, 531 So. 2d at 128). Here, however, Hilton's penalty phase
defense relied heavily on the assertion that Hilton was a law-abiding citizen prior
to his exposure to Ritalin. Dr. Prichard's testimony was provided in rebuttal to that
assertion. We therefore find that the testimony in this case when "[v]iewed in
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context, ... was offered in rebuttal to the defense, not as a nonstatutory
aggravator." Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1208 (Fla. 2005). Accordingly, we
Witness Sequestration
Hilton argues that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Prichard to stay in
the courtroom, despite the sequestration rille. Because we find that the trial court
did not err in excluding Dr. Prichard from the sequestration rule, we deny relief on
this claim.
witnesses, but that the rule is not an absolute that must be invoked at the mere
request of counsel. See Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1984) (citing
Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961)). Section 90.616(2)(c), Florida
party's attorney to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause, and the trial
court has wide discretion in making that determination. See Knight v. State, 746
Here, Dr. Prichard was pennitted to stay in the courtroom upon the State's
request. Because the State was late filing its notice of intent to seek the death
penalty, Dr. Prichard was prevented from examining Hilton. The State requested
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194
that he be excluded from the sequestration rule to give Dr. Prichard a chance to
expert witnesses and did not serve as a fact witness. During cross-examination,
Dr. Prichard stated that he "sat through the entire penalty phase ... and handed
notes to Mr. Meggs." Accordingly, we find that Dr. Prichard's presence was
essential to the presentation of the State's cause and that the trial court did not
Aggravators
Hilton argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the HAC and
CCP aggravating circumstances and that the trial court erred in finding these
circumstances applied in Hilton's case. The State argues that the trial court
find competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's
'is to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of
law for each aggravating circumstance, and, if so, whether competent substantial
evidence supports its finding.'" Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1260-61 (Fla.
2004) (quoting Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997)); see also Heyne
v. State, 88 So. 3d 113, 122 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 574 (2012). In deciding
- 15 - 195
whether a lower court erred in its finding of an aggravator, we do not reweigh the
doubt but instead "review the record to determine whether the trial court applied
the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether
competent substantial evidence supports its finding." Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d
HAC
This Court has explained the meaning of the HAC aggravator as follows:
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d I, 9 (Fla. 1973); see also Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d
1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998) ("The HAC aggravator applies only in torturous murders-
those that evince extreme and outrageous depravity as exemplified either by the
suffering of another."). This Court has also stated that"[ u]nlike the cold,
mind, intent and motivation of the defendant, the HAC aggravator focuses on the
- 16 - 196
means and manner in which death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances
surrounding the death." Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998) (citing
Stano v. State, 460 So. 2d 890, 893 (Fla. 1984)). Furthermore, we have held that
"[i]n determining whether the HAC factor was present, the focus should be upon
perpetrator." Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 369 (Fla. 2003); see also Heyne, 88
So. 3d at 122; McGirth, 48 So. 3d at 794. The victim's mental state may be
Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988). "[F]ear, emotional strain, and
terror of the victim during the events leading up to the murder may make an
otherwise quick death especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." James v. State, 695
So. 2d 1229, 1235 (Fla. 1997); see also Swafford, 533 So. 2d at 277; Hall, 87 So.
3d 671-72. Additionally, we have held that the actions of the defendant preceding
the actual killing are also relevant. Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1335 (Fla.
1997).
was held anywhere from 2 days to a week prior to her murder, and that she was
injured enough during that time to leave traces of her blood on several of Hilton's
items. The trial court's inferences that the victim was likely terrified, suffering
from emotional strain, or suffering during the time leading up to her murder are
- 17- 197
supported by our review of the record. Accordingly, we find that there is
competent, substantial evidence contained in the record to support the trial court's
finding of HAC.
CCP
state of mind, intent, and motivation of the defendant." Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d
277,298 (Fla. 2009) (citing Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998)). The
trial court's determination of whether CCP is present in a case is based upon the
totality of the circumstances. Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 115 (Fla. 2008).
CCP can be proved by circumstantial evidence. Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561,
576-77 (Fla. 2004). CCP can be indicated by the circumstances showing such facts
277. It is the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder
was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an act of emotional frenzy or
- 18-
198
panic, or a fit of rage. Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 581 (Fla. 2007). "'[T]he
facts supporting CCP must focus on the manner in which the crime was executed,
assess[ es] the record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its weight.' " McCoy v.
State, 853 So. 2d 396, 407 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922,
This Court has also found the heightened premeditation required to support
CCP where a defendant has a lengthy period of reflection and the opportunity to
abandon the plan but, instead, commits the murder. Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d
148, 162 (Fla. 1998). We explained in Alston that where the defendant had ample
opportunity to release the victim but instead, after substantial reflection, "acted out
the plan [he] had conceived during the extended period in which [the] events
704 So. 2d 500, 505 (Fla. 1997)) (citation omitted); see also Looney v. State, 803
- 19- 199
the manner of killing was not able to be established, the method of disposal of the
victim's body was calculated and carried out after a period of needed reflection.
Hilton's statements on the self-made video and to a fellow inmate describe being
with the victim for a long enough time for careful reflection. Accordingly, we find
that the trial court did not err in finding this aggravating factor.
Mitigation
Hilton argues that that trial court improperly rejected the lack of capacity
mitigating factor and failed to provide reasons why there is substantial, competent
evidence in the record to support the rejection of the mitigating circumstance. The
State argues that the trial court properly weighed the experts' testimonies and
In rejecting this mitigating factor, the trial court stated, "[t]he Court finds
that Dr. Prichard's testimony was more credible and more consistent with the other
evidence ih the case as to this point. The Court finds that this factor in mitigation
was not proven." A trial court may reject a defendant's claim that a mitigating
circumstance has been proven as long as the record contains competent substantial
evidence to support the trial court's rejection of the mitigation. See Spencer, 645
with the other evidence in the case. See Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1005 (Fla.
2006).
- 20-
200
Here, the testimony was not uncontroverted and, "[i]t is apparent from the ... trial
support of these factors but found this testimony unpersuasive." Roberts v. State,
519 So. 2d 885,894 (Fla. 1987). Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.
Ring Claim
Hilton argues that this Court should re-examine its holdings in Bottoson v.
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002), and King v.
Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 657 (2002). Because Hilton
because Hilton had previously been convicted of a prior violent felony, we find his
request without merit. We have repeatedly rejected this argument when either
aggravating factor is present. See McMillian v. State, 94 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 2012),
cert. denied, 2013 U.S. Lexis 1305 (Feb. 19, 2013); Heyne v. State, 88 So. 3d 113,
120 n.2 (Fla. 2012); Kopsho v. State, 84 So. 3d 204, 220 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 190 (2012); Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 540 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 132
Sufficiency
Hilton does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
evidence to determine whether it is legally sufficient. See Crain v. State, 894 So.
- 21 - 201
2d 59, 72 (Fla. 2004) (" ... in capital cases, this Court independently assesses the
review of the record, we find that there is competent substantial evidence to sustain
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is
State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001) ("In determining the sufficiency of the
evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the
2007, and that on December 15, her decomposing body was found beheaded and
with her hands removed. Dunlap had been last seen on December 1, 2007, at Leon
Sinks National Park. Her car was located abandoned on Crawfordville Highway
on December 3 with a tire that had been punctured by an item later identified as
Dunlap's car and later identified that man as Gary Hilton. Witnesses spoke with
Hilton in surrounding areas during the time Dunlap was reported missing.
Witnesses identified the clothing Hilton was wearing during that time period. On
December 2, 3, and 4, a man matching Hilton's build and wearing clothing similar
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202
to that described by witnesses used Dunlap's ATM card and PIN at Hancock Bank
on Termessee Street to remove a total of $700 from her bank account. In a self-
made video retrieved from a camera found in Hilton's possession, Hilton is shown
items and killing "those b*tches." Charred human bones, including a skull and
hand bones, were found in a fire pit near a campsite where Hilton was seen by
Shawn Matthews. In addition, this campsite also contained cigarette butts that
contained Hilton's DNA. Dunlap's DNA was found on articles recovered from
Hilton's van, including two sleeping bags, Hilton's duffel bag, some pants and on
the Hi-Tee boots Hilton was seen discarding. Hilton was overheard by law
enforcement telling a fellow inmate that he would tell them where the head was if
they would give him a life sentence. On the drive from Georgia to Florida, Hilton
told law enforcement that he had lost his mind, but hadn't done anything before
Proportionality
v. State, 869 So. 2d 1196, 1204 (Fla. 2004)); Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d 98 (Fla.
2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-8923 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2013). A review of the
- 23- 203
evidence demonstrates that the proportionality of Hilton's sentence of death is
proportionate.
Here, the jury's recommendation was unanimous. The trial court weighed
the six aggravators proven by the State against the mitigation proven by Hilton and
by competent, substantial evidence and the record "fails to reveal any indication
that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning little weight to the mitigation
that was established." Hampton, 103 So. 3d at 121. We find that the imposition of
the death sentence in this case is proportionate when compared to other death
sentences that this Court has upheld. See, e.g., Hildwin v. State, 727 So. 2d 193
(Fla. 1998) (four aggravators: HAC, prior violent felony, pecuniary gain, and under
mitigators); Johnston v. State, 841 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2002) (prior violent felony,
kidnapping, pecuniary gain, and HAC versus one statutory mitigator and twenty-
six nonstatutory mitigators); Suggs v. State, 923 So. 2d 419,440 (Fla. 2005)
(sentence to death proportionate when the trial court found seven aggravating
factors and three mitigating factors, including one statutory mental mitigator and
this Court noted that the murder "particularly heinous and premeditated"); Owen v.
State, 862 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2003) (finding death sentence proportionate for 23 year
- 24-
204
old defendant, despite the presence of three statutory mitigators, including both
mental mitigators and sixteen other mitigators where there was evidence of
multiple stab wounds and the presence of multiple aggravators, including HAC,
CCP, and a conviction for another murder); Rose v. State, 787 So. 2d 786 (Fla.
Conclusion
death. It is so ordered.
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender and William Carl McLain, Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
- 25- 205
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
- 26-
206
&.L 207
Westlaw,
Page I
134 S.Ct. 686, 187 L.Ed.2d 556, 82 USLW 3329
(Cite as: 134 S.Ct. 686)
No. 13-6416.
Dec. 2, 2013.
U.S.,2013
Hilton v. Florida
134 S.Ct. 686, 187 L.Ed.2d 556,82 USLW 3329
END OF DOCUMENT
v.
Defendant.
_ ____cl
On November 25, 2014, Hilton, represented by Robert A. Morris, filed a Motion for Post-
Conviction Relief. This is the State's Answer to the Motion for Post-Conviction Relief. This
209
Facts and Procedural History of the Case
Hilton was convicted of first-degree murder for which he was sentenced to death. The
facts of this case as recited by the Florida Supreme Court in the direct appeal opinion are:
On February 28, 2008, a Leon County grand jury indicted Gary Michael Hilton
I(H· the llrst-degree murder of Cheryl Dunlap between December I and December
15,2007, kidnapping, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and grand theft of currency.
Hilton pleaded not guilty on March 14, 2008. Hilton proceeded to a jury trial
commencing on February 2, 2011.
Cheryl Dunlap, 46, was last seen alive on December I, 2007. That morning,
Dunlap called a friend, Kiona Hill, and made arrangements to have dinner with
her that evening. That afternoon, Dunlap went to Leon Sinks to read, where she
was seen by Michael and Vikki Shirley at approximately 1:30 p.m. The Shirleys
described that Dunlap was wearing jeans and a sweater and carrying a hardback
book. Dunlap did not mTive for dinner that evening and was missed at church the
following morning by Tanya Land. Land went to Dunlap's residence and found
her dog, but noticed that her car was missing so she called the police. Steven
Ganey of the Wakulla County Sheriffs Office took the missing person report on
December 3, 2007.
Dunlap's car, a white Toyota Camry, was found on December 3, 2007, on the side
of Crawfordville Highway parked near the woods. The car had deliberate tire
runctures in the sidewall that was later identified as a bayonet piercing. On
December I, the car had received a disabled vehicle ticket from Florida Highway
Patrol Trooper Brian Speigner. Ganey testified that it appeared that someone had
driven into the woods with all four tires intact and punctured the tire after the car
had been parked. Dunlap's purse was recovered in her car, but no money was
found.
Dunlap's Ameris Bank account records revealed that Dunlap cashed a check with
a drive-through teller at 11:17 a.m. on December 1. The records further revealed
that three cash withdrawals were made at the A TM at Hancock Bank on West
Tennessee Street on December 2, 3, and 4, 2007, totaling $700. In addition, two
attempted withdrawals were declined because they exceeded the daily limit. The
video from the security camera at the bank showed that the person making the
transactions was wearing a blue and white patterned, long-sleeved shirt, glasses, a
hat, and a make-shift mask made from tape.
210
thigh muscle. Dr. Anthony Clarke, an associate medical examiner, performed the
autopsy. Dr. Clarke opined that Dunlap's head and hands had been removed by
an instrument with a sharp blade and that the dismemberment occulTed
postmortem. The cause of death was not able to be detennined, but Dr. Clarke
opined that it was likely to have been a violent homicide. Additionally, Dr.
Clarke noted that there was a significant pre-mortem bruise located on Dunlap's
middle to lower back and that the bruise was not consistent with a normal fall
injury. Dr. Clarke estimated that Dunlap's body could have been in the woods for
seven to fifteen days. Dr. Clarke testified that his best estimate was that Dunlap
died between December 5 and December 8, 2007.
Several witnesses testified that they saw or encountered Gary Michael Hilton
during the time period surrounding Dunlap's disappearance. In late November
2007, George Ferguson encountered Hilton on LL Wallace Road. Hilton asked
Ferguson for a jump start because his van, a white Chevrolet Astra, would not
crank. Ferguson testified that it did not appear to him that Hilton actually needed
the assistance. Ethan Davis provided similar testimony, that sometime in late
November 2007, Hilton stopped him and asked for help starting his vehicle. Davis
declined. Shawn Matthews also encountered Hilton in late November near his LL
Wallace Road camp. Hilton appeared to be familiar with the area and told
Matthews about a nearby sinkhole. On December 1, 2007, Celeste Hutchins saw
Hilton on Crawfordville Highway, not far from Leon Sinks. Hutchins testified
that Hilton was rummaging through a white Camry on the side of the road. On
December I 0, 2007, Loretta Mayfield spoke to Hilton at a convenience store on
Crawfordville Highway. Mayfield testified that Hilton was wearing a blue and
white patterned shirt. Hilton was also wearing something on his left side that
looked like a large knife holder. Mayfield testified that the shirt she saw Hilton
wearing looked like the one in the ATM security video. On December 11, 2007,
Stephen Prosser saw Hilton in the Apalachicola National Forest. On December
I 2. 2007. Michael Travis saw Hilton in the forest near the Bloxham cutoff and
then saw him again on December 14. On December 18, 2007, Teresa Johnson
saw Hilton in Bristol, Florida, where Hilton told her that she looked like Dunlap
and that it was "too bad" about that girl getting murdered.
Sometime between December 18, 2007, and January 1, 2008, Hilton made his
way to Georgia where he kidnapped and murdered Meredith Emerson. Hilton
took Emerson from Blood Mountain and held her for four days before murdering
her. He cooperated with Jaw enforcement in exchange for a life sentence. Hilton
211
was arrested in Georgia after Stephen Shaw saw Hilton walk to the back of a
convemence store in the direction of the store's dumpsters and called law
enforcement. Law enforcement officers recovered items Hilton was seen
discarding in a dumpster at the convenience store. From the dumpster, law
cni'orccmcnt recovered a U.S. Forestry citation for unauthorized camping, a knife
and sheath, Hi-Tee boots, some chain, a padlock, gloves, a jacket, a folding
police baton, and a blue backpack. Hilton gave Georgia officials information on
where to find his bayonet on a hiking trail on Blood Mountain in North Georgia.
Later, Jeff Foggy, an FDLE tool mark expert, matched the bayonet to the puncture
marks in Dunlap's tire. Georgia law enforcement also gathered items from
Hilton's van. Items recovered from the van included clothing, jackets, gloves,
camping equipment, duffel bags, two sleeping bags, Hi-Tee boots, a camera,
tobacco rolling papers, Hilton's Georgia driver's license, tape, paper towels, maps,
two BB pistols, a book purchased at a Tallahassee book store, and dog food.
On February 12, 2008, Sergeant David Graham and Detective Dawn Dennis with
the Leon County Sheriffs Office executed a search warrant on Hilton while he
was in custody in Georgia. Hilton's DNA was collected and the entire execution
of the warrant was recorded. Portions of the recording were played for the jury.
On June 6, 2008, Sergeant Graham and two other officers drove Hilton from
Georgia to Florida. Although Hilton was not questioned, he spoke for nearly the
entire live-hour drive, which was recorded. The State also played portions of this
recording at trial. Hilton stated:
I'm not all bad. I mean, you got to understand, I mean, I'm sure you can see. I
mean, I'm a (expletive] genius, man. I'm not a-I'm not all bad. I just, you know,
lost my mind for a little bit. Lost a grip on myself~ man. What can I tell you? FBI
and everybody else is trying to scratch their head, hey, guys don't get started
doing my shit at 61 years old. It just don't happen, you know. Like there's a retired
FBI (indecipherable) named Cliff Van, Clifford Van Zandt, that keeps getting
himself in the news, talking about me. And he said, this guy didn't just fall off the
turnip truck, he said. You know, in other words, he's been doing this. But like I
told you before, you know, when I saw you before, I said, remember, I said I'd
give you one for free. Nothing before September, okay? I mean, I'm not joking,
okay? I just, I got old and sick and couldn't make a living and just lost, flat lost
my [expletive] mind for a while, man. I couldn't get a grip on it.
Additionally, Hilton made statements to a fellow inmate at the Leon County Jail
that were overheard by Correctional Officer Caleb Wynn. Specifically, Hilton
told inmate Summers that he could answer all the State Attorney's questions if he
would give him a life sentence, that he would reveal where the head was located,
that his bayonet was used on Dunlap's tire, that he would explain how he "pulled
it off' on a busy highway, that he spent a few hours or a few days with Dunlap,
and that he felt no regret other than getting caught.
212
The penalty phase began on February 17, 2011, during which the state called Clay
Bridges of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. Agent Bridges testified about
Hilton's prior felony conviction-the murder of Emerson in Georgia to which
Hilton pleaded guilty. The State played Hilton's taped conversation with law
enforcement where he described kidnapping Emerson, holding her captive, and
stripping her body naked to remove DNA and fiber evidence. He also stated that
"you either kill them or you get caught."
Hilton presented four expert witnesses who testified regarding his psychological
condition: Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist and clinical director of the Brain Imaging
Center at the University of California, Irvine; Dr. Charles Golden, a clinical
neuropsychologist performing neuropsychological testing and examinations; Dr.
Abbey Strauss, a psychiatrist with special expertise in psychopharmacology; and
Dr. William Morton, a board certified psychiatric pharmacist and professor; and
nine lay witnesses. The State then called Dr. Greg Prichard in rebuttal.
On I cbru<1ry 21, 20 II, the jury recommended unanimously that Gary Hilton be
sentenced to death for the murder of Cheryl Dunlap.
The trial court held the Spencer 1 hearing on April 7, 2011. The State presented
three victim impact witnesses: (1) Ms. Emma Blount, the victim's aunt; (2) Laura
Walker, the victim's best friend; and (3) Gloria Tucker, the victim's cousin. Hilton
presented no witnesses.
The trial court found that the State had proven six aggravators beyond a
reasonable doubt. Assigning weight to each aggravator, the trial court found: (1)
the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony (great weight); (2) the
murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping (great weight); (3) the
murder was committed to avoid arrest (moderate weight); (4) the murder was
committed for pecuniary gain (some weight); (5) the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and (6) the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) (great weight).
The cou11 also considered and weighed each mitigating circumstance proposed by
Hilton and found one statutory mental mitigating factor-at the time of the
murder Hilton was under extreme emotional distress (some weight). Under the
catch-all provision, the trial court considered ten mitigating factors, finding that
Hilton established eight of them and rejecting two. The court found: (l) Hilton
grew up in an abusive household (some weight); (2) Hilton abused drugs,
specifically Ritalin (some weight); (3) Hilton was deprived of a relationship with
his biological father (moderate weight); (4) Hilton is already serving a life
sentence so society is protected (some weight); (5) Hilton served his country in
the U.S. military (very little weight); (6) Hilton suffered maternal deprivation and
lack of bonding between mother and child (some weight); (7) Hilton was removed
1
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
213
from his home and put into foster care when he was a child (some weight); (8)
Hilton grew up in a tlnancially poor family (not proven); (9) Hilton suffered a
traumatic brain injury as a child (some weight); and (10) Hilton suffers from
severe mental defects (not proven).
On April 21, 20 II, the trial court followed the jury's unanimous recommendation
and sentenced Hilton to death. The coutt found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
aggravators outweighed the mitigators.
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Hilton raised six claims: I) the trial court erred
in admitting his statements to law enforcement as they constituted inadmissible Williams rule
evidence because they were only relevant to show his propensity to commit the crime; 2) the trial
court en·ed in admitting Dr. Gregory Prichard's testimony during the penalty phase regarding
circumstances; 3) the trial court ened in permitting Dr. Prichard to remain in the couttroom,
despite invocation of the rule of sequestration; 4) the trial court erred in finding that the HAC
and CCP aggravating circumstances applied, as the evidence was insufficient for such a finding;
'i) the trial court erred in rejecting the lack of capacity mitigating factor and failed to provide
reasons why there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the rejection of this
mitigating circumstance; and 6) the Florida Supreme Court erred in upholding the death sentence
in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Hilton's
convictions and death sentence. Hilton at 756. The Florida Supreme found the death sentence to
be proportionate. Hi!wn at 755. The Florida Supreme Court also reviewed the sufficiency of the
evidence. !d. Hilton then tiled a motion for rehearing on April 2, 2013, which was denied on July
2, 2013.
214
On September 12, 2013, Hilton filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Cout1, raising a Rinl claim, which was denied on December 2, 2013. Hilton v. State,
On November 25, 2014, Hilton, represented by Robert A. Morris, Esquire, filed a 3.851
Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, raising ten claims (including sub-claims). This is the State's
215
Evidentiary Hearings
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim, the movant must allege specific facts.
Davis v. State, 26 So.3d 519, 533 (Fla. 2009) (finding a claim of ineffectiveness to be legally
ilhul'llcicnt because it did not allege specific facts and therefore, the defendant was not entitled
to an ev1dentiary hearing on the claim, citing Jones v. State, 998 So.2d 573, 587-88 (Fla. 2008)).
The defendant ·'bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid
claim." Hannon v. State, 941 So.2d 1109, 1138 (Fla. 2006); Johnston v. State, 70 So.3d 472,483
(Fla. 2011) (explaining that where a movant presents only bare conclusory allegations on several
issues, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claims). Furthermore, a trial com1
need not conduct an evidentiary hearing on claims that are conclusively rebutted by the existing
record. Pagan v. State, 29 So.3d 938, 955 (Fla. 2009) (explaining, that while the Florida
Supreme Couti encourages trial coutis to hold evidentiary hearings on post-conviction motions, a
hearing: is warranted only where a defendant alleges specific facts, not conclusively rebutted by
the record. which demonstrate a deficiency in counsel's performance that prejudiced the
defendant and stating that summary or conclusory allegations are insufficient); Rhodes v. State,
986 So.2d 501,513-14 (Fla. 2008) (same). Furthermore, some claims are purely a matter of law
that do not require any factual development. Claims that are meritless as a matter of law, because
there is controlling precedent against the claim, should be summarily denied. Mann v. State, 112
So.3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2013) (stating "because Mann raised purely legal claims that have been
previously rejected by this Cout1, the circuit court properly summarily denied relief').
216
Post-Conviction Relief
performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,669 (1984). To demonstrate
deficient performance, the defendant must show that "counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." ld. at 687. To demonstrate prejudice he must establish "that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional e!Tors, the result of the proceeding would have
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective.
illk"lwl'l 1 Stale. 70 StUd 503, 512 (Fla. 2011); Strickland at 689. A fair assessment of an
attorney's performance requires that every effot1 be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight. to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Lukehart at 512; Strickland at 689. Judicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Id. "Strategic decisions do not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and
rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct."
Lukehart at 512. An attorney can almost always be second-guessed for not doing more but that is
not the standard. Pagan v. State, 29 So.3d 938, 949 (Fla. 2009). "[A] court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy."' Strickland at 689.
The strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable is even stronger when
trial counsel is experienced. See Cummings v. Sec'y, Fla. Dept. ofCorr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356
217
(11' 11 Cir. 2009) (citing Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1316 (ll'h Cir. 2000) (en
bane). In the Eleventh Circuit's words, "experience is due some respect." Chandler at 1316.
Prejudice means that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional enors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland at 694.
is not enough for the defendant to show that the enors had some conceivable effect on the
t>utcumc ur the prucccding.'· fJ at 693. This second prong does not require proof that "counsel's
deticient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the case." Gaskin v. State, 822
So.2d 1243, 1257, n.3 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052) Instead,
it requires a showing that, in light of all the evidence sunounding his conviction, the conduct
renders the results of the proceeding unreliable. !d. at 1247; see also Strickland at 694.
10
218
I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN PRESENTING A "DEFENSE" OF
INNOCENCE AND/OR REASONABLE DOUBT DURING THE GUILT PHASE
AND THEN MAKING A CONCILATORY ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF LIFE
DURING THE PENALTY PHASE, AND DEFENDANT WAS NEVER
CONSULTED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A DEFENSE
Hilton asser1s ineffective assistance of trial counsel for presenting a defense of innocence
and/or reasonable doubt during the guilt phase and then arguing in favor of a life sentence during
the penalty phase, essentially arguing that trial counsel presented inconsistent theories, and
furthermore, failed to consult with Hilton before presenting this defense. First, Hilton was
represented by a team comprised of three Assistant Public Defenders with extensive experience:
Maria lnes Suber, Robert S. Friedman, and Paula Saunders. Ms. Suber, lead counsel, has been a
member of the Florida Bar since 1986; Mr. Friedman has been a member since 1985; and Ms.
Saunders has been a member since 1980; all three have prior capital trial experience. Second,
trial counsel did not allude to, argue, or put on testimony or evidence in an attempt to establish
that llillon was innocent. but merely attempted to prove reasonable doubt in the State's case- a
reasonable trial strategy. (T Vol. 24, p 47-55 & Vol. 37 p 1529-1560) In fact, attorneys
commonly have their clients enter pleas of not guilty, proceed to trial, and later, plea for mercy
during the penalty phase. Third, it is the State's position that it was trial counsel's deliberate
strategy to proceed through the guilt phase, requiring the State to present admissible evidence
establishing the essential elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury,
before proceeding to the penalty phase. There was nothing inconsistent between what was
·'Because advocacy is an art and not a science, and because the adversary system requires
II
219
stmtcgic decisions of' trial counsel should not be second-guessed by a reviewing court /d. at 689-
91. "Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current counsel disagrees with trial
counsel's strategic decisions." Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1047 (Fla. 2000).
As stated previously in this Answer, a trial comi need not conduct an evidentiary hearing
on claims that are conclusively rebutted by the existing record. See Pagan at 955. Because the
records rebuts the allegation that trial counsel argued innocence at trial before conceding guilt
and seeking a recommendation for a life sentence at the penalty phase, this claim should be
denied.
Furthermore, Hilton has failed to establish that had he entered a plea instead of
proceeding to trial, there is a reasonable probability he would have received a different sentence
and thus, his claim fails the prejudice prong of Strickland. A plea of guilty would have resulted
in the same conviction he received from the jury. The only plausible difference in outcome
would have been the timing of the State's presentation of its evidence; the State would have
presented its evidence of Cheryl Dunlap's brutal kidnapping and murder at the penalty phase
instead of the guilt phase (and this would have been to Hilton's detriment as the evidence would
have been fresh in the jurors' minds prior to deliberating). Nonetheless, the jury would have been
presented with and considered evidence regarding the manner in which Ms. Dunlap was
I his clatm should be summarily denied because Hilton has failed to prove his allegations
12
220
II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN THEIR FAILURE TO ADVISE
DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO ENTER A GUILTY PLEA AND PROCEED
DIRECTLY TO A PENALTY PHASE
Hilton finds fault in trial counsel's alleged failure to advise him of his right to enter a
guilty plea and proceed directly to a penalty phase. Hilton, however, has failed to cite any
authority holding that trial counsel must do this. Due to the depravity ofthis case, the State chose
not to make any plea offers. Thus, trial counsel was left with the decision to advise their client of
entering a plea to the court or proceeding to trial. Proceeding to trial is a tactical decision for the
defendant and his counsel, in which many variables come into play. Since it is the State's burden
to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense presumably strategically planned for the
possible best-case scenario outcomes involving the State failing to meet its burden; for one or
more of its witnesses to fail to appear and testify at trial; for the State to fail to prove an element
of the offenses charged; for jury nullification; or for a conviction on a lesser-included offense.
Hilton had nothing to lose by proceeding to trial. A plea would have resulted in the outcome
Capital case defense counsel should be aware that there is usually some value in
putting on a reasonable doubt defense even in cases where overwhelming
evidence of guilt exists. Depending on the tone of the defense, and the role
defendant plays in it, this value will not be outweighed by the possibility of
adverse sentcncer reaction. ·rhe first benefit of a reasonable doubt defense in an
overwhelming evidence case is that the evidence of defendant's capital crimes,
and possibly even factors in aggravation, will come out during the guilt phase.
Tile rendition of a guilty verdict psychologically concludes that stage, and, at the
penalty phase, it is not likely that the prosecution will repeat its testimonial
parade. Instead, the state will probably rely on the record evidence. Although this
can still be damaging to defendant's life case, such recalled evidence tends to lose
its vividness, particularly when contrasted with penalty phase testimony favorable
13
221
to the convicted defendant. Thus gomg through a guilt phase trial helps to
segregate and distance n·om the sentencer the prosecution's strongest case against
the defendant. Were defendant simply to admit guilt and go straight to the penalty
phase trial, the prosecution at that time would undoubtedly present much of what
it otherwise would have presented during the guilt phase.
Second, it may be possible in the course of the guilt phase trial to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses in a manner calculated to show that the defendant has
positive sides or features. For example, defense counsel might elicit hom a
detective or prison ofl1cial that the defendant was cooperative or remorseful or
had been a model prisoner. While such questioning is insufficient to defeat the
pmsccution's guilt phase case, it lays a foundation for the presentation of
llllllt!illlllg C\ idcncc at the penalty phase.
ThinJ, putting the prosecution to its guilt phase proof also lengthens the tTial and
permits the sentcncer to observe the defendant and become better acquainted with
her. Depending on defendant's general demeanor and reaction to trial events, this
may dispose the scntencer in the defendant's favor.
Finally, a reasonable doubt defense does not preclude the defendant f\·om taking
the stand, admitting the offenses, and expressing contrition or remorse. The
decision 1vhcthcr the defendant should testify can be made after the quality and
strength of the prosecution's case has been assessed. Should the prosecution's case
unexpectedly turn out to be weaker than anticipated, the defendant would have the
option of remaining silent and allowing the case to go to the jury on the issue of
reasonable doubt. If; however, the case for guilt is strong, an appropriate
admission of guilt, coupled perhaps with expressions of remorse, might have a
t~mm.tble intluence on the sentencer at the penalty phase.
h>1 the reasons enumerated above, reasonable doubt defenses are not necessarily
1nccmsistcnt with the presentation ol' a mitigating case at the penalty phase and
may not suffer from the penalty phase advocacy limitations of denial defenses
such as alibi or mistaken identity.
Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
Hilton argues that subjecting the jury to hearing about the gruesome and violent nature of
the murder again at the penalty phase prejudiced him. The State provided one witness in rebuttal:
14
222
Dr. Pritchard. He testified about his diagnosis of Hilton and how he arrived at that diagnosis. (T
Vol. 41, p 575) Specifically, he referred to testimony defense witnesses presented, such as
Hilton's abusive childhood (T Vol. 41, p 583), his childhood head injury (T Vol. 41, p 583), the
shooting of his step-father (T Vol. 41, p 584), his discharge from the military (T Vol. 41, p 585),
his prior marriages (T Vol. 41, p 589), his prior arrests (T Vol. 41, p 591)- none of these were
issues presented at trial. He did discuss defendant's statements regarding both the Florida and
Georgia murders, but that was in explaining how he reached his diagnosis, in rebuttal to the four
mental health witnesses presented by the defense, and in detailing why he felt Hilton appreciated
the criminality of his actions. (T Vol. 41, p 592-602) Specifically, Dr. Pritchard discussed how
Hilton described his actions as "hunting" (T Vol. 41, p 592) and the self-serving reason why
Hilton offered information about the location of Meredith's body in Georgia, that is, to obtain a
life sentence. (T Vol. 41, p 595) He also detailed why he believed Hilton dismembered the
bodies, removed the victim's clothing and poured bleach on Meredith's body- to cover the
murders up. (I Vol. 41, p 600) Dr. Pritchard was simply rebutting testimony presented by the
defense during the penalty phase. The jury was not twice submitted to gruesome photos or the
hotTifk details of what the victims endured while held captive by the defendant.
Even if some of Dr. Pritchard's testimony reiterated the repugnant nature of Hilton's
actions. it is the State's position that his actions alone resulted in a recommendation of death, not
a recitation of the fact that the two victim's bodies were dismembered.
More importantly, Hilton knew of his right to plea from his case in Georgia. In that case,
for the killing of Meredith Emerson, he chose to enter a plea in exchange for a life sentence on
January 31,2008. (T Vol. 38, p 48) He entered this plea shortly before being retumed to Florida
15
223
to l~tcc the charges in the instant case. There is no doubt, based on his plea to the case in Georgia
that he was aware of his ability to enter a plea instead of proceeding to trial.
And, again, Hilton is unable to show prejudice. The end-result would have been the same
This claim should be summarily denied because Hilton has failed to prove his allegations of
Hilton submits that lead trial counsel in this case expressed an inability to properly
represent him due to over-extension and an overwhelming caseload. However, this vague
allegation does not comport with the test announced in Strickland. The Florida Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Dennis v. State, 109 So.3d 680, 691 (Fla. 2012) when it affirmed the trial
court's summary denial of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Dennis argued that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to secure a second chair and for representing other clients
while representing him. The Court found the claim to be facially insufficient as Dennis failed to
include any allegations regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland. Dennis generally claimed
that trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for his trial, but he did not include any allegation
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to secure a second chair
and his failure to represent only Dennis, the result of Dennis' trial would have been different or
16
224
Vague and conclusory allegations, lacking specificity, are insufficient to warrant relief.
Doorha/ v. State, 983 So.2d 464, 482-85 (Fla. 2008). In Doorbal, the trial court summarily
dc111cd lm claims without an evidentiary hearing because Doorbal had failed to allege a specific
omission or overt act upon which his ineffective assistance claim was based. An example
addressed by the Supreme Court was Doorbal's claim that the death of trial counsel's father
immediately prior to trial, as well as the illness of his mother, interfered with his representation
of Doorbal and resulted in ineffective assistance. Doorbal's claim is not unlike the conclusory
allegation Hilton presents when he alleges that trial counsel was unable to adequately represent
him because of over-extension and an overwhelming caseload. See also Ragsdale v. State, 720
So.2d 203, 208 (Fla. 1998) (finding that trial judge properly denied evidentiary hearing where
defendant provided insufficient facts as to "how the outcome would have been different had
counsel acted otherwise"): Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912,913 (Fia.1989) (holding that a mere
must establish two components under Strickland; Stephens, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 2000).
First, a defendant must establish conduct on the part of counsel that is outside the broad range of
competent perfom1ance under prevailing professional standards. Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d
912, 913 (Fla.1989). Second, the deficiency in counsel's performance must be shown to have so
affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that confidence in the outcome is
undermined. !d.; see also Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 219 (Fla.l998) ("[T]he benchmark
illl' JUdging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undem1ined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
17
225
Ineffectiveness under Strickland requires more than just a showing that tlial counsel was
overworked. Hilton must demonstrate with specificity "that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
.·\n>c>lJmcnt." Strickland at (lH7. Even if a defendant meets that threshold, he or she must also
prove that such an error prejudiced the defense. !d. Hilton has not demonstrated how this
Counsel has neglected to enunciate the conduct on the part of lead counsel that was
outside the broad range of competent performance under prevailing professional standards and
has failed to show that the det!ciency so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings
that confidence in the outcome is undermined. A mere blanket statement that an overwhelming
While addressing Doorbal's amended motion for post-conviction relief, which did not
seck to lllli'oducc nc\\ claims, but rather, supplemented existing claims with additional facts, the
Florida Supreme Colll1 reiterated its prior holding that '[a] defendant may not raise claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel on a piecemeal basis by refining his or her claims to include
additional factual allegations after the postconviction court concludes that no evidentiary hearing
is required." DooriJa/, 983 So.2d at385, quoting Viningv. State, 827 So.2d 201,212 (Fla. 2002),
/)o()fh,ti, %_1 So.2d at 385 (concluding that trial court did not err in denying rehearing "for the
lirst time made lllCtual allegations relating to his claim that counsel was ineffective in
investigating and presenting mental health mitigating evidence.") The DooriJal Comi concluded
that his amended motion "contain[ ed] the type of post-Hu;Thearing 'piecemeal' supplementation
18
226
Furthermore. the record reflects that there were nearly thirty-six months between the
11\ing or the complaint (February 28, 2008) and start of jury selection (January 31, 2011).
3
During that time, llilton sought and received a number of continuances This was ample time,
I'm three attorneys assigned to Hilton's case, to prepare the case for trial, even in light of a heavy
eascload. The record conclusively rebuts this allegation. Sef Roherts v. State, 568 So.2d 1255,
125~ (detendant must allege specitk facts that are not conclusively rebutted by the record to be
evidentiary hearing, and because Hilton has failed to prove his allegations of deficient
performance by trial counsel, as well as prejudice, this claim should be summarily denied
Hilton has L1iled to establish that conduct on the pa11 of counsel that is outside the broad
'"""' ul· cutnpctctll pcrllHmancc under prevailing professional standards was taken and that the
deficiency in counsel's pcrlclrmance so aff'ected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings
that con11dencc in the outcome is undermined. If in fact, the trial team was reassigned to different
roles in the trial, the trial still proceeded, witnesses were still examined and cross-examined,
evidence was still admitted. The trial team consisted of three senior attomeys with a plethora of
3
!n <:~dditton to the continuances granted pre-trial, Hilton's lead attomey requested a continuance on the morning
jury selection was scheduled to begin, The basis for her continuance was that she needed additional time to discuss
the case and evidence with Hilton. The trial court denied this request, flnding that counsel had four more days to
have these discussions with Hilton. (T. VoL 17, p 7-8) Counsel did not seek a continuance because she was not
prepared, had not concluded discovery, had not met with or deposed witnesses, had not reviewed the evidence, or
had not flied the necessary pleadings, etc, FUlihermore, the tlia! docket is riddled with numerous motions filed by
tria! counsel as well as hearings having been held on same, The evidence shows that Hilton's case had been
<Hicqu<lt~'l)· prcp<ll"ed and litigated pre-tri£J!.
19
227
experience. Surely, they could adapt to a change in roles, especially in light of the fact that they
Again, the State submits that a mere conclusory allegation of ineffective assistance is
insufficient to wanant an evidentiary hearing. Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912, 913 (Fia.1989).
Not only has counsel made a broad allegation of ine!Tective assistance of trial counsel based on
re-shuffling of the trial team's roles within days of trial, he has failed to demonstrate how Hilton
Hilton argues that trial counsel failed to utilize crucial mitigation during the penalty
phase that had been developed by the mitigation expert. The record shows otherwise.
First, Hilton takes issue with a Power Point presentation of his life. Tlial counsel intended
to use and attempted to publish to the jury the mitigation expert's Power Point presentation of
llilton's life. However, the trial court sustained several of the State's objections to the slides
c'<llltained within the presentation as attempting to elicit sympathy from the jury, irrelevant, or
prejudicial. (T Vol. 40, p 354-377) It would have been extremely clitTicult to modify the
presentation, removing most of the slides, minutes before it was expected to be presented to the
.Jury. It also would not have carried the weight it had initially because most of the slides would
have been removed. As such, trial counsel opted not to present the presentation, stating "we can't
present this in a Ji·agmentecl and disjointed manner.'' (T Vol. 40, p 375) The bottom line is that
the presentation contained numerous slides which the trial cout1 properly ruled were
inadmissible. This was not a matter of trial counsel simply deciding not to present it. (T Vol. 40,
20
228
p 354-377) Rather, the mitigation expert, who is evidently not well-versed in evidentiary matters,
prepared a presentation which was objectionable on several grounds and thus, inadmissible.
Second, Hilton alleges that the mitigation expert developed a chronological history of his
medical and mental health history. as well as an extensive list of witnesses. Hilton's medical and
mental history was testified to by a number of witnesses presented by the defense. At least two
interviews conducted by the mitigation specialist, Betty Fuentes, were admitted into evidence
and published to the jury; the first was an interview she conducted of"J"homas L. Perchoux (T
Vol. 40, p 390) and the second was of Jin Hee Lee. (T Vol. 41, p 554) A third interview, that of
Ot1Jcer Steve King of the Duluth City Police Department, was likely conducted by her (as the
witness refers to a "'ma'am" in answering the interviewer's question), however the interviewer
did not specifically identify herself on the recording. (T Vol. 41, p 530)
In footnote 7, Hilton indicates that the mitigation expert's medical history of Hilton
included evidence that a l"ormer doctor of Hilton's ·'believed that the Defendant had 'relapsing
remitting Multiple Sclerosis' and the doctor wrote a note to a federal court seeking to excuse him
li·omjury duty opining that the Defendant had a 'form of Multiple Sclerosis."' (Motion p. 16)
First, this footnote does not indicate that Hilton was actually diagnosed with Multiple
Sclerosis. only that the doctor "believed" he had "relapsing remitting Multiple Sclerosis."
Second, this is a belief from the same doctor who incorrectly prescribed Ritalin and Effexor to
Hilton which resulted in the doctor's disciplinary action by the Georgia State Board of Medical
Examiners and which was argued, to the jury, to have caused Hilton's mental decline and his
subsequent actions in committing the murders of Cheryl Dunlap and Meredith Emerson. Third, it
docs not indicate how this evidence was to be introduced. Was the doctor going to be called or
was this more hearsay in the fonn of unauthenticated records, which would have presumably
21
229
been obJected to, like most of the PowerPoint slides? Fourth, it would have been foolish to admit
this evidence when two other doctors presented by Hilton's defense testified that he did not have
Multiple Sclerosis and actually self-diagnosed the condition. It was simply good trial strategy in
opting not to present conflicting evidence or testimony, indicating that Hilton did have Multiple
Sclerosis. That evidence or testimony would have effectively diluted the credibility of the other
two doctors, who opined that Hilton did not have Multiple Sclerosis, and further that he suffered
Hilton boldly concludes that trial counsel felt hopeless at the conclusion at the guilt
phase and this hopelessness affected their ability to properly represent Hilton at the penalty
phiise. (Hiler than this statement. there is nothing in the record that indicates that such a sense of
hopelessness distorted counsel's professional judgment. ·rheir strategy was well within the range
of professionally reasonable judgments. 'T'hey presented several witnesses and evidence, which
resulted in the trial court finding one statutory mental mitigating factor and that Hilton had
established eight of the ten mitigating factors he presented under the catch-all provision. Hilton
at 749-50. Simply stated, trial counsel put on what evidence they could in Hilton's defense with
Counsel is not ineffective for strategic decisions that, in hindsight, did not work to the
defendant's advantage. Mansfield v. State, 911 So.2d 1160, 1174 (Fla. 2005). Furthermore,
"'strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have
been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of
professional conduct." Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fia.2000). See also Brown v.
S!ii/e, 894 So.2d 137, 147 (Fla.2004); Howell v. State, 877 So.2d 697, 703 (Fla. 2004).
22
230
The aggravating circumstances (Hilton was previously convicted of a violent felony -
gwen great weight: the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping - given great
weight: the murder was committed to avoid mTest - given moderate weight; the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) - given great weight; and the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) - given great weight) were so overwhelming that no
substantial prejudice resulted from the absence, at the penalty phase, of the mystery evidence the
The allegation that trial counsel failed to present a 'wealth of information' in mitigation is
vague and conclusory. Aside from mention of the PowerPoint presentation, no other piece of
evidence or witness has been specifically identified. Consequently, this claim should be
summarily denied. See Dennis v. State, 109 So.3d 680, 691 (Fla. 2012); Doorbal v. State, 983
Hilton falls short of meeting his burden under Strickland as it relates to this claim.
Contrary to the assertion that trial counsel failed to properly investigate matters related to
Hilton's early childhood development, brain trauma, injury, cognitive impairment and mental
health, trial counsel presented four mental health experts during the penalty phase who testified
to these matters as they related to their opinions regarding Hilton's mental health at the time of
the murders. Not only had trial counsel thoroughly investigated these matters, but they then
provided them to the four mental health experts to assist them in evaluating Hilton. Furthermore,
trial counsel presented the testimony of several lay witnesses who testified about Hilton's
childhood and apparent mental health issues. It should also be noted that Hilton concedes this
23
231
matter in his own Motion for Post-Conviction Relief on page 25, "[i]n the instant case, the
Defendant presented extensive evidence of mental health issues, defect, injury and impairment."
First, trial counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Joseph Wu. Dr. Wu, testified that he
was a medical doctor at the University of California, Irvine, College of Medicine, having been
with the college since 1988; was licensed to practice in the State of California; was the clinical
director of the Brain Imaging Center; and was an Associate Professor in residence in the
Department of Psychiatry and Human Behaviors. (T Vol. 38, p 98) He further testified that he
had published over fifty peer-reviewed atiicles on brain imaging and neuropsychiatric disorders
and specialized in the area of neuropsychiatry. (T Vol. 38, p 99) At the time of his testimony, he
had testified as an expert in the field of neuropsychiatry on at least thirty occasions. (T Vol. 38, p
99-1 00) Dr. W u relied heavily on Hi !ton's childhood head injury which caused brain damage at
age ten, his "emotional abuse, rejection," and the mismanagement of the Ritalin prescribed
dur1ng the years preceding the murders, in concluding that Hilton's ability to exercise judgment
Second, trial counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Charles Josh Golden, a licensed
Vol. 39, p 159) He testified that he taught at Nova Southeastern University in the doctoral-level
teaching program and devoted approximately ten percent of his time to his private practice. (T
Vol. 39, p 159-60) He also published over three hundred books, chapter and articles and had
testified as an expert well over one hundred times. (T Vol. 39, p 160) He conducted
neuropsychological testing of Hilton, as well as an interview. (T Vol. 39, p 190) He learned that
I Iii tun 11as uncoml<>nablc around people- he couldn't relate to others. (T Vol. 39, p 187) He
learned that Hilton had depressive episodes and previously attempted suicide. (T Vol. 39, p 190)
24
232
He had manic episodes. (T Vol. 39, p 191) He learned that Hilton had "serious problems as a
child." He testified that Hilton had a brain injury; he had rheumatic fever as a child; his father
walked out on him; his mother remarried a man he despised; he did poorly in school; and he
moved from school to school. (T Vol. 39, p 191-2) Dr. Golden diagnosed Hilton with organic
personal tty disorder, which he determined was produced by a combination of brain injury and
social events (T Vol. 39, p 193), finding that his ability to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired. (T Vol. 39, p 195) Dr. Golden, on cross-
examination, agreed that Hilton's drug abuse and alcohol abuse throughout his lifetime also
Third, trial counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Abbey Strauss, a psychiatrist with a
medical degree. (T Vol. 39, p 215) Dr. Strauss testified that he was licensed to practice in the
State of Florida since 1985. (T Vol. 39, p 216) He had testified as an expert somewhere between
two hundred and two hundred fifty times. (T Vol. 39, p 216) Dr. Strauss was specifically asked
abuut \\hat he kne" of' Hilton's background. He explained that he was aware of Hilton's
"horrible. horrible childhood," (T Vol. 39, p 236) including his parents' divorce; his relationship
with his step-father; his mother's rejection of him for his step-father; his time in foster care; the
lack of bonding between he and his mother or any parental figure; the fact that he shot his step-
father at age fourteen; and the lack of relationship between he and his biological father. (T Vol.
39, p 237-9) He explained that the failure of his mother to be a prominent figure in his life
resulted in the Oedipus complex (T Vol. 39, p 244) and described how that affected him as he
progressed into adulthood. (T Vol. 39, p 247-8) He testified to knowledge of the mismanagement
of the Ritalin and Effexor prescribed during the years preceding the murders. (T Vol. 39, p 240)
lie rl'licwcd the deposition of Hilton's former employer, Mr. Tabor, who provided insight into
25
233
the change Hilton underwent during the time he was taking the combination of Ritalin and
H!Cxor. (I Vol. 39, p 242) He had a !so been given copies of Hi !ton's military discharge records.
(T Vol. 39, p 243) Dr. Strauss concluded with a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and
schizoaffective disorder, which had existed for a "very, very long time in his life" emphasizing
that the situations in his life "mostly triggered by the inappropriate prescriptions of the Ritalin
and Effexor that just pushed him over the edge." (T Vol. 39, p 260)
Fourth, trial counsel presented the testimony of Dr. William Alexander Motion, Jr., a
Professor Emeritus of Pharmacy at the Medical University of South Carolina, the College of
Pharmacy and Clinical Associate Professor of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences in the
Department of Psychiatry at the Medical University of South Carolina, with twenty-eight years
299-300) He testified that he authored forty-six peer-reviewed publications, including one about
the phenomena of what occurs when people abuse Ritalin. (T Vol. 40, p 303) He had testified as
an expert in psychopharmacology addictions and psychopharmacy practice just over sixty times.
Dr. Mm1on testified that the Office of the Public Defender provided him with a number of
documents and records prior to meeting with Hilton. (T VoL 40, p 305) He also reviewed a
number of tapes, videotapes (of law enforcement interviews and home videos taken by Hilton
himself) (T VoL 40, p 331), and audiotapes and transcripts in order to indirectly observe Hilton
prior to evaluating Hilton. (T VoL 40, p 306) Dr. Morton was aware of Hilton's prescription
dosages and the dates during which he was prescribed Ritalin and Effexor. (T VoL 40, p 312) He
also reviewed Dr. Deicher's disciplinary records from the Georgia State Board of Medical
Examiners and the deposition of Hilton's former employer, Mr. Taber. (T Vol. 40, p 326) He
was familiar with Hilton's history of extensive substance abuse as an adolescent and young
26
234
adult. (T Vol. 40, p 342) He interviewed Hilton on January 29, 2010. (T Vol. 40, p 333) In Dr.
Morton's opinion, Hilton's prescribed drug combination of Ritalin and Effexor would be
expected to produce profound and unwanted side effects and behavioral changes. (T Vol. 40, p
337)
Trial counsel also presented the previously-videotaped statement of Victorine Rowe, the
neighbor of Hilton and his mother in April, 1951. (T Vol. 40, p 379) She testified about hearing
Hilton's mother screaming and learning that a Murphy bed had fallen on Hilton, splitting his
head open. She described the injury as appearing as if Hilton had been scalped. (T Vol. 40, p
380)
He testified that he became acquainted with Hilton as a result of his wife having worked with
llilton's mother in the late 1950's through early 1960's. (T Vol. 40, p 392) Hilton's mother
subsequently asked Mr. Pcrchoux and his wife to take care of Hilton because she was having
problems with him and he was having problems with her husband, Hilton's step-father. (T Vol.
40, p 394-5) He was told that Hilton had been seeing a psychiatrist, but didn't know why. (T Vol.
40, p 395) Hilton's mother and step-father never came to visit Hilton while he was in the
Perchoux's care. (T Vol. 40, p 400) After some time had passed, Hilton's mother returned for
Trial counsel presented an audio recording of Hilton's mother. Cleo Debag, who was
deceased at the time of the trial. Ms. Debag testified that Hilton never knew his biological father.
(T Vol. 41, p 420) She stated that Hilton's step-father, Nilo, mentally abused and often yelled at
Hilton. (T Vol. 41, p 430) She advised that Hilton changed schools often before reaching the
sixth grade (T Vol. 41, p 434) and often stayed at school for as little as three to four months
27
235
before they moved to another city. (T Vol. 41, p 441) She spoke about some childhood injuries
Hilton suffered, including a broken hand and the injury to his head from the Murphy bed
accident. (T Vol. 41, p 444-45) She discussed two failed marriages. (T Vol. 41, p 460, 469-70)
She volunteered that she had not talked to her son for the ten years prior to the murders after he
became angry with her for not giving him money. (T Vol. 41, p 476) She detailed the incident in
which Hilton shot his step-father (T Vol. 41, p 484), which led to Hilton being sent to juvenile
hall (T Vol. 41, p 487) before going to stay with a friend. (T Vol. 41, p 485) He did not return
home until Ms. Debag told the authorities that she would leave her husband to regain custody of
Hilton. (T Vol. 41, p 487) She also relayed an incident during which she miscarried and had to
have Hilton call the doctor's office. She had to leave Hilton at their apartment alone while she
obtained medical treatment. She described him as being "scared to death." (T Vol. 41, p 489)
Matia Dabag Castelli, the sister of Nilo Debag, Hilton's step-father, testified for Hilton.
%,· c~rl:1incd that Nilo didn't love Hilton: didn't associate much with him; and in her opinion,
was jealous of Hilton. (T Vol. 41, p 507-8) She also described Hilton's mother as not being a
loving or affectionate mother and her relationship with Hilton as "cold." (T Vol. 41, p 508)
Sandy Herman Carr, Hilton's junior high school girlfriend also testified on his behalf. (T
Vol. 41, p 513) She testified that Hilton and his step-father did not get along at all. (T Vol. 41, p
514) She testit!ed about her knowledge of Hilton shooting his step-father at the age of fourteen
and subsequently being sent to foster case as a result. She described how Hilton appeared more
relaxed while in foster care than he had been at home with his mother and step-father. (T Vol.
41, p 516)
28
236
Roy Cave, a high school friend of Hilton's testified about their tenure in a band together.
(T VoL 41, p 519) He also described how they enlisted in the Atmy and went to boot camp
The defense also presented the testimony of Stefanie Durham, the daughter of Constance
Wagner, with whom Hilton moved in, in 1981, when she was thirteen years of age. (T Vol. 41, p
523-4) The lived together as a family for approximately two years. She described Hilton as the
ideal father figure, making sure her needs were attended to. (T VoL 41, p 524-5)
An audio recording of an interview taken of Officer Steve King of the Duluth Police
Department on November 15, 2010 was presented to the jury. (T VoL 41, p 529-30) He
described an incident, on February 25, 2006, during which he responded to a call of a suspicious
person and encountered Hilton. (T Vol. 41, p 532-4) He described Hilton as agitated and "a little
bit confused, like a little bit out of it." (T VoL 41, p 534)
James Scott Gillespie was called on Hilton's behalf and testified that he, along with
approximately thi11y others. were fishing in an area known as Cooper's Creek in Northern
Georgia in June, 2007. (T Vol. 41, p 540) He walked up onto Hilton, where he witnessed him
slumped over, rocking back and forth, sharpening a knife. He spoke to Hilton, but Hilton simply
Mary Pat King testified that she worked as a law enforcement officer (T Vol. 41, p 549)
with the United Forest Service in November, 2007 when she saw Hilton walking his dog at 7:40
p.m. in the Apalachicola National Forest, which was unusual. (T VoL 41, p 546-7) She stopped
and spoke with him for five to fifteen minutes. Hilton did not appreciate her contact and insisted
she was hassling him. He commented that he did not like the government and in general, acted
negative and hostile. (T VoL 41, p 550) After her encounter, she made a notation in her Jog book
29
237
that she had contact with a "Signal 20," which she defined as a crazy person. (T Vol. 41, p 547-
8)
A video-recorded interview, dated December 30, 2010, of Jin Hee Lee, the operator of a
laundromat in Cambridge, Georgia was played. Mr. Lee stated that Hilton had been a regular
customer of his laundromat for at least three or four years; he remembered him because of his
dog (T Vol. 41, p 555-7) In 2007, he noticed a physical change in Hilton, leading him to believe
Hilton had been drinking. (T Vol. 41, p 559) Hilton denied drinking. (T Vol. 41, p 559) He
explained Hilton's appearance and behavior was different than what he had experienced in the
Not only did trial counsel thoroughly investigate Hilton's early childhood development,
brain trauma, injury, cognitive impairment and mental health, they then provided that
information to four different mental health exper1s who used that information in evaluating
Hilton and subsequently testified at the penalty phase as to how those matters played a role in
In addition to the testimony presented by the four mental health experts, trial counsel also
admitted Hilton's military discharge records, as well as disciplinary records from the Georgia
State Board of Medical Examiners regarding the Ritalin and Effexor which were improperly
prescribed to Hilton by Dr. Deicher in the years preceding the murders. Trial counsel also
presented the testimony, either previously-recorded or live, of several lay witnesses, including
lamily members, persons who played an important role in Hilton's childhood, his junior high
ck!CnJant must allege specific t~tcts that are not conclusively rebutted by the record and which
30
238
demonstrate a deficiency in performance that prejudiced the defendant." Roberts v. State, 568
So.2d 1255, 1259 (Fla.l990). As to this claim, the record is replete with the evidence counsel
argues is Jacking.
Hilton has failed to establish that had more detailed evidence of Hilton's 1961 arrest for
shooting his step-father and subsequent time in foster care been offered during his penalty phase
trial, there is a reasonable probability he would have received a different sentence and thus, his
gtven great weight; the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping - given great
weight; the murder was committed to avoid an·est - given moderate weight; the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) - given great weight; and the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) - given great weight) were so oveJWhelming that no
substantial prejudice resulted from the absence, at the penalty phase of, any additional evidence
of Hilton's early childhood development, brain trauma, injury, cognitive impairment and/or
mental health.
Counsel submits that Hilton was previously diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis. But there
is no actual medical diagnosis to support this. Furthetmore, two of the defense's own witnesses
tcsti l'icd at the penalty phase that Hilton diagnosed himself with Multiple Sclerosis for symptoms
he was experiencing that were actually related to depression. Specifically, Dr. Wu testified,
"Then he started to have episodes of extreme fatigue. And he thought that he had multiple
31
239
sclerosis. He tried to self-diagnose himself. ... And again, I think what was happening is that he
was starting to become more depressed in addition to having this kind of downward deteriorating
Dr. Golden testified similarly. stating, "He self-diagnosed himself with multiple sclerosis
thinking that the symptoms that I see as being depression were the symptoms of a neurological
disorder. There is no evidence he has actually- neurologically has multiple sclerosis. But a lot of
the symptoms like he can't get out of bed, his legs feel leaded, he feels unable to move for long
periods of time, those are symptoms of severe depression." (T Vol. 39, p 191)
Trial counsel had Hilton evaluated by four mental health experts with extensive and
varying experience. It is doubtful that all four failed to diagnose Multiple Sclerosis and even
more, that two would specifically rule that diagnosis out. Simply stated, Multiple Sclerosis was
never diagnosed because it was not an ailment that Hilton was afflicted with and cannot now be
Even if Hilton had multiple sclerosis, it did not impede his ability, at sixty-one years of
age, to kidnap, chain, torture, kill, decapitate and dismember Cheryl Dunlap and a few weeks
later, to kidnap, torture, kill and decapitate Meredith Emerson, nor did it impede his ability to put
thought into covering his tracks after each brutal murder and then to offer a self-serving, detailed
cun!Cssion about his kidnapping and killing of Meredith in exchange for a life sentence from the
State of Georgia.
The four defense mental health experts testified on Hilton's behalf that he had been
afflicted with some sort of mental illness. The trial court accepted this testimony and gave it
some weight in finding one statutory mental mitigating factor- that at time of Dunlap's murder,
32
240
Lastly, Hilton's claim fails the prejudice prong of Strickland because he cannot establish
that had the evidence been offered during his penalty phase trial, there is a reasonable probability
he would have received a different sentence. Again, the aggravating circumstances (Hilton was
previously convicted of a violent felony given great weight; the murder was committed in the
course of a kidnapping - given great weight; the murder was committed to avoid arrest - given
moderate weight; the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) - given great
weight; and the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP)- given great weight) were
so overwhelming that no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence, at the penalty phase, of
Hilton contends that his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment because of his
mental illness, brain damage, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, depression and multiple
sclerosis at the time of the murder. Assuming that he was afflicted with all of these conditions,
Power v. State, 992 So.2d 218 (Fla. 2008) holds that those alleged diagnoses would not serve as
a bar to execution. "[N]either this Court nor the Supreme Court has recognized mental illness as
a pn se bar to executton." !d. at 222; see Johnston v. State, 27 So.3d II (Fla. 2008) (finding that
Johnston's reliance on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002) was misplaced when he was neither a minor nor one who was insane or mentally
4
!n order to avoid any confusion on the part of the reader, this claim is consecutively numbered as VI, although
counsel numbered his as VII in his Motion for Post Conviction Relief.
33
241
retarded); Lawrence v. State, 969 So.2d 294, 300 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting proposition that the Equal
Protection C'lause requires extension of Atkins to the mentally ill due to their reduced
culpability); Simmons v. Stqte, 105 So.3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (holding claims that defendants
with mental illness must be treated similarly to those with mental retardation due to reduced
culpability to be without merit). "Instead, mental illness can be considered as either a statutory
mental mitigating circumstance if it meets the definition (i.e., the crime was committed while the
considered and weighed by the court in imposing a sentence." Power at 222. That was the case
here; as Hilton concedes in his own motion, the trial court was presented with "extensive
evidence of mental health issues, defect, injury and impairment." (Motion, p. 25) The trial court
considered that evidence and found that Hilton was under extreme emotional distress at the time
of the murder; the trial court also gave some weight to the mitigating factor of Hilton's childhood
brain injury, but found that the factor that Hilton suffered from severe mental defects was not
proven. However, no evidence whatsoever was presented that he was mentally retarded.
The Florida Supreme C'ourt, in deciding Spencer v. State, 691 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Fla.
1996). held that in reviewing proportionality, "we will not disturb the sentencing judge's
determination as to 'the relative weight to give to each established mitigator' where the ruling is
supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record." The Court also held that it will also
"anirm the weight given an aggravator if based on competent, substantial evidence." Blake v.
Stat~. 972 So.2d 839, 846 (Fla. 2007). The Florida Supreme Court requires that the death
penalty be "reserved only for those cases where the most aggravating and least mitigating
circumstances exist.'' Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 965 (Fla. 1996). This is the case here.
34
242
Should a detennination be reached that Hilton is incompetent to be executed at or near
the time of his execution, his execution would undoubtedly be stayed for further examination,
pursuant to F.S. § 922.07 (2014). See Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1984) (finding
tlwt th~ statutory procedure is now the exclusive procedure for determining competency to be
executed). Thus, Hilton's claim may be best described presently as an unripe Ford claim.
Hilton attacks Florida's capital sentencing statute, which authorizes a death sentence
recommendation by a bare majority vote and allows a trial judge to disregard a jury's life
sentence recommendation, as arbitrary and capricious. This claim should have been raised on
direct appeal. Since it was not, it is barred in a 3.851 proceeding. "Issues which either were or
could have been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral
unanimous finding of death. Thus, Hilton has no standing to make this argument. See, e.g.,
Hollingsworth v. Peny, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) ("To have standing, a litigant must seek
relief for an injury that affects him in a 'personal and individual way;"' quoting Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 n. I (1992)); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,357 (1996) ("The remedy
must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has
established"); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134, 139, 134 (1978) ("A person who is aggrieved
by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a
search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights
35
243
infringed;" "the issue of standing involves two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a
particular legal right has alleged 'injury in fact,' and, second, whether the proponent is asserting
his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third
parties").
CONCLUSION
The bottom line is that Hilton committed the brutal kidnapping, murder and
dismemberment of Cheryl Dunlap. The evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Witnesses were
able to put Hilton near the scene of the crime. Similar fact evidence was introduced regarding an
almost identical kidnapping, murder and dismembe1ment which occurred less than a month after
this murder, to which Hilton pled guilty. And Hilton confessed. "When a defendant challenges a
death sentence ... the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,
the scntencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not wan·ant death. Strickland at 695. "A court making the prejudice inquiry
must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would
reasonably likely have been different absent the errors." !d. at 696. The record affirmatively
demonstrates beyond a doubt that even if trial counsel had committed each of the errors
complained of in the Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, there is no chance that the outcome
would have been different. The fact is that the aggravating circumstances proved in this case
were completely overwhelming. The State respectfully requests that this Honorable Court
36
244
Respectfully submitted
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CARINE L. EMPLIT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
FLORIDA BAR NO. 0011943
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE CAPITOL, PL-01
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050
(850) 414-3300
primary email:
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
secondary email:
carine.emplit@myfloridalegal.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to Motion for
Post-Conviction Relief has been furnished via the e-portal to Robert A. Morris, Esquire, 911 East
Park Avenue, Tallahassee, FL 32301 this 26th of January, 2015.
CARINE L. EMPLIT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorney for the State
37
245
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
vs.
Defendant.
--------------------~/
ORDER GRANTING EVIDENTIARY HEARING
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Post-
Conviction Relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, filed on November 25,2014.
The Court having considered said motion, the State's Response and being otherwise
fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following findings:
Defendant has set forth a prima facie showing of entitlement to the relief
requested and thus an evidentiary hearing will be required. Therefore it is
DONE and ORDERED this 2"d day of February, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon
County, Florida.
Circuit Judge
cc: r-n '01
"'""
........ ....,
Larine L. Emplit
Assistant Attorney General
Georgia Cappleman
Chief Assistant State Attorney
om
:z::O
nAro
...,
o;J
~n
a'Ro·o _,,,.
Office of the Attorney General Office of the State Attorney C('""Jo:;:IO
I .
w i"""'"'"""
~9;526
The Capitol, PL-01
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
301 S. Monroe Street, Suite 475
Leon County Courthouse
~:-~N,>i
~ -o,.,-,
..,....,"'
r""
-o
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"'_,... c~
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Tallahassee, FL ....
O(Tl
Robert A. Morris, Esquire . ;p.;o N
911 East Park A venue
Tallahassee, FL 32301 246 ~
Fjling #25330318 E-Filed 03/25/2015 05:10:32 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DIVISION: FELONY
GARY HILTON,
Defendant.
--------------~!
.COMES NOW the Defendant and moves this Honorable Court to continue the
hearing in this Cl\USe, and as grounds therefore would state and allege as follows:
1. ·The above-styled case is presently set for a hearing on March 26,2015 at 10:00am in
accordance with Rule 3.851, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The purpose of
the hearing is for the defense to provide a witness list and exhibit list in accordance
3. The. undersigned has recently been appointed in a case that has demanded
unexpected attention. It is a death penalty case as well where all of the appeals (save
the certiorari petition to the United Stale Supreme Court) have been exhausted and it
appears the Governor is going to sign the death warrant. The undersigned has had to
247
f
4. The defense intends on filing a motion seeking to amend Mr. Hilton's motion as well
as the required companion motion stating the grounds that are believed to provide
entitlement to relief.
6. The defense has an exhibit list and a witness list prepared, but if granted relief as
articulated above it will change the landscape a bit and entitle the State to respond in
kind.
7. The defense can advise of my schedule for the summer, but speculation suggests that
August or September would likely be a hearing time and it will be longer than an
8. I need to seek the appointment of certain experts that won't require much inquiry
9. Counsel has just received roughly 500 pages of documents from the PD's office
yesterday that willlikel y be exhibits, but has not had time to go through them and
10. The undersigned has been in contact with Deputy Chief State Attorney Georgia
WHEREFORE, the Defendant moves this Honorable Court to continue the hearing
in this cause.
248
By:-+--.......;::'---4"-""--___::,_,"'----
ROB RT A MORRIS, ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 East Park Avenue
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111 Facsimile (850) 792-1113
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
COURT APPOINTED
alex @ramlawyer.com
efiling@ramlawyer.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been delivered by Electronic Mail:
249
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
VS.
CASE NO. 2008-CF-697A
DIVISION: FELONY
GARY HILTON,
Defendant.
----------------~/
THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court upon the Defendant's Unopposed Motion
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED the Defendant's Motion is GRANTED and the hearing
scheduled Thursday, March 26, 2015 shall be continued to the Court's docket on Q~r; t 1.~
2015 at( 0; C() a.m./p.nr. courtroom TBA.
}._~
-t-IA
day of March, 2015.
\
JAMES C. HANKINSON
CIRCUIT JUDGE
FILED IN
OPEN COURT /j
Date 03\ ~(Q Imdf3Jnd!JVo:y
N!
s 250
1
STATE OF FLORIDA
vs.
GARY MICHAEL HILTON, ORIGINAL
Defendant.
---------------1
251
2
1 APPEARANCES
'- 2
3 REPRESENTING THE STATE:
4 CARINE L. EMPLIT, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
and
5 CHARMAINE MILLSAPS, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
6 PL-01, THE CAPITOL
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050
7
8 GEORGIA CAPPLEMAN, ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY
and
9 EDDIE EVANS, ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY
OFFICE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY
10 LEON COUNTY COURTHOUSE, SUITE 475
301 SOUTH MONROE STREET
11 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
12
13 REPRESENTING THE DEFENDANT:
14 ROBERT L. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT L. MORRIS, LLC
15 911 E. PARK AVENUE
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
16
17
18 certificate of Reporter 8
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
252
3
1 PROCEEDINGS
2 THE BAILIFF: All rise. court is now in session.
3 The Honorable James c. Hankinson presiding.
4 THE COURT: Be seated, please, folks.
5 We're here in the State of Florida versus Gary
6 Hilton, 2008CF697. The matter was set for case
7 management here today.
8 I have received the unopposed motion for a
9 continuance of case management. I decided to go ahead
10 and come into the courtroom to grant that continuance
11 because there's some things we need to make sure are
12 clear on dates and so forth. I will grant the motion to
13 continue.
14 we need to have a case management, and we were early
15 enough that we can still stay within our time frames,
16 have the case management, needs to occur by April 26th.
17 I'm proposing a case management on April 23rd, 10:00. I
18 really can do it any time that day if that's an
19 inconvenient day, but I don't have a lot of flexibility
20 on days. I was trying to give us as much time as we can,
21 because the evidentiary hearing is going to run from that
22 date.
23 Is that date, can you all work that out?
24 MR. MORRIS: April 23rd, 2:00, is fine by the
25 defense, Judge.
253
4
254
5
255
6
1 didn't know that we had settled on the 8th and 9th, but I
2 will advise of her of that and send a subpena.
3 THE COURT: All right. so I'm granting the case
4 management continuance at the request. of the defense to
5 April 23.rd at 10:00, setting the evidentiary hearing for
6 september 8th and 9th.
7 Anything else we need to take up at this point in
8 time?
9 MR. MORRIS: Not from the defense, Judge.
10 THE COURT: State?
11 MR. EVANS: Your Honor, if you don't mind, I need to
12 ask Mr. Morris about it. There is one thing because I
13 understood there may be an amendment.
14 (Brief pause.)
15 MR. MORRIS: Judge, Mr. Evans makes a good point. I
16 did articulate some of this in the motion. I intend on
17 filing a motion seeking leave to amend stat1ng good cause
18 as to why that should be granted, and in compliance with
19 the rules of procedure, attaching the amended arguments.
20 of course the court will, if the court were to grant
21 leave to amend, that would provide some time expansion in
22 terms of the jurisdictional time periods for the State to
23 respond and hearings and so on and so forth.
24 THE COURT: That's not how I read the rule, frankly.
25 MR. MORRIS: Okay.
"--'
SUE ELLEN MELLO, RPR, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
256
7
257
8
1 CERTIFICATE
2 STATE OF FLORIDA:
3 COUNTY OF LEON:
4 I, SUE ELLEN MELLO, Registered Professional
5 Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings
6 were taken before me at the time and place therein designated;
7 that my shorthand notes were thereafter translated under my
8 supervision; and the foregoing pages are a true and correct
9 record of the aforesaid proceedings.
10 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative,
11 employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor
12 relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or
13 financially interested in the foregoing action.
14
DATED this 26th day of March 2015.
15
16
17
18
19
SUE ELLEN MELLO, RPR
20 OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LEON COUNTY COURTHOUSE
21 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
22
23
24
25
SUE ELLEN MELLO, RPR, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
258
Filing# 26437267 E-Filed 04/•. ~/2015 10:29:46 AM
~.l
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT.
COMES NOW, the undersigned attorney, and files this Defendant's Exhibit List on
behalf of GARY MICHAEL HILTON, the Defendant in the above-styled cause, pursuant to
2. Internal Emails from the Office of the Public Defender (152 pages)
5. January 27, 2011 Defense's Response to State's Reply for Emergency Motion to
Continue Trial
6. January 27, 2011 Order Denying Defendant's Emergency Motion to Continue Trial
1 Defendant has not separately listed all documents attached to each numbered exhibit herein, but
places the State on notice that all attachments to all documents listed herein are included within
this Defendant's Exhibit List.
259
10. Life History of Gary Michael Hilton prepared by Betty Fuentes (184 Pages)
12. General Records Matrix File and Email file (Box 326214)
14. All exhibits and/or physical evidence listed on any exhibit list filed by the State
pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A), unless subject to objection by Defendant.
15. All documents and/or physical evidence produced by Defendant to State via the
exchange process mandated under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A).
16. All documents and/or physical evidence discovered by Defendant and disclosed to
State within a reasonable amount of time prior to evidentiary hearing. 2
2 Due to the extensive amount of documentary evidence generated (no less than 150 full
"banker's boxes" of documents) in this, and related cases, Defendant anticipates the potential
need to supplement this Defendant's Exhibit List, requests to reserve the right to do so, and will
file any necessary supplement immediately upon the discovery and/or receipt of such evidence.
260
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State
Leon County Courthouse, 4a' Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Capital Appeals
Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on
261
Filing# 26437267 E-Filed 04/~j2015 10:29:46 AM
~
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT.
COMES NOW, the undersigned attorney, and files this Defendant's Witness List
NON-EXPERT WITNESSES
2. Paula Saunders
3. Rob Friedman
4. Merribeth Bohanan
5. Nancy Daniels
6. Betty Fuentes
7. Andy Thomas
8. Steven Been
9. Tracy Record
262
I 0. Chris EHrich
14. Names and Addresses of those individuals contained in the Key Mitigation
Witnesses File developed by Betty Fuentes
EXPERT WITNESSES
263
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3rd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Capital Appeals
Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on
264
Filing# 29110891 E-Filed 06/:;u/LOIS 01:33:05 PM
v.
Defendant.
COME NOW, the State of Florida, by and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby
requests that this Honorable Court issue an Order setting a Case Management Conference and For
Other Relief in the above-referenced case. In support of this request, the undersigned submits the
following:
I. Collateral counsel, Robert A. Morris, filed his initial Motion for Post-Conviction
4. On March 25, 2015, Morris filed an Unopposed Motion to Continue the Case
Motion to Amend his Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, which was nearly prepared.
265
(See Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of the Unopposed Motion for Continuance within the
court file.) 1
5. On March 26, 2015, this Court granted the Unopposed Motion to Continue, resetting
the Case Management Conference for April 23, 2015, and setting the evidentiary
hearing for September 8-9, 2015. At the March 26, 2015 hearing, Morris reiterated
his intention of filing a motion seeking leave to amend his initial post-conviction
motion. (See lines 15-19, page 6 of the April 23, 2015 transcript, attached and
6. On April 23, 2015, the parties reconvened. Morris notified the State that he had
obtained the defendant's signature on the amended motion for post-conviction relief,
and anticipated filing both his motion to amend and proposed amended motion for
post-conviction relief within the next two business days. 2 The Court held a brief
hearing, but argument was not heard on the postconviction motion and answer.
7. Since a Case Management Conference has yet not occurred, nor has an order setting
forth which issues will be heard at the evidentiary hearing been entered, there are
presently no claims for the court to hear at the evidentiary hearing scheduled for
September 8-9,2015.
8. Pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.85l(f)(5)(A), "[t]he trial court shall hold a case
1
Interestingly, the Motion to Continue (paragraph 8, page 2) also refers to the need for appointment of experts,
presumably to testifY at the September 8-9, 2015 evidentiary hearing. The defense has yet to move for such
appointment.
2
Approximately one month later, on May 22, 2015, and in response to an email from the undersigned, collateral
counsel advised that he had to obtain Hilton's signature "once more" and that this was the "only thing" holding him
up from filing his motion to amend and proposed amended motion for postconviction relief.
2
266
2015 hearing when it announced, "We need to have a case management .... " (See
9. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A) also requires that both parties disclose all
documentary exhibits that they intend to offer at the evidentiary hearing, provide an
exhibit list of all such exhibits, and exchange a witness list with the names and
the witness list, and copies of all expert reports shall be attached.
10. Since April27, 2015, counsel for the defendant has repeatedly assured the State that
he will be filing his motion to amend, along with his proposed amended motion for
postconviction relief; and that he will be providing addresses for the witnesses listed
on his witness list, as well as copies of the exhibits he intends to use. Despite
repeated and documented requests by the State for same since late-April, the motion
to amend along with the proposed amended motion for postconviction relief,
addresses for the witnesses listed on his witness list, and exhibits have not been
provided.
11. In order to keep this case on track and proceed to the evidentiary hearing on
September 8 - 9, 2015, the defense must file its motion to amend and proposed
3
While Hilton did provide copies of his Witness List and Exhibit List to the undersigned at tbe April23, 2015 hearing,
the witness list lacks the required addresses for all listed witnesses. The State remains unable to commence deposing or
interviewing many of the listed witnesses. Additionally, footnote 2 (page 2) ofthe Defendant's Exhibit List refers to his
anticipated "need to supplement" the exhibit list. No supplement has been filed and as discussed above, the exhibits
initially identified on the Exhibit List filed on April 23, 2015 have not even been provided to the State.
3
267
allowing time for the Court to enter an order allowing the amendment and time for
I 2. A Case Management Conference must be held in order for this Court to determine
addressed at the evidentiary hearing, and to hear argument on any purely legal claims
not based on disputed facts. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(t)(5)(A)(i) and (ii). As it stands
now, while an evidentiary hearing is scheduled, which claims will be heard at that
13. A Case Management Conference is also necessary for purposes of disclosing all
well as the names and addresses of any potential witnesses. Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.851 (t)(S)(A).
14. Consequently, the State is respectfully requesting the Court to order the defense to
file its motion to amend and proposed amended motion for postconviction relief by
a date certain, preferably in early-July; to order the defense to file its motion for
be heard at the evidentiary hearing, scheduled for September 8-9,2015, and which,
if any, will be disposed of prior to the hearing, and for the parties to file their
complete witness lists and exchange exhibits, and expert reports, if any.
268
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the State of Florida respectfully requests that this Court order the defense to
file its motion to amend and proposed amended motion for postconviction relief by a date certain,
preferably in early-July; order the defense to file its motion for appointment of experts by a date
certain, preferably in early-July; and schedule a Case Management Conference no later than early-
August, 2015 in the above-entitled case so that the case may proceed to the evidentiary hearing
Respectfully submitted
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CARINE L. EMPLIT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
FLORIDA BAR NO. 0011943
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE CAPITOL, PL-01
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050
(850) 414-3580
primary email:
carine.emplit@myfloridalegal.com
secondary email:
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
CO-COUNSEL FOR THE STATE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Case
Management Conference has been furnished via the e-portal to Robert A. Morris, Esquire, 911
East Park Avenue, Tallahassee, FL 32301; Georgia Cappleman, Chief State Attorney and
269
Eddie Evans, Assistant State Attorney, 301 South Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL 32301 this
30th ofJune, 2015.
CARINE L. EMPLIT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorney for the State
270
1
STATE OF FLORIDA
vs.
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
1 APPEARANCES
2
3 REPRESENTING THE STATE:
4 CARINE L. EMPLIT, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
and
5 CHARMAINE MILLSAPS, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
6 PL-01, THE CAPITOL
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050
7
12
13 REPRESENTING THE DEFENDANT:
17
18 certificate of Reporter 8
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
272
3
1 PROCEEDINGS
2 THE BAILIFF: All rise. Court is now in session.
3 The Honorable James c. Hankinson presiding.
4 THE COURT: Be seated, please, folks.
5 we're here in the state of Florida versus Gary
6 Hilton, 2008CF697. The matter was set for case
7 management here today.
8 I have received the unopposed motion for a
9 continuance of case management. I decided to go ahead
10 and come into the courtroom to grant that continuance
11 because there's some things we need to make sure are
12 clear on dates and so forth. I will grant the motion to
13 continue.
14 we need to have a case management, and we were early
15 enough that we can still stay within our time frames,
16 have the case management, needs to occur by April 26th.
17 I'm proposing a case management on April 23rd, 10:00. I
18 really can do it any time that day if that's an
19 inconvenient day, but I don't have a lot of flexibility
20 on days. I was trying to give us as much time as we can,
21 because the evidentiary hearing is going to run from that
22 date.
23 Is that date, can you all work that out?
24 MR. MORRIS: April 23rd, 2:00, is fine by the
25 defense, Judge.
273
4
274
5
275
6
1 didn't know that we had settled on the 8th and 9th, but I
2 will advise of her of that and send a subpena.
3 THE COURT: All right. so I'm granting the case
4 management continuance at the request of the defense to
5 April 23rd at 10:00, setting the evidentiary hearing for
6 september 8th and 9th.
7 Anything else we need to take up at this point in
8 time?
9 MR. MORRIS: Not from the defense, Judge.
10 THE COURT: State?
11 MR. EVANS: Your Honor, if you don'·t mind, I need to
12 ask Mr. Morris about it. There is one thing because I
13 understood there may be an amendment.
14 (Brief pause.)
15 MR. MORRIS: Judge, Mr. Evans makes a good point. I
16 did articulate some of this in the motion. I intend on
17 filing a motion seeking leave to amend stating good cause
18 as to why that should be granted, and in compliance with
19 the rules of procedure, attaching the amended arguments.
20 of course the court will, if the court were to grant
21 leave to amend, that would provide some time expansion in
22 terms of the jurisdictional time periods for the state to
23 respond and hearings and so on and so forth.
24 THE COURT: That's not how I read the rule, frankly.
25 MR. MORRIS: Okay.
276
7
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
277
8
1 CERTIFICATE
2 STATE OF FLORIDA:
3 COUNTY OF LEON:
4 I, SUE ELLEN MELLO, Registered Professional
5 Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings
6 were taken before me at the time and place therein designated;
7 that my shorthand notes were thereafter translated under my
8 supervision; and the foregoing pages are a true and correct
9 record of the aforesaid proceedings.
10 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative,
11 employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor
12 relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or
13 financially interested in the foregoing action.
14
DATED this 26th day of March 2015.
15
16
17
18
19
SUE ELLEN MELLO, RPR
20 OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
LEON COUNTY COURTHOUSE
21 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
22
23
24
25
278
Filing# 29143327 E-Filed 07ivliL015 09:12:38 AM
vs.
Defendant.
:- ,.
ORDER DENYING STATE'S MOTION FOR AN ADDITIONAL
CASE MANAGEMENT
THIS matter coming on to be heard upon the State of Florida's Motion for
Case Management Conference and for other Relief filed on June 30, 2015, and the
Court being fully advised in the premises, finds as follows:
!. A case management occmTed on April 23, 2015. The Court does not
anticipate having another case management conference.
2. On that same date, the Defense filed their Witness and Exhibit Lists as
required by rule. The State had until June 23, 2015 to file their Witness
and Exhibit List. For whatever reason, that has not occurred.
279
5. The Court reviewed the State's motion to summarily deny all defense
claims. The Court denied that motion by granting Defendant an
evidentiary hearing. If there are purely legal issues to be resolved they
should be presented to the Court by appropriate motion Otherwise the
evidentiary hearing will proceed as outlined by the Defendant.
DONE and ORDERED this l '5. ~ay of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon
County, Florida.
~~-=t,(!~
\·,~- ~-~
; ~
( ~AMES C. llANKINSON
l_Pircuil Judge
cc:
Carine L. Emplit
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
The Capitol. PL-0 1
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
Georgia Cappleman
Chief Assistant State Attorney
Oflice of the State Attorney
301 S. Monroe Street, Suite 475
Leon COlmty Courthouse
Tallahassee, FL 32301
Eddie Evans
Assistant State Attorney
Office of the State Attorney
301 S. Monroe Street, Suite 475
Leon County Courthouse
Tallahassee, FL 323 0 1
280
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA.
vs.
Defendant.
I. lnes Suber
2. Paula Saunders
3. Robert Friedman
4. Merribeth Bohanan
5. Betty Fuentes
6. Chris EHrich
7. Nancy Daniels
8. Andy Thomas
EXPERT WITNESSES
281
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
282
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA.
vs.
Defendant.
~
-~-'· ~t
I. Any or all exhibits introduced by the State at trial. <-
c.::
2. Any or all transcripts of proceedings in this matter.
.... ~ """"'""'~''
I
0">
~,·
:::>::
Respectfully submitted this 2d day of July, 2015. g
w
(J1
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY certifY that a true and correct copy of the for oing docu ent has be.:;~ served by
U. S. Mail to Robert A. Morris, 911 E. Park Avenue, Tallahass e, FC 323 I, o this -~_day of July,
2o1s. 1
cr:
w . 1--
z::>u
-0..5;.
~
0
283
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA.
vs.
Defendant.
----------------------~/
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoin document has b~ljl,served by
U.S. Mail to Robert A. Morris, 911 E. Park Avenue, Tallahasse 3 301 this ~dayofJuly,
2015.
284
Filing# 30087376 E-Filed 07/24, ~Jl5 04:56:06 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT.
----------------------~'
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the
Procedure and files this Motion for Leave to Amend Initial Postconviction Motion and .
285
. :S·W" J
2. A trial court's refusal to grant a party leave to amend a 3.851 motion is
(Fla. 2008) citing Bryant v. State, 901 So.2d 810, 817 (Fla.2005).
matters that have already been presented to a court. See Surinach v. State, 110
relief are subject to the two-year time limit for filing rule 3.850 motions unless
they merely enlarge an issue or issues raised in the original motion."); Rincon
v. State, 996 So.2d 922, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Admittedly, the foregoing
rulings are pursuant to Rule 3.850, but they provide a lens through which
4. In the instant case, the undersigned has been tasked with a daunting task. The
opposing counsel who prefers to have the steadfast assurance when things will
be filed and how .1 This Court tried this case. It is well aware of the massive
'Opposing counsel (Ms. Emplit and presumptively the Office of the Attorney General) has filed a motion that
calls into question the ethics, ethos and professionalism of the undersigned. That need not be a debate. The
undersigned will candidly admit looking at opposing counsel and telling her, "I will file an amended motion
on X date, Y date and Z date." I did not do it. The undersigned will admit his failings to this Court as he always
has and does. Opposing counsel doesn't have the benefit of having and Jiving the experience of a sole
practitioner who works very hard every day to afford indigent defendants the best representation possible.
The undersigned has a vibrant practice that does not include the benefit of an office such as the Office of the
Attorney General. It does include the opportunity to sit in offices with people or pick up the phone with
persons such as Mr. Meggs, Ms. Cappleman and Mr. Evans and have dialogue about issues. That is likely
because. we serve as trial lawyers in the same trenches and We can appreciate one another's schedules and
perspectives.
286
number of issues that it had to digest. In simplistic terms, the case is not ·
simple.
5. To that end, the undersigned was not able to address the issues that have now
witnesses, inability to obtain documents, the voluminous record, etc ... The
undersigned is more than willing to provide any explanation of "just cause" the
6. The amendments have served to streamline the claims. The State will likely
contend that they expand them, but they do not. When viewed through the
sub-category of the claim that they are made, they actually narrow the scope.
They have not been asserted individually. They have been asserted as an
aggregate. It seemed most intelligent to "put all of the cards on the table." It
allows everyone to know what the issues are and there is not a meandering
stream of testimony.
hereto because they are duplicative of the originals. In the event of that
necessity, the undersigned would request leave to simply amend with the
287
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of July, 2015.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State
Leon County Courthouse, 4'" Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Carine Emplit,
ROBERT A MORRIS
288
I
i
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT.
--------------------------'
AMENDED MOTION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel pursuant to Rule 3.851, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and files this Motion for
Post-Conviction Relief and as grounds therefore would state and allege as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Defendant shall be referred to as the "Defendant." The State shall be referred to as
the "State." Any references to the Record shall be refened to by the designation "R" and the
appropriate volume and page number designations. In some instances, the volumes of the
Record are broken up and refened to by different stages of the proceedings (e.g. "Jury Selection,
Trial, Sentencing, etc ... ). In those cases, any references shall be referred to by the designation
"R" followed by the proceeding and the appropriate page number designation (e.g. R, Jury
Selection, 6). There will be references to documents and matters that will be made part of the
instant Motion without Citation or reference. This is due to Rule 3.851, Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure proving to be ari unworkable "rule." The demands of the "rules" invite the
289
assembly of a document (a motion for post-conviction relief) in a relatively short period of time
without the benefit of having all of the available references. Some of this is due to the concern
of filing the appropriate pleading/s within the jurisdictional time periods required to preserve
state remedies as well as federal remedies. Nonetheless, the undersigned will do his best to
direct the Comt's attention, and that of opposing counsel, to the appropriate references.
The Defendant was charged by Indictment on Febmary 28, 2008 for First Degree
Murder, Grand Theft Motor Vehicle, Kidnapping and Grand Theft. (Ex. A). The Office of the
Public Defender for the Second Judicial Circuit filed a motion on March 5, 2008) seeking
appointment in the instant case. (Ex. B). An order granting the motion was entered on the same
date despite the State's somewhat dubious motion filed the next day asserting that the Defendant
didn't follow procedures or was not entitled to counsel. 1 (Ex. C). Nevertheless, the trial court
rectified the situation and entered an amended order of appointment. (Ex. D). The State filed
their Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty on July 28, 2008. (Ex. E). The matter was
called on for trial and Jury Selection was conducted between January 31, 2011 and Febmary 2,
2011. (R, Jury Selection, 1-1083). The "guilt phase" commenced on Febmary 4, 2011 and
concluded on Febmary 15, 2011. (R, Trial-Guilt Phase, 1-1609). The jury returned a verdict of
guilty of First Degree Murder (interrogatory verdict of premeditation and felony murder),
Kidnapping (interrogatory verdict of proof of intent to facilitate a felony and to inflict bodily
harm or terrorize and Grand Theft. (Ex. F). The jury found the Defendant not guilty of Grand
1 It is troublesome that the genesis of our "adversarial" legal process contemplates that it is completely acceptable
for the prosecutorial body (the State) to attempt to deprive an accused of any representation while the State tries to
build and mount a case that involves the interrogation and confrontation of the defendant despite watershed holdings
such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
- 2-
290
Theft Motor Vehicle. (Ex. F). The "penalty phase" commenced on Febmary 17, 2011 and
concluded on Febmary 21, 2011. (R, Jury Trial- Penalty Phase, 1-758). The jury returned an
advisory verdict of 12-0 recommending the imposition of the death penalty; (Ex. G). A
"Spencer Hearing" was conducted on April 7, 20 I 1. (R, Spencer Hearing, 1-48). The Defendant
was adjudicated guilty on April 21, 2011 and sentenced to Death for Count I. (R, Sentencing, 1-
6, Ex. H, Ex I). The Defendant was sentenced to Life on Count II and five (5) years on Count
IV; each sentence to tun consecutively. (R, Sentencing, 1-6, Ex. H, Ex I). The Defendant timely
The Defendant appealed to the Supreme Comt of Florida who rendered their opinion on
March 21, 2013 in Hilton v. State, 117 So .3d 742 (Fla. 2013) (not final until the p~riod for
moving for re-hearing). See Rule 9.330, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure). In the opinion,
the Supreme Comt of Florida affirmed the convictions and death sentence and addressed the
5) HAC
6) CCP
7) Mitigation (Argument that trial court erred in finding lack of capacity not proven)
8) Ring Claim
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10) Proportionality (Independent duty by Court to review and finding of proportionate)
(Ex. K).
The Defendant filed a motion for rehearing on April 2, 2013 which was denied on July 2,
2013. The Mandate was issued on July 31,2013. The United States Supreme Court denied a
Petition for Ce1tiorari on December 2, 2013. Hilton v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 686 (2013). (Ex. L).
ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of Florida has explained that for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims to be successful, two factors must be established: First, the claimant must identify
particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of
reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear,
substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and
reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. Bolin v. State, 41
So.3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).
This articulation came based on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The deficiency prong of Strickland "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. There is a strong presumption that
counsel's performance was not ineffective, and it is up to the defendant to present evidence to
overcome this presumption. !d. at 689. "A fair assessment of attorney perfonnance requires that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
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circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's
The prejudice prong of Strickland is established where a defendant shows that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
confidence in the outcome." Franqui v. State, 59 So .3d 82, 95 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Strickland,
Defense counsel undoubtedly has a duty to discuss potential strategies with a defendant.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). It has
been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court that denial of responsibility or
commission of offenses during the guilt phase can compromise the defense's ability to persuade
the jury during the penalty phase. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct 551 (2004). It is
conceded counsel is not required to obtain the defendant's consent to"every tactical decision."
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-418, 108 S.Ct. 646,98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (an attorney has
authority to manage most aspects of the defense without obtaining his client's approval).
trial strategies, particularly where evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Prosecutors are more likely
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to seek the death penalty, and to refuse to accept a plea to a life sentence, when the evidence is
overwhelming and the crime heinous. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 299, 329 (1983). In such cases, "avoiding
execution [may be] the best and only realistic result possible." ABA Guidelines for the
Where guilt is overwhelming, defense counsel must reasonably decide to focus on the
trial's penalty phase, at which time counsel's mission is to persuade the trier that his client's life
should be spared. Where defense counsel is unable to negotiate a guilty plea in exchange for a
life sentence, defense counsel must strive at the guilt phase to avoid a counterproductive course.
See Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different? 42 Mercer L.Rev.
695, 708 (1991) ("It is not good to put on a 'he didn't do it' defense and a 'he is sorry he did it'
mitigation. This just does not work. The jury will give the death penalty to the client and, in
essence, the attorney."); Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial
Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 Cornell L.Rev. 1557, 1589-1591 (1998)
(interviews of jurors in capital trials indicate that juries approach the sentencing phase
guilt-phase defense); id., at 1597 (in capital cases, a "run-of-the-mill strategy of challenging the
prosecution's case for failing to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" can have dire
implications for the sentencing phase). In this light, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for
attempting to impress the jury with his candor and his unwillingness to engage in "a useless
charade." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-657, n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657
(1984).
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Justice Ginsburg, delivering the Opinion for the Court in Nixon, noted:
In Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037 (Fla. 2000), the Florida Supreme Comt held that
"strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have
been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under·the norms of
In the instant case, there were "strategic issues" that were incredibly problematic. They
were not strategic at all; they were without strategy. The "defense" apparently formulated a
"strategy" that the argument should be posited that the Defendant did not conunit the crimes with
which he was charged in the face of the evidence. (R. Trial, Guilt Phase, 47-55, 1529-1560).
Thereafter, and upon conviction, it was determined (or predetermined) that the argument should
be asserted that Defendant should be the recipient of a life sentence due to mitigators and/or the
absence of aggravators. (R. Trial, Penalty Phase, 36-747). The conflicting defense theories
served to assure the rejection of counsels' arguments. as well as any and all of the Defendant's
mitigation which may have served to avoid the reconunendation of imposition of the death
penalty. This cannot be said to be strategy given the norms among advocates in death penalty
litigation. There is nothing strategic about the competing presentations. In fact, it is to the
contrary.
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Compounding matters further, counsel did not have discussion with the Defendant about
the merits, positives and negatives about making arguments in the differing phases of the u·ial
that were "in the alternative." The Defendant would not have allowed the presentation of his
defense, in the manner presented, had he been afforded the opportunity to ascertain knowledge of
Given the foregoing, counsel was ineffective in representing the Defendant. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). There is a
reasonable probability that the outcome in the proceedings would have been different if counsel
had not embarked on their divergent defense. See !d. The Defendant's convictions and sentence
should be vacated.
values that the public defender upholds. At some point, however, abstract theoretical
justifications fall short in the face of reality. For example, defenders who are motivated by a
belief that no individual is guilty until proven so, soon find that such moral indeterminacy does
not comport with their daily experiences." Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justification:
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Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, April1993 Harvard L.Rev. 1239 (citations
omitted). 2
Pleading guilty without a guarantee that the prosecution will recommend a life sentence
holds little if any benefit for the defendant. See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases§ 10.9.2, Commentary (rev. ed.2003),
reprinted in 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 913, 1045 (2003) ("If no written guarantee can be obtained that
death will not be imposed following a plea of guilty, counsel should be extremely reluctant to
participate in a waiver of the client's trial rights."). Pleading guilty not only relinquishes trial
rights, it increases the likelihood that the State will introduce aggressive evidence of guilt during
the sentencing phase, so that the gruesome details of the crime are fresh in the jurors' minds as
they deliberate on the sentence. See Goodpaster, 58 N.Y;U.L.Rev., at 331; supra, at 558-559,
560-561.
However, counsel for a defendant in a capital case certainly has the obligation to explain
acceptable even where that plea contains a "protestation of innocence when ... a defendant
intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the
judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt." See Florida Bar v. Levine, 571 So.2d 420, 421n.
1 (Fla.1990) quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37,91 S.Ct. 160, 167,27 L.Ed.2d
162 (1970). Likewise, it is completely acceptable in the State of Florida for a defendant to enter
2 As this court is aware, the undersign~ has served as conflict counsel representing the indigent for more than
sixteen (16) years and has the utmost respect for those who do. Invariably, the instant ground will be incorrectly
interpreted as an attack on those who defend the indigent. That simply is not the case. This pleading is filed on
behalf of an individual on Death Row who relies upon the undersigned to champion his rights and to protect the
sanctity of his life without deference to bias or prejudice.
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a guilty plea to first degree murder and move directly to a penalty phase proceeding. See Allred
In the instant case, the Defendant was not advised of his ability to enter a guilty plea and
proceed directly to a penalty phase whether with or without a jury. He was not advised of the
potential ramifications of a jury being exposed to overwhelming evidence of guilt during the
guilt phase and being re-exposed to much of the same evidence again in the penalty phase.
Similarly, he was not advised of the negatives associate with a decision to enter a guilty plea and
proceed in that fashion. In short, the Defendant was always of the belief that he had no choice
but to proceed to trial and was not advised of the options and alternatives available and any
professional advice associated therewith. The Defendant's understanding was that he must plod
forward to trial with no option but to fight against the crushing weight of evidence against him.
Had the Defendant been advised of his due process rights and options, he would have
elected a different course and there is a reasonable probability the election would have impacted
the outcome. The Defendant should have been afforded this opportunity. His right to trial is just
that; his. It appears that trial counsel deprived the Defendant of an election of rights because of
their personal disagreement with their perception of the viability of the option. The Defendant
was not incompetent to proceed, thus allowing counsel to make decisions in his stead. He should
have been afforded the very rudimentary and basic options and the legal advice associated with
those options. 3 The Defendant contends that the outcome of the proceedings would be wholly
3 The options provided should have been: I) You may have a trial as it relates to your guilt. If found guilty, there
will be a penalty phase where a recommendation is made about the sente1ice being life or death. 2) You may waive
your right to the guilt phase and plea and then proceed to the penalty phase where the same recommendations will
be,made. 3) You can waive your right to a jury trial as it relates to both the guilt phase and/or the penalty phase.
Discussion should have been held as it relates to each option. 4) We can concede guilt in the guilt phase in order to
retain credibility for the penalty phase.
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different had he been provided that information because the jury would not have been forced to
absorb days upon days of "defense" combatting the inevitable to only then be forced to a penalty
phase where the jury would be exposed to much of the same information on the heels of having
denied responsibility. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984).
is maintained at a level that enables counsel to provide each client with high quality legal
representation in accordance with these supplementary Guidelines and the ABA Guidelines as a
whole. "All too often in defender organizations[,] ... attorneys are asked to provide
representation in too many cases .... Unfortunately, not even the most able and industrious
lawyers can provide quality representation when their workloads are unmanageable. Excessive
the adversary system. See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases§ 10.9.2, Commentary (rev. ed.2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra
L.Rev. 913, 1045 (2003) citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Providing Defense Services
Standard 5-5.3 cmt. (3d ed. 1992); see also Model Code of Prof' I Responsibility EC 2-30 (1997);
Model Rules of Prof' I Conduct Rule 1.3 cmt. 2 (2002) ("A lawyer's work load must be
controlled so that each matter can be handled competently."); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up
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Gideon's Trumpet, 71 Fordham L.Rev. 1461, 1509 (2003) ("If a defense delivery system does
not at once identify and impose limits on the number of cases for which an individual lawyer will
be responsible, case pressures will inevitably overwhelm the lawyer and compromise the
representation.").
In the case of mitigation specialists on the staff of an institutional defender office, the
office should implement mechanisms to ensure that their workload is maintained at a level that·
enables them to provide each client with high quality services and assistance in accordance with
these Guidelines. See ABA Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense
Teams In Death Penalty Cases (2008) § 6.1, reprinted in 36 Hofstra L.Rev. 677 (2008). It is the
duty of the defense team to aid counsel in coordinating and integrating the case for life with the
Guideline 4.1 of the ABA Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of
select one or more such persons whose qualifications fit the individual
needs of the client and the case. Applications to the court for the funding
seal.
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members to determine that they are competent; and to supervise and direct
the work of all team members. Counsel must conduct such investigation of
the background, training and skills of the team members as will determine
that they are competent and must ensure on an ongoing basis that their
C. All members of the defense team are agents of defense counsel. They
of the defense team have a duty to maintain complete and accurate files,
the necessary legal knowledge for each individual case, including featirres ·
mitigation specialists with know ledge of the law affecting their work,
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litigation; applicable evidentiary rules, procedural bars and "dooropening"
protections.
assigned to, among and within the Office of the Public Defender for the Second Judicial Circuit.
Lead counsel in the case expressed inability to properly represent the Defendant with effective
result, the Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Counsel asked for relief and
, opportunity from the employer for the Defendant to have effective assistance of counsel. That
. relief did not come in a manner that afforded the Defendant effective assistance of counsel. The
employer's decision about making a transfer of the lawyer among the Defendant's "trial ranks"
as well as within the office, upon complaint, cannot be said to have afforded the Defendant with
The Defendant did not receive effective assistant of counsel due to the high volume of
cases and the workload assigned to counsel. The outcome would have been different had the
Defendant not been placed in a circumstance where the foregoing situation transpired. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
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B. COUNSEL WAS INEFECTIVE BECAUSE THE
ENITRE DEFENSE TEAM WAS REASSIGNED
TO DIFFERENT ROLES WITHIN DAYS OF THE
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL LEAVING THEM EACH
INDIVIDUALLY IN CAP ABLE OF BEING
EFFECTIVE IN THEIR NEW AREA OF
ASSIGNMENT.
Defense counsel was ineffective for not presenting a cogent and consistent argument.
Counsel was "re-shuffled" to meet the emotional, psychological and physiological demands of
the defense team on the "eve of trial" and at the "eleventh hour." Each member of the team was
re-organized into a role that they had not previously been properly familiar with. This came as a
result of those matters addressed above in Argument III, Paragraph A. There is no question that
each defense attorney involved was familiar with the case, but counsel was rendered deficient
and ineffective due to the case being very specific in terms of role and function of counsel.
Essentially, the lawyers stopped being effective in their respective areas and hoped to do their
best going forward without the requisite familiarity with the facts specific to their role. 4
Lead counsel viewed the matter through one lens and asked for help or reassignment in
the case. The mitigation specialist viewed it through a different lens and resigned (emphasis
supplied) due to her work and advocacy not being utilized on behalf of the Defendani when it
should have been utilized. The youngest lawyers were zealous advocates and one felt so
disenfranchised and in such disagreement with the defense team that they resigned or were
terminated due to insubordination. 5 While each lawyer assigned to the case has "tried cases" in
4 The undersigned has over 150. banker's boxes of documents and dozens of "Gigsn of data. in this case and it is
difficult to imagine people being able to "brush up" on all of this in the final moments of trial preparation.
5 What is evident is that the lawyer filed a pleading styled "Notice pf Withdraw" in the midst of a trial; which is
arguably bizmre and best characterizes the fracture in the defense team.
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the past, the re-shuffling process resulted in lawyers who do not regularly try jury trials doing
exactly that. The effort in this trial was inconsistent, incongruous and ineffective.
In this instance the Defendant was denied -effective assistance of counsel due to the
fracture, discord, disagreement and disharmony among defense counsel. Defense counsel was
incapable of rendering effective assistance of counsel due to the combativeness within. The
Defendant was an audience member to the trial within his trial team. Had this circumstance not
occurred, the outcome in the trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
humanize the Defendant and would have served to have a meaningful impact on the jury's
recommendation of life versus death. More specifically, the mitigation expert developed Power
Point presentations on the life history of the Defendant. 6 Likewise, the mitigation expelt
developed a chronological history of the Defendant's medical and mental health history. 7 The
mitigation expert prepared an extensive list of witnesses that could provide an excellent
chronology of the Defendant's life and circumstances. The mitigation expert developed
6 The Power Point presentation tracks the Defendant in a very poignant manner.
7 This in(:luded history of his doctor who was over-prescribing medication to the Defendant on which the defense
was incredibly reliant and the State sought to. But, it included important information that the Defendant didn't
simply "self-diagnose" himself with Multiple Sclerosis. The records reflect that the doctor actually believed that the
Defendant had "relapsing remitting Multiple Sclerosis" and the doctor also wrote a note to a federal court seeking to
excuse him from jury duty opining that the Defendant had a "form of Multiple Sclerosis."
. 16.
304
mitigation and evidence that would provide a jury with a very visceral view of the Defendant.
Instead, defense counsel opted for a very clinical and sterile approach in seeking to avoid
the death penalty. The defense called a few "clinicians" to testify about the Defendant's
diagnosis and/or problems. More specifically, counsel relied upon Dr. Wu 8 to "carry the day"
with his PET scan analysis in conjunction with psychologists and neuro-psychologists who had
little or no familiarity with the history of the Defendant other than the documents they were
provided to review. The defense also called a couple of friends and family in support of his
character.
The Defendant's trial may well have been one where counsel "ground through" the guilt
phase and felt hopeless at the conclusion. Counsel is entitled to those feelings, but that is not
acceptable as it relates to the Defendant. First, defense counsel made the ineffective decision to
combat everything during the guilt phase. Second, defense counsel is required to be effective in
the penalty phase irrespective of whether they feel "bleak or blue" about the prospects and the
potential outcome. 9 The Defendant's penalty phase presentation reads "on a cold record" as one
In sum, the mitigation specialist assigned to the case prepared an extensive and massive
amount of mitigation evidence and testimony with witnesses who were able to testify about the
8 Dr. Wu has gained a dubious and questionable reputation as it relates to his credibility and testimony in death
penalty cases; particularly in Florida. See http://www. voiceofoc.org/oc south/article ca05b81 e-b794-11 e3-b723-
00I 9bb2963f4.html. A review of his Power Point presentation to the jury contains slides of that have absolutely no
relevance or bearing on the Defendant's case whatsoever.
'If counsel thought or had the premonition that "we have lost this jury," is it not wiser to tJu·ow the entire weight of
the defense's mitigation over the jury rail and for the purposes of hoping to get a division in the recommendation
and/or preserving the record?
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Defendant's life circumstances, mental health, physical health, character, etc... Virtually none
of it was used. The mitigation expert resigned her long-held position as a result of this
The Defendant, after having established a relationship with the mitigation expert,
believed, desired and expected that significant mitigation developed and acquired would be
presented to the jury during a penalty phase. It was not presented. Counsel was ineffective for
failing to present the mitigation evidence. Had counsel presented the mitigation evidence there
., Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
appellate review. The error at issue here is the trial court's denial of Trial Counsel's for-cause
challenge. Denial of a challenge for cause is grounds for reversible error. Hamilton v. State, 54 7
So. 2d 630, 632 (Fla. 1989). In order to preserve such an error for appellate review, where trial
counsel's motion to strike a juror for cause is denied, and he is thereafter forced to exhaust all
peremptory challenges, he must first "identify a specific juror whom he otherwise would have
struck peremptorily". Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1990).
In the instant case, Jury Selection proceeded over the course of several days. (R. Jury
Selection, 1-1082). There were numerous "cause challenges" that were asserted during jury
selection. Many of them were granted, but many of them were not. While the defense team
made objections to the denial of cause challenges, the defense team failed to preserve any of
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these objections for the purposes of appellate review by utilization of the process outlined in
Trotter.
The Defendant asserts that the failure to properly preserve the denial of cause challenges
for appellate review was and is ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, .
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Moreover, the failure to preserve the
cause challenges was the result of the overall dynamic of the "defense team." The "team" was so
fractured that individuals did not clearly understand their assignments in order to afford effective
representation. There is not better demonstration than going to the effort of relentlessly
objecting and making arguments to preserve matters and then wholly failing to take the
. additional steps necessary to preserve the matter for appellate review. The Defendant would
assert that the unfulfilled preservation of the objections for cause that were denied or overruled
(R. Jury Selection, 1-1 082) served to prejudice the Defendant by denying him appellate review
of those issues and that the outcome of his direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court would
have been different if those matters had been preserved. See !d. Likewise, this same inaction
combined with other matters serves to demonstrate the defense's lack of preparation and
collaboration to address vitallega!issues of this nature and served to provide the Defendant with
is arguable that they should not have been called during the guilt phase, but it is definitive that
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Mr. Tabor was the Defendant's long-time employer. He was and is capable of testifying
that he knew the Defendant and had employed him for approximately ten (10) year. l-Ie was and
is able to articulate that the Defendant was a good employee throughout that period of time until
his ultimate demise into abenant behavior. Mr. Tabor noticed anomalies in the Defendant's
behavior leading up to his anest after the Defendant began taking prescription drugs. Mr.
Tabor's reaction to these behaviors was one of concern and fear to the extent that he took
Dr. Deicher was the doctor that Mr. Hilton saw on a routine basis who prescribed (over-
prescribed) him with attention deficit disorder medication. While inappropriate to call a witness
solely for the purposes of impeachment, the defense team would have been able to illicit
testimony in harmony with the defense theory which was: that Mr. Hilton had mental
conditions and infirmities, he was prescribed medication for those conditions and infi!Tllities, the
doctor was not diligent or attentive to the patient's usage of those drugs, the doctor had
participated in creating the Defendant's enatic and abenant behavior based on his conduct of
over-prescribing medication, and that the doctor had been disciplined for his prescription
behaviors.
The absence of these witnesses during the guilt phase served to deprive the jury of an
understanding of the Defendant's mental and physical health. It is conceded that the Defendant
did not pursue a defense of "not guilty by reason of insanity," nor did he pursue of a defense of
something akin to involuntary intoxication. However, there was most certainly a suggestion to
the jury during both phases of the trial.that Mr. Hilton should not be held responsible for the
complete culpability of his actions due to Dr. Deicher's actions impacting the actions of the
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Defendant. These factors were likely relevant to the jury's determination of guilt and the degree
of guilt.
made during the penalty phase. Both witnesses served to mitigate the Defendant's conduct and
. provided rational explanation for his abrupt change in behavior and a chronological timeline
associated therewith. The calling of these witnesses would also have served to combat the
State's presentation that the abuse of prescription drugs was contrived or that it was simply a
It is important to understand that the shuffling and mixing and matching of the roles of
the defense team in the immediate run-up to trial served to preclude the defense from
recognizing the crucial nature of these witnesses. Due to the disjuncture in the defense team,
counsel failed to recognize the impmt of these witnesses to the defense presentation. Given the
foregoing, it is the assertion of the Defendant that the failure to call the two witnesses in the guilt
and/or penalty phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel whether it be evaluated alone
or in conjunction with other claims asserted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
Wu that related to the Defendant's involvement in the filming of a "movie" called "Deadly Run."
(R. Penalty Phase, 146). This testimony served to "open the door" to testimony by Dr. Prichard
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on rebuttal as well as during closing argument. (R. Penalty Phase, 633-686, 702-728). The
importance of this testimony or the opening of the door to it being introduced is that it allowed
the jury to learn that Defendant had been involved in some type of film about homicidal
behaviors. The cross-examination of Dr. Wu, the defense's own witness, went unchecked and
It is the Defense's position that this neglect was the result of the fracture in the defense
team and their lack of preparation and awareness of particular facts that their respective
witnesses may be reliant upon or may testify about. In this regard, it is the Defendant's assertion
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and seek the exclusion of this matter. It
served to allow the jury to learn of an extremely prejudicial matter that would have otherwise not
been admissible. It fostered the ability to make argument in the same vein. The failure to object
served as ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
expert opinion during the penalty phase. (R. Penalty Phase, 590-594). His testimony was reliant
upon hearsay upon hearsay and he was allowed to share the information he was reliant upon with
the jury. No objections were made to the introduction of this testimony. There is no question
that Dr. Prichard's testimony was damning, but nothing was done to object, preserve for review
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It is the Defense's position that the failure to prepare, objec~ preserve for review or
counter Dr. Prichard's testimony was ineffective assistance of counsel. This is particularly true
when viewed through the lens of the fact that the defense team was somewhat "cobbled together"
at the last minute in terms of their responsibilities. Counsel responsible for this witness was not
aware of the potential of this testimony, did not object to this testimony, did not preserve the
record and did not counter this testimony with anything that would affirmatively combat the
testimony. To this end, defense counsel was ineffective and was ineffective in conjunction with
the other errors amongst the defense team. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
testifying to admissions that were overheard and attributed to the Defendant. The admissions
attributed to the Defendant changed the complexion of the case from being a case of
circumstantial evidence to direct evidence. In the mass and swath of depositions and discovery
taken by the defense team, the one page report by the correction's officer was overlooked and
care, attention and preparation was not paid to this issue that served to alter the defense.
The Defendant asserts that this lack of preparation and lack of ability to address this
testimony in conjunction with the entirety of the trial served to be ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
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Likewise, this lack of preparation serves to be further demonstrative of the fracture and division
amongst the defense team that served to provide the Defendant with ineffective assistance of
COW1Sel. Jd.
Phase, 263-264). The defense team presented a theory of the Defendant being over-prescribed
medication and engaging in the behavior involved in the case. No sooner than the defense was
finished with their direct examination than the State sought to gather testimony that the witness .
had been guilty of the very same infraction. More specifically, the witness was guilty of over-
prescribing medications and had been reprimanded. Coilllsel was unfamiliar with this
circumstance and acknowledged it on the record. The transcript reads a bit like the scene from
The Defendant asserts that this lack of preparation and lack of ability to address this
testimony in conjunction with the entirety of the trial served to be ineffective assistance of
coilllsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Likewise, this lack of preparation serves to be further demonstrative of the fracture and division
amongst the defense team that served to provide the Defendant with ineffective assistance of
counsel. I d.
10 http://www.imdb.com/title/ttOlJ 7913/ The movie where Matthew McConaughey unwittingly places a witness on
the witness stand who has previously been convicted of a sex crime on a mi11or [although he went on to marry that
person] and the defense had no idea of the vulnerability of their witness.
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IV. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE,
RESEARCH AND PRESENT EVIDENCE RELATED
TO THE DEFENDANT'S EARLY CIDLDHOOD
DEVELOPMENT, BRAIN TRAUMA, INJURY,
COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT AND MENTAL
HEALTH BEFORE AND AFTER WHAT WAS
PRESENTED AT TRIAL AS WELL AS THE
EPIDEMIOLOGY ASSOCIATED AND TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE TO THAT END.
The general rule is "[a]n attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation,
Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 570 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 571
(Fla.l996) ).
On March 31, 2009, Chris EUrich forwarded a memorandum for the Office of the Public
Defender for the Second Judicial Circuit by facsimile to the Miami-Dade County Clerk of
Comts. This memorandum requested records related to the Defendant's arrest "around
September 1961 for attempted murder." No effort was made to physically go to obtain those
Ms. Kimberly Stevens, Esq. was court-appointed to represent the Defendant in United
States v. Gary Michael Hilton, 1: 11-cr-00049-MR-DLH-1, in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina. Ms. Stevens has been a civil and criminal litigator in the
trial and appellate courts of the State of North Carolina since 1993, and was a law clerk to United
States District Judge Patrick J. Duggan, Eastern District of Michigan, Detroit Division, in 1992.
Ms. Stevens has provided direct trial and post-conviction representation in approximately 35
death penalty cases. She has been appointed by the federal courts as learned counsel in capital
cases in North Carolina, Virginia, Nevada and Puerto Rico. She is also a consulting capital
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313
attorney in conjunction with the Trial Assistance Unit at the North Carolina Office of Indigent
Defense Services for trial counsel in capital cases throughout the State of North Carolina. She
served as an Assistant Capital Defender for the State of North Carolina in recent years.
Ms. Stevens and her staff directly communicated with the Miami-Dade County Clerk of
Court and Juvenil.e Services and physically went to attempt to obtain documents. During that
effort, Ms. Stevens and her defense team learned that the records related to the Defendant had
recently been destroyed and would have been available had the Defendant's trial cotinsel gone to
obtain them during the pendency of the instant case. This related to both court records as well as
medical records.
September 6, 1961. He was placed in the care and custody of a Mrs. Ruth Heller on or about
September 13, 1961. On September 15, 1961, the following entry appears, "Order: Gary com. to
psychiatric in patient services of Jackson Memorial for observation evaluation and possible
treatment; authorities to advise Court when child ready to be discharged." It does not appear that
he was released approximately one month later. On May 7, 1962, the Defendant was removed
from Ms. Heller's care and custody and transferred to that of Mr. and Mrs. Frank Capuzzi. On
January 25, 1963, the Defendant was removed from the care and custody of Mr. and Mrs.
Had this information been investigated and properly presented it would have enabled the
defense to paint an entirely different picture of the Defendant during the penalty phase and to
combat the State's aggressive contention by their own expert. (R. Penalty Phase, 568-684).
Defense counsel would have been able to adequately portray and describe the Defendant from a
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very young age to the point of the offense that is the subject of this case. That would have
young age, the psycho-social reasons of the crime for which he was incarcerated at a young age,
his rape by an attorney at a very young age, etc... The defense was ineffective in their failure to
start at the beginning of the Defendant's life and to explain sequentially and chronologically how
During the testimony of the State's expert, he was essentially reliant upon what he heard
in the courtroom during testimony as well as historical documents he was afforded the
opportunity to review. He concluded and opined on several occasions that the Defendant had
certain psychological features and defects without the benefit of knowing the Defendant's full
psychological development history. This served as a powerful too!for the State to rebut and
Defense counsel was ineffective in their failure to properly investigate matters related to
the Defendant's early childhood development, brain trauma, injury, cognitive impairment and
mental health both before and after the evidence presented at trial. Had counsel been effective,
the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
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The generi3.] rule is ''[a]n attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation,
Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553,570 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 571
(Fla.1996)).
In the instant case, there is evidence the Defendant was diagnosed with Multiple
repeated episodes of inflammation of the nervous tissue in the brain and spinal cord, causing loss
of the insulating myelin sheath. It is documented science that MS can create lesions on the brain
neurologist as an expert witness in the defense case, but that was to generically testify about
observed abnormalities in the brain function based on analysis of a PET scan. The Defendant
was never properly evaluated for his neurological condition to discern whether there was an
arguable and contributing defense that would serve in mitigation. Instead, the State was enabled
to argue that the Defendant "self-diagnosed" himself with MS and utilized this point through
The Defendant asserts that he does in fact have a neurological condition that impacts his
cognitive capacities. Had defense counsel taken the time obtain a proper evaluation and
diagnosis, the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel was ineffective for failing to do so
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VII. MR. IDLTON'S EXECUTION WOULD VIOLATE
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
A. EXECUTING THE MET ALLY ILL
CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT'S PROIDBITION AGAINST
CRULE AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
Courts identify "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society," Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion), in order to determine which
punishments "are forbidden," Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879), by the Eighth
Amendment. Evolving standards can be identified via "objective indicia," Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551,572 (2005), and by "the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the
Court's own understanding of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose."
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011,
2021 (2011). Because of his mental illness, brain damage, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder,
depression and. multiple sclerosis at the time of the offense, Defendant's execution would violate
"The concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment." Graham, 130 S.Ct.
at 2021 (2011). Our evolved standards of decency limit the death penalty to "those offenders
who commit 'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability
makes them 'the most deserving of execution,"' Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2650 (quoting Roper, 543
U.S. at 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)). An offender must
truly be the "worst of the worst," Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2650, to be eligible for execution; and to
be the worst, a defendant must be the most "culpable" of offenders. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 ("the
lesser culpability of the mentally retarded"); Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (relying on "the diminished
culpability of juveniles").
. 29.
317
In Hall v. Florida, Justice Kennedy writing for the Court opined:
engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses ... [which] make[s] it less likely that they can
process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their
conduct based upon that information." Atkins, 536 U.S., at 320, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Retributive
values are also ill-served by executing those with intellectual disability. The diminished capacity
of the intellectually disabled lessens moral culpability and hence the retributive value of the
punishment. See id., at 319, 122 S.Ct. 2242 ("If the culpability of the average murderer is
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of
the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution")." Hall, 134 S.Ct.
1986 (2014).1l
Given the evidence in the Defendant's case of mental illness, brain damage, bipolar
disorder, anxiety disorder, depression and multiple sclerosis, he does not qualify for "the worst
of the worst" and his death sentence is disproportionate punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. The Defendant suffered a brain injury at a young age, has manifested
psychological and mental impairment from a very young age forward, suffered depression the
entirety of his life, has been diagnosed as bi-polar, has suffered anxiety, has malformations in
crucial functioning areas of his brain and was diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis.
II On its face, much ofthe reasoning in Hall seem logically to apply to persons with mental illness:
If Defendant's doctors and medical history are correct, Defendant's mental deficiencies are comparable in
severity to mental retardation. In Hall, the Court held that to have a rigid test defining what constitutes
mental rerordation because the test in Florida failed to take into account the error implicit in the test's own
design, but it also precluded the court from considering deficits in the defendant's adaptive functioning
over his life.
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318
When a defendant's mental functioning is seriously compromised, the defendant is not
the worst of the worst. For example, the mentally retarded are not the most culpable because
they have "disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses" and "do
not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduCt." Atkins, 536 U.S. 306-307. A person who has diminished capacities to understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
control impulses and to understand the reaction of others," Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, is not the
most culpable. 12
Similarly, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment ban on excessive and
cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the execution of juveniles because of their "diminished
culpability," their developing brains, and their propensity for "'ill-considered actions and
decisions."' Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. The Atkins and Roper categorical bans on executions ought
'
to apply to the seriously mentally ill, and to persons with brain impainnent. 13
12
On its face, much of the reasoning in Atkins seems logically to apply to persons with mental illness in the same
manner as described in Hall.
People v. Danks, 82 P.3d 1249, 1285 (S.Ct. Cal2004) (Kennard concurring/dissenting); see also Bryan v. Mullin,
335 F.3d 1207, 1237 (JOili Cir. 2003) (dissenting op.; Supreme Court's logic applies to those with severe mental
deficiancies"); Corcoran v. State, 774 NE 495 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker J., dissenting) (Atkim rationale is ']ust as
compelling" for prohibiting the execution of the "seriously mentally ill"); State v. Nelson, 803 A2d I (NJ 2002)
(Zappala, J., concuning)("Lesser culpability" of seriously mentally ill defendant is indistinguishable from mentally
retarded defendant).
13Several state courts have refused to recognize that Atkins and/or Simmons require that seriously mentally ill
and/or brain damaged individuals, with their reduced culpability, cannot be executed under the Eighth Amendment.
See, e.g., Reese v. State, 14 So.3d 913 (Fla. 2009); State v. Hancock, 840 N.E.2d 1032 (Ohio 2006); Lewis v. State,
620 S.E.2d 778 (Ga. 2005).
• 31 •
319
In the instant case, the Defendant presented extensive evidence of mental health issues,
defect, injury and impairment. As such, the execution of the Defendant is violative of the Eighth
because it poses a risk of arbitrary enforcement based on non-unanimous juror death sentence
Eddings v. Oklahoma the criminal justice system must go "to extraordinary measures to ensure
that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is
humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or
mistake." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
arbitrary nature of Florida's use of the death sentence, in this case, is in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the Consitution and the corresponding provision of the Florida Constitution. U.S.
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires the courts consider "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturirig society." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574;
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). Florida's jury recommendation system iri capital
cases is not in accord with the evolving standards of decency because juries are neither required
to issue a unanimous death sentence on punishment, nor is their recommendation biriding on the
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trial court. Pursuant to Graham v. Florida, the Eighth Amendment's Ctuel and Unusual
Punishments Clause analysis requires that a coutt make two determinations on a "sentencing
practice at issue." 560 U.S._, S.Ct. 2011 (2010). Courts are first to take into account
practice." !d. See also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ("[T]he 'clearest and most reliable objective
Perry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). Second, courts consider whether the punishment at bar
comports with "the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court's own
understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and
purpose." ld.
With respect to the societal standards, thirty-two out of thirty-four death penalty states
require unanimous death sentences and do not allow judges to override thejury. Unanimous
legislation/20121. Only in the two remaining death penalty states, Florida and Alabama, is
unanimity not required. Moreover, in these two states, the jury's recommendation is non-binding
on the judge, meaning that the court can override a life recommendation and sentence the
defendant to death. § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. Finally, Florida is the only state in the union that
allows juries to recommend a death sentence by a simple majority. 14 See Whitfield v. State, 706
It is acknowledged that the recommendation of the jury in the Defendant's case was
unanimous. However, it is also acknowledged that Florida is an outlier that does not comport
14 Alabama requires that at leas.t lO jury members recommend death. Unanimous Death Sentences in Florida?,
http://www. wjhg.com/home!headl ines!Unanimous-Death-Sentences-in-Florida-185585892.html ..
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· with societal norms where the structure calls for the jury to make a "recommendation" that need
The second reason Florida's death sentencing scheme is out of step with the Eighth
Amendment's evolving standards of decency is because it is the only state that allows a judge to
ovenide a jury's recommendation of life without parole. That is, a Florida jury's "sentence" is
merely a non-binding recommendation. See § 921.141 (2), Fla. Stat. Florida's jury
recommendation is an outlier among the standards elaborated by the controlling norms. Thirty-
two other states have determined that a jury of one's peers, not a single judge, who may be
subject to pressures of retention or election, must decide whether a citizen should be executed by
the state.
Florida's high death sentencing rates, which seem only to climb as other states' rates
decline, demonstrate an arbitrary effect of a system that does not require juror unanimity and
only contemplates a recommendation. Florida has the fourth largest population in the nation.
Florida's percentage of annual death sentences are stunning. In 2012 and 2013, seventy-
nine individuals nationwide were sentenced to death in each year, the second lowest number
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322
in 2013 and twenty of those in 2012 were in Florida Florida accounted for 18% of nationwide
death sentences in 2013 and 25% in 2012. It is no surprise with these growing numbers and
Florida's outlier structure, Florida has the highest number of death row exonerations in the
country- twenty-three, or 16.5% of the nation's 139 wrongful capital convictions. DPIC,
http://www. deathpenaltvin(o. org/florida-1. Taken together these statistics reveal that an illllocent
person charged with first degree murder is significantly more likely to be sentenced to death in
Florida than if that crime was committed in any other death penalty state in the country.
Second, courts consider whether the punishment at bar comports with "the standards
elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court's own understanding and interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose." Jd. The Supreme Comt's
precedent emphasizes that the Eighth Amendment "ca!lllot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of
death under legal systems that permit this uniq11e penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 310 (Bre!lllan, J., concurring). Florida's death
penalty system is a complete anomaly among the other thirty-three death penalty states.
Because Florida's death penalty system is not in step with the "evolving standards of
decency," the death penalty in this case is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Florida
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason the Defendant's sentence of death should be vacated due to
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T A. MORRI , ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 E. Park Avenue
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111
(850) 792-1113 Facsimile
alex @ramlawyer.com
efiling@ramlawyer.com
- 36-
324
Sworn Oath
-37-
325
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State
Leon County Courthouse, 4'b Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Carine Emplit,
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326
Filing# 30160644 E-Filed 07/28/L015 10:28:10 AM
vs.
Defendant.
------·--------------~/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
INITIAL POST CONVICTION MOTION
Law, filed on July 24, 2015, and the CoUJt being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, it is hereby:
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the motion be granted. The state shall
County, Florida.
e.
JAMES C. HANKINSON
Circuit Judge
327
SERVICE LIST
Carine L. Emplit
Carine.emplit@myfloridalegal.com
Georgia Cappleman
SA02 LeonFelonv@leongountyfl.gov
Eddie Evans
Assistant State Attorney
Office of the State Attorney
301 S. Monroe Street, Suite 475
Leon County Courthouse
Tallahassee, FL 32301
328
Filing# 30235439 E-Filed 07/2'1!2015 01:57:34 PM
COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel, and moves to incur costs for a forensic psychologist and in support thereof, shows the
following:
1. The Defendant is indigent and the undersigned was appointed by the Court to
3. The past forty eight (48) hours have presented extraordinary circumstances for the
Defense in this case. The Defense anticipated calling Dr. Harry McClaren as an
expert witness as well as a factual witness. Dr. McClaren was originally retained by
the Office of the Public Defender to serve as an expert witness when the instant case
was at the trial level. He served as a consultant and conducted a tremendous amount
329
was not utilized as a witness during the penalty phase. It is now argued that this was
a critical error constituting ineffective assistance of counsel because the jury did not
have the benefit of a proper forensic psychological profile of the Defendant during
the penalty phase of the trial that encompassed his complete psycho-social profile as
4. The Defense has never been in a rush to seek the appointment of Dr. McClaren as an
expert witness in the instant proceeding. This is primarily due to the fact that Dr.
McClaren was originally involved in the case and had a great deal of familiarity with
the case that did not necessitate "authorization to incur costs" at an earlier point. The
undersigned had prepared a motion seeking the "authorization to incur costs" which
passed away within the last forty eight (48) hours. This has left the Defense in a
somewhat dire situation due to the loss of a crucial witness as well as a hearing date
that is in the near future. Dr. McClaren was not only crucial for his ability to testify
about the Defendant's psycho-social makeup, but he was also integral in being able to
speak to matters related to the breakdown in the internal workings of the defense team
as well as his research that went without presentation. Likewise Dr. McClaren was
testimony from Dr. Prichard and render an opinion about Dr. Prichard's
1 The undersigned contemplated attaching the motion that was/is prepared as an exhibit, but did not see the necessity
of it.
330
6. In that regard, the undersigned immediately initiated telephone communications
instance, none of them are able to be available and/or prepared for the presently
7. The undersigned seeks authorization to retain the services of Dr. Terrance Leland,
9. Dr. Leland is a respected and experienced forensic psychologist who has testified as
10. The record that exists in the instant case is massive. There are over one hundred
(100) banker's boxes as well as thousands of pages of files that are digitally stored. 3
Candidly, in seventeen ( 17) years of practice, the undersigned has never encountered
a more voluminous case. The case files have literally filled an entire executive office
2 The hourly rate comports with the standard hourly rates afforded by the Justice Administration Commission for
mental health experts. See http://www.justiceadmin.org/court app counselffmmsandrates.aspx, CIRCWT 2- DUE
PROCESS COSTS ESTABLISHED RATES FOR SERVICES PROVIDED ON. OR AFTER JULY I, 2010.
3 Mr. Hilton is labeled as a "serial killer" and his counsel from offenses in the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina was kind enough to facilitate electronic file sharing that has served to save the
State of Florida thousands of dollars. The contents of those documents were related to the instant offense, offenses
in North Carolina and offenses in Georgia. They are highly relevant to the matters at issue.
331
and the electronic data could not be stored on the finn's hard drive. A separate hard
drive had to be purchased to facilitate storage. The penalty phase transcripts alone
are several hundred pages and "a day's worth of reading." This is without regard to
·the myriad of documents that need to be contempiated such as: Mr. Hilton's
Hilton's foster home records, Mr. Hilton's academic records, Mr. Hilton's arrest
records, Mr. Hilton's familial history and records, Mr. Hilton's military service
records and a plethora of other records and documentation. It has taken dozens, if not
hundreds of hours, for the undersigned to become familiar with the file.
11. The authorization for "costs" sought herein serves to exceed the standards that are set
forth in §27.711 (6), Florida Statutes (2015). The undersigned has incurred certain
costs that have already been "billed against the $15,000.00 allotment." They are
nominal in nature and counsel has not abused the financial infrastructure established
by the legislature or the Justice Administration Commission. To that end, the costs
have been for necessities such as copies, transcripts and rudimentary materials. The
undersigned is seeking the appointment of 3 experts. One is Dr. Leland who is the
subject of this motion. The other is a lawyer and legal expert in death penalty
litigation, Clyde Taylor, who is the subject of an additional motion. The final one is
an additional legal expert who is an expert in death penalty litigation and capable of
testifying to matters that Mr. Taylor is not going to or unable to adequately address.
12. The undersigned would assert, in the absence of this Court finding extraordinary
circumstances and granting relief, that §27 .711, Florida Statutes (2015) is
332
unconstitutional due to its confiscatory nature. See Makemson v. Martin County, 491
So.2d 1109 (Fla.l986). The statute places arbitrary maximums on the amount an
attorney may spend in defense of their client in.a case where the ultimate penalty is at
stake. The statute does not account for differences or variances in cases. It does not
contemplate the reality that death penalty cases are not "cookie cutter." They are not
13. The instant case is fraught with difficulties for any practitioner. The defense is
saddled with examining issues related to the guilt phase that contemplate homicides
in three different states as weii as the evidence attendant thereto. Likewise, the
defense is burdened with a exploring a psychological history that was not explored
and presented during the initial trial. This history spans the entirety of the
Defendant's life and dates back sixty (60) plus years and involves a massive amount
of documents.
14. Dr. Leland will be tasked with reviewing ali of the documents mentioned above. It is
more problematic that Dr. Leland will now be tasked with reconstructing Dr.
15. The undersigned has not taken a carte blanche "punch the financial ticket" on
Hilton. The authorization sought has contemplated 100 hours of time or two work
weeks. This is inclusive of review of the record, travel to and from Death Row,
333
16. Counsel for the defense has not conferred with As.sistant Attorney General Ms.
Emplit as it relates to the relief sought in this motion. Seemingly, the prosecutorial
arm of the State of Florida does not have an interest in the present Motion.
Nevertheless, Ms. Emplit apparently embraces the Defense's requested relief based
on her pleading filed on June 30, 2015 seeking to compel counsel to seek experts. 4
Counsel for the defense has had some difficulty discerning who actually needs to be
'
consulted and contacted for the State of Florida. On the one hand, The Honorable
William N. Meggs has attended hearings from the Office of the State Attorney.
Likewise, Deputy Chief State Attorney Georgia Cappleman has attended hearings.
Assistant State Attorney Eddie Evan has also been participatory. The State of Florida
has also included Assistant Attorney General Ms. Emplit, Assistant Deputy Attomey
General Ms. Snurkowski and another attorney whose name eludes the undersigned. It
is unclear to counsel who is "in charge" for the State of Florida. Be that as it may,
defense counsel has remained in relatively constant contact with Assistant State
Attorney Eddie Evans about the procedural and factual aspects of the case. There
17. The undersigned has contacted Assistant General Counsel Bradley Bischoff from the
incur costs insofar as the request is within the statutory parameters. However, he
4 Ms. Emplit's motion can potentially be construed as the State's expression of concern that counsel is rendering
ineffective assistance in this proceeding. In the alternative, it can also be construed as the State simply desiring to
be prepared for the hearing that is in September. ·
334
objects on behalf of the Justice Administration Commission to any authorization
18. Counsel for the Defense requests that this Court recognize the extraordinary nature of
this case, the extraordinary nature of the circumstances that presently beset the
Defense and enter an order with the requisite findings and authorizing the Defense to
WHEREFORE, the Defense requests this Court enter an order authorizing the defense
to incur costs for Dr. Terrance Leland up to a maximum of $15,000.00 at the statutorily
a
authorized rate of $150.00 per hour with finding that such authorization is necessary due to
Respectfully submitted,
335
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a tme copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant General
Attorney's Office, Leon County Courthouse, 41h Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL,
Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 291h day of July,
2015.
~
[ .
336
Filing# 30235439 E-Filed 07/2'7,2015 01:57:34 PM
COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel, and moves to incur costs for an attorney who is an expert in death penalty litigation and
1. The Defendant is indigent and the undersigned. was appointed by the Court to
2. The defense requll:es the assistance of a legal expert in order to adequately present the
defense's case.
337
4. The undersigned seeks authorization to retain the services of Clyde Taylor, Esq. The
per hour. 1
5. Mr. Taylor is a respected trial lawyer who has testified as an expert witness in a
cases at the trial level, appellate level and post-conviction level. This Court is
familiar with his credentials and his expertise. It is anticipated that Mr. Taylor can
and will testify as an expert regarding the American Bar Association standards in
capital cases for both the guilt phase as well as the penalty phase. It is also
anticipated that he is able to testify on matters that could have been or should have
been contemplated by the defense team for Mr. Hilton in their preparation and
presentation of a defense. Likewise, Mr. Taylor can and will testify regarding
omissions made by Mr. Hilton's defense team as well as. communications that should
6. The record that exists in the instant case is massive. There are over one hundred
(100) banker's boxes as well as thousands of pages of files that are digitally stored. 2
Candidly, in seventeen (17) years of practice, the undersigned has never encountered
a more voluminous case. The case files have literally filled an entire executive office
and the electronic data could not be stored on the firm's hard drive due to its size. A
1 The hourly rate comports with the standard hourly rates afforded by the Justice Administration Commission for
Western District of North Carolina was kind enough to facilitate electronic file sharing that has served to save the
State of Florida thousands of dollars. The contents of those documents were related to the instant offense, offenses
in North Carolina and offenses in Georgia. They are highly relevant to the matters at issue.
338
separate hard drive had to be purchased to facilitate storage. The penalty phase
transcripts alone are several hundred pages and "a day's worth of reading." This is
without regard to the myriad of documents that need to be contemplated such as: Mr.
Mr. Hilton's foster home records, Mr. Hilton's academic records, Mr. Hilton's arrest
records, Mr. Hilton's familial history and records, Mr. Hilton's military service
records and a plethora of other records and documentation. It has taken dozens, if not
hundreds of hours, for the undersigned to become familiar with the file.
7. The authorization for "costs" sought herein does not serve to exceed the standards
that are set forth in §27.711 (6), Florida Statutes (2015). However, when taken on
aggregate in conjunction with other experts and costs incurred, the "statutory cap"
representation and the proper preparation and presentation of the defense. The
undersigned has incurred certain costs that have already been "billed against the
One is Mr. Taylor who is the subject of this motion. The other is a forensic
additional legal expert who is an expert in death penalty litigation and capable of
adequately address. The combined "costs" exceed the provided statutory structure.
8. The undersigned would assert, in the absence of this Court finding extraordinary
unconstitutional due to its confiscatory nature. See Makemson v. Martin County, 491
339
So.2d 1109 (Fla.l986). The statute places arbitrary maximums on the amount an
attorney may spend in defense of their client in a case where the ultimate penalty is at
stake. The statute does not account for differences or variances in cases. It does not
contemplate the reality that death penalty cases are not "cookie cutter." They are not
all the same with identical issues. This case is unique in its scope and complexity as
9. The instant case is. fraught with difficulties for any practitioner. The defense is
saddled with examining issues related to the guilt phase that contemplate homicides
in three different states as well as the evidence attendant thereto. Likewise, the
defense is burdened with a exploring a psychological history that was not explored
and presented during the initial trial. This history spans the entirety of the
Defendant's life and dates back sixty (60) plus years and involves a massive amount
of documents.
10. Mr. Taylor will be tasked with reviewing all of the documents mentioned above. It is
somewhat whimsical that the enactments of the legislature afford the opportunity for
11. The undersigned has not taken a carte blanche "punch the financial ticket" on
expenses. To the contrary, the undersigned has presented a measured and fiscally
3 Itis interesting that court appointed counsel can try a case (potentially on multiple occasions where there is no
compensation for a "do-over"/mistrial) and his/her fee is 50-75% less than the "expert" who wrote a five (5) page
letter about a defendant's mental health. This is notto besmirch the role of these persons, butto highlight this is in
the face of counsel spending dozens of hours meeting with a defendant, meeting with witnesses, making court
appearances, preparing for trial and actually trying a case (which impacts the frrm's ability to conduct day to day
business). Literally, an investigator or a psychologist gathers more compensation than a lawyer charged with
protecting a criminal defendant's constitutional rights and interests. Counsel cannot pretend to have the same
wisdom as the legislature. Be that as it may, it would seem that our governing bodies would compensate persons in
ratio and proportion to their actual role in a case.
340
conservative and responsible approach to being able to appropriately defend Mr.
Hilton.
12. Counsel for the defense has not conferred with Assistant Attorney General Ms.
Emplit as it relates to the relief sought in this motion. Seemingly, the prosecutorial
arm of the State of Florida does not have an interest in the present Motion.
Nevertheless, Ms. Emplit apparently embraces the Defense's requested relief based
on her pleading filed on June 30, 2015 seeking to compel counsel to seek experts. 4
Counsel for the Defense has had some difficulty discerning who actually needs to be
consulted and contacted for the State of Florida. On the one hand, The Honorable
William N. Meggs has attended hearings from the Office of the State Attorney.
Likewise, Deputy Chief State Attorney Georgia Cappleman has attended hearings.
Assistant State Attorney Eddie Evan has also been participatory. On the other, the
State of Florida has also included Assistant Attorney General Ms. Emplit, Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Ms. Snurkowski and another attorney whose name eludes
the undersigned. It is unclear to counsel who is "in charge" for the State of Florida.
Be that as it may, defense counsel has remained in relatively consiant contact with
Assistant State Attorney Eddie Evans as well as Deputy State Attorney Georgia
Cappleman about the procedural and factual aspects of the case. There have been no
'Ms. Emplit's motion can potentially be construed as the State's expression of concern that counsel is rendering
ineffective assistance in this proceeding. In the alternative, it can also be construed as the State simply desiring to
be prepared for the hearing that is in September.
341
13. The undersigned has contacted Assistant General Counsel Bradley Bischoff from the
authorization to incur costs insofar as the request is within the statutory parameters.
WHEREFORE, the Defense requests this Court enter an order authorizing the defense
to incur costs for Clyde Taylor up to a maximum of $7,500.00 at a rate of $150.00 per hour.
Respectfully submitted,
R~ ~QUffiE MORRIS,
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 E. Park Avenue.
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111
(850) 792-1113 Facsimile
alex@ramlawyer.com
342
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant General
Attorney's Office, Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL,
and Carine Emplit, carine.emplit@myfloridalegal.com, Capital Appeals Bureau, Office ·of the
Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida32399-1050 on this 29th day of July,
2015.
343
Filing# 30252594 E-Filed 07/2:nL015 04:20:26 PM
~
COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel, pursuant to Rule 3.851(f)(5)(C), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and moves this
. Court to continue the evidentiary hearing presently scheduled in this matter and in support
1. The Defendant is indigent and the undersigned was appointed by the Court to
2. An evi'aentiary hearing is presently set for September 8-9, 2015. The hearing has
been set for several months and all parties have been on adequate notice.
3. The past forty eight (48) hours have presented extraordinary circumstances for the
Defense in this case. The Defense anticipated calling Dr. Harry McClaren as an
expert witness as· well as a factual witness. Dr. McClaren was originally retained by
the Office of the Public Defender to serve as an expert witness when the instant case
was at the trial level. He served as a consultant and conducted a tremendous amount
344
I
of research that included interviews and evaluatioQS of the Defendant as well as
I
i
collateral investigation in order to form an expert opinion. Ultimately, Dr. McClaren
was not utilized as a witness during the penalty phase. It is now argued that this was
a critical error constituting ineffective assistance of counsel because the jury did not
have the benefit of a proper forensic psychological profile of the Defendant during
the penalty phase of the trial that encompassed his complete psycho-social profile as
4. Dr. McClaren was a crucial witness then and now in his ability to testify about the
related to the breakdown in the internal workings of the defense team as well as his
research that went without presentation. Likewise, Dr. McClaren was able to provide
testimony about the defense's ability to anticipatorily diffuse testimony from Dr.
Prichard during the trial. He was also able to render an expert opinion about Dr.
passed away within the last forty eight (48) hours. This has left the Defense in a
somewhat dire situation due to the loss of a crucial witness as well as a hearing date
that is in the near future. In that regard, the undersigned immediately initiated
psychology field. In each instance, none of them were/are able to be available and/or
345
6. The Defense was never been in a rush to seek the appointment of Dr. McClaren as an
expert witness in the instant proceeding. This was primarily due to the fact that Dr.
McClaren was originally involved in the case and had a great deal of familiarity with
the case that did not necessitate "authorization to incur costs" at an earlier point. The
undersigned had prepared a motion seeking the "authorization to incur costs" which
7. It is critical for this Court to understand that the undersigned has/had met with Dr.
presentation in this proceeding. In fact, Dr. McClaren served to identify issues that
counsel would have been unable to identify without his consultation. Pivotally, this is
not a circumstance of the Defense "sitting on their laurels" and using a tragedy as
8. The Defense is now placed in the very difficult situation of: A) the loss of a very
.critical witness, B) the necessity to find a witness who can attempt to adequately
address those issues delegated and assigned the witness who is now deceased, C) the
time associated with allowing an expert to gain adequate familiarity within which to
render an opinion and D) the evidentiary "gymnastics" 1 associated with the testimony
of that witness.
9. Rule 3.851(f)(5)(C), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "The trial
court also may for good cause extend the time for holding au evidentiary hearing up
to 90 days." The rule of procedure is silent as to whether this means it cau happen on
1 The undersigned has begun to contemplate the evidentiary ramifications of the loss of Dr. McClaren as a witness,
but is certain that the full impact has not yet been appreciated. An example wmild be the new witness considering
Dr. McClaren's notes and their independent admissibility as well as the expert's reliance on those notes in
formulating an opinion.
346
one occasion, on one occasion for each party, on repeated occasions for each party,
etc ... The undersigned is mindful of the "Timely Justice Act of 2013" which, in
10. The foregoing is mentioned because an extension of time for ninety (90) days does
not seem to adequately contemplate the devastating circumstance the Defense has
suffered in this instance. Be that as it may, the Defense requests the ninety (90) day
extension as provided in the rule. Should there be a necessity for a further extension
due to the complexity of the case and the challenges associated therewith, the
undersigned will present the matter in writing and call the matter on for hearing.
11. The undersigned has conferred with Deputy State Attorney Georgia Cappleman .and
she does not oppose the relief sought in light of the issues outlined above.
12. While the rule of procedure does not require a verification of counsel, the
undersigned certifies that this Motion is filed in good faith and not solely for the
Procedure.
13. The undersigned would respectfully request that this matter be called on for hearing
to determine if relief is to be granted. In the event relief is granted, it will afford the
parties the opportunity discuss and confirm dates certain. The time window that is
347
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant General
Attorney's Office, Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL,
Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 29th day of July,
2015.
348
Filing# 30253201 E-Filed 07/29/2015 04:24:48 PM
v.
COMES NOW, the Justice Administrative Commission ("JAC"), by and through the
undersigned attorney and files this response to the above-cited motions as follows:
rate of$150 per hour for attorney Clyde Taylor, Jr. as a legal expert. Counsel is also seeking an
order authorizing $15,000.00 at the established rate of$150 per hour for mental health expert Dr.
Terrance Leland.
2. As to the retention of Attorney Taylor as an expert, JAC objects only insofar ass.
27.711(6), F.S., imposes a cap of$15,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses in a capital collateral
case, which includes experts. As of this date, only $439.94 has been paid under that subsection,
however should the Court additionally authorize $15,000.00 for Dr. Leland, the cap may be
exceeded. JAC encourages seeking preauthorization for such expenses as it facilitates payments
3. The Florida Supreme Court has held that in order to authorize expenses over the statutory
cap, the trial court must determine that extraordinary and unusual circumstances exist. See
Page 1
349
McClain v. Atwater, 110 So.3d 892 (Fla. 2013). Inasmuch as the Florida Supreme Court has
established a mechanism for exceeding the statutory cap, there is no need to address the issue of
4. As to the retention of Dr. Leland, JAC objects only insofar ass. 27.711(6), F.S., imposes
a cap of$15,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses in a capital collateral case. As of this date, only
$439.94 has been paid under that subsection, however should the Court authorize $15,000.00 for
Dr. Leland, the cap may be exceeded. The Court will need to determine whether extraordinary
5. If any providers require direct payment, the JAC's procedures require the vendor to
execute the appropriate contract and follow JAC's billing and audit procedures to obtain
payment.
6. Pursuant to the JAC Agreement, any direct payment to a due process vendor is contingent
upon Counsel providing any and all necessary documentation in support of a billing to JAC in an
expeditious fashion. Counsel shall promptly review any billing for direct payment to a due
process vendor for accuracy and completeness and must certify that the work was satisfactorily
performed. In the event JAC issues a deficiency notice regarding any billing, Counsel or the due
process provider shall promptly resolve the deficiency so that JAC can process the billing for
payment. The order should reflect that Counsel must comply with all JAC policies and
procedures in the submission of billings to JAC for direct payment to a due process vendor.
7. JAC does not request to participate in any hearing set on these motions. Should the Court
WHEREFORE, the JAC requests this Court, should it grant the Defendant's motions,
also include in its order the specific due process services authorized, as well as hourly or per unit
Page 2
350
rates and maximum fees approved, and that the provider be paid in accordance with rates, terms
and conditions set forth by Florida Statutes, and the JAC contract, policies and procedures.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been sent by
email and/or U.S. Mail on this 29th day of July, 2015 to:
Respectfully submitted,
Page 3
351
Filing# 30284361 E-Filed 07/2\v/2015 12:37:02 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DIVISION: FELONY
COMES NOW, the Defendant, GARY MICHAEL HILTON, by and through the
undersigned counsel, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of an order quashing any and all
investigative subpoena(s) issued by the State Attorney to members of the Defendant's trial
defense team for interrogation on or about August 10, 2015, and in support thereof, states the
following:
1. In the instant case, Hilton seeks post-conviction relief, pursuant to Rule 3.851, Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure, from his conviction for First Degree Murder.
2. Hilton filed his Motion for Post"Conviction Relief on or about November 26, 2014.
3. An Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief was filed on July 24, 2015.
4. This matter is currently set for an evidentiary hearing on September 8 & 9, 2015.
5. Hilton and the State each filed witness lists on April 23, 2015 and July 14, 2015,
respectively, naming as witnesses certain members of Hilton's trial defense team, to wit:
Nancy Daniels (elected Public Defender for 2nd Judicial Circuit), Andy Thomas
(Assistant Public Defender), Paula Saunders (Assistant Public Defender), Rob Friedman
352
(former Assistant Public Defender), Merribeth Bohanan (former Assistant Public
Defender), Betty Fuentes (former Assistant Public Defender), Steven Been (Assistant
Public Defender), Tracy Record (former Assistant Public Defender), Ines Suber
(Assistant Public Defender), Chris EUrich (investigator for Public Defender), Monica
Jordan (investigator).
6. On or about March 26, 2015, Assistant State Attorney Georgia Cappleman issued
Hilton's trial defense team seeking to compel their presence and responses to the State's
7. The subpoena(s) is/are not issued for purposes of securing witness attendance at a
8. The State has not filed a motion seeking prehearing discovery in this matter, nor has this
9. The subpoena(s) is/are not issued for purposes of deposing witnesses in this matter,
10. The State did not provide notice to the undersigned for any such subpoena(s) for the
11. Hilton is not being investigated by the State to determine whether criminal activity has
occurred or is occurring.
1 Atthe time of this motion, the undersigned is only aware of the subpoena issued to Public
Defender Investigator Chris EUrich. It is believed that additional members of Hilton's trial
defense team have received identical subpoenas; however, the State has faj!ed to provide the
undersigned with notice of any such subpoena(s) being issued.
2
353
II, THE SUBPOENA(S) SHOULD BE QUASHED
Generally, the State Attorney is empowered to issue subpoenas under the court's
authority where: 1) the subpoena is issued pursuant to Rule 3.220, Florida Rules of Criminal
pursuant to the State Attorney's investigative subpoena power codified in § 27.04, Florida
Statutes. Neither circumstance exists in the case at bar. Instead, the State seeks to compel
1) The subpoenas were not issued pursuant to authority under Rule 3.220
Neither the movant nor respondent are entitled to prehearing discovery in proceedings
for post-conviction relief. "In most cases any grounds for post-conviction relief will appear on
the. face of the record. On a motion which sets forth good reason, however, the court may allow
limited discovery in to matters which are relevant and material, and where the discovery is
permitted the court may place limitations on the sources and scope. State v. Lewis, 656 So.2d
1248 at 1250 (Fla. 1994) (citing Davis v. State, 624 So.2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). While
the trial judge's inherent authority, rather than any express authority found in the Rules of
In the instant case, the State has not moved this Court for authority to conduct
prehearing discovery, nor has this Court entered any order authorizing the State to subpoena
354
defense witnesses for deposition, interrogation, or for any reason other than securing the
Section 27.04, Florida Statutes, in relevant part, authorizes the state to use" ... process of
his or her court to summon witnesses from throughout the state to appear before the state
attorney at such convenient places in the state attorney's judicial circuit and at such convenient
· times as may be designated in the summons, to testify before him or her as to any violation
Section 27.04, Florida Statutes, allows the state attorney to issue subpoenas as part of an
ongoing investigation. See Imparato v. Spicola, 238 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970).
·Essentially, the state attorney is a "one-man grand jury", and is the investigatory and accusatory
arm of our judicial system, subject only to limitations imposed by the Constitution, common
law, and statutes for protection of individual rights and to safeguard against possible abuses of
allow the State to obtain the information necessary to determine whether criminal activity has
occurred or is occurring. State v. Investigation, 802 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
The State cannot be required to prove that a crime has occurred before it can issue an
investigative subpoena because the entire purpose of the investigative subpoena is to determine
whether a crime has occurred. !d. See also Doe v. State, 634 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1994) (State has
power to issue investigative subpoenas pursuant to Section 27.04, F.S., because the State has
strong interest in gathering information relevant to an initial inquiry into suspected criminal
activity). Where the state attorney issues an investigative subpoena to a witness pursuant to
355
§27.04, F.S., the subject matter of an interrogation must be confined to violations of the
criminal law. Morgan v. State, 309 So.2d 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (citing Barnes v. State, 58
I
I
j
So.2d 157 (Fla. 1952). The State Attorney does not have authority to subpoena and interrogate
In the instant case, the State is not seeking information to determine whether a crime has
occurred or is occurring. That ship set sail long ago as Hilton has already been investigated,
indicted, tried, and convicted. Instead, the State seeks to use its subpoena power to compel the
B. The information is protected by privilege and rio waiver has been made
Equally troubling is the nature of the information sought by the State via the investigative
subpoena(s) at issue. The State has subpoenaed members of Hilton's legal defense team and
invariably seeks information protected by Hilton's attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine. This information is not subject to disclosure unless or until there is a waiver of such
The undersigned recognizes that this Court, at some point, is likely to find that privilege
has been waived by virtue of Mr. Hilton's assertions in his post-conviction pleadings as well as
through any testimony he provides alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. However, it seems
an untenable position for the Court to make that finding at this point and try to "referee" a
The undersigned does not possess the same insight as this Court as to how the judiciary
routinely handles matters of this nature. It would seem that the Court needs to make a finding of
waiver or that Mr. Hilton needs to provide an affirmative waiver. However, questions or
5
356
discussions posed to former counsel should likely be conducted in an official proceeding (e.g.
deposition) where current counsel can be present and interpose objections if necessary. There
are a number of lines of inquiry that Mr. Hilton's post-conviction pleadings may not waive or
serve to waive. By way of example, Mr. Hilton's trial team may have privileged information
related to the homicides in Georgia and North Carolina. However, a waiver of privilege may not
extend to those areas of inquiry and they could serve to adversely impact Mr. Hilton and/or other
proceedings.
The State is not entitled to inquire about any cormnunications between Hilton and his
lawyers and investigators as those cormnunications were made in connection with the rendition
of legal services and, accordingly, the attorney-client privilege protects disclosure of such
confidential cormnunications. SeeR. Reg. Fla. Bar 3-7.1; § 90.502 Florida Statutes. Hilton has
not waived this privilege and the Court has not made a finding that the privilege has been
waived.
The work-product privilege is designed to protect the work and mental impressions of counsel
under the circumstances and is controlled by Rule 3.220(g}(l), Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure. This privilege protects the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecuting or
defense attorney and/or members of their legal staffs. Hilton has not waived this privilege and
the Court has not made a finding that the privilege has been waived.
357
3) Due Process requires evidentiary hearing on waiver issue
Although the privileges and protections discussed above may be asserted by the
members of Hilton's trial defense team, the privilege is possessed by Hilton. See§ 90.502(2),
Florida Statutes. Whether the privilege exists and, if so, whether is has been waived are
questions of fact that can be determined only after an evidentiary hearing. Rogers v. State, 742
So.2d 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). There would be serious due process issues created by a
procedure through which the client lost the privilege without notice or an opportunity to be
heard. Jd.
The State seeks to compel, by investigative subpoena aud without notice to Hilton, the
requires Hilton be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard before any finding by the
Court that he has waived any such privilege(s). To date, Hilton has not waived any privilege(s),
the State has not provided notice to Hilton of its intent to question his legal team regarding
privileged information, and no evidentiary hearing has been held to determine whether any such
WHEREFORE, the Defendant moves this Honorable Court to enter an order quashing
any and all investigative subpoenas issued by the State to members of Defendant's trial defense
358
RESPECTFULLY~.~~
D,
B~ (.fJJ~
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Carine Emplit,
· carine.emplit @myfloridalegal.com, Capital Appeals Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, PL-
01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 30th day of July, 2015.
359
IN THE CIRCUIT COUI~.T OF THE
SI3CQ.Ntl)UDIC!AL CIRClJ!T, lN
AND. FOR !.EON COUNTY, FLORIDA.
Gary M Iiiltoii,
Defundant(s)
--~-------...!/
TO: ALL AND SINGULAR Tl-IE SHERIFFS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear before· the Honornbk Georgia Capp!eman, Assistant State Attorney of the
Second JudiCial Circuit, by nrrivillg ptomptly O.li the fourth floor SUITE 475 on the 4tlt Floor of the LEON
COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 3Ql SOUTH MONROE STREET, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA, as follows:
and you shall be called to testify in this .case. If you fail to appeal1, contempt of court. You are
subpoei1aed to appear by the foUowing attorney, and unless "-A·.--hl,:. s14br:¢e11q by this attorney orthe Court,
you shall respondto this subpoena as directed,
"'""~'~'"~~mon~••••-;•~k~;+~
360
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
vs.
'2
w
en
COMES NOW the State of Florida and files this response to the defendant's motion to
I. The State will release the witnesses from the subpoena for interviews. See Fanqui v.
State, 965 So.2d 22, 34-35 (Fla. 2007), where in dicta, the Court indicated it agreed that section
27.04, Florida Statutes, "should not be used as a discovery tool to compel defense counsel to
2. The wavier of the attomey client privilege was made by filing the motion. In
addressing a similar claim the Florida Supreme Court set forth when the attorney client privilege
is waived and what post conviction counsel should do if he has an objection to specific areas that
A defendant may not invoke the attorney-client privilege to preclude trial counsel
from testifYing about their conversations when those discussions relate to the
defendant's claims of ineffective assistance. See Turner v. State. 530 So.2d 45, 46
(Fla.I987); see also§ 90.502(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999) ("There is no attorney-client
privilege ... when [a] communication is relevant to an issue of breach of duty by
the lawyer to the client ... arising from the lawyer-client relationship."). Under
In Computer
361
LJ.w
'~-
such circumstances, the attorney-client privilege is also waived as to trial
counsel's files. See Reedv. State, 640 So.2d 1094, 1097 IF!a.l994); accord
LeCrov v. State, 641 So.2d 853 1Fia.l994). Further, the waiver of the
attorney-client privilege occurs "when [the defendant] .file[:~] a motion for
postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel." Reed, 640 So.2d
at I 097 (emphasis added).
16 Thus, we agree with the trial court's ruling that Arbelaez waived his
attorney-client privilege as to trial counsel's files when he filed his motion
claiming that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately
investigate and prepare for trial.1 As explained in Reed, the State "will ordinarily
be entitled to examine the trial attorney's entire file." 640 So.2d at I 097. However,
Arbelaez "may move to exclude from discovery any portion of the file which
contains matters unrelated to the crimes for which [he] was convicted." !d. If such
a motion is filed, then "the court shall conduct an in-camera inspection of that
portion of the file in question to determine whether it should be disclosed." !d.
WHEREFORE based upon the foregoing, the State would request that the Court deny the
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been
furnished to Counsel for the Defendant, Robert A. Morris, The Law f s of bert A. Morris,
LLC, 911 East Park Avenue, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, alex a d
efiling@ramlawyer.com this --i--
day of August, 2015. .
362
Filing# 30603059 E-Filed 08/G, ,2015 II :34:29 AM
C'\
VS.
CASE NO.: 2008 CF 697A
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
Subpoena(s), filed on July 30, 2015, and the Court having considered the State's response and
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the motion be denied as moot. The State has agreed
considered, the Court does feel compelled to make comment on the attorney-client privilege
claim. As to the prior "defense team", as the Defendant puts it, the attorney-client privilege was
waived by the filing of the motion before the cotut attacking the "defense teanl's" competence.
~;·-. ~£~~
Florida.
AMES C. HANKINSON
( ),ircuit Judge
See Service List
363
SERVICE LIST
Carine L. Emplit
,Garine.en.lpliti?ilrnvfloridal~g'iLrom
Georgia Cappleman
$A9.UeonE~Jony@l<:\mg()Lllllyfl.gov
364
Filing# 30701758 E-Filed 08/11!2015 09:23:05 AM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DIVISION: FELONY
GARY M. HILTON,
Defendant.
--------------------~'
NOTICE OF FILING
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through the undersigned attorney and provides this
And/Or Motion to Declare §27. 711, Florida Statutes as Confiscatory and Motion
to Incur Costs for Expert Witness for Forensic Psychologist And/Or Motion to
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
365
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
366
Filing# 30253201 E-Filed 07/29/2015 04:24:48 PM
v.
GARY MICHAEL HILTON, JUDGE: HANKINSON
Defendant.
COMES NOW, the Justice Administrative Commission ("JAC"), by and through the
undersigned attorney and files this response to the above-cited motions as follows: .
rate of$150 per hour for attorney Clyde Taylor, Jr. as a legal expert. Counsel is also seeking an
order authorizing $15,000.00 at the established rate of$! SO per hour for mental health expert Dr.
Terrance Leland.
27.711(6), F.S., imposes a cap of$15,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses in a capital collateral
case, which includes experts. As ofthis date, only $439.94 has been paid under that subsection,
however should the Court additionally authorize $15,000.00 for Dr. Leland, the cap may be
exceeded. JAC encourages seeking preauthorization for such expenses as it facilitates payments
3. The Florida Supreme Court has held that in order to authorize expenses over the statutory
cap, the trial court must determine that extraordinary and unusual circumstances exist. See
Page 1
367
McClain v. Atwater, 110 So .3d 892 (Fla. 2013). Inasmuch as the Florida Supreme Court has
established a mechanism for exceeding the statutory cap, there is no need to address the issue of
4. As to the retention of Dr. Leland, JAC objects only insofar ass. 27.711(6), F.S., imposes
a cap of$15,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses in a capital collateral case. As of this date, only
$439.94 has been paid under that subsection, however should the Court authorize $15,000.00 for
Dr. Leland, the cap may be exceeded. The Court will need to determine whether extraordinary
5. If any providers require direct payment, the JAC's procedures require the vendor to
execute the appropriate contract and follow JAC's billing and audit procedures to obtain
payment.
6. Pursuant to the JAC Agreement, any direct payment to a due process vendor is contingent
upon Counsel providing any and all necessary documentation in support of a billing to JAC in an
expeditious fashion. Counsel shall promptly review any billing for direct payment to a due
process vendor for accuracy and completeness and must certify that the work was satisfactorily
performed. In the event JAC issues a deficiency notice regarding any billing, Counsel or the due
process provider shall promptly resolve the deficiency so that JAC can process the billing for
payment. The order should reflect that Counsel must comply with all JAC policies and
procedures in the submission of billings to JAC for direct payment to a due process vendor.
7. JAC does not request to participate in any hearing set on these motions. Should the Court
WHEREFORE, the JAC requests this Court, should it grant the Defendant's motions,
also include in its order the specific due process services authorized, as well as hourly or per unit
Page2
368
rates and maximum fees approved, and that the provider be paid in accordance with rates, terms
and conditions set forth by Florida Statutes, and the JAC contract, policies and procedures.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been sent by
Respectfully submitted,
Page3
369
Filing# 30898876 E-Filed 08!1 ...,1015 03:39:06 PM
v.
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
------------------~/
ANSWER TO AMENDED MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
On November 25,2014, Hilton, represented by Robert A. Morris, filed a Motion for Post-
Conviction Relief. On January 26, 2015, the State filed its Answer to the Motion for Post-
Conviction Relief. Thereafter, on July 24,2015, Hilton filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Initial
Postconviction Motion and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, attaching his Amended Motion
for Post-Conviction Relief. The Court granted the Motion for Leave to Amend Initial
Postconviction Motion on July 28, 2015. This is the State's Answer to the Amended Motion for
Post-Conviction Relief. This Court should summarily deny all of the claims.
370
Facts and Procedural History of the Case
Hilton was convicted of first-degree murder for which he was sentenced to death. The
facts of this case as recited by the Florida Supreme Court in the direct appeal opinion are:
On February 28, 2008, a Leon County grand jury indicted Gary Michael Hilton
for the first-degree murder of Cheryl Dunlap between December I and December
15, 2007, kidnapping, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and grand theft of currency.
Hilton pleaded not guilty on March 14, 2008. Hilton proceeded to a jury trial
commencing on February 2, 2011.
Cheryl Dunlap, 46, was last seen alive on December I, 2007. That morning,
Dunlap called a friend, Kiana Hill, and made arrangements to have dinner with
her that evening. That afternoon, Dunlap went to Leon Sinks to read, where she
was seen by Michael and Vikki Shirley at approximately I :30 p.m. The Shirleys
described that Dunlap was wearing jeans and a sweater and carrying a hardback
book. Dunlap did not arrive for dinner that evening and was missed at church the
following morning by Tanya Land. Land went to Dunlap's residence and found
her dog, but noticed that her car was missing so she called the police. Steven
Ganey of the Wakulla County Sheriffs Office took the missing person report on
December 3, 2007.
Dunlap's car, a white Toyota Camry, was found on December 3, 2007, on the side
of Crawfordville Highway parked near the woods. The car had deliberate tire
punctures in the sidewall that was later identified as a bayonet piercing. On
December I, the car had received a disabled vehicle ticket from Florida Highway
Patrol Trooper Brian Speigner. Ganey testified that it appeared that someone had
driven into the woods with all four tires intact and punctured the tire after the car
had been parked. Dunlap's purse was recovered in her car, but no money was
found.
Dunlap's Ameris Bank account records revealed that Dunlap cashed a check with
a drive-through teller at II: 17 a.m. on December I. The records further revealed
that three cash withdrawals were made at the ATM at Hancock Bank on West
Tennessee Street on December 2, 3, and 4, 2007, totaling $700. In addition, two
attempted withdrawals were declined because they exceeded the daily limit. The
video from the security camera at the bank showed that the person making the
transactions was wearing a blue and white patterned, long-sleeved shirt, glasses, a
hat, and a make-shift mask made from tape.
371
thigh muscle. Dr. Anthony Clarke, an associate medical examiner, performed the
autopsy. Dr. Clarke opined that Dunlap's head and hands had been removed by
an instrument with a sharp blade and that the dismemberment occurred
postmortem. The cause of death was not able to be determined, but Dr. Clarke
opined that it was likely to have been a violent homicide. Additionally, Dr.
Clarke noted that there was a significant pre-mortem bruise located on Dunlap's
middle to lower back and that the bruise was not consistent with a normal fall
injury. Dr. Clarke estimated that Dunlap's body could have been in the woods for
seven to fifteen days. Dr. Clarke testified that his best estimate was that Dunlap
died between December 5 and December 8, 2007.
Several witnesses testified that they saw or encountered Gary Michael Hilton
during the time period surrounding Dunlap's disappearance. In late November
2007, George Ferguson encountered Hilton on LL Wallace Road. Hilton asked
Ferguson for a jump start because his van, a white Chevrolet Astro, would not
crank. Ferguson testified that it did not appear to him that Hilton actually needed
the assistance. Ethan Davis provided similar testimony, that sometime in late
November 2007, Hilton stopped him and asked for help starting his vehicle. Davis
declined. Shawn Matthews also encountered Hilton in late November near his LL
Wallace Road camp. Hilton appeared to be familiar with the area and told
Matthews about a nearby sinkhole. On December I, 2007, Celeste Hutchins saw
Hilton on Crawfordville Highway, not far from Leon Sinks. Hutchins testified
that Hilton was rummaging through a white Camry on the side of the road. On
December I 0, 2007, Loretta Mayfield spoke to Hilton at a convenience store on
Crawfordville Highway. Mayfield testified that Hilton was wearing a blue and
white patterned shirt. Hilton was also wearing something on his left side that
looked like a large knife holder. Mayfield testified that the shirt she saw Hilton
wearing looked like the one in the ATM security video. On December II, 2007,
Stephen Prosser saw Hilton in the Apalachicola National Forest. On December
12, 2007, Michael Travis saw Hilton in the forest near the Bloxham cutoff and
then saw him again on December 14. On December 18, 2007, Teresa Johnson
saw Hilton in Bristol, Florida, where Hilton told her that she looked like Dunlap
and that it was "too bad" about that girl getting murdered.
Sometime between December 18, 2007, and January I, 2008, Hilton made his
way to Georgia where he kidnapped and murdered Meredith Emerson. Hilton
took Emerson from Blood Mountain and held her for four days before murdering
her. He cooperated with law enforcement in exchange for a life sentence. Hilton
372
was arrested in Georgia after Stephen Shaw saw Hilton walk to the back of a
convenience store in the direction of the store's dumpsters and called law
enforcement. Law enforcement officers recovered items Hilton was seen
discarding in a dumpster at the convenience store. From the dumpster, law
enforcement recovered a U.S. Forestry citation for unauthorized camping, a knife
and sheath, Hi-Tee boots, some chain, a padlock, gloves, a jacket, a folding
police baton, and a blue backpack. Hilton gave Georgia officials information on
where to find his bayonet on a hiking trail on Blood Mountain in North Georgia.
Later, Jeff Foggy, an FDLE tool mark expert, matched the bayonet to the puncture
marks in Dunlap's tire. Georgia law enforcement also gathered items from
Hilton's van. Items recovered from the van included clothing, jackets, gloves,
camping equipment, duffel bags, two sleeping bags, Hi-Tee boots, a camera,
tobacco rolling papers, Hilton's Georgia driver's license, tape, paper towels, maps,
two BB pistols, a book purchased at a Tallahassee book store, and dog food.
On February 12, 2008, Sergeant David Graham and Detective Dawn Dennis with
the Leon County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant on Hilton while he
was in custody in Georgia. Hilton's DNA was collected and the entire execution
of the warrant was recorded. Portions of the recording were played for the jury.
On June 6, 2008, Sergeant Graham and two other officers drove Hilton from
Georgia to Florida. Although Hilton was not questioned, he spoke for nearly the
entire five-hour drive, which was recorded. The State also played portions of this
recording at trial. Hilton stated:
I'm not all bad. I mean, you got to understand, I mean, I'm sure you can see. I
mean, I'm a [expletive] genius, man. I'm not a-I'm not all bad. I just, you know,
lost my mind for a little bit. Lost a grip on myself, man. What can I tell you? FBI
and everybody else is trying to scratch their head, hey, guys don't get started
doing my shit at 61 years old. It just don't happen, you know. Like there's a retired
FBI (indecipherable) named Cliff Van, Clifford Van Zandt, that keeps getting
himself in the news, talking about me. And he said, this guy didn't just fall off the
turnip truck, he said. You know, in other words, he's been doing this. But like I
told you before, you know, when I saw you before, I said, remember, I said I'd
give you one for free. Nothing before September, okay? I mean, I'm not joking,
okay? I just, I got old and sick and couldn't make a living and just lost, flat lost
my [expletive] mind for a while, man. I couldn't get a grip on it.
Additionally, Hilton made statements to a fellow inmate at the Leon County Jail
that were overheard by Correctional Officer Caleb Wynn. Specifically, Hilton
told inmate Summers that he could answer all the State Attorney's questions if he
would give him a life sentence, that he would reveal where the head was located,
that his bayonet was used on Dunlap's tire, that he would explain how he "pulled
it off" on a busy highway, that he spent a few hours or a few days with Dunlap,
and that he felt no regret other than getting caught.
373
The penalty phase began on February 17, 2011, during which the state called Clay
Bridges of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. Agent Bridges testified about
Hilton's prior felony conviction-the murder of Emerson in Georgia to which
Hilton pleaded guilty. The State played Hilton's taped conversation with law
enforcement where he described kidnapping Emerson, holding her captive, and
stripping her body naked to remove DNA and fiber evidence. He also stated that
"you either kill them or you get caught."
Hilton presented four expert witnesses who testified regarding his psychological
condition: Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist and clinical director of the Brain Imaging
Center at the University of California, Irvine; Dr. Charles Golden, a clinical
neuropsychologist performing neuropsychological testing and examinations; Dr.
Abbey Strauss, a psychiatrist with special expertise in psychopharmacology; and
Dr. William Mmion, a board certified psychiatric pharmacist and professor; and
nine lay witnesses. The State then called Dr. Greg Prichard in rebuttal.
On February 21, 2011, the jury recommended unanimously that Gary Hilton be
sentenced to death for the murder of Cheryl Dunlap.
The trial court held the Spencer 1 hearing on April 7, 2011. The State presented
three victim impact witnesses: (I) Ms. Emma Blount, the victim's aunt; (2) Laura
Walker, the victim's best friend; and (3) Gloria Tucker, the victim's cousin. Hilton
presented no witnesses.
The trial court found that the State had proven six aggravators beyond a
reasonable doubt. Assigning weight to each aggravator, the trial court found: (I)
the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony (great weight); (2) the
murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping (great weight); (3) the
murder was committed to avoid arrest (moderate weight); (4) the murder was
committed for pecuniary gain (some weight); (5) the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and (6) the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) (great weight).
The court also considered and weighed each mitigating circumstance proposed by
Hilton and found one statutory mental mitigating factor-at the time of the
murder Hilton was under extreme emotional distress (some weight). Under the
catch-all provision, the trial court considered ten mitigating factors, finding that
Hilton established eight of them and rejecting two. The court found: (I) Hilton
grew up in an abusive household (some weight); (2) Hilton abused drugs,
specifically Ritalin (some weight); (3) Hilton was deprived of a relationship with
his biological father (moderate weight); (4) Hilton is already serving a life
sentence so society is protected (some weight); (5) Hilton served his country in
the U.S. military (very little weight); (6) Hilton suffered maternal deprivation and
lack of bonding between mother and child (some weight); (7) Hilton was removed
1
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
374
from his home and put into foster care when he was a child (some weight); (8)
Hilton grew up in a financially poor family (not proven); (9) Hilton suffered a
traumatic brain injury as a child (some weight); and (I 0) Hilton suffers from
severe mental defects (not proven).
On April 21, 2011, the trial court followed the jury's unanimous recommendation
and sentenced Hilton to death. The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
aggravators outweighed the mitigators.
Hilton v. State, 117 So .3d 742, 746-50 (Fla. 2013) (footnote included).
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Hilton raised six claims: 1) the trial court erred
in admitting his statements to law enforcement as they constituted inadmissible Williams rule
evidence because they were only relevant to show his propensity to commit the crime; 2) the trial
court erred in admitting Dr. Gregory Prichard's testimony during the penalty phase regarding
circumstances; 3) the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Prichard to remain in the courtroom,
despite invocation of the rule of sequestration; 4) the trial court erred in finding that the HAC
and CCP aggravating circumstances applied, as the evidence was insufficient for such a finding;
5) the trial court erred in rejecting the lack of capacity mitigating factor and failed to provide
reasons why there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the rejection of this
mitigating circumstance; and 6) the Florida Supreme Court erred in upholding the death sentence
in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Hilton's
convictions and death sentence. Hilton at 756. The Florida Supreme found the death sentence to
be proportionate. Hilton at 755. The Florida Supreme Court also reviewed the sufficiency of the
evidence. Id. Hilton then filed a motion for rehearing on April2, 2013, which was denied on July
2, 2013.
375
On September 12, 2013, Hilton filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court, raising a Rinfl claim, which was denied on December 2, 2013. Hilton v. State,
On November 25, 2014, Hilton, represented by Robert A. Morris, Esquire, filed a 3.851
Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, raising ten claims (including sub-claims). The State filed its
Answer to the Motion for Post-Conviction Relief on January 26, 2015. Thereafter, on July 24,
2015, Hilton filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Initial Postconviction Motion and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law, attaching his Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief. The Court
granted the Motion for Leave to Amend Initial Postconviction Motion on July 28, 2015. This is
the State's Answer to the Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief. This Court should
2
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
376
Evidentiary Hearings
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim, the movant must allege specific facts.
Davis v. State, 26 So.3d 519, 533 (Fla. 2009) (finding a claim of ineffectiveness to be legally
insufficient because it did not allege specific facts and therefore, the defendant was not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on the claim, citing Jones v. State, 998 So.2d 573, 587-88 (Fla. 2008)).
The defendant "bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid
claim." Hannon v. State, 941 So.2d 1109, 1138 (Fla. 2006); Johnston v. State, 70 So.3d 472, 483
(Fla. 2011) (explaining that where a movant presents only bare conclusory allegations on several
issues, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claims). Furthermore, a trial court
need not conduct an evidentiary hearing on claims that are conclusively rebutted by the existing
record. Pagan v. State, 29 So .3d 938, 955 (Fla. 2009) (explaining, that while the Florida
Supreme Court encourages trial courts to hold evidentiary hearings on post-conviction motions, a
hearing is warranted only where a defendant alleges specific facts, not conclusively rebutted by
the record, which demonstrate a deficiency in counsel's performance that prejudiced the
defendant and stating that summary or conclusory allegations are insufficient); Rhodes v. State,
986 So.2d 501,513-14 (Fla. 2008) (same). Furthennore, some claims are purely a matter of law
that do not require any factual development. Claims that are meritless as a matter of law, because
there is controlling precedent against the claim, should be summarily denied. Mann v. State, 112
So.3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 20 13) (stating "because Mann raised purely legal claims that have been
previously rejected by this Court, the circuit court properly summarily denied relief').
377
Post-Conviction Relief
performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984). To demonstrate
deficient performance, the defendant must show that "counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." !d. at 687. To demonstrate prejudice he must establish "that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective.
Lukehart v. State, 70 So.3d 503, 512 (Fla. 2011); Strickland at 689. A fair assessment of an
attorney's performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Lukehart at 512; Strickland at 689. Judicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. !d. "Strategic decisions do not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and
rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct."
Lukehart at 512. An attorney can almost always be second-guessed for not doing more but that is
not the standard. Pagan v. State, 29 So.3d 938, 949 (Fla. 2009). "[A] court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy."' Strickland at 689.
The strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable is even stronger when
trial counsel is experienced. See Cummings v. Sec'y, Fla. Dept. of Carr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356
378
(ll'h Cir. 2009) (citing Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1316 (ll'h Cir. 2000) (en
bane). In the Eleventh Circuit's words, "experience is due some respect." Chandler at 1316.
Prejudice means that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland at 694.
is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding." !d. at 693. This second prong does not require proof that "counsel's
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the case." Gaskin v. State, 822
So.2d 1243, 1257, n.3 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052) Instead,
it requires a showing that, in light of all the evidence surrounding his conviction, the conduct
renders the results of the proceeding unreliable. !d. at 1247; see also Strickland at 694.
10
379
I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN PRESENTING A "DEFENSE" OF
INNOCENCE AND/OR REASONABLE DOUBT DURING THE GUILT PHASE
AND THEN MAKING A CONCILATORY ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF LIFE
DURING THE PENALTY PHASE, AND DEFENDANT WAS NEVER
CONSULTED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A DEFENSE
Hilton asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel for presenting a defense of innocence
and/or reasonable doubt during the guilt phase and then arguing in favor of a life sentence during
the penalty phase, essentially arguing that trial counsel presented inconsistent theories, and
furthermore, failed to consult with Hilton before presenting this defense. First, Hilton was
represented by a team comprised ofthree Assistant Public Defenders with extensive experience:
Maria Ines Suber, RobertS. Friedman, and Paula Saunders. Ms. Suber, lead counsel, has been a
member of the Florida Bar since 1986; Mr. Friedman has been a member since 1985; and Ms.
Saunders has been a member since 1980; all three have prior capital trial experience. Second,
trial counsel did not allude to, argue, or put on testimony or evidence in an attempt to establish
that Hilton was innocent, but merely attempted to prove reasonable doubt in the State's case- a
reasonable trial strategy. (T Vol. 24, p 47-55 & Vol. 37 p 1529-1560) In fact, attorneys
commonly have their clients enter pleas of not guilty, proceed to trial, and later, plea for mercy
during the penalty phase. Third, it is the State's position that it was trial counsel's deliberate
strategy to proceed through the guilt phase, requiring the State to present admissible evidence
establishing the essential elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury,
before proceeding to the penalty phase. There was nothing inconsistent between what was
"Because advocacy is an art and not a science, and because the adversary system requires
11
380
strategic decisions of trial counsel should not be second-guessed by a reviewing court. !d. at 689-
91. "Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current counsel disagrees with trial
counsel's strategic decisions." Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1047 (Fla. 2000).
As stated previously in this Answer, a trial court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing
on claims that are conclusively rebutted by the existing record. See Pagan, 29 So3d at 955.
Because the record rebuts the allegation that trial counsel argued innocence at trial before
conceding guilt and seeking a recommendation for a life sentence at the penalty phase, this claim
should be denied.
Furthermore, Hilton has failed to establish that had he entered a plea instead of
proceeding to trial, there is a reasonable probability he would have received a different sentence
and thus, his claim fails the prejudice prong of Strickland. A plea of guilty would have resulted
in the same conviction he received from the jury. The only plausible difference in outcome
would have been the timing of the State's presentation of its evidence; the State would have
presented its evidence of Cheryl Dunlap's brutal kidnapping and murder at the penalty phase
instead of the guilt phase (and this would have been to Hilton's detriment as the evidence would
have been fresh in the jurors' minds prior to deliberating). Nonetheless, the jury would have been
presented with and considered evidence regarding the manner in which Ms. Dunlap was
This claim should be summarily denied because Hilton has failed to prove his allegations
12
381
II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN THEIR FAILURE TO ADVISE
DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO ENTER A GUILTY PLEA AND PROCEED
DIRECTLY TO A PENALTY PHASE
Hilton finds fault in trial counsel's alleged failure to advise him of his right to enter a
guilty plea and proceed directly to a penalty phase. Hilton, however, has failed to cite any
authority holding that trial counsel must do this. Due to the depravity of this case, the State chose
not to make any plea offers. Thus, trial counsel was left with the decision to advise their client of
entering a plea to the court or proceeding to trial. Proceeding to trial is a tactical decision for the
defendant and his counsel, in which many variables come into play. Since it is the State's burden
to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense presumably strategically planned for the
possible best-case scenario outcomes involving the State failing to meet its burden; for one or
more of its witnesses to fail to appear and testify at trial; for the State to fail to prove an element
of the offenses charged; for jury nullification; or for a conviction on a lesser-included offense.
Hilton had nothing to lose by proceeding to trial. A plea would have resulted in the outcome
Capital case defense counsel should be aware that there is usually some value in
putting on a reasonable doubt defense even in cases where overwhelming
evidence of guilt exists. Depending on the tone of the defense, and the role
defendant plays in it, this value will not be outweighed by the possibility of
adverse sentencer reaction. The first benefit of a reasonable doubt defense in an
overwhelming evidence case is that the evidence of defendant's capital crimes,
and possibly even factors in aggravation, will come out during the guilt phase.
The rendition of a guilty verdict psychologically concludes that stage, and, at the
penalty phase, it is not likely that the prosecution will repeat its testimonial
parade. Instead, the state will probably rely on the record evidence. Although this
can still be damaging to defendant's life case, such recalled evidence tends to lose
its vividness, particularly when contrasted with penalty phase testimony favorable
13
382
to the convicted defendant. Thus going through a guilt phase trial helps to
segregate and distance from the sentencer the prosecution's strongest case against
the defendant. Were defendant simply to admit guilt and go straight to the penalty
phase trial, the prosecution at that time would undoubtedly present much of what
it otherwise would have presented during the guilt phase.
Second, it may be possible in the course of the guilt phase trial to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses in a manner calculated to show that the defendant has
positive sides or features. For example, defense counsel might elicit from a
detective or prison official that the defendant was cooperative or remorseful or
had been a model prisoner. While such questioning is insufficient to defeat the
prosecution's guilt phase case, it lays a foundation for the presentation of
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.
Third, putting the prosecution to its guilt phase proof also lengthens the trial and
permits the sentencer to observe the defendant and become better acquainted with
her. Depending on defendant's general demeanor and reaction to trial events, this
may dispose the sentencer in the defendant's favor.
Finally, a reasonable doubt defense does not preclude the defendant from taking
the stand, admitting the offenses, and expressing contrition or remorse. The
decision whether the defendant should testify can: be made after the quality and
strength of the prosecution's case has been assessed. Should the prosecution's case
unexpectedly turn out to be weaker than anticipated, the defendant would have the
option of remaining silent and allowing the case to go to the jury on the issue of
reasonable doubt. If, however, the case for guilt is strong, an appropriate
admission of guilt, coupled perhaps with expressions of remorse, might have a
favorable influence on the sentencer at the penalty phase.
For the reasons enumerated above, reasonable doubt defenses are not necessarily
inconsistent with the presentation of a mitigating case at the penalty phase and
may not suffer from the penalty phase advocacy limitations of denial defenses
such as alibi or mistaken identity.
Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
Hilton argues that subjecting the jury to hearing about the gruesome and violent nature of
the murder again at the penalty phase prejudiced him. The State provided one witness in rebuttal:
14
383
Dr. Pritchard. He testified about his diagnosis of Hilton and how he arrived at that diagnosis. (T
Vol. 41, p 575) Specifically, he referred to testimony defense witnesses presented, such as
Hilton's abusive childhood (T Vol. 41, p 583), his childhood head injury (T Vol. 41, p 583), the
shooting of his step-father (T Vol. 41, p 584), his discharge from the military (T Vol. 41, p 585),
his prior marriages (T Vol. 41, p 589), his prior arrests (T Vol. 41, p 591)- none of these were
issues presented at trial. He did discuss defendant's statements regarding both the Florida and
Georgia murders, but that was in explaining how he reached his diagnosis, in rebuttal to the four
mental health witnesses presented by the defense, and in detailing why he felt Hilton appreciated
the criminality of his actions. (T Vol. 41, p 592-602) Specifically, Dr. Pritchard discussed how
Hilton described his actions as "hunting" (T Vol. 41, p 592) and the self-serving reason why
Hilton offered information about the location of Meredith's body in Georgia, that is, to obtain a
life sentence. (T Vol. 41, p 595) He also detailed why he believed Hilton dismembered the
bodies, removed the victim's clothing and poured bleach on Meredith's body - to cover the
murders up. (T Vol. 41, p 600) Dr. Pritchard was simply rebutting testimony presented by the
defense during the penalty phase. The jury was not twice submitted to gruesome photos or the
horrific details of what the victims endured while held captive by the defendant.
Even if some of Dr. Pritchard's testimony reiterated the repugnant nature of Hilton's
actions, it is the State's position that his actions alone resulted in a recommendation of death, not
a recitation of the fact that the two victim's bodies were dismembered.
More importantly, Hilton knew of his right to plea from his case in Georgia. In that case,
for the killing of Meredith Emerson, he chose to enter a plea in exchange for a life sentence on
January 31, 2008. (T Vol. 38, p 48) He entered this plea shortly before being returned to Florida
15
384
to face the charges in the instant case. There is no doubt, based on his plea to the case in Georgia
that he was aware of his ability to enter a plea instead of proceeding to trial.
And, again, Hilton is unable to show prejudice. The end-result would have been the same
This claim should be summarily denied because Hilton has failed to prove his allegations of
Hilton submits that lead trial counsel in this case expressed an inability to properly represent
him due to over-extension and an overwhelming caseload. However, this vague allegation does
not comport with the test announced in Strickland. The Florida Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Dennis v. State, 109 So.3d 680, 691 (Fla. 2012) when it affirmed the trial court's
summary denial of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Dennis argued that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to secure a second chair and for representing other clients while
representing him. The Court found the claim to be facially insufficient as Dennis failed to
include any allegations regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland. Dennis generally claimed
that trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for his trial, but he did not include any allegation
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to secure a second chair
and his failure to represent only Dennis, the result of Dennis' trial would have been different or
16
385
Vague and conclusory allegations, lacking specificity, are insufficient to warrant relief.
Doorbal v. State, 983 So.2d 464, 482-85 (Fla. 2008). In Doorbal, the trial court summarily
denied his claims without an evidentiary hearing because Doorbal had failed to allege a specific
omission or overt act upon which his ineffective assistance claim was based. An example
addressed by the Supreme Court was Doorbal's claim that the death of trial counsel's father
immediately prior to trial, as well as the illness of his mother, interfered with his representation
of Doorbal and resulted in ineffective assistance. Doorbal' s claim is not unlike the conclusory
allegation Hilton presents when he alleges that trial counsel was unable to adequately represent
him because of over-extension and an overwhelming caseload. See also Foster v. State, 132
So.3d 40, 62 (Fla. 2014) (reiterating its prior holdings that "mere conclusory allegations are
insufficient" to warrant evidentiary hearing and are proper for summary denial); Ragsdale v.
State, 720 So.2d 203, 208 (Fla. 1998) (finding that trial judge properly denied evidentiary
hearing where defendant provided insufficient facts as to "how the outcome would have been
different had counsel acted otherwise"); Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989)
meritorious, a defendant must establish two components under Strickland; Stephens, 748 So.2d
I 028, I 033 (Fla. 2000). First, a defendant must establish conduct on the part of counsel that is
outside the broad range of competent performance under prevailing professional standards.
Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912, 913 (Fla.1989). Second, the deficiency in counsel's
performance must be shown to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings
that confidence in the outcome is undermined. !d.; see also Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216,
219 (Fla.l998) ("[T]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
17
386
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
Ineffectiveness under Strickland requires more than just a showing that trial counsel was
overworked. Hilton must demonstrate with specificity "that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland at 687. Even if a defendant meets that threshold, he or she must also
prove that such an error prejudiced the defense. Id Hilton has not demonstrated how this
Counsel has neglected to enunciate the conduct on the part of lead counsel that was
outside the broad range of competent performance under prevailing professional standards and
has failed to show that the deficiency so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings
that confidence in the outcome is undermined. A mere blanket statement that an overwhelming
While addressing Dom·bal's amended motion for post-conviction relief, which did not
seek to introduce new claims, but rather, supplemented existing claims with additional facts, the
Florida Supreme Court reiterated its prior holding that '[a] defendant may not raise claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel on a piecemeal basis by refining his or her claims to include
additional factual allegations after the postconviction court concludes that no evidentiary hearing
is required." Doorbal, 983 So.2d at 385, quoting Vining v. State, 827 So.2d 201,212 (Fla. 2002),
Doorbal, 983 So.2d at 385 (concluding that trial court did not err in denying rehearing "for the
first time made factual allegations relating to his claim that counsel was ineffective in
investigating and presenting mental health mitigating evidence.") The Doorbal Court concluded
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387
that his amended motion "contain[ed] the type ofpost-Huffhearing 'piecemeal' supplementation
Furthermore, the record reflects that there were nearly thirty-six months between the
filing of the complaint (February 28, 2008) and start of jury selection (January 31, 2011).
During that time, Hilton sought and received a number of continuances. 3 This was ample time,
for three attorneys assigned to Hilton's case, to prepare the case for trial, even in light of a heavy
case load. The defense deposed hundreds of witnesses listed by the State. Lead counsel inspected
over one thousand pieces of evidence. The record conclusively rebuts this allegation. See Roberts
v. State, 568 So.2d 1255, 1259 (defendant must allege specific facts that are not conclusively
assistance).
an evidentiary hearing, and because Hilton has failed to prove his allegations of deficient
performance by trial counsel, as well as prejudice, this claim should be summarily denied
Hilton has failed to establish that conduct on the part of counsel that is outside the broad
range of competent performance under prevailing professional standards was taken and that the
3
In addition to the continuances granted pre~trial, Hilton's lead attorney requested a continuance on the morning
jury selection was scheduled to begin. The basis for her continuance was that she needed additional time to discuss
the case and evidence with Hilton. The trial court denied this request, finding that counsel had four more days to
have these discussions with Hilton. (T. Vol. 17, p 7-8) Counsel did not seek a continuance because she was not
prepared, had not concluded discovery, had not met with or deposed witnesses, had not reviewed the evidence, or
had not filed the necessary pleadings, etc. Furthermore, the trial docket is riddled with numerous motions filed by
trial counsel as well as hearings having been held on same. The evidence shows that Hilton's case had been
adequately prepared and litigated pre-trial.
19
388
deficiency in counsel's performance so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings
that confidence in the outcome is undermined. If in fact, the trial team was reassigned to different
roles in the trial, the trial still proceeded, witnesses were still examined and cross-examined,
evidence was still admitted. The trial team consisted of three senior attorneys with a plethora of
experience. Surely, they could adapt to a change in roles, especially in light of the fact that they
Again, the State submits that a mere conclusory allegation of ineffective assistance is
insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912, 913 (Fla.1989).
Not only has counsel made a broad allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on
re-shuffling of the trial team's roles within days of trial, he has failed to demonstrate how Hilton
Hilton argues that trial counsel failed to utilize crucial mitigation during the penalty
phase that had been developed by the mitigation expert. The record shows otherwise.
First, Hilton takes issue with a Power Point presentation of his life. Trial counsel intended
to use and attempted to publish to the jury the mitigation expert's Power Point presentation of
Hilton's life. However, the trial court sustained several of the State's objections to the slides
contained within the presentation as attempting to elicit sympathy from the jury, irrelevant, or
prejudicial. (T Vol. 40, p 354-377) It would have been extremely difficult to modify the
presentation, removing most of the slides, minutes before it was expected to be presented to the
jury. It also would not have carried the weight it had initially because most of the slides would
20
389
have been removed. As such, trial counsel opted not to present the presentation, stating "we can't
present this in a fragmented and disjointed manner." (T Vol. 40, p 375) The bottom line is that
the presentation contained numerous slides which the trial court properly ruled were
inadmissible. This was not a matter of trial counsel simply deciding not to present it. (T Vol. 40,
p 354-377) Rather, the mitigation expert, who apparently is not well-versed in evidentiary
matters, prepared a presentation which was objectionable on several grounds and thus,
inadmissible.
Second, Hilton alleges that the mitigation expert developed a chronological history of his
medical and mental health history, as well as an extensive list of witnesses. Hilton's medical and
mental history was testified to by a number of witnesses presented by the defense. At least two
interviews conducted by the mitigation specialist, Betty Fuentes, were admitted into evidence
and published to the jury; the first was an interview she conducted of Thomas L. Perchoux (T
Vol. 40, p 390) and the second was of Jin Hee Lee. (T Vol. 41, p 554) A third interview, that of
Officer Steve King of the Duluth City Police Department, was likely conducted by her (as the
witness refers to a "ma'am" in answering the interviewer's question), however the interviewer
did not specifically identify herself on the recording. (T Vol. 41, p 530)
In footnote 7, Hilton indicates that the mitigation expert's medical history of Hilton
included evidence that a former doctor of Hilton's "believed that the Defendant had 'relapsing
remitting Multiple Sclerosis' and the doctor wrote a note to a federal court seeking to excuse him
from jury duty opining that the Defendant had a 'form of Multiple Sclerosis.'" (Motion p 16)
First, this footnote does not indicate that Hilton was actually diagnosed with Multiple
Sclerosis, only that the doctor "believed" he had "relapsing remitting Multiple Sclerosis."
Second, this is a belief from the same doctor who incorrectly prescribed Ritalin and Effexor to
21
390
Hilton which resulted in the doctor's disciplinary action by the Georgia State Board of Medical
Examiners and which was argued, to the jury, to have caused Hilton's mental decline and his
subsequent actions in committing the murders of Cheryl Dunlap and Meredith Emerson. Third, it
does not indicate how this evidence was to be introduced. Was the doctor going to be called or
was this more hearsay in the form of unauthenticated records, which would have presumably
been objected to, like most of the PowerPoint slides? Fourth, it would have been foolish to admit
this evidence when two other doctors presented by Hilton's defense testified that he did not have
Multiple Sclerosis and actually self-diagnosed the condition. It was simply good trial strategy in
opting not to present conflicting evidence or testimony, indicating that Hilton did have Multiple
Sclerosis. That evidence or testimony would have effectively diluted the credibility of the other
two doctors, who opined that Hilton did not have Multiple Sclerosis, and further that he suffered
Hilton boldly concludes that trial counsel felt hopeless at the conclusion at the guilt
phase and this hopelessness affected their ability to properly represent Hilton at the penalty
phase. Other than this statement, there is nothing in the record that indicates that such a sense of
hopelessness distorted counsel's professional judgment. Their strategy was well within the range
of professionally reasonable judgments. They presented several witnesses and evidence, which
resulted in the trial court finding one statutory mental mitigating factor and that Hilton had
established eight of the ten mitigating factors he presented under the catch-all provision. Hilton
at 749-50. Simply stated, trial counsel put on what evidence they could in Hilton's defense with
Counsel is not ineffective for strategic decisions that, in hindsight, did not work to the
defendant's advantage. Mansfield v. State, 911 So.2d 1160, 1174 (Fla. 2005). Furthermore,
22
391
"strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have
been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of
professional conduct." Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000). See also Brown v.
State, 894 So.2d 137, 147 (Fla.2004); Howell v. State, 877 So.2d 697,703 (Fla. 2004).
given great weight; the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping - given great
weight; the murder was committed to avoid arrest - given moderate weight; the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) - given great weight; and the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) - given great weight) were so overwhelming that no
substantial prejudice resulted from the absence, at the penalty phase, of the mystery evidence the
The allegation that trial counsel failed to present a 'wealth of information' in mitigation is
vague and conclusory. Aside from mention of the PowerPoint presentation, no other piece of
evidence or witness has been specifically identified. Consequently, this claim should be
summarily denied. See Dennis v. State, 109 So.3d 680, 691 (Fla. 2012); Doorbal v. State, 983
Hilton, in a conclusory fashion, lacking detail, avers that counsel was ineffective for
failing to preserve overruled cause challenges to prospective jurors. He fails to set forth which
jurors who remained on his jury were biased, a showing required by the Florida Supreme Court's
Carratelli opinion. Because he has not and cannot comply with the requirements set forth in
Carratelli, and because this claim has been insufficiently pled, it should be summarily denied.
23
392
Carratelli v. State, 961 So.2d 312 (Fla. 2007) is the seminal case for the test to be applied
for this type of claim. In Carratelli, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that to show
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise and preserve a denial of a challenge for
cause, the defendant must show that an actually biased juror sat on the jury. The court went on to
define an actually biased juror as one who is not impartial; one who is biased against the
defendant. 4 The Court concluded that evidence of actual bias must also be plain on the face of
the record. Carratelli v. State, 961 So.2d at 324. In reality, this means that an evidentiary hearing
is often not required on this type of claim. Unless the actual bias of a juror is apparent on the face
of the record, there is no need to explore, at an evidentiary hearing, whether counsel failed to
exercise a challenge against a juror who actually sat on the defendant's jury as a matter of
reasonable trial tactics. In this case, counsel did raise cause challenges to nearly all potential
jurors; a number were properly denied, and several were granted, some with and some without
Hilton has neglected to allege that any of the jurors who participated in the deliberations
were actually biased and furthermore, has failed to demonstrate how that bias is evident from the
record.
It necessarily follows that if Hilton cannot identify specific jurors who were in fact
biased, he cannot identify the prejudice he suffered as a result of their remaining on the jury. Had
counsel properly preserved the overruled cause challenges, Hilton would be facing the same
4
A juror is competent if he or she "can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the
evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court." Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041
(Fla. 1984); see also Guardado v. State, -- So.3d -- (Fla. 20 15) (same). Therefore, actual bias means bias-in-fact that
would prevent service as an impartial juror.
5
The State is unable to respond effectively to this sub-claim because Hilton has failed to identifY which challenges
for cause should have been preserved for appellate review.
24
393
problem he faces today. He still cannot identify bias from the face of the record. Consequently,
Additionally, trial counsel, Ms. Suber, did exactly what Hilton complains she did not. In
keeping with Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1990), during jury selection and after her
request for additional peremptory challenges was denied, Suber laid a record concerning a juror
she would have liked to have exercised a peremptory challenge against by stating, "I am required
to state whoever, pursuant to- I would like to keep, the record reflect that if I were to be granted
peremptory, I would strike Rice, Sally, Rice, because of her views on the death penalty." (T. Vol.
23, p I 077). Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to do something that she, in fact,
did. Bates v. State, 3 So.3d 1091, 1106, n.20 (Fla. 2009) (observing that counsel cannot be held
ineffective for what counsel actually did); Stephens v. State, 975 So.2d 405, 415 (Fla. 2007)
(explaining that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object, when, in fact, he did.)
Lastly, this claim has been insufficiently pled. Hilton has simply alleged that trial counsel
was ineffective because cause challenges were not preserved. He does not identify which cause
challenges should have been preserved; nor he does identify which jurors who remained on his
hearing on a claim, the movant must allege specific facts. Davis v. State, 26 So.3d 519, 533 (Fla.
2009) (finding a claim of ineffectiveness to be legally insufficient because it did not allege
specific facts and therefore, the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim,
citing Jones v. State, 998 So.2d 573, 587-88 (Fla. 2008)). The defendant "bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim." Hannon v. State, 941 So.2d
1109, 1138 (Fla. 2006); Johnston v. State, 70 So.3d 472,483 (Fla. 2011) (explaining that where a
25
394
movant presents only bare conclusory allegations on several issues, he was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on the claims). For these reasons, this claim should be summarily denied.
Hilton asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of his
former employer, Mr. Tabor, and his former physician, Dr. Deicher. Counsel was not ineffective
because the testimony, at the guilt phase would have been inadmissible; because the testimony,
at the penalty phase, would have been cumulative to other testimony and evidence that had been
presented to prove the facts these witnesses would have otherwise testified to; counsel made the
reasonable strategic decision not to present Tabor and Dr. Deicher, who could have been more
harmful than beneficial to Hilton's case; and Hilton has failed to demonstrate the prejudice he
suffered as a result of these witnesses not being called. Thus, counsel was not ineffective and this
While acknowledging that his defense did not involve insanity or involuntary
intoxication, Hilton's Amended Motion alleges that this testimony should have been presented to
suggest to the jury, during both phases of the trial, that he should not be held responsible for the
complete culpability of his actions due to Dr. Deicher's actions in prescribing Hilton various
medications. (Amd Motion p 20). This type of evidence of would have been inadmissible during
the guilt phase as evidence bordering on diminished capacity, a defense not recognized in
Florida. The Florida Supreme Court has previously held that defense counsel is not ineffective
for failing to present the defense of diminished capacity because diminished capacity is not a
viable defense in Florida. See Chestnut v. State, 538 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1989) (holding that
diminished capacity is not a viable defense); see also Hodges v. State, 885 So.2d 338, 352 n. 8
26
395
(Fla. 2004) ("This Court has held on numerous occasions that evidence of an abnonnal mental
condition not constituting legal insanity is inadmissible to negate specific intent."); Spencer v.
State, 842 So.2d 52, 63 (Fla. 2003) (holding that evidence of defendant's disassociative state
At the penalty phase, defense expert, Dr. Strauss was specifically asked about reviewing
Mr. Tabor's deposition. He told the jury that he had in fact reviewed the deposition transcript,
and that Tabor indicated that he noticed a recent change in Hilton's behavior, especially from the
use of Ritalin. He referred to Tabor's statement that Hilton had manic symptoms, sometimes
speaking so quickly that it was hard to understand him. He relayed Tabor's observations of
Hilton becoming more disagreeable or difficult to speak to. Dr. Strauss told the jury that Tabor
described Hilton's behavior as "bizarre." (T. Vol. 40, p 327-29) Dr. Strauss testified that Tabor
had previously explained that Hilton had become hostile, threatening, and demanded money
from him. The defense also presented uncontroverted evidence that Hilton had been incorrectly
prescribed Ritalin and Effexor, and that those prescriptions could have led to his mental decline,
through expert testimony from Dr. Wu (T. Vol38, p 135), Dr. Strauss (T. Vol. 39, p 240) and Dr.
Morton (T. Vol. 40. p 337). Finally, the defense admitted records from the Georgia State Board
of Medical Examiners, reflecting Dr. Deicher's disciplinary action for the improperly prescribed
medications to Hilton. (T. Vol. 38 p 87-95). During his cross-examination of the State's expert,
Dr. Prichard, trial counsel successfully elicited similar testimony concerning Dr. Deicher's
improper prescription of Ritalin and Effexor and the effect others noticed it had on Hilton, as
well as Tabor's observations. (T. Vol. 42, p 656-63) Thus, evidence of Tabor's views were
27
396
It is well-established that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to provide
cumulative evidence. Gudinas v. State, 816 So.2d 1095, 1108 (Fla. 2002); see also Card v. State,
497 So.2d 1169, 1177 (Fla. 1986) ("We refuse to render counsel ineffective for failing to proffer
testimony that would have been entirely cumulative."); Kilgore v. State, 55 So.3d 487, 504 (Fla.
2010) (same). Since this was un-rebutted evidence, there was no need to present additional
testimony proving this matter. Certainly, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
present cumulative evidence proving the same point. Thus, this claim should be denied.
were available to testify at trial. Presumably, this is why the defense presented the evidence
through expert testimony and not from the witnesses themselves. 6 Collateral counsel has not
demonstrated that the witnesses were actually available at the time of trial. "A defendant cannot
establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to call a witness who is
unavailable." White v. State, 964 So.2d 1278, 1286 (Fla.2007); see also Evans v. State, 995 So.2d
933, 943 (Fla. 2008) (finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call an
unavailable witness at trial where reasonable efforts were made to find the witness).
Furthermore, "[ c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current counsel
disagrees with trial counsel's strategic decisions." Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1047 (Fla.
2000). Counsel's strategic decisions will not be second-guessed on collateral attack. Johnson v.
State, 769 So.2d 990 (Fla. 2000); see Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1993). Here, it was
more beneficial to the defense to present information obtained from Hilton's fonner employer,
Tabor, who feared Hilton, through an expert witness. First, such a presentation limited the State's
ability to cross-examine the witness. Second, it required less pre-trial preparation. And, third, the
6
Testimony was elicited from Dr. Prichard indicating that Tabor was "very frightened of Mr. Hilton. 1' One may
infer that he may have been an uncooperative witness for the defense. (T. Vol. 42, p 664)
28
397
defense could have the expert testify to only those pieces of evidence which would benefit their
Finally, Hilton has failed to demonstrate the prejudice he suffered as a result of counsel
not having presented the testimony of Tabor and Dr. Deicher. Certainly, based on the weight of
evidence against Hilton, the outcome of both the guilt and penalty phases would not be any
different had these witnesses testified, especially since their testimony would have been
Thus, for the reasons argued above, this claim should be summarily denied.
Hilton argues that counsel should have objected to Dr. Wu's testimony, during cross-
examination, concerning a movie entitled, "Deadly Run." He submits that failure to object
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. To the contrary, counsel was not ineffective and any
objection raised would have been overruled since the line of questioning was completely proper
concerning the movie, "Deadly Run" as Dr. Wu had testified about it during direct examination.
Specifically, he stated,
... [Hilton] started to become more paranoid about his employer, started to
become more demanding. And his employer noted that he wouldn't stop talking
and that when the employer tried to get a word in edgewise, he would shout over
him if he tried to respond. And the employer noted that he just became more and
more bizarre. And the employer noted that he started to become delusional, that
he said was involved in making a movie called Deadly Run.
29
398
(T. Vol. 38, p 128) (emphasis added) "It is too well settled to need citation of authority that a fair
and full cross-examination of a witness upon the subjects opened by the direct examination is an
absolute right, as distinguished from a privilege ...." Coco v. State, 62 So.2d 892, 894 (Fla.
1953) (en bane). "[C]ross-examination is not confined to the identical details testified to in chief,
but extends to its entire subject matter, and to all matters that may modify, supplement,
contradict, rebut or make clearer the facts testified to in chief.... " Boyd v. State, 910 So.2d 167,
185 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Coco. 62 So.2d at 895). "A prosecutor can use cross-examination to
delve further into issues raised during the direct examination and to impeach a witness's
credibility." See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1982). Because Dr. Wu testified
about the movie, "Deadly Run," during his direct examination, it was completely proper for the
State to inquire further during its cross-examination. Any objection to this line of questioning
during cross-examination would have been meritless and overruled. Thus, counsel cannot be said
to have been ineffective for failing to object. An attorney is not ineffective for failing to raise or
preserve a meritless issue. Ladd v. Jones. 864 F.2d 108, 109-10 (lith Cir.); United States v.
Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (lith Cir. 1992) ("a lawyer's failure to preserve a meritless issue
plainly cannot prejudice a client"); Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (I ith Cir. 2001)
(finding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue). Counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise an objection to cross-examination which was perfectly lega1. 7
Some claims are purely a matter of law that do not require any factual development.
Claims that are meritless as a matter of law, because there is controlling precedent against the
claim, should be summarily denied. Mann v. State, 112 So.3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2013) (stating
7
Further. it should be noted that Dr. Prichard, during his direct examination, addressed the movie, after which
counsel immediately raised an objection, which was overruled by this Court. (T. Vol. 41, pg. 592). Counsel cannot
be deemed ineffective for doing exactly what the defendant claims he did not. Bates v. State, 3 So.3d 1091, 1106,
n.zo (Fla. 2009)
30
399
"because Mann raised purely legal claims that have been previously rejected by this Court, the
circuit court properly summarily denied relief.") Here, the record clearly reflects that Dr. Wu
testified about the movie, "Deadly Run" during his direct examination, thus opening the door to
subsequent cross-examination on that matter, as well as testimony from other experts and
Hilton cannot demonstrate the requisite prejudice. The amount of evidence presented by
the State at the penalty phase was overwhelming. The outcome of his penalty phase, that is, the
sentence of death, would not have been any different without reference to the movie, in light of
In sum, counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to cross-examination of Dr. Wu on
matters concerning the movie, "Deadly Run" because any objection would have been meritless
since he had testified about the very same issue during his direct examination, and such an
objection would have been overruled. This claim should be summarily denied.
Hilton avers that it was improper for Dr. Prichard to testify to his prior bad acts,
specifically alleged sexual misconduct involving his former wife's two underage children, and
submits that that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to it. 8 The record clearly rebuts
this allegation; trial counsel did, in fact, object to this testimony, citing "collateral damage" as
the basis for his objection, which was overruled by this Court. (T. Vol. 41, p 589-90) This Court
8
Interestingly, collateral counsel complains that Dr. Prichard's testimony was "reliant upon hearsay upon hearsay"
which is akin to the testimony provided by defense experts, Drs. Wu and Strauss, who told the jury about Mr.
Tabor's prior testimony that they gathered from reviewing a prior interview conducted by Georgia authorities, as
well as a prior deposition.
31
400
properly found the evidence of Hilton's prior bad acts, which occurred prior to his ingestion of
Ritalin, admissible as rebuttal to the defense's theme that he "never did anything wrong until
these murders, and that it was a sudden change in his life created by Ritalin .... " (T. Vol. 41, p
607) Because the record clearly rebuts this claim, it should be summarily denied. Pagan v. State,
29 So.3d 938, 955 (Fla. 2009) (A trial court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing on claims
Although Dr. Prichard briefly testified about the alleged sexual misconduct (which
consisted of just over two pages of trial transcript from eighty-five pages of his entire trial
testimony), trial counsel obtained concessions that there had been no convictions for the bad acts
he described concerning sexual misconduct with two underage children; that he was not even
aware of the children's names; and that he had not spoken to the children who were now adults.
(T. Vol. 41, p 641-43) Trial counsel effectively countered Dr. Prichard's direct examination
testimony.
Not only did trial counsel raise a timely objection to this line of questioning, he then
thoroughly cross-examined Dr. Prichard about same, obtaining helpful concessions for Hilton's
Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to do something that he, in fact, did.
Bates v. State, 3 So.3d 1091, 1106, n.20 (Fla. 2009) (observing that counsel cannot be held
ineffective for what counsel actually did); Stephens v. State, 975 So.2d 405, 415 (Fla. 2007)
(explaining that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object, when, in fact, he did.)
Not only did trial counsel raise a timely objection, but the trial court correctly overruled
it. The case law on prior bad acts is clear. The Florida Supreme Court has previously held, "[t] is
32
401
permissible to introduce evidence that helps to put the entire case into perspective to the extent
that its relevance is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect." Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 17 (Fla.
2000). See also Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 1994) (finding that trial court's
ruling that State's use of defendant's prior bad acts was proper to rebut her allegation that she
had killed the victim in self-defense). In this case, just as in Wuornos, the prior bad acts evidence
did not become a feature of the trial and was relevant to rebut the claim that Hilton had lived a
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court addressed this issue and determined that Hilton's
expert's testimony opened the door for Dr. Prichard's testimony, thus the trial court properly
admitted the testimony. Hilton, 117 So.3d at 751. Thus, this issue is meritless as a matter of law,
and should be summarily denied. Mann v. State, 112 So.3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2013) (stating
"because Mann raised purely legal claims that have been previously rejected by this Court, the
For all of the reasons argued above, this sub-claim should be summarily denied.
Hilton avers that his trial counsel was unaware that the State intended to call Correctional
Officer Caleb Wynn to testify to admissions he overhead Hilton make while in custody at the
jail. This allegation is clearly rebutted by the record and, thus, should be summarily denied.
Correctional Officer Caleb Wynn was called as a witness by the State. His testimony was
initially proffered outside the jury's presence. (T. Vol. 34, p 1215-1262) Thereafter, he was
33
402
permitted to testimony before the jury. 9 He explained that he was employed by the Leon County
Sheriffs Office and worked at the county jail. (T. Vol. 34, p 1239) On August 21, 2008, he
overheard a conversation between Hilton and another inmate, Fred Summers, during which
Hilton said, "if the State would give him life, he'd tell them where the head is and that the family
would probably want to know." Hilton's statement was followed by laughter. (T. Vol. 34, p
1241; 1243) On August 25, 2008, he overheard Hilton say, "the only regret he's got is getting
caught and if he had a second chance, he would do it right. And he stated that he could kick
hisself in the ass every day for it." (T. Vol. 34, p 1244) Correctional Officer Wynn also recalled
Hilton stating, "that all the answers to Willie Meggs' questions and everybody else's questions
could be answered tomorrow and everything could be over tomorrow if the State would give him
life." (T. Vol. 34, p 1244-45) Officer Wynn detailed how Hilton found Dunlap attractive,
explaining that she worked as a Sunday school teacher; Hilton imagined that "plenty of guys
must have wanted" her. (T. Vol. 34, p 1246) When asked whether he got a rush from killing,
Hilton was overheard describing the feeling like "being in the military. You got to go in and
destroy the village like a warrior," after which he began laughing "awkwardly." (T. Vol. 34, p
1246-47)
Ms. Suber declined to cross-examine Officer Wynn during the proffer, but moved to
exclude him as a witness, arguing that the State committed a discovery violation by only
providing his report and not specifically providing the substance of Hilton's statements. (T. Vol.
34, p 1220-26) The State responded by informing the Court that Officer Wynn's report had been
9
As a result of Suber's strenuous objections to Officer Wynn's proffered testimony, she was successful in obtaining
a ruling that Wynn was not permitted to testify about Hilton's statements that he was "very selective" of the victims
he chose. (T. Vol. 34, p 1237)
34
403
provided to the defense in discovery September, 201 0; his name was listed at jury selection 10 ; his
testimony was addressed in the State's opening statement 11 ; the substance of his testimony was
discussed between the State and defense; Officer Wynn had been sitting outside the courtroom
for three days of trial; the defense never asked the State how to get in touch with him; and the
contents of Hilton's statements, which Officer Wynn testified to, were in his report. (T. Vol. 34,
p 1228). Most importantly, Officer Wynn's deposition had been scheduled for the Friday before
trial, yet Ms. Suber cancelled it, a fact Ms. Suber acknowledged. (T. Vol. 34, p 1227-29) After
hearing from both sides, the Court declined to exclude Officer Wynn's testimony, determining
that his report had been provided to defense in discovery in September, 2010 and that the defense
had not suffered prejudice, commenting that it could not see how the trial strategy would have
changed if Officer Wynn had been specifically listed on the State's witness list, and futther, that
the defense had known the State was going to call him at trial based on its reading of his name to
the jury and mention of him during its opening statements. (T. Vol. 34, p 1231-32) The Court did
allow the defense time to speak to Officer Wynn and ordered the State to make him available.
Ms. Suber cross-examined Officer Wynn during his trial testimony before the jury. (T.
Vol. 34, p 1247-62) She questioned Wynn about the contents of his reports, detailing the
statements he testified to. (T. Vol. 34, p 1250) She was able to get Wynn to concede that every
detail he testified to on direct was not in his reports and that he did not include Ms. Dunlap's
name in his report, when detailing Hilton's statements about his victim. (T. Vol. 34, p 1251;
1254) She was also able to get Wynn to admit that he did not notate the fact that Hilton and
10
Officer Caleb Wynn's name was read to the panel of prospective jurors on February 2, 201!. (T. Vol. 22. p 671)
11
During its opening statement, the State discussed the fact that the jury would hear "statements that [Hilton] made
to law enforcement and you'll hear statements that he made to an inmate when he didn't know that law enforcement
was listening." (T. Vol. 24, p 45)
35
404
Summers spoke on his daily Jogs for either August 21 or August 25, 2008. (T. Vol. 34, p 1259-
60)
defendant must allege specific facts that are not conclusively rebutted by the record and which
demonstrate a deficiency in performance that prejudiced the defendant." Roberts v. State, 568
So.2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 1990). As to this claim, the record is full of evidence contradicting this
claim, including the reading of Officer Wynn's name to the prospective jury; mention of his
testimony during the State's opening statement; his report was provided to the defense, in
discovery, in September, 2010; and trial counsel had scheduled Officer Wynn's deposition
before trial.
Trial counsel did object after the State's proffer of Officer Wynn's testimony. This Court
heard argument and ultimately ruled that Officer Wynn could testify to all but one statement
made by Hilton. Raising an objection to the anticipated testimony does not constitute deficient
performance.
Hilton has failed to even attempt to address prejudice in this claim. The bottom line is
that this testimony would always have been admissible as a statement by a party opponent. There
was no keeping it from the jury's consideration. !-lad counsel deposed the officer prior to trial, it
would not have changed his testimony and it would have still been presented to the jury. Counsel
did cross-examine Officer Wynn in an attempt to undermine his credibility, but as is most often
the case with uninterested witnesses, it did not seem to sway the jury. Additionally, there was a
plethora of evidence proving Hilton's guilt. The outcome of the guilt phase would not have been
any different had trial counsel spent more time investigating Officer Wynn's statements.
36
405
Furthermore, this claim has been insufficiently pled. Hilton has simply alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective because they "were unaware of the fact that a correctional officer would
be testifying to admissions that were overheard and attributed to the Defendant." He further
states, "[t]he Defendant asserts that this lack of preparation and lack of ability to address this
testimony in conjunction with the entirety of the trial served to be ineffective assistance of
counsel." (Amd Motion p 23) He does not identify what constitutes "lack of preparation;" nor
does he identify what prejudice he suffered as a result. He simply makes vague and conclusory
allegations. To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim, the movant must allege specific
facts. Davis v. State, 26 So.3d 519, 533 (Fla. 2009) (finding a claim of ineffectiveness to be
legally insufficient because it did not allege specific facts and therefore, the defendant was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim, citing Jones v. State, 998 So.2d 573, 587-88 (Fla.
2008)). The defendant "bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally
valid claim." Hannon v. State, 941 So.2d 1109, 1138 (Fla. 2006); Johnston v. State, 70 So.3d
472, 483 (Fla. 2011) (explaining that where a movant presents only bare conclusory allegations
Hilton complains that trial counsel was completely unprepared for impeachment of their
own expert witness, Dr. Strauss. However, and again, the record conclusively rebuts this
allegation. Because the record rebuts this allegation, it should be summarily denied.
At the conclusion of his direct examination, the following exchange occurred between
37
406
FRIEDMAN: Just a couple more questions. How long have you been practicing
psychiatry in the state of Florida?
FRIEDMAN: Not necessarily. Have you ever had any disciplinary actions--
STRAUSS: Yes, I have.
FRIEDMAN:-- recently?
STRAUSS: And there is a second one ongoing that is not yet settled. But these are
from incidents that occurred in 1997 and 1999 related to some record keeping issues.
Recordkeeping issues were changed. The patients -- no one was ever injured. There is no
damages to patients in either case. So.
FRIEDMAN: That's all I have.
(T, Vol. 39, p 262-63) (emphasis added)
Clearly, not only was counsel prepared for impeachment of Dr. Strauss with his
disciplinary actions, he sought to address it during his direct examination, in an attempt to take
the wind out of the State's sails. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to do
something that he, in fact, did. Bates v. State, 3 So.3d 1091, 1106, n.20 (Fla. 2009) (observing
that counsel cannot be held ineffective for what counsel actually did); Stephens v. State, 975
So.2d 405, 415 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
Hilton fails to provide a record cite for his allegation that trial counsel "was unfamiliar
with this circumstance and acknowledged it on the record." What is in the record is Friedman's
comment that he had not seen a copy of the state medical's board order, which the State used to
38
407
impeach Dr. Strauss. (T. Vol. 39, p 264) Not having previously seen an order and not being
familiar with bases for impeachment of your own witness are two very different things. Hilton
has made a leap he cannot support with evidence from the record.
The evidence in the record clearly rebuts this claim. A trial court need not conduct an
evidentiary hearing on claims that are conclusively rebutted by the existing record. Pagan v.
State, 29 So.3d 938, 955 (Fla. 2009). Consequently, this claim should be summarily denied.
Hilton falls short of meeting his burden under Strickland as it relates to this claim.
Contrary to the assertion that trial counsel failed to properly investigate matters related to
Hilton's early childhood development, brain trauma, injury, cognitive impairment and mental
health, trial counsel presented four mental health experts during the penalty phase who testified
to these matters as they related to their opinions regarding Hilton's mental health at the time of
the murders. Not only had trial counsel thoroughly investigated these matters, but they then
provided them to the four mental health experts to assist them in evaluating Hilton. Furthermore,
trial counsel presented the testimony of several lay witnesses who testified about Hilton's
childhood and apparent mental health issues. It should also be noted that Hilton concedes this
matter in his own Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief on page 32, "[i]n the instant case,
the Defendant presented extensive evidence of mental health issues, defect, injury and
impairment."
First, trial counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Joseph Wu. Dr. Wu, testified that he
was a medical doctor at the University of California, Irvine, College of Medicine, having been
with the college since 1988; was licensed to practice in the State of California; was the clinical
39
408
director of the Brain Imaging Center; and was an Associate Professor in residence in the
Department of Psychiatry and Human Behaviors. (T Vol. 38, p 98) He further testified that he
had published over fifty peer-reviewed articles on brain imaging and neuropsychiatric disorders
and specialized in the area of neuropsychiatry. (T Vol. 38, p 99) At the time of his testimony, he
had testified as an expert in the field of neuropsychiatry on at least thirty occasions. (T Vol. 38, p
99-100) Dr. Wu relied heavily on Hilton's childhood head injury which caused brain damage at
age ten, his "emotional abuse, rejection," and the mismanagement of the Ritalin prescribed
during the years preceding the murders, in concluding that Hilton's ability to exercise judgment
Second, trial counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Charles Josh Golden, a licensed
Vol. 39, p !59) He testified that he taught at Nova Southeastern University in the doctoral-level
teaching pro gram and devoted approximately ten percent of his time to his private practice. (T
Vol. 39, p 159-60) He also published over three hundred books, chapter and articles and had
testified as an expert well over one hundred times. (T Vol. 39, p 160) He conducted
neuropsychological testing of Hilton, as well as an interview. (T Vol. 39, p 190) He learned that
Hilton was uncomfortable around people- he couldn't relate to others. (T Vol. 39, p 187) He
learned that Hilton had depressive episodes and previously attempted suicide. (T Vol. 39, p 190)
He had manic episodes. (T Vol. 39, p 191) He learned that Hilton had "serious problems as a
child." He testified that Hilton had a brain injury; he had rheumatic fever as a child; his father
walked out on him; his mother remarried a man he despised; he did poorly in school; and he
moved from school to school. (T Vol. 39, p 191-2) Dr. Golden diagnosed Hilton with organic
personality disorder, which he determined was produced by a combination of brain injury and
40
409
social events (T Vol. 39, p 193), finding that his ability to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired. (T Vol. 39, p 195) Dr. Golden, on cross-
examination, agreed that Hilton's drug abuse and alcohol abuse throughout his lifetime also
Third, trial counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Abbey Strauss, a psychiatrist with a
medical degree. (T Vol. 39, p 215) Dr. Strauss testified that he was licensed to practice in the
State of Florida since 1985. (T Vol. 39, p 216) He had testified as an expert somewhere between
two hundred and two hundred fifty times. (T Vol. 39, p 216) Dr. Strauss was specifically asked
about what he knew of Hilton's background. He explained that he was aware of Hilton's
"horrible, horrible childhood," (T Vol. 39, p 236) including his parents' divorce; his relationship
with his step-father; his mother's rejection of him for his step-father; his time in foster care; the
lack of bonding between he and his mother or any parental figure; the fact that he shot his step-
father at age fourteen; and the lack of relationship between he and his biological father. (T Vol.
39, p 237-9) He explained that the failure of his mother to be a prominent figure in his life
resulted in the Oedipus complex (T Vol. 39, p 244) and described how that affected him as he
progressed into adulthood. (T Vol. 39, p 247-8) He testified to knowledge of the mismanagement
of the Ritalin and Effexor prescribed during the years preceding the murders. (T Vol. 39, p 240)
He reviewed the deposition of Hilton's fonner employer, Mr. Tabor, who provided insight into
the change Hilton underwent during the time he was taking the combination of Ritalin and
Effexor. (T Vol. 39, p 242) He had also been given copies of Hilton's military discharge records.
(T Vol. 39, p 243) Dr. Strauss concluded with a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and
schizoaffective disorder, which had existed for a "very, very long time in his life" emphasizing
41
410
that the situations in his life "mostly triggered by the inappropriate prescriptions of the Ritalin
and Effexor that just pushed him over the edge." (T Vol. 39, p 260)
Fourth, trial counsel presented the testimony of Dr. William Alexander Morton, Jr., a
Professor Emeritus of Pharmacy at the Medical University of South Carolina, the College of
Pharmacy and Clinical Associate Professor of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences in the
Department of Psychiatry at the Medical University of South Carolina, with twenty-eight years
299-300) He testified that he authored forty-six peer-reviewed publications, including one about
the phenomena of what occurs when people abuse Ritalin. (T Vol. 40, p 303) He had testified as
an expert in psychopharmacology addictions and psychopharmacy practice just over sixty times.
Dr. Morton testified that the Office of the Public Defender provided him with a number of
documents and records prior to meeting with Hilton. (T Vol. 40, p 305) He also reviewed a
number of tapes, videotapes (of law enforcement interviews and home videos taken by Hilton
himself) (T Vol. 40, p 331), and audiotapes and transcripts in order to indirectly observe Hilton
prior to evaluating Hilton. (T Vol. 40, p 306) Dr. Morton was aware of Hilton's prescription
dosages and the dates during which he was prescribed Ritalin and Effexor. (T Vol. 40, p 312) He
also reviewed Dr. Deicher's disciplinary records from the Georgia State Board of Medical
Examiners and the deposition of Hilton's former employer, Mr. Taber. (T Vol. 40, p 326) He
was familiar with Hilton's history of extensive substance abuse as an adolescent and young
adult. (T Vol. 40, p 342) He interviewed Hilton on January 29, 2010. (T Vol. 40, p 333) In Dr.
Morton's opinion, Hilton's prescribed drug combination of Ritalin and Effexor would be
expected to produce profound and unwanted side effects and behavioral changes. (T Vol. 40, p
337)
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411
Trial counsel also presented the previously-videotaped statement of Victorine Rowe, the
neighbor of Hilton and his mother in April, 1951. (T Vol. 40, p 379) She testified about hearing
Hilton's mother screaming and learning that a Murphy bed had fallen on Hilton, splitting his
head open. She described the injury as appearing as if Hilton had been scalped. (T Vol. 40, p
380).
He testified that he became acquainted with Hilton as a result of his wife having worked with
Hilton's mother in the late 1950's through early 1960's. (T Vol. 40, p 392) Hilton's mother
subsequently asked Mr. Perchoux and his wife to take care of Hilton because she was having
problems with him and he was having problems with her husband, Hilton's step-father. (T Vol.
40, p 394-5) He was told that Hilton had been seeing a psychiatrist, but didn't know why. (T Vol.
40, p 395) Hilton's mother and step-father never came to visit Hilton while he was in the
Perchoux's care. (T Vol. 40, p 400) After some time had passed, Hilton's mother returned for
Trial counsel presented an audio recording of Hilton's mother, Cleo Debag, who was
deceased at the time of the trial. Ms. Debag testified that Hilton never knew his biological father.
(T Vol. 41, p 420) She stated that Hilton's step-father, Nilo, mentally abused and often yelled at
Hilton. (T Vol. 41, p 430) She advised that Hilton changed schools often before reaching the
sixth grade (T Vol. 41, p 434) and often stayed at school for as little as three to four months
before they moved to another city. (T Vol. 41, p 441) She spoke about some childhood injuries
Hilton suffered, including a broken hand and the injury to his head from the Murphy bed
accident. (T Vol. 41, p 444-45) She discussed two failed marriages. (T Vol. 41, p 460, 469-70)
She volunteered that she had not talked to her son for the ten years prior to the murders after he
43
412
became angry with her for not giving him money. (T Vol. 41, p 476) She detailed the incident in
which Hilton shot his step-father (T Vol. 41, p 484), which led to Hilton being sent to juvenile
hall (T Vol. 41, p 487) before going to stay with a friend. (T Vol. 41, p 485) He did not return
home until Ms. Debag told the authorities that she would leave her husband to regain custody of
Hilton. (T Vol. 41, p 487) She also relayed an incident during which she miscarried and had to
have Hilton call the doctor's office. She had to leave Hilton at their apartment alone while she
obtained medical treatment. She described him as being "scared to death." (T Vol. 41, p 489)
Maria Dabag Castelli, the sister ofNilo Debag, Hilton's step-father, testified for Hilton.
She explained that Nilo didn't love Hilton; didn't associate much with him; and in her opinion,
was jealous of Hilton. (T Vol. 41, p 507-8) She also described Hilton's mother as not being a
loving or affectionate mother and her relationship with Hilton as "cold." (T Vol. 41, p 508)
Sandy Herman Carr, Hilton's junior high school girlfriend also testified on his behalf. (T
Vol. 41, p 513) She testified that Hilton and his step-father did not get along at all. (T Vol. 41, p
514) She testified about her knowledge of Hilton shooting his step-father at the age of fourteen
and subsequently being sent to foster case as a result. She described how Hilton appeared more
relaxed while in foster care than he had been at home with his mother and step-father. (T Vol.
4l,p516)
Roy Cave, a high school friend of Hilton's testified about their tenure in a band together.
(T Vol. 41, p 519) He also described how they enlisted in the Army and went to boot camp
The defense also presented the testimony of Stefanie Durham, the daughter of Constance
Wagner, with whom Hilton moved in, in 1981, when she was thirteen years of age. (T Vol. 41, p
44
413
523-4) The lived together as a family for approximately two years. She described Hilton as the
ideal father figure, making sure her needs were attended to. (T Vol. 41, p 524-5)
An audio recording of an interview taken of Officer Steve King of the Duluth Police
Department on November 15, 2010 was presented to the jury. (T Vol. 41, p 529-30) He
described an incident, on February 25, 2006, during which he responded to a call of a suspicious
person and encountered Hilton. (T Vol. 41, p 532-4) He described Hilton as agitated and "a little
bit confused, like a little bit out of it." (T Vol. 41, p 534)
James Scott Gillespie was called on Hilton's behalf and testified that he, along with
approximately thirty others, were fishing in an area known as Cooper's Creek in Northern
Georgia in June, 2007. (T Vol. 41, p 540) He walked up onto Hilton, where he witnessed him
slumped over, rocking back and forth, sharpening a knife. He spoke to Hilton, but Hilton simply
Mary Pat King testified that she worked as a law enforcement officer (T Vol. 41, p 549)
with the United Forest Service in November, 2007 when she saw Hilton walking his dog at 7:40
p.m. in the Apalachicola National Forest, which was unusual. (T Vol. 41, p 546-7) She stopped
and spoke with him for five to fifteen minutes. Hilton did not appreciate her contact and insisted
she was hassling him. He commented that he did not like the government and in general, acted
negative and hostile. (T Vol. 41, p 550) After her encounter, she made a notation in her log book
that she had contact with a "Signal20," which she defined as a crazy person. (T Vol. 41, p 547-
8)
A video-recorded interview, dated December 30, 2010, of Jin Hee Lee, the operator of a
laundromat in Cambridge, Georgia was played. Mr. Lee stated that Hilton had been a regular
customer of his laundromat for at least three or four years; he remembered him because of his
45
414
dog. (T Vol. 41, p 555-7) In 2007, he noticed a physical change in Hilton, leading him to believe
Hilton had been drinking. (T Vol. 41, p 559) Hilton denied drinking. (T Vol. 41, p 559) He
explained Hilton's appearance and behavior was different than what he had experienced in the
Not only did trial counsel thoroughly investigate Hilton's early childhood development,
brain trauma, injury, cognitive impairment and mental health, they then provided that
information to four different mental health experts who used that information in evaluating
Hilton and subsequently testified at the penalty phase as to how those matters played a role in
In addition to the testimony presented by the four mental health experts, trial counsel also
admitted Hilton's military discharge records, as well as disciplinary records from the Georgia
State Board of Medical Examiners regarding the Ritalin and Effexor which were improperly
prescribed to Hilton by Dr. Deicher in the years preceding the murders. Trial counsel also
presented the testimony, either previously-recorded or live, of several lay witnesses, including
family members, persons who played an important role in Hilton's childhood, his junior high
defendant must allege specific facts that are not conclusively rebutted by the record and which
demonstrate a deficiency in performance that prejudiced the defendant." Roberts v. State, 568
So.2d 1255, 1259 (Fla.l990). As to this claim, the record is replete with the evidence counsel
argues is lacking.
Hilton has failed to establish that had more detailed evidence of Hilton's 1961 arrest for
shooting his step-father and subsequent time in foster care been offered during his penalty phase
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415
trial, there is a reasonable probability he would have received a different sentence and thus, his
given great weight; the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping - given great
weight; the murder was committed to avoid arrest - given moderate weight; the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) - given great weight; and the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) - given great weight) were so overwhelming that no
substantial prejudice resulted from the absence, at the penalty phase of, any additional evidence
of Hilton's early childhood development, brain trauma, injury, cognitive impairment and/or
mental health.
Counsel submits that Hilton was previously diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis, but there
is no actual medical diagnosis to support this. Furthermore, two of the defense's own witnesses
testified at the penalty phase that Hilton diagnosed himself with Multiple Sclerosis for symptoms
he was experiencing that were actually related to depression. Specifically, Dr. Wu testified,
"Then he started to have episodes of extreme fatigue. And he thought that he had multiple
sclerosis. He tried to self-diagnose himself. ... And again, I think what was happening is that he
was starting to become more depressed in addition to having this kind of downward deteriorating
Dr. Golden testified similarly, stating, "He self-diagnosed himself with multiple sclerosis
thinking that the symptoms that I see as being depression were the symptoms of a neurological
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416
disorder. There is no evidence he has actually- neurologically has multiple sclerosis. But a
lot of the symptoms like he can't get out of bed, his legs feel leaded, he feels unable to move for
long periods of time, those are symptoms of severe depression." (T Vol. 39, p 191) (emphasis
added)
Trial counsel had Hilton evaluated by four mental health experts with extensive and
varying experience. It is doubtful that all four failed to diagnose Multiple Sclerosis and even
more, that two would specifically rule that diagnosis out. Simply stated, Multiple Sclerosis was
never diagnosed because it was not an ailment that Hilton was afflicted with and cannot now be
Even if Hilton had multiple sclerosis, it did not impede his ability, at sixty-one years of
age, to kidnap, chain, torture, kill, decapitate and dismember Cheryl Dunlap and a few weeks
later, to kidnap, torture, kill and decapitate Meredith Emerson, nor did it impede his ability to put
thought into covering his tracks after each brutal murder and then to offer a self-serving, detailed
confession about his kidnapping and killing of Meredith in exchange for a life sentence from the
State of Georgia.
The four defense mental health experts testified on Hilton's behalf that he had been
afflicted with some sort of mental illness. The trial court accepted this testimony and gave it
some weight in finding one statutory mental mitigating factor- that at time of Dunlap's murder,
Lastly, Hilton's claim fails the prejudice prong of Strickland because he cannot establish
that had the evidence been offered during his penalty phase trial, there is a reasonable probability
he would have received a different sentence. Again, the aggravating circumstances (Hilton was
previously convicted of a violent felony - given great weight; the murder was committed in the
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417
course of a kidnapping - given great weight; the murder was committed to avoid arrest- given
moderate weight; the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) - given great
weight; and the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP)- given great weight) were
so overwhelming that no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence, at the penalty phase, of
mental illness, brain damage, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, depression and multiple
sclerosis at the time of the murder. Assuming that he was afflicted with all of these conditions,
Power v. State, 992 So.2d 218 (Fla. 2008) holds that those alleged diagnoses would not serve as
a bar to execution. "[N]either this Court nor the Supreme Court has recognized mental illness as
a per se bar to execution." !d. at 222; see Johnston v. State, 27 So .3d 11 (Fla. 2008) (finding that
Johnston's reliance on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002) was misplaced when he was neither a minor nor one who was insane or mentally
retarded); Lawrence v. State, 969 So.2d 294, 300 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting proposition that the Equal
Protection Clause requires extension of Atkins to the mentally ill due to their reduced
culpability); Simmons v. State, 105 So.3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (holding claims that defendants
with mental illness must be treated similarly to those with mental retardation due to reduced
12
In order to avoid any confusion on the part of the reader, this claim is consecutively numbered as VI, although
counsel numbered his as VII in his Amended Motion for Post Conviction Relief.
49
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culpability to be without merit). "Instead, mental illness can be considered as either a statutory
mental mitigating circumstance if it meets the definition (i.e., the crime was committed while the
considered and weighed by the court in imposing a sentence." Power at 222. That was the case
here; as Hilton concedes in his own motion, the trial court was presented with "extensive
evidence of mental health issues, defect, injury and impairment." (Amd Motion, p. 32) The trial
court considered that evidence and found that Hilton was under extreme emotional distress at the
time of the murder; the trial court also gave some weight to the mitigating factor of Hilton's
childhood brain injury, but found that the factor that Hilton suffered from severe mental defects
was not proven. However, no evidence whatsoever was presented that he was mentally retarded.
The Florida Supreme Court, in deciding Spencer v. State, 691 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Fla.
1996), held that in reviewing proportionality, "we will not disturb the sentencing judge's
determination as to 'the relative weight to give to each established mitigator' where the ruling is
supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record." The Court also held that it will also
"affirm the weight given an aggravator if based on competent, substantial evidence." Blake v.
State, 972 So.2d 839, 846 (Fla. 2007). The Florida Supreme Court requires that the death
penalty be "reserved only for those cases where the most aggravating and least mitigating
circumstances exist." Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 965 (Fla. 1996). This is the case here.
the time of his execution, his execution would undoubtedly be stayed for further examination,
pursuant to F.S. § 922.07 (2014). See Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1984) (finding
50
419
that the statutory procedure is now the exclusive procedure for determining competency to be
executed). Thus, Hilton's claim may be best described presently as an unripe Ford claim.
Hilton attacks Florida's capital sentencing statute, which authorizes a death sentence
recommendation by a bare majority vote and allows a trial judge to disregard a jury's life
sentence recommendation, as arbitrary and capricious. This claim should have been raised on
direct appeal. Since it was not, it is barred in a 3.851 proceeding. "Issues which either were or
could have been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral
unanimous finding of death. Thus, Hilton has no standing to make this argument. See, e.g.,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) ("To have standing, a litigant must seek
relief for an injury that affects him in a 'personal and individual way;"' quoting Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 n. I (1992)); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,357 (1996) ("The remedy
must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has
established"); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134, 139, 134 (1978) ("A person who is aggrieved
by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a
search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights
infringed;" "the issue of standing involves two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a
particular legal right has alleged 'injury in fact,' and, second, whether the proponent is asserting
51
420
his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third
parties").
CONCLUSION
The bottom line is that Hilton committed the brutal kidnapping, murder and
dismemberment of Cheryl Dunlap. The evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Witnesses were
able to put Hilton near the scene of the crime. Dunlap's DNA was found in Hilton's van. And
Hilton confessed to a fellow inmate. At the penalty phase, the jury was presented with evidence
of an almost identical kidnapping, murder and dismemberment which occurred less than a month
after this murder, to which he pled guilty. "When a defendant challenges a death sentence ... the
question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ...
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not
warrant death. Strickland at 695. "A court making the prejudice inquiry must ask ifthe defendant
has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been
different absent the errors." !d. at 696. The record affirmatively demonstrates beyond a doubt
that even if trial counsel had committed each of the errors complained of in the Amended Motion
for Post-Conviction Relief, there is no chance that the outcome would have been different. The
fact is that the evidence of guilt, as well as the aggravating circumstances proved in this case
were completely overwhelming. The State respectfully requests that this Honorable Court deny
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421
the motion.
Respectfully submitted
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CARINE L. EMPLIT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
FLORIDA BAR NO. 0011943
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE CAPITOL, PL-01
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050
(850) 414-3 300
primary email:
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
secondary email:
carine.emplit@myfloridalegal.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to Amended
Motion for Post-Conviction Relief has been furnished via the e-portal to Robert A. Morris,
Esquire, 911 East Park Avenue, Tallahassee, FL 32301 this 14'h day of August, 20I5.
53
422
Filing# 31238576 E~Filed 08/2-.,2015 03:48:38 PM
vs.
CASE NO. 2008-CF-697A
D!YTSTON: FELONY
GARY HILTON,
DEATH PENALTY
Defendant.
THIS CAUSE, came before the Court upon the Defendant's Unopposed Motion for
Continuance pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.85 1. This Court having reviewed the Motion, heard
arguments of counsel, and be otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby m.akes the toll owing
findings:
I. The Defendant's Motion is GRANTED. The death of defense expert witness, Dr.
2. The evidentiary hearing scheduled September 8'h and 9'11, 2015 is cancelled and shall
3. Counsel for the Defendant shall provide an amended witness list and exhibit list to the
4. The State shall furnish a witness list and exhibit list to the Defe11dant within thirty (30)
423
5. The Defendant and State shall confer and set this matter for an intervening ca.~e
that time. Defense counsel shall be responsible for coordinating said hearing.
\ . (_Jjl. () '
'
'/·:>¥:?~~ .. . .~ . ~
./J Q~··~
1
JAMES C. HANKINSON
\,_JIRCUIT JUDGE
CARINE EMPLIT
Assistant Attorney General
424
Filing# 31238576 E-Filed 08/2..,,2015 03:48:38 PM
STATE OF FLORII)A,
CASE NO.: 2008CF697A
DEATH PENALTY
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
Tl-flS CAUSE came before the Court upon the Motion to Incur Costs for Forensic
in the above cause. This Coutt having reviewed the Motion, the response of the Justice
Administrative Commission, having heard the arguments of counsel and being otherwise fully
forensic psychologist Dr. T~rencc Leland and may incur up to $7,500.00 for his
2. This Order is entered without prejudice for the Defendant to reapply for additional
authorization is not predetermined and will be subject to the standards set forth in
425
3. The defense and forensic psychologist must comply with all policies and
Copies:
GEORGIA CAPPLEMAN
Assistant State Attorney
CARINE EMPUT
Assistant Attorney General
BRADLEY R. BISCHOFF
Justice Administrative Commission
426
Filing# 32014306 E-Filed 09/l4iL015 02:35:19 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,·
DEFENDANT.
--------------------~~
COMES NOW, the undersigned attorney, and files this Defendant's Witness List
·on behalf of GARY MICHAEL HILTON, the Defendant in the above-styled cause,
NON-EXPERT WITNESSES
2. Paula Saunders
Leon. County Courthouse
301 S. Monroe Street
Suite 401
Tallahassee, FL 32301
3. Rob Friedman
175 Salem Court
Tallahassee, FL 32301
427
4. Merribeth Bohanan
Dept. of Financial Services
200 E. Gaines
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
5. Nancy Daniels
Leon County Courthouse
301 S. Monroe Street
Suite 401
Tallahassee, FL 32301
6. Betty Fuentes
(850) 509-2739
7. Andy Thomas
Leon County Courthouse
301 S. Monroe Street
Suite 401
Tallahassee, FL 32301
8. Steven Been
Leon County Courthouse
301 S. Monroe Street
Suite 401
Tallahassee, FL 32301
9. Ines Suber
Leon County Courthouse
301 S. Monroe Street
Suite 401
Tallahassee, FL 32301
428
12. Clyde Taylor, Esq.
2303 North Ponce De Leon Boulevard
SuiteL
St. Augustine, FL 32084
15. Names and Addresses of those individuals contained in the Key Mitigation
Witnesses File developed by Betty Fuentes
EXPERT WITNESSES
429
ORRI , ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 E. Park Avenue
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111
(850) 792-1113 Facsimile
alex@ramlawyer.com
Attorney for Defendant
COURT APPOINTED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by Electronic
mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County Courthouse, 3'd Floor,
301 S. Monroe· Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State Attorney Georgia
Courthouse, 4"' Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Capital Appeals Bureau, Office
of the Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 323 1050 on this 14"' day of
September, 2015.
430
Filing# 33550030 E-Filed 10/22/2015 11:25:40 AM
v.
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
------------------~'
ORDER FOLLOWING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
On October 21, 2015, this Court conducted a CIISe Management Conference at which
the following parties were present: Chief Assistant State Attorney Georgia Cappleman;
Assistant State Attorney Eddie Evans; Assistant Attorney General Carine Emplit; and
At the case management conference, this Court heard argument as to whether claims
VII(A) and VII(B) raised in Defendant's Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief
The Court and parties also discussed discovery obligations related to the Defendant's
expert witnesses.
It is hereby ORDERED that Claim VII(B) is denied as being a purely legal claim,
This Court reserves ruling on Claim VII(A) and orders the parties to coordinate a hearing
431
It is hereby ORDERED that the Defendant shall file his experts' reports by December I,
2015.
...... "\ II'- J2.
__ day of October, 2015 in Tallahassee, Leon County,
DONE AND ORDERED thisU..
Florida.
cc:
432
Filing# 34358570 E-Filed 11/12/2015 10:56:31 AM
v.
Defendant.
--------~/
MEMORANDUM REGARDING CLAIM Vll(A) OF DEFENDANT'S AMENDED
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
COMES NOW, the State of Florida, by and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby
files this Memorandum setting forth its position that Claim VII(A) of Defendant's Amended
Motion for Post-Conviction Relief is a purely legal claim, which requires no factual development
at the upcoming evidentiary hearing, consistent with Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A)(ii). Hilton is
presently eligible for execution because he is not intellectually disabled, nor is he a juvenile. This
is an unripe claim, under controlling Florida Supreme Court precedent. Hilton cannot allege that
the bar to execution is applicable well before the Governor has signed a death warrant. In short,
Hilton does not suffer from the necessary disability or fit the age requirement to be exempt from
execution and his allegation that he may be insane at the time of execution is unripe for this
Court's review. In support of the State's position that Claim VII( A) is a purely legal claim which
is unripe and which does not require factual development, the undersigned submits the
following:
433
A. CLAIM VII( A) IS UNRIPE FOR REVIEW
At best, this claim can be described as an unripe Ford1 claim. As indicated by Florida Statute
§ 922.07(1) (2015), "(w]hen the Governor is informed that a person under sentence of death may
be insane, the Governor shall stay the execution of the sentence and appoint a commission of
three psychiatrists to examine the convicted person."2 See also Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So.2d
471 (Fla. 1984) (finding that the statutory procedure is now the exclusive procedure for
In Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1984), the Florida Supreme Court addressed
this issue, agreed "that an insane person cannot be executed," and held that F.S. § 922.07 sets
forth "the procedure to be followed when a person under sentence of death appears to be insane.
The execution of capital punishment is an executive function and the legislature was authorized
to prescribe the procedure to be followed by the governor in the event someone claims to be
insane." Thus, in Goode the Florida Supreme Court held that under F.S. § 922.07 the governor
can make the determination; Goode does not stand for the proposition that the issue of sanity to
The Florida Supreme Court has declined to address unripe claims and summarily denied
relief. See Morris v. State, 931 So.2d 821, 93 7 n.l5 (Fla. 2006) (denying relief on Morris's fifth
habeas claim alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights would be violated because he may be
incompetent at the time of execution, and finding that the claim was not ripe for review as no
death warrant had been signed); Rogers v. State, 957 So.2d 538, 556 (Fla. 2007) (finding that
1
Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
2
See also Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.81 I -3.812, which address insanity of the Defendant at the time of
execution. In fact, F. R. Crim. P. 3.81 J(c) provides, [n]o motion for a stay of execution pending hearing, based on
grounds of the prisoner's insanity to be executed, shall be entertained by any court until such time as the Governor
of Florida shall have held appropriate proceedings for determining the issue pursuant to the appropriate Florida
Statutes." (emphasis added)
434
Rogers' claim, which asserted that his Eighth Amendment rights would be violated because he
may be incompetent at the time of execution, was not ripe for review until a death warrant was
issued); Floyd v. State, 18 So.3d 432, 459 (Fla. 2009) (holding that no relief was warranted on
Floyd's claim that he suffered impaired mental health since childhood and as such, his Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment would be violated because he may be
incompetent at the time of his eventual execution); Sireci v. State, 825 So.2d 882 (Fla. 2002)
(determining that claim that defendant's execution would violate the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment because he may be incompetent at the
time his sentence is carried out was certainly not ripe for review).
Hilton may avail himself of the F.S. § 922.07(1) and Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 procedures
when a death warrant is signed; not now. Ferguson v. State, 112 So.3d 1154 (Fla. 2012)
(Ferguson invoked both post-conviction procedures and F.S. § 922.07 at the time the death
warrant was signed). In this case, it is unknown when Hilton will be executed. Thus, any factual
evidence he seeks to present at the upcoming evidentiary hearing on this claim would be
fruitless. The dispositive issue is whether Hilton is insane at the time the Governor signs the
death warrant, not what his mental state is now. Consequently, this claim is unripe for review by
In his Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, Hilton avers that executing the mentally
ill constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. He relies on his alleged diagnoses of mental illness, brain damage, bipolar disorder,
anxiety disorder, depression, and multiple sclerosis at the time of the offense as a bar to his
435
execution.' (Amd. Mot. at p. 29) Hilton, in advancing his argument, attempts to draw similarities
between his conditions and those who are ineligible for execution, such as those who are
While legal insanity is a per se bar to execution, neither the Florida Supreme Court, nor the
United States Supreme Court has recognized mental illness as a per se bar to execution, under
Ford. Power v. State, 992 So.2d 218,222 (Fla. 2008) (citing Diaz v. State, 945 So.2d 1136 (Fla.
2006)); see Ripkowski v. Thaler, 438 Fed.Appx. 296, 303 (5th Cir. 2011) ("The Supreme Court
has never held that mental illness removes a defendant from the class of persons who are
constitutionally eligible for a death sentence."); In re Neville, 440 F.3d 220, 221 (5th Cir. 2006)
(finding that Atkins did not exempt mentally ill inmates from execution); In re Woods, 155
Fed.Appx. 132, 136 (5th Cir. 2005) (declining to grant a successive habeas petition to consider
the defendant's alleged mental illness because the constitutional rule created in Atkins did not
cover mental illness); Simmons v. State, 105 So.3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (holding claims that
defendants with mental illness must be treated similarly to those with mental retardation due to
reduced culpability to be without merit); Barwick v. State, 88 So.3d 85, 106 (Fla. 20!1)
(rejecting on the merits "the argument that Roper extends beyond the Supreme Court's
pronouncement that the execution of an individual who was younger than eighteen at the time of
the murder violates the eighth amendment"); Johnston v. State, 27 So .3d II (Fla. 20 I 0) (finding
that Johnston's reliance on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002) was misplaced when he was neither a minor nor one who was insane or
mentally retarded); Lawrence v. State, 969 So.2d 294, 300 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting proposition that
the Equal Protection Clause requires extension of Atkins to the mentally ill due to their reduced
3
Hilton has not made an argument that his execution would be unconstitutional on other grounds, such as the
midazolam claim recently raised by Jerry William Correll and rejected by the Florida Supreme Court in October,
2015. (SCIS-147). His claim is confined to his mental illness being the equivalent of an intellectual disability.
436
culpability). "Instead, mental illness can be considered as either a statutory mental mitigating
circumstance if it meets the definition (i.e., the crime was committed while the defendant "was
circumstance. Such mental mitigation is one of the factors to be considered and weighed by the
court in imposing a sentence." Power, 992 So.2d at 222. The Florida Supreme Court has
repeatedly rejected attempts to extend Atkins beyond intellectual disabilities. Frances v. State,
143 So.3d 340 (Fla. 2014) (noting "this Court has previously rejected defendants' attempts to
extend Atkins to mental impairments that are not mental retardation," citing Henyard v. State,
992 So.2d 120 (Fla. 2008)); Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So.3d 535, 563 (Fla. 201 0) (same). The
Florida Supreme Court has held on several occasions that other mental defects are not entitled to
the same consideration as mental retardation. See, e.g., Reese v. State, 14 So.3d 913, 920 (Fla.
2009) (rejecting Atkins claim where postconviction testimony indicated that the defendant was
under a "severe emotional disturbance" at the time of the offense); Connor v. State, 979 So.2d
852, 867 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting claim where the defendant suffered from mental and
psychological disorders such as organic brain damage, frontal lobe damage, micrographia, and
stuttering, on grounds that these conditions were different from mental retardation); Lawrence v.
State, 969 So.2d 294, 300 n. 9 (Fla. 2007) (declining to extend Atkins to the mentally ill).
Because Hilton is not intellectually disabled, or a juvenile, the bar he seeks on his execution
C. CONCLUSION
Claim VII(A) should be denied without an evidentiary hearing because it is a purely legal
claim which is also unripe for review, for which no factual development can be made at the
present time. No witness can testifY, nor is there any evidence that can be presented, to prove that
437
Hilton will be incompetent at the time of execution, a time which remains unknown to all parties
involved in this matter. The proper time for bringing forth this allegation, should Hilton actually
The State respectfully requests this Honorable Court deny Claim VII(A) for the
aforementioned reasons.
Respectfully submitted
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CARINE L. EMPLIT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
FLORIDA BAR NO. 001 I943
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE CAPITOL, PL-01
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050
(850) 414-3300
primary email:
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
secondary email:
carine.emplit@myfloridalegal.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Regarding Claim VII(A) of Defendant's Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief has been
furnished via the e-portal to Georgia Cappleman, Chief Assistant State Attorney,
cappelmang@leoncountyfl.gov; Eddie Evans, Assistant State Attorney,
eevans@1eoncountyfl.gov; Robert A. Morris, Esquire, alex@ramlawyer.com, this 12th day of
November, 2015.
CARINE L. EMPLIT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorney for the State
438
Filing# 34555073 E-Filed 11/17/2015 02:56:35 PM
v.
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
I
ORDERFOLLO~GCASEMANAGEMENTCONFERENCE
which the following parties were present: Chief Assistant State Attorney Georgia
Cappleman; Assistant State Attorney Eddie Evans; Assistant Attorney General Carine
VII(A) raised in his Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, as the claim is a purely
Should Defendant be found incompetent after the Governor has signed the death
warrant, Defendant may then avail himself of the protections provided in F.S. § 922.07 and
It is hereby ORDERED that Claim. VII(A) is denied as being a purely legal claim,
439
l -+LA
DONE AND ORDERED this ""t day of November, 2015 in Tallahassee, Leon County,
Florida.
S C. HANKINSON
cuitJudge
cc:
440
Filing# 35146818 E-Filed 12/04/2015 08:26:15 AM
v.
Defendant.
I
COMES NOW, the State of Florida, by and through the undersigned attorney, and files
3. Defendant filed his initial Witness List on April23, 2015, listing five expert
witnesses.
4. Thereafter, Defendant filed his first Amended Witness List on September 14,2015,
listing four expert witnesses.
1
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.85!(f)(5)(A) provides that at the case management conference, the
defendant shall disclose all docwnentary exhibits that he intends to offer at the evidentiary
hearing and shall file and serve an exhibit list of all such exhibits and a witness list with the
names and addresses of any potential witnesses. "All expert witnesses shall be specifically
designated on the witness list and copies of all expert reports shall be attached." Further, Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.85!(f)(6) provides "[a]ll expert witnesses who will testify at the evidentiary
hearing must submit written reports, which shall be disclosed to opposing counsel as
provided in subdivision (f)(5)(A)."
441
6. In addition to the Rule, this Court entered an Order on October 22, 2015, which
specifically required the Defendant to file his experts' reports by December I, 2015.
7. No expert reports have been provided to the State as of the date of the filing of this
Motion.
8. The Leon County Clerk's docket online does not reflect any additional disclosure
filings by the defense.
9. As of the date of the filing of this motion, the State is without the experts' reports,
and consequently, the State is hampered in its ability to prepare for the evidentiary
hearing, which is scheduled for next month. Additionally, the defendant will suffer no
prejudice is providing copies of records he is required and has been ordered to
provide.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the State respectfully requests this Court compel
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Compel
Defense Expert Reports has been furnished via the e-portal to Robert A. Morris, Esquire;
Georgia Cappleman, Chief State Attorney; and Eddie Evans, Assistant State Attorney this 4th
day of December, 2015.
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CARINE L. EMPLIT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
FLORIDA BAR NO. 0011943
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE CAPITOL, PL-01
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050
(850) 414-3580
primary email:
carine.emplit@myfloridalegal.com
secondary email:
capapp@m yfl oridalegal. com
CO-COUNSEL FOR THE STATE
442
Filing# 35246907 E-Filed 12/07/2015 04:31:00 PM
v.
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
----------------~'
ORDER COMPELLING DEFENSE EXPERT REPORTS
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the State's Motion to Compel Defense
Expert Reports. The Court having considered said motion and being otherwise fully advised in
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(SXA) requires the defendant to file and serve a witness list with
the names and addresses of any potential expert witnesses, and to attach copies of all expert
This Court entered an Order Following Case Management Conference on October 22,
2015 requiring the Defendant to file his expert reports by December I, 2015.
The Defendant has failed to comply with both the Rule and Order.
It is hereby ORDERED that the Defendant shall file his experts' reports within five (5)
443
Florida.
cc:
444
j
COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel, pursuant to Rule 3.851(f)(5)(C), Florida Rules of CriniinalProcedure and moves this
Court to continue the evidentiary hearing presently scheduled in this matter and in support
1. The Defendant is indigent and the undersigned was appointed by the Courl to
2. An evidentiary hearing is presently set for January 19,2016- January 21, 2016. The
hearing has been set for several months as a result of a prior unopposed defense
3. Rule 3.851(f)(5)(C), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "The trial
court also rnay for good cause extend the time for holding an evidentiary hearing up
1 The prior motion to continue was made as a resUlt of the untimely death of Dr. Hany McClaren who had served as
an expert consultant for the defense trial team and who was assisting the defense in this post-conviction proceeding.
445
to 90 days." The rule of procedure is silent as to whether this means it can happen on
one occasion, on one occasion·for each party, on repeated occasions for each party,
etc ... The undersigned is mindful of the "Timely Justice Act of 2013" which, in
4. In the prior motion to continue, counsel mentioned concern regarding the constrictive
of the categories.
5. Dr. Terence Leland, Ph.D. was authorized to assist the defense as an expert in
forensic psychology. Since that point in time, Dr. Leland has diligently prepared in
the capacity requested. To that end, )le has been provided access to some sixty four
witnesses. He has also scoured numerous paper records. However, Dr~ Leland has
prepared to render opinions in each of the facets the defense anticipates testimony.
6. The defense seeks a ninety (90) day continuance for the foregoing reason. The
defense asserts that the defense's necessary reliance on Dr. Leland's opinion
within the restrictive time parameters is good cause to continue the evidentiary
hearing. The defense would also assert that it would be a manifest injustice to
446
preclude the defense from adequate preparation. Attached hereto is Exhibit A which
is an inventory of the length of audio and video items as well as the number of pages
of items in written format. .The sheer. volume of the data contained in each of these
files and sub-folders is massive. This does not take into account the data that was
provided by the State and utilized by Dr. Pritchard and the State during the penalty
phase of the trial. 2 Likewise, it does not take into account some 120 banker's boxes
'
i·
provided by the Office of the Public Defender. Finally, it does not take into account
the time necessary to conduct interviews with collateral sources and witnesses. Dr.
facts.
7. The defense also seeks a continuance in light of the opinion handed down by the
. United States Supreme Court on today's date in Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505.
8. This Court entered a non-final order on October 22, 2015 denying Claim VII(B) as a
· purely legal claim. Claim VII(B) can best be characterized as a "Ring claim." The
Court articulated at. the hearing that the status of the law required the denial of the
claim and also mentioned the small likelihood of the United States Supreme Court
9. The United States Supreme Court has now rendered an opinion in Hurst that impacts
this Court's prior ruling. There are legal issues that remain to be resolved by the .
Florida Supreme Court in the wake of the Hurst opinion. The defense requests a
rehearing on the October 22, 2015 non-final order denying Claim VII(B) in light of
2 The State has provided a CD through public records requests that purports to provide all of the mental health
records that they were in possession of and reliant Upon and that were provided to Dr. Pritchard in advance of his
testimony during the penalty phase.
447
the Hurst opinion. The defense does not seek to protract the proceedings and requests
a briefing schedule for the defense and the State; The defense requests twenty (20)
days within which to submit their memorandum to the Court on rehearing and matters
attendant thereto. The defense would suggest fifteen (15) days within which the State
may respond and five (5) days within which the defense may reply.
10. The undersigned has conferred with Deputy State Attorney Georgia Cappleman and
Assistant State Attorney Eddie Evans by conference call and they oppose a
11. While the rule of procedUre does not require a verification of counsel, the
undersigned certifies that this Motion is filed in good faith and not solely for the
Procedure.
12. The undersigned would respectfully request that this matter be called on for hearing
to determine if relief is to be granted. 1n the event relief is granted, it will afford the
parties the opportunity discuss and confirm dates certain. The undersigned will
advise the Court that he is presently scheduled to be before The Honorable Robert L.
Hinkle in United States v. Terry Mize, 5: 15cr25-RH in the Panama City Division of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida for a sentencing in
14,2016. The undersigned is certainly mindful of the priority that this case takes as a
Death Penalty case. It is only mentioned because the undersigned will likely need
conflicting time.
448
WHEREFORE the Defendant requests the entry of an order granting a continuance of
the evidentiary hearing as well as granting reconsideration of the issue previously denied in the
non-final order entered on October 22, 2015 Claim VII(B) and providing a briefing schedule as
outlined above or in some other fashion as the Court may deem just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
~~-~
RbBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 E. Park Avenue.
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111
(850) 792-1113 Facsimile
alex @ramlawyer.com
449
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge; Leon County
Courthouse, 3rd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant General
Deputy Chief State Attorney Georgia Cappleman, SA02 LeonFelony@ Jeoncountyf!.gov, State
Attorney's Office, Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. MomoeStreet, Tallahassee, FL,
Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 12th day of
January, 2016.
@)~~
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
450
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY ORGANIZED
CASE NO: 2008-CF-697 DEFENDANT: GARY MICHAEL HILTON
. Length/Pages
451
h. WI Hilton William 2
i. WI Kulish & Bennett 162
j. WI McKinney, Robyn 303
k. WI Nilo Dabag 52
I. WI Rae!, Samuel 63
m. WI Reynolds Don 84
n. WI Rowe Vikki 32
o. WI Stewart Shawn 87
p.. WI Tabor John 476
q. Witness List Subpoenas 327
r. McKinney Robyn 3
7. DTG Key Mitigation Witness
a. 1 Life History 140
b. 2Family 32
c. 3 Mental Health History 32
d. 4 Mental Health Time of Crime 20
e. 5 Mental Health Post Arrest 18
f. Hilton Mitigation Witness 47
g. Hilton Mitigation Witness (2) 5
8. Florida Discovery Mise 3
9. Florida Trial Mise 3
10. FPD1 Indexes & Summaries 456
1.1. FPD2 Lists 2,266
a. Hilton - Various Witness Lisis 93
b. Hilton Former Addresses 94
c. Mitigation Witness Lists 97
12. FPD3 Fuentes Mitigation Witnesses
a. Mitigation Witnesses Extra Copies 563
b. Mitigation Witnesses All Alphabetical 560
c. Witness by Significance 375
d. Atlanta & GBI Witnesses 56
e. Atlanta Witnesses 131
f. Fuentes Questions 21
g. Atlanta Interviews Witnesses & Names 21
h. · Betty's Memos File- Friedman Folder 88
i. BFM- Atlanta Mitigation Witness who doesn't know GH 11/22-10/07 7
j. BFM- Atlanta Mitigation Witness who don't know/!. 7
k. BFM Investigation Leads 20
I. Brent Beth DGC Conflicted video copy 3/25/12 1
m Brent Elizabeth & William 1
n. Burdette April DGC conflicted copy 3/25/12 1
o. Caldwell Kenneth DGC conflicted copy 3/25/12 5
p. Castelli Maria DGC conflicted copy 3/25/12 3
q. Dr. Kulish GA GBI 11
r. Dr. Kulish Lawrence 0825 (DG Conflicted copy 3/25/12) 6
s. Fuentes Witness List and Notes 43
t. Fuentes Atlanta Witness who did not know /!. 14
u. Fuentes Interviews 727 pp Box326206 727
v. Hilton Gary- GBI Interviews Fuentes Interview Summaries 72
13. FPD4 Depositions 5,213
14. FPD5 Attorney Been & Suber Notes 263
452
15. FPD6 Chris Ell rich Interviews & Memos 238
I 16. FPD6A Fuentes
17. FPD7 Hilton Interviews
538
115
I
I
a. 1" weekly visit
b. B FM GH Excerpts GAPD
3
7
c. Contact Visit 37
) d. ,Fuentes Memo 1117 7
1
e. GH excepts GAPD 7
f. Interviews DF Team 3
I
1 g. Original Interview 3
! h. Fuentes Questionnaire 86
i. BF Memo GH Excepts GAPD 7
j. BF Interview- GH Weekly Interv 80
k. FLPD Hilton Statements to DF Team 224
!. SBM Contact Visit 6/19/08 3
18. FPD Hilton Mise Timelines 297
19. FPD Autopsy 67
20. FPD Hilton GH Records
a. 1 DTG Record Summary 18
b. 2 Birth 33
c. 3 Schools 84
d. 4 Military Records 197
e. 4B Marriages 16
f. 4C Car Insurance 14
g. 5 Pre-Arrest Medical Records 10
h. SA Various Lab Tests 22
i. SB Pharmacies 53
j. 6 Prior Court & Criminal Records 1,219
k. 7TheCave 32
!. 7A Cell Phone 44
m. 7B Vet Records 9
n. 7C Camping Facility 2
0. 8 GH Addresses 15.
p. 9 Deicher 468
q. 10 Employment 23
r. 11 Post-Arrest MediCal Records 1,521
s. 12 Dawson Ct. Jail Records 690
t. 13GADOC 681
u. 14 Leon County Jail 536
v. 15 No Records Found 74
w. 16 Pretrial Letters from GH 160
x.. Records Matrix 13
21. FPD Home Movies 24
22. ·FPD Media Coverage 1,075
· 23. FPD Mise
·a. DNA Mixed Samples 50
b. CD Family & Friends Info 14
c. Emerson- CD Comparison 1
d. FL Crime Scene Location 5
24. FPD Snitch File 868
25. FPD Cave Box 836
453
26. GA Homicide Plea & Ga Mise 164
27. GHMiscPhotos 427
454
Terenc:eLeland, Ph. 0.
Clinical and Forensic Psychology
1235 Miccosukee Road
Tallaha~>see, Florida 32306
Phohe (850) 402-1976 Fax (850) 365-7978
Memorandum
:Pate: 12/1/15
Shortly following the lll}tirnely death of Dr. Harry McClaren, I agreed to beco111e engaged in
Mr. Hilton's cas.e. Dr. McClaren had been working with you and had· considerable .knowledge ·
of the case, having been involved in preparing for mitigation testimony many months prior to
trial. He did not testify at penalty pha.Se, apparently due to a last-minute reshtifflirig of the
defense team. and changes in mitigation strat~>gy, midway thtough trial. You requested that I
(1} critique the penalty phase expert testimony, (2) attempt to "reconstruct" Dr. McClaren's
psychologicallpsychosocial understanding/formulation of the case,. and (3) offer my own case
fomiulation. ·
(f) Both Defense and State penalty phase experts 11ppear to bave reviewed and incotpomted
into their testimony only a fraction of the information tbst was available regarding Mr.
Hilton's psychological/ psychosocial functioning. As a consequence; their <:ase formulations
were incomplete and their testimony oversimplified and/or overstated. Their representations
of the Defendant seemto be single-dimension caricatores that neglect the complex multi-
determinant nature of human behavior.
(2) It is unlikely tbst Dr. McClaren's understanding of Mr. Hilton can be reconstructed with
much specificity. He appears to bave reviewed considerably more information about the
Defendant's psychologica!lpsycbosocial ftuictioning than was inspected by either Defense or
State penalty phaSe experts. In all likelihood, had he be$ allowed to testify, he would. bave
offered a m.ore complete and accurate explanation of Mr. Hilton's hist<lry and actions. He
would almost certainly have anticipated the thrust of Dr. Gregory Prichard's testimony for the
State and been prepared to address the limitations and inaccuracies oftbst testimony.
455
I
I ,~~
\
.J
2 Re: G. Hilton
/
//
/' m I (lip. not yet pr!'lpared to offer nJy own clinical formulation in this case. Voluminous
/ recqrds existthat need to be reviewed .. The Defendli.tit muSt also be directly intecyi!!'wed. Any
opinion/conclusion~ at ~Pis time would b~ very prelitninary and subject to significant
uncertainty and error. I estimate that I will need an additioi:ull2 to 3 months to complete my
evaluation.
456
Filing# 36522569 E-Filed 01/13/2016 02:56:14 PM
V.
Defendant.
_________________ ./
COMES NOW, the Office of the Attorney General, by and through the undersigned
attorney, and hereby submits its objection to Defendant's motion to continue the evidentiary
hearing, currently scheduled for January 19, 2016- January 21, 2016, motion for rehearing, and
1. The Defendant filed his initial Motion for Postconviction Relief on November 25,
2014.
Defendant moved to continue the hearing for ninety (90) days due to the death of his
3. This court entered an order, on August 24, 2015, granting the Defendant's motion to
continue the evidentiary hearing; the order reset the evidentiary hearing to January 19
- 21, 2016, providing the Defendant nearly five (5) additional months to prepare.
4. On August 24, 2015, this court also entered an order authorizing the defendant to
457
5. The Defendant now seeks to continue the evidentiary hearing for another ninety (90)
day period in order for his expert, Dr. Terence Leland, to become "adequately
prepared to render opinions .... " and in light of the United States Supreme Court's
6. The Office of the Attorney General objects to this request for several reasons.
7. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 (f)(5)(C) states "The trial court may for good cause extend the
time for holding an evidentiary hearing for up to 90 days." (emphasis added) The
the Defendant has already received a continuance of 148 days in this case.
8. Further, Dr. Leland was authorized to be retained nearly five (5) months ago and it
has been nearly fourteen (14) months since the Defendant filed his initial motion for
postconviction relief.
assistance of trial counsel, not the competency or sanity of the Defendant. Only one
of the claims in his amended motion for postconviction relief pertains to his mental
health (Claim 5) and that is an allegation that Defendant suffers from multiple
sclerosis. Surely, if Dr. Leland is able to render such a diagnosis, he could have done
10. The Defendant, at trial, presented the testimony of four (4) mental health experts: (I)
Dr. Wu, a physician; (2) Dr. Golden, a psychologist; (3) Dr. Strauss, a psychiatrist;
and (4). Dr. Morton, a pharmacologist. The Defense also conferred with Dr.
458
II. The case Jaw is clear that the mere hiring of a new expert in postconviction who
counsel. Wheeler v. State, 124 So.3d 865, 885 (Fla. 20 13); Wyatt v. State, 70 So.3d
12. The Defendant also argues that the evidentiary hearing should be continued in light of
the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Hurst v. Florida; he also
requests this Court grant a re-hearing on its order denying Claim VII(B) of his
13. The Hurst decision has no impact on this litigation and should not serve as a basis for
continuance of the evidentiary hearing, nor should the Court grant the Defendant's
request for re-hearing on Claim VII(B). The United States Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Florida Supreme Court have repeatedly
held that Ring1 does not apply retroactively. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348
(2004); Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247 (II th Cir. 2003); and Johnson v. State, 904
So.2d 400 (Fla. 2005). Thus, it follows that Hurst, a ruling clearly based on the Ring
14. Assuming that Hurst could be applied retroactively, Claim VII(B) is procedurally
barred as it should have been raised on direct appeal. Farina v. State, 93 7 So.2d 612,
15. Additionally, Ring, and now, Hurst, are inapplicable because the Defendant had a
prior violent felony conviction (for the murder of Meredith Emerson in Georgia),
which the State proved at trial and to which this Court assigned great weight. Bevel v.
459
16. Furthermore, the jury's recommendation for death in this case was a 12-0 vote, so,
again, Ring/Hurst does not apply. Crain v. State, 894 So.2d 59 (Fla. 2004).
17. Since there is no basis on which to grant re-hearing on Claim VII(B), this Court
should also deny the request for a briefing schedule concerning same.
WHEREFORE, for the aforementioned reasons, the State respectfully requests that this
Court deny Hilton's motion to continue the evidentiary hearing, currently scheduled for January
19, 2016- January 21, 2016, motion for rehearing, and motion for briefing.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to
Defendant's Motion to Continue Evidentiary Hearing, Motion for Rehearing, and Motion for
Briefing Schedule has been furnished via the e-portal to Georgia Cappleman, Chief Assistant
State Attorney, cappelmang@leoncountyfl.gov; Eddie Evans, Assistant State Attorney,
eevans@leoncountyfl.gov; Robert A. Morris, Esquire, alex@ramlawyer.com this 13 1h day of
January, 2016.
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CARINE L. MITZ
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
FLORIDA BAR NO. 0011943
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE CAPITOL, PL-0 I
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050
(850) 414-3300
primary email:
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
secondary email:
carine.mitz@myfloridalegal.com
460
Filing# 36777984 E-Filed 01120/2016 02:46:21 PM
vs.
CASE NO. 2008-CF-697A
DIVISION: FELONY
GARY HILTON,
Defendant.
I
TillS CAUSE, having come before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion to Continue
Evidentiary Hearing, Motion for Rehearing and Motion for Briefing Schedule; and this Court
having reviewed the Motion arid heard arguments of counsel, the Court finds that the recent
issuance of the United States Supreme Court's Opinion in Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, WL
I. The Defendant's Motion is GRANTED and the evidentiary hearing scheduled January
2. A stay of the proceedings is entered in this case until such time as the Florida Supreme
Court can address the questions raised in Hurst v. Florida, No. 14~7505, WL 112683
3. The evidentiary hearing in this case shall rescheduled no sooner than thirty (30) days
and no later than sixty (60) days after the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Lamhrix
v. Jones, Florida Supreme Court Case No. 16-56 or such other case that may intercedelt
to provide this Court guidance with respect to the unresolved matters in Hurst.
461
4. This Court's prior non-final order entered on October 22, 2015 denying Claim VII(B)
is vacated. The Defendant shall have ten (1 0) days from the issuance of an opinion in
Lambrix or any other case that may intercede that provides guidance on the unresolved
VII(B). The State shall have five (5) days thereafter to file a responsive pleading,
1-b +k
dayofJanuary,2016. (nunc pro tuncJanuaryl5. 20161
JAMES C. HANKINSON
CIRCUIT JUDGE
462
Filing# 50355296 E-Filed 12,.:.1/2016 08:45:34 AM
J.L
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO.: 2008-CF-0697
CAPITAL CASE
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
I s I csfkm,~/0;· 2: 9/&',JZ"N'
JENNIFER L. KEEGAN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Florida Bar No.: 0105283
PL-01, The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
jennifer.keegan@myfloridalegal.com
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
Phone: (850) 414-3579
463
Co-counsel for the Plaintiff
464
Filing# 54636911 E-Fi1ed 04/04t2017 04:39:39 PM
DIVISI0N: FELONY
GARY HILTQN, DEATH PENALTY
Defendant.
-------...JI
I. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Thls matter is set for an evidentiary hearing to start on Tuesday, October 3rd ar2:30pm,
cont. Wednesday October 4th a.t 8:30am: (all day), cont. Thursday October 5.that8;30am:
(mo~t all day), cont. FridayQctober 61ha.t 8:30am (all day). . The parties indicate no
scheduling conflicts with these dates, !l){cept .liS follows: .fv1s, Cappleman's regular
co\lrti'oom.dayis Qctober 3, 2017. Mr. Evans and Ms. Keegan are availablef'Orthe State..
fvir, Morris is available fortheDefense,
In accord!l!lc.e with the Americans withi)isabilities Act, persons needing special
accommodation to participate in this proceeding should.contact the Court
Adinillistrator's Office no later than seven days prior to the proceeding al(850) 577-
4300.
Should tJje Defendant seek to file an amended ptist-conviction motioll., the Defendant
shall. file amotion seeking leaveto.RIJlend !l!ld attach ~e amet;tded motion on .or befqrll ~
April 24,,2017.. If the Court grants leave to amen~accepts the.amendi:d ..motlon ll.il&
ppts an,.,,•i9e!!~m, 1~¢btg, in nhe!ur i11 tJ!Ift\ th.e .~ta.te shall fii~ an An.~wer~ithln 3.00' .. .
d. aysofthe qo\lfl'sord.•e.r; 'T'.~e...· bcP•v•i- V\41\.<i ~Nl....,ID14"-''( 1"""""~
.c.-,~. C,.V(dl.,.;.ll\.'\1 o.r"'( \.\-e. ell. to I "\..~ iJ
III.DISCLOSURI: OF WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS
No late~. than 90 days after the &tate files itS answe~ to any .amended post-~onviction
motion (if s1,1chleave.Is granted) odrom the dell.ial ofl.eave to amend the present post-
C:onvictionrootion, both parties shall disclose alldoci.unentary e){hj.bits thlit they intend to
offer at the evidentiary heating, provide an e){hjbit list ofall such (lxhibiis, and exchange
a witness list. with the names iutd addresses of any potential witnesses. All expert
witnes~es sh!lll be so. designated on the witness list, and copies ofall expert repo~ shall
be.attached.
465
All expert witnesses who will testifY at the evidentiary hearing. must sul:lmitwritten
reports, which shall be disclosed to opposing counsel as provided in subdivision Rule
J,8Sl (f)(S)(A), Florida Rules ofCriminaLProcedure. If the defendant intends to .offer
expert testimony of his or her mental status, tbe state shall be entitled to have tbe
defendant examined by its own mental healthexpei'(, If tbe defendant fails to cooperate
with the state's expert, the trial coUrt may, in its discretion, proceed as proVided in Rule
l202(e), Florida Rtiles of Criminal Procedure.
Upon motion, or upon its own motion and without the consent of any party, tbe coUrt may
petinit a wi.fi1es.s to testifY at the evidentiary hearing by contemporaneous video
cmnrininication eqQipml;lnt that makes .the witness visible to all parties during the
testiinony. There lllust be appropriate safeguards for tbe court to maintain s!ltlicient
controLover tbe equipment and tbe transmission oftbe testimony so the collrt maY stop
the communic.ation to accommodate objections or prevent prejudiee. Iftestimony is taken
through video comn111nication equipment, there must be a llotary p!il:llic or other person
at~thorized to administer oaths in the witness's jurisdiction who is prese11t with the
witness and who administers the oath consiste11t with the laws of tbe jurisdiction where
tl;!e witness is located. The>cost for the use of video communication equipi11.ent is the
responsibility ofeither the. requesting party or, if upon its own motion, the CoUrt.
CoUI1.sel for the Defendant .shall be responsible for filing a Motion to Transport .and
obtaining an Order to Transport to procure tbe Defendal1.t1s presence for the sched1ded
hearin&.
l'I. . ~D. qN'E,AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, on this Lday
-t"'-
of v.. \? r ' I , 2017.
{~
AMES C. HANKINSON, CIRCUIT JUDGE
466
Filing# 54690294 E-Filed 04/05/2017 03:35:14 PM
1
STATE OF FLORIDA
vs.
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
_______;Defendant.
1 APPEARANCES
6 and
10
14
15 INDEX
16 PAGE:
17 Certificate of Reporter 11
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1 PROCEEDINGS
2 (Defendant not present.)
3 THE COURT: Be seated, please, folks.
4 We're here in State of Florida v. Gary Hilton,
5 2008-CF-697. We may not have needed to set a hearing on
6 this, but I thought just as a courtesy I would.
7 Basically, I just wanted to see if there is any
8 reason that we continue the stay; and, if not, set some
9 time frames for what's going to occur next. Let me hear
10 first, Mr. Morris, are you aware of any reason why we
11 should continue the stay?
12 MR. MORRIS: Well, while Lambrix is not final at
13 this point, I don't foresee there being a change. And,
14 also, there are multiple other cases that have spoken to
15 the issues of retroactivity, harmless error, et cetera.
16 so I think that there's sufficient case law that provides
17 guidance to the court. so that's a long way of me
18 telling you that, no, I don't see a reason that the stay
19 should remain.
20 THE COURT: State?
21 MS. KEEGAN: Jennifer Keegan for the record, Your
22 Honor.
23 THE COURT: I'm sorry, do that again.
24 MS. KEEGAN: Jennifer Keegan the record, Your Honor,
25 with the Attorney General's office.
1 two period and then they scan those and then put them
2 into the record. It confused me the first time I saw
3 some of those, but that's typically done. That's just
5 record.
475
10
4 motion.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1 CERTIFICATE
2 STATE OF FLORIDA:
3 COUNTY OF LEON:
4 I, JULIE L. DOHERTY, Registered Merit Reporter, do
5 hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken
25
477
Filing# 55382054 E-Filed 0'-., ""0/2017 04:19:55 PM
).\!>
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT.
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the
Procedure and files this Second Motion for Leave to Amend Initial Postconviction
1. As this Court is aware, a stay of the proceedings was entered on January 20,
2016 in the wake of Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505, WL 112683 (.Tan. 12,
2016).
2. This Court lifted the stay of the proceedings at a case management conference
held on March 23, 2017 after confening with counsel for both parties.
478
4. The Court entered a Case Management Order for Evidentiary Hearing on April
4, 2017 setting the case for evidentiary hearing October 3, 2017- October 6,
2017.
5. In the Apri14, 2017 Order, the Court directed that any amended pleaded should
transformations in the last twelve (12) months. See Laws 2016, c. 2016-13, §
3, eff. March 7, 2016; Laws 2016, c. 2016-24, § 49, efT. Oct. 1, 2016; Laws
7. The foregoing evolution of the law through the appellate courts as well as the
479
9. A trial court's refusal to grant a party leave to amend a 3.851 motion is
(Fla. 2008) citing Bryant v. State, 901 So.2d 810,817 (Fla. 2005).
matters that have already been presented to a court. See Surinach v. State, 110
relief are subject to the two-year time limit for filing rule 3.850 motions unless
they merely enlarge an issue or issues raised in the original motion."); Rincon
v. State, 996 So.2d 922, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Admittedly, the foregoing
rulings are pursuant to Rule 3.850, but they provide a lens through which
11. The undersigned has drafted a Second Amended Motion for Post-Conviction
memorandums.
12. The amendments presented are not new claims. They are renumbered and
there are different subsections. However, they serve two purposes. First, they
address the legal issues that have arisen since the imposition of the stay of the
proceedings. Second, they serve to more narrowly tailor the presentation of the
arguments before the Court. All of the amendments provide more specificity
480
and clarity to the legal issues presently before the Court and relate back to the
13. The undersigned has not incorporated attachments/exhibits into the pleading
attached hereto because they are duplicative of those filed with the original
pleading. In the event of that necessity, the undersigned would request leave to
14. The undersigned has conferred with Assistant Attorney General Jennifer
Keegan and she has no objection to the filing of a second amended pleading in
so far as the amendments address the legal arguments that have arisen and
481
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3rd Floor, 301 S. Momoe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State
Leon County Courthouse, 4111 Floor, 301 S, Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallal1assee, Florida32399-1050 on this 20 111 day of April, 2017.
482
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff,
Defendant.
Defendant Gary Hilton, through counsel, respectfully moves this Court for an Order,
pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, vacating and setting aside the judgments of convictions and
sentence, including his sentence of death, imposed upon him by this Court. In support thereof,
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Judge for the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial
Circuit of Florida, Leon County, entered the judgments of conviction and sentence under
consideration. Mr. Hilton was charged by Indictment on February 28, 2008 for first degree murder
of Cheryl Dunlap, grand theft motor vehicle, kidnapping, and grand theft. Exh. A The Office of
the Public Defender for the Second Judicial Circuit was appointed to represent Mr. Hilton. Exh.
B. The State filed their Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty on July 28, 2008. The matter
was called on for trial, and jury selection was conducted between January 31, 2011 and February
2, 2011. R, Jury Selection, 1-1083. The guilt phase commenced on February 4, 2011 and
concluded on February 15, 2011. R, Trial-Guilt Phase, 1-1609. The jury returned a verdict of
guilty of first degree murder (interrogatory verdict of premeditation and felony murder), kidnaping
483
(interrogatory verdict of proof of intent to facilitate a felony and to inflect bodily harm or terrorize)
and grand theft. The jury found Defendant not guilty of grand theft motor vehicle.
The penalty phase commenced on February 17, 2011 and concluded on February 21, 2011.
R, Jury Trial-Penalty Phase, 1-758. The jury returned an advisory verdict of 12-0 recommending
A Spencer hearing was conducted on April 7, 2011. R, Spencer Hearing, 1-48. The judge
sentenced Defendant to death on Apri121, 2011 for Count!. R, Sentencing, 1-6. Defendant was
also sentenced to life on Count II and five (5) years on Count IV, with each sentence to run
consecutively. !d.
The Court found the following aggravating circumstances to support the death sentence:
(1) Defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony based on his conviction for
murder in Georgia (great weight); (2) the capital felony was committed during a kidnapping (great
weight); (3) the capital felony was committed to avoid an·est (moderate weight); (4) the capital
felony was committed for financial gain (some weight); (5) the capital felony was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); and the capital felony was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner (great weight). Hilton v. State, 117 So. 3d 742, 749 (Fla.
2013).
The Court found one statutory mitigating factor-that Defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime. The Court rejected as
unproven the mitigating factor that Defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. The
Court found the non-statutory mitigating factors that (1) Hilton grew up in an emotionally abusive
and neglectful home; (2) Hilton abused drugs, including Ritalin, over a long period of time; (3)
484
Hilton had no relationship with his biological father; (4) Hilton is already serving a life sentence;
(5) Hilton served his country in the military; (6) Hilton suffered maternal deprivation and lacked
bonding of a mother and child; (7) Hilton was placed in foster care as an adolescent; and (8) Hilton
suffered traumatic brain injury as a child. The Court rejected as not proven the non-statutory
mitigating factors that (1) Hilton grew up financially poor and (2) Hilton suffers from severe
Mr. Hilton was sentenced to death for the first degree murder of Cheryl Dunlap; he was sentenced
to a consecutive sentence of life for the kidnapping of Che1yl Dunlap; he was sentenced to a
Defendant appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. The issues on appeal were the
following:
(!)The trial court ened in admitting statements .Hilton made to law enforcement because
the statements included references to inadmissible collateral crimes. The Florida Supreme Court
folll1d that the statements did not include admissions of collateral crimes and showed
(2) The trial court ened in allowing the State to present, through the testimony of Dr.
Prichard, allegations of Hilton's arrests, prior bad acts, and uncharged crimes that were improper,
non-statutory aggravating circumstances. The Florida Supreme Court denied this claim because
this testimony was offered to rebut the penalty phase defense that Mr. Hilton was a law-abiding
485
(3) The trial court erred in excusing the State's expert witness psychologist from the
sequestration rule during penalty phase, in permitting the State's expert to render an opinion on
the validity and credibility of the opinions rendered by the defense mental health experts, and
denying a requested jury instruction concerning the correct use of the State's expert's testimony.
The Florida Supreme Court denied this claim because the State had filed its notice of intent to seek
death late and was unable to send Dr. Prichard to examine Mr. Hilton, so Dr. Prichard needed to
observe the penalty phase to be a meaningful witness for the State. Id at 751-52.
(4) The trial court erred finding the heinous, atrocious, or cruel and the cold, calculated,
and premeditated aggravating circumstances and in relying on the facts of the collateral murder
conviction in Georgia as a basis to find the aggravators. The Flori.da Supreme Court denied this
claim. As to the heinous, atrocious, and cruel factor, it found that there was substantial evidence
that the victim bad been held for several days before her death and that she was injured enough to
bleed. As to the cold, calculated, and premeditated factor, it fow1d that Mr. Hilton's statements to
the police and a fellow prisoner established that he was with the victim for a long enough time to
(5) The trial court erred in rejecting the mitigating circumstance that Hilton had an impaired
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions or to conform his actions to the requirements
of the Jaw without adequate evaluation of the defense expert testimony presented in mitigation.
The Florida Supreme Court denied this claim because it found that the trial court had compared
the expert testimony to the rest of the evidence and follild the State's expert more credible. ld at
754.
procedures are unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment pursuant to Ring v. Arizona. The
486
Florida Supreme Court denied this claim because two of the aggravators were the
contemporaneous kidnapping felony and a prior violent felony, which insulated any Ring error.
!d. at 754-55.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Hilton's conviction and sentence. !d. at 756.
Mr. Hilton respectfully requests that his convictions and sentences, including his sentence
Claim 1: Trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase in violation of Mr.
Hilton's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective counsel
During Mr. Hilton's penalty phase, trial counsel inexplicably failed to elicit relevant
testimony from witnesses on the stand, completely failed to call other witnesses who had helpful
information, and did not adequately consult with and prepare the expert witnesses. Cotmsel's
stewardship during the penalty phase was deficient, and these deficiencies prejudiced Mr. Hilton
by not providing the effective counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
I. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present compelling mitigation evidence
Trial counsel opted for a barebones, streamlined mitigation presentation during the penalty
phase. This left out much of Mr. Hilton's life history and led to a mitigation story that ultimately
hurt Mr. Hilton because it opened the door to the State's harmful rebuttal evidence. Trial counsel
collected historical infonnation about Mr. Hilton's life, which included, among other things, head
injuries, neglect, sexual abuse, suicidal ideations, instability, poverty, and mental illness.
However, the jury never heard a vast majority of this information, including that this was not
simply a case of Ritalin overuse, but instead Ritalin overuse by a man who was already impaired
487
and on the cusp of a breakdown. Trial counsel could have shown the jury that Mr. Hilton's brain
damage and mental illness, in addition to his troubled life history, left him especially vulnerable
to the effects of wrongfully prescribed Ritalin. Had trial counsel presented a more complete picture
of Mr. Hilton's life history, there is a reasonable likelihood that the result of the penalty phase
would have been different and the jury would have voted for life.
A. Mitigating evidence available at the time of trial would have shown Mr.
Hilton's life filled with mental illness, brain injury, childhood abuse and
neglect, unstable relationships, and years of substance abuse.
Cleo Marie Debag nee Reynolds, Mr. Hilton's mother, was born in Calhoun, Georgia, in
1925. She had three siblings, and she was the second oldest When Ms. De bag was eleven-years-
old, her mother died. A few years later, her father remarried a much younger woman. Ms. Debag' s
father and stepmother abused and starved the kids. The parents would put the children outside
without any food, and the children were not allowed to come in. When they were inside, Ms.
De bag's father would hide the food from them. Finally, Ms. Debag's stepmother grew tired of the
children and sent them to live elsewhere. Ms. Debag was left on her grandmother's porch and
eventually moved in with her aunt and uncle. She viewed her aunt and uncle as her parents after
that. Ms. Debag dropped out of school in ninth grade and worked as a dishwasher.
In 1943, Ms. Debag was working as a waitress in a pharmacy when William Esco Hilton
came in. He asked for pennission to take her home, and she agreed. They started dating after this,
and they married tlu·ee months later on October 2, 1943. Mr. William Hilton was thirty-two, and
Three months after they were married, Mr. William Hilton left to join the Army. After
this, Ms. Debag and William Hilton never lived together again. They would see each other
488
sporadically and meet in hotels. Three years after they were married, Ms. Debag got pregnant. At
the time, the IruUTiage was not going smoothly, and Ms. Debag got pregnant intentionally in the
hopes that it would force William Hilton to get them an apartment. Her plan did not work, but
William Hilton left his young family and moved to Jackson, Georgia to open a jewelry
store. He actually had another wife in Jackson at the same time that he was married to Ms. Debag,
and he had four more children. At least two of these children were also abandoned by their father.
2. Mr. Hilton spent his early childhood with his impoverished single
mother
Ms. Debag had been hoping for a girl when she got pregnant, so she dressed Mr. Hilton in
girl's clothes for the first few months of his life. She rented out a room in a house and lived there
with him. There was no cri.b, so he slept in the same bed as his mother. William Hilton was not
providing financial assistance, so they did not have much money. Ms. Reynolds tried to sue him
for child support at one point, but Legal Aid was unable to locate him.
When Mr. Hilton was a baby, Ms. Debag was very attentive. She always had him with her
when she was not working and spent all of her free time taking care of him. She took a lot of
When Mr. Hilton was nine-months-old, Ms. Debag divorced William Hilton. She brought
her baby to the courthouse with her, and he played under the table during the proceedings. William
Hilton would not even acknowledge his son. This was the last time that William Hilton saw his
son. He was later shot and killed by one of his wives, Edna May Hilton, in Lexington, Kentucky
Ms. Debag continued raising her baby by herself. When Mr. Hilton was one-and-a-half,
I
he had to go in for tonsil and adenoid surgery. Ms. Debag had to put hot towels on his head
489
because the pain from his sinuses was so intense. Around this same time, Mr. Hilton also
con!Tacted rheumatic fever. This lasted until he was five-years-old. The doctors told Ms. Debag
not to let Mr. Hilton walk, and after that she carried him until he was three.
Ms. Debag returned to work when Mr. Hilton was two. She made $1.00 per hour and
$25.00 per month. Since Ms. Debag was not making very much money, they either rented out
rooms or lived in housing projects. She would get home very late, so she would make him dinner
and then put him to bed right away. She did not have as much time for her young son, and she did
not get to interact with him as much as she once had. When she did spend time with him, however,
she treated him like a friend instead of her very young child. She was lonely, so she would talk to
Mr. Hilton as if he were an adult and shared personal, mature things with him.
When Ms. De bag could take time off work, she would take Mr. Hilton on trips. She would
take him to see his cousins in Gainesville, Georgia. However, one of his older cousins threw a
mattress on Mr. Hilton and smothered him, almost killing him. Mr. Hilton was only four at the
time.
Even after the sinus surgery, Mr. Hilton continued to suffer from his sinus problems as a
young child. When Mr. Hilton was only five, he was in so much pain that Ms. Debag walked in
on him holding a knife, about to cut his arms. When Mr. Hilton started attending kindergarten, he
Around this time, Mr. Hilton got a pet bird named Pee Wee. He was very attached to the
bird. Ms. Debag left the window open one day, and the bird flew away. Mr. Hilton spent hours
calling for his bird, who never returned. Though it was an accident, Mr. Hilton blamed his mother
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When Mr. Hilton was in second grade, Ms. De bag transferred for work to Tampa, Florida.
They lived in a housing project. Mr. Hilton went to daycare when he was not in school, but it was
not a good one. One day, Mr. Hilton got stuck in a bathroom. When he called for help, nobody
responded. He had to crawl through a window to get out. After that, Ms. De bag started leaving
Mr. Hilton with a neighbor. However, the neighbor tried to throw Mr. Hilton into an alligator pit,
and this terrified Mr. Hilton. He started going to the Boys and Girls Club of Tampa after that,
where he excelled.
Mr. Hilton's life changed for the worse in 1955. When he was nine-years-old, his mother
met and married Nilo Debag. Mr. Debag was a horse trainer from Argentina. He traveled around
to different race tracks around the country. One night, he was at a park in Tan1pa when he came
across Ms. Debag and Mr. Hilton. It was raining, so he offered them a ride and to go get something
to eat. Ms. Debag was still having financial problems, and Mr. Debag had a lot of money. By this
time, Ms. Debag had her own apartment, and Mr. De bag started coming over and staying the night.
Two months after they started dating, Mr. and Ms. De bag got married.
Mr. Hilton's life was very different after his mother's remaniage. He went from having
his mother give him her full attention when she was not at work to her regularly choosing her new
husband over him. Mr. De bag traveled a lot for work, training and buying horses. Mr. Hilton's
mother would go with him, and when she did this she would leave Mr. Hilton with his aunt. Mr.
Debag became possessive over Ms. Debag, and he wanted her all to himself. Once they were
married for two months, they moved to Toledo, Ohio. They left Mr. Hilton behind, and he moved
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Six weeks later, Ms. Debag moved back to Tampa, and Mr. Hilton returned to her care.
Mr. Debag moved separately to Chicago and then Cleveland. Once Ms. Debag and Mr. Hilton
were back in Tampa, they rented a room within a house. A day or two after they moved in, Ms.
Debag was trying to unscrew a Murphy bed bolted to the floor but could not get under it. She
asked Mr. Hilton to go under the bed, but then it fell on his head. Ms. Debag lifted the bed and
started screaming. The metal bars had cut Mr. Hilton's scalp open. A next door neighbor,
Victorine Rowe, heard the screaming and ran. over. She saw Ms. Debag trying to hold bloody
towels over Mr. Hilton's head and to calm down so the towels would stay still. Another neighbor
came over to take them to the hospital. Mr. Hilton was in the hospital for a week, and he received
two hundred (200) stitches in his head. When he finally went back home, his entire head was
bandaged.
Mr. Hilton continued to move around a lot with his mother and stepfather. He changed
schools about every three months. Within a couple years, Mr. Hilton lived in Atlanta, Tampa,
Toledo, Louisville, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and back to Tampa. Mr. and Ms. Debag continued to
pull Mr. Hilton out of school to travel around with him. Mr. Hilton tried to participate in school
activities. For example, in Toledo he became a school patrol; but this was short-lived because he
had to move again. The family went to Tampa, Chicago, Miami, Hialeah, San Francisco, and back
to Hialeah. Between kindergarten and seventh grade, Mr. Hilton changed schools seventeen times.
A few times, he was in school for less than a week. Wben they were in San Francisco, Mr. Hilton
missed school for a month after a flood prevented him from returning to school.
Mr. Debag lived with the family sporadically. One of the times that they were all living
together in Toledo, about a year after Mr. and Ms. Debag were married, Mr. Hilton started
vomiting a lot. Ms. Debag took him to the doctor, who told them that Mr. Hilton had an ulcer.
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The ulcer went away once Mr. Debag was living by himself in Ohio and Mr. Hilton was with his
mother in Florida. Ms. De bag assumed that Mr. Hilton was afraid of Mr. De bag and that is why
he got the ulcer. When Mr. Debag got angry, which was often, he would break and throw things.
One time he tore up one of Mr. Hilton's favorite coats. Ms. De bag told Mr. Hilton not to speak or
respond to Mr. Debag's outbursts. Ms. Debag suspected that Mr. Hilton and Mr. Debag were
jealous of each other because they both wanted all of her time and attention.
When Mr. Hilton was ten, Mr. Debag left for one of his business trips. While he was gone,
Ms. De bag had a miscarriage. Mr. Hilton was the only one around, and he had to call an ambulance
During all this moving around, Mr. Debag brought Mr. Hilton back a Dalmatian named
Muhamad. Mr. Hilton got very attached to the dog and dressed him up for Halloween. He played
with and trained Muhamad. Then, Mr. De bag suddenly took Muhamad away and never brought
him back. Another time, when Mr. Hilton was eleven, they lived next door to a family who got a
puppy. Mr. De bag thought that the family was not taking care of the puppy, so he took it. They
brought the puppy with them when they moved back to Florida. Shortly after the move, the dog
disappeared. Mr. Hilton found the dog's body in a trash can where Mr. Debag had thrown it.
When Mr. Hilton was around eleven or twelve, Ms. De bag came home from work. Mr.
Debag and Mr. Hilton had been home alone together. Mr. Hilton privately told his mother that
Mr. Debag had tried to take off his pants in front of him. Ms. Debag dismissed it and did not
Mr. Debag cared little about education and thought nothing of pulling Mr. Hilton out of
school. When the family moved. to Puerto Rico, then, they did not enroll Mr. Hilton in school
there. Ms. De bag tried to enroll Mr. Hilton in correspondence school, but she never got the paper
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work in. Mr. Hilton was expected to help Mr. De bag because Mr. Debag had been working since
before he was ten and wanted the same for Mr. Hilton. In Puerto Rico, Mr. Hilton was with Mr.
Debag when Mr. Debag was beaten by other horse trainers. Mr. Debag almost died in the beating
Mr. Hilton and Mr. and Ms. De bag returned to Florida when Mr. Hilton was fourteen. They
lived in Miami Beach first, where Mr. Hilton fell out of a tree and broke every bone in his hand.
He did not tell his mother until later that night when he had to tell her because his hand was so
swollen. They moved to Hialeah, Florida next That year, he got a persistent rash in his genital
area. Ms. Debag treated it at home with boric acid. She also got the same rash, but hers was
Around this time, Mr. Hilton started dating Sandy Herman, a classmate ofhis. They mostly
hung out after school and did homework together. Mr. Hilton's other friend at that time, Leonard
Scalfani, was two years older than him and had been held back a few times. Otherwise, Mr. Hilton
did not really socialize with any other students. Ms. Herman went to Mr. Hilton's home a few
times, and she met both of his parents. Ms. Debag was nice to her, but Mr. Debag was distant.
She wa~ not sure if he just did not know much English or if it was his personality, but he would
In 1961, Mr. and Ms. De bag separated. This was one of seven times that this happened.
Mr. Hilton and his mother moved into a one bedroom apartment in a moteL On September 5,
196!, Mr. Hilton stopped off at the apartment to try and reconcile with Ms. Hilton. Mr. Hilton
told Mr. De bag to go away, but Mr. Debag refused. Mr. Hilton threatened to call the police if Mr.
Hilton would not go, but this did not faze Mr. Debag. Mr. Hilton had a gun that he had borrowed
from a friend, so next he threatened to shoot Mr. Debag. Mr. Debag still did not leave and
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encouraged Mr. Hilton to shoot. Mr. Hilton aimed at Mr. Debag's lower stomach and shot him
there. Ms. Debag chose her husband over her son because she talked to a counselor who said it
was her duty to be loyal to her husband. Mr. Hilton was taken into juvenile custody, and the
attorney appointed to represent him made sexual passes at him and paid him for sex. Mr. Hilton
ultimately ended up staying with the Kellers, family friends who offered to take Mr. Hilton in.
While Mr. Hilton was in foster care, Ms. Herman went with Ms. Debag to buy a set of
drums for Mr. Hilton. He taught himself to play and started playing with a band, The Famous
Yell ow Jackets.
The shooting was in the local papers. Ms. Herman broke up with Mr. Hilton right after.
She changed schools, and the two of them just stopped talking. Mr. Hilton was devastated, and he
had a breakdown. He was admitted to Jackson Memorial Psychiatric Unit. After his release from
that unit, he moved in with Margarite and Thomas Perchoux for six months. Margarite Perchoux
worked with Ms. De bag at the time. They lived two blocks away from Ms. Debag, but Ms. Debag
never came to visit her son. She also did not assist financially.
Ms. Debag left Mr. Debag again shortly after, and Mr. Hilton left the Perchouxs to move
back in with his mother. Ms. De bag took Mr. Hilton to Atlanta with her to meet an aunt who was
ill. While there, Mr. Hilton met a young woman around his age, Beverly Hilton, who had the same
last name. When Mr. Hilton told his mother, she went to see Ms. Hilton's mother Verna and
discovered that William Hilton had married Vema Hilton while still married to Ms. De bag. Mr.
Hilton was learning for the first time that he had a sister.
When they returned to Florida in 1963, Mr. Hilton taught himself to play the drums and
struted playing in a band. This was one of the few times Mr. Hilton seemed happy. Usually, he
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was brooding about his horne life. When he played in the band, though, he became a different
person and was in a better mood, although he also bragged a lot about his drum skills.
After Mr. Hilton joined the band, they usually practiced at Mr. Hilton's house because his
mother and stepfather were rarely home. Even though they practiced there several times per week,
one of Mr. Hilton's bandrnates recalls that he only saw Mrs. Debag a few times and Mr. Debag
once. The few times that Mrs. Debag was around, she and Mr. Hilton had an unusual relationship
The band would play at various clubs. Mr. Hilton drank and smoked marijuana after the
gigs. This was the only time Mr. Hilton really communicated normally, since the marijuana
In general, Mr. Hilton had a high opinion of himself and tried telling others how smart he
was. He did not really have friends so much as acquaintances, and he tried to be sociable but was
very socially awkward. Because ofthis, the band members carne and went. Mr. Hilton was critical
During this time, Mr. Hilton was still upset about his home life, and at times he would stay
with other people. This included a stay an attorney who represented Mr. Hilton on one of his
juvenile charges. The attorney was a male much older than Mr. Hilton, who was around fifteen or
sixteen at the time. One of Mr. Hilton's bandmates, Roy Cave, knew that Mr. Hilton continued to
spend time with this attorney after the case was over. The three of them went to a bar one time,
and they got a motel room with two rooms afterward. Mr. Hilton stayed in the room with the older
attorney, and they had sex. When Mr. Cave confronted Mr. Hilton about this later, Mr. Hilton
explained that his attorney was giving him a place to stay and money or drugs.
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Mr. Hilton eventually went on to join a more experienced band. He answered an ad in the
Miami Herald for a band that was looking for a drummer. Mr. Hilton was selected, and he dropped
out of school. He was making money and working late hours, so his mother consented. Mr. Hilton
was only sixteen, however. When the band found out, they had to let him go.
With no job and no high school degree, Mr. Hilton decided to join the army. He was only
seventeen, so his mother had to sign a waiver. She did so even though she still described his
behavior as "infantile."
Mr. Hilton went to go say goodbye to Ms. Herman before he le.ft, although they had not
spoken in a while. He showed up at her school during the lunch hour. Mr. Hilton told her that he
had been staying with an older man, and that this man had been making sexual passes at him.
While he did not explain who this man was to Ms. Herman, this was likely the older attorney that
Mr. Cave had seen with Mr. Hilton. Mr. Hilton told Ms. Herman that he was starting to like it and
In the army, Mr. Hilton was able to earn his G.E.D. He also continued his passion for
drums and was assigned as the dmmmer while they marched. He trained as a paratrooper and had
to jump out of a plane for his graduation. During his military training, Mr. Hilton also developed
a fascination with weapons. He requested to join the Special Forces. He was in a secret unit, the
Davie Crockett Division, which transported nuclear weapons from trucks. Everyone in the unit
had to have a high IQ to get in. Mr. Hilton still did not fit in with the rest of his unit, though. The
unit only had about fifteen members, so the rest of the guys would hang out with each other and
get to know each other. Mr. Hilton was an outcast. He would talk about things that nobody else
wanted to talk about, and he spoke very rapidly. He always wanted to talk about how smatt he
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was and how he thought he would eventually end up in Special Forces. During this time, Mr.
In 1967, Mr. Hilton spent four and a half weeks in the United States Army Medical Center
Psychiatric Hospital. He said he was losing interest in the military and reported hearing voices.
Eventually, Mr. Hilton was found unfit to be in the military, and he was honorably discharged.
Mr. Hilton met his first wife, Ursula, when he was in Germany. They married in 1968.
After his discharge, Ursula moved back to the United States with Mr. Hilton, and they lived in an
apartment with Mr. and Ms. Debag. They divorced in 1971 due to irreconcilable differences, and
Soon after his divorce, Mr. Hilton started dating Paulette Goldman. She introduced Mr.
Hilton to Quaaludes, and he became addicted. He confided in Ms. Goldman that his mother had
Mr. Hilton moved to Atlanta in 1973 where he started working as a telemarketer. A young
woman, Dina Evonne Baugh, came into the company he worked for in 1976 looking for a job. She
moved in with Mr. Hilton almost immediately. She had a son, Cameron, from a previous marriage,
and Cameron lived with them. Mr. Hilton encouraged Ms. Baugh to get her realtor's license.
When she went to get her diploma from the realtor's office, a woman passed out in the lobby. Mr.
Hilton did not even hesitate in performing CPR on the woman. A year after they met, Mr. Hilton
and Ms. Baugh got married. He took to being a stepfather was the homeroom dad for Cameron's
class. However, Mr. Hilton also started drinking heavily. He started drinking to get off the
Quaaludes. He would start one addiction to get over another, and he was soon an alcoholic.
In 1977, Mr. Hilton started a company called Green Light Advertising. He circulated
brochures that had other people's advertisements printed on them. After the starting the company,
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he went to the doctor to get help for his alcoholism. The doctor prescribed Antabuse, a medicine
The marriage to Ms. Baugh was shmt-lived, and they divorced six months after they
married. Mr. Hilton cried when he signed the divorce papers. He continued to live with Ms. Baugh
for another tour months until he found somewhere else to live. Ms. Baugh kept Mr. Hilton's name
In January 1979, Ms. Goldman came to see Mr. Hilton in Atlanta. They had not seen each
other for six years. She was still addicted to drugs. She stayed with him for a week before leaving,
and they did not see each other again after that.
Mr. Hilton was an avid runner, and he started running at Stone Mountain Park in Stone
Mountain, Georgia. He fell in love with a police officer, Sue Ellen Edwards, who worked there.
They married in March 1979, two or three months after they met. Mr. Hilton was Ms. Edwards'
fourth marriage. She had two children from a previous mmTiage, and Ms. Edwards thought that
Mr. Hilton did a good job of walking into a full fmnily. They bought a house using Mr. Hilton's
Veteran's Affairs loan. They divorced seven months later, however. Even after the divorce, they
After the divorce, Mr. Hilton moved to an apartment building in Tucker, Georgia. He met
a fifteen-year-old girl, Shawn Stewart, who lived in his building. Ms. Stewart's mother was the
building manager. Ms. Stewart was on her school's volleyball team, and she and Mr. Hilton started
running together. Mr. Hilton was also friends with Ms. Stewart's mother. Ms. Stewart saw Mr.
Hilton as a father figure. Even when she left for college a few years later, she would still stay in
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In 1982, Mr. Hilton went with his mother to visit his maternal uncle and uncle's wife in
North Carolina. The two women went shopping, and Mr. Hilton stayed with his uncle. While
they were there, Mr. Hilton's uncle made sexual passes at him.
Mr. Hilton continued to make other friends during this time. He met Connie Wagoner in
1983, and he moved in with her and her children. Ms. Stephanie Durham Brim, Ms. Wagoner's
daughter, was about eleven when Mr. Hilton first moved in. He would spend time with her and
taught her how to shoot a bee bee gun. Mr. Hilton started using Quaaludes again when he was
living with Ms. Wagoner. He was eccentric because he was so bubbly and over-the-top, but Ms.
Brim enjoyed having him around. When Mr. Hilton and Ms. Wagoner broke up, it was a peaceful
break and Mr. Hilton moved out. Ms. Wagoner and Ms. Brim went to visit Mr. Hilton in Atlanta
Mr. Hilton was still drinking heavily, and he also started using LSD, marijuana, and other
drugs. His mother refused to come visit him during that time because of his drug use. Also around
this time, Mr. Hilton started running a charity scam. He would call people asking for donations
for his charity, but he was really using the money for himself. He was very good at this, though,
and able to malce a living. Mr. Hilton would stop drinking for good in 1989.
Mr. Hilton randomly decided to reach out to his old high school sweetheart, Ms. Hennan.
He called her parents' house and pretended to be an alumni of her high school or college. They
gave Mr. Hilton her home phone number. He called her one day and they had a brief ten minute
conversation where they just caught up on each other's lives. Then Mr. Hilton made an
In 1984, Mr. Hilton retained a lawyer, Samuel Rae!, on a minor charge. Mr. Rae] got Mr.
Hilton out of the charge, and Mr. Hilton was very appreciative. He started offering to help Mr.
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Rae! file things or giving Mr. Rae! rides to his meetings. Mr. Rae! found Mr. Hilton endearing,
and the two became friends. Mr. Hilton continued to act strangely. When Mr. Rae! put his house
up for sale and had a house tour, Mr. Hilton went and made up outrageous facts about the house.
He told people that Martin Luther King, Jr. had given a speech there and that it had ties to the Civil
War. Mr. Hilton was such a good salesman that people believed him, and it was typical for Mr.
Mr. Rae! and another one of his friends started working on a movie about a serial killer up
in Alaska. Mr. Hilton took an interest in the project. Mr. Rae! gave him small tasks to do around
the set. Later, Mr. Hilton tried to claim more credit for the movie.
Mr. Rae] had. a dog when he became friends with Mr. Hilton, and Mr. Hilton was wonderful
with the dog. He would play with the dog and give it hugs and kisses. He would bring around
more expensive brands of dog foods for the dog. He go out and get dog food even when it was
snowing. That dog passed away, and around 1990, Mr. Rae! got a golden retriever named Yuppie.
Mr. Hilton treated Yuppie the same way he treated the other dog; he loved him. When Yuppie
was almost a year old, he suddenly went missing from Mr. Rael's backyard. Mr. Hilton was
furious and helped Mr. Rae! hang up posters around the neighborhood and search for the dog.
They were not able to find Yuppie. Mr. Hilton also gradually stopped talking to Mr. Rae! around
this time. They went from talking every day to not talking at all. About a year after Yuppie went
missing and Mr. Hilton stopped talking to Mr. Rae!, Mr. Rae! was driving around Atlanta when he
saw Mr. Hilton out running. Mr ..Hi.lton had a dog with him, a dog that looked exactly like Yuppie.
Mr. Hilton continued his life with his dog, now called Ranger. Mr. Hilton was religious
about keeping up with Ranger's shots, and people who observed him during this time said that he
fawned over Ranger. Mr. Hilton took Ranger on vacation with him, including a trip to Washington,
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D.C. in 1994. Mr. Hilton went to find the names of the men he had served with. One of these men
had died on his first day of service in Vietnam. Mr. Hilton found it hard to find places that rented
to dog owners. He started living in storage facilities whenever he could not find a place.
However, Mr. Hilton was also very obsessed with his dog. He collected Rangers' fur in
Ziploc baggies and documented where the fur had been collected from. He noted the dates that he
opened and closed the Ziploc baggies. He kept ajoumal of Ranger's activities, down to the date
and time that Ranger would do trivial things, such as catching a ball.
In 1997, Mr. Hilton was arrested. His mother and Mr. Debag had just been scarnmed out
of $10,000, so they did not have the money to bail .him out. Mr. Hilton was upset that his mother
had paid for the scam and would not pay for her own son to get out of jail. He called his friend
Shawn Stewart, whom he was still friends with. She bailed him out.
Mr. Hilton then went and got a job with John Tabor. He worked on and off for Mr. Tabor's
company, Insulated Wall Systems, for the next ten years. Mr. Hilton's job was to find leads on
people who needed vinyl siding, and Mr. Tabor would do the installation. Mr. Hilton lived in a
house in Chamblee whenever he was working and then stayed in the storage facilities when he was
not. At other times he was homeless or lived out of his van. On April 12, 2000, Mr. Hilton was
homeless when a tornado hit Atlanta. He had to find shelter in a Motel 6 in Norcross. He also
During his time working for Mr. Tabor, Mr. Hilton had confrontations with his co-workers
and other people who worked in the area. One of his co-workers in the late 1990s, Ms. Parrott,
did what she could to avoid him because of his mood swings. He changed daily and sometimes
hourly. When he was upset, he would slam doors and start cursing. He was on the phone trying
to get leads for Mr. Tabor, and he would scream at people and hang up on them if they refused Mr.
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Tabor's services. Ms. Parrott had been with the company longer than Mr. Hilton and was supposed
to train him, but he would get upset with her if she tried to correct him on anything. Mr. Hilton
Another woman who worked in the area, Barbara Speed, worked in an office next to Mr.
Tabor's business for twelve years. Mr. Hilton would come in and ramble on for hours. lt was
difficult for her to have a conversation with him because he would bounce around between topics
so much. Even though they did not know each other very well, he would make strange requests
of her, such as asking her to do his laundry or look up people he knew in the military. Mr. Hilton
was also very territorial. She saw him putting up barricades in the parking lot to try and block
Ranger died in 2002. Mr. Hilton was devastated. He started looking through obituary
pages because he found comfort in reading about other people who had suffered loss. Mr. Hilton
was depressed, and he told multiple people, including mere acquaintances, that he was
contemplating suicide. He still had the bags of Ranger's fur and planned to make a blanket out of
it someday. He also kept Ranger's skin and bones in a tub. He had all of Ranger's toys. He had
In 2003, Mr. Hilton was still distraught over Ranger's death. He saw an ad for a golden
retriever puppy and bought Dandy. Mr. Hilton took Dandy to the same places he had taken Ranger.
He started documenting Dandy's behavior and collecting Dandy's fur in the same way that he had
with Ranger.
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5. When Mr. Hilton started taking wrongfully prescribed medications,
Ritalin and Effexor, his psychological impairments made him that
much more susceptible to their effects, culminating in a mental break
and the 2007 string of crimes
In the early 2000s, Mr. Hilton's mental health started deteriorating rapidly. He regularly
frequented Candler Park in the Atlanta area, and he had run-ins with other people at the park. He
would yell at people for having their dogs off leash and threaten them and/or their dogs if they got
too close to Dandy. He would get right in people's faces to yell at them. He would make
inappropriate sexual comments in front of women, and he usually chose to talk to women instead
of men. He carried around a baton, and sometimes he had a stick that he sharpened into a knife.
Some ofthese people were afraid of Mr. Hilton and called the police.
In 2005, Mr. Hilton became convinced that he had multiple sclerosis. He found an
endocrinologist, Dr. Harry Deicher, in the yellow pages and started going to him for prescription
medication. Dr. Deicher noted that he had multiple sclerosis, without doing the requisite testing,
and prescribed Mr. Hilton with medications like Ritalin and terazosin. He later prescribed Effexor.
The prescription that Dr. Deicher gave to Mr. Hilton was more than three times the dose
recommended by the FDA. He started telling anyone who would listen, including strangers, about
his multiple sclerosis diagnosis. One of the people that Mr. Hilton called to tell about his diagnosis
was his ex-wife Ms. Edwards. He called her to explain that he had told his mother about the
Once Mr. Hilton was on the Ritalin, his behavior became even more bizarre than before.
He became paranoid that Mr. Tabor had stolen $10,000 from him, despite the fact that Mr. Tabor
had loaned him money throughout the years which Mr. Hilton had not repaid. He and Mr. Tabor
got into arguments over the money, and Mr. Hilton left his job. He continued to contact Mr. Tabor
about the money, until finally Mr. Tabor wrote him a check for $2,500 to get him to go away. Mr.
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Tabor included a strongly-worded letier with the check, so Mr. Hilton returned the letter and tore
the check in pieces. He showed up at Ms. Stewart's place of employment and asked her for money.
He was spoke even faster than he usually did. He had lost a lot of weight and some of his teeth
were missing. He told Ms. Stewart that he had quit his job and asked for $800. She gave him the
money because he had given her almost the same amount years before without any hesitation. She
Mr. Hilton left to go camping then.. At all three of the campsites where the crimes. were.
committed, witnesses described him as a bizarre man. He paced back and forth, mostly talking
only to himself, almost as if he was in a trance. When he spoke to other people, he was rambling
and changing topics very suddenly. He tried to convince people to come off the path with him. He
was frustrated and ranting about problems he had with the park. Mr. Hilton was wearing an
After the crimes, the police were still searching for Mr. Hilton, and Ms. Stewart saw his
picture on tl1e TV. Mr. Hilton called her for money one more time. This time, she told him no
Despite the abundance of mitigation evidence trial counsel's mitigation specialist had
uncovered, trial counsel inexplicably failed to present it during ilie penalty phase. Shortly before
the guilt phase, Robert Friedman, lead counsel during the penalty phase, had mentioned to Andy
Thomas, then Deputy Public Defender, that he was going to streamline the penalty phase and call
in just as many witnesses as he needed to thread the story together. Right before the guilt phase
started, Betty Fuentes, the mitigation specialist, found out iliat this meant not calling Dr. Deicher,
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the doctor who had over-prescribed Mr. Hilton's medications. Ms. Fuentes quit the case at that
time because of her frustration with Mr. Friedman's strategy. She had been working on a life
histoty presentation, so two of the other team members, attorney Paula Satmders and fact
investigator Chris EHrich, had to rush to complete the presentation at the last minute.
Once the penalty phase started, Mr. Friedman "streamlined" the penalty phase by relying
mostly on expert testimony. Trial counsel obtained four expert witnesses to testify at the penalty
phase. Several crucial factors in Mr. Bilton's life were briefly mentioned once by an expert
without any kind of explanation and details, including but not limited to, the emotional abuse that
Mr. Hilton suffered at the hands of his mother and stepfather, his admission into a psychiatric
hospital, the sexual abuse he suffered as a juvenile at the hands of his attorney, genetic disorders
within the family, Mr. Hilton's history of delusions and hallucinations, and his years-long battle
with rheumatic fever when he was a toddler. All of these warranted further detail and supporting
Other lay witnesses filled in a few superficial details, mostly via video testimony or over
the phone. By the end of the penalty phase, the jury had not heard much of Mr. Hilton's life
history. The lackluster penalty phase presentation failed to go into: I) the multigenerational
history of mental illness in Mr. Hilton's family; 2) the stark contrast between Mr. Hilton's mother
smothering him as a young child and then neglecting him after her remarriage; 3) Mr. Hilton's
repeated attempts at self-mutilation and/or suicide dating back to age five; 4) the various physical
illnesses that affected Mr. Hilton's mind as a child; 4) his years-long battle with substance abuse
as an adult; and 5) Mr. Hilton's impaired mental state and gradual deterioration throughout his life
that left him vulnerable to the effects of Ritalin overdose. Thus, in comparison to the information
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that was available, trial counsel precluded the jury from hearing how Mr. Hilton got to where he
C. Trial counsel's performance was deficient because they did not investigate Mr.
Hilton's life history, and they failed to present this mitigating evidence that
they did have
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Hilton must show that trial counsel's
performance was deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This occurs
By the time of Mr. Hilton's trial in 2011, it was clearly established law that defendants in
capital cases are entitled to an individualized sentencing at the penalty phase. See e.g., Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("[A]n individualized decision is essential in capital cases.");
Woodsonv. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,304 ("[W]e believe that in capital cases the fundamental
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character
and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the patticular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."); Raulerson v.
Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803,806 (lith Cir. 1984); Barnes v. State, 29 So. 3d 1010,1025 (Fla. 2010).
This is achieved by allowing the jury to "consider all relevant mitigating evidence." Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 307 (1990). Necessarily, counsel in capital cases have a duty to
reasonably investigate and develop mitigating evidence and present that evidence to the jury. See
Rornpilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir.
1994) (counsel has a "duty to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence"); Spann v.
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507
State, 985 So. 2d 1059, 1069 (Fla. 2008) ("An attorney in a capital case has a duty to investigate
and present to the court and the jury, when applicable, the mitigating evidence found to exist.").
professional norms at the time of trial were also clearly developed. The American Bar Association
had provided multiple guidelines requiring counsel in capital cases to investigate the client's life
history "from conception to the time of sentencing," 2003 Guideline lO.ll(F)(l); meet with
potential witnesses in face-to-face, one-on-one interviews, often more than once, 2008 Guideline
lO.ll(C); and hire a mitigation specialist, 2003 Guideline 4.1. This is in addition to the general
requirement that defense counsel in any case provide zealous advocacy to their clients. Criminal
Justice Standards for the Defense Function 4-1.2(b), Fourth Ed. While the ABA standards are
only guides, they may still help the courts in determining what reasonable professional judgment
was at the time of trial. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.
Where trial counsel did discover certain evidence but did not present it, "then a
determination must be made whether the failure to put this evidence before the jury was a tactical
"highly deferential," and courts "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Jd at 689. Accordingly, "strategic
decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been
considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional
Courts have found counsels' actions unreasonable even where the defense team did
conduct a thorough investigation of their client's background but did not present the mitigation at
trial, made an inadequate presentation, or did not prepare the witnesses to testify. This is because
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508
the faiJLU'e to present available mitigating evidence "prejudices a convicted defendant's receiving
an individualized sentence." Hardwick v. Crosby, 320 F.3d 1127, 1163 (1 Ith Cir. 2003).
For example, in Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1991), the defense only
presented two witnesses in addition to their client at the penalty phase. !d. at 1016. The lawyers
in the case did not interview these witnesses until the day before and the day of trial, and they
spoke only for a few minutes. !d. at 1017. Once one of the witness took the stand, they only asked
him six questions. ld. At an evidentiary hearing on state post-conviction, it was revealed that the
witness had much more information than had been asked at trial. !d. A head il'\iury the defendant
had suffered was mentioned "only in passing." I d. at 1018. Trial counsel completely avoided
other topics, such as the defendant's intellectual disability. I d. The Eleventh Circuit found that
this undermined "[t]he primary purpose of the penalty phase ... to inslU'e that the sentence is
individualized by focusing the particularized characteristics of the defendant" and granted penalty
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court vacated a death sentence in Parker v. State, 3 So. 3d
974 (Fla. 2009), where the defense presented a "bare bones" penalty phase and presented the
defendant's life history through the secondhand testimony of defense team investigators rather
than firsthand witness accounts. See id. at 984-85. At first glance, evidence presented during
Parker's penalty phase touched on many of the mitigation themes often found compelling:
These witnesses testified that Parker's childhood was chaotic and dysfunctional.
His father abandoned the family when Parker was only a few months old; his
mother was frequently hospitalized for serious mental problems; he spent his
childhood in a series of foster homes; he was physically and sexually abused; and
he has a long history of alcohol abuse and violent behavior.
!d. at 983-84. During the Rule 3.851 evidentiary hearing, however, more details were provided to
support these broader themes. For example, the mother's "serious mental problems" were actually
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509
an ongoing battle with schizophrenia for which she was repeatedly hospitalized. !d. at 984. The
sexual abuse that had briefly mentioned at trial was at the hands of caretakers and older children
in the community. !d. Moreover, this information came from the actual witnesses rather than the
secondhand testimony of defense investigators. !d. The Florida Supreme Court found this
"fleshed out" evidence should have led to further investigation and been presented at the trial. See
id. at 985. Thus, it is not enough that counsel conduct an investigation and present a brief summary
of a client's life history. The failure to actually present that life history in a manner that resonates
with the jury and provides meaning to the right to individualized sentencing is deficient.
Here, trial counsel's performance was deficient. Much like Cunningham and Parker, the
pre-trial investigation revealed a number of themes for the defense to go into during the penalty
phase, including: !) the multigenerational history of mental illness in Mr. Hilton's family; 2) the
stark contrast between Mr. Hilton's mother smothering him as a young child and then neglecting
him after her remaniage; 3) Mr. Hilton's repeated attempts at self-mutilation and!or suicide dating
back to age five; 4) the various physical illnesses that affected Mr. Hilton's mind as a child; 4) his
years-long battle with substance abuse as an adult; and 5) Mr. Hilton's impaired mental state and
gradual deterioration throughout his life that left him vulnerable to the effects of Ritalin overdose.
However, trial counsel did not present evidence on any of these subjects, choosing instead to
cmsorily summarize Mr. Hilton's childhood and focus on his head injury after the Murphy bed
Trial counsel completely failed to investigate some major areas altogether. For example,
they never did a multigenerational review of mental illness in Mr. Hilton's family. See 2008 ABA
Guideline I O.!l(E)(2)(a) (recommending review extending at least three generations back). They
also failed to investigate Mr. Hilton's time in the military and the effect this had on him mentally.
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510
Rather than calling the lay witnesses who had firsthand accounts about Mr. Hilton's life,
trial counsel relied heavily on experts to present this information. However, trial counsel had not
provided their experts with relevant background materials so that the experts could conduct an
accurate examination of Mr. Hilton's mental health history. They did not provide the experts with
a multigenerational mental and physical health history for Mr. Hilton's relatives. During
discovery, the defense had received Georgia Bureau of Investigation photos documenting Mr.
Hilton's obsession with his dogs, including a plastic container holding his deceased dog's remains;
Ziploc baggies filled with years of fur he had collected from both dogs as well as documentation
of where and when it had been collected; and detailed journals noting mundane activities, such as
fetching a ball. The experts did not receive this clear evidence of mental illness and were unable
to consider it in their assessment of Mr. Hilton. Consequently, the experts made vague passing
comments to just a few of the traumatic events in Mr. Hilton's life, and tl1ey focused mostly on the
Despite trial counsel's reliance on their experts, they failed to prepare their experts before
the penalty phase. One expert, Dr. Wu, testified to Mr. Hilton's exaggerated participation in the
making of a movie. He testified that he believed this claim to be false and that it demonstrated
Mr. Hilton's grandiosity. R, Penalty Phase, 122. In reality, the movie in question, Deadly Rtm,
existed, and trial counsel had succeeded on a motion in limine to prevent mention of the violent
film that was produced twelve years before the crimes. After Dr. Wu's mistal,e, the State's expert
was able to go into the violent nature of the film, testify to its similarities to Mr. Hilton's crimes,
and tell the jury that Mr. Hilton actually had assisted in the making of the film. Trial counsel
missed an opportunity to remedy the situation by failing to cail Mr. Hilton's friend Samuel Rae!.
Mr. Rae! produced the film, and he would have been willing to testify that Mr. Hilton had a very
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511
minor role ofrunning errands around the set, that he became involved in the film after the script
had already been written, that the story was based on a case up in Alaska, and that the crimes in
the movie bore no resemblance to Mr. Hilton's crimes beyond the fact that they took place in the
woods. The failure to prepare Dr. Wu or fix his blunder with Mr. Rael's testimony allowed more
aggravating evidence against Mr. Hilton and affected Dr. Wu's credibility. Finally, trial coU!lsel
called Dr. Strauss to testify to Dr. Deicher's unethical behavior in over-prescribing Mr. Hilton.
Because trial counsel had not properly vetted Dr. Strauss before hiring him, however, they did not
know that Dr. Strauss himself had been subjected to disciplinary action for unprofessional
prescription practices. See R, Penalty Phase, 265. Because trial counsel relied on these experts to
get in mitigating evidence about Mr. Hilton, the experts' decreased credibility reduced the
Moreover, trial counsel did not make use of the witnesses they called. Roy Cave was
definitely available at the time of trial, as he was one of the witnesses who testified. However, the
defense merely asked him about his time in the band and boot camp with Mr. Hilton. See R,
Penalty Phase, 518-21. In reality, Mr. Cave had witnessed the older male attorney coercing the
sixteen-year-old Mr. Hilton into having sex with him, had infmmation about Mr. Hilton's bizarre
behavior even as a teen and his inability to make real friends, Mr. Hilton's substance use at such a
young age, and Mr. Hilton's rocky, argumentative relationship with his mother that left him in a
sullen mood almost all of the time. Trial counsel also called Ms. Sandy Herman, who dated Mr.
Hilton briefly in high schooL See R, Penalty 513-17. They asked her about how kindly he had
treated her in high school but did not ask her about Mr. Hilton's decision to join the anny because
of the strange relationship he had with an older male who was "propositioning" him for sex, or
Mr. Hilton's random decision to find her years after they had last seen each other and sudden
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512
inappropriateness with her during that phone call. This information would have been relevant to
establishing Mr. Hilton's long history of mental illness and how vulnerable his mental state was
even before the Ritalin, but trial counsel simply did not present the evidence.
Finally, trial counsel elicited testimony that Mr. Hilton had diagnosed himself with
multiple sclerosis, see e.g., R. Penalty Phase, 120, but they never actually confirmed whether or
not he had it. They failed to do so despite the fact that multiple sclerosis testing could have helped
the defense no matter the result. Multiple sclerosis is a neurological disease and could have
affected Mr. Hilton's mental state. Alternatively, if Mr. Hilton did not have multiple sclerosis,
then he was exhibiting paranoia and frustration about a disease that he did not have, at times even
By ignoring much of Mr. Hilton's history, the jury was unable to understand that Mr. Hilton
was in a vulnerable position mentally for much of his life rather than just after he started using
Ritalin, making him that much more susceptible to the effects of Ritalin abuse and overdose. This
nuance was especially important when Ritalin is a well-known drug, and the jurors likely
associated its use with helping to calm down children suffering from attention disorders. The jury
would not have understood its impact on a mentally vulnerable adult who became more manic
after its use. Trial counsel's failure to make this clear fell below an objective standard of
Mr. Hilton must also show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Prejudice exists where "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." !d. at
694. In reaching a determination on prejudice, courts have looked not just at the achtal death
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513
sentence imposed, but also whether or not certain mitigating factors were rejected, whether the
evidence would have rebutted certain aggravating factors, and whether reviewing courts relied on
the lack of evidence to affirm the conviction. For example, in Parker, the Flmida Supreme Court
reviewed new evidence presented during the Rule 3.851 evidentiary hearing and noted that on
direct appeal, it had affirmed the trial court's finding of no mitigating factors because there had
not been sufficient evidence to support such a finding. Parker, 3 So. 3d at 984.
Here, Mr. Hilton was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficiencies in not presenting
compelling, readily-available mitigation evidence. Mr. Hilton has suffered from severe mental
illness for most of his life, but the trial court rejected the statutory mitigating factor that Mr. Hilton
was substantially impaired and could not conform to the requirements of the law, and it rejected
the non-statutory mitigating factor that he suffered from severe mental defects. Despite the fact
that Mr. Hilton's mother made only $1.00 an hour and $25.00 per month and could not afford an
apartment for herself and her son, the trial court rejected the mitigating factor that Mr. Hilton grew
up financially poor. This is because while trial counsel quickly glazed over these aspects of Mr.
Hilton's life, they did not provide the necessary details to actually prove these mitigating factors.
This resulted in the court finding three fewer mitigating factors than actually existed, and Mr.
Indeed, the defense's failure to present a fuller picture of Mr. Hilton's life history actually
assisted the State 's rebuttal presentation. Because the penalty phase defense suggested that the
Ritalin was the major catalyst for change in Mr. Hilton's behavior and he had been fine before
that, the State was allowed to call Dr. Prichard to testify about Mr. Hilton's prior tmcharged
offenses, including soliciting money for charity only to keep it himself and the tmproven hearsay
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514
allegations that Mr. Hilton had inappropriately touched his ex-girlfriend's daughter. The trial court
And I understand that there were a whole lot of things that carne out in the expert's
testimony that normally would be, you know, verboten, I mean.·- just couldn't do.
But the whole theme of the defense expert's testimony was that Mr. Hilton never
did anything wrong until these murders, and that it was a sudden change in his life
created by Ritalin that brought about- it was based on, you know, these medical
problems compow1ded by his brain damage. And I think that just kind of opens the
door. I think the State has the right to contest that this is in fact the situation.
R, Penalty Phase, 520. Thus, unlike in other cases where courts have found trial cow1sel 's
decision not to introduce mitigating evidence because of the possibility of opening the door
to harmful rebuttal evidence, see, e.g., Douglas v. State, 141 So. 3d 107, 121 (Fla. 2012),
here, trial counsel's .failure to present more expansive mitigating evidence allowed this
harmful evidence to come in. This prejudiced Mr. Hilton not only during his penalty phase,
where this evidence effectively rebutted the mitigation presented, but also on direct appeal.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admission of Dr. Prichard's testimony
because "Hilton's penalty phase defense relied heavily on the assertion that Hilton was a
law-abiding citizen prior to his exposure to Ritalin. Dr. Prichard's testimony was provided
in rebuttal to that assertion." Hilton v. State, 117 So. 3d 742, 751 (Fla. 2013). Mr. Hilton
was doubly prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance, and he is entitled to a new
penalty phase.
Claim 2: Trial counsel was ineffective because the defense team was in complete disarray,
due to inconsistent preparation, a fractured and divisive team, unreasonable caseloads, and
the unreasonable strategic decisions that resulted
Many of the problems before and during the trial were a conseqllence of the chaotic nature
of the defense team assigned to Mr. Hilton's case. Throughout its representation of Mr. Hilton,
the team engaged in eruptive team feuding and w1dermined each other's strategies. This led to the
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515
repeated shifting of roles, including in the weeks leading up to trial. This chaos reached its peak
when two of the team members withdrew from the case in the middle of the trial. The in-fighting
prevented them from providing the competent assistance of counsel required by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Moreover, the high case load at the Public Defender's Office at the time
also affected trial counsel's ability to effectively represent Mr. Hilton. Accordingly, Mr. Hilton is
I. Trial counsel was ineffective due to the divisive nature of the defense team
When the Public Defender's Office was first appointed to represent Mr. Hilton, the office
assigned a standard team to the case: Ines Suber as lead counsel, Steven Been as second chair,
Betty Fuentes as mitigation specialist, and Chris EHrich as fact investigator. They started receiving
discovery, and Mr. Been soon left the division for unrelated reasons. This began a revolving door
of attorneys. Robert Friedman was brought in from the appeals unit to help out. Tracy Record
came in as second chair, but she left the unit within a couple months. Nicole Jamieson and
Merribeth Bohanon, two other young attorneys in the office, helped out with projects that came
up.
It became quickly apparent that this case needed to focus on the guilt phase. Ms. Suber
had successfully negotiated plea deals with the State in the past, but such an outcome was not
likely in this case. She continued to try and focused a lot of energy and resources on going through
the physical evidence and consulting with forensic experts. In the meantime, Ms. Fuentes started
an expansive mitigation investigation that would ultimately result in her speaking with over 300
witnesses.
As the discovery came in, Ms. Suber did not allow anyone else to have a full picture of the
case. She selected which team members got to go review the physical evidence, mostly relying on
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516
Ms. Fuentes. Other team members made copies of what they did have, but there was no stlucture
or organization, and no one person other than Ms. Suber knew everything about the case. As a
result, many documents were lost or overlooked. The State started requiring the defense team to
sign a log whenever the prosecutors disclosed evidence after the third or fourth time that the
defense claimed not to have received discovery that had previously been disclosed.
Ms. Suber continued to focus on combating the forensic evidence, and the other team
members struted to disagree with her. Ms. Suber was also working long hours and had difficulty
sleeping. She went to the doctor and got a prescription for Ambien. Tbis helped her sleep, but she
suffered from adverse side effects where she would black out and not remember things she had
done after taking it. Other members of the team reported getting emails fl·om Ms. Suber in the
middle of the night, between 2:00 and 4:00 a.m. This happened on a regular basis, and the emails
were often rambling and vitriolic; she would chastise them for things they had and had not done.
There was also little communication with Mr. Hilton about the reality of the case against him. Mr.
Friedman was permanently brought into the team. He was supposed to serve as Ms. Suber's second
chair in the guilt phase, and then in the penalty phase, Mr. Friedman would serve as lead counsel
Several of the members of the team went to talk to N arrey Daniels, the Public Defender.
They were concerned that Ms. Suber was wasting all her time and energy on the guilt phase, and
that she was going for a futile innocence strategy. Ms. Fuentes had already uncovered the evidence
of Mr. Hilton's downfall after becoming addicted to the Ritalin, and she thought that they should
incorporate that into the guilt phase. Then, even if it did not work to clear Mr. Hilton of first-
degree murder, it would lay the groundwork for the penalty phase. Ms. Daniels suggested that
they recommend this strategy to Ms. Suber, but Ms. Suber rejected this strategy. Ms. Fuentes was
35
517
so upset by this that she threatened to quit. Ms. Daniels, and others in the office, requested her to
stay and continue to help. They also reminded her that her place on the team was as an investigator,
In the summer of 2010, about six months before the trial was supposed to start, the team
was confident in getting a continuance. Ms. Suber had already booked a five week trip home to
visit her family, a trip she took every December. Right before they filed the continuance motion,
however, the case changed judges. Judge Hankinson denied the continuance, and they only had a
This caused a complete breakdown in the team. Ms. Suber was devastated that she would
not get to take her trip. She actually tried to go on a five-week trip anyway, but Ms. Daniels told
her she could not take such a long leave before this trial. The case was also not even close to
having a complete investigation. They had started on the minor motions and met with minor
witnesses, but they had not started reaching out to the more significant guilt phase witnesses yet
at all. Plus, there was still the argument over whether they should present some kind of mental
Once it was clear that the team was not working together, Ms. Daniels put Ms. Suber solely
in charge of the guilt phase and Mr. Friedman solely in charge of the penalty phase. Ms. Daniels
also brought in Paula Saunders from the appeals unit. Ms. Saunders had worked smoothly with
Ms. Suber in the past, and Ms. Daniels thought that it would help Ms. Suber from feeling ganged
up on. The remaining junior attorney, Ms. Bohanon, started off doing tasks for both but ultimately
After this shift, the team was completely fractured. Ms. Saunders uJtimately agreed with
Mr. Friedman, and she started working on pretrial motions and the penalty phase. Furthermore,
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518
Ms. Suber felt that Ms. Saunders was there to get her spot on the case, so she did not trust Ms.
Saunders. Meanwhile, Ms. Saunders hoped that Ms. Suber would be able to keep going because
Ms. Saunders did not know enough about the case to take the lead in the guilt phase if Ms. Suber
got pulled from the team. Both sides developed their phases individually. They did not invite
each other to meetings, and they did not collaborate on a theme. Going into trial, the defense team
TI1e problems did not dissipate once the trial started. During jury selection, some members
of the team were upset because Ms. Suber requested more peremptory challenges because of the
mass amount of media attention, but then when the court granted them, she did not use them to get
people off of the case. Ms. Suber and Ms. Saunders argued various pretrial motions, and Ms.
Suber was ill-prepared and stumbling in court. She admitted as much, saying multiple times on
the record that they were not prepared to proceed to trial. Once, she even arrived late. Other
members of the team were shocked because Ms. Suber had been a great trial lawyer in the past and
Once the guilt phase started, the consequences of having fractured phases really showed.
Ms. Suber introduced evidence that the penalty phase lawyers would have preferred stayed out.
Most importantly, she relied on the fully adversarial hmocence defense. She challenged the
overwhelming forensic and physical evidence, ignoring the fact that even if the jury ruled out one
piece, there was still so much left to consider. Ms. Suber also objected to minor issues, coming
off as overly combative. At one pomt, one defense counsel objected to another defense counsel.
Ms. Suber continued her bumbling presentation that had started in the pre-trial motions.
If possible, the penalty phase was even more chaotic. Shortly before the guilt phase, Robert
Friedman, lead counsel during the penalty phase, had mentioned to Andy Thomas, then Deputy
37
519
Public Defender, that he was going to streamline the penalty phase and call in just as many
witnesses as he needed to thread the story together. Right before the guilt phase started, Betty
Fuentes, the mitigation specialist, found out that this meant not calling Dr. Deicher, the doctor who
had over-prescribed Mr. Hilton's medications. Ms. Fuentes quit the case at that time. She had
been working on a life history presentation, so Ms. Saunders and Mr. EUrich had to complete the
presentation.
Ms. Bohanon returned to court the next day to realize that nobody had informed Mr. Hilton
that Ms. Fuentes was no longer with the team, despite the fact that he was closer to Ms. Fuentes
than to anyone else on the defense team. Mr. Friedman and Ms. Saunders then told Mr. Hilton
that Ms. Fuentes was overworked and had had a breakdown. Ms. Bohanon told Mr. Hilton that
Ms. Fuentes had a strategic difference with the others and that she had left, so Ms. Saunders asked
her to leave the courtroom. Ms. Saunders accused Ms. Bohanon of undermining the relationship
with the client. She also believes she heard Ms. Bohanon telling Mr. Hilton that they were
providing ineffective assistance of counsel. This defeated the months of work they had put into
cultivating a relationship with Mr. Hilton, and Ms. Bohanon was banned from the courtroom. She
Once the penalty phase started, Mr. Friedman "streamlined" the penalty phase by relying
mostly on expert testimony. The experts made vague passing comments to just a few of the
traumatic events in Mr. Hilton's life, and they focused mostly on the Murphy bed incident and the
Ritalin prescriptions. Other lay witnesses filled in a few superficial details, mostly via video
testimony or over the phone. Similar to the guilt phase, several of the witnesses testified to things
that the defense had successfully fought to keep out during the guilt phase.
38
520
This inability of the defense team to work as a unit on the case resulted in the defense
team's deficient performance. Because the team could not get along and multiple members left
the capital unit while the case was still going, those representing Mr. Hilton did not have time to
review the entire case file. Other than Ms. Suber, no one on the team saw the entire file because
she was possessive about it and would not let them see it. The constant rotation of team members
left the files disorganized, so no one knew where anything was. Some members, such as Ms.
Sanders, were appointed to the case right before trial, and others, namely Ms. Fuentes and Ms.
Bohanon, left abruptly in the middle of trial so that the other members had to quickly step in and
perform their work without a full understanding of the case. This division caused multiple mishaps
at trial. The team members working on the guilt phase had no idea what the team working on the
penalty phase was doing. The penalty phase team later felt that evidence was introduced in the
guilt phase that they would have preferred not to have before the jury. Then, as explained above
in Claim 1, in the penalty phase, a defense expert in the penalty phase bringing up evidence that
guilt phase counsel had successfully kept out through a motion in limine.
All of this chaos was not the effective assistance of counsel required by the Constitution.
Trial counsel's performance was deficient and prejudiced Mr. Hilton, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687, because he did not have a defense team that agreed on and united around a strategy, and trial
counsel was making decisions about the case without knowing all of the relevant information.
II. Trial counsel was ineffective because they had an excessive workload at the time of
Mr. Hilton's trial, which prevented them from dedicating the necessary time and
resources to his case
The defense team was not working on Mr. Hilton's case in a vacuum, and the Public
Defender's Office had several other high proftle cases at the same time. The capital unit at the
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521
time comprised of Ms. Suber as lead counsel and whomever the Office appointed as her co-
counsel. Ms. Fuentes was the mitigation specialist, and Mr. Ellrich was the fact investigator.
These four were expected to handle all of the capital cases in the Second Judicial Circuit. At the
time, this included the Rachel Hoffman murder, another case that garnered extensive media
coverage and included a wrongful death civil suit. Another case the office had at the same time
as Mr. Hilton's case was out on St. George's Island, so the team had to drive nearly two hours out
of Tallahassee to meet with witnesses on that case. Ms. Bohanon and Ms. Jamieson were both
involved in that case. Another one of the cases involved an intellectual disability claim, so the
Office expended many resources on the development of that case. Under this pressure, trial
counsel requested multiple continuances once the trial started, all of which were denied.
This highly centralized workload onto such a small unit prevented the team from focusing
as much attention on Mr. Hilton's case as they needed to. The Florida Supreme Court "has
repeatedly recognized that excessive caseload in the public defender's office creates a problem
regarding effective representation." Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State,
115 So. 3d 261,282 (Fla. 2013). This is because "[w]hen excessive caseload forces the public
defender to choose between the rights of the various indigent criminal defendants he represents, a
Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 1990). Indeed, the Florida Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar allow for counsel to withdraw from a case when "there is substantial
risk that the representation of 1 or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer." Rule 4-
1.7(a)(2).
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522
Both trial counsel's failure to make use of this rule and the inadequate representation they
provided as a result were deficient performance and prejudiced Mr. Hilton. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687. The high workload prevented counsel from interviewing all of the witnesses they
needed to by the time the trial started, and they failed to review all of the documents in the case.
Indeed, they overlooked a report by a correctional officer who overheard Mr. Hilton confessing to
the crime to another prisoner and thus were surprised by his testimony at trial. Up Lmtil that point,
trial counsel's defense strategy had been that the State's case was based on circumstantial
evidence. The correctional oftlcer's testimony completely undermined their strategy, and had they
not overlooked the witness, they would have pursued a more sensible defense or at least would
have been prepared to rebut his testimony. This constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and
Claim 3: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a cohesive, united defense in the
guilt and penalty phases
Trial counsel spent a majority of the guilt phase futilely trying to combat the overwhelming
forensic evidence in this case. Trial counsel's defense strategy was that the State's case was mere! y
circumstantial, and at some points they even suggested that witnesses had identified someone else
as the main suspect. See, e.g., R, Guilt Phase, 1533 (during closing argument, Ms. Suber reminds
the jury that witness testimony identified a taller man in his 40s rather than Mr. Hilton as the
perpetrator). Then, in the penalty phase, they presented evidence that Mr. Hilton had committed
this crime because he had a mental breakdown after Dr. Deicher over-prescribed rum Ritalin. See,
e.g. R, Penalty Pha~e 123 (Dr. Wu testifies that Mr. Hilton "was never violent li!Jtil he started to
get on Ritalin."). Because trial counsel presented a guilt phase defense that contradicted the
penalty phase defense, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and Mr. Hilton is
41
523
As previously explained in Claim 2, a majority of the defense team wanted to present a
guilt phase defense that Mr. Hilton was affected by the over-prescription of Ritalin. This would
have been much more reasonable than the denial of guilt the defense actually presented. Indeed,
this is the strategy recommended by the ABA Guidelines. See 2003 Guideline 10.10.1 ("(T]rial
counsel should formulate a defense theory. Counsel should seek a theory that will be effective in
connection with both guilt and penalty, and should seek to minimize any inconsistencies.").
However, Ms. Suber insisted that they go with an adversarial approach and try to undermine all of
the forensic evidence, despite the fact that the evidence in this case was overwhelming and that
even if she succeeded in diminishing one type of evidence, there was still an abundance of evidence
to establish Mr. Hilton's guilt. Trial counsel's decision to deny Mr. Hilton's guilt in the guilt phase
and then completely change messages and blame the Ritalin in the penalty phase diminished their
The Florida Supreme Court has refrained from finding ineffective assistance of counsel
where a defendant asserted that trial counsel should have presented mitigating evidence when that
mitigating evidence was inconsistent with the guilt phase theory. See, e.g., Blanco v. State, 963
So. 2d 173, 179 (Fla. 2007) (denying an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because "the
mitigators Blanco argue[d] should have been presented at his penalty phase [were] inconsistent
with his theory of the case: that he is innocent of [the] murder"). It stands to reason, then, that it
does constitute ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel to knowingly present inconsistent
guilt and penalty phases. Here, that is just what trial counsel did, and their representation was
ineffective. Mr. Hilton is entitled to a new trial under Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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524
Claim 4: Defendant's death sentence violates Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State
Mr. Hilton's death sentence is unconstitutional under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments in
light of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State. Both Hurst decisions apply retroactively to Mr.
Hilton's case under the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla.
20 16). The Hurst decisions are also required to be applied retroactively to Mr. Hilton under federal
law. The State cannot meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Hurst error
was harmless. Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, Mr. Hilton requests that this Court
Mr. Hilton's death sentence violates Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State. In Hurst v.
Florida, the United States Supreme Court held that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violated
the Sixth Amendment because it required the judge, not the jury, to make the findings of fact
required to impose the death penalty under Florida law. 136 S. Ct. at 620·22. Those flndings
included: (I) the aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether
those aggravators were "sufflcient" to justify the death penalty; and (3) whether those aggravators
outweighed the mitigation. Florida's unconstitutional scheme first required an advisory jury to
render a generalized sentencing recommendation for life or death by a majority vote, without
specifying the factual basis for the recommendation, and then empowered the sentencing judge
alone, notwithstanding the jury's recommendation, to conduct the required fact-finding. !d. at 622.
The Supreme Court held that before making its recommendation, the jury, not the judge, must
make the findings offact required to impose the death penalty under Florida law. !d.
In Hurst v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that, in addition to the principles
articulated in Hurst v. Florida, the Eighth Amendment also requires unanimous jury fact-finding
43
525
as to (I) which aggravating factors were proven, (2) whether those aggravators were "sufficient"
to impose the death penalty, and (3) whether those aggravators outweighed the mitigation. 202 So.
3d at 53-59. The Court made clear that each of those determinations are "elements" that must be
found by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt.Jd. at 57; see also Jones v. State, No. SC 14-
990, 2017 WL 823600, at *16 (Fla. Mar. 2, 2017). In addition to rendering unanimous findings
on each of those elements, the Court explained that the jury must unanimously recommend the
death penalty before a death sentence may be imposed. Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d at 57 ("(B]efore
the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the jury in a capital case must
unanimously and expressly find all the aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death, unanimously
find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and unanimously
recommend a sentence of death."). The Court further cautioned that, even if the jury unanimously
found each of the elements required to impose the death penalty satisfied, the jury was not required
to recommend the death penalty. !d. at 57-58 ("We equally emphasize that ... we do not intend
to diminish or impair the jury's right to recommend a sentence of life even if it finds the
aggravating factors were proven, were sufficient to impose death, artd that they outweigh the
mitigating circumstances.").
The Florida Supreme Court also ruled that Hurst claims must be subjected to individualized
harmless error review, and that the burden is on the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the Hurst error did not impact the sentence. !d. at 67-68. lfthe State is unable to make that showing,
Mr. Hilton's jury was never asked to make unanimous findings on any of the elements
required to impose a death sentence under Florida law. Instead, after being instructed that its
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526
verdict was advisory, and that the ultimate responsibility for imposing a death sentence rested with
the judge, Mr. Hilton's jury rendered only a generalized advisory recommendation to impose the
death penalty. The record does not reveal whether the jurors unanimously agreed that any
particular aggravating factors was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or unanimously agreed that
those aggravators were sufficient to impose the death penalty, or unanimously agreed that those
Accordingly, Mr. Hilton's death sentence violates the Sixth and Eighth Amendments in
B. Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State apply retroactively to Mr. Hilton's case.
The Florida Supreme Cowt has found that both Hurst decisions apply retroactively to Mr.
Hiltons whose sentences were final after the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona,
122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), on June 24, 2002. Here, Mr. Hilton's conviction became final on
December 2, 2013, when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari off
direct appeaL See Hilton v. Florida, 117 So. 3d 742 (2013). Thus, his sentence was final after
C. The Hurst error in Mr. Hilton's case was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt
Because Mr. Hilton's death sentence violates Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State, and those
decisions are retroactive to him, Mr. Hilton should be granted relieffrom his death sentence unless
the State can prove that the Hurst error was "harmless beyond a rea~onable doubt" In the Hurst
context, the Florida Supreme Court has defined "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" as "no
reasonable probability that the error contributed to the sentence." Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d at 68.
45
527
1. The State bears the burden of establishing harmlessness
The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the burden is on the State to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Hurst error did not impact the Mr. Hilton's death sentence.
See Id at 67-68 ("[T]he burden is on the State, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury's failure to unanimously find all the facts necessary for imposition
of the death penalty did not contribute to [the] death sentence."). The "State bears an extremely
heavy burden" in this context. !d. at 68. A court's finding that a Hurst error was harmless will be
"rare." King v. State, No. SC!4-1949, 2017 WL 372081, at* 17 (Fla. Jan. 26, 2017).
The Florida Supreme Court has indicated that a unanimous jury recommendation is a factor
in Hurst harmless error analysis, but not necessarily a dispositive factor in every case. The Court
has emphasized this principle on several occasions. In Hall v. State, the Court stated that a jury's
unanimous recommendation "lays afoundation for us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt" that
the Hurst error was ham1less, and then assessed other harmlessness factors, such as the "egregious
facts" of the case, reflecting a traditional harmless error analysis that evaluated the aggravation
and mitigation. No. SCIS-1662, 2017 WL 526509, at *22-23 (Fla. Feb. 9, 2017) (emphasis added).
Again in King v. State, the Court emphasiz.ed that the unanimous recommendation was not
dispositive, but rather "begins a foundation for us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt" that the
Hurst error was harmless. 2017 WL 372081, at* 17 (emphasis added). In Woodv. State, No. SC!5-
954,2017 WL 411336, at *13 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2017), the Court indicated that a Hurst error in a
unanimous-recommendation case would-if the case were not already being remanded for
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528
imposition a life sentence on proportionality grounds-require a remand for a new penalty phase
More recently, in Jones v. State, the Court explained that the instructions to the jury, in
combination with the unanimous recommendation, allowed the Court to conclude that three of the
required elements for a death sentence had been satisfied-sufficiency of the aggravation, weight
of the aggravation relative to the mitigation, and the unanimous recommendation-but that an
individualized examination of the specific aggravators found by the judge was still necessary to
determine whether "the remaining element: that the jury unanimously and expressly find all the
aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt"-was satisfied. 2017 WL
823600, at *16 (internal quotes omitted). Thus, the Court has made clear that in some unanimous
recommendation cases the Hurst error was not harmless. Mr. Hilton's is such a case.
The Hurst error in Mr. Hilton's case should not be ruled harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, not only due to the problems inherent in using the advisory jury's recommendation to infer
what fact-finding would have occurred in a constitutional proceeding, but also because the
circumstances of this case reflect, more other unanimous-recommendation cases the Florida
Supreme Court has addressed, a reasonable probability that the Hurst error impacted the sentence.
conclude that the jury would have unanimously found all the required elements for the death
penalty satisfied in a constitutional proceeding, particularly in light of the jury's belief about its
47
529
As a general matter, it is only logical that a unanimous pre-Hurst jury recommendation
does not serve as a complete bar to Hurst relief under the harmless error doctrine. After all, Florida
juries before Hurst, including Mr. Hilton's, made only a general recommendation to impose the
death penalty, without deciding if any of the other required elements had been satisfied. In Hurst
v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that the jury must render unanimous fact-finding, under
a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, on all of the required elements for a death sentence: (1)
which aggravating factors were proven, (2) whether those aggravators were "sufficient" to impose
the death penalty, and (3) whether those aggravators outweighed the mitigation. 202 So. 3d at 53-
59. The jury's unanimous findings on those elements must precede the jury's vote as to whether
to recommend a death sentence. See id. at 57 ("[B]efore the trial judge may consider imposing a
sentence of death, the jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the
aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously find that the
aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors
Therefore, even in cases where the jury unanimously recommended death, there is no way to know
whether the jury would have unanimously found all the other preceding elements satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt. See Hall, 2017 WL 526509, at *24 (Quince, J., dissenting) ("Even though the
jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, whether the jury unanimously found each
aggravating factor remains unknown."). Indeed, Mr. Hilton's jurors may have reached a
unanimous overall recommendation, but there is nothing in the record that reveals the basis for the
recommendation, and there is therefore a reasonable probability that each juror, or groups ofjurors,
may have based their recommendations on a different calculus. The Florida Supreme Court has
made clear that all jurors must be on the same page with respect to each of the underlying elements.
48
530
And as the Florida Supreme Court cautioned in Hurst v. State, engaging in speculation
about the jury's fact-finding "would be contrary to our clear precedent governing harmless error
review." 202 So. 3d at 69; see also Mosley, 2016 WL 7406506, at *26. The reasoning the Court
supplied in declining to speculate about the jury's fact-finding in Hurst v. State, even though that
case involved a non-unanimous jury recommendation, applies equally to Mr. Hilton's unanimous
jury recommendation:
202 So. 3d at 68. Here too, this Court cannot determine what aggravators Mr. Hilton's jury found
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, how many jurors found which particular aggravators sufficient
for death, or how the jurors conducted the weighing process (particularly given the uncertainty
This uncertainty as to what the advisory jury would have decided if tasked with making
the critical findings offact takes on additional significance in light of the principles articulated in
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). In
Caldwell, the Court held that a capital sentence is invalid if it was imposed by a jury that believed
that the ultimate responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rested
elsewhere and not with the jury.Jd at 328-29. The Supreme Court explained that it "has always
premised its capital punishment decisions on the assumption that a capital sentencing jury
recognizes the gravity of its task and proceeds with the appropriate awareness of its truly awesome
dete1mination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for
49
531
determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death sentence lies elsewhere." ld at 328-29,
Mr. Hilton's jury was led to believe that its role in sentencing was diminished when the
Court instructed it that its sentence was advismy. It was with these instructions in mind, which
informed Mr. Hilton's jury "that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death sentence lies elsewhere," id at 328-29, that the jurors rendered a unanimous
recommendation to impose the death penalty. Given the jury's belief that it was not ultimately
responsible for the imposition of Mr. Hilton's death sentence, this Court cannot even be ceJiain,
to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt, that the jury would have made the same unanimous
recommendation without the Hurst error. In light of the principles articulated in Caldwell, this
Court therefore also cannot be certain, to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt, that the jury would
have unanimously found all of the other required elements satisfied. And, of course, the Court
cannot be sure that the jury would have declined to exercise its discretion to unanimously
recommend a life sentence after itself making the findings on the other required elements.
Moreover, the jury's consideration of the mitigation in Mr. Hilton's case may have been
significantly impacted by the jury's knowledge that it was not ultimately responsible for the
sentence. In a constitutional proceeding, where the jmy was properly apprised of its role as fact-
finder, the jury may have afforded greater weight to the mitigation in Mr. Hilton's case. As such,
it cannot be concluded that a jury would have tmanimously found or rejected any specific
mitigators in a constitutional proceeding. Cf Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375-84 (1988);
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (both holding in the mitigation context that
the Eighth Amendment is violated when there is uncertainty about jury's vote). In Hurst v. State,
this Court emphasized that mitigation is an important consideration in assessing harmless error.
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532
202 So. 3d at 68-69 ("Because we do not have an interrogatory verdict commemorating the
findings of the jury ... we cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that no rational jury, as trier of
fact, would determine that the mitigation was 'sufficiently substantial' to call for a life sentence.").
In Mr. Hilton's case, the court found the following mitigating factors:(!) Hilton was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime; (2) Hilton grew
up in an emotionally abusive and neglectful home; (3) Hilton abused drugs, including Ritalin, over
a long period oftime; (4) Hilton had no relationship with his biological father; (5) Hilton is already
serving a life sentence; (6) Hilton served his country in the military; (7) Hilton suffered maternal
deprivation and lacked bonding of a mother and child; (8) Hilton was placed in foster care as an
adolescent; and (9) Hilton suffered traumatic brain injury as a child. Given this mitigation, there
is a reasonable probability that at least some jurors in a constitutional proceeding, having been
properly advised of their role as fact-finder in deciding whether to sentence Mr. Hilton to death,
would have decided that the death penalty should not be imposed.
The jury's unanimous recommendation in Mr. Hilton's case also does not account for the
likelihood that defense counsel's approach to diminishing the weight of the aggravating factors
and presenting mitigation. at the. p€llalty p!1ase.wouldhave been different had counsel knoWIJ.,that
the jury, not the judge, would be required to unanimously agree on each of the elements required
to impose the death penalty. The impact of the unconstitutional scheme may have begun as early
as jury selection for the penalty phase. Counsel may have conducted his questioning of prospective
jurors differently had he known that only one juror needed to be convinced, as to only one of the
required elements, in order for Mr. Hilton to avoid a death sentence. During the penalty phase
51
533
itself, defense counsel's approach may have been different had the jury, rather than the judge, been
required to unanimously find that each specific aggravating factor had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Indeed, in a constitutional proceeding, defense counsel may have successfully
Defense counsel's approach may also have been different had the jury, as opposed to the
judge, been required to unanimously make the "sufficiency" and "insufficiency" findings
regarding the aggravating factors. In addition, counsel's approach to the mitigation may have
differed in a penalty phase where the jury rendered the findings regarding the weight of
aggravation relative to mitigation. Counsel's thinking also may have been impacted had he known
the jury would be instructed that it was entitled to recommend a life sentence even if it had
unanimously agreed that all of the other elements for a death sentence were satisfied. Counsel may
have given different advice to Mr. Hilton, and the decision-making may have been different.
Given those and other uncertainties about the Hurst error's impact on counsel's strategy
and presentation, the jury's unanimous recommendation does not allow this Court to reliably
conclude that the jury would have unanimously made all of the required findings of fact in a
necessary to establish how counsel's approach may have differed in a post-Hurst penalty phase.
The jury's unanimous recommendation also does not account for the possibility that the
sentencing court may have exercised its discretion to impose a life sentence if the court had been
bow1d by the jwy 's findings on each of the elements required for a death sentence, rather than the
court's own findings on those elements. See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d at 57 (noting that nothing
52
534
111 Hurst has diminished "the right of the trial court, even upon receiving a unanimous
recommendation for death, to impose a sentence of life."); Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3)(2) (revised
Florida capital sentence statute providing that, even if the jury recommends death, "the court, after
considering each aggravating factor found by the jury and all the mitigating circumstances, may
impose a sentence of life imprisomnent without the possibility of parole or a sentence of death.
The court may consider only an aggravating factor that was unanimously found to exist by the
jury."). The Hurst decisions have fundamentally altered the source of information upon which
judges are required to determine whether to impose a life sentence as a matter of discretion.
Before Hurst, judges first rendered findings on each of the elements required to impose a
death sentence, and if the court found those requirements for the death penalty were satisfied, the
judge then decided, based on his own findings, whether to impose a death sentence or life sentence.
That is what occurred here: the judge made findings and then, based on those findings, decided
that a death sentence was warranted. However, after Hurst, juries now make the underlying
fmdings on the dements required to impose death. If the jury finds that the requirements for the
death penalty are satisfied, the judge still decides whether to sentence the defendant to death or
exercise his or her discretion to impose a life sentence, but now based on the jury's jindings. Thus,
it is unknown whether Mr. Hilton's judge would have exercised his discretion to impose a life
sentence in the same way if he was bound by the jury's underlying findings, rather than his own.
For example, the jury's findings in a proceeding that complied with Hurst may have yielded
a lesser number of aggravators than the judge's findings, which may have led the judge to decide
that a life sentence was appropriate. The jury's findings may have also yielded different
"sufficiency" and "insufficiency" determinations than those made by Mr. Hilton's judge. And the
jury may have made different findings regarding the relative weight of the aggravators of
53
535
mitigators. Whereas Mr. Hilton's judge was bound only by his own findings on those elements in
determining whether to exercise his discretion to impose a life sentence, the judge in a
constitutional proceeding that complied with Hurst would be required to exercise his discretion in
the context of the jury's findings, not his own. The jury's unanimous recommendation thus does
not allow this Court to reliably conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the judge would
have imposed a life sentence if bound by the jury's findings rather than his own findings.
6. To the extent the State may argue that the Hurst error is harmless due
to the judge's finding of certain aggravators based on prior or
contemporaneous convictions, the Florida Supreme Court has
explicitly rejected that argument
To the extent the State may argue that the Hurst error is rendered harmless by the fact that,
among the aggravators applied to Mr. Hilton, were those based on contemporaneous felony
convictions, the Florida Supreme Court has rejected the idea that a judge's finding of such
aggravators is relevant in the harmless-error analysis of Hurst claims, and has granted Hurst relief
despite the presence of such aggravators. See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 2016 WL 6901498, at *6
(Fla. Nov. 23, 2016) (rejecting "the State's contention that Franklin's prior convictions for other
violent felonies insulate Franklin's death sentence from Ring and Hurst v. Florida."); McGirth v.
State, 2017 WL 372095, at *2 (Fla. Jan. 26, 2017) (contemporaneous felony); Mosley, 2016 WL
19, 2017) (prior violent felony); Calloway v. State, 2017 WL 372058, at *9 (Fla. Jan. 26, 2017)
(prior violent felony); Durousseau v. State, 2017 WL 411331, at *6 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2017) (prior
violent felony); Simmons v. State, 207 So. 3d 860,861 (Fla. 2016) (prior violent felony). Notably,
the Florida Supreme Court found the Hurst error not harmless in Mosley despite the fact that the
judge in that case had found a contemporaneous felony aggravator. Mosley, 2016 WL 7406506, at
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536
7. This Court should reject any suggestion in some prior cases that an
advisory jury's unanimous recommendation is a factor to consider in
Hurst harmless error analysis because such reliance violates the United
States Constitution
As noted above, this Court can hold that the Hurst error in Mr. Hilton's case was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt without contradicting any of the Florida Supreme Court's
harmless error review, and the burden is on the State to prove in each particular case that the Hurst
error did not impact the sentence. Second, while the Florida Supreme Court has ruled Hurst errors
hannless in some unanimous-recommendation cases, the Court has also indicated that a unanimous
jury recommendation is not by itself dispositive of the harmless error analysis. Third, in light of
the individual circumstances of this case, and the instructions to the jury, the Court may hold that
Mr. Hilton's Hurst error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt without contradicting any
That being said, although it is not necessary for resolving the harmless error inquiry in Mr.
Hilton's favor, there are significant reasons grounded in federal constitutional law that this Court
As previously explained, this Court cannot reliably infer from the unanimous jury
recommendation in a particular case that that the same jury would have unanimously found that
each of the required elements for a death sentence were satisfied in a constitutional proceeding,
particularly in light of Caldwell's holding about the impact of a jury's belief that its death-
1 See Davis v. State, 207 So.3d 142 (Fla. 2016); King v. State, No. SCI4-1949, 2017 WL 372081 (Fla.
Jan. 26, 20 17); Hall v. State, No. SC 15-1662, 2017 WL 526509 (Fla. Feb. 9, 20 17); Kaczmarv. State,
No. SCI3-2247, 2017 WL 410214 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2017); Knight v. State, No. SC14-1775, 2017 WL
41 1329 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2017); True hill v. State, No. SC14-15 14, 20 I 7 WL 727167 (Fla. Feb. 23, 201 7);
Jones v. State, No. SC14-990, 2017 WL 823600 (Fla. Mar. 2, 2017).
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537
sentencing role is minimized, i.e., that jurors do not have the ultimate responsibility for deciding
life or death. The jury's recommendation also does not account for the likelihood that defense
counsel's approach may have been different in a constitutional proceeding, or that the court may
have decided to impose a life sentence if bound by jury findings, rather than its own. In addition
conducting Hurst harmless error analysis violates the United States Constitution.
Under the Sixth Amendment, any reliance on the jury's recommendation is problematic in
light of Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993). In Sullivan, the Supreme Court
emphasized that "[h]armless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which the jury
actually rested its verdict." !d. at 279 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
Mr. Hilton's and other pre-Hurst Florida cases, there was no constitutionally valid jury verdict on
the critical findings of fact required to impose a death sentence. Sullivan requires that, before a
reviewing court may apply harmless error analysis, there must be a valid jury verdict, grounded in
Although Sullivan addTessed a jury verdict as to guilt, the logic of Sullivan applies equally
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that ocCUlTed without the error,
a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be
so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no
matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be-would
violate the jury-trial guarantee.
Jd. at 279-80. In Mr. Hilton's case too, any reliance on his advisory jury's unanimous
Reliance upon an advisory jury's unanimous recommendation also runs afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause requires that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
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538
State must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
( 1970). This requirement attaches to any factual finding necessitated by the Sixth Amendment. In
Sullivan, the Supreme Court observed that "the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated."
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278. "It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that
the defendant is probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to determine (as Winship requires)
whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt .... In other words, the jury verdict required by
the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id This requirement
is clearly incorporated into the Hurst line of cases, beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 500
U.S. 466 (2000) ("[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.") (emphasis
added). Any reliance upon the jury recommendation requires the underpinnings of the
determinations, including the unanimous advisory recommendation here, did not incorporate the
8. To the extent this Court needs further evidence that the Hurst error in
Mr. Hilton's case cannot be found harmless, a hearing is appropriate
to probe the impact of the Hurst error on defense counsel's strategy and
presentation
For the reasons above, this Court should not rule that the Hurst error in Mr. Hilton's case
was hannless beyond a reasonable doubt, because any such ruling on the present record would be
based on impermissible speculation. To the extent this Court needs further evidence that the errors
were not harmless, a hearing is appropriate to probe the impact of the Hurst errors on defense
counsel's strategy and presentation. The Florida Supreme Court has approved of such hearings in
similar contexts. In Meeks v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 1991), the Court, while considering
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539
a habeas petition raising a claim under Hitchcock v. Duggar, 481 U.S. 393 (1987), determined that
the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of harmless error and remanded.
Here, as in Meeks, this Court should allow a hearing so that it can make findings of fact
regarding harmlessness. At a hearing on whether the Hurst error in his penalty phase was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Hilton could present evidence, among other things, that defense
counsel's approach to diminishing the weight of the aggravating factors would have been different
had counsel known that the jury, not the judge, would make the critical findings of fact. For
instance, a defense counsel's entire approach would have been different had the jury, as opposed
to the judge, been required to make the "sufficiency" and "insufficiency" findings. Counsel would
have given different advice to Mr. Hilton, and the decision-making in this case would have been
different. This is especially true in light of the fact that the jury's consideration of the evidence is
different if the jury is required to make the sentencing findings, instead of making only an advisory
recommendation. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29 (recognizing significant impact of a jury's
belief that the ultimate responsibility for determining whether a defendant will be sentenced to
death lies elsewhere). A hearing is therefore appropriate to evaluate the effect of the statute
defense penalty-phase theories at the sentencing and resentencing; counsel's advice to the client;
Claim 5: Trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to Mr. Hilton's ineligibility for tbe
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment due to his severe mental illness
Whether a punishment is proportionate within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment is
determined by the evolving standards of decency, since "the standard of extreme cruelty is not
merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a mora! judgment. The standard itself remains the
same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change." Kennedy v.
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540
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,419 (2008) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger,
J., dissenting)). Regardless of how the public feels about a punishment, the"[ e]vo!ving standards
of decency must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of
criminals must conform to that rule." !d. at 420. Even if legislation has not yet caught up to what
the Constitution requires, "[i]t seems conceded by all that the Amendment imposes some
obligations on the judiciary to judge the constitutionality of punishment and that there are
punishments that the Amendment would bar whether legislatively approved or not." Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 313-14).
As with any punishment, the death penalty must be proportionate. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at
173 (internal citations omitted) ("[Capital] punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime."). The Supreme Court has adopted two steps when faced with
excessiveness claims regarding the death penalty. It first looks to "objective indicia of society's
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice with respect to executions."
Roper, 543 U.S. at 563. To make this assessment the Court generally considers "the historical
sentencing decisions juries have made .... " Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788. After the objective indicia,
the Comt moves to the second step, which considers proportionality in light of the "standards
elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court's own understanding and interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment's text, meaning, and purpose." Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. This second
step is the more dominant factor. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 ("[a]lthough the judgments of
legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge
whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty ... ").
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By using this test, the U.S. Supreme Court has found the death penalty unconstitutionally
excessive when used against those who have not committed homicide, Kennedy, 554, U.S. at 421;
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801; Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; those with intellectual disabilities, Atkins, 536
U.S. at 321; and juveniles under eighteen, Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. See also Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (mandatory life without parole excessive for juveniles under eighteen who
have committed homicide); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 20!1, 2034 (2010) (life without parole
excessive for juveniles under eighteen who have not committed a violent offense).
State law also protects against excessive punishment in capital cases. The guarantee
against cruel, unusual, and excessive punishment is not merely imposed on the federal government.
The Eighth Amendment applies to Florida pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article 1,
see also Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 335 (Fla. 2007) (Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment may apply to "the method and type of punislunent,"
"a particular class of individuals," "claims of excessive punishment," and "claims involving prison
conditions"). The opportunity for proportionality review is a priority that occurs in every capital
Tilman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. !991). The Florida Supreme Comt has
acknowledged that when deciding a punishment's propmtionality, "a reviewing court must never
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lose sight of the fact that the death penalty has long been reserved only for the most aggravated
and least mitigated of first-degree murders." Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411,416 (Fla. 1998).
As explained below, the standards of decency have now evolved so that the death penalty
is a disproportionate sentence as applied to Defendant because he has severe mental illnesses and
was a juvenile whose brain was not fully developed at the time of the crime.
Mr. Hilton has suffered from head injuries and mental illness for much of his life. When
Mr. Hilton was one-and-a-half, he had to go in for tonsil and adenoid surgery. His mother, Ms.
Debag, had to put hot towels on his head because the pain from his sinuses was so intense. Around
this same time, Mr. Hilton also contracted rheumatic fever. This lasted until he was five-years-
old. The doctors told Ms. De bag not to let Mr. Hilton walk, and after that she carried him until he
was three. Even after the sinus surgery, Mr. Hilton continued to suffer from his sinus problems as
a young child. When Mr. Hilton was only five, he was in so much pain that Ms. Debag walked in
on him holding a knife, about to cut his arms. When Mr. Hilton started attending kindergarten, he
Around the age often, Mr. Hilton suiiered from a severe head injury. Ms. Debag was trying
to unscrew a Murphy bed bolted to the floor but could not get under it. She asked Mr. Hilton to
go under the bed, but then it fell on his head. Ms. Debag lifted the bed and started screaming. The
metal bars had cut Mr. Hilton's scalp open. A next door neighbor, Victorine Rowe, heard the
screaming and ran over. She saw Ms. De bag trying to hold bloody towels over Mr. Hilton's head
and to calm down so the towels would stay still. Another neighbor came over to take them to the
hospital. Mr. Hilton was in the hospital for a week, and he received two hundred (200) stitches in
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his head. When he finally went back home, his entire head was bandaged. Multiple trial experts
testified that this injury resulted in brain damage that still affects Mr. Hilton to this day.
Mr. Hilton started abusing substances when he was a young teenager, often dlinking
alcohol and smoking marijuana. This use only increased as he grew older, and he frequently used
acid, LSD, and Quaaludes. In his fifties, Mr. Hilton became convinced that he had multiple
sclerosis. He diagnosed himself and started telling anyone who would listen, including his
acquaintances, people from the past whom he had not spoken with in years, and complete strangers.
This led him to seek out Dr. Deicher, a doctor he found in the yellow pages, and Dr. Deicher
prescribed him with Ritalin. Dr. Deicher quickly increased the dosage to 80 milligrams per day,
Mr. Hilton had exhibited bizarre behavior his entire life, including sudden mood changes,
the inability to control his anger, paranoia, exaggerated attachment to animals, extreme energy,
and rapid and forced speech. After Mr. Hilton started taking the Ritalin, this behavior became
even more pronounced, those who interacted with him noticed the changes and were afraid of him.
The defense experts at trial agreed that Mr. Hilton suffers from brain damage in his frontal
lobe, which affects his executive functioning and ability to control his actions. Mr. Hilton was
also diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. The experts agreed that these factors all impaired
Mr. Hilton's judgment and impulse control on the night of the crime.
B. The objective indicia do not indicate that those with severe mental illness
should be sentenced to death.
The first step of the proportionality test is to assess whether there is a national consensus
against using the death penalty on certain classes of offenders and offenses. This is generally
found using "the historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative judgments,
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international opinion, and sentencing decisions juries have made ... " Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788.
Courts generally look at federal and state legislation and, if any new legislation has recently been
passed, what direction it has been going. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 423.
Even if a punishment is still technically authorized, however, courts will look at how many States
actually use it. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2024 (the Court focmd that although twenty-
eight jurisdictions still allowed juveniles who had not committed homicide to be sentenced to life
Despite the focus on legislation, "[t]here are [other] measures of consensus." Kennedy,
554 U.S. at 433. A consensus may also be gleaned from jury verdicts, number of executions, or
prosecutorial discretion. If prosecutors ate choosing not to seek the death penalty against certain
types of offenders or juries are not voting to execute them, then this serves as evidence of a
consensus against the imposition of these penalties. As the Court stated in Enmund v. Florida,
when it was deciding whether the death penalty was proportionate for a petitioner charged as a
felony accomplice who had not killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, "[I]t would be relevant
if prosecutors rarely sought the death penalty for accomplice felony murder, for it would tend to
indicate that prosecutors, who represent society's interest in punishing crime, consider the death
penalty excessive for accomplice felony murder." 458 U.S. at 796. Jury verdicts can also show
who communities across the country feel is or is not deserving of the death penalty, even if the
defendant does not fit into a clear cut category. In Enmund, a "nontriggerman" comparable to
Enmund had not been executed for almost thirty years, and there were only 41 people on death
row who had not actually committed the murder underlying their sentence. !d. at 795. Enmund
was the only one who had been sentenced to death without a showing of the requisite intent to kill.
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545
Jd See also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 409 (noting that only two people convicted of child rape were
The legislative trend in many states shows that there is a growing consensus against
sentencing defendants with severe mental illnesses to death. Prior to abolishing the death penalty,
Connecticut prohibited its use where "the defendant's mental capacity was significantly impaired
or the defendant's ability to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was
significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution."
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-46a. Currently, eight states have bills pending that would similarly
protect those with severe mental illnesses from facing capital punishment. At Least Seven States
Introduce Legislation Banning Death Penalty for People with Severe Mental Illness, Death Penalty
Mulls Death Penalty Exemption for People with Severe Menta/Illness, Huffington Post (Mar. 7,
representatives in Texas, the state often thought to be the leader of capital punislunent, introduced
a bill that would exempt those with severe mental illnesses from the death penalty, a determination
that a judge would make prior to trial. Id Rep. Toni Rose, the sponsor of the bill, explained that
it "would bring Texas' death penalty into alignment with laws that bar executions for vulnerable
groups like juveniles and the intellectually disabled .... " ld Six of these eight bills were proposed
by Republican sponsors, indicating biprutisan support and a high likelihood of success. Seven
States Introduce Legislation. For example, in Indiana, the bill's Republican sponsor, Senator
James Merritt, clarified that while he supports the death penalty in general, he sees a "bright line
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There is other objective evidence that the death penalty is disproportionate for prisoners
with severe mental illnesses. Twenty-two of the death penalty states that provide for specific
statutory mitigating factors plus the federal government have a mitigating factor that addresses the
defendant's impaired ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law due to mental
illness, defect, or disease 2 This is in addition to the nineteen states that have entirely abolished
the death penalty and thus do not impose it anyone, let alone on adolescent defendants or those
with severe mental illnesses. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997 (2014) (explaining that
when reviewing state statutes to determine evolving standards of decency, states that have
abolished the death penalty or have a moratorium count as states that do not impose capital
punislm1ent against a category of people). Moreover, Florida equates severe mental illness with
"retardation[] or other severe disabilities" in other situations. See, e.g., l-05-08-A2 Guveniles
ineligible for referral to post-adjudication juvenile drug court if they have "severe mental illness,
retardation, or other severe disabilities that would likely result in the inability to successfully
complete the drug court conditions"). This shows that an overwhelming consensus of forty-one
jurisdictions have passed laws either precluding Defendant from the death penalty or instructing
that his mental illness that Defendant's mental illness precludes him entirely from the death penalty
2
See Alabama, Ala. Code§ 13A-5-51(6); Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 13751(1); Arkansas, Ark.
Code. Aim. § 5-4-605(3); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1.3.1201(b); Florida, Fla. Stat.
Ann.§ 921.141 (f); Indiana, Ind. Code Ann.§ 35-50-2-9(6); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 21-6625(6);
Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. & 532.025(7); Louisiana, La. C.Cr. P. art. 905.5(e); Mississippi,
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(£); Missouri, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.032(6); Nebraska, Neb. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 29-2523(g); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5(a); Nmth Carolina, N.C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-2000(6); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §(3); Pennsylva11ia, 42 Pa. Stat. §
9711(3); South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(6); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
204(8); Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(d); Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(iv);
Washington, Wash. Rev. Code Aim. § 10.95.070(6); Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(vi);
United States, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(1).
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547
Professional organizations have also spoken against the death penalty's use against those
with severe mental illness. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,830 (1988) (United States
Supreme Court considered the advice of professional organizations in exempting juveniles under
16 from the death penalty). In December 2016, the American Bar Association issued a white paper
calling for a severe mental illness exemption to the death penalty. Multiple mental health
Association, the National Alliance on Mental Illness, and the Mental Health America have also
spoken out in support of such an exemption. See Mental Illness Legislation, supra, at 34. Public
support for a mental illness exemption is at an all·time high, with Americans in favor of such an
Finally, recent events show that juries have been reluctant to impose the death penalty on
those with severe mental illnesses. For example, in 2015, a young man in Colorado, James
Holmes, was convicted of multiple counts offirst·degree murder for opening fire in a movie theater
in Aurora, Colorado. Ann O'Neill, Theater Shooter Holmes gets 12 l!le sentences, plus 3,318
massacre-sentencing. Holmes presented an insanity defense, so much of the guilt phase focused
on his severe mental illness. !d. The jury rejected this defense and convicted him of 24 counts of
first-degree murder and 140 counts of attempted murder. !d. Even then, the jury was unable to
agree to impose any death sentences following a penalty phase that again focused on Holmes'
This shows an overwhelming consensus that, in jurisdictions where the death penalty is a
possible sentence, significance is placed on the defendant's ability to fully grasp the wrongfulness
of his/her actions and confmm his/her actions based on that assessment. The experts who have
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548
evaluated Mr. Hilton have all expressed how his brain damage would have impaired his ability to
f111ly grasp the wrongfulness of his actions and conform his behavior based on that assessment.
Thus, his condition is viewed as mitigating in twenty-two jurisdictions. These numbers are
especially telling when added to the nineteen jurisdictions that have repealed the death penalty,
since in those states Defendant would definitely not face execution. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1997
(suggesting taking into account states with no death penalty when counting).
Just as the death penalty cannot constitutionally be applied to the intellectually disabled or
to juveniles under eighteen, the objective indicia of national trends show that the evolving
standards of decency no longer support the death penalty for Mr. Hilton.
I. Mr. Hilton's reduced culpability decreases the likelihood that his death
sentences align with any of the necessary purposes of punishment:
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation
In moving to the second step of the proportionality test-the Supreme Court's own
jurisprudence and rationale-Defendant's death sentences still do not pass constitutional muster.
Defendant did not have the cognitive abilities to judge the wrongfulness of his conduct and act in
a way reflecting the potential consequences. Thus, imposing a death sentence on Defendant would
not be effective deterrence or retribution. Since a death sentence must pass both prongs of the
proportionality test, including that it must be imposed for one of the purposes of punishment, his
After a court has examined whether the objective indicia point to a sentence's
excessiveness, "[the court's] own judgment is 'brought to bear' by asking whether there is reason
to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313,
citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 597. This step carries significant weight, since the Supreme Court has
expressed that "it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition
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549
of the death penalty,, .." Enmund, 458 US, at 797. Even ifthere are statutes still authorizing a
certain punishment, "there are punishments that the [Eighth] Amendment would bar whether
legislatively approved or not" See Gregg, 428 U.S, at !53, citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 313-14.
When a court progresses to its own judgment, it looks at "the culpability of the offenders at issue
in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question,"
Graham, 13 0 S, Ct. at 2026, and makes this determination based on "the standards elaborated by
controlling precedents and by the Court's own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's text, history, meaning, and purpose," Kennedy, 554 U.S, at 421. The death penally
is more likely to be found excessive, then, when the defendant has a lesser culpability,
For a death sentence to be constitutional, the purposes of punishment must be met. See,
e.g, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. Thus, when faced with a proportionality claim, the Supreme Court
requires the sentence to "measurably contribute to one or both of [deterrence or retribution]". See
Enmund, 458 U.S, at 798. If the death penalty fails to do this, it is "nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering." ld. at 798, citing Coker, 433 U.S. at
592. The failure to meet these goals contributed to the Supreme Court finding that the death
penalty was unconstitutional when imposed on the intellectually disabled and juveniles. See, e.g.,
Mr. Hilton's background makes it equally as unlikely that deterrence and retribution would
serve as effective justifications for imposing a death sentence on him. He bears many of the same
characteristics that the Supreme Court attributed to juveniles and the intellectually disabled when
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550
a. Mr. Hilton's death sentences do not meet the purpose of deterrence
It is highly unlikely that Mr. Hilton experienced any deterrent effect by the death penalty
before the crime. A punishment only deters if a crime has been committed as a result of
"premeditation and deliberation." See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799. The U.S. Supreme Court found
in Atkins that deterrence is not a valid justification for execution of the intellectually disabled. 536
U.S. at 320. This is because they have "cognitive and behavioral impairments" that result in their
"diminished ability to understand and process information, learn from experience, engage in
logical reasoning, and control impulses." !d. at 318. These impairments make it "less likely that
they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control
Juveniles have similar qualities tl1at undermine the deten·ence argument. Their youth gives
them greater "difficulty weighing long-term consequences," Graham, 130 S.. Ct.. at2D32,.makes
them "less likely to take possible punishment into consideration," id. at 2028, or make a "cost-
'
benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution," Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815,837, and they may lack "the ability to consider the full consequences of a course of
action and to adjust [their] conduct accordingly ...." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2476. This gives them
the same issues that the intellectually disabled may have in realizing the potential consequences of
Deterrence would have been no more effective on Mr. Hilton than on juveniles or the
intellectually disabled. His mental illness means that he had no greater likelihood of being able to
assess the consequences of his actions and act according to the result of that assessment than a
younger juvenile who makes "impetuous and ill-considered decisions" and has "difficulty
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551
defendant who has the "diminished ability to understand and process information, learn from
experience, engage in logical reasoning, or control impulses," Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. If
Defendant did not have time to think about or control his actions, then he would not have been
able to consider the consequences either. The U.S. Supreme Court in Atkins also emphasized that
barring the intellectually disabled from the death penalty would not affect deterrence of the rest of
the population since this protection would not apply generally. !d. at 320. The same can be said
for Mr. Hilton, since his characteristics derived from specific severe mental illnesses that would
Retribution would also not be justified for Mr. Hilton since his mental illness inhibits his
ability to control his impulses. For many of the same reasons as those that made deten-ence
ineffective, the Supreme Court also found that a death sentence imposed on juveniles and the
intellectually disabled did not align with the principles of retribution. Intellectually disabled
offenders are often seen as less culpable because of their decreased ability to control their actions.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320. While they often know right from wrong, they have a "diminished
capacity to understand and process, communicate, abstract mistakes and learn from experience,
engage in logical reasoning, control, and impulses, and understand others' reactions." !d. at 318.
This increases their tendency to act impulsively. I d. When intellectually disabled offenders are
less likely to have control over their actions and to assess the wrongfulness before commit1ing a
Juveniles are similarly less able to control their actions. The underdeveloped nature of
their brains affect their ability to rationalize, and "psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds" which affect juveniles' ability to
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552
control their behavior. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. Additionally, they are more susceptible to
outside influence and peer pressure, and they cannot control or remove themselves from brutal and
Mr. Hilton's death sentences do not align with the purpose of retribution. Intellectually
disabled defendants are viewed as less culpable because of their "disabilities in areas of reasoning,
judgment, and control of their impulses" and their tendency to "act on impulse." Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 3 I 8. Juveniles have been found to bear "less control, experience with control, and control over
[their] own environment" and a lack of brain development necessary to control behavior. Graham,
130 S. Ct. at 2026. They also cannot control or remove themselves from brutal and dysfunctional
family and home environments. Miller, 132 U.S. at 2468. Mr. Hilton's mental illness has led to
these same tendencies. The defense experts agreed that he bears the characteristics of a juvenile,
problem solving, and problematic executive function. Thus, the Court does not achieve the
The culmination of everything in Mr. Hilton's background does not support any finding
that he is "the worst of the worst." Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. When evaluating proportionality
claims, courts must limit the use of the death penalty. This stems from the tension caused by the
Court's desire to guide the jury's discretion by narrowing the classes of people eligible for the
death penalty while at the same time allowing the jury a broad amount of information in deciding
who makes up that class of the worst offenders. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 436. The majority in
Kennedy found that since this tension is still in search of a "unifying principle" which "has
produced results not altogether satisfactory," the use of the death penalty should be limited for
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553
only the most deserving cases. !d. at437. See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 568, citing Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 319 ("Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category of
the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of
execution.'"). For example, the categorical ban was justified for intellectually disabled defendants
because if an "average murderer" does not possess the culpability to be sentenced to death, then
an intellectually disabled defendant who has a lesser culpability should not be deemed to either.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 350. The desire to limit the use of the death penalty has thus been a major part
of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to place categorical bans on the death penalty.
Mr. Hilton is not in the class of the most serious offenders because ofhis brain damage and
frontal lobe dysfunction. The analysis surrounding the proportionality of the death penalty focuses
mostly on retribution and deterrence, and, as previously discussed, Mr. Hilton's death sentences
d. Because Mr. Hilton's death sentence does not meet any of the purposes
of punishment, it is disproportionate and out of line with the evolving
standards of decency
The standards of decency have now evolved in such a way that applying the death penalty
in Mr. Hilton's case is disproportionate. When comparing Mr. Hilton's death sentences with the
principles found throughout the U.S. Supreme Comt's proportionality jurisprudence, there is a
clear pattern between the intellectually disabled, those with severe mental illnesses, and
adolescents regardless of whether they are under or over the age of 18. The intellectually disabled
and children under 18 are exempt from the death penalty because imposing such a sentenee on
them does not meet any of the purposes of punishment: retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420. So too here. As explained above, Mr. Hilton's cognitive
impairments parallel those exhibited by juveniles and the intellectually disabled, so that the effect
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554
of retribution and detenence are inhibited. To impose a death sentence on Defendant under these
circumstances would completely undercut the Supreme Court's attempt for the past forty years to
limit the situations in which the death penalty is constitutionally permissible. Accordingly, Mr.
Claim 7: Trial counsel was ineffective for their failure to preserve for appeal the denial
of cause challenges during jury selection
It is essential to defense counsel's role as advocate that he preserve reversible enors for
appellate review. The enor at issue here is the trial court's denial of Trial Counsel's for-cause
challenge. Denial of a challenge for cause is grounds for reversible enor. Hamilton v. State, 54 7
So. 2d 630, 632 (Fla. 1989). In order to preserve such an enor for appellate review, where trial
counsel's motion to strike a juror for cause is denied, and he is thereafter forced to exhaust all
peremptory challenges, he must first "identify a specific juror whom he otherwise would have
struck peremptorily". Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1990).
In the instant case, Jury Selection proceeded over the course of several days. (R. Jury
Selection, 1-1082). There were numerous "cause challenges" that were asserted during jury
selection. Many of them were granted, but many of them were not. While the defense team made
objections to the denial of cause challenges, the defense team failed to preserve any of these
objections for the purposes of appellate review by utilization of the process outlined in Trotter.
The Defendant asserts that the failure to properly preserve the denial of cause challenges for
appellate review was and is ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
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555
Claim 8: Cumulative error
Even if each individual claim is insufficient to set aside Mr. Hilton's conviction and
sentence, all of trial counsel's errors taken together renders his guilty verdicts and death sentence
unreliable. In considering all aspects of the defense counsel's deficient performance as part of a
cwnulative analysis, Mr. Hilton would not have been found guilty of first-degree murder and
Mr. Hilton requests the following relief, based on his prima facie allegations
1. That he be allowed leave to amend this motion should new claims, facts, or legal
precedent become available to counsel;
3. That his judgments of convictions and sentence, including his sentence of death, be
vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
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556
AFFIDAVIT
Before me personally appeared GARY HILTON, who after being duly swom and
deposed, said that he is the person named in and who executed the foregoing Motion and that
the statements therein contained are true and correct.
My Commission Expires:
?1411CJ(..t 13/ "''""
Produced Identification: /
(Type ofidentification: ~J:.n,.....CC ,:8>0,
CERTIFICATE BY ATTORNEY
l HEREBY CERTIFY that I have discussed the contents of the motion fully with the
Defendant, that I have complied with Rule 4-L4 of the Rules of Professional
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been fumished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Momoe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant State
75
557
Attorney Georgia Cappleman, SA02_LeonFelony@leoncountyfl.gov, State Attorney's Office,
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
76
558
Filin& # 55472733 E-Filed 04/:.e. ,.J017 11:43:01 AM
.2'1
Defendant.
------~---"/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR LEAVB TO
AMEND INITIAL POSTCONVICTION MOTION
cc:
Eddie Evans, Assistant State Attorney
Georgia Cappleman, Assistant State Attorney
Robert A. Morris, Counsel for Qefendant
Jennifer Keegan, Assistant Attorney General
559
. Filing# 56460292 E-Filed 05/L. ,017 06:00:59 PM
J.s-
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff,
Defendant.
------------------------~/
STATE'S ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED MOTION
FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
counsel, and hereby responds to Defendant Hilton's Second Amended Motion for
Postconviction Relief ("Motion"). On April 20, 2017, Hilton filed his Motion,
raising seven claims for relief. This Answer to Hilton's Motion follows.
The State does not object to an evidentiary hearing on claims 1 and 2(1);
Citations
record shall be referred to by "R" and followed by the volume and page number;
560
Facts and Procedural History
Hilton was convicted of grand theft, and the kidnapping and first-degree
murder of Cheryl Dunlap. The relevant facts concerning the crimes are recited in
Cheryl Dunlap, 46, was last seen alive on December 1, 2007. That
morning, Dunlap called a friend, Kiona Hill, and made arrangements
to have dinner with her that evening. That afternoon, Dunlap went to
Leon Sinks to read, where she was seen by Michael and Vikki Shirley
at approximately 1:30 p.m. The Shirleys described that Dunlap was
wearing jeans and a sweater and carrying a hardback book. Dunlap
did not arrive for dinner that evening and was missed at church the
following morning by Tanya Land. Land went to Dunlap's residence
and found her dog, but noticed that her car was missing so she called
the police. Steven Ganey of the Wakulla County Sheriffs Office took
the missing person report on December 3, 2007.
561
been parked. Dunlap's purse was recovered in her car, but no money
was found.
562
Several witnesses testified that they saw or encountered Gary Michael
Hilton during the time period surrounding Dunlap's disappearance. In
late November 2007, George Ferguson encountered Hilton on LL
Wallace Road. Hilton asked Ferguson for a jump start because his
van, a white Chevrolet Astro, would not crank. Ferguson testified that
it did not appear to him that Hilton actually needed the assistance.
Ethan Davis provided similar testimony, that sometime in late
November 2007, Hilton stopped him and asked for help starting his
vehicle. Davis declined. Shawn Matthews also encountered Hilton in
late November near his LL Wallace Road camp. Hilton appeared to
be familiar with the area and told Matthews about a nearby sinkhole.
On December 1, 2007, Celeste Hutchins saw Hilton on Crawfordville
Highway, not far from Leon Sinks. Hutchins testified that Hilton was
rummaging through a white Camry on the side of the road. On
December 10, 2007, Loretta Mayfield spoke to Hilton at a
convenience store on Crawfordville Highway. Mayfield testified that
Hilton was wearing a blue and white patterned shirt. Hilton was also
wearing something on his left side that looked like a large knife
holder. Mayfield testified that the shirt she saw Hilton wearing
looked like the one in the ATM security video. On December 11,
2007, Stephen Prosser saw Hilton in the Apalachicola National Forest.
On December 12, 2007, Michael Travis saw Hilton in the forest near
the Bloxham cutoff and then saw him again on December 14. On
December 18, 2007, Teresa Johnson saw Hilton in Bristol, Florida,
where Hilton told her that she looked like Dunlap and that it was "too
bad" about that girl getting murdered.
563
hiking trail on Blood Mountain in North Georgia. Later, Jeff Foggy,
an FDLE tool mark expert, matched the bayonet to the puncture
marks in Dunlap's tire. Georgia law enforcement also gathered items
from Hilton's van. Items recovered from the van included clothing,
jackets, gloves, camping equipment, duffel bags, two sleeping bags,
Hi-Tee boots, a camera, tobacco rolling papers, Hilton's Georgia
driver's license, tape, paper towels, maps, two BB pistols, a book
purchased at a Tallahassee book store, and dog food.
I'm not all bad. I mean, you got to understand, I mean, I'm sure you
can see. I mean, I'm a [expletive] genius, man. I'm not a-l'm not all
bad. I just, you know, lost my mind for a little bit. Lost a grip on
myself, man. What can I tell you? FBI and everybody else is trying to
scratch their head, hey, guys don't get started doing my shit at 61
years old. It just don't happen, you know. Like there's a retired FBI
(indecipherable) named Cliff Van, Clifford Van Zandt, that keeps
getting himself in the news, talking about me. And he said, this guy
didn't just fall off the turnip truck, he said. You know, in other words,
he's been doing this. But like I told you before, you know, when I saw
you before, I said, remember, I said I'd give you one for free. Nothing
before September, okay? I mean, I'm not joking, okay? I just, I got old
and sick and couldn't make a living and just lost, flat lost my
[expletive] mind for a while, man. I couldn't get a grip on it.
564
on Dunlap's tire, that he would explain how he "pulled it off' on a
busy highway, that he spent a few hours or a few days with Dunlap,
and that he felt no regret other than getting caught.
The penalty phase began on February 17, 2011, during which the state
called Clay Bridges of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. Agent
Bridges testified about Hilton's prior felony conviction-the murder
of Emerson in Georgia to which Hilton pleaded guilty. The State
played Hilton's taped conversation with law enforcement where he
described kidnapping Emerson, holding her captive, and stripping her
body naked to remove DNA and fiber evidence. He also stated that
"you either kill them or you get caught."
The trial court found that the State had proven six aggravators beyond
a reasonable doubt. Assigning weight to each aggravator, the trial
court found: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a violent
felony (great weight); (2) the murder was committed in the course of a
kidnapping (great weight); (3) the murder was committed to avoid
arrest (moderate weight); (4) the murder was committed for pecuniary
gain (some weight); (5) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious
1
Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
565
or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and (6) the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) (great weight).
On April 21, 2011, the trial court followed the jury's unanimous
recommendation and sentenced Hilton to death. The court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravators outweighed the
mitigators.
Hilton v. State, 117 So. 3d 742, 746-50 (Fla. 2013) (footnote included).
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Hilton raised six claims: 1) the trial
inadmissible Williams rule evidence because they were only relevant to show his
propensity to commit the crime; 2) the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Gregory
Prichard's testimony during the penalty phase regarding Hilton's past criminal
566
trial court erred in permitting Dr. Prichard to remain in the courtroom, despite
invocation of the rule of sequestration; 4) the trial court erred in finding that the
HAC and CCP aggravating circumstances applied, as the evidence was insufficient
for such a finding; 5) the trial court erred in rejecting the lack of capacity
mitigating factor and failed to provide reasons why there is substantial, competent
evidence in the record to support the rejection of this mitigating circumstance; and
6) the Florida Supreme Court erred in upholding the death sentence in light of Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Hilton's
convictions and death sentence. Hilton, 117 So. 3d at 756. The Florida Supreme
found the death sentence to be proportionate. Id. at 755. The Florida Supreme
Court also reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence. Hilton then filed a motion for
On September 12, 2013, Hilton filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court, raising a Ring claim, which was denied on
Relief. The State filed its Answer to the Motion for Postconviction Relief on
January 26, 2015. Thereafter, on July 24, 2015, Hilton filed a Motion for Leave to
attaching his Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief. The Court granted the
567
Motion for Leave to Amend Initial Postconviction Motion on July 28, 2015, and
the State filed its answer on August 14, 2015. On January 20, 2016, this Court
entered a stay pending the Florida Supreme Court's decisions on the application of
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). The stay was lifted in open court on March
23, 2017. Hilton filed his Second Motion for Leave to Amend Initial
attaching his Second Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief. This Court
granted Hilton's motion on April4, 2017. The State's Answer to Second Amended
establish deficient performance, Hilton must show that counsel made specific
errors so serious that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed to Hilton by
the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687; Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245, 252 (Fla. 2004)
("a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of
counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the
568
and held "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remams simply
ineffective. Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503, 512 (Fla. 2011) (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690). "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
Hilton has the burden to "overcome the presumption that, under the
Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 809 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Michel v. Louisian1!, 350
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). "Strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's
So. 3d at 512. An attorney can almost always be second-guessed for not doing
more, but that does not meet the stringent Strickland standard for deficient
probability that but for trial counsel's deficiencies, he would have received a
different outcome. Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010). A reasonable probability
10
569
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. "It is not
enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on
are subject to summary denial when the court can determine the outcome of the
proceeding would not be affected even if counsel were deficient. Franqui v. State,
59 So. 3d 82, 96 (Fla. 2011); Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828 (Fla. 2011); Walls v.
State, 926 So. 2d 1156, 1173 (Fla. 2006) (summary denial appropriate on
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where evidence was cumulative). See also
Stewart v. State, 801 So. 2d 59, 65 (Fla. 2001) (where the Strickland standard
assess the other prong). "Failure to sufficiently allege both prongs results in a
summary denial of the claim." Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 758 (Fla. 2007)
(citing Thompson v. State, 796 So. 2d 511, 514 fn. 5 (Fla. 2001)).
a Rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on the written materials before the court.
A court may summarily deny a postconviction claim when the claim is legally
II
570
insufficient, procedurally barred, or refuted by the record. See Frangui, 59 So. 3d
at 101; Troy, 57 So. 3d at 840 (citing Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 543 (Fla.
2008)).
defendant to include a detailed allegation of the factual basis for any claim for
a legally sufficient claim. Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. See Frangui,
59 So. 3d at 96 (citing Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000)). The
trial court may also summarily deny claims that are conclusively refuted by the
The trial court must summarily deny claims that are procedurally barred. Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.85l(e)(l). The Florida Supreme Court has consistently held that a
claim that could and should have been raised on direct appeal is procedurally
barred. Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla. 2006) (citing Davis v. State,
915 So. 2d 95, 129 (Fla. 2005); Duckett v. State, 918 So. 2d 224, 234 (Fla. 2005);
The Merits
Hilton alleges that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of
12
571
mitigation the defense team possessed, and failing to effectively present the
mitigation evidence they used. (Motion at 5-33) While the State does not concede
that trial counsel was ineffective, the State does not object to an evidentiary
Hilton primarily alleges that his defense team was disorganized and
be ideal, but it certainly does not establish ineffectiveness; the Strickland standard
resulted. The alleged deficiencies that Hilton points to, such as the defense theories
used at trial, appear to be reasonable strategic decisions and are not subject to
counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's
2
This claim was previously raised in Claims III, IV, and V in Hilton's first Amended Motion for
Postconviction Relief. The State objected to an evidentiary hearing in its response because the
claims were facially insufficient at that time. As this claim is now facially sufficient, the State
withdraws its objection.
13
572
So. 3d at 512. While the State does not concede that trial counsel was ineffective,
Excessive Workload
Hilton submits that the defense team was working under an excessive
caseload and did not spend as much time on Hilton's case as they needed to.
(Motion at 40) Specifically, he alleges the defense team did not have time to
interview all the witnesses and evidence in the case, including the correctional
specific error that Hilton alleges is that the defense team overlooked correctional
officer Caleb Wynn's report in the evidence and was unprepared to address his
The record demonstrates that although lead counsel, lnes Suber, objected to
Officer Wynn's testimony due to a discovery violation, she was well prepared to
address his testimony. During opening statement, the State referenced the
substance of Officer Wynn's testimony, and Suber objected, stating she was not
Following opening statements, the State and Suber discussed Officer Wynn and the
3
This claim was previously raised in Claim III in Hilton's first Amended Motion for
Postconviction Relief. The State objected to an evidentiary hearing in its response because the
claim was facially insufficient at that time. As this claim is now facially sufficient, the State
withdraws its objection.
14
573
State saw that Suber was in possession of Officer Wynn's statement in a folder on
defense counsel's table. The State asked Suber if she was familiar with Officer
Wynn and his testimony, and Suber confirmed that she was. (R/34:1209-10) When
the State called Officer Wynn to testifY, Suber again objected, stating that Officer
Suber's handling of Officer Wynn's testimony was effective and did not
excluding one of Hilton's statements that he was "very selective" of the victims he
his report, gaining a concession from him that every detail he testified to on direct
was not in the reports he drafted, and that he never included the victim's name
that he did not document anywhere on his daily logs that Hilton and the other
(R/34: 1259-60) These facts demonstrate that trial counsel was properly prepared to
address Officer Wynn's testimony, and was not deficient in preparing Hilton's
defense.
Furthermore, the record reflects that there were nearly thirty-six months
between the filing of the complaint (February 28, 2008) and the start of jury
selection (January 31, 2011). During that time, Hilton sought and received a
15
574
number of continuances. 4 The defense team had ample time for the three attorneys
assigned to Hilton's case to prepare the case for trial, even in light of a heavy
caseload. The defense deposed hundreds of witnesses listed by the State. Lead
counsel inspected over one thousand pieces of evidence. Furthermore, the trial
docket is riddled with numerous motions filed by trial counsel as well as hearings
held on such motions. The record shows that Hilton's case had been adequately
prepared and litigated pre-trial. The record conclusively rebuts this allegation. See
Roberts v. State, 568 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 1990) (defendant must allege specific
Strickland claims require more than just a showing that trial counsel was
overworked. Hilton must demonstrate with specificity "that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Even if a defendant meets
that threshold, he or she must also prove that such an error prejudiced the defense.
4
In addition to the continuances granted pre-trial, Hilton's lead attorney requested a continuance
on the morning jury selection was scheduled to begin. Counsel did not seek a continuance
because she was unprepared or had not concluded discovery, but because she wanted additional
time to discuss the case with Hilton. The trial court denied this request, finding that counsel had
four more days to have these discussions. (RJI7:7-8) Furthermore, the trial docket is riddled with
numerous motions filed by trial counsel as well as hearings having been held on same. The
record shows that Hilton's case had been adequately prepared and litigated pre-trial.
16
575
Id. As the record conclusively rebuts Hilton's allegations of error, this claim
Hilton alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting a defense
theory of innocence and/or reasonable doubt during the guilt phase and admitting
guilt during the penalty phase. Specifically, Hilton claims the penalty phase theory
behavior and ultimately, the murder, and such a theory was inconsistent with the
guilt phase defense. (Motion at 41-42) This claim is facially insufficient because
Hilton failed to allege any specific basis of prejudice, and it is meritless because
the guilt and penalty phase theories did not conflict with each other.
The record reflects that trial counsel did not argue actual innocence, they
merely attempted to demonstrate that there was reasonable doubt in the State's
case. The approach was comprised of pointing out inconsistencies in the evidence,
is common practice for trial attorneys to have their clients enter a not guilty plea,
proceed to trial on a reasonable doubt defense, and then plea for mercy in the
penalty phase. Raising such a defense did not assert factual innocence in this case,
17
576
as Hilton appears to allege, and thus, it was not inconsistent with the penalty phase
theory.
Hilton claims that the inconsistent theories diminished the defense team's
credibility in front of the jury, and the defense team should have used a different
guilt phase theory. (Motion at 42) However, he fails to allege how a change to the
guilt phase theory would have resulted in a life sentence. Even if diminished
credibility, standing alone, could establish prejudice, the record refutes Hilton's
allegation that the guilt and penalty phase theories were inconsistent. As Hilton's
Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 616, and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Hilton is
not entitled to relief because the unanimous death recommendation from the jury in
his case, combined with the overwhelming evidence supporting the aggravators in
this case, renders any Hurst error harmless. Hilton's claim is without merit and the
facts are fully contained in the record, thus the claim should be summarily denied.
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have unanimously recommended
18
577
death had it been instructed in accordance with Hurst v. State. See Hurst v. State,
202 So. 3d at 68 (analyzing whether the jury's failure to unanimously find all the
facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty contributed to Hurst's death
sentence); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 523 (Fla. 2007) (explaining
that the harmless error analysis for a violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000), is whether the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that a
rational jury would have found penetration when there was a failure to have the
Any Hurst error in Hilton's case is plainly harmless because the jury in his
case voted unanimously to impose the death penalty. The Florida Supreme Court
has consistently found Hurst error harmless in cases with similar circumstances
where the jury unanimously voted to impose the death penalty. Davis v. State, 207
So. 3d 177 (Fla. 2016); King v. State, 211 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 2017); Truehill v. State,
211 So. 3d 930 (Fla. 2017); Jones v. State, No. SC14-990 2017 WL 823600 (Fla.
March 2, 2017); Oliver v. State, No. SC12-3150 2017 WL 1282098 (Fla. April 6,
2017); Morris v. State, No. SC14-1317 2017 WL 1506853 (Fla. April 27, 2017);
Tunidor v. State, No. SC14-2276 2017 WL 1506854 (Fla. April 27, 2017). In light
of the Florida Supreme Court's decisive precedent, the jury's unanimous death
recommendation in this case renders any Hurst error in this case harmless.
19
578
Hilton asserts multiple flawed reasons for this Court to depart from the
Florida Supreme Court's decisive precedent and find harmful Hurst error in his
case. Firstly, Hilton argues that he should get relief because his jury made a
aggravators that were proven, the sufficiency of the aggravators, and the weighing
of the aggravation and mitigation. (Motion at 47-48) Such logic would render
every Hurst error harmful, which was clearly not the intent of the Florida Supreme
Court. In Davis, the Court found Hurst error harmless, notwithstanding the juries'
verdict, saying such a verdict reassured the Court that a rational jury would have
Hilton further alleges the jury instructions in his case misled the jury about
the significance of their role in sentencing by telling the jury that its sentence was
advisory. (Motion at 49-50) Firstly, these instructions do not mislead the jury. A
jury's sentence verdict is advisory and the trial court has the authority to depart
from a jury's death recommendation and impose a life sentence when it sees fit.
This fact has not changed as a result of Hurst. See § 921.141(2)(3), Fla. Stat.
Secondly, in Truehill, the Court specifically noted that, much like Hilton's case,
20
579
the trial court instructed the jury that the verdict was advisory. 211 So. 3d at 955.
These facts did not sway the Court's conclusion that any Hurst error was harmless
because the jury was instructed on the proper considerations in making a sentence
recommendation that the jury made the constitutionally required findings. Id. at
955-57. Like Truehill, Hilton's jury was instructed that it needed to determine
outweighed the mitigation before the death penalty could be imposed. It was also
instructed that it was not required to enter a death sentence, even if all the
sentencing requirements were met. (R/12:2307-14) The jury instructions reflect the
requirements described in Truehill and support the conclusibn that any Hurst error
Hilton also raises the tenuous argument that trial cbunsel's penalty phase
approach "may" have been different if the jury instructions complied with Hurst
and that the trial court "may" have imposed a life sentence if it had been bound by
the jury findings. He claims that this possibility renders Hurst error harmful.
(Motion 51-54) These arguments are unpersuasive because they are highly
speculative and because the Florida Supreme Court has not found such speculative
rendered Hurst relief harmless. Notably, the Court has not found Hurst relief to be
21
580
harmful in any cases that included a unanimous jury recommendation. Speculative
arguments like Hilton's have not been persuasive before the Florida Supreme
Finally, Hilton argues that because the jury's verdict was constitutionally
flawed due to a Hurst error, the Sixth Amendment compels this court to reject the
claims that "before a reviewing court may apply harmless error analysis, there
must be a valid jury verdict." (56) Such an argument would render it impossible to
apply harmless error review to any case involving a Hurst error. The argument also
encourages this Court to break from established Florida Supreme Court precedent,
which it cannot do. State v. Herring, 76 So. 3d 891, 897 (Fla. 2011); State v.
Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1976) ("Where an issue has been decided in the
Supreme Court of the state, the lower courts are bound to adhere to the Court's
ruling when considering similar issues, even though the court might believe that
the law should be otherwise"). The Florida Supreme Court has considered the
argument that harmless error review is inapplicable to Hurst errors, and has
rejected it outright. Johnson v. State, 205 So. 3d 1285, 1289-90 (Fla. 2016).
factor in evaluating whether a Hurst error is harmless. Davis, 207 So. 3d at 177;
King, 211 So. 3d at 866; Truehill, 211 So. 3d at 930. The suggestion that the Sixth
22
581
Amendment prohibits Florida Supreme Court's use of unanimous verdicts in
presence of officers. The facts of the murder are egregious and fully support the
from the jury, any Hurst error is clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hilton claims that his mental illness makes him ineligible for the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment. This argument appears to be twofold: Hilton
claims that his death sentence should be vacated because his mental illness 5 renders
him ineligible for the death penalty, and he claims his trial counsel was ineffective
for not raising this claim at his trial. Hilton is not entitled to relief on this claim
because it is unripe and existing law in Florida does not recognize mental illness as
Hilton is eligible for the death penalty because he does not fall into any class
that is excluded from application of the death penalty under the Eighth
5
Hilton notes various mental conditions relevant to this claim, including brain damage,
pervasive drug use in his youth, multiple sclerosis, schizoaffective disorder, and exhibitions of
"bizarre" behavior. (Motion at 61-62)
23
582
Amendment. In advancing his argument, Hilton attempts to draw similarities
between his conditions and those who are ineligible for execution, such as
juveniles and those who are intellectually disabled. However, unlike Hilton's
mental health conditions, age and intellectual disability are clearly established
categorical bars to execution. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(prohibiting the death penalty for defendants who committed their crimes before
age 18); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting the death penalty for
defendants who are intellectually disabled). Hilton claim seeks the recognition of a
new fundamental constitutional right, for which there is no support in the law.
992 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 2008), holds that those alleged diagnoses would not serve as a
bar to execution. "[N]either this Court nor the Supreme Court has recognized
mental illness as a per se bar to execution." Id. at 222; see Johnston v. State, 27 So.
3d 11 (Fla. 2008) (finding that Johnston's reliance on Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 and
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304, was misplaced when he was neither a minor nor one who
was insane or mentally retarded); Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 300 (Fla.
2007) (rejecting proposition that the Equal Protection Clause requires extension of
Atkins to the mentally ill due to their reduced culpability); Simmons v. State, 105
So. 3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting claims that defendants with mental illness
24
583
culpability). The law is very clear that a categorical bar to execution does not
In the event that Hilton is attempting to allege that his mental illness renders
him legally insane, and thereby incompetent to be executed, such a claim is unripe
for review. While mental illness is not a legal bar to execution, as discussed supra,
mental illness that rises to the level of legal insanity may prohibit execution. Legal
raising a Ford claim, vesting the power in the governor to determine whether a
defendant is insane. Insanity is a bar to execution when a person "lacks the mental
capacity to understand the fact of the impending execution and the reason for it."
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.81l(c). In Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1984), the
Florida Supreme Court held that the governor has the inherent right to make the
motion for a stay of execution pending hearing, based on grounds of the prisoner's
insanity to be executed, shall be entertained by any court until such time as the
Governor of Florida shall have held appropriate proceedings for determining the
6
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
25
584
issue pursuant to the appropriate Florida Statute." Hilton's Ford claim is unripe
because he has not followed the proper statutory procedure for raising such a
claim.
Finally, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that Hilton's
mental illness renders him ineligible for the death penalty because such a claim is
meritless and unripe for review. Counsel cannot be ineffective for refusing to raise
a frivolous claim. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (trial counsel's
failure to raise unethical or frivolous claims does not violate Strickland); Nix v.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (trial counsel's refusal to participate in client's
false testimony was not a Strickland violation). Furthermore, because this claim
would not warrant relief if trial counsel had raised it, there is no prejudice. As
Hilton puts forth a conclusory claim that trial counsel was ineffective for
State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990), so that such denials could be raised on appeal.
(Motion at 73) This claim fails for three reasons: trial counsel was not deficient
7
This claim is sequentially numbered as Claim 6 but Hilton's Motion, presumably due to
typographical error, has this claim listed as Claim 7. (Motion at 73)
26
585
because she followed proper procedures during jury selection; Hilton is unable to
demonstrate prejudice by showing that an actually biased juror sat on his jury; and
Firstly, trial counsel followed the procedure set forth in Trotter v. State for
preserving the denial of cause challenges for appeal. Trotter requires that trial
counsel demonstrate on the record that all peremptories have been exhausted and
that a specific objectionable juror has been seated on the jury that counsel would
strike if he or she had a peremptory challenge available. 576 So. 2d at 693. Suber
followed the Trotter procedure during jury selection. After Suber's request for
additional peremptory challenges was denied, she laid a record identifying a juror
she would have liked to remove by use of a peremptory challenge. She stated, "I
am required to state whoever, pursuant to - I would like to keep, the record reflect
that ifl were to be granted peremptory, I would strike Rice, Sally, Rice, because of
ineffective for failing to do something that she, in fact, did. Bates v. State, 3 So. 3d
1091, 1106 fn. 20 (Fla. 2009) (observing that counsel cannot be held ineffective for
what counsel actually did); Stephens v. State, 975 So.2d 405, 415 (Fla. 2007)
(explaining that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object, when,
in fact, he did).
27
586
Secondly, Hilton cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong because there is
nothing in the record that demonstrates that any of the jurors seated in Hilton's
case were actually biased. A Strickland claim related to jury selection requires
proof, plain on the face of the trial record, that an actually biased juror sat in the
case. In Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007), the Florida Supreme Court
concluded that a Strickland claim for failing to preserve a denial of a challenge for
cause must establish that an actually biased juror sat on the jury, and such bias
must be plain on the face of the record. The court went on to define an actually
biased juror as one who is not impartial; one who is biased 8 against the defendant.
Id. at 324.
Here, Hilton has failed to allege that any of the jurors were actually biased.
Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that any of the jurors were actually
biased. If Hilton cannot identify specific jurors that were actually biased, he cannot
demonstrate prejudice.
Finally, this claim is insufficiently pled. Hilton has simply alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective because cause challenges were not preserved. He does not
identify which cause challenges counsel should have preserved, nor does he
8
Actual bias means bias-in-fact that would prevent service as an impartial juror. See United
States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133-34 (1936) (stating, in a case where U.S. government
employees served as jurors in a criminal case prosecuted by the U.S. government, that the jurors'
employment status did not automatically disqualify them, but the defendant had the ability
during voir dire to "ascertain whether a prospective juror ... has any bias in fact which would
prevent his serving as an impartial juror").
28
587
identify which jurors who remained on his jury were biased. He simply makes
facts. The defendant "bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based
upon a legally valid claim." Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1139 (Fla. 2006)
several issues, summary denial was proper). For these reasons, this claim should be
summarily denied.
Hilton alleges that he did not receive a fair trial due to the numerous errors
in his case. He asserts that the errors complained of in his Motion tainted his case
and these errors are not harmless. (Motion at 74). Cumulative error relief is not
warranted in Hilton's case because there were no individual errors in his case.
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of
cumulative error. Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1456 (5th Cir. 1992) (en
bane) (noting the Supreme Court has not directly spoken regarding cumulative
that none of the individual errors warrants reversal while asserting that the
combined effect of legally insufficient claims still merits relief. Id. at 1456 (en
29
588
events none of which individually violated a defendant's constitutional rights
cumulative error claim cannot warrant relief unless the trial court finds specific
claims of error meritorious. Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008)
Hilton's claims are meritless, he is not entitled to cumulative error relief. See
Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003) ("[W]here individual claims of error
alleged are either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative
error must fail.); Vining v. State, 827 So. 2d 201, 219 (Fla. 2002) (where the
defendant's claims were either meritless, procedurally barred, or did not meet the
CONCLUSION
30
589
deny Claims 2(II), 3-6 9and suspend ruling on Claim 7 until completion of the
evidentiary hearing.
Respectfully submitted,
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JACK CAMPBELL
STATE ATTORNEY
9
This claim is sequentially numbered as Claim 6 but Hilton's Motion, presumably due to
typographical error, has this claim listed as Claim 7. (Motion at 73)
31
590
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been
Attorney for the Defendant; and the Office of the State Attorney,
32
591
Filing# 57759744 E-Filed 06>.: ;/2017 03:08:50 PM
IU.
Defendant.
----------------------------~1
ORDER DISMISSING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND CLAIM 6 OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FORPOST-CONVICTION RELIEF
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Second Amended Motion for
Post-Conviction Relief filed on April 20, 2017. The Court having considered the motion,
reviewed the court record, and being otherwise fully advised, hereby finds as follows:
Defendant raises seven claims in his Second Amended Motion for Post-Conviction
Relief. Defendant's Claim 6 1 is legally insufficient and is therefore dismissed with leave to
amend within thirty (30) days.
It is therefore
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Claim .6 of Defendant's Second Amended Motion
for Post-Conviction Relief filed on April 20, 2017, is hereby DISMISSED with leave to amend
within thirty (30) Days.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this (L£ +""-
day of June,
2017.
ES C. HANKINSON
IRCUIT JUDGE
Copies:
State Attorney's Office
1
The 6~ claim nlised in Defendant's motion is titled c.laim 7. To avoid confusion this Court will refer to that claim
as Claim (). The claim in question is titled, "Trial counsel was ineffective for their failure to preserve for appeal the
denial of cause challenges during jury selection."
592
Filing# 59026323 E-Filed 07/14/2017 12:02:36 PM
COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel, and moves this Court for an extension of time to amend the Second Amended Motion
1) Defendant's Second Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief was filed on April
20,2017.
insufficient on June 14, 2017. The Court granted leave to amend the claim within
3) The undersigned was scheduled to meet with the Defendant to review the amended
claim late last week and earlier this week so it could be timely filed. That meeting
was cancelled because of illness. The undersigned, his wife and children have all
been ill with a stomach virus that has been relentless and incapacitating. Several
593
doctor visits and sleepless nights have been the nonn as it has moved from one person
to the other.
4) The undersigned requests a brief extension of time within which to amend Claim 6.
Counsel requests seven (7) days until July 21, 2017 within which to amend. This will
afford Counsel time to finalize the amendment and to review the amendment with the
5) The undersigned has conferred with Assistant State Attorney Georgia Cappleman and
WHEREFORE the Defendant requests the entry of an order granting a seven (7) day
Respectfully submitted,
594
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 14th day ofJuly, 2017.
595
Filing# 59099367 E-Filed 011. i/2017 01:57:06 PM
11
vs.
CASE NO. 2008-CF-697 A
DIVISION: FELONY
DEATH PENALTY
GARY HILTON,
Defendant.
I
THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court upon the Defendant's Unopposed Motion
for Extension of Time for Leave to Amend Motion for Post-Conviction Relief; and this Court
having reviewed the Motion and heard arguments of counsel and being otherwise fully advised
_ _ _ DENIED
JAMESC'~
I
CIRCUIT JUDGE
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
Attorney for Defendant
596
Filing# 59308067 E-Filed O'L0/2017 04:04:30 PM
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through the undersigned counsel, and moves to
l. The Defendant is indigent and the undersigned was appointed by the Court to
counsel. Among those claims and related to the claims are that the Defendant's
conditions.
597
5. To that end, the defense seeks for the Court to grant approval to incur costs for the
services of Dr. Thomas Hyde, M.D., Ph.D. Dr. Hyde is a Professor of Psychiatry
Medical Degree (1984) and his Doctoral Degree (1984) from the University of
6. Dr. Hyde has been qualified as an expert witness in multiple Florida courts. He
the historical materials available as well as the materials that ha.ve been assembled
proceeding. In doing so, he desires the records that have been compiled related to
Preliminary indications are that the Defendant has/had a neurological disease that
was not investigated and was not presented in the penalty phase of the
Defendant's trial.
8. Dr. Hyde requests initial authorization for 40 hours with leave to seek additional
authorization. Dr. Hyde's rates are $300.00 per hour and $150.00 per hour for
travel.
9. c·ounsel has bee.n l!nable to locate an expert in Dr. Hyde's field within the local
area or within the State of Florida that has the same expertise, qualifications,
598
research experience, willingness to be involved, and courtroom experience.
penalty.
10. The defense has previously sought leave to incur costs for a forensic psychologist.
Dr. Hyde's expertise has been recommended by multiple doctors and evaluators
based on the necessity of gaining his expertise which is separate and apart from
the
II. The undersigned counsel has contacted Brad Bischoff, Esq. of the Justice
Administrative Commission to ask for his position on the instant motion. The
defers to the Court's discretion in this matter. Mr. Bischoff advised that the
instant motion.
WHEREFORE, the defense requests this Court enter an order authorizing the defense to
Respectfully submitted,
599
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Coutihouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State
Leon County Courthouse, 4111 Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Je1mifer Keegan,
PL-0 1 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050, Brad Bischoff, Esq., Justice Administrative
600
Thomas Michael Hyde, M.D., Ph.D.
Chief Medical Officer, Lieber Institute for Brain Development, 655 North Wolfe
Street, Third Floor, Ranges Building, BaiHmore, Maryland 21205
Office Telephone: 410~955~0443
PERSONAL INFORMATION:
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND:
601
1988-1996 Special Volunteer, Laboratory of Neuropathology,
Clinical Brain Disorders Branch, National institute of
Mental Health, Washington, D.C.
602
AWARDS AND HONORS:
1974 Valedictorian
Magruder Senior High School
Rockville, Maryland
603
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS:
RESEARCH FUNDING:
604
China, Changsha, China.
November 20, 2014 Grand Rounds, "Leiber Institute for Brain Development:
Genetics and Molecular Pathology of Complex
Developmental Brain Disorders", Department of
Neurosurgery, Johns Hopkins School of Medicine,
Baltimore, Maryland.
ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES:
605
1992-present Member, Program Committee, Winter Conference on
Brain Research
606
1999-2002 Member, Board of Directors, Winter Conference on
Brain Research
607
PUBLICATIONS:
1. HydE), T.M. and R.R. Miselis. Effects of area postrema/caudal medial nucleus of the solitary
tract lesions on food intake and body weight. American Journal of Physiology. 244: 577-587,
1983.
2. Hyde, T.M. and R.R. Miselis. Effects of area postrema/caudal medial nucleus of the solitary
tract lesions on water and sodium balance. American Journal of Physiology. 246: 173·182,
1984.
3. Miselis, R.R., T.M. Hyde, and R.E. Shapiro. The area postrema and adjacent solitary nucleus
in water and energy balance. Federation Proceedings. 43: 2969-2971,1984.
4. Hyde, T.M., M. Gibbs, and S.J. Peroutka. Distribution of muscarinic cholinergic receptors in
the dorsal vagal complex and other selected nuclei in the human medulla. Brain Research. 447:
287-292, 1988.
5. Hyde, T.M. and S.J. Peroutka. Distribution of cholecystokinin receptors in the dorsal vagal
complex and other selected nuclei in the human medulla. Brajn Research. 495: 198·202, 1989.
6. Hyde, T.M., J.R. Hotson, and J.E. Kleinman. Differential diagnosis of choreiform tardive
dyskinesia. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences. 3: 255-268,1991.
7. Hyde, T.M., B.A. Aaronson, C. Randolph, K.C. Rickler, and D.R. Weinberger. The relationship
of birthweight to the phE)notypic expression at Tourette's Syndrome in monozygotic twins.
Neurology, 42: 652-657, 1992.
B. Hyde, T.M., J.C. Ziegler, and D.R. Weinberger. Psychiatric disturbances in metachromatic
leukodystrophy: insights into the neurobiology of psychosis. Archives of Neurology. 49: 401·
406, 1992.
9. Egan, M.F., T.M. Hyde, G.W. Albers, A. Elkashef, R. Alexander, A. Reeves, A.O. Blume, and
R.J. Wyatt. Treatment of tardive dyskinesia with vitamin E. American Journal of Psychiatry. 149:
773-777, 1992.
10. Hyde, T.M. and R.R. Miselis. The subnuclear organization of the human caudal nucleus of
the solitary tract. Brain Research Bulletin, 29: 95·1 09, 1992.
11. Egan, M.F., T.M. Hyde, D.L. Tirschwell, J.E. Kleinman, and D.R. Weinberger. Laterality of
appendicular tardive dyskinesia in chronic schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatry, 31: 1098-1109,
1992.
12. Hyde, T.M., L.-C. Wu, I.B. Krasnov, S.K. Sigworth, N.G. Daunton, and F. D'Amello.
Quantitative autoradiographic analysis of muscarinic cholinergic and GABAA (benzodiazepine)
receptors in the forebrain of rats flown on COSMOS 2044. Brain Research. 593: 291-294, 1992.
13. Hyde, T.M., E.K. Fitzcharles,. and D.R. Weinberger. Age-related prognostic factors in the
severity of illness of Tourette's Syndrome in monozygotic tWins. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and
Clinical Neurosciences. 5: 178-182, 1993.
608
14. Randolph, C., T.M. Hyde, J.M. Gold, T.E. Goldberg, and D.R. Weinberger. Tourette's
Syndrome in monozygotic twins: relationship of tic severity to neuropsychological function.
Archives of Neurology. 50: 725· 728, 1993.
15. Goldberg, T.E., T.M. Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, and D.R. Weinberger. The course of
schizophrenia: neuropsychological evidence for a static encephalopathy. Schizophrenia Bulletin.
19: 797-804, 1993.
16. Gupta S., M.F. Egan, and T. M. Hyde. An unusual presentation of tardive dyskinesia with
prominent involvement of the pectoral musculature. Biological Psychiatry. 33: 291·292, 1993.
17. Elkashef, A.M., M.F. Egan, J.A. Frank, T.M. Hyde, B.K. Lewis, and R.J. Wyatt. Basal ganglia
iron content in tardive dyskinesia: an MRI study. Biological Psychiatry. 35: 16-21, 1994.
18. Abi-Dargham, A., M. Laruelle, J. Seibyl, Z. Rattner, A.M. Baldwin, S.S. Zoghbi, Y. Zea-
Ponce, J.D. Bremner, T.M. Hyde, D.S. Charney, P.B. Hoffer, and A.B. Innis. SPECT
measurement of benzodiazepine receptors in human brain with [123]Jomazenil: kinetic and
equilibrium paradigms. Journal of Neurochemistry. 35: 228-238, 1994.
19. Ohuoha, D.C., M.B. Knable, S.S. Wolf, J.E. Kleinman, and T.M. Hyde. S-HT3 receptor
distribution in the human nucleus of the solitary tract and other structures of the caudal medulla:
a quantitative autoradiographic study. Brain Research. 637: 222·226, 1994.
20. Sambunaris, A. and T.M. Hyde. Stroke-related aphasias mistaken for psychotic speech: two
case reports. Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry and Neurology. 7: 144·147, 1994.
21. Hyde, T.M., s. Nawroz, T.E. Goldberg, D. Strong, J.L. Ostrem, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E.
Kleinman. Is there cognitive decline in schizophrenia? A cross-sectional study. Biitish Journal of
Psychiatry. 164: 494-500, 1994.
22. Wolf, S.S., T.M. Hyde, and D.R. Weinberger. Malformations of the septum pellucidum: two
distinctive cases in association with schizophrenia, Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience. 19:
140-144, 1994.
23. Hyde, T.M., H.A. Emsellem, C. Randolph, K.C. Rickler, and D.R. Weinberger. EEG
abnormalities in monozygotic twins with Tourette's Syndrome. British Journal of Psychiatry. 164:
811-817,1994.
24. Cantor-Graae, E., T.F. McNeil, K.C. Rickler, K. Sjostrom, R. Rawlings, E.S. Higgins, and
T.M. Hyde. Are neurological abnormalities in Well discordant monozygotic co-twins of
schizophrenic subjects the result of perinatal trauma? American Journal of Psychiatry. 151:
1194-1199,1994.
25. Wolf, S.S., T.M. Hyde, T.W. Moody, R.C. Saunders, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman.
The autoradiographic characterization of 1251-neurotensin binding in human entorhinal cortex.
Brain Research Bulletin. 35: 353-358, 1994.
609
26. Egan, M.F., Y. Hurd, T.M. Hyde, D.R. Weinberger, J.E. Kleinman, and R.J. Wyatt.
Alterations in mRNA levels of D2 receptors and neuropeptides in striatonigral and striatopallidal
neurons of rats with neuroleptic-induced dyskinesias. Synapse. 18: 178-189, 1994.
27. Knable, M.B., T.M. Hyde, M. Tosayali, R.J. Wyatt, J.E. Kleinman, D.R. Weinberger, and M.F.
Egan. Quantitative autoradiography of striatal dopamine D1, D2, and reuptake sites in rats with
vacuous chewing movements. Brain Research. 646: 217-222, 1994.
28. Knable, M.B., T.M. Hyde, M.M. Herman, J.M. Carter, LB. Bigelow, and J.E. Kleinman.
Quantitative autoradiography of dopamine-D1 receptors, D2 receptors and dopamine uptake sites
in post-mortem striatal specimens from schizophrenic patients. Biological Psychiatry. 36: 827-
835, 1994.
29. Hyde, T.M., M.F. Egan, R,J, Brown, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman. Diurnal variation
in tardive dyskinesia. Psychiatry Research. 56: 53-57, 1995.
30. Hyde, T.M. and D.R. Weinberger. Tourette's Syndrome: a model neuropsychiatric
disorder. Journal ofthe American Medical Association. 273: 498-501, 1995,
31. Egan, M.F., T.M. Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, and R.J. Wyatt. Neuroleptic-induced vacuous
chewing movements in rodents: incidence and effects of long-term increases in haloperidol dose.
Psychopharmacology. 117: 74-81, 1995.
32. Hyde, T.M., M.F. Egan, LL Wing, R.J. Wyatt, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman.
Persistent catalepsy associated with severe dyskinesias in rats treated with chronic injections of
haloperidol decanoate. Psychopharmacology. 118: 142-149, 1995.
33. Hyde, T.M,, M.E. Stacey, R. Coppola, S.F. Handel, K.C. Rickler, and D.R. Weinberger.
Structural abnormalities in Tourette's Syndrome: a quantitative MRI study in monozygotic twins.
Neurology. 45: 1176-1182, 1995.
34. Knable, M.B., D.W. Jones; R. Coppola, T.M. Hyde, K.S. Lee, J. Gorey, and D.R.
Weinberger. Lateralized differences in lodine-123-IBZM uptake in the'basal ganglia activity in
asymmetric Parkinson's disease. J. Nuclear Medicine. 36: 1216-1225, 1995,
35. Egan, M.F., J.N. Ferguson, and T.M. Hyde. Effects of chronic naloxone administration on
vacuous chewing movements and catalepsy in rats treated with long-term haloperidol decanoate.
Brain Research Bulletin 38: 355-363, 1995.
36. Wail, S.S., T.M. Hyde, R.C. Saunders, M.M. Herman, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman.
Autoradiographic characterization of neurotensin receptors in the entorhinal cortex of
schizophrenic patients and control subjects. J. Neural Transmission., 102: 55-65, 1995.
37. Murray, A.M., T.M. Hyde, M.B. Knable, M.M. Herman, LB. Bigelow, J.M. Carter, D.R.
Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman. The distribution of putative D4 dopamine receptors in post-
mortem striatum from patients with schizophrenia. J. Neuroscience. 15: 2186-2191, 1995.
610
38. Lynn, R.B., G.-Y. Gao, R.V. Considine, T.M. Hyde, and J.F. Caro. Autoradiographic
localization of leptin binding in the choroid plexus of ob/ob and db/db mice. Biochemical and
Biophysical Research Communications. 219: 884-889, 1996.
39. Lynn, R.B., T.M. Hyde, R.B. Cooperman, and R.R. Miselis. Distribution of bombesin-like
Immunoreactivity in the nucleus of the solitary tract and dorsal motor nucleus of the rat and
human: colocaliza:tion with tyrosine hydroxylase. J. Comparative Neurology. 369: 552-570,
1996.
40. Considine, R.V., E.L. Considine, C.J. Williams, T.M. Hyde, and J.F. Caro. The hypothalamic
leptin receptor is humans: identification of incidental sequence polymorphlsms and absence of
the db/db mouse and fa/fa rat mutations. Diabetes. 45:992-994, 1996.
41. Hyde, T.M., M.B. Knable, and A.M. Murray. The distribution of dopamine D1- D4 receptor
subtypes in human dorsal vagal complex. Synapse. 24: 224-232, 1996.
42, Wolf, S.S., D.W. Jones, M.B. Knable, J. Gorey, K.S. Lee, T.M. Hyde, R. Coppola, and D.R.
Weinberger. Phenotypic variation in Tourette Syndrome twins correlates with dopamine receptor
imaging in caudate. Science. 273: 1225-1227, 1996.
43. Knable, M.B., T.M. Hyde, A.M. Murray, M.M. Herman, and J.E. Kleinman. A postmortem
study of frontal cortical dopamine D1 receptors in schizophrenics, psychiatric controls, and
normal controls. Biological Psychiatry. 40: 1191-1199, 1996.
44. Egan, M.F., J,N. Ferguson, and T.M. Hyde. Effects of rating parameters on assessment of
neuroleptic-induced vacuous chewing movements. Pharmacology, Biochemistry, and Behavior.
53: 401-410, 1996.
45. Egan, M.F., Y. Hurd, J.N. Ferguson, S.E. Bachus, E.H. Hamid, and T.M. Hyde.
Pharmacological and neurochemical differences between acute and tardive vacuous chewing
movements induced by haloperidol. Psychopharmacology. 127: 337-345, 1996.
46. Bachus, S.E., T.M. Hyde, M.M. Herman, M.F. Egan, and J.E. Kleinman. Abnormal
cholecystokinin mRNA levels in entorhinal cortex of schizophrenics. J. Psychiatric Research. 31:
233-256, 1997.
47 . Hyde, T.M. and D.R. Weinberger. Seizures and schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin. 23:
611-622, 1997.
48. Hurd, Y.L., M.M. Herman, T.M. Hyde, L.B. Bigelow, D.R. Weinberger; and J.E. Kleinman.
Prodynorphin mANA expression is increased in the patch versus matrix compartment of the
caudate nucleus in suicide subjects. Molecular Psychiatry. 2: 495-500, 1997.
49. Shimon, H., G. Agam, R.H. Belmaker, T,M. Hyde, and J.E. Kleinman. Reduced frontal cortex
inositol levels in postmortem brain of suicide victims and patients with bipolar disorder. American
J. Psychiatry. 154: 1148-1150, 1997.
50. Krimer, L.S., T.M. Hyde, M.M. Herman, and R.C. Saunders. The entorhinal cortex: an
examination of cyto- and myelo-architectonic organization in humans. Cerebral Cortex. 7: 722-
731, 1997.
611
51. Krimer, L.S., M.M. Herman, R.C. Saunders, J.C. Boyd, T.M. Hyde, J.M. Carter, J.E.
Kleinman, and D.R. Weinberger. A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the entorhinal cortex in
schizophrenia. Cerebral Cortex. 7: 732-739, 1997.
52. Noga, J.T., T.M. Hyde, M.M. Herman , C.F. Spurney, L.B. Bigelow, D.R. Weinberger, and
J.E. Kleinman. Glutamate receptors in the post-mortem striatum of schizophrenia, suicide, and
control brains. Synapse. 27: 168-176, 1997.
53. Moore, K.A., G.W. Kunsman, B.S. Levine, M.M. Herman, J. Cervenak, and T.M. Hyde. A
comparison of ethanol concentrations in the occipital lobe and cerebellum. Forensic Science
International. 86: 127-134, 1997.
54. Vawter, M.P., H.E. Cannon-Spoor, J.J. Hemperly, T.M. Hyde, D.M. VanderPutten, J.E.
Kleinman, and W.J. Freed. Abnormal expression of cell recognition molecules in schizophrenia.
Experimental Neurology.149: 424-432, 1998.
55. Baca, S.M., B.K. Lipska, M.F. Egan, S.E. Bachus, J.N. Ferguson, and T.M. Hyde. Effects of
prefrontal cortical lesions on neuropeptide and dopamine receptor gene expression in the
striatum-accumbens complex. Brain Research. 797: 55-64, 1998.
56. Mulberg, A. E., R.T. Weyler, S.M. Altschuler, and T.M. Hyde. Cystic fibrosis transmembrane
conductance regulator expression in human hypothalamus. NeuroReport. 9: 141-144, 1998.
57. Heinz, A., M.B. Knable, S.S. Wolf, D.W. Jones, J.G. Gorey, T.M. Hyde, and D.R.
Weinberger. Tourette's Syndrome: [l-123jbeta-CIT SPECT correlates of vocal tic severity.
Neurology. 51: 1069-1074,1998.
58. Hamid, E.H., T.M. Hyde, S.M. Baca, and M.F. Egan. Failure to down regulate NMDA
receptors in the striatum and nucleus accumbens associated with neuroleptic-induced dyskinesia.
Brain Research. 796: 291-295, 1998.
59. Vawter, M.P., J.J. Hemperly, T.M. Hyde, S.E. Bachus, D.M. VanderPutten, A.L. Howard, H.E.
Cannon-Spoor, M.T. McCoy, M.J. Webster, J.E. Kleinman, and W.J. Freed. VASE-containing N-
CAM isoforms are increased in the hippocampus in bipolar disorder but not schizophrenia.
Experimental Neurology. 154: H 1, 1998.
60. McNamara, R.K., T.M. Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, and R.H. Lenox. Expression of myristoylated
alanine-rich C kinase substrate (MARCKS) and MARCKS-related protein (MAP) in the prefrontal
cortex and hippocampus of suicide victims. J. Clinical Psychiatrv. Supplement 2: 21-6, 1999.
61. Vawter, M.P., A.L. Howard, T.M. Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, and W.J. Freed. Alterations of
hippocampal secreted N-CAM in bipolar disorder and synaptophysin in schizophrenia. Molecular
Psychiatry. 4: 467-475, 1999.
62. Spurney, C.F., S.M. Baca, A.M. Murray, G.E. Jaskiw, J.E. Kleinman, and T.M. Hyde.
Differential effects of haloperidol and clozapine on ionotropic glutamate receptors in rats.
Synapse. 34: 266-276, 1999.
63. Holt, D.J., M.M. Herman, T.M. Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, C.M. Sinton, D.C. German, L.B. Hersh,
A.M. Graybiel, and G.B. Saper. Evidence for a deficit in cholinergic interneurons in the striatum in
schizophrenia. Neuroscience. 94: 21-31, 1999.
612
64. Shannon Weickert, C.,M.J. Webster, S.M. Colvin, M.M. Herman, T.M. Hyde, D.R.
Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman. Localization of epidermal growth factor receptors and putative
neuroblasts in human subependymal zone. Journal of Comparative Neurology. 423: 359-372,
2000.
65.. Bower, C.M., T.M. Hyde, M. Zaka, E.H. Hamid, S.M. Baca, and M.F. Egan. Decreased mu-
opioid receptor binding In the globus pallidus of rats treated with chronic haloperidol.
Psychopharmacology. 150: 260-263, 2000.
66. Meredith, GE, I.E.. De Souza, T.M. Hyde, G. Tipper, M.L Wong, and M.F. Egan. Persistent
alterations in dendrites, spines, and dynorphinergic synapses in the nucleus accumbens sheil of
rats with neuroleptic-induced dyskinesias. Journal of Neuroscience. 20: 7798-7806, 2000.
67. Weickert, C.S., M.J. Webster, T.M. Hyde, M.M. Herman, S.E. Bachus, G. Bali, D.R.
Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman. Reduced expression of GAP-43 mRNA in dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex of schizophrenics. Cerebral Cortex. 11: 136-147, 2001.
68. Webster, M.J., C.S. Weickert, M.M. Herman, T.M. Hyde, and J.E. Kleinman. Synaptophysin
and GAP-43 mRNA levels ih the hippocampus of subjects with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia
Research. 49: 89-98, 2001.
69. Winterer, G., M.F. Egan, T. Radler, T. Hyde, R. Coppola, and D.R. Weinberger. An
association between reduced interhemispheric EEG coherence in the temporal lobe and genetic
risk for schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research. 49: 129-143, 2001.
70. Egan, M.F., T.E. Goldberg, T. Gscheidle, M. Weirich, R. Rawlings, T.M. Hyde, LB. Bigelow,
and D.R. Weinberger. Relative risk for cognitive impairments in siblings of patients with
schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatry. 50: 98-107, 2001.
71. Noga, J.T., T.M. Hyde, S.E. Bachus, M.M. Herman, and J.E. Kleinman. AMPA receptor
binding in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of schizophrenics and controls. Schizophrenia
Research. 48: :361-363, 2001.
72. Crook, J.M., M. Akil, B.C.W. Law, T.M. Hyde, and J.E. Kleinm.an. Comparative analysis of
group II metabotropic glutamate receptor immunoreactivity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of
patients with schizophrenia and normal subjects. Molecular Psychiatry. 7: 157-164, 2002.
73. Egan, M.F., T.M. Hyde, J.B. Bonomo, V.S. Mattay, LB. Bigelow, T.E. Goldberg, and D.R.
Weinberger. Relative risk of neurological signs in siblings of patients with schizophrenia~
American Journal of Psychiatry. 158: 1827-1834, 2002.
74. Vawter, M.P., L Thatcher, N. Usen, T.M. Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, and W.J. Freed. Reduction of
synpasln in the hippocampus of patients with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Molecular
Psychiatrv. 7: 571-578, 2002.
· 75. Mattay, V.A., A. Tessitore, J.H. Callicott, A. Bertolino, T.E. Goldberg, T.N. Chase, T.M. Hyde,
and D.R. Weinberger. Dopaminergic modulation of cortical function in patients with Parkinson's
disease. Annals of Neurology 51: 156-164,2002.
76. Hamid, E.H., T. M. Hyde, S.E. Bachus, M.F. Egan, B. Kinkead, G.B. Nemeroff, and J.E.
Kleinman. Neurotensin receptor abnorrnaiities in the mesial temporal lobe In schizophrenia.
Biological Psychiatrv15: 795-800, 2002.
613
77. Tessitore, A.. R. Hariri, F. Fera, W.G. Smith, T. N. Chase , T. M. Hyde, D. R. Weinberger and
V. S. Mattay. Dopamine modulates the response of the human amygdala: A study in Parkinson's
disease. Journal of Neuroscience. 22: 9099·91 03, 2002.
78. Vawter, M.P., J.M. Crook, T.M. Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, D.R. Weinberger, K.G. Becker, and W.J,
Freed. Microarray analysis of gene expression in the prefrontal cortex in schizophrenia.
Schizophrenia Research. Schizophrenia Research. 58: 11, 2002.
79. Weickert, T. W., A. Terrazas, LB. Bigelow, J.D. Malley, T. Hyde, M.F. Egan, D.R. Weinberger,
and T.E. Goldberg. Habit and skill learning in schizophrenia: evidence of normal striatal
processing with abnormal cortical input. Learning and Memorv. 9:430-42, 2002.
80. Matsumoto, M., C.Shannon Weickert, M. Akil, T.M. Hyde, M.M. Herman, J.E. Kleinman, and
D.R. Weinberger. Catechol-0-methyltransferase (COMT) mRNA expression in human and rat
brain: evidence for a role in cortical neuronal function. Neuroscience. 116: 127-137,2003.
81. Lerhmann, E., J. Oyler, M.P. Vawter, T.M. Hyde, B. Kolachana, J.E. Kleinman, M.A. Huestis,
K.G. Becker, and W.J. Freed. Transcription profiling in the human prefrontal cortex: evidence for
two activational states associated with cocaine abuse. Pharmacogenomics Journal. 3: 27-40,
2003.
82. Akil, M., B.S. Kolachana, D.A. Rothmond, T.M. Hyde, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman.
Catechol-o-methyltransferase genotype and dopamine regulation in the human brain. Journal of
Neuroscience. 15: 2008-2013, 2003.
83, Halim, N.D., C.S. Weickert, B.W. McClintock, T.M. Hyde, D.R. Weinberger, J.E. Kleinman,
and B.K. Lipska. Presynaptic proteins in the prefrontal cortex of patients with schizophrenia and
rats with abnormal prefrontal development. Molecular Psychiatry, 8:797-810,2003.
84. Matsumoto, M., C.Shannon Weickert, S. Beltaifa, B. Kolachana, J. Chen, T.M. Hyde, M.M.
Herman, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman. Catechol-0-methyltransferase (COMT) mRNA
expression in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of patients with schizophrenia.
Neuropsychopharmacology. 28: 1521·1530, 2003.
85. Welckert, C.S., T.M. Hyde, B.K. Lipska, M.M. Herman, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman.
Reduced brain-derived neurotrophic factor in prefrontal cortex of patients with schizophrenia.
Molecular Psychiatry. 8: 592-610, 2003.
87. Ghose, S., C. Shannon Weickert, S.M. Colvin, M.D, J. T. Coyle, M. M. Herman, T. M. Hyde,
and J. E. Kleinman. Glutamate Carboxypeptidase II gene expression in the human frontal and
temporal lobe in schizophrenia. Neuropsychopharmacology. 29: 117-125,2004.
88. Hashimoto, R., R.E. Straub, C.S. Weickert, T.M. Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, and D.R. Weinberger.
Expression analysis of neuregulin-1 in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in schizophrenia.
Molecular Psychiatry. 9:299-307, 2004.
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89. Shannon Weickert, C., R.E. Straub, M. Matsumoto, B.W. McClintock, T.M. Hyde, M.M.
Herman, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman. Human dysbindin (DTNBP1) gene expression;
anatomical distribution in normal brain and altered expression in sChizophrenic prefrontal cortex
Archives of General PsychiatrY. 61: 544·555, 2004.
90. Law, A.J., C. Shannon Weickert, T.M.Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, and P.J. Harrison. Neuregulin-1
(NRG-1) mANA and protein in the adult human brain. Neuroscience. 127: 125-136,2004.
91. Zhu, G., R.H. Lipsky, K. Xu, S. Ali, T. Hyde, J. Kleinman, L.A. Akhtar, D.C. Mash, and D.
Goldman. Differential expression of human COMT alleles in brain and lymphoblasts detected by
AT-coupled 5' nuclease assay. Psychopharmacology. 177:178-184,2004.
92. Egan, M.F., R.E. Straub, T.E. Goldberg, I. Yakub, J.H. Callicott, A.A. Hatiri, V.S. Mattay, A.
Bertolino, T.M. Hyde, C. Shannon-Weickert, M.Akil, J. Crook, R.K. Vakkalanka, R. Balkissoon,
A.A. Gibbs, J.E. Kleinman, and D.R. Weinberger. Variation in GRM3 affects cognition, prefrontal
glutamate, and risk for schizophrenia. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 101:
12604-12609, 2004.
93. Law, A.J., C. Shannon Weickert, T.M. Hyde, J. E. Kleinman, and P. J. Harrison. Reduced
spinophilin but not MAP-2 expression in the hippocampal formation in schizophrenia and mood
disorders: evidence for a pathology of dendritic spines. American Journal of Psychiatrv. 161:
1848-1855, 2004.
94. Chen, J., B.K. Lipska, N. Halim, Q.D. Ma, M. Matsumoto, S. Melham, B.S .. Kolachana, T.M.
Hyde, M.M. Herman, J. Apud, M.F. Egan, J.E. Kleinman, D.R. Weinberger. Functional analysis
of genetic variation in catechol-0-methyltransferase (COMT): effects on mANA, protein, and
enzyme activity in postmortem human brain. American Journal of Human Genetics. 75: 807-821,
2004.
95. Weickert, C.S. D.A. Kittell, R.C. Saunders, M.M. Herman, A.A. Horlick, J.E. Kleinman, and
T.M. Hyde. Basic fibroblast growth factor and fibroblast growth factor receptor-1 in the human
hippocampal formation. Neuroscience. 131: 219-233, 2005.
96. Deep-Soboslay, A., M.Akil, C.E. Martin, L.B. Bigelow, M.M. Herman, T.M. Hyde, and J.E.
Kleinman. Reliability of psychiatric diagnosis in postmortem research. Biological Psychiatry. 57:
96-101,2005.
97. Holt, D.J., S.E. Bachus, T. M. Hyde, M. Witttie, M.M. Herman, M. Vangeil, G.B. Saper, and
J.E. Kleinman. Reduced density of cholinergic interneurons in the ventral striatum in
schizophrenia; an in situ hybridization study. Biological Psychiatry. 58: 408-416,2005.
98. Matsumoto, M., S. Beltaifa, c. S. Weickert, M.M. Herman, T.M. Hyde, R.C. Saunders,
B.K.Lipska, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman. A conserved mANA expression profile of
SREB2 (GPR85) in the adult human, monkey, and rat forebrain. Brain Research: Molecular Brain
Research. 138:58-69,2005.
9.9. Weickert, C.S., D.L. Ligons, T. Romanczyk, G. Ungaro, T.M. Hyde, M.M. Herman, D.R.
Weinberger, J.E. Kleinman. Reductions in neurotrophin receptor mRNM in the prefrontal cortex
of patients with schizophrenia. Molecular Psychiatry. 10: 637-650, 2005.
100. Perlman WR, Matsumoto M, Beltaifa S, Hyde TM, Saunders RC, Webster MJ, Rubinow DR,
Kleinman JE, Weickert CS. Expression of estrogen receptor alpha exon-deleted mANA variants
in the human and non-human primate frontal cortex. Neuroscience. 134:81-95,2005.
615
101. Lowe, R.H., A.J. Barnes, E. Lehrmann, W.J. Freed, J.E. Kleinman, T.M. Hyde, and M.A.
Huestis. A validated positive chemical ionization GC(MS method for the identification and
quantification of amphetamine, opiates, cocaine, and metabolites in human postmortem brain.
Journal of Mass Spectrometrv. 41:175-184,2006.
102. Lipska , B.K., T. Peters, T. M. Hyde, N. Halim, C. Horowitt, S. Mitkus, C.S. Weickert, M.
Matsumoto, A. Sawa, R. Straub, R. Vakkalanka, M. M. Herman, D. R. Weinberger , and J. E.
Kleinman. Expression of DISC1 binding partners Is reduced in schizophrenia and associated
with DISC1 SNPs. Human Molecular Genetics. 15: 1245-1258, 2006.
103. Law, A.J., B.K. Lipska, C.S. Weickert, T.M. Hyde, R.E. Straub, R. Hashimoto, P.J. Harrison,
J.E. Kleinman, and D.R. Weinberger. Neuregulin 1 transcripts are differentially expressed in
schizophrenia and regulated by 5' SNPs associated with the disease. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences. 103: 6747-6752, 2006.
105. Lipska, B.K., A. Deep-Soboslay, C.S. Weickert, T.M. Hyde, C.E. Martin, M.M. Herman, J.E.
Kleinman. Critical factors in gene expression in postmortem human brain: focus on studies in
schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatrv. 60: 650·658, 2006.
106. Lipska, B.K., S. Mitkus, M. Caruso, T.M. Hyde, J. Chen, R. Vakkalanka, R.E. Straub, D.R.
Weinberger, J.E, Kleinman. RGS4 mANA expression in postmortem human cortex is associated
with COMT Vai158Met genotype and COMT enzyme activity. Human Molecular Genetics. 15:
2804-2812, 2006.
107. Lehrmann, E., Colantuoni, C., Deep"Soboslay, A., Becker, K.G., Lowe, R. Huestis, M.A.
Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Freed, W.J. Transcriptional changes common to human cocaine,
cannabis and phencyclidine abuse. PLoS ONE, 1(1): e114.doi:10.1371~ournal.pone.0000114,
2006.
108. Hyde, T.M., Goldberg, T.E., Egan, M.F., Lener, M., Weinberger, D.R. The relationship of
frontal release signs and cognition in schizophrenics, their siblings, and normal controls. British
Journal of Psychiatry. 191:120-125, 2007.
109. Mathew, S.V., Law, A.J., Lipska, B.K., Davila-Gracia, M.R., Zamora, E.D., Mitkus, S,N.,
Vakkalanka; R., Straub, R.E., Weinberger, D.R., Kleinman, J.E., Hyde, T.M. a? nicotinic
acetylcholine receptor mANA e~pression and binding in postmortem human brain are associated
with genetic variation in Neuregulin 1. Human Molecular Genetics. 16: 2921-2932, 2007.
110. Halirn, N.D., Lipska, B.K., Hyde, T.M., Deep-Soboslay, A., Saylor, E.M., Herman, M.M.,
Thakar, J.., Verma, A., Kleinman, J.E. Increased lactate levels and reduced pH in postmortem
brains of schizophrenics: medication confounds. Journal of Neuroscience Methods. 169:208-213,
2008.
111. Mitkus, S.N., Hyde, T.M., Vakkalanka, R., Kolachana, B., Weinberger, D.R., Kleinman, J.E.,
Upska, B.K. Expression of oligodendrocyte-associated genes in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of
patients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research. 98: 129-138,2008.
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112. Weickert, C.S., Rothmond, D.A., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Straub, R.E. Reduced
DTNBP1 (dysbindin-1) mRNA in the hippocampal formation of schizophrenia patients.
Schizophrenia Research. 98: 105-110, 2008.
113. Lehrmann, E., Afanador, Z.R., Deep-Soboslay, A., Gallegos, G., Darwin, W.O., Lowe, R.H.,
Barnes, A.J., Huestis, M.A., Cadet, J.L, Herman, M.M., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Freed, W.J.
Postmortem diagnosis and toxicological validation of illicit substance abuse. Addiction Biology.
13:105-117,2008.
114. Deep-Soboslay, A., Iglesias, J., Hyde, T.M., Bigelow, LB., lmamovic, V., Herman, M.M.,
Kleinman, J.E. Evaluation of tissue collection for postmortem studies of bipolar disorder. Bipolar
Disorders. 1O: 822-828, 2008.
115. Colantuoni, C., Hyde, T.M., Mitkus, S., Joseph, A, Sartorius, L, Aguirre' C., Creswell, J.,
Johnson, E., Deep-Sobolsay, A., Herman, M.M., Lipska, B.K., Weinberger, D.R., and Kleinman,
J.E. Age-Related Changes in the Expression of Schizophrenia Susceptibility Genes in the Human
Prefrontal Cortex. Brain Structure and Function. 213:255-271,2008.
116. Agarwal V., Konimaddi R., Valli K, Ryder D., Hyde T.M., Kleinman J.E., Strobel H., and
Ravindranath V. Drug metabolism in human brain: high levels of cytochrome P4503A43 in brain
and metabolism of anti-anxiety drug alprazolam to its active metabolite. PLoS ONE 3: e2337,
2008.
117. Hyde, T.M., Deep-Soboslay, A., Iglesias, B., Callicott, J.H., Gold, J.M., Meyer-Lindenburgh,
A., Honea, R.A., Bigelow, LB., Egan, M.F., Emsellem, E.M., and Weinberger, D.R. Enuresis as a
premorbid developmental marker of schizophrenia. Brain. 131: 2489-2498, 2008.
118. Ghose, S., Crook, J.M., Bartus, C.L, Sherman, T.G., Herman, M.M., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman,
J.E., and Akil, M. Metabotropic glutamate receptor 2 and 3 gene expression in the human
prefrontal cortex and mesencephalon in schizophrenia. International Journal of Neuroscience.
118: 1609-1627, 2008.
119. Sartorius, LJ., Weinberger, D.R., Hyde, T.M., Harrison, P.J., Kleinman, J.E., and Lipska,
B.K. Expression of a GRM3 splice variant is increq.sed in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of
individuals carrying a schizophrenia risk SNP. Neuropsychopharmacology. 33: 2626-2634,
2008.
120. Buerlein, R.C., Hyde, T.M., Lipska, B.K., Robinson Jr., W.E., Khosla, A., and Kleinman, J.E.
A comparison of human brain dissection by drill versus saw on nucleic acid quality. Journal of
Neuroscience Methods. 179: 68-70, 2009.
121. Huffaker, S.J., Chen, J., Sambataro, F., Nicodemus, K.K., Yang, F., Mattay, V,, Lipska, B.K.,
Hyde, T.M., Song, J., Rujescu, D., Giegling, 1., Chang, J. Egan, M.F., Goldberg, T.E., Kleinman,
J.E., Lu, B., and Weinberger, D.R. A hovel, primate specific brain isoform of KCNH2: role in
cognition, hippocampal biology and association Wiih schizophrenia. Nature Medicine15: 509-518,
2009.
122. Nakata, K., Lipska, B.K., Hyde, T.M., Ye, T., Newburn, E.N., Morita, Y., Vakkalanka, R.,
Barenboim, M., Sei, Y., Weinberger, D.R., and Kleinman, J.E. DISCi variants are upregulated in
schizophrenia and associated with risk polymorphisms. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences. 106: 15873-15878, 2009.
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123. Bristow, G.C., Lane, T.A., Walker, M., Chen, L., Sei, Y., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E.,
Harrison, P.J., and Eastwood, S.L. Expression of Kinase Interacting with Siathmin (KIS, UHMK1)
in human brain and lymphoblasts: ettects of schizophrenia and genotype. Brain Research. 1301:
197-206, 2009.
124. Thakker-Varia, S., Jean, Y.Y., Parikh, P., Sizer, C.F., Ayer, J.J., Parikh, A, Hyde, T.M ..•
Buyske, S., and Alder, J. The neurpeptlde VGF is reduced in human bipolar postmortem brain
and contributes to some of the behavioral and molecular ellects of lithium. Journal of
Neuroscience. 30: 9368-9380, 2010.
125. Eastwood, S.L., Walker, M., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., and Harrison, P.J. The DISC1
Ser704Cys substitution attects centrosomal localisation of its binding partner PCM1 in glia in
human brain. Human Molecular Genetics. Hi: 2487-2496, 2010.
126. Deep-Soboslay, A., Hyde, T.M., Callicott, J.P., Lener, M.S., Verchinski, B.A., Apud, J.A.,
Weinberger, D.R., and Elvevag, B. Handedness, heritability, neurocognition and brain
asymmetry in schizophrenia. Brain. 133: 3113-3122, 2010.
127. Lemaitre, H, Mattay, V.S., Sambataro, F., Verchinski, B., Straub, R.E., Callicott, J.H.,
Kittappa, R., Hyde, T.M., Lipska, B., Kleinman, J.E., McKay, R., and Weinberger, D.R.
Parkinson's disease associated variation in FGF20 modulates hippocampal biology. Journal of
Neuroscience. 30: 5992-5997, 2010.
128. Bigos, K.L., V.S. Mattay, J.H. Callicott, R.E. Straub, R. Vakkalanka, B. Kolachana, T.M.
Hyde, B.K. Lipska, J.E. Kleinman, and D.R. Weinberger. Genetic variation in CACNA1C allects
brain circuitries related to mental illness. ArchiVes of General Psychiatry. 67: 939-945, 2010.
129. Kao, W.T., Y. Wang, J.E. Kleinman, B.K. Lipska, T.M. Hyde, D.R. Weinberger, and A.J.
Law. Common genetic variation in Neuroregulin 3 (NRG3) influences risk tor schizophrenia and
impacts NRG3 expression in hurnan brain. Proceedings of the NatiOnal Academy of Sciences.
107:15619-15624,2010.
130. Wong, J., T.M. Hyde, H.L. Cassano, A. Deep-Soboslay, J.E. Kleinman, and C.S. Weickert.
Promoter specific alterations of brain-derived neurotrophic factor rnRNA in schizophrenia.
Neuroscience. 169: 107101084, 2010.
131. Hellsten, K.S., S.T. Sinkkonen, T.M. Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, T. Sarkioja, A. Maksimow, M.
Uusi-Oukari, and E.R. Korpi. Human locus coeruleus neurons express the GABA(A) receptor
garnrna2 subunit gene and produce benzodiazepine binding. Neuroscience Letters. 477: 77-81,
2010.
132. Cenjero-Goldberg, C., T.M. Hyde, S. Chen, U. Dreses-Werringloer, M.M. Herrnan, J.E.
Kleinman, P. Davies, and T.E. Goldberg. Molecular signatures in post-mortern brain tissue of
younger individuals at high risk lor Alzheimer's disease as based on APOE genotype. Molecular
Psychiatry. 16:836-847,2010.
133. Zhang, F. 0. Chen, T. Ye, B.K. Lipska, R.E. Straub, R. Vakkalanka, R. Rujescu, D. St. Clair,
T.M. Hyde, L. Bigelow, J.E Kleinman, and D.R. Weinberger. Evidence of sex-modulated
association of ZNF804A with schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatry. 69: 914-917, 2011.
134. Hyde, T.M., B.K. Lipska, T. Ali, S.V. Mathew, A.J. Law, O.E. Meiitiri, R.E. Straub, T. Ye, C.
Colantueni, M.M. Herman, L.B. Bigelow, D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman. Expression of
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GABA signaling molecules KCC2, NKCCt, and GAD1 in cortical development and schizophrenia.
Journal of Neuroscience. 31: 11088-11095, 2011.
135. Kang, H.J. , Y.l. Kawasawa, F. Cheng, Y. Zhu, X. Xu, M. Li, A.M.M. Sousa, M. Pletikos, K.A.
Meyer, G. Sedmak, T. Guennel, Y. Shin, M.B. Johnson, Z. Krsnik, S. Mayer, S. Fertuzinhos, S.
Umlauf, A. Vortmeyer, D.R. Weinberger, S. Mane, T.M. Hyde, A. Huttner, M. Reimers, J.E.
Kleinman, and N. Sestan. Spatiotemporal transcriptome of the human brain. Nature. 478: 483-
489, 2011.
136. Colantuoni, C., B.K. Lipska• T. Ye·, T.M. Hyde· R. Tao, J.T. Leek' E.A. Colantuoni, A.G.
Elkahloun, M.M. Herman· D.R. Weinberger, and J.E. Kleinman. Temporal Dynamics and Genetic
Control of Transcription in the Human Prefrontal Cortex. Nature. 478: 519-523, 2011.
137. Newburn, E.N., T.M. Hyde, T. Ye, Y. Morita, D.R. Weinberger, and B.K. Lipska. Interactions
of human truncated DISC1 proteins: implications for schizophrenia. Translational Psychiatry.
Epub, 2011.
138. Numata, S., T. Ye, T.M. Hyde, X. Guitart-Navarro, R. Tao, M. Wininger, C. Colantuoni, D.R.
Weinberger, J.E. Kleinman, and B.K. Lipska. DNA methylation signatures in development and
aging of the human prefrontal cortex. American Journal of Human Genetics. 90: 260-272, 2012.
139. Zeng, H., Shen, E.H., Hohmann, J.G., Oh, S.W., Bernard, A., Royall, J.J., Glattfelder, K.J.,
Sunkin, S.M., Morris, J.A., Guillozet-Bongaart, A.L. Smith, K.A., Ebbert, A.J., Swanson, B., Kuan,
L., Page, D.T., Overly, C.C., Leln, E.S., Hawrylycz, M.J., Hof, P.R., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E.,
and Jones, A.R. Large-scale cellular"resolution gene profiling in human neocortex reveals
species-specific molecular signatures. Cell. 149: 483-496, 2012.
140. Tao R., C. Li, E.N. Newburn, T. Ye, B.K. Lipska, M.M. Herman, D.R. Weinberger, J.E.
Kleinman, and T.M. Hyde. Transcript-specific associations of SLC12A5 (KCC2) in human
prefrontal cortex with development, schizophrenia, and affective disorders. Journal of
Neuroscience. 32: 5216-5222, 2012.
141. Law, A.J., W. Yanhong, Y. Sei, P. 0' Donnell, P. Piantadosi , F. Papaleo, R.E. Straub, W.
Huang, C.J. Thomas, R.Vakkalanka, A. Besterman, B.K. Lipska, T.M. Hyde, P.J. Harrison, J.E.
Kleinman and D.R. Weinberger. NRG1-ErbB4-p110i5 signaling in schizophrenia and p110i5
inhibition as a potential therapeutic strategy. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
109:12165-70,2012.
142. Bliss, L.A., Sams, M.R., Deep-Soboslay, A., Ran-Patterson, R., Jaffe, A..• Chenoweth, J.G.,
Jaishankar, A., Kleinman, J.E., and Hyde, T.M. Use of postmortem human dura mater and scalp
for deriving human fibroblast cultures. PloS One. 7: e45282, 2012.
143. Jenko, K.J., Hirvonen, J., Henter, J.D., Anderson, K.B., Zoghbi, S.S., Hyde, T.M., Deep-
Soboslay, A., Innis, R.B., and Kleinman, J.E. Binding of a tritiated inverse agonist to cannabinoid
CB(1) receptors is increased Jn patients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research. 141:185-8,
2012.
144. Ye, T., Lipska, B.K., Tao, R., Hyde, T.M., Wang, L., Li, C., Choi, K.H., Straub; R.E.,
Kleinman, J.E., and Weinberger, D.R. Analysis of copy number variations in brain DNA from
patients with schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders. Biological Psychiatrv. 72: 651-4,
2012.
145. Guillozet-Bongaarts, A.L., Hyde, T.M., Dalley, R.A., Hawrylycz, M.J., Henry, A., Hot, P.R.,
619
Hohmann, J., Jones, A.R., Kuan, C.L., Royall, J., Shen, E., Swanson, B., Zeng, H., Kleinman,
J.E. Altered gene expression in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of individuals with
schizophrenia. Molecular Psychiatrv. 19: 478-485,2013.
146. Kunii, Y., Hyde, T.M., Li, C., Kolachana, B., Dickinson, D., Weinberger, D.R., Kleinman,
J.E., Lipska, B.K. Revisiting DARPP-32 In postmortem human brain: changes in schizophrenia
and bipolar disorder and genetic associations with t-DARPP-32 expression. Molecular
Psychiatry. 19: 192-199,2014.
147. Kaalund, S., Newburn, E., Ye, T., Tao, R., Li, C., Deep-Soboslay, A., Herman, M.M., Hyde,
T.M., Weinberger, D.R., Lipska, B.K., and Kleinman, J.E. Contrasting Changes in DRD1 and
DRD2 Splice Variant Expression in Schizophrenia and Affective Disorders, and Associations with
SNPs in Postmortem Brain. Molecular Psychiatry. 19: 1258-1266, 2014.
148. Conejero-Goldberg , C., Gomar, J., Bobes-Bascaran, T., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E.,
Herman, M.M., Chen, S., Davies, P., and Goldberg, T. APOE2 Enhances Neuroprotection
Against Alzheimer's Disease Through Multiple Molecular Mechanisms. Molecular Psychiatry. 19:
1243-1250,2014.
149. Morita, Y., Callicott, J.H., Testa, L.R., Mighdoll, M.l., Dickinson, D., Chen, D., Tao, R.,
Lipska, B.K., Kolachana, B., Law, A.J., Ye, T., Straub, R.E., Weinberger, D.R., Kleinman, J.E.,
and Hyde, T.M. Characteristics of the cation co-transporter NKCC1 in human .brain: alternate
transcripts, expression in development, and potential relationships to brain function and
schizophrenia. Journal of Neuroscience. 34: 4929-4940, 2014.
150. Dickinson, D., Straub, R.E., Trampush, J.W., Gao, Y., Feng, N., Xle, B., Shin, J., Lim, H.K.,
Ursini, G., Bigos, K.L., Kolachana, B,, Hashimoto, R., Takeda, M., Baum, G.L., Rujescu, D.
Callicott, J.H., Hyde, T.M., Berman, K.F., Kleinman, J.E., and Weinberger, D.R. Differential
effects of common variants in SCN2A on general cognitive ability, brain physiology and
messenger RNA expression in schizophrenia cases and control individuals. JAMA Psychiatry.
71:647-656, 2014.
151. Punzi, G., Ursini, G., Shin, J.H., Kleinman, J.E. Hyde, T.M., and Weinberger, D.R.
Increased expression of MARCKS In post-mortem brain of violent suicide completers is related to
transcription of a long, non-coding, antisense RNA. Molecular Psychiatry. 19: 1057-1059,2014.
152. Yoon, K.J., Nguyen, H.N., Ursini, G., Zhang, F., Kim, N.S., Wen, Z., Makri, G., Nauen, D.,
Shin, J.H., Park, Y., Chung, R., Pekle, E., Zhang, C., Towe, M., Hussain!, S.M., Lee, Y., Rujescu,
D., St Clair, D., Kleinman, J.E., Hyde, T.M., Krauss, G., Christian, K.M., Rapoport, JL,
Weinberger, D.R., Song, H., and Ming, G.L. Modeling a genetic risk for schizophrenia in IPSCs
and mice reveals neural stem cell deficits associated with adherens junctions and polarity. Cell
Stem Cell. 15: 79-91, 2014.
153. Birnbaum R., Jaffe, A.E., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., and Weinberger, D.R. Prenatal
expression patterns of genes associated with neuropsychiatric disorders. American Journal of
Psychiatrv. 171 :758-67, 2014.
154. Tao, R., Cousijn, H., Jaffe, A., Burnet, P., Edwards, F., Eastwood, S.L., Shin, J.H., Lane, T.,
Walker, M., Maher, B., Harrison, P., Hyde, T.M., and Kleinman, J.E. ZNF804A Expression in
Human Brain: A Novel Transcript Fetally Regulated by the Psychosis Risk SNP rs1344706, and
Alterations in Schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder and Major Depression. JAMA Psychiatry.
71 :1112-20, 2014.
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155. Jaffe A.E., Deep-Soboslay A., Tao R., Hauptman D.T., Kaye W.H., Arango V., Weinberger
D.R., Hyde T.M., and Kleinman J.E. Genetic neuropathology of obsessive psychiatric syndromes.
Translational Psychiatry. Epub: 2014 Sep 2;4:e432. dol: 10.1 038/tp.2014.68.
156. Birnbaum, R., Jaffe, A.E., Chen, Q., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., and Weinberger, D.R ..
Investigation of the prenatal expression patterns of 108 schizophrenia- associated genetic JoeL
Biological Psychiatry. 77:343-51,2015.
157. Jaffe A.E., Shin J., Collado-Torres L., Leek J.T., Tao R., Li C., Gao Y., Jian Y., Maher BJ.,
Hyde T.M., Kleinman J.E., and Weinberger D.R. Developmental regulation of human cortex
transcription at base resolution. Nature Neuroscience. 18: 154-61, 2015.
158. Ohl, K., Ursini, G., Ll, M., Shin, J.H., Ye, T., Kleinman, J.E., Hyde, T.M., Hashimoto, R., and
Weinberger, D.R. DEGS2 polymorphism associated with cognition In schizophrenia Is associated
with gene expression in brain. Translational Psychiatry. Epub: April 14, 2015; dol:
10.1 038/tp.2015.45.
159. Jenkins, A., Paterson, C., Wang, Y., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., and Law, A.J. Neurexln 1
(NRXN1) Splice isoform expression during human neocortical development and aging. Molecular
Psychiatry. Epub:dol:10.1038/mp.2015.107, 2015.
160. Gray, A., Deep-Soboslay, A., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., and Sodhi, M.S. Sex differences
in glutamate receptor gene expression In major depression and suicide. Molecular Psychiatry. 20:
1057-1068,2015.
161. Kunli, Y., Zhang, W., Xu, Q., Hype, T.M., McFadden, W., Shin, J.H., Deep-Soboslay, A., Ye,
T., Ll, C., Kleinman, J.E., Wang, K.H., and Llpska, B.K. CHANA? and CHRFAM7A mRNAs: co-
localized and their expression levels altered In the postmortem dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in
major psychiatric disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry. 172: 1122-1130, 2015.
162. Conejero-Goldberg, Concepcion, Hyde, T.M., Chen, S., Herman, M.M., Kleinman, J.E.,
Davies, P., and Goldberg, T.E. Cortical transcriptional profiles In APOE4 carriers with
Alzheimer's disease: patterns of protection and degeneration. Journal of Alzheimer's Disease.
48:969-78,2015.
163. Mou, Z., Hyde, T.M., Llpska, B.K., Martinowich, K., Wei, P., Ong, C.-J., Hunter, L.A.,
Palaguachi, G:l., Morgun, E., Teng, R., Lai, C., Condarco, T.A., Demldowich, A.P., Krause, A.J.,
Marshall, L.J., Haack, K., Voruganti, V.S., Cole, S.A., Butte, N.F'., Comuzzle, A.G., Nails, M.A.,
Zonderman, A.B., Singleton, A.B., Evans, M.K., Martin, B., Maudsley, S., and Han, J.C. Human
Obesity Associated with an Jntronic SNP In the Brain-Derived Neurotrophic Factor Locus. Cell
Reports. 13: 1073-80, 2015.
164. Hyde, T.M. and 2adwaj, A.A. Editorial: Molecular mechanisms and timing of cortical
immune activation in schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry. 172:1052-3, 2015.
165. Pletnikova, 0., Rudow, G.L., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Ali, S.Z., Bharadwaj, R.,
Gangadeen, s., Crain, B.J., Fowler, D.R., Rubio, A. I., and Troncoso, J.C. Alzheimer Lesions in
the Autopsied Brains of People 30 to 50 Years of Age. Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology. 28:
144-52, 2015.
166. Brudek, T., Winge, K., Rasmussen, N.B., Bah!, j,M.C., Tanassi, J., Agander, T.K., Hyde,
T.M., and Pakkenberg, B. Altered alpha'synuclein, parkin, and synphilin isoform levels in multiple
system atrophy brains. Journal of Neurochemistry. 136:172-185,2016.
621
167. Jaffe, A., Hyde, T., Kleinman, J., Weinberger, D., Chenoweth, J., McKay, R., Leek, J., and
Colantuoni, C. Practical impacts of genomic data "Cleaning" on biological discovery using
surrogate variable analysis. BMC Bioinformatics. Epub: DOl: 10.1186/s12859·015-0808·5,
2015.
168. Schubert, C.R., O'Donnell, P., Quan, J., Wendland, J.R., Xi, H.S., Domenici, E., Essioux,
L., Kam-Thong, T.,Airey, D., Calley, J.N., Collier, D.A., Eastwood, B., Ebert, P., Liu, Y.,
Nisenbaum, L., Ruble, C., Scherschel, J., Smith, R.M., Didriksen, M., Matsumoto, M., Saito, T.,
Brandon, N.J., Cross, A.J., Wang, Q,, Manji, H., Kolb, H., Furey, M., Drevets, W.C., Heon Shin,
J., Jaffe, A.E., Jia, Y., Straub, R.E., Deep-Soboslay, A., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., and
Weinberger, D.R. BrainSeq: Neurogenomics to drive novel target discovery for neuropsychiatric
disorders: BrainSeq • a human brain genomics consortium. Neuron. Epub: DOl:
http://dx.doi.org/1 0.1 016(j.neuron.2015.1 0.047, 2015.
169. Jaffe, A.E., Gao, Y., Deep-Soboslay, A., Tao, R., Hyde, T.M., Weinberger, D.R., and
Kleinman, J.E. Mapping DNA methylation across development, genotype and schizophrenia in
the human prefrontal cortex. Nature Neuroscience. Epub: doi: 10.1 038/nn.4181, 2015.
170. Li, M., Luo, X., Landen, M., Bergen, S.E., Hultman, C.M., Li, X., Zhang, W., Yao, Y., Zhang,
C., Liu, J., Mattheisen, M., Cichon, S., Muhlesien, T.W., Degenhard,t F.A., Nothen, M.M.,
Schulze, T.G., Grigoroiu-Serbanescu, M, Li, H., Fuller, C.K., Chen, C., Dong, Q., Chen, C.,
Jamain, S. 1 Leboyer, M., Bellivier, F., Etain, B., Kahn, J.-P., Henry, C., Preisig, M., Kutalik, Z.,
Castelao, E., Wright, A., Mitchell, P.B., Fullerton, J.M., Schofield, P.R., Montgomery, G.W.,
Medland, S.E., Gordon, S.D., Martin, N.G., MooDS Consortium, The Swedish Bipolar Study
Group, Rietschel, M., Liu, C., Kleinman, J.E., Hyde, T.M., Weinberger, D.R., and Su B. Impact of
a cis-associated gene expression SNP in 20q11.22 on bipolar disorder susceptibility,
hippocampal structure and cognitive performance. British Journal of Psychiatry. Epub: pii:
bjp.bp.114.156976, 2015.
171. Ruble, C.L., Smith, R.M., Calley, J., Munsie, L., Airey, D.C., Gao, Y., Shin, J.H., Hyde, T.M.,
Straub, R.E., Weinberger, D.R., and Nisenbaum, L.K. Genomic structure and expression of the
human serotonin 2A receptor gene (HTR2A) locus: identification of novel HTR2A and antisense
{HTR2A·AS1) exons. BMC Genetics. Epub: 001: 10.1186fs12863-015-0325-6, 2016.
172. Rannals, M.D., Hamersky, G.RT., Page, S.C., Campbell, M.N., Briley, A., Gallo, R.A., Phan,
B.N., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Shin, J.H., Jaffe, A.E., Weinberger, D.R., and Maher, B.J.
Psychiatric risk gene transcription factor 4 regulates intrinsic excitability of prefrontal neurons via
repression of SCN1 Oa and KCNQ1. Neuron. Epub: doi: 10.1 016/j.neuron.2016.02.021, 2016,
173. Ivanov, N.A., Tao, R., Chenoweth, J.G., Brandtjen, A., Mighdoll, M.l., Genova, J.D., McKay,
R.D., Jia, Y., Weinberger, D.R., Kleinman, J.E., Hyde, T.M., and Jaffe, A.E. Strong components
of epigenetic memory in cultured human fibroblasts related to site of origin and donor age. PLoS
Genetics. Epub: doi: 10.1371/journal.pgen.1 005819, 2016.
174. Davis, K.N., Tao, R., Li, C., Gao, Y., Gondre-Lewis, M.C., Lipska, B.K., Shin, J.H., Xie, B.,
Ye, T., Weinberger, D.R., Kleinman, J.E., and Hyde, T.M. GAD2 alternative transcripts in the
human prefrontal cortex, and in schizophrenia and affective disorders. PLoS One. Epub:_doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0148558, 2016.
175. Clark, S., Pocivavsek, A., Nicholson, J., Notarangelo, F., Langenberg, P., McMahon, R.,
Kleinman, J., Hyde, T., Stiller, J., Postolache, T., Schwarcz, R., and Tonelli, L. Reduced
kynurenine pathway metabolism and cytokine expression in the prefrontal cortex of depressed
622
individuals. Journal of PsychiatrY and Neuroscience. 41: 386"394, 2016.
176. Olesen, R.H., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Smidt, K., Rungby, J. and Larsen, A. Obesity and
age-related alterations In the gene expression of zinc-transporter-proteins in the human brain.
Translational Psychiatrv. Epub: doi: 10.1038/tp.2016.83, 2016.
177. li, M., Jaffe, A.E., Straub, R.E., Tao, R., Shin, J.H., Yanhong, W., Chen, 0., li, C., Jia, Y.,
Ohi, K., Maher, B.J., Brandon, N.J., Cross, A., Chenoweth, J., Hoeppner, D.J., Wei, H., Hyde,
T.M., McKay, R., Kleinman, J.E., and Weinberger, D.R. A human-specific AS3MT isoform and
BORCS7 are molecular risk factors in the 1Oq24.32 schizophrenia locus. Nature Medicine.
22:649-56, 2016.
178. McFadden, W.C., Jaffe, A.E., Ye, T., Paltan-Ortiz, J.D., Hyde, T.M., and Kleinman, J.E.
Assessment of genetic risk for distribution of total interstitial white matter neurons in dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex; role in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research. Epub: doi:
1D. 1016~.schres.2016.04.007, 2016.
179. Garcia-sea, A., Walker, M.A., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Harrison, P.J., and Lane, T.A.
Metabotropic glutamate receptor 3 (mGiu3; mGiuR3; GRM3) in schizophrenia: Antibody
characterisation and a semi-quantitative western blot study. Schizophrenia Research. Epub: doi:
1D. 1016/j.schres.2016.04.015, 2016.
180. Montano, C., Taub, M.A., Jaffe, A., Briem, E., Feinberg, J.l., Trygvadottir, R., ldrizi, A.,
Runarsson, A., Berndsen, B., Gur, R.C., Moore, T.M., Perry, R.T., Fugman, D., Sabunciyan, S.,
Yolken, R.H., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Sobel!, J.L., Palo, C.N., Palo, M.T., Go, R.C.,
Nimgaonkar, V., Weinberger, D.R., Braff, D., ·Gur, R.E., Fallin, M.D., and Feinberg, A.P.
Association of DNA Methylation Differences With Schizophrenia in an Epigehome-Wide
Association Study. JAMA Psychiatry. Epub: doi: 10.1 DO 1!jamapsychiatry .2016.0144, 2016.
181. Paterson, C., Wang, Y., Hyde, T.M., Weinberger, D.R., Kleinman, J.E., and Law A.J.
Temporal, Diagnostic, and Tissue-Specific Regulation of NRG3 lsoform Expression in Human
Brain Development and Affective Disorders. American Journal of Psychiatry. Epub:
appiajp201616060721, 2016.
18.2. Vendelbo, J., Olesen, R.H., Lauridsen, J.K., Rungby, J., Kleinman, J.E., Hyde, T.M., and
Larsen A. Increasing BMI is associated with reduced expression of P-glycoprotein (ABCB1
gene) in the human brain with a stronger association in African Americans than Caucasians.
Pharmacogenomics Journal. Epub: doi: 10.1 038/tpj.2016.74, 2016.
183. Bharadwaj, R.A., Jaffe, A.E., Chen, 0., Deep-Soboslay, A., Goldman, A.L., Mighdoll, M.l.,
Cotoia, J.A., Brandtjen, A.C., Shin, J., Hyde, T.M., Mattay, V.S., Weinberger, D.R., and Kleinman,
J.E. Genetic risk mechanisms of posttraumatic stress disorder in the human brain. Journal of
Neuroscience Research. Epub: doi: 1D.1002/jnr.23957, 2016.
184. Hwang, T., Park, C.-K., Leung, A.KL, Gao, Y., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Rajpurohit, A.,
Tao, R., Shin, J.H., and Weinberger, D.R. Dynamic regulation of RNA editing in human brain
development and disease. Nature Neuroscience. 19:1093-9, 2016.
185. Jo, J., Xiao, Y., Sun, A.X., Cukuroglu, E., Tran, H.-D., Goke, J., Tan, Z.Y., Saw, T.Y., Tan,
C.-P., Lokman, H., Lee, Y., Kim, D., Ko, H.S., Kim, S.-0., Park, J.H., Cho, N.-J., Hyde, T.M.,
Kleinman, J.E., Shin; J.H., Weinberger, D.R., Tan, E.K., Je, H.S., and Ng, H.H., Midbrain-like
organoids from human pluripotent stem cells contain functional dopaminergic and neuromelanin
producing neurons. Cell Stem Cell. 19: 248-57, 2016.
623
186. Hoseth, E.S., Ueland, T., Diesel, 1., Birnbaum, R., Shin, J.H., Kleinman, J.E., Hyde, T.M.,
March, R.H., Hope, S., Lekva, T., Abraityte, A.J., Michelsen, A. E., Melle, 1., Westlye, LT., Ueland,
T., Djurovic, S., Aukrust, P., Weinberger, D.R., and Andreassen, O.A. A study of TNF-pathway
activation ih schizophrenia aild bipolar disorder in plasma and brain tissue. Schizophrenia
Bulletin. Ep11b: dol: 10.1 093/schbul/sbw183, 2017.
187. Kang, J.Y., Chadchankar, J., Vien, T.N., Mighdoll, M.l., Hyde, T.M., Mather, R.J., Deeb,
T.Z., Pangalos, M.N., Brandon, N.J., Dunlop, J., Moss, S.J. Deficits in the activity of presynaptic
y-Aminobutyric acid type B receptors contribute to altered neuronal excitability in Fragile X
Syndrome. Journal of Biological Chemistry. Epub: pii: jbc.M116.772541. doi:
10.1074/jbc.M116.772541, 2017.
188. Olesen, R., Lauridsen, J., Larsen, A., Vendelbo, J., Hyde, T., Kleinman, J., Bibby, B., Brock,
B., and Rungby, J. High BMI levels associate with reduced mANA expression of IL1 0 and
increased mANA expression of iNOS (NOS2) in human frontal cortex. Translational Psychiatry.
In press, 2017.
189. Birnbaum, R., Jaffe, A. E., Chen, Q., Shin, J.H., BrainSeq Consortium, Kleinman, J.E., Hyde,
T.M., and Weinberger, D.R. Investigating the neuro-immunogenic architecture of schizophrenia.
Molecular Psychiatry. In press, 2017.
190. Wright, C., Shin, J.H., Rajpurohit, A., Deep-Soboslay, A., Collado-Torres, L., Brandon, N.J.,
Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Jaffe, A.E., Cross, A., and Weinberger, D.R. Altered expression of
histamine signaling genes in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Translational Psychiatry. In press,
2017.
191. Rutten, B.P.F., Vertnetten, E., Vinkers, C.H., Ursini, G., Daskalakis, N.P., Pishva, E., de
Nijs, L., Houtepen, L.C., Eijssen, L., Jaffe, A.E., Kanis, G., Viechtbauer, W., van den Hove, D.,
Schraut, K.G., Lesch, K.-P., Kleinman, J.E., Hyde, T.M., Weinberger, D.Fl., Schalkwyk, L.,
Lunnon, K., Mill, J., Cohen, H,, Yehuda, R., Baker, D.G., Maihofer, A.X., Nievergelt, C.M., Gauze,
E. and Baks, M.P.M. Longitudinal analyses of the DNA methylome in deployed military
servicemen identify susceptibility loci for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Molecular Psychiatry.
In press, 2017.
192. Mighdoll, M.l., Deep-Soboslay, A., Bharadwa), R., Cotoia, J.A., Benedek, D.M., Hyde, T.M.,
and Kleinman, J.E. Implementation and clinical characteristics of a Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder brain collection. Journal of Neuroscience Research. In press, 2017.
193. Norgren, N,, Kang, J., Lam, M., li, Z., Chen, J., Jaffe, A.E., Foo, J.N., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman,
J.E., Shin, J.H., Tai, E.S., Weinberger, D.R., Shi, Y., Lee, J., and Liu, J. Targeted resequencing
analysis of genes within GWAS associated loci identifies MPHOSPH9 as implicated in
schizophrenia. Under review, 2017.
194. Jaffe, A.E., Tao, R., Norris, A.L., Kealhofer, M., Nellore, A., Shin, J.H., Kim, D., Jla, Y.,
Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Straub, R.E., Leek, J.T., and Weinberger, D.R. A framework for RNA
quality correction in differential expression analysis. Under review, 2017.
624
INVITED CHAPTERS, LETTERS, EDITORIALS, AND REVIEWS:
1. Hyde, T.M., R. Eng, and R.R. Miselis. Brainstem mechanisms In hypothalamic and dietary
obesity. In: Neural Basis of Feeding and Reward., Edited by B.G. Hoebel and D. Navin., Haer
Institute, 97-114, 1982.
2. Miselis, R.R., T.M. Hyde, and R.E. Shapiro. Disturbances in water balance controls following
lesions to the area postrema and adjacent solitary nucleus. In: The Physiology of Thirst and
Sodium Appetite., Edited by G. de Caro, A.N. Epstein, and M. Massi, Plenum Press, N.Y., pp.
279-285, 1986.
3. Miselis, R.R., R.E. Shapiro, and T.M. Hyde. The area postrema. In: Circumventricular
Organs and Body Fluids., Edited by P.M. Gross, CRC Press, N.Y., Vol. II, Chap. 8, pp. 185-208,
1987.
4. Hyde, T.M. and D.R. Weinberger. The brain in schizophrenia. In: Seminars in Neurology. 10:
276-286, 1990.
5. Hyde, T.M., M.F. Casanova, J.E. Kleinman, and D.R. Weinberger. Neuroanatomical and
neurochemical pathology in schizophrenia. In: Annual Review of Schizophrenia., Edited by A.
Tasman and S.M. Goldfinger, APA Press, Washington, D.C., Voi.10, Section 1, Chapter 1, pp. 7-
23;1991.
6. Khat, V., M.F. Egan, T.M. Hyde, and R.J. Wyatt. Neuroleptics and classic tardive dyskinesia.
In: Drug-Induced Movement Disorders., Edited by A.E. Lang and W.J. Weiner, Futura Publishing,
Mount Kisco, N.Y., pp. 121-166, 1992.
7. Kleinman, J.E. and T.M. Hyde. Structural foundations of mental illness and treatment:
neuroanatomy. In: Current Psychiatric Therapy., Edited by D.L. Dunner, W.B. Saunders Co.,
Philadelphia, Pa., ppc 3-7, 1992.
8. Wolf, S. S., T.M. Hyde, and D.R. Weinberger. Neurobiology of schizophrenia. In: ~
Opinion in Neurology and Neurosurgery. 6: 86-92, 1993.
9. Ohuoha, D.C., T.M. Hyde, and J.E. Kleinman. The role of serotonin in schizophrenia: an
overview of the nomenclature, distribution, and alterations of serotonin receptors in the central
nervous system. In: Psychopharmacology. (Supplement: Proceedings on Serotonin, Dopamine,
and Their Interactions in Schizophrenia; Edited by R.S. Kahn and M. Davidson.) 112: S5-S15,
1993.
10. Hyde, T.M., J.C. Ziegler, and D.R. Weinberger.· Response to letter re: psychopathology in
metachromatic leukodystrophy. In: Archives of Neurology. 50: 131, 1993.
11. Egan, M.F., T.M. Hyde, A. Elkashef, and R.J. Wyatt. Response to letter re: treatment of
tardive dyskinesia with vitamin E. In: American Journal of Psychiatrv. 150: 992-993, 1993.
12. Clardy, J.A., T.M. Hyde, and J.E. Kleinman. Chapter 7. Postmortem neurochemical and
neuropathological studies in schizophrenia. ln.: Schizophrenia: from mind to molecule. Edited
by N.C. Andreasen. American Psychiatric Press, Washington, D.C., pp. 123-145, 1994.
13. Kleinman, J.E .., T.M. Hyde,. and M. M. Herman. Chapter 75. Methodological issues in the
neuropathology of mental illness. In: Psychobharmacology: the Fourth Generation of Progress.
Edited by F.E. Bloom and D.J. Kupfer. Raven Press: New York. pp. 859-864, 1995.
625
14. Coppola, R.C. and T.M. Hyde. Applied Electrophysiology. In: Comprehensive Textbook of
Psychiatry.Edited by H. I. Kaplan and B.J. Sadock. Williams and Wilkins: Baltimore. pp. 72-79,
1995.
15. Daniel, D.G., K. Smith, T.M. Hyde, and M.F. Egan. Neuroleptic-induced tardive dyskinesia.
In: American Journal of Psvchiatrv. 153: 734, 1996.
16. Katsetos, C.D., T.M. Hyde, and M.M. Herman. Neuropathology of the cerebellum in
schizophrenia- an update: 1996 and future directions. In: Biological Psychiatrv. 42: 213-224,
1997.
17. Bachus, S.E., T.M. Hyde, M. Akil, C.S. Weickert, M.P. Vawter, and J.E. Kleinman.
Neuropathology of suicide: a review and an approach. In: Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences836: 201-219, 1997.
18. Kittell, D.A., T.M. Hyde, M.M. Herman, and J.E. Kleinman. The collection of tissue at
autopsy: practical and ethical issues. In: Using CNS Autopsy Tissue in Psychiatric Research.
Edited by B. Dean, T.M. Hyde, and J.E. Kleinman. Harwood: Melbourne, Australia. pp. 1-18,
1998.
19. Egan, M.F. and T.M. Hyde. The neurobiology of schizophrenia. In: Comprehensive
Textbook of Psychiatrv. Edited by H. I. Kaplan and B.J. Sadock. Williams and Wilkins: Baltimore.
Volume I, pp. 1129-1146, 1999.
20. Hyde, T.M. and J.M. Crook. Cholinergic systems in schizophrenia: primary pathology or
epiphenomena. In: J. Chemical Neuroanatomy. 22: 53-63, 2001.
21 .. Freed, W.J., Lehrman, E., Hyde, T.M., Kleinman, J.E., Vawter, M.P., and Becker, K. Gene
expression profiling in drug abuse. In: 2001 ONDCP International Technology Symposium
Proceedings: Counterdrug Research and Development .. 1: 119-131, 2001.
22. Freed, W.J., T.M. Hyde, J.E. Kleinman, K. Becker, and M.P. Vawter. Analysis of gene
expression in schizophrenia using DNA microarrays. In: The Economics of Neuroscience. 4: 48-
57,2002.
23. Hyde, T.M. Tourette syndrome. In: The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Edited by L.
Nadel. Nature Publishing Group: London. 2002.
24. Hyde, T.M. Cognitive Impairment in Demyelinating Disease, In: The Neurobiology of Mental
Illness. Edited by D.S. Charney and E.J. Nestler. Oxford University Press: San Francisco; pp.
873-880, 2003.
25. Hyde, T.M. and S. W. Lewis. The secondary schizophrenias. In: Schizophrenia. Edited by
S.R. Hirsch and D.R. Weinberger. Blackwell Science: Oxford, England; pp. 187-202,2003.
26. Lehrmann, E., T.M. Hyde, M.P. Vawter, K.G. Becker, J.E. Kleinman and W.J. Freed. The
use of microarrays to characterize neuropsychiatric disorders: postmortem studies of substance
abuse and schizophrenia. In: Cumin! Molecular Medicine 3: 437-446, 2003.
27. Hyde, T.M., J.A. Apud, W.C. Fisher, and M.F. Egan. Tardive dyskinesia. In: Drug Induced
Movement Disorders. Edited by S.A. Factor, A. E. Lang, and W. 'J. Weiner. Futura Publishing
Co.: Armonk, N.Y.; Chapter 9, pp. 213-256.
626
28. Mathew, S.V., S.N. Mitkus, B.K., Lipska, T.M. Hyde, and J.E. Kleinman. Postmortem Studies:
A Focus on Susceptibiltty Genes in Schizophrenia . in: The Handbook of Contemporary
Neuropharmacology Edited by D.R. Sibley, I. Hanin, M. Kuhar, and P. Skolnick. John Wiley &
Sons, New York. 200S.
29. Hyde, T.M. Cognitive Impairment in Demyelinating Disease. In: The Neurobiology of Mental
Illness. Edited by D.S. Charney and E.J. Nestler. Oxford University Press: San Francisco; pp.
1001-1009, 2009.
30. Deep-Soboslay, A, F.M. Benes, V. Haroutunian, J.K. Ellis, J.E. Kleinman, and T.M. Hyde.
Psychiatric Brain Banking: Three Perspectives on Current Trends and Future Directions.
Biological Psychiatry. 69: 104-112, 2011.
31. Kleinman, J.E., A.J. Law, B.K. Lipska, T.M. Hyde, J.K. Ellis, P.J. Harrison, and D.R.
Weinberger. Genetic neuropathology of schizophrenia: new approaches to an old question and
new uses for postmortem human brains. Biological Psychiatry. 69:140-145,2011.
32. Hyde, T.M. and M.A. Ron. The Secondary Schizophrenias. In: Schizophrenia. Edited by
D.R. Weinberger and Paul J. Harrison. Wiley-Blackwell: West Sussex, United Kingdom; pp.
165-184, 2011.
33. Mighdoll, M.l., Tao, R., Kleinman, J.E., and Hyde, T.M .. Myelin, myelin-related disorders,
and psychosis~ Schizophrenia Research. 161: 85-93, 2015.
34, Hyde, T.M. and R.A. Bharadwaj. Molecular mechanisms and timing of cortical immune
activation in schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry. In press, 2015.
627
Filing# 59372743 E-Filed 07i:2lt2017 04:52:08 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff,
GARY HILTON,
Defendant.
Defendant Gary Hilton, through counsel, respectfully moves this Court for an Order,
pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, vacating and setting aside the judgments of convictions and
sentence, including his sentence of death, imposed upon him by this Court. In support thereof,
insufficient on June 14,2017. The Court granted leave to amend the claim within thirty
(30) days.
2) The Defendant sought leave for an extension of time to file an amendment to Claim
Six (6) and the Court granted leave until July 21,2017.
3) The Defendant respectfully requests that the Court accept this pleading as an
amendment of Claim Six (6) and incorporate it into the previously filed pleading as if
1 Claim Six (6) is incorrectly numbered as Claim 7 in the Second Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief.
628
Claim 6: Trial counsel was ineffective for their failure to preserve for appeal the denial
of cause challenges during jury selection
It is essential to defense counsel's role as an advocate that he/she preserve reversible errors
for appellate review. The error at issue here is the trial court's denial of Trial Counsel's for-cause
challenges. Denial of a challenge for cause is grounds for reversible error. Hamilton v. State, 54 7
So. 2d 630, 632 (Fla. 1989). In order to preserve such an error for appellate review, where trial
counsel's motion to strike a juror for cause is denied, and he is thereafter forced to exhaust all
peremptory challenges, he must first "identify a specific juror whom he otherwise would have
struck peremptorily". Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1990).
In the instant case, Jury Selection proceeded over the course of several days. (R. Jury
Selection, 1-1 082). There were numerous "cause challenges" that were asserted during jury
selection. Many of them were granted, but many of them were not. While the defense team made
objections to the denial of cause challenges, the defense team failed to preserve any of these
objections for the purposes of appellate review by utilization of the process outlined in Trotter.
The defense team went to the painstaking effort of objecting to the empanelment of a large number
of prospective jurors from the jury pool only to fail to make an objection that served to request
additional peremptory challenges in the face of the denial of a cause challenge, articulate the reason
for the request and identify why a particular juror would have been/should have been stricken as
well as why a different juror would have been better suited. Likewise, the defense team allowed
for the swearing of the jury without noting the aforementioned procedures and any objections.
The Defendant asserts that the failure to properly preserve the denial of cause challenges
for appellate review was and is ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). There is no question that the defense team
629
did not meet their burden of preserving any issues related to the denial of cause challenges. The
conduct, or lack thereof, satisfies the deficient performance prong of Strickland. The prejudice
"In the context of the denial of challenges for cause, such prejudice can be shown only
where one who was actually biased against the defendant sat as a juror. We therefore hold that
where a postconviction motion alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise or
preserve a cause challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that a juror was actually biased."
Caratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007). In Caratelli, the Court articulated:
A juror is competent if he or she "can lay aside any bias or prejudice and
render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions
on the law given to him by the court." Lusk, 446 So.2d at I 04!. Therefore,
actual bias means bias-in-fact that would prevent service as an impartial
juror. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133-34, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81
L.Ed. 78 (1936) (stating, in a case involving a statute permitting government
employees to serve as jurors in the District of Columbia, that the defendant
in a criminal case still has the ability during voir dire to "ascertain whether
a prospective juror ... has any bias in fact which would prevent his serving
as an impartial juror"). Under the actual bias standard, the defendant must
demonstrate that the juror in question was not impartial-i.e., that the juror
was biased against the defendant, and the evidence of bias must be plain on
the face of the record. See Carratelli II, 915 So.2d at 1260 (citing Jenkins,
824 So.2d at 982); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038-40, !04
S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (stating that in habeas review a state
court's findings are presumed correct and that although the record showing
the ambiguous voir dire answers of three jurors challenged for cause
"arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell which of these
answers was said with the greatest comprehension and certainty").
The foregoing analysis essentially weighs whether the Strickland analysis is related to
prejudice suffered at the appellate level or at the trial level. The Court has resolved that issue in
favor of necessitating that a defendant demonstrate that he/she suffered prejudice at the trial level
by a juror who evidenced bias. !d. The Defendant asserts that the face of the record demonstrates
bias of jurors sought to be stricken for cause and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing
630
to preserve this matter for appellate review which would have yielded a different outcome. (R.
The Defendant has not requested an evidentiary hearing on this issue and would rely on
the face of the record. In the event the Court denies Claim 6 (as amended and contained herein)
without an evidentiary hearing, the Defendant intends to present evidence related to this same
accepted as Claim 6 and incorporated into the previously filed post-conviction pleading as if set
forth therein.
Respectfully submitted,
Is/Robert A. Morris _ _ _ _ _ __
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 E. Park Avenue
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111
(850) 792-1113 Facsimile
alex@ramlawyer.com
efiling@ramlawyer.com
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
COURT APPOINTED
631
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Rule 3.851 (e)(F) the undersigned counsel certifies that the contents of this
pleading have been discussed with the Defendant fully and that Counsel has complied with the
Rules of Professional Conduct and that this pleading is filed in good faith.
Is/Robert A. Morris=::--:==----
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant State
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 21st day of July, 2017.
Is/Robert A. Morris=-=c::-:=-=-=----
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ.
632
Filing# 59416367 E-Filed 07/24/2017 02:12:28 PM
GARY M. HILTON,
Defendant.
COMES NOW, the Justice Administrative Commission ("JAC"), by and through the
undersigned attorney and files this response to the above-cited motion as follows:
rate of $300 and $150 per hour for travel for an out of state neuropsychologist.
2. JAC may only pay for miscellaneous expenses as provided by Section 27.711(6), F. S.
That subsection provides a cap of $15,000 and JAC's records show that $7,939.94 has been paid
as of this date. Inasmuch as the remaining service sought will exceed the cap, JAC objects to
3. The rate for experts in this circuit is $150 per hour. JAC objects to any rates in
4. Counsel has the burden to establish the particularized need for expert services.
Counsel needs to show the expert is necessary for the defense of the case.
5. Counsel also has the burden to establish diligent efforts to obtain services within the
defendant has a due process right to the assistance of experts in his or her defense, that right is
633
not unfettered. See Lavender v. State, 889 So.2d 882, 885 (5th DCA 2004). The right is limited
to experts that are relevant and necessary to the defense of the case. See id. The defendant is not
entitled to a specific expert or one of his or her "personal liking", but is only entitled to the
services of a competent expert. See Walls v. State, 926 So.2d 1156, 1177 (Fla. 2006). The use
of out of state providers is unnecessary and unreasonable where there are competent experts in
7. The JAC Capital Collateral Contract specifically addresses this issue. Paragraph
Attorney shall not seek authorization from the court for out-of-state experts or
mitigation specialists, absent a showing that there are no such providers with
appropriate skills or expertise available, first, in the county in which the case was
filed and, second, in any other county in the State of Florida. If Attorney obtains
an out-of-state due process provider without making such a showing, Attorney
agrees not to request reimbursement for any travel expenses including
compensation for travel time on behalf of the due process provider. An order
authorizing the employment must be in writing and contain specific findings
regarding the unavailability of a qualified in-state expert or mitigation specialist.
The attorney shall submit a copy of the order to JAC.
As directed by the JAC Contract, absent a showing that there are no competent experts available
within Florida, this Court should not authorize the retention of an out-of-state expert.
8. The additional costs associated with out-of-state experts such as travel time and travel
expenses can dramatically increase the amount incurred for the expert services.
9. Although the defense may desire the services of the requested expert because of his
preeminence in the field, the standard is whether there are competent experts within Florida who
can address the concerns indicated in Counsel's motion. In that there are numerous experts
within Florida who perform the type of evaluation set forth in Counsel's motion, JAC anticipates
Counsel cannot meet the substantial burden set forth in the JAC contract executed by Counsel.
2
634
I 0. JAC requests that this matter be set for hearing. JAC requests to appear
WHEREFORE, the JAC requests this Court, should it grant the Defendant's motion, also
include in its order the specific due process services authorized, as well as hourly or per unit
rates and maximum fees approved, and that the provider be paid in accordance with rates, terms
and conditions set forth by Florida Statutes, and the JAC contract, policies and procedures.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been sent by
email, and/or U.S. Mail as indicated this 24th day of July, 2017 to:
Respectfully submitted,
635
Filing# 60074714 E-Filed 08/0/, L017 05:30:07 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff,
Defendant.
--------------------------~/
STATE'S ANSWER TO AMENDED CLAIM 6
20, 2017, Hilton filed his Second Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief
("Motion"), raising seven claims for relief. One June 14, 2017, this Court entered
an Order striking Claim 6 of Hilton's Motion. Hilton filed his Amended Claim 6 of
Hilton puts forth a conclusory claim that trial counsel was ineffective for
State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990), so that such denials could be raised on appeal.
636
This claim fails for three reasons: trial counsel was not deficient because she
prejudice by showing that an actually biased juror sat on his jury; and this claim is
insufficiently pled.
Firstly, trial counsel followed the procedure set forth in Trotter v. State for
preserving the denial of cause challenges for appeal. Trotter requires that trial
counsel demonstrate on the record that all peremptories have been exhausted and
that a specific objectionable juror has been seated on the jury that counsel would
strike if he or she had a peremptory challenge available. 576 So. 2d at 693. Ines
Suber, one of Hilton's defense attorneys, followed the Trotter procedure during
jury selection. After Suber's request for additional peremptory challenges was
denied, she laid a record identifying a juror she would have liked to remove by use
- I would like to keep, the record reflect that if I were to be granted peremptory, I
would strike Rice, Sally, Rice, because of her views on the death penalty."
(R/23: 1077) Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to do something that
she, in fact, did. Bates v. State, 3 So. 3d 1091, 1106 fn. 20 (Fla. 2009) (observing
that counsel cannot be held ineffective for what counsel actually did); Stephens v.
State, 975 So. 2d 405, 415 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that counsel cannot be deemed
637
Secondly, Hilton cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong because there is
nothing in the record that demonstrates that any of the jurors seated in Hilton's
case were actually biased. A Strickland claim related to jury selection requires
proof, plain on the face of the trial record, that an actually biased juror sat in the
case. In Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007), the Florida Supreme Court
concluded that a Strickland claim for failing to preserve a denial of a challenge for
cause must establish that an actually biased juror sat on the jury, and such bias
must be plain on the face of the record. The court went on to define an actually
biased juror as one who is not impartial; one who is biased 1 against the defendant.
Id. at 324.
Here, Hilton has failed to provide specific allegations of jurors' actual bias.
Rather, Hilton relies on the broad claim that the face of the record reflects juror
bias, without referencing a single specific juror or even a section of the record that
supports his claim. (Amended Claim 6 at 3-4) Furthermore, nothing in the record
indicates that any of the jurors were actually biased. If Hilton cannot identify
1
Actual bias means bias-in-fact that would prevent service as an impartial juror. See United
States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133-34 (1936) (stating, in a case where U.S. government
employees served as jurors in a criminal case prosecuted by the U.S. government, that the jurors'
employment status did not automatically disqualify them, but the defendant had the ability
during voir dire to "ascertain whether a prospective juror ... has any bias in fact which would
prevent his serving as an impartial juror").
3
638
Finally, this claim is insufficiently pled. Hilton has simply alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective because cause challenges were not preserved. He does not
identify which cause challenges counsel should have preserved, nor does he
identify which of the jurors who served on his jury were biased. While Hilton has
added additional legal discussion to his Amended Claim 6, his allegations remain
facially insufficient because he still fails to provide specific facts that would
factual allegations about which cause challenges were not properly preserved and
establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim." Hannon v. State,
941 So. 2d 1109, 1139 (Fla. 2006) (explaining that where a movant presents only
Amended Claim 6 remains facially insufficient. For these reasons, this claim
CONCLUSION
Amended Claim 6.
Respectfully submitted;
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
4
639
Is/ Jennifer L. Keegan
JENNIFER L. KEEGAN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Florida Bar No.: 0105283
PL-01, The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
jennifer.keegan@myfloridalegal.com
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
Phone: (850) 414-3579
Co-counsel for the Plaintiff
JACK CAMPBELL
STATE ATTORNEY
640
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been
Attorney for the Defendant; and the Office of the State Attorney,
641
Filing# 60386320 E-Filed 08/1,.,2017 05:46:13 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEATH PENALTY
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
DEFENDANT.
----------------------~/
COMES NOW, the undersigned attorney, and files this witness list on behalf of
GARY MICHAEL HILTON, the Defendant in the above-styled cause, pursuant to Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A).
NON-EXPERT WITNESSES
2. Paula Saunders
3. Rob Friedman
4. Merribeth Bohanan
5. Nancy Daniels
6. Betty Fuentes
7. Andy Thomas
8. Steven Been
642
9. Tracy Record
643
30. Heather Parrott
644
50. LanceR. Stewart
66. Any and all witnesses listed previously listed as witnesses by the defense and
the State of Florida.
645
EXPERT WITNESSES
67. Dr. Wu (testified at trial and any available reports previously disclosed)
68. Dr. Sesta (listed as a defense witness for trial and any available reports
previously disclosed)
69. Dr. Ouaoa (listed as a defense witness for trial and any available reports
previously disclosed)
70. Dr. Golden (testified at trial and any available reports previously disclosed)
71. Dr. Morton (testified at trial and any available reports previously disclosed)
72. Dr. Strauss (testified at trial and any available reports previously disclosed)
75. Dr. Donna Maddox (retained by Mr. Hilton's defense team in United States v.
Gary Michael Hilton)
76. Dr. Norman Camp (a military psychiatrist who has reviewed Mr. Hilton's
military records)
Is/Robert A. Morris'==-=-=----
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ.
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 E. Park Avenue
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111
(850) 792-1113 Facsimile
alex@ramlawyer.com
Attorney for Defendant
COURT APPOINTED
646
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3rd Floor, 30 I S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 3230 I, Assistant State
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 14th day of August, 2017.
Is/Robert A. Morris==-===----
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ.
647
Filing# 60388126 E-Filed 08/1.,.,2017 06:48:23 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEATH PENALTY
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
DEFENDANT.
_______________________,/
COMES NOW, the undersigned attorney, and files this exhibit list on behalf of
GARY MICHAEL HILTON, the Defendant in the above-styled cause, pursuant to Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A).
648
• Gary Michael Hilton Florida DOC medical and mental health records
Hilton
649
• Hialeah arrest reports related to Gary Michael Hilton
• Dr. Deicher's medical board findings with respect to treatment of Gary Michael
• Photos (fur pictures, notes, dog towels, pictures of and related to "Ranger")
• Veterinary records
650
• 57 page transcript of interview by SA Bridges of Gary Michael Hilton
• Pages 1-811 of Florida DOC medical records related to Gary Michael Hilton
the military
• Miami Dade Community College school records related to Gary Michael Hilton
651
• Statements and declarations of witnesses for post-conviction proceedings
• Any and all exhibits listed by the State of Florida and by the defense for the
• A reservation of the right to amend the exhibit list as evidence becomes available
Is/Robert A. Morris
ROBERT A. MORRI=:::::-S,-::E::-::Sc::Q:-.---
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 E. Park Avenue
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111
(850) 792-1113 Facsimile
alex@ramlawyer.com
Attorney for Defendant
COURT APPOINTED
652
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 30 I S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 3230 I, Assistant State
Leon County Courthouse, 41h Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 21 ' 1 day of July, 2017.
Is/Robert A. Morris==-===----
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ.
653
Filing# 61706424 E-Filed 09/19/2017 01:30:06 PM
IN THE CIRCillT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA.
Gary M Hilton,
Defendant.
I
COMES NOW the State of Florida files this motion to compel the Public Defender in and
for the Second Judicial Circuit to produce his files/records regarding the defendant that are
relevant to the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his Amended Rule 3.851
motion, as grounds the State would show:
I. The Defendant has raised numerous grounds in his Amended Rule 3. 851 motion
claiming that the Public Defender's Office rendered ineffective assistant of counsel in the above
styled cause.
2. By filing the post conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant has waived the attorney client privilege to former counsel's files and records relevant
to the claims. Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2000).
3. The Public Defender is requesting a court order compelling release of his files/records
regarding the defendant.
4. The defendant's current post conviction counsel, Robert A. Morris, has been contacted
and does not oppose this motion.
WHEREFORE the State requests this Court to enter an order granting the relief requested
herein.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK CAMPBELL
STATE ATTORNEY
Is/Eddie D. Evans
Assistant State Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing motion has been furnished to Robert
A. Morris, efiling@ramlawyer.com, on September 19, 2017, by e-service.
Is/Eddie D. Evans
Assistant State Attorney
654
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
v.
SPN: 197149
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
--------------------------~/
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the State's motion to compel the Public Defender in
and for the Second Judicial Circuit to produce his files/records regarding the defendant that are
relevant to the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his Amended Rule 3.851
motion, the defendant's current post conviction counsel having no objection, and the Court being
fully advised, it is hereby,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Public Defender in and for the Second Judicial
Circuit produce to the State Attorney's Office, his files/records regarding the defendant that are
relevant to the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his Amended Rule 3.851
motion.
655
Filing# 61934562 E-Filed 09/2. 017 12:28:40 PM
!),$'
COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel, pursuant to Rule 3.85l(f)(5)(C), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and moves this
Court to continue the evidentiary hearing presently scheduled in this matter and in support
I. The Defendant is indigent and the undersigned was appointed by the Court to
2. An evidentiary hearing is presently set for October 3, 2017- October 6, 2017. The
hearing has been set for several months after continuances and changes in the legal
landscape.
4. Counsel for the Defendant has encountered a significant obstacle in his ability to
656
5. The undersigned has had a personal medical issue that has required and continues to
6. Counsel met with a surgical specialist on Friday, September 22, 2017. The surgeon
noted the urgency of the procedure and immediately scheduled the procedure for
7. The procedure/s scheduled are not elective procedures and they are medically
necessary. The surgeon has advised counsel that he should anticipate being
incapacitated from work for approximately one week (until October 5, 2017) due to
pain management. The invasiveness and the extent of the procedure will require pain
medication for approximately seven (7) to ten (I 0) days. This period would be during
the scheduled hearing in this matter. Thereafter, the surgeon has advised that there
will be a four (4) to six (6) week period of treatment and rehabilitation.
8. In candor, the undersigned does not believe his attention to the matter at hand has
been sufficient over the last several weeks and would not be sufficient in the coming
selfish one related to his own health. Asking to be relieved as counsel of record
would not afford the Defendant better representation. It would protract a case that
9. The undersigned has practiced many years before this Court and recognizes the
importance of moving the instant case forward. However, this is an instance that
657
I 0. The undersigned has conferred with Assistant State Attorney Georgia Cappleman and
she has no objection to a continuance ofthe evidentiary hearing in this matter under
II. While the rule of procedure does not require a verification of counsel, the
undersigned certifies that this Motion is filed in good faith and not solely for the
Procedure.
the evidentiary hearing and setting the matter for a case management to determine an alternate
hearing date.
Respectfully submitted,
658
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant General
Attorney's Office, Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL,
the Attorney General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 25tl' day of
September, 2017.
659
Filing# 61943402 E-Filed 09/: Wl7 02:04:09 PM
;H....
Defendant.
----------------~/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANI''S EXPEDITED UNOPPOSED
MOTION TO CONTINUE EVIDENTIARY HEARING
THIS CAUSE having coming before the Court upon Defendant's Expedited
Unopposed Motion To Continue Evidentiary Hearing, filed September 25, 2017,
and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby:
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the motion be granted. The evidentiary
hearing set for October 3 - 6, 2017 is hereby continued. A case management
conference is set for October 17, 2017 at 10:30 a.m.
DONE and ORDERED this)..<;;.._,. d~ of September, 2017, in Tallahassee,
Leon County, Florida.
Copies:
Georgia Cappleman, Assistant State Attorney
Alex Morris, Defense Counsel
660
Filing# 70890056 E-Filed 04;,6/2018 01:29:33 PM
COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel, pursuant to Rule 3.851 (f)(5)(C), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and moves this
Court to continue the evidentiary hearing presently scheduled in this matter and in support
I. The Defendant is indigent and the undersigned was appointed by the Court to
2. An evidentiary hearing is presently set for the week of April 30, 2018. The hearing
3. The hearing was last continued by the undersigned due to an imminent and urgent
surgical procedure. Fortunately, Counsel has recovered for the most part.
attention. Timing could not and cannot be worse. The circumstances related to
661
compare and contrast the aggressiveness of surgical procedures and post-surgical
treatment options.
and she advised that she had no opposition to a continuance and would join in it if
necessary. Counsel has styled the instant pleading as being unopposed because it
the evidentiary hearing and setting the matter for a status conference for a new hearing date to be
scheduled.
Respectfully submitted,
Is/Robert A. Morris _ _ _ _ _ __
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 E. Park Avenue.
Tallahassee, Florida 323 01
(850) 792-1111
(850) 792-1113 Facsimile
alex@ramlawyer.com
662
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant State
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 18th day of April, 2018.
Is/Robert A. Morris=:-:=::----
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ.
663
Filing# 70903093 E-Filed 04/18/2018 03:14:01 PM
Vs.
CASilNO. 2008"CF697A
DIVISION: FELONY
GARY H!LTON,
Defendant.
I
THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court upon the Defendant's Unopposed Motion
Evidentiary hearing sched:oled the we.ek of April 30, 2018 shall be continued to the Comt' s Case
Management docket May 22,2018 at 10:30 a.m.; courtroom 3·A and the parties are instructed to
coordinate a new hearing date and time with Cha!)lbers prior to that ~.
JAMES C. HANKINSON
· CIRCUIT JUDGE
664
Filing# 78516858 E-Filed OYiLr/2018 11:42:36 AM
~-
vs.
Gary M Hilton,
Defendant(s).
----------------~/
COMES NOW, the State of Florida, by and through the undersigned Assistant State
Attorney, and pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.190 moves this Honorable
Court to enter an Order issuing a commission to take the video-taped testimony of Paula
The Defendant is set for hearing on his 3.850 motion the week of October 29,2018.
Paula Saunders, one of Defendant's original attorneys, is an essential State witness in the
above-mentioned hearing.
Witness Paula Saunders is unavailable for the hearing date as she has puchased plane
tickets for departure on October 25 and plans to be out-of-state for 2 weeks for the
birth of her grandchild.
Attorney for Defendant, Alex Morris, has been contacted and does not objectio thi~ ·:\
motion. · ,<,
G)
c' C·)
> ,l:-
665
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the State of Florida respectfully request that the
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing motion has been furnished, bye-
Is/Georgia Cappleman
Assistant State Attorney
666
Filing# 78569384 E-Filed 09/21l/2018 09:19:30 AM
:~-B
STATE OF FLORIDA,
vs.
Gary M Hilton,
Defendant(s).
I
This cause coming on to be heard upon the State's written Motion to Perpetuate and the
ames c. Hankinson
ircuit Judge
667
Filing# 79840245 E-Filed 10/L::i/2018 08:57:04 AM
Gary M Hilton,
Defendant.
I
NOTICE OF FILING
TO: Robert A. Morris
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the State is filing a disc containing the
marked as State's Exhibit 1 for purposes of next week's 3.850 hearing in the above-styled case.
Both parties stipulate to the Judge reviewing this 2 hour testimony prior to next week's hearing if
Respectfully submitted,
JACK CAMPBELL
STATE ATTORNEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been sent to
668
Filing# 79842070 E-Filed 10/i.J/2018 09:21:16 AM
~s
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through the undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rule
2. There are dozens of witnesses to be called and many of them are from different
4. However, given the logistical and financial issues related to witnesses traveling
6. The undersigned has conferred with Assistant State Attorney Georgia Cappleman
669
7. Counsel is mindful of the requirements within the rule with respect to visibility of
the witness to all parties as well as the necessary safeguards required. Further,
counsel is also aware that the witness must be sworn by a notary or a person
the infrastructure is in place for this to run smoothly as well as with the varying
WHEREFORE, the defense requests this Court enter an order authorizing the taking of
Respectfully submitted,
670
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3rd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Deputy Chief State
Leon County Courthouse, 41h Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050, Brad Bischoff, Esq., Justice Administrative
671
Filing# 79849482 E-Filed 10/25/2018 10:34:44 AM
vs.
CASE. NO. ~ous~cf".697A
DIVISION: FELONY
DEATH PENALTY
OARY HfL:tON,
Defendant.
THIS CAUSE, having come before the Court upon ~he Defendartf!t UnoPJlOSed Mo:tion to
Take testimony by Contemporaneous Video Communication; and th(s Court having rev;iewed fue
GRANTED. Co:unsel shall he responsible for ensuring compliance with: Rule J.ssl(f)(S)(D),
Florid;~ Rule of Criminal Prqcedure and shall he responsible for eQsuritrgtharfue utilization ofsueh
technology proc.eedsin an orderly and expedlentmannJJt as the Court would normally reqJiit!il if the
AMES C. RANKINSON
. IR.(;UIT JUD.GB
COPIES FURNl$f!):iJ)TO:
R0JlERTA. MORRIS, ESQJJIRE
Attorney ibf:Oefendanl
QEORCllA CAPPI;!'lMAJ\1, ESQUIRE
AssistatltShjt¢ Attorney
)EJ\!Nfi'ER KEEGAN, .ESQUIRE
Assistant.At!orney Q¢!\¢ral
672
Filing# 80035083 E-Filed 10, _,v/2018 07:06:11 AM
~()
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT.
----------------------~'
COMES NOW, the undersigned attorney, and files this witness list on behalf of
GARY MICHAEL HILTON, the Defendant in the above-styled cause, pursuant to Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.85l(f)(5)(A).
Andy Thomas
Ines Suber
Betty Fuentes
Lunch
Nancy Daniels
Chris Ellricll
673
Tracy Record (11 :OOam via video)
Lunch
Julie Hartwein
Robert Friedman
Steven Been
Merribeth Bohanan
State's case
Defense rebuttal
674
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of October, 2018.
Is/Robert A. Morris==:=-=-=----
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ.
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 E. Park Avenue
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111
(850) 792-1113 Facsimile
alex(tilramlawyer.com
Attorney for Defendant
COURT APPOINTED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, yct Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant State
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 30th day of October, 2018.
675
Filing# 80035083 E-Filed 1uie>v/2018 07:06:11 AM
.so
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT.
--------------------~/
COMES NOW, the undersigned attorney, and files this exhibit list on behalf of
GARY MICHAEL HILTON, the Defendant in the above-styled cause, pursuant to Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.85l(f)(5)(A).
Exhibit 1
Exhibit 1 B Birth
Exhibit 1 F Family
Exhibit 1 H School
676
Exhibit 2
Exhibit 2 A Declarations
Exhibit 2 B Deicher
Exhibit 2 C Dog
Exhibit 2 D Medical
Exhibit 2 E Military
Exhibit 3
Is/Robert A. Morris--,--,-----
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ.
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
911 E. Park Avenue
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111
(850) 792-1113 Facsimile
alex@ramlawyer.com
Attorney for Defendant
COURT APPOINTED
677
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3rd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant State
Leon County Courthouse, 4'h Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-0 1 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 30th day of October, 2018.
Is/Robert A. Morris.~,---,--,-,----
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ.
678
~
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DEFENDANT'S 3
EXHIBIT #'-=---
679
--·-·
Q)
Q)
-·
-t
CD
680
681
682
683
kson
tore
684
685
686
687
I
-·
CJ)
-·
3
CD
688
689
690
691
692
Cleo gave Gary this doll, she used
693
it to illustrate what would happen to
him during sinus surgery
694
695
en
-·
696
697
Gary, other
retur ned 2
en
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
:::::r
-·
CJ)
707
708
1951
• Gary had a pet bird named Pee Wee, Cleo
left the window open in the apartment and
the bird flew away ,
• Gary spent hours calling for the bird to
come back .
.,-.
709
710
711
en
0
a.
712
713
I
-·
en
3
-·
714
715
716
Gary ith his
m
..
~
7\
CD
717
718
719
1955
• Gary was 9 years old when his mother married
Nilo Debag from Argentina who was a horse
trainer. He would travel to different race tracks
around the country depending on the horse
racing season. She only dated him two months
before marrying him.
• Cleo was having financial problems at the time
and Nilo was making a lot of money.
720
Gary at
times unt
in Ge ith
721
916 Shadow Lawn, Tampa
House where Murphy Bed fell on
his head when he was 9 years old,
he had 200 stitches on his head
'
722
MtJrphy Bed looks like without
the mattress.
723
This is a Murphy bed against
the wall.
School Record showing
724
916 Shadow Lawn
Address
mr.T.SBOROtTGH COUNTY SCErooL CENSUS RECOBD CAIU>
Hilton, Gary Michael · M «XI
••"'"''1······~------------·-·.-·····-------------·······
. autl tflrsl>
· --·--··· Birth Celtlf!cate
(mkldle>
Sll!ltt F ( )
cXl
Novem~r 22, l9ij.6 Erident:et ~Policy c l
....- ...,··---~~...··-.,;;u;,------------~;;;;-----------i;.;.;; ------- othn c 1
~ce-------~~~~-~~~--------~~~~1!~-------~~e;ia
fellY> (Comt:n -------------------~-----------------------
· (s;ateJ
Fathv Mother
••...Mx!s......O.lacL R. Hi 1 ton_________ _
Qcc:apli!UC>n ...... _. _______ .,._ ... __ .,. _________ ... _.._ ___,..__________ _... ___ ..._______ .,;:_____ ,..,.,.__.. __ _._...,...____... ..,...,____ _
----~*·-~------------------·
--~-~ J!::::: dl , _ _ _ _..,.
-------------·------
--------------·- ......
... ----- ...--- ...-------
-- _..,____________
___..,_________ .... _.,. ______ ---------
__,..,. .... ____ ..... ____ .,. ____ .,.. __ ..,, ... __....... ________ .. __ _
-----~--- .....
____ ..,._... ..,......... __ .. ______ ,.__ .....____
.._ ------...--... ___,...,.. ____..,__________________ _... _______.._.,.
---~---~--------~---~-------· ------ -----------------·-----~-~-~-- ------~~---
------·----- ----
_____ . ,._________ ...,___________ -·. .------- . . -...................... _. . ___.,.____ .... . . . . . . --..o:'... . . . . . --.. . . . _____
---------~--~------~---------
:
725
• Between the age of 7 and 9 Gary traveled
with his mother and Step-father to the
following cities. He changed schools
approximately every three months.
726
one of his trips. Nilo names it
Mohamed after his middle name.
Gary got very attached to the dog,
but Nilo later took it away and
never brought it back.
727
• The traveling continued between the ages
of 9 and 11 . He continued to be pulled
from school in order to travel with his
parents.
'
733
734
• His teacher described him as very
nervous.
• Cleo described him at introverted.
0
c..
735
736
737
• Gary was withdrawn yet again to travel to
Puerto Rico. He did not enroll in school
there, but his mother said she enrolled him
in correspondence school, but the
paperwork never got there so he did not
start it.
738
• While in Puerto Rico Gary witnessed Nilo
getting severely beaten up by oth~r horse
trainers. Nilo had to be hospitalized and
was close to death.
-·
Sll
3
-·
739
•
~-I
-· ::::r
Sll CD
3- · -h
Sl)
003
"'0 ==
::::::! • '<
::::J ~
CCCD
en
c....~
c
.~ en
::::J
Ir-+
-· 0
cc
.::::r"'Tl
-0
-·
c..
Sl)
•
I
CD
CD
::::J
~
0
-en
-
-·
740
~
CJ)
0
-
a.
741
742
1961
• His mother and Nilo separate. One of approximately 7 times.
• Cleo and Gary move into a one bedroom apartment/motel
• On 9/5/61 Nilo comes by to get his wife back
• Gary tells him to go away but Nilo refuses
• Gary had a borrowed rifle and tells Nilo to go away Nilo says shoot me
• Gary warms him again Nilo gets a mattress and puts it in front of himself
and tells Gary to shoot
• As Nilo advances t()ward Gary he shoots Nilo in the stomach
• Nilo suffers no long lasting effects and does not press charges
• Gary is taken into juvenile custody
• Cleo chooses Nilo over Gary so Gary goes into Foster Care at the Keller's
home
• Girlfriend Sandy Herman breaks up with him after shooting and the incident
covered in the paper
• Gary has a breakdown and goes into Jackson Memorial Psychiatric Unit
• He then moves into Margarite and Thomas Perchoux's home for 6 months
743
Article in the Miami Herald
Boy Shoots
Step~Dad
At Hialt-11h
. iiy JOil:S t,'~OEftWOOD
W-14 :&;1•tr ..,.rf't"~
A 14•!;>£Ul'-t:>ld hoy M<JO.i oul-
'l:lde-- and :;Jh.ot hut Hl'pfathf'r
--
i:h~ •.11 opNI. h.t-1:~ dPM"
:Mi::Jnday M .a Hildcah pOt~
,ru,ft •tool! •t tht'" trent dNJf
"'"""'·
.u~ -E'arn~ it;> thf' doer- ~)!
A_,pat1;,1ltt>nt 4, ~SE -7th Av..:o,
liin~:tto.h, bf'~.~t~u:r;e "' !!t!':!t10n
urngon bot-lon~ing to- 41·:>-~ar~
old NUo l)nbJJ.Jt hM 1-(,!Hed lilt
ih~ f-4U'"klng lint.. (Into t.he
»venue.,
li:n•._UCJS-t.:tn Jloald 01.\ba~.
Ulf): ift<ept~r. WO..\- thr~. t£>
t~ bill 'idtle. Cleo. and ht'r
.on,. Gllor)". tg. ll>o tr.t!'W b~ he
bwf ft!lht~. HATrn.d for s.e\111~
~ the D'Ab:ap. bt&d ~n
IM'pti..Tt~tNI tf\b laM: h1.·~:~ M.tonthto
-"ihd \'i..:'h'< trytng· ro dfe<.."t a
'J:'~Jh:~;Uuth
745
guitar at Harry's home 1962
"The Fabulous Yellow Jackets"
Thomas and Margarite Perchoux
746
Gary lived with them about
6 months
747
• After leaving the Perchoux family Hilton
returns to live with his mother when she
leaves Nilo once again.
748
Ga aught
s
749
1963
• Gary quits school with his mother's
consent and joins a local band
.,
750
751
1964
• At the age of 17 his mother signs a waiver
in order for Gary to enlist in the Army
• While in the Army Gary earns his GED.
-,
752
753
• Gary went to see Sandy Herman to tell her
he was leaving for the Army
• He told her he had been prostituting
himself to an older man for money and he
did not want to do this any money, so he
was leaving for the Military
754
-
.....L.
<0
(j)
755
756
757
758
759
-
-·
760
761
\
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
Gary with Harry Keller and Harry's
771
wife Peggy, 1966
772
Gary with Harry's wife Peggy
773
774
775
776
777
.1967
M.a.rrJ~c !:!led Mr-ciJ'b and the C.:,urt h~tv1ng heal'd the teuUrrton)l of fbe partbll' and,
tM- wUncee:, ·tll!d haV4Jg ~uily coJ(sider~d·the m!ltler~ n:$1ndll" ttlat thlD Col.Ll't btu!l jur~ ..
d.!cdon of the av.bjeet maltel"" het-eaf and ol the· pa:rtteiJ hereto ando ac:coN:IIngly~ ~t ta:
3. . T~ jurtsdJc:t~~tet""h"reoCand
the p!lrtt~<:s hereto. /lttUf "
4, The Court hcoraby rnUrlee and appr-oves tile J'r(lperiy8ettlemunt
I
Agr(!am~nt entered !ntto·between the p.lll"'.fes and tiJe Property wUl be distributed 1.n
d-··-T""
DONE AND 0
STAT.EOF
781
1971
• Gary begins a relationship with Paulette
Goldman
• Paulette introduces Gary to Quaaludes
'
TnWponlng Officers: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
The un.dersign~td c,:,nifics and $Wears that he has just and roasonablt: grounds to believe, and does beUeve that:
On the day t>f _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
{L.u~Na;m") (F"intNam~}
fOR
AUGUST 1977
bngnf
798
Gary and Sue buy a house using
his VA loan.
3;113;2: Ho~ll oo;d1 D!r,.
799
800
801
802
Gary and Michael
803
1979
• Sue and Gary divorce after 7 months of
•
marnage
!
804
1980
• Gary begins his long
friendship with Shawn
Stewart
805
806
1982
• Gary's Uncle takes him to Pinnacle
Mountains State Park and makes sexual
passes at him.
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
1985
!
!
816
817
1986
'
• Started doing LSD, Marijuana plus other
drugs, including alcohol almost everyday
till 1988.
• His mother would not come visit him
during the years when he was on drugs.
'
818
819
1989
• Gary stops drinking alcohol for good
)
820
821
822
1991
• Gary gets his first
Labrador Retriever
• He names him
Ranger.
'
'
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
1997-2007
• Gary 'WOrked for John . .
Tabor from 1997-
2007.
• The company was
Insulated Wall
Systems
• Gary would find leads
for Tabor in order for
him tb install vinyl
siding.
''
840
Gary moved into 4169 Clermont
, Rd, Chamblee in 1997
841
842
843
844
2002
• His dog Ranger died.
'
• Gary became obsessed with the obituary
pages. He found comfort in reading about
other people who had lost a loved one.
• He became very depressed and suicidal.
.......
...............
.......
1\)
i\)
0
0
w
845
846
Gary with Dandy as a puppy 2003
G)
Q)
~
'< ,_
-· '"
847
848
849
850
851
852
2005
• Gary found Dr. Deicher an Endocrinologist in
the yellow pages
853
Gary would use Cambridge
854
Laundromat until 2007
it is owned by two Korean sisters
855
2007
• Gary quits Insulated Wall Systems.
• Gary begins to live in the forests.
• Gary visits Shawn to ask for money, she
found him very different, she did not
recognize him, he said he was very sick
856
2008
• Gary gets arrested in Georgia on 1/5/08
'
857
Ritalin found on Gary
at the time of arrest
Photo taken in 2008
858
still showing the scar from the
M1u ·... •h1 · B~edl i'n1c:ide~n1t'
859
860
Cleo i1sited
her
'
as
we a, had
lost 0.
862
~
··,
DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
=-'---\
# _ _L_- - -
863
MITIGATION WITNESSES Date la- '6,
_:l..,CD- \
Very damaging Carey Kelly 2267 (770) 529- 12/2/2009 Date Hilton right after her high school
(Ex- Capehart 0903 days, Shawn Stewart introduced them.
girlfriend) Circle (404) 433- They used pot and Quaaludes. She came
Atlanta, GA 9838 by his house saw him with a man and he
looked evil. She says he had mood
swings not mentally ill. He became very
possessive, when she broke up with him
he came to the house put gasoline
around the house and car port with
people inside the house. He was charged
with arson but the case was later
dismiss,ed.
Not available William D's father/ wife killed him 10/71//
Hilton
1
864
Not enough Pam 79 N Hill Dr. (601) 590 12/7/2009 Brief encounters while Hilton lived with
info. Johnson W#79 0537 son found him weird not mentally ill. He
Carriere, MS (601) 799- was very reclusive.
39426 2499
(601) 590-
0537
Has no info. William (404) 848- 12/8/2009 Has no personal memory of Client
4900
Not good Elizabeth 1957 Dresden (404) 634- 12/5/2009 Say Hilton pushing dog into van tried to
Brent Dr. NE 0831 stop him became overly angry. They
Atlanta, GA called the police and Hilton was charged
with animal cruelty. Case later
dismissed
2
865
866
Daisy Gil E.D. (305) 261- 4/2/2009
2848
4
867
Horrible Olin D. 1297 Turkey (321) 728- 4/17/2008 Refuses to be a part of the D's life, very
Hilton Creek Dr. NE 7976 angry
(brother Palm Bay, Fl
different 32905
5
868
Not needed Sonia Okun 150 E. 18th (212) 254- 817/2008 Sister to Paulette Goodman ex girlfriend
St. 6R 0506 of Hilton. No info
NY, NY (212)
10003 2546038
Not needed Clyde 2441 (407) 302- 6/18/2009 Has no memory of Hilton
Nothie Poinsetta, 3403
Avenue (321) 377-
Sanford, FL 1914
32771
Leonard 2355 NE 935- 6/1/2009 Went to school with Hilton from Middle
6
869
info. But maybe Scalfani 191st Street 3466 school to High school. He said he hung
ok Miami, Fl around with Gary for 2-3 years.
33180 He considered Gary an antisocial kind
of a guy. He said that no one liked him
in school. He said he was a loaner. He
would stay by himself and did not get
involved. He said he made friends with
him because he was easy going. Gary
was not liked because he would say
weird to shock
Not available Richard 15490 NW Dr. Emerson was the only Psychiatrist at
Deseased Emerson 7th Avenue 6/19/2009 the clinic. He told her that he has been
Psychiatrist Miami,FL deceased for many years. I checked on
33169 Dr. Emerson and he died on
7/27/93 ... this is the psychiatrist that
called him a social at 15.
Not good Mandy Precision (770) 536- 7/112009 No info.
Paterson Hair Cutters 6881
Not good Scott Precision (770) 526- 7/112009 No Info.
Gooch Hair Salon 6881
Not available Fulton Fulton Co. 8/5/2009 D worked for him in 1968. Fulton died
Greenburg Exterminatio 4/1112000. Dead
n
Not Available Newman Miami, 8/5/2009 Former friend of the D and used on as a
Higbee Florida reference in the Miami Dade College
He died on 10/15/1992
7
870
No info Alvin Elkes 1160 N. Old (386) 674- 4/15/2009 Co- worker at Miami Dade College
Mill Drive 9579 not remember Hilton
Some important Andre (954) 226- 8/29/2008 He said that his mother told him that
info. But Suleiman 3464 Hilton was abused by his mother. He
limited (Son of said that Hilton's mother had sexual
Paulette relationships with him. He said his
Goldman) mother told him that Hilton would
throw food at Ursula. He said that
Ursula was his mother's friend but he
does not know where she is. They lost
track of her many years ago.
Only one Christa 13429 Hwy (601) 766- 4/112009 She said she went to visit her sister in
contact with Sparks 613 1780 Miami and while visiting her, Ursula
Hilton Limited (Sister of Lucedale, MS asked her if she wanted to go see Gary.
info. first wife, 39452 She went with her and he lived in a
Ursula room with no furniture. He was sitting
Hilton) on the floor and he had long hair. He
looked unkempt. He acted weird. He
would speak but his words were not
clear.
:---hi:
8
871
No way thinks Linda P.O. Box (770) 490- 6/23/2009 She met Hilton at Blackburn Park in
she was next in Schaefer 1346 0077 Atlanta. She lived around the park area
line Ada, OK for 5 years. Hilton would come to the
park everyday to walk his dog. She now
thinks he clearly wanted to kill her. He
would want her to walk with him to
secluded areas of the rk.
9
872
873
874
Only good if the Clay Atlanta, GA (770) 507- 7/1/2009 He said the story of Hilton hitting one of
SA calls brother Roselle 7150 his brothers with a brush was his
to say he hit brother's story. He says Hilton never
him when touched him. He is not aware if he hit
young anyone else.
To much Kelly Dawson (706) 216- 6/26/2009 He had no psychiatric problems on the surface.
negative stuff/ Bennett County Jail 6446 He was not disabled in appearance. He did not
have quick speech. He was not speaking
not enough (Nurse for
bizarre. He told her he had MS. He was taking
positive Dr. Kulish) numerous medications. He wanted his
medication to be started immediately. After
the plea the FBI came to see him and he told
them that if a life sentence was too much he
would kill himself. The FBI then told her to
check him out to see if he was suicidal. She did
not find him to be. She said he thought
everything out before doing it. He told her that
he was in control and they were not. He told
her that he was smarter than they were. He
told her he was suicidal at that moment. He
was the first person she had seen that would
say he did something like that and showed no
remorse. He had a list of reason why he did it.
He told her he was old, had MS, to sick to take
care of self, couldn't work, could not afford
medicines, he had no where to live, prison was
a sure thin!!; and he could 1/;et meds.
Very Unstable Robyn 4083 Red (770) 972- 10/30/2008 Thinks the D worked at her house, she is odd but
and provides me with information that she finds. No
witness has her Mckinney Laurel Way 2576 first hand knowledge. Wrote to Hilton and he
QWn agenda. Snellville, GA ongoing responded letter on file. He talked to her about
30039 Tabor.
12
875
876
Not available Jay Martin- Georgia 6/19/2009 He is deceased he was the probation
Dead Vegue officer when he shot his step-father
(Probation
Officer
after
shooting of
step-father)
Limited Info. Jason 841 The (770) 318- 6/24/2009 He never thought he had a mental
Preste Circle 6062 illness. He did do a lot of pot. He said
Lawrencevill he Jived with his mother Connie
e,GA Wagoner for about a year. He did not
see any abusive behavior.
Horrible Glen (706) 265- 6/26/2009 Follower of serial killers. No first hand
Adams 9983 information.
"wolfscratc
h"
Limited info. Gay City Hall (706) 635- 6/23/2009 A man resembling Hilton came in and
Crescenti Ellijay, GA 4711 asked about Kusawatti Resort.
(706) 276-
3111
Limited info Debbie 4040 Candler (404) 406- 6/25/2009 She said she was deathly afraid of
Woolf Park 5088 Hilton. She said he was weird and his
Dundwoody, eye had a strange expression. He spoke
GA very loud.
Limited Info Diane Pike (770) 451- 6/25/2009 She is friends with Karen Whitehead. They
3193 were walking in the park when they heard a
dog in pain. They saw Hilton in a crouched
position next to his dog. He told them there
14
877
was a pack of wild dogs and he was afraid they
would hurt his
Limited Info Debbie 2277Mundy (770) 452- 6/23/2009 He was an unusual person. He was very
Golden Drive 7372 withdrawn.
Chamblee,
GA
---+
15
878
No info. Richard Dir. of Boys/ 4/24/2009 He says that he does not remember the
Someillan Girls Club in D and will not
16
879
Limited info Joe Pulizzo jpulizzo@md 4/23/2009
c.edu
1850 W Nancy
Creek Dr NE,
Atlanta, Ga
30341-1453(
17
880
Limited info on Ron Miller 4706 (770) 394- 6/24/2009 He also thought of Hilton as crazy not
mental health Equestrian 2549 dangerous. He did not see him
Way functioning normal. He said the way he
dressed and his actions were not normal.
He thought Hilton was in his own
universe.
Not good Sheree 4347 (770) 454- 6/24/2009 Says that the D spoke to her about
Rosende Burtford 6513 training dogs. She met him while they
Circle were in Murphy Candler Park. Felt
Atlanta, GA stalked ~him.
Not good was Sallie 1870 (404) 307- 4/25/2009 She say him instigate fights. He hid in
afraid of him Samuel D'youville 0360 his van where people normally did not
Atlanta, GA (770) 454- park
8021
Little info on Graham 4210 Pointer (678) 617- 6/24/2009 Thought it was odd that the D said that
mental health Hansen Ct. 7343 he was only there for that day, but he
prior to Oakwood, had enough camping equipment to last
Meredith death GA for two weeks. Thought the D was off
but not paranoid. He had scattered
speech.
Not good Kay 4184 Brawley (770) 455- 4/25/2009 She began to avoid the park because of
Dame row Dr.NE 7062 him. He yelled at her for having her dog
Atlanta GA (770) 827- off of a leash. He was never nice and
6714 always agitated. She assumed that he
18
881
was mentally ill.
Not enough info Kim 4202 Candler 6/24/2009 Says that she and he mother parked
very negative McGray Lake West beside him at the park. He was fussing
Atlanta, GA at them because there were other
parking spaces. Another time, she says
that he was very harsh with his dog.
Hilton mean and very military.
Saw him after June Novak 557 College (404) 375- 6/23/2009 Says the
the NC murders Hill Drive 4515 D asked for a ride to a bigger town so
gave him a ride Hiawasee, that he could use his credit card. She
GA says that he was very demanding. She
gave D a ride to Helen.
Possible but Diane 3681 Cold (770) 220- 4/26/2009 A friend introduced Gary to her. She
might to Clohessy Spring Lane 0755 said that he always made comments
dangerous Chamblee, about women. After seeing him on the
GA news, she witnessed him cleaning and
vacuuming the van. She called the
police. She thought he suffered from
extreme isolation. Tried to engage
people in inappropriate ways. He would
test your level of fear.
SA might call Clinton 4333 Snoopy (850) 513- 4/30/2009 His mother was a friend of the D when
him since he is Rosselle Lane 3734 he was 8-9 years old. The D sometimes
inFlorida his Tallahassee, babysat for his mother. Mother stopped
brother says no FL contacting him after the D was caught
to beating spanking her son. Thought Hilton was
shifty.
19
882
Limited info Josh 2929 Lake (678) 936- 6/24/2009 Met the D a day before Meredith went
Hanson Hallow Road 2234 missing. Concerned about who may be
Gainesville, on the trail behind him. He took off very
GA fast into the woods. He had knowledge
of woods. According to witness Hilton
looked like he had a screw loose.
Limited info AI McEver 4640 (404) 434- 6/25/2009 He says D always had a night stick,
Chamblee 5486 water bottles and a knife. D would
Dunwoody become upset if a dog was off the leash
Road in the park.
Limited info Larry (770) 963- 6/29/2009 Never met D personally. He said he
Grover 3641 spoke to him about 6 times in the late
90's. Larry answered an ad for siding
and Hilton answered the phone.
No info Melinda 1290 B. (770) 536- 6/23/2009 She says that she was not the one to cut
Howington Thompson 6881 D's hair. Her information was
Bridge Road secondhand.
Gainesville,
Ga
Limited info Nile Jones 3179 (770) 451- 6/25/2009 Says he saw the D many times in the
Laventure 6332 12/6/10 park with a martial arts baton with him.
Drive He always had his backpack, also.
Chamblee, Thought he was not 100% there ..... He
GA was egotistical. He never mentioned
women at all. He never spoke to
himself. He spoke to him about 6 times.
20
883
He said the last time he saw him was 3
month before he was arrested. He was
always the same there were no changes
in his demeanor during the time he
knew him.
Not good hung Tim (404) 256- 6/24/2009 D's concern about him being in a shed at
up on me Mitchell 1240 Murphy Candler park.
(678) 499-
0301
Not good at all Timothy 5233 (404) 897- 6/26/2009 Says the D screamed at him and Dee
Williams Kimblewick 3034 Jordan about their kids messing up the
Cove park. Also says that the D began to
Dunwoody, advance towards Dee. Police were called,
GA but D left before they arrived.
Not good/ no Larry 2277 Mundy (706) 273 6/23/2009 Claims to have seen Hilton in his town
info//Police Callahan Drive 4054 but did not return my call on 6/23/09
Chief of Chamblee,
police GA
Limited info Barbara Post Office (706) 889- 6/23/2009 She says when D came in he had wild
Ostrowski 300 Cherry 1933 eyes and asked for a Liberty stamp. He
Log did not say anything weird. She worked
Cherry Log, at post office.
GA
Limited info Bryan (770) 712- 6/26/2009 He says that he did not see D's face at
Sin~leton 8779 camp~round. He is unsure if the van
21
884
belonged to D.
No info on Mary 2371 5/28/2009 Mary was a friend of Cleo who lost
Hilton only his Kayler Highway72E touch after Cleo sold her house and
mother Not Abberville, moved away. Said that she was a great
enough sc 29620 person.
Russ 205 Mayfield (770 932 Left note on door on 10/30/08 did not
Morton Farm Dr. 9992 respond, have not been able to locate
Boss- Lawrencevill Lives in Oregon or Washington state
perfection eGa
roofing and
siding
No info Monique (770) 457 Phone disconnected/ dealt with him at
Lund 7270 Murphy park. Spoke to husband instead
Not enough info Lee Olwine 4174 Regency (770) 986 8/25/10 Strangely dressed and would jump out
Park Ct. 8872 of the woods. Creepy
Atlanta
Nancy (678) 421 Unable to reach
Clark 6680
Katrina (404) 312 Left the country for a while responded
Guettler 1247 on 7/1/09 still not spoken to her
Eddie and There whereabouts are unknown
Earl
Wheeler
Cousins
Lucille Eberton, Ga? Whereabouts are unknown
Well
Kindergart
en teacher
22
885
Walter 3780 Glen (770) 972 Have gone to his house 2 times while I
Goddard Ian Dr. 2001 (770) was in Atl4/25/09 10/30/08
972 1653 Dec. 2009
23
886
Stewart St. 1527 Does not remember him.
Davy Galway, NY
Crockey 12074
Platoon
leader
Possible but Harry 67 Lula Cove 828 483 6/9/09 They were the foster parents after the
could be Clyde Rd 4442 father shooting. They took him in
dangerous Keller Sr. North because it was the only way he would
and Harry Carolina come out of detention. Problem is that
Keller II 28787 Hilton threaten his wife/mother and she
called the probation officer to come get
him. Jr. saw him while Hilton worked at
Miami Dade Comm College and was
Dr. Kulish
Awful Pastor River of Life 850 926 He was Dunlap's pastor. He will not
Henry Crawfordvill 1200 assist us wants the death penalty for
Jones e Hilton.
Possible only Capt. Ryan Lumpkin 8/25/10 He was in the room when Hilton spoke
for Scott Jail to the Dr. Hilton smelled like sulfur.
24
887
effect Hilton cocky and arrogant, and
everything else intelligent.
not
Limited info Chris 2277Mundy 770 452 6/23/09 Hilton told him he had to put a man
Golden Drive 7372 down in Stone Mountain. He would
Chamblee, repair Hilton's van. One time it smelled
Ga like had died in it.
Timmy Not located
Odom
Cousin
Terry Not located
Odom
cousin
25
888
unknown
No information Internet buff Unable to locate
Code name
Tazebell 276 988 Wrote to me on 10/20/09 /does not know
4791 Hilton but
Possibly good Barbara Casey and 770 454 12/3/09 Worked next door would print flyers
has some Speed Assoc. 1000 for Hilton. Ordered the baton through
background Realtors the internet for him. Hilton was very
info. 4175 angry when Tabor fired him. Hilton
Clairmont was very protective of his surroundings.
Rd He told her that he was close to dying.
Atlanta She said that Tabor would stand by the
window naked when the women who
worked in the office would go get their
cars. She saw Tabor being very rude to
26
889
,, ,. , . -Y<(i'-,
, ,; ''
. '
Need to be Karen 317 709 6/25/09 Spoke to her she does not want to speak
deposed Bareford 3203 to me without checking me out with the
SA says she saw Hilton night before
murder in Atlanta. She was with her
._ .....,
·'
uu.ruu:ouu
Not available Robert Dept. chair 8/5/09 Hilton worked for him in 1971. But this
Hilbert Miami Dade witness died on 10/22/93
Jr. C'niiPoP
Not available Nilo Dabag Deceased Had federal arrest for being in Mafia
L'4. .J.'•. 4.L
27
890
Not enough Jason Shyr 4163 678 358 1111/08 Jason owns the property next to Tabor.
info. Clairmont 5438 He saw Hilton carrying a gun in his
Chamblee, pants. Says Hilton carried a silver
Ga retractable baton. Would not give
specifics on why he thought Hilton was
weird.
To dangerous Laura Woodstock 770 926 6/24/09 She sold Dandy to Hilton. He was very odd
Johnson Ga 8618 would bring her pictures of Dandy constantly.
He had excessive photos of the dog. One day
Johnsongrad
came to her home and took her dog out for a
e2@Yahoo.co walk without permission. She was concerned
m about him and told her daughters not to
answer the door.
Limited info Fred 7635 Nesbit 770 350 12/5/09 Hilton called the police on someone who
28
891
Johnson Ferry Rd. 0003 was stealing from the shop. The man
Atlanta 770 457 was arrested but later Fred dropped the
3134 <'h<ora'"" and Hilton was
Possible but Chris 79 NHill Dr. (601) 590 12/8/08 Hilton lived with him. Hilton would
might be Johnson W#79 0537 laugh constantly during conversations.
negative Carriere, MS (601) 799- Would drink a lot of coffee. Hilton got
39426 2499 into an argument with Jeff Hebert
another roommate and was arrested for
battery. Hilton did not like his mother.
killed his uvlo'i."'·
29
892
Horrible Jorrn 3351 (770)558- 11/20/10
Brunnhoeff Raymond Dr 2086
er Atlanta, GA
Not Good Deana 1918 770 725 11/30/10 Has no memory of Hilton
Everett- Elizabeth St 4202
mitch Statham, Ga
Pending Durant Auto Doc 770)922- 11/17/10 Wants pictures sent to him to see if he
Godwin 1800 1134 knows him. He was not at home when I
Brandywine went there. Called back.
CtSE
Conyers, GA
30013
Rockdale
County
(770)922-
1134
30
893
Not good Bob 385 0474 (770)381- 11/20/10 Did not recognize Hilton
Cunneen 5659 Fern 0474
CreekDrSW
Liburn, GA
Not good Ricky 71 Herbert (770)963- 11/19/10 Does not remember Hilton
McDaniel Hayes Dr 1547
Lawrencevill
e,GA
Not good Dana 1150 (770)844- 11/18/10 Does not remember Hilton
Johnson Rosewood 6171
(Cooper) Dr,
Alpharetta,
GA 30005
Not good Pam 557 Telfair 11/19/10 Does not remember Hilton
Hargrove Ct
(Baker) Suwannee,
GA
Not good George 2048 Nichols (404)284- 11/20/10 Does not remember Hilton
Harris Ln 7831
Decatur GA
31
894
30032
Not good Jim Russell 5741 (770)888- 11/18/10 Does not remember Hilton
Kendrick Ln, 6265
Cummings,
GA30041
Not good Sue Willis 2070 (678)240- 11/18/10 Does not remember Hilton
Countryridge 0104
Rd,
Alpharetta,
GA30004
32
895
Too dangerous Bill Lawson 564 Highway 706 348 12/6/10 Bill saw Hilton on Blood Mountain on
255 6747 New Years Day 2008. He saw him
Cleveland, 706 244 coming out of the woods with his
Ga 4333 Golden Retriever. He appeared to be
scared or with fear. He was guilty of
something. He said he saw him
hunched over in the woods like he was
the bathroom.
Not enough Jeff 404 992 12/6/10 He said he did not have the attire for the
information Landers 5073 park. He would wear hiking outfits
with backpacks. He would not saw
hello or smile. He looked out of
33
896
He said he never saw him speaking to
himself. He said that he was rude to his
dog.
Not good Jerry 554 Stanley 706 219 12/6/10 Jerry called the GBI about a man that
O'Dell NixRd 7606 looked like Hilton. He said that who
Cleveland, 706 878 they arrested was not the same person
Ga 4689 he saw.
Not good John 10255 770 936 11/30/10 He said Hilton was collecting money for
Joudon Rillridge Ct 1345 a charity called Baptist Christian
Alpharetta, 678 497 Children's Home. John would call the
Ga 7001 places and get the donations and Hilton
would go get the money. At first he
thought Hilton was legit but then it was
obvious that he was keeping the money.
John said he could not stomach preying
on people so he quit. Hilton would prey
on people's sympathies.
Not enough Johnnie jamakerjam1 800 407 11/30/10 She met Hilton through a mutual friend
information Pickens (tl),aol.com 6248 who told her that Hilton was hiring
404 296 telemarketers. She went to work for
0193 him but only stay for two or three
weeks. She said she figured out that
there was something wrong with what
he was doing. She worked with him in
34
897
1983 or 84. Sbe would make calls for
bim for bis charities, and then was
asked to tbe from tbe
Not enough Joy Dittmer 770 312 12/6/10 Sbe is a nurse. Sbe never noticed any
information 4206 mental illness. He was just bizarre. He
never bad a confrontation with her. She
never called tbe police on him. He
never jumped out of the woods on her.
35
898
Not enough Scott 1451 678 513 12/6/10 Scott was with his wife Karen hiking at
information Stansbury Greenwood 1712 Amicalola Park in late August when
Ct they ran into Hilton. Scott said the trail
Ga has 620 He said Hilton was
36
899
30115 scoping his wife out.
Not enough Tim 3805 Drew 770 294 12/3/10 He said he looked like he had been
information Petraroi Campground 6279 camping for months. Tim said he
Rd passed Hilton on a cliff and he made
Cumming, sure he had the inside of the trail. He
Ga said that Hilton eyes looked stressed
770 294 6279 out. Something about him was not
normal. He looked like he was up to
something.
Not good MarkGady 404 918 12/6/10 He saw Hilton on 12/31/07 Hilton
3392 appeared stoic. He was not jittery. He
looked like an old frail man. Nothing
was out of the norm. He appeared to
have been in the trail for a while. He
seemed calm.
Not enough info Todd 706 769 12/6/10 Hilton looked very jovial and outward.
Hosley 7882 He was disheveled. He was eager to
chat. He was upbeat and had rapid
speech. He looked outgoing and did not
look frighten. 111107
Not enough info Gregg 404 292 12/6/10 . He thinks it was 2004 when they met.
Jordan 6004 The last time he saw him was a couple
of months before the end of2007. He
did not notice any changes in his
behavior during the years.
No enough info Jennifer 706 540 12/7/10 She said she thought that he was odd.
37
900
Pressey 6002 He had a fly swatter attached to his
jacket.
Terrible Patricia 864 979 12/7/10 She met him at Murphy Candler Park.
Stoud 0027 He was very aggressive toward her. He
threatened to hit her dog if her dog
came near to his.
Terrible Meryl 770 457 . Hilton did not allow Dandy anywhere
Reaves 5282 near her dog. She saw him in the
parking lot of the park hitting his dog.
He was weird and creepy she said. She
avoided him all the time.
Randy 404 607 12/7/10 Randy and his wife Liz and their son
Portwood 4879 were hiking Blood Mountain on 1/1/08
404 353 the same day that Emerson went
8653 missing. Hilton did not have a speech
problem. He rambled and was very
authoritative.
Liz 404 281 12/8/10 Liz was hiking with her husband Randy
Portwood 6572 and their son on 1/1/08. Hilton started
404 353 rambling about getting stuck in the
8653 trails and the Union rescue people not
coming to get you. He said they were
too fat to hike up. He said once there
was a man with a broken femur which
they had trouble getting him off. She
asked him if he lived nearby but he did
not respond.
38
"'CD
901
902
Not enough info Jason 1277 404 513 1217/10 Jason was at the Starbucks coffee across
Barlow Dunwoody 2849 from the Chevron Station when Hilton
lane was arrested (1/4/08) .. He approached
Atlanta Hilton and asked him what his dog's
name was. Hilton looked at him and
said his name is George. Jason already
knew the dog's name was Dandy. Hilton
then told him he better out of here.
Not enough info Mark 922 lester hill 706 897 1217/10 Mark saw Hilton on 111108 while hiking
Puckett Suches, ga 4125 Blood Mountain. He remembers Hilton
706 897 4125 carrying a big hunting knife and a
baton. Mark thought it was odd
because that is not what normal hikers
carry. His speech did not get his
attention, but what he wore did. He
looked down and out and needy.
Not good Skip 25Rocky 706 344 1217/10 Skip saw Hilton at the QT store in
Comeau Road 8163 January 2008. He said he was putting
Dawsonville in 11 gallons of gas when he observed
Hilton dumping things into the
dumpster. He said Hilton had
in a that looked like a
40
903
basketball. It appeared heavy. He said
the van had NC plates on it. He said he
recognized him from the photos in the
news. He said Hilton looked decrepit
and old. He was hunched over. He also
had a girls cap on. He said he watched
him for about 10 minutes. He said he
also saw Hilton drinking out of the dogs
bowl after the dog drank. He said
Hilton was cleaning his van.
Not good Adam Link 50 Sosebee 917 334 12/7/10 Adam Link saw Hilton and Meredith on
Dr 7109 111/08 on Blood Mountain Hilton
Dahlonega, intentionally walked off the path when
Ga they were about to meet. He was not
friendly.
Not enough info Alexandria 8630 678 717 12/7/10 Alexandria was working at the Chevron
Grubb 9360 station the windows. Hilton
41
904
Way 678 343 came by and asked her if he could get
Gainesville, 9225 some water for his dog inside the store.
Ga She said yes and he filled a jug, while
she took care of his dog. Hilton was
wearing a white cap. He was an old
guy. Soon afterward the police came
and arrested him. They also found his
stuff in the dumpster.
Not enough info Derrick 678 907 12/7/10 Derrick met Hilton when he was about
Nassar 5384 8-9 years old. Hilton worked doing
maintenance at the apartments where
they lived. He does not remember much
about him then. He said he was with his
mother years later when they saw him
hitch hiking. His mother stopped and
picked him up. He said Hilton told her
that he had a disease. He only spent
about an hour with him. His mother
has passed away.
Not enough info Dr. James 800 202 267 He said he met Hilton and Meredith on
Frazier lndependenc 3537 Blood Mountain on 1/1/08. He had no
eAveSW personal contact with Hilton
Washington
DC
42
905
Not enough info Karen 770 451 1217/10 He was disheveled. He was also
Whitehead 1107 friendly. He had negative glances.
There were no fluctuations in his
speech. He did not look like he was
from the neighborhood.
No info Bobby 126 770 926 12/7/10 He saw Hilton on Blood Mountain on
Touhy Springwater 7376 12/29/07. Bobby was coming out of the
trace trail and found Hilton I the parking lot.
were next to each other.
43
906
Ga Nothing he did caught his attention. He
770 926 7376 only said hi to him. He saw his picture
in the news and called the GBI.
Not enough info Merari 404 538 1217/10 Merari was working at the Chevron
Abe be 6214 Station when Hilton was arrested. He
44
907
said he did not speak to him. He said he
did see him dump things into the
dumpster. He did not know what he was
throwing in. He said a customer called
the police and they came and got him.
45
908
909
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA
Defendant
--------------~/
ORDER FINDING DEFENDANT COMPETENT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the revtew of competency
evaluations conducted by Salvatore M. Blandino, Ph.D. on April 29, 2014, and
Brady Lee Hudson, Ph.D. on April 30, 2014. The Court finds that the defendant is
competent to proceed based upon these reports and the stipulations of both parties
as to the accuracy of these reports.
It is, therefore;
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendant is competent to proceed.
The Clerk of Court shall make the competency evaluations of Dr. Blandino and Dr.
Hudson part of the record in this case for further purposes. {- ~
DONE AND ORDERED at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida this~G' day
of October, 2018.
J MES C. HANKINSON
IRCUIT JUDGE
Copies:
Georgia Cappleman, Assistant State Attorney
Robert A. Morris, Defense Counsel
s
910
Mitigation Witness for Trial
Childhood
Thomas Perchoux - We can tape record him again because he can testifY that he
was in psychiatric care when young
Victorine Rowe-we have her statement(through me)
Cleo Dabag- (through me)
Teenage years
Roy Cave was in band with him, knows about foster care
Sandy Herman- girlfriend
Beverly Lehmann Hilton-hostile witness but she is his sister
Maria Castelli
Juan Castelli
Early Adulthood
STATE'S
EXHIBIT # .....eci==-=---
Date 16\s\ \\1$
( \
Case Name <2:: \.hl_.~~
:i
Case No .•::2. c:a,~ cs:-~~I911
.,'I
:i
li
Adult prior to and 2005
Maria Linarte- nurse next door to Clairmont address thought he was mentally ill
Chad Smallwood
Justin Wight
Karen Stansbury
Scott Gill
Mildred Stevens
Shaun Faukner
Casey Smith
Robert Schmidt
Tom Roger
Nancy Linkesh
Jail life
912
DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT #r---'_5_,·"----
---~- <'%
Date l c:.
( '
Case Name G: \-\:3:::-l:.\Q,,~
1;;-<c,~ I
Case No. ,,.:;J.a,Q/"tC?_
913
?nri I•Jriicial Circuit Ma ...
FYI
- - Forwarded message - - -
From: Paula Saunders <paula.saunders@flpd2.com>
Date: Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 5:33PM
Subject: Re: our client
To: lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com>
Cc: Robert Friedman <robert.fiiedman@flpd2.com>, Bill McLain <bill.mclain@flpd2.com>, Merribeth Bohanan
<merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
This was entirely unnecessary and a distraction in the midst of trial. My only point was that you had no right to
undermine Rob's decision and instruct Faye to contact a penalty phase witness about a subpoena, especially
when you had not discussed it with Rob. This is micro-managing.
This has been a difficult and stressful case for all of us, most of all for you. I don1 intend to discuss this further
until the case is ol.l3r.
I'm glad you got some rest this weekend.
Paula
https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui~2&ik... 1/7
2/21/2011 Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
• 1 bene~! ),he client ewn if the judge calls me unprofessional again. I do not haw a personal issue on any of this
1 fnterference crapola because my high and satisfaction comes from knowing that i personally haw done
ewrything that I think is humanly possible to prepare the client's case and preserw the clients' rights. That is
I my high. I am at peace with what I did in this case regardless of the outcome. I tried my absolute best to be
I prepared.
During the process of preparation, and inwstigation, I will be the first to agree I interfere a lot. As lead, first
J
chair, or supervisor or whatewr name you want to affix to me, i think it is my responsibility to investigate the
case thoroughly so that later on , we as a team, can make decisions based on what we know and what it has
been thoroughly inwstigated. I aso feel it is my responsibility to make sure projects assigned to others to
inwstigate or research are accomplished in a timely manner. It is only after the assigned projects haw sat for
owr a month or more and requests for updates are not resofwd, that I interfere with and do the project
myself, This part, the inwstigative process, has caused sore feelings at times, but I do not know of any
other way to inwstigate or prepare the cases unless someone takes on the responsibility to insure all is
inwstigated timely. I am open for suggestions. This is what I call "lead" I do not know how else to handle
assigments when people sit for 3 or 4 months without doing anything about them, either because the attendant
J issue is not that pressing because the trial will be probably in a year or two, or because of other work related
1 assignments. All people in\Qived in the unit haw always been allowed to take the initiatiws of inwstigating
whatewr issue comes to mind. You came into the team in this case and you initiated a lot of investigations on
I issues that nobody had not dreamed of before for the last three years, at least not I. Your concerns for the
'J"scrubs" for example was one of those that caused me some anxiety and generated lots of work. Your concern
, for the beads generated additional inwstigatiw work. Merribeth has thought about other issues and she too
'Ihas generated inwstigations. I am sure Rob has generated investigations of issues that came to his mind as
well. I too take initiatiws as to issues, and Chris probably wishes that I did not because it generates lots of
I work for him. Betty has thought of issues and that generated lots of work. Chris himself has thought of issues
J and inwstigated as well. Julie came into the case and thought of issues that generated additional
1 inwstigation, and ewn prompted the team finding and retaining of an expert that was fisted as a witness,
deposed by the State, but that has not yet been released because now that I think about it was not included in
1
the list that I had Friday. Merribeth helped a lot in contacting this expert, securing him, gathering the
I information to be sent to him, etc. The issue of securing a pet scan caused some complications at first, but I
1 am glad now that I owrrode the input and made the decision to hire another neuropsychologist Ouau because
i that created the crystal clear ellidence that a pet scan was needed. Merribeth was assigned to set up the pet
1
scan in this case and you do not know of the amount of work she did to secure a location for the test. She
I made all the arrangements for Wu to come. It was hell for MB to work on liability contracts , confidential
I contracts, , etc. and etc., and that caused deadlines to be set because of our time constraints, and she
1 endured as a trooper when i finally said, well I guess I need to be included in your conwrsations, because the
I situation was going back and forth. As it turned out, it newr became necessary for me to become in\Qfwd.
i She did it all. She ewn went and picked up Wu and took him to the facility and back. Faye has also
I generated lots of inwstigations. The only requirement is that we tell each other so we do not duplicate.
I Some of you complimented me on my cross of Matt Ruddell. I thank you for the compliments. I want to let all
j of you know that I gaw Merrribeth a deadline of less than 20 minutes to prepare the cross of Matt Ruddell -
she had been in\Qfwd in the deposition of the witness and she was well wrsed as to all the issues attendant to
the witness. While he was testifying in open court, Merribeth, carried out my instructions , orders I will say,
without any bitching or bickering She sat at the bench behind the defense table and wrote all the questions by
hand. 1haw learned to read what she calls her scribbles. The only issues that I added were related to the
actual dates being displayed on the screen because she was busily writing questions instead of listening to
that was being said. Thanks MB. You haw a special gift that the clients will certainly will benefit from. I am
going to continue to use that gift of yours fbr the benefit of the clients as much as I can, so I am sure you will
feel used at some point. Also, you do not know how pleased I am to hear that your satisfaction and pride in a
job well done is not contingent upon you personally presenting the stuff to the jury, and getting the credits fbr
it. Your high and satisfaction comes from knowing that your work was presented. Also, I want to personally
thank Merribeth for the preparing of the guilt phase cross examination of witness Matthews and specially fbr
the preparation of the cross examination of Jo Ellen Brown. While she was not used in guilt phase to do any
cross because of the team decision to separate the guilt from the penalty, credits belong where they are due.
So for those of you that complimented me on the cross of Matt Ruddell, please compliment Merribeth instead
if you get the chance.
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'! (';
I To me Paula, it is kind of strange that you accuse me or tell me to learn to be a team player, when I haw been
I the one to include ewryone in the team when crucial decisions in the case haw been made. I do not know if
1 that is what you meant by my being a team player or learning to be a team player or not. I haw no clue.
I Maybe one day we will discuss it and if it will benefit the client, i willleam whatewr you suggest. If you meant
, to tell me to leam to respect the decisions of others in the case, and their judgments, I think I do not need to
I
, learn that because I take seriously the decisions made by others. For example, the team was blessed when
I you agreed to join the defense. You were assigned to handle two statements made by the client, among other
' things, that were really bad. I did not interfere with what you did. I thank you for the time you spent away from
your daughter to accomplish the job you haw been assigned, and I more than anyone knows how much time
we wish to spend with our family but cannot because of job commitments; As to the projects assigned, to
iyou, some of which you \Qiunteered for, you did the research, gaw me the proposed motions, I made one or
iI two typo suggestions, and wrbatim there were filed as prepared by you. You argued the motions during the
trial. I did not interfere with any of your arguments ewn though I had different ideas as to how to argue them. 1
Idid not interfere with any meetings or decisions you made as to the edited portions, or any decisions to leaw
in materials that the judge agreed to delete. In my mind I questioned why but I deferred to your good judgment
1
Iand expertise. Besides that was your issue not mine. Moreowr, when an issue arose and you and Rob were
[ not physically in the courtroom because you were meeting with Eddie as to the statements, I immediately
Iphoned you from the courtroom because the issue had been argued by you when you were present in
1
the courtroom and it was being revisited by Willie Meggs. You and Rob immediately came down, and I did not
1 interfere with any of your arguments, and deferred to all of your arguments on the matter as well. One time you
1 came to me and told me that it was time for me to help you instead, and you assigned me the job of calling
I Neil Smith and the other Georgia lawyer, which I did. I only reached Neil. I was not satisfied with what he was
1 saying and particularly I was alarmed by the tinie frame he was giving us to call him back, 30 minutes. I
! personally called you but you indicated you were busy with the prosecutor. I went to Rob's office to discuss
1
the issue with him, and Bill was there as well, and we discussed the issue because I was going to call Neil
back and get more imfornation from him. You came in and found me in Rob's office. You and I went to my
i1 office and we called Neil. During your talk to Neil, I deliberately left the office, and I did not interfere with any
1 discussions you had with Neil. I did make a couple of suggestions in a piece of paper during the recital of the
1 facts as to the issues in the courtroom, and you incorporated those facts. If this interference is what you are
I talking about, I apologize but I thought it was important as to the plea negotiations and whatewr you were
j arguing at the time for you to point out to the court that I had personally communicated the offer to the State,
1 which you did not know because of your being in the case for only a month, but I beliew you were in the case
I when that was done. I am not sure. If you view my giwn you a note to correct your statement that Falsetti
[ instead of Foggy had compared the bayonet to the bones of the victim and had found no match, I apologize
-The penalty phase is Rob's job and responsibility. Rob and I had talked and he and I had decided that he will
do the penalty phase. After our decision, I receiwd input from others. I presented that input to the whole
, team. And finally our decision was solidified. At one time, the office wanted Rob to handle the guilt phase so
I that I could concentrate in the death penalty phase but I thought that would be unfair to Rob.
I -Rob has the heavy burden of getting the client life in prison and I am sure he has worked long hours including
[ weekends on this. I did not attend any of the meetings he had and I haw not participated nor interfered with
1
any of his selection of witnesses nor with his decisions to retain new experts or recontacting old ones. When
McClaren wanted to know if he was going to be called and was requesting to see the client again, I deferred to
Rob to call him to advise him if he was to be called or not. The neurologist Ouau has phoned me sewral times
on my cell because he too thought he was going to be part of it. I haw not returned those calls. I did mention
it to Merribeth since my understanding is that she is part of the penalty phase and is going to help handle
I
1
sewral civilian witnesses, although i do not know if that is true, and she indicated to me that she will call and
1
talk to him since she and I haw another death penalty case coming up in March and I did not want to cause
any negatiw reaction on this expert of ours for that other case based on any decision not to use him in this
1 case. It was Rob's decision to use this neuropsychologist or retain another one, and I did not interfere nor did I
participate in that decision, and in fact, i was not ewn asked for input as to that. This Dr. Golden that he
retained was the one that came to our case in Willie Smith all disheawd and all owr the place, without a
. coat, with his pants fly open and who had lost all of the documents in our case then. This is also the expert
f that suggested that I falsify records because IRS was auditing him, and I refused but offered to giw him letters
I concerning the actual work he had done in our cases. But this expert is a pair with Wu, so I am sure that
I • • • • ••• - • • • •,
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·1 weiglie.a heallily in Rob's decision to retain him. Other than at meetings of the entire team, I haw not
iodiscussed anything with Rob dealing with the penalty phase at all. I haw not been asked for any input and I
haw not prollided any input whatsoewr. l.haw talked to Rob sewral times but all those times were related to
I
guilt phase issues, because I wanted to pick his brain and get his opinions as to some issues inasmuch as he
I
has been in the case since October of 2009, in paper since March of 2010, and has read the entire dis cowry.
I'
haw not interfered with his selection of witnesses to subpoena. I only know what it was prollided to me to
, read to the jury when we read witnesses to see if they knew any names. Rob has listed some 24 or 25
! witnesses. I haw no kowledge if any of those haw been serwd or not, except that I know at least as to
I Deicher and Tabor, the appropriate papers were filed to secure the attendance of those witness because as the
' supervisor, lead or whatewr name you want to call me, I was asked to sign the papers that he had prepared. 1
haw no personal knowledge if any of the 24 or 25 witnesses haw been released or not. Moreowr, this is not
the first time that Rob has participated in one of my cases, so I take offense on your allegations that I do not
trust what he does. I personally know of his skills and his knowledge of the law particularly since he and 1
worked in the Coy Evans' case together. During the meeting last Friday, I skipped through the names of the
I
, penalty phase witnesses and did not address any of them at all. You and I wanted to hear about the penalty
I phase as well but Rob said that he had appointments which I took to mean, appointments with witnesses
I' dealing with the penalty phase. I think he said something to the effect that He will talk to me Monday, but I am
not ewn sure now if I heard him correctly.
1
After, you and Rob left the meeting, an issue arose as to Deicher and the issue was brought to my attention as
the supervisor of the capital unit or the first chair or the lead, the bitch, or whatewr you want to call me, or the
only team lawyer present in the office at the time. It was around 7 1/2 at night. As the supervisor, first chair
j or lead or whatewr you want to you call it, I want you to know that there is is multitude of issues on a daily
i
basis that I am asked to decide on the spot. For example, while trying Hilton, we were appointed to a new
1 murder case, the office got yet another one that is accused of killing two but is a juwnile and was assigned to
1 Justin's dillision, and there is also one in the horizon claiming he can hire his own lawyer but haw not been
' able to do so. Depositions had to be reset for the death penalty trial scheduled in Quincy in July because
I Hankinson finally agreed to continue a huge hearing in Peacock that I haw not ewn started preparing. I had to
I do a huge hearing on the Bard! case in December as well. When I am asked to make decisions I try my best
I to use my better judgment in any giwn time and often times I make decisions that will allow consultation with
1 others or more thinking. I am wry conservatiw in my decisions or at least I try to be. Because the issue
I brought to me late Friday concerned a penalty phase witness and Roli had indicated that he was meeting with
I someone that I assumed were witnesses in the case, and because I did not know what was going on as to the
! penalty phase and I still do not, I asked Faye to specifically call the witness and indicate to him that he was
! not released. I think she did. I haw not released any of Rob's witnesses. My decision WAS NOT
· RELEASE, because i did not know what decision he had reached as to this witness. If you lliew that as
interfering oh well fine and dandy but I stand by my decision, and I stand by my authority as a supervisor, lead
or whatewr you want to call to call me to reach that decision, which in reality was in fa~.Ur of the defense
because I do not know if he will be called or not. You yourself was called by the prosecutor in this case to
1 reach decisions, and you yourself reached conservatiw decisions and did not agree to anything. After you told
me as to what you did, I did not ewn bother contacting the State at all, ewn though a ~.Uice message had
been left on my cell, and look as to the big issue we litigated. I do not haw a personal problem with any of the
attorneys or legal assistants calling or telling any witness that he or she is not released until the lawyer
assigned gets to decided himself or herself.
As I haw done in the past and will do in the future I always treasure the input of the entire team, and I do not
haw any personal issues with people interfering with any of the final decisions or telling me directly what to
do or people taking the initiatiw of asking me to ask for inwstigations to be done, or people taking the initatiw
to suggest issues to research and the like. My self esteem is wry secured within me. My personal opinion is
'I that interference at least at my lewl decisions, makes my final decisions a lot easier to resolw because I can
use the input of great legal minds, and the inwstigators' minds, as opposed to just my mind. On Friday last,
before we met, and at 4 1/2 p.m. and in front of all of you, and based on comments by the judge that he later
found out of character, I told the judge that I was mentally and physically exhausted and I could not ewn think
further. If you want to know the truth or ewn care to know it, the whole courtroom was spinning on me, I was
about to throw up by all the ellidence, I was s~en the judge'~ face and all of your faces double?· ~ere at the
I last minutes of my last cross I was absent m1nded and the JUdge had to asked me at least tw1ce 1f I had
I questions. The presssure of me halling to face all that bad ellidence introduced on Friday and cross the
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wnnesses as to an ot mat e111aence In me presence ot tne JUry, was oveiWnelmmg, partiCUiany smce 1 Know
some detailed facts that none of you really know, or care probably know. It is tough when you hale kowledge
but yet you have to attempt to contest those facts. I hope you will never have to endure that. I take the
, responsibility for all the blunders and mistakes, and the extra questions that I should not have asked during
1
the guilt phase crosses or arguments, but I can tell you that it did not really help much to hear some of you
1
talking about it during the actual trial. This is not gossip, I hear them myself because the comments were
i made without checking around as to who was hearing, and unfortunately I was one of the persons.
I[ - Notwithstanding my level of exhaustion on Friday, you, Rob, MB, (later Chris and Betty) requested a
i meeting because all of you wanted to participate in decisions I would make as to what to present during the
defense's guilt phase. Rob announced and gave me the directions in court that the meeting will be at 5 and 1
I nodded in agreement. Immediately after that decision was made, I rushed into the office and requested, not
i requested I demanded, that Faye provide me with the list of witnesses subpoenaed. There was a long list.
. Witnesses have been subpoenaed by me prior to trial, some during the actual trial, and some had been
I subpoenaed at your suggestion that we introduce evidence. Faye wanted to be present so her job as to who to
I release or not could be easier. Also during that short break I had, decisions were made on the spot
I concerning the video testimony of Meg Martin, and I remember receiving the directions from Julie to be at my
I home at 1 p.m. on Saturday. Only one member of the team ,Chris, hurriedly came into my office concerned
II
about my health and started repeatedly suggesting, ordering me, to take a 24 hour break.
I -At the meeting, and one by one I told each of you what evidence each of the witnesses will bring to the case
and then I opened for discussion the witness, the evidence and I took the 1o0te from all of you. One by one, the
I
. majority decision was that we release the witness and I did. The defense's guilt phase was left with one
i' witness, Adina Schwartz. Rob loOted to introduce the witness to perfect the appeal. MB appeared neutral.
[ You 1o0ted against it. I sided with Rob. Therefore by majority decision, that testimony that you worked so hard
I to secure, will be introduced or proffered, and then the defense will rest.
1-so I say to you Paula. Thank you so very much for all of the help and all you do as a friend of mine. Thank
you for doing the cross of the two witnesses. Thank you for researching the three issues and presenting the
I two big issues in court. And thank you any other input that you may have given me and/or Rob. But having
I said that, you owe me a big apology because I have not interfered with anything you or Rob hale done. If you
I take offense simply because I said to Rob why was Deicher lawyering up, I could care less. I heard Rob at a
i general meeting of the team saying something about his lawyering up. The issue of Deicher subpoena came to
me as a supervisor, lead or whatever name you want to affix to me on Friday. And I was merely suggesting
maybe additional research. You know, contrary to what you may or may not think, trial lawyers also have
good ideas sometimes. Again, I expect an apology from you. And I do not care if you disagree with my offering
Rob assistance. If he wants my input I will be ready, if he does not want it, that is okay as well. My job will be
done tomorrow. I have lot of other things I have to start doing and preparing starting Monday when I finish my
part and I intend to bring my notebook and start typing and sending investigative requests in order to prepare
. the death penalty case that Hankinson scheduled for March, the death penalty case scheduled for trial in July
and the huge hearing that I am hoping will result in the actual bar to the death penalty on April 8.
, P.S. I have relaxed this weekend. I slept all day Saturday and half a day today. Yesterday was good. I got
up only to feed Mischa when she barked and barked at me and I went back to bed. Today, I hale finally
started calling all of my family and my Jessica to say hello. There is no preparation to do in the motion for
judgment of acquittal. My closing argument will be very short and I will refer back to my examples during jury
selection as many of you have suggested. And I am reviewing the jury instructions as well.
phase lawyers take over. It's been two long, painful weeks, and you need to chill now, as difficult as that
II may be.
I 1 Paula
'
I On Fri, Feb 11, 2011 at 11:17 PM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com> wrote:
· I Rob- As you can see it is almost 11 and I cannot still sit down and relax. My head is still spinning around
I and naturally now my mind is shifting about the penalty phase and I am sorry we could not sit and
I
, discuss it today as you all wanted to discuss what was coming next during the guilt phase. Thanks all for
I•
I I your willingness to arrange a meeting and all the guidance that you provided.
! I I
I I seem to remember that you mentioned to me about a month ago that Deicher- one our crucial witness, if
I not the most crucial, was lawyering up. Lawyering up as to what?
, I
I !1 thought the fifth amendment only applies to criminal charges and not to him under the circumstances, as
I I know them and as you I think you related to me.
I ! II
I '
1. He cannot lawyer up and refuse to honor our subpoena because you obtained a properly issued
subpoena and he has been declared to be a material witness by both our court and the georgia court,
I right? So the subpoena is duly served, so he cannot lawyer up as to that.
12. He cannot lawyer up as to anything dealing with his license because he already settled that issue with
, his licensing board in georgia and he was publicly reprimanded, and that reprimand was published. I doubt
I I it Georgia can open up another investigation based on the same fact scenario as already considered. The
I I I1 issue of his treatment of the client has been resolved.
1 3. There are no wrongful death or medical malpractice cases pending against him, but even ifthey were
II I. he cannot claim a fifth amendment and in fact he would be subject to depositions, etc. So the right to
I ! i lawyer up does not attach here. Or does it?
,I I 4. So I think I missing part of the facts here. Because I probably am, and you had to leave the meeting
I I
. I I and
I did not want to talk about the penalty phase today, and we did not address the subpoena to Deicher,
I I I have requested that Faye contact Deicher immediately to tell him that he will not be released from our
!
II I1 subpoena, period until we have the opportunity, you and I to discuss this issue.
I 5. Am I missing something here? As lead counsel, I am still responsible for the whole scenario, but I want
II i to pause to thank you so very much for all your help in filing the boiler plate death penalty motions that
' II 'I requires so much time to just sit and sort out, plus all other motions that you have filed , plus preparing
the 4 experts , plus preparing all other death penalty phase witnesses, plus and plus and plus. I am
I1 starting to reel the stress that you must be going through, wow.
I 6. The reprimand order only mentions a G. H. Is that sufficient to connect our GH to the GH there? How
I i 1 can Deicher lawyer up to come to court and acknowledge that our GH was his client?
I
I . Like I say, i think i have insufficient facts and would like to discuss this and the death penalty case
I I Istrategy with you at your earliest convenience .
., P .S. Please also know that I am available to assist you in anyway that you deem appropriate. If you wish
me to contact any witnesses or do any scheduling this Sunday, I will be glad to assist. My plan is to be
II completely prepared as to your lay witnesses anyways and as to all the witnesses, i think you listed 25,
, so that when I am sitting in court and you need any assistance, or ask any consultation with the derense
I table, I can at least pass notes and the like - I will be very discreet as to not to give the appearance that I
I am participating for credibility purposes. I am sure Paula also will be very discreet as to not make it
I apparent that we are participating in the scenario, although at this point, all this credibility stand is just
I that a stand because the jury knows we all know the facts. Also, I want to offer you any assistance that
you might need in doing whatever research you want me to do during the midst of your penalty phase,
I even if u wish me to start right now. My closing argument as to the guilt phase is no stress situation . It
1 will be short and to the point. So please let me know, how I may assist you. I will be willing to come in
. this Saturday and Sunday to assist you in any way possible. Please let me know.
-thanks.
I
I
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Dear Nancy - Afer I talked to you about the possibility of capital moving to the little building
accross the street, and the offiCe's rationale that it will be good because we do not have clients
visiting, i went and looked at the place just to see if i could be objective. The offices were closed
and all i could hear were kids yelling and screaming. Is there a nursing school downstairs? It
was extremely hard with my hurt foot to step every single step up and down to get to
the office space. MB thought it was even crazy for me to go with the amount of pain i was having
but I told her that this is what i needed to do my health notwishstanding.
1. My whole staff declines and objects to the move because we want and like our existing offices
and nothing there compares to what we have. It will be a demotion for us to go there since we do
now get paid for what we do. We view our offices as a small privilege or at least I do since I
have in my opinion, handled the job of two lawyers for three years, the office knows about it
and not once i have been praised for the job I do, All i have received from the office for the last
three years are put downs and even insinuaitions that I am mentally ill. I think I am beginning to
believe that i must be mentally ill to handle capital cases alone for over three years now and
successfully in my opinion, i am sure not yours. We view our offices as privileges.
2. Faye and now I have health issues with walking up the stairs. While those issues do not
interfere with our job right now, it is very unfair for you to require us to go up stairs. As you said
to me, today, the last time you sprained your foot, you had problems for six months. I am in no
way conceding that my foot problem affects my ability to be a good lawyer. I am only saying that
walking up the stairs carrying a couple of boxes full might be something that my doctor will not
approve and if my doctor does not approve it, i guess the issue will be for theoffice to dismiss me
because i cannot walk properly with boxes up some stairs , or keep me at the existing place. I
intend to get a doctor's excuse because lately I feel, as much of the rest of the staff does, that the
main purpose of the office is to get rid of us the hard working people and specially the ones that
do not for some reason or another do not fall in the the good graces of Mr. Tomasino.
3. There is not an elevator in that building. We deal with hundreds of documents that all of us
take home with us. I frankly think it will be unfair that you order me to carry three boxes full all the
way down and then up to the office. I have a hurt foot, but also I do not want to have a hurt back,
neither do i want to trip and fall downstairs, God forbid, !that I fall and break my hip or something
like that. I do not think the office will be willing to take on that responsibility, simply because
someone suggested that capital go to somewhere. I was surprised but not appalled surprise, that
when I discussed this issue your only concern was of clients needing special accommodations. I
guess if I cannot carry stuff home, i suppose the office is willing to hire another lawyer to help in
capital.
4. Your rationale for capital moving there is because we do not have clients to visit. If that is the
rationale, frankly, you have lots of stfaff that you can move there. For example. You can send
Tomassino, Lori, sharon Fernandez and the intake over there because they never have to see
clients either. In fact that will be the ideal place for them because they finish their job everyday
and they get to go home and relax and not worry about anything but the next set of bills the next
day.
5. Appeals likewise never ever sees a client. So you can send the appellate section there. In
fact, there are many appellate lawyers there already. Misdemeanors only go to court once a
month now. All clients can go there to visit. For the ones that you will be worry to accommdate
because no elevator, which i am sure will be one in a 1000, the lawyer can come to the main
conference room and talk to the client.
The issue as I see it and as the rummor has been going on for over a month now, is that Your
Administrator does not want to see Capital to be around the main office. While I respect your
selection of your administrator and his desire to remove people from the office that he does not
920
like (which he has been sucessfullatery), I do believe that instead of removing capital from the
main office, it will be an excelent idea tot remove him from the main office. Think about it. John
then will have the ability to have two or three or even four computers going at the same time so
that he can track down all the emails that we all receive and send, plus he will have the time to
devote to decide what other technology he will like to bring into the office or which harding
working people he wants to get rid of the office. Lori on the other hand, who is the one that is
responsible for the budget in its totality, will have a quiet time to pay the bills in the office. Their
job is a 8 hour at the most job each day. Unlike me that works 12 and 14 hours a day, they do not
have to carry boxes down to review each night at home. I object to the move..
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Mail Calendar Documents Sites Video more "" merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com I£. I
Bordt
Brundidge
.· ines SubertQ me, Betty, Faye [R;PiYf-j·.
show details 9/14/10
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aflermuchthOiJ~hl; lhl;lloedecidecl.to ask the office to. tender the
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will a be lqt happier. Please_ give me your input.
· ·
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Merribeth Bohanan
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supervision
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
1 message
alter much thought, I have decided to ask the office to tender the superusion of the capital unit to somebody
else. I have tried my best to be a good superusor to no avail. Maybe if you get Tomassino as a superusor, you
will be a lot happier. Please give me your input. Thanks
923
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2/21/2011 Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
supervision
1 message
after much thought, I haw decided to ask the office to tender the supervision of the capital unit to somebody
else. I haw tried my best to be a good supervisor to no avail. Maybe if you get Tomassino as a supervisor, you
will be a lot happier. Please giw me your input. Thanks
924
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Maii" Calendar Documents Sites Video more v merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com I & I
Compose Mail Reuters: Oddly Enough -Suspended teacl>er defends critical IJiog - 4 days ago
lnbox (1)
<<Back to "Misc"[Remove label "Mise" -~;p;;;tspam [ ~le~;-1 '·------·-'·-·-·---~-
Starred [.. f%r.i a6ti 8ns 1
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All Mail Re: Appreciation lunch Mise x
Bordt ' .· Setty Fuentes to lnes, me,. Chris show details 9/3/10 j Reply [ -]
·------ ..-,
Brundidge ai,Y~tiere is fine
.
._: .:,·-·... -:.
Cha~.ez
Compose Mail Engadget- NEC's MEDII-IS N-04C is only 7.7rnm thick. has Android 2.2. I~FC. and rWeb Clip < >
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_ . _s_ Suber to I show details 9/29/10 I -RePIYT~i- Turn off highlighting
Brundidge . · j~stfor your eyes
II .to cany three boxes full all the way down and then up to
. the office. I haw a hurt foot, but also I do not want to
ha~oe a hurt back, neither do i want to trip and.fall
. i:fpWnstairs, God forbid, llhal I fall and break my hip or
~orrjething like that. I do not think the office will be
wi!liqg to take on that responsibility, simply because
.'som.,;one suggested that capital go to somewhere. I
' \/,(as s~rprised but not appalled surprise, that when I
disou~sed this issue your only concern was of clients
: rieel:!ing special accommodations. I guess if I cannot
•• :'c~@''stuff home, i suppose the office is willing to hire
·, · a~bHier lawyer to help in capitaL
L~-·~J
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2/21/2011 Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
Mail Calendar Documents Sites Video more v merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com 1 J, 1
I'~
!l_ had it . .
______________________________________ J
, I-·-·---··--
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the Web
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Bordt · Be show details Feb 13 17 davs aaol Reply I
Brundidge Betty Fuentes
Cha~z betty. fuentes@·i'Jpcl2. com
= Closed or Transfered
CMC's
Computer info.
Hanner ~~ Enili~L Chat j Video & more ·.
Hilton -<mes.s.uoerlO,!npa..:.com"
Lane [)l,itt:FFebruary 13, 2011 9:26:45 PM EST
McGriff To: Bf)tty Fuentes
·. ~betty.fuehtes@flpd2.com>
McMillian · ~l!Pl~l?t: Re: I've had it
Mise
15 more..-
~efty. Jstal),<jby yoiJ, It v.fillbe different
. once u, MB arid I work it.
Contacts
. ~f)cj~lj~~~ll thr¢~ of ~.s ha~ a heart.
Tasks - . f!ang il') there. Yi)u ran absolute
!;l~sE1t td tile capii~l. 4nite~n when we
Chat d!!!~grf)e on things @d vye ta~f)
.. stab~ <Jleach,other,. :t_halol:lJhe highest
ISearch, add, or invite I
!_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
· /espE:c:fi9r:y()G~n~.'·,ow _-. ·-· _···. ·
Merribeth Bohanan . -····-•·>..•.. y()ufpf3~pna]itY an~yqur ~eart. It is
. '·''. •· .•..afff)Otirig (he a~Wf)JJ dE1eply
Invisible
... @!yg~ c~h. see.~y th~. ~mail~ the total
:You are invisible. ft-agmeWitiprr qfthe <Mensa, - ·
'Go visible
Gall phone
• on~/13!1~···seity ~Jentf)~.-·
.:bettyJuentes@fipd2.com> wrote:
~\9iybr1e
Jennifer Turner
.I know is sick of
Lori Hocking
all-these e-inails back and
Tread softly because ... forth, so I will make
Nicole Jamieson
Sounds like buying st.. it quick; I just want to tell
Sharon Fernandez elol:)ryone that it will take a
!1m not a\1\tah:e: tr~f later riiirade for rrtll. ·
Anthony Perez to e~r work. Mitigation
Dancing Bull again.
.. As I. sit here oh a 930
r.hri<: P.llrir.h ~ltnrl:!l.\1 ninht nrl!t.n:::.rinn
https:f/mail.google.com/mail/?rlz~ 1R6... 1/1
2/21/2011 Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
revocation of contract
1 message
After Dr. Prichard testified as he did in our Hilton case, I am requesting that the office se~oer all ties with this
psychologist. He came to the courtroom and simply was llicious. He had not factual basis for his opinions , he
had not examined the client, and came to court ant said client was a bad guy without tests and facts. That is
pretty bad and exbits his \lias ... So sorry, I sit here I see no excuse for testifying as the did did except for
money and that makes this potential expert ~oery questinnable. Do no use him
931
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Compose Mail BusinessWeek.com --Top News -Swag: 1l1e Currency of Hollywood- 2 days ago
In box to "Mise" I Re~-;;;eJ.ilieJ "Mi;~;; Reportspam] Delete'] I,_________
Starred
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Mi>Waciiof1s I -··- .... ...JL........c.....;::
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Bordt
Brundidge
Chavez
.:\\{":~ . ·-'i:~D:·-, . . : ·
Merribeth Bohanan · '• Jlie'!3,!lilt Phase comes before the Penalty Phase. Adding Jury
Invisible . •$.~1~i@>n if we are able to pick a jury it will probably be end of February
\-~?to~~ we
address the Penaliy phase.
-··: :· . r . . . -
You are invisible.
Go visible :-~~-~;~body
is questioning your work ethics. I never had questioned
Call phone . ttjpse{ ·I did write a merna to Nancy bringing to her attention what I
· Jennifer Turner
..per<\&i~ a division in the representation of Mr. Hilton, because I Still feel
··••·.lh~t:Way. The idea was to divide what we au· be doihg but the idea was
· Lori Hocking ' ftii@r'tb be territorial about what each of us is called to do for the client.
Tread softly because ...
Nicole Jamieson ' , C(d'i~JlOt corn plain about your work ethics and I never said you did not
Sounds lii(e buying st.. · :.workhard, since, the penalty phase was build up based on all of your
Sharon Fernandez <.' b'on\act with the witnesses and also in your suggestion that we do the
I'm not awake, try later ' p~fl!~ah, rny following your recommendation which was not initially
•.• reb~i\,ed to good of an idea and finally turning to be the gist of the
Anthony Perez
. ij?~\iafty phase. You ere also very instrumental in getting the Deicher
Dancing Bull ··. · qrder'which is the nurnber one stuff in our facorin the case. 933
r.hri<: P.llrir.h
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Compose Mail Reuters: Oddly Enough -Suspended teacher defends critical blog- 4 days ago
In box
(( Back to "Mise" j_Remov:_ laber.::_r,_isc'' rR~~rt s_r;;;;;TDelet~] '·-·------..'--·-·----;:.
Starred
r -·• rybre actibns l
Sent Mail
Drafts
All Mail Interviewing witnesses Mise x
Bard! ' , E!~tty Fuentes to Nancy:fnes: R show details Jan 28 l__~eply J~:=.:J
Brundidge
[\pparer~tly there was someissue with me saying that I could not ,I
Chawz ih!¢nnE!v:J witpes~es .. I am really so sick of this petty stuff. For
- Closed or Transfered .. ~h'yqj:l~v,rho <iuestiqn my War~ habits: ·
-...,.,.,.
·:,.":··
CMC's
. ~~§~~4-Jhrougry the holidliys inclyt:fing days when e~ryone else was on
Computer info. vacation. ·_ · · ·· · · ·-
Hanner
Hilton
~~~tM9f1day when we had a holiday I was interviewing the snitch.
Lane 'lhl,lrs(ja}d work With my son sick until I had to take him to the
McGriff
My:sorlcqnti[lues to be on. be rest <JOd I haw left him alone to work.
McMillian
Mise 1 nMf"Thllr5day rwas looking at videos we hax.e hadtorewr and no one
15 more ... .ha~·seen them. Luckly finding one we will be using in penalty.
Chat ~~'IJ int~~ showerbruiied IllY shOulder and bled in my arm. Woke up
'i:l\5:30
..,, and went to Miarni to· ihtennew wiiness.
·, ISe~~h, add, or invit~ _j . ,~,- •.: ''
Merribeth Bohanan
I':M9'\i~~rt
\¥iii{
was beating f!iiu1y frOm alfthe things that I haw been dealing
<,· .. ·· . . .·•·... ·· .. .
Invisible
You are imnsible.
1•. ~~nklyiji is ridipulous that I haw_ to wriie this.
:Go visible
Call phone
Jennifer Turner
. ·-~- J:~R~·e~pjly:._·~~-~R:':;e~p~ly::t~o~a~II:__~F~o~rW~a~rd~-'-~Betty
: i_,•
••, ••.. is not available to chat
[_.______________________j
Lori Hocking
Tread softly because ...
Nicole Jamieson
Sounds like buying st.. ~---~--------------------'
I
Sharon Fernandez
I'm not awake, try later « Back to "Mise" [ Remove la~~!..:~~sc"J R~port spam j Delete J
Anthony Perez I 0:>r~ ~~~-J .
Dancing Bull
r.hriR P.llrir:h
934
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2/21/2011 Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
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'!label: mise
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I [ Search Mail II' si;'arch the Web)
Compose Mail Reed items from any RSS or Atom feed right here. CwPublic Defender, 2nd Judicial i
In box « Back to "Mise" I ~rijq~e l~bei "1\".is<.;" l Report spam UJ:tete ·I
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Contacts
Tasks
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Compose Mail ESPN.corn -LeBron hits triple-double, l<obe MVI0 in West win- 8 hours a[Jo
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All Mail Re: mandatory meeting on Monday Mise x
Bordt ., f~~~sub~rtoB~tty show details Jan 21 ~=-Re~~LJ
Brundidge 'tkho\'f Lfeel the same way although in addition to meeting we all are I
Cha\l'lZ . \'fdrl<ing as well. bummer!!! We will all celebrate wh.en we are done
- Closed or Transfered ~!J~ ~~~- pac:;k to norf11al qapital cas~s ..•... I wiU a neat way for all of us
tQ q~I~J:l.r~te ai\dalioftha'tgood stuff.~. And yes, Paula ... they do ha\l'l
CMC's
:· .a la\r&(lr$ ic)unge in fhe cou~housewhef(l we can celebrate afterwards
Computer info. ·. .· win 6r!t?§~ ill style ... 'Nith wine andbeer and champagne like we did.
Hanner 1 it is()~ it)e fist_floor~·· .. asfaras meetings, this is the last of the
.·· ... rf1oHicans .·or is iimohikans ..•.:.as rar as lam concerned. Probably will
Hilton
me~!jndj\oidually from nci'N ori. See you Monday at 3.... I hope your
Lane so.h)5.doillg bett(lr. I still ha'-l'l wry sharp pains that haw kept me
McGriff arrl
. d§#!'i bQ\ i det(lrrnined not t.o let sharp stomach pains and nausea
McMillian .. ~nd t\~ac:l.~th(ls distr,~ct .rf1~: ....• ,.,;ouch .........• it easy say than done.
.. Qr'ffi:~an?1. ?011.?t7:,qOAM, B~tty Fuentes .
Mise ' <betty.fuentes@flpd2.bom> wrote: .
15 more" <.! R.ea!ly? I thinK We're meeting more t.han working.
j:l:'.:•:•:·c
Contacts .~,:·\·.·:_:_,::):>:_:;;'_-.:-~-:,.-... . . . . .·' .
Tasks
:r./ ~1S~n 20, 2011, at 12:31 PM, lries Suber <ines.suber@fipd2.com>
Chat :l'#fOt~. ·. . .
:ISearch, add,or-invite
~'---····---· ---'
( ; /~~A~r$wm be a mandatory meeting !hi!; coming Monday at 3.p.m. in
•..•..·• j@69ntereh~e room. Pl~asemake attempts to arriw promptly. I
Merribeth Bohanan .,. ' cl'ij! MriY a~()Utt~~ rate nbtice and any prior commitments that you
Invisible .rpigf1tha\.\3 but this meeting is very important. thanks.
-.. __,,,,
c_·-~~-~---J
Jennifer Tumer
Lori Hocking
Tread softly because ...
Nicole Jamieson
Sounds lil(e buying st.. ---·---- .,~----··
Sharon Fernandez
I'm not awal(e, try later «Back to "Mise" ~~~e ll!b~l~is~:_I_Rep·o~-~pam J DeJe_:eJ '·----------"-----
Anthony Perez !·M:lre' actions
Dancing Bull
r.hri" F>llrir.h 936
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Compose Mail ESPN.com -LeBron hits triple-double, l<obe MVf-' in West win- 8 hours ago
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All Mail Travis Peacock Mise x
Bordl r.. )!l~s Suber I~ Nancy, Andy show details Jan 13f Replyr1
Brundidge
Cha-.ez
•N~~W ~ I want to let you know that I prepared and filed a motion to
·· •ct:ihtiil\le Peacock and that I ha-.e requested the court to grant me a 15
- Closed or Transfered l'llfrillt€(1iearing on this motion. My motion is -.ery specific and clear
· <ti](fb~sically just focussed on the issues we discussed yesterday. I
CMC's
' dictp()(!Tlention in the motion anything about my request to the office
Computer info. · .cilr'Q.oi;t!wo months ago to reassign the case to allow another attorney
Hanner . t& ef!'~.cji-.ely represent Tra~s duling the upcoming hearing. Judging by
·• -Ji;~§k's.~mail yesterday as to my asking to agree for the continuance,
Hilton
• \IV(I.Iir:il.C::omments to me as to a short continuance in Hilton which I
Lane . tgl(:f y(JI.l about, and Hankinson's comments from the bench when he
McGriff . de[ij~c;l)he continuance in October, I think we need to regroup to see
McMillian
t\6W b~st to addres.s the issue of my going to the office administration
C:§!J6efiiing the caseload conflict. I am grateful that the office
Mise · r~Msigned 5 cases that were not death cases. Howe-.er, I am
15 more• toimented by the_ fact that I might need to tell the court or put on the
rebc'irdthat .I ha-.e asked the office to reassign the case because I low
' ; ':( \,·: _,_,:(. '::\ .,
,---~-~-,
Contacts rr\Y..pfliqe, I respect you .and Andy personally and all the people in my
Tasks ·.offle.~ (y.tith the exception of one) and I do not want anything negati-.e to
';\Beh{~id about the office during a court proceeding.
::\•: -,--.-,:',}'•',', ''\0· ., . .
Chat
;,1Yh~~-heen with the Office since 1987. I started in appeals, and
[search, add, or in~te J 'i h]p\!il(lto the trial di~sion around 1980. I belie-.e that I ha-.e handled all
-·---- ------ > d(tii~,~~s~s ~ssigned to me at any particular moment, to the
Merribeth Bohanan s~tisfa@on of the clients, myself and the office hopefully. In my 23 or
Invisible ' lll<ir~'Y¢13rs with the office I ha-.e ne-.er neglected to handle anything.
;.;$J~qe{y0 u put me in the capital unit, all of the death cases ha-.e been
•You are in~sible. , naficti¢d to the satisfaction of the clients, and all the people in1o0l-.ed in
•Go ~sible >
lh~~hiiare l/f3ry proud of our results. No judge has complained to you
Call phone ;iil,iqtit !rw perfonnance in court or my failure to prepare or nothing like
·
th~t. '1\Jo clients of mine ha-.e e-.er come to you or the office to
Jennifer Turner
Lori Hocking
.s8mri@im that I am not representing them properly and in my 25 years
lj~:al] attorney if two clients ha-.e complained about me to the Florida
Tread soffly because ... Bar;
will be considered too many . No client of mine has e-.er come to
Nicole Jamieson · ihe (:burt to say that I am neglecting them in my performance or that I
Sounds lil<e buying st.. hl;IWl hot prepared their case. The office has neliar indicated to me that
Sharon Fernandez I had neglected my job or that I ha-.e not produced. The cases ha-.e
I'm not awake, try later . bg¢ri h~ndled timely, within the time frame at least, that any capital
·• •base sHould be handled. There is back logs in the assignments to the
Anthony Perez
. ·~nit.• Hilton is the oldest case we ha-.e, and of the cases transferred
Dancing 8 u!l W~r~ ~lati-.ely new cases, with the exception of Dominic Hill which was
r.hri.~=: Allrir.:h :::' _ .,:;. ·:·_ ~ .r..• •. ___ .. _ u . . -• __ ...... --- _ .. _. - __ - 937
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Compose Mail Engadget- Panasonic's HV200 portable ·rv is controlled with a wave of the hand - 8
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All Mail update Mise x
Bordt .. ln~sSubertoRobert, Paula, showdetails-12/19/10 L~eply __[_ J
Brundidge Ro~ -Ineed to update you as to what happened December 10. jl
Chawz p.~Se,rilber ~ 0 w~ h~d ~ hearing on the Demo.crat's motion to unseal
= Closed or Transfered
CMC's
. sewral mottons tn hmtne that had been filed tn the case. I had also
. fil~q a motion to close pretrial hearings dealing with motions in limine
'a~!JJhe ellidence. The motions to unseal by the Democrat and WCTV
Computer info. ha<:fbeen originally scheduled for December 22 but Jessica wanted me
Hanner ·. tq gqto Tampa on December 21 and I was trying my best to
' ·. aq~O~[TJOdate. her as well, so I conllinced Mike, Kellin and Georgia to
Hilton
' · h~~ tij13 hearing mowd to December 10. At the request of the
Lane q~rn.c:ii;fat, and because all the parties thought that we ought to address
McGriff ' Jh~ ql()$ure oft he hearings together with the motions to unseal since
l)
·· ll4roua!lt to the Democrat and WCTV, the defense has to demonstrate
McMillian
un~erLewis and McCrary that the closure and sealing of motions was
Mise ·.• '$jili'hecesary, i wrote and filed the motion to close the pretrial hearings
15 more" a~ W~JI. That is the 37 page motion that I filed in the case (which
. fl~lpf)d ine finish the motion for a change ofwnue, ha! finally!!)
Contacts
Tasks '''l]llcijfiilge as usual Was an absolute jerk, but maybe I was the jerk. ·In
' li!Oy, 6{.ei1t, and regardless and as predicted, the defense is going to
Chat ha~ h.orrible time with this judge and we need to be on our toes to see
at
if aily time we can file a motion to recuse him. I haw a copy of the
: [search, add, or inVI_·te_ _j eriti[~ li(')aring on CD if you care to hear the judge. Nancy suggested
th~flg~t a copy to see how nasty he was, i did get a copy, but it is
Merribeth Bohanan ' ~~rleq ~omewhere on my desk because that is the least of my worries
Invisible ··..:~ttb!s point; although writing this update to you has brought to mind if
.:: \1.(~)1~~ sufficient grounds to mow to recuse him now, and if so, the
You are inllisible. >ffi()tioil is due tomorrow!!!.
'Go visible
Call phone .it~tJW~ys,
tbafti&
<···
the judge unsealed sewral motions ... and one of the motions
tmsealed was the motion that you prepared under Frye dealing
Jennifer Tumer
: \i.fith.t~etool mark. When I asked him to reconsider and tried to
Lori Hocking . appfda9h the bench to point to the part that was important, he basically
Tread softly because ... ·. yeiiMiat me and told him to get away from him. Ha!
Nicole Jamieson
Sounds lil\e buying st.. ''iJ.li~{iswhat the judge said during the December 10 hearing- going on
Sharon Fernandez t\'iy ~(:)gollection
··:·:;·:,':'.,:'':
.
I'm not awal1e, try later
•· ~ifYbucto not want mo!ions unsealed...... do not file them
Anthony Perez
-1 c~nnot beliew that the state would not stipulate to some of these
Dancing Bull
mot'ions ... he did not say which ones.
r:hri~ P.llrir:h l.;.!lo.·. • ' · · - · · - · · · · . . • . £! . . . . . . . .: . . . . . . • ..t.o 938
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Compose Mail NYT Travel - European Airports Balk at Easing Ban on Uquids- 9 hours ago
Bordt ~,. · ln'es Suber to Robert, Paula, show details 12/19/10 l Reply j_J
Brundidge ~~~ -I need to update you as to what happened December 10.
Cha~.ez [)(3gefnber 10 we had a hearing on the Democrat's motion to unseal
= Closed or Transfered
CMC's
~~~@ motions in limine that had been filed in the case. I had also
:~le9.flrnotion to close pretrial hearings dealing with motions in limine
•, {a~d•tliere\oidence. The motions to unseal by the Democrat and WCTV
Computer info. 'h~'d b$en originally scheduled for December 22 but Jessica wanted me
Hanner ' i()~pJo Tampa on December 21 and I was trying my best to
§qc_iJI'llfnodate her as well, so I con\oinced Mike, Ke\oin and Georgia to
Hilton
. ti~l@the hearing mo~.ed to December 10. At the request of the
Lane d~f:n~)t)iat, and because all the parties thought that we ought to address
McGriff . Jh~'qle)sure of the hearings together with the motions to unseal since
McMillian puf5u~nt to the. Democrat and WCTV, the defense has to demonstrate
. uhc:l~r}.ewis and McCrary that the closure and sealing of motions was
Mise stillhecesary, i wrote and filed the motion to close tile pretrial hearings
15 moreT .a$.WE!!I. That is the 37 page motion that I filed in the case (which
·~~lped me finish the motion for a change of venue, ha! finally!!)
Contacts
Tasks .: ·jt~·j~~ge as usual was an absolute jerk, but maybe I was the jerk. In
.·a~ye~ht, and regardless and as predicted, the defense is going to
Chat ·. • . h~j&· .1'\Prrible time with this judge and we need to be on our toes to see
.!riii! ~ny time we can file a motion to recuse him. I ha~.e a copy of the
~-~ear~~· add, or in\oite Jj . efitif¢ ~earing on CD if you care to hear the judge. Nancy suggested
·. Wf!t:J~(3t a copy Iosee how nasty he Was, i did get a copy, but it is
Merribeth Bohanan
Invisible
! ~.Urecl.~oniewhere on my desk because that is the least of my worries
•.: .~f'll'li§Ypoint; although writing this update to you has brought to mind if
····~~ila\)e sufficient grounds to move to recuse him now, and if so, the
.... fi'l8tib'ri
You are in\oisible. is due tomorrow!!!.
'. ' ;' ,,.~· '•:''
Go \oisible ·:..;.·. :;·/:;:·:·:·;"
Call phone : 'f,~yYJ~ys, the judge unsealed several motions ... and one of the motions
· .tH<~(@unsealed was the motion that you prepared under Frye dealing
Jennifer Turner
wl\~ th~ tool mark. When I asked him to reconsider and tried to
Lori Hocking 1
appr()ach the bench to point to the part that was. important, he basically
Tread softly because ... i · yeiled ~~ me and told him to get away from him. Hal
Compose Mail NYT Travel- Choice Tables: Flemisl1 Comfort Food in French Flanders- 1 day ago
In box « Back to "Mise" / Remove l~bel "~isc" /.Report spam l.~~~~--~ '--'-'-------'-~---
Starred ,- ~~e ~cticins _j
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All Mail Re: my work schedule during the holidays
Mise X Print all
Bordt
--------~--:;;:;-~
Brundidge Nancy Daniel show details 12/15/10 1_ ____'::1'~ ____1
Cha>ez l'tll ~h~oting for 2 p.m. tomorrow. I
- Closed or Transfered
CMC's '9FVV¢<f, Dec 15,_2010 at 4:52PM, Robert Friedman
<:robEirtJriedrilan@flpd2.com> wrote:.
Computer infb. ~ Pl(i (fveryone decide on a time yet? As I said, I'm
Hanner -_._ ~v;:iHable anytime
Hilton ::fihursday or Friday~
.,·>.·:;·.:,,.·.. : :
Lane
;.;.d!l\ilfed, Dec 15, 2010 at 2:03PM, Nancy Daniels
McGriff '';j,:nat1cy.Cianiels@flpd2:corn> ·
McMillian ,__-;_;;,wrote:
·:.,
>>'"• ·: ..;
< i:-:•,- .-· : . .'•. . ·' . .. .
·.. :'>'I would like to haw a meeting of the capital team to
15 morev :. di~de ~P the
>.> _fe~popsibilities for the Hilton trial once and fbr all
Contacts before ihe end
Tasks .• :0?-.<.\fthisweek._l tllink this-is necessary so that
'e~ryqn~ can focus on
Chat ' . ~~-iJ~~irresponsibilities and prepare adequately for the
' Wi~l. J could _ _ •-_- _. · -
§arch,!_dd, or imlite J ~?-'h~~ the meeting anyti111e tomorrow or after 1 p.m .
.:,0:6fri~ay, Please · __ _. ·•
Merribeth Bohanan
,'?,¥:QEifpack with me-and let rile know when you are
im~sib!e - 'llvaiiabie. ·
/label:misc
L-·-~--------·---·-·-----------····-·--··---·-f
! !Se;;;;;h ~ill
·--··"------
I
rsearch the Web ;:::':::\ic'd
-·--·---
Compose Mail l"(euters: Oddly Enough -Clown Brazilian congressman messes up first \Ole- 4
In box « Back to "Mise" / Remove labei"Misc'1 Report spam / ?<'le~J '-'-'-'-~----'L'----~.
Starred · · / 0:'re
actions -~
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Print all
Bordt . lnes Suber to show details 12/15/10-L__Repiy·-·1 ~J
Brundidge .·: y;ei,; youare entitled to take your time off 12/28, 12/29
-
Cha~.ez
Closed or Transfered
. and 12/30 as well as the rest of that week. You also
.· h~~d tci rest I
CMC's
}.§A\t\f:d, Dt;JcJ5, 2010 at 2:p6 PM, Merribeth Bohanan
Computer info. . • <:,fll$~ribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com> wrote:
Hanner . L!ne,s, · · ·
Hilton
··r,:llnqerstand your riot wanting to deal with this while
Lane
McGriff
I Y9Y are away. I wlll behappy to handle whatewr I
I f<:l~ while you are out. ·
. McMillian
.· •. ,8?W$ver, I washoping to take the following three
Mise ~ays off: . 12/28, 12/29 and 12/30.
15 more ... 1
.,lf~eems friJmJack's email that he is ok to hold off
Contacts < ,•~iitif January but w$ will se~ - I will handle any and all
Tasks . ·': ..{hirigs
-. ,., . --
here in the office
.,
but for those three days.
Compose Mail ESP!~. com -Caroline \Nozniacld eases past Svdlana f\uznetsova of Russia to win
In box « Back to "Mise" I R~riJqv~ la~el ;,Mi~c'' I Report spafll_l Delet~-~
Starred l.:c¥''~ a2ti;ns 1 ----
Sent Mail
Drafts
All Mail Re: Hilton matters. Mise x
Bordt l~es Suber to Robert, me, Fe show detail.s 12f12f10
Brundidge .jb ~lie~bro~h i llle~lli io say fjrst we~k of january
~~~1~E~~~~b8~fJ~rn~ ~61~:R~·
Chavez
- Closed or Transfered
lryes, puber
CMC's . ~.
Computer info. •· ·,. !' ~~ @i)iii~ i$J~~IIy pfe$~~ring meto tell th~m why I cannot even
Hanner
Hilton
· l~~~rl~at~ei!Ydit~l[ifr~C~·~=k~ :idhb~e·~~:~:~. ~~~ea~~~i Je~~s 0 0
Lare.scfiedWedfoitheweel<sofbecernber 13 to the end of
Lane
McGriff
·. 'l ~Bd~~r:~M~~t8i~~J~~~i~11ha~l2~~~~!~!~~~~f~zne~:~ h:;:n
. . ! t~efi~\(.y~e~.~f.~~.S~!ll~~(.f~1.$(lttiisdown in the dumps as I see it
McMillian
I B~~J~mn. if i~ ce~n 9~ ?8P~! Jt~f:!'.Y. ?ar:J~?t see ~c:>~ my second chair
Mise 1 cannot handle hal]dle.that.dep()!;llion and test1mony also. I took
15 morev •· care of all oft he he~riligs that Were scheduled for December 21 and
22. So please whafis left?: December4 13 is tomorrow and 1will
·., -'i . . _'-"'·:·:."·,_.'_; • y.··· ·
.;~·c·.:".•;.-,--"' i" :·"-'(.'-.::- ,._ ·, _•. · ': :•; " , ·._ ,. ,- " , .· . _ . .
Contacts tel~~ ~are 9f)hat • Q.l3~eiTI~erl4 there is a depo that Rob can
· h§ln~le:.•... Opp~ 1. aiji $ort}'.he capf1ot handle because he is on
Tasks
~C:~tio~: •. Wh? ~l.~~l* .~pn~q!!!~lffqr qecember 14? December 15
Chat ·• qej:ioqf Fal~etti ~pj:iears tO be off. The other depos that. you wanted
t0sefiof'20 and tnerEis(ofthe time. after the end ()f the december,
[ Se_~_rch, add, or inlli~ Rbb wilrBe a61etp fia!ldl¢ becau~~ by tnat ume he wm be rested
•· #8~-J~kin~ tili;i q!f, ·pie~~~ a~llis~. • ·
'.·.-·;.
Merribeth Bohanan
., . < ·. : . > >
https://mail.google.com/mail/?rlz=1R6... 1/1
2/21/2011 Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
Mail Calendar Documents Sites Video more v merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com I .11
Compose Mail I'>JYT Travel- 13ool~s of The ·nmes: In His Own Words, a Singular Man's Double Life-
In box
Starred
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Drafts
New window
All Mail Hilton evidence tomorrow and next day
Mise X Print all
Bordt
Brundidge r. in~s Suber tor show details 12/7/10 I
Reply I =1
Chawz 1
. ( ~9'.68! bEllie~ it is E)SSe~tiiJI
for you to be at th;-_- - I
- Closed or Transfered . . e\!idE)Qt<E) viE)iNihQ t01110mJW or the lle)(t day. IJVe need to
CMC's ,t\se ourvalu~ble time ~ry smartly. Would you please
.-· -·· 4~El ~~~s,e _t\'JO days to ~nalize your motions as_ to the
Computer info. . Lane aggravalors? _I know you haw already done all of
Hanner t.tJ~ r¢~e.arch becau~:>e you spent I think weeks or some
Hilton __-.·. timi:! 0 rrthe project So maybe my Friday I will like to
Lane
a
. < hall!i draft. Thanks.
15 more" .-· So,'JY.,oUid like for you to after you finish your stuff on
•. l..apE)\"'hiqh sh()uld be.d<mebY Friday because you
Contacts ~9rki:id oh it fufa long period Of lime, to take the.file of
Tasks ·-~~H!:iryndidge_ar1q s~e ifwe haw the transcript of the
-·· · .-_leMwitniissios transcribE)d: 1llen, please set some
Chat depos for it. You can request the depos to be set in or
;_~f;g@.~.March. thank$~
L~ea~ch,_ad~ or invite
Al~6i ~~ide ft(i1T1 p;ericojn Lane.;. who else do we need
Merribeth Bohanan
to depp§e. ·_ I thil]k th.e _medic~! exah!iher.. · Please haw
Invisible .,,,......
tliatpepp.setfor
,_ .. ,., _,,, ...
__ -· - the first
. week
.',
of March. Thanks. MB
;You are invisible.
Go visible
••·¥~kg~~swel;; lam sure allofthiscan be
~(icbmpiished tqrrlorro»r a~d nextday. I am handling
· Call phone < .)~e hl:l~ring in Hilton Cll]dBprdt, so really tllere is
Jennifer Tumer .·.· hpthing'that you haw'iealiy pressing at the present
Lori Hocking
'tihi~- Thanks a whole bunch.
Tread softly because ...
Nicole Jamieson
Sounds li!<e buying st.. ,:.. ~R~--~~p~ly~··---~F~orw~·~a~rd~---l~n_:es~is:_:;not available to chat
t__.____________j
Sharon Femandez
I'm not awake, try later
_____________________ .I
Anthony Perez
Dancing Bull
943
;~~::~::,...,..._,.....:_
r.hri" F>llrir.h
https://mail.google.com/mail/?rlz= 1R6... 1/1
2/21/2011 Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
Mail Calendar Documents Sites Video more 1' merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com I J. I
Compose Mail NYT Global Home- Reform Lawyer Says Tunisia Risl\s !'lnarclw - 5 hours ago
lnbox «Back to "Mise" I Remove la~ei"Misc;' ] Report spam [!i.rete j ·~-----_j ___ _
Starred i.More aciipry~ . J
Sent Mail <Newer
Drafts
All Mail Hilton Mise x
.: -: ~· _-: _; j
Jennifer Tumer
Lori Hocking
Tread softly IJecause ...
Nicole Jamieson
Sounds like buying st..
J_· === ·=·
·.
Sharon Fernandez
I'm not awake, try later
<< Back to "Mise" [ Rem011~ labei"Misc" [ Report spam j Delete _[ .. _________,____
Anthony Perez r: War~ hc:!ions J
Dancing Bull
~hri~ Rllri~h 944
https://mail.google.com/mail/?rlz= 1R6 ... 1/1
L/LlfLUll Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
Mail Calendar Documents Sites Video more v merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com I J1, 1
L label:misc
I ,·-------.
' 1 Search Mail j Search the Web j·
---·---·------·----------···--·--·_j - - - - - - - - - - - -
I-··--·---<,
Compose Mail The Official Google Slog- Designing award-winning video games with Sl<etchUp- 3
lnbox
«Back to "Mise" ~ove labei~'Misc~eport sp~mJ-~Ie(e;-1 ·----·----'--~--
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Sent Mail
Drafts
All Mail Re: Today Mise x
Bordt --rnes Suber to me, Fay-e--~how details 11/8/10 l____~ep~T=I
Brundidge 1. Order on motion to continue Prim ... done.
Cha~ez 2. fY!aterials for DNA expert selected, letter done and gi~en to Faye
- Closed or Transfered 3. Transfer memo on Richardson done
CMC's
·,_.··_._f.•.· ¢hri-ections on Motions in Limirie 3,4,5 done.
. 5. Motion in Limine 6 - done
Computer info. 6. Mptibll in Limine 7- done
Hanner i .. Motion in Limine 8 - done
~- 'rvit;>,Hon in Limine 9- done
Hilton
9; fVlOtion in limine 10 done
Lane lqi rytq~i6n in Limine II done
McGriff 1J;,_pl:~paration for Fazio conference done
·.. ,Jf;··-~~)ection of menial health materials to be sent to Sesta, McClaren
McMillian
l!~cJ-9W~ -done
Mise . 13: J3E!quest for appointment with. Sesta from Rob done
15 more.., . <14; · Rgloiew and preparation of all DNA - done - Request for se!Vices
•h<l~ ~lieiJdY been done.
Contacts p.
.• 1 ~esearch as to how long DNA can remain on a cigarette - done
Tasks ·• · j9_:;~e;~ew of Evidence I and Evi.dence II done as to what I further need
to .be incorporated - done
Chat · 17:.·M~mo to Paula as to issues needed to be research done again
· ~rydre~ent
: J Search, add, or invite I ·'1Jh follow up with Andy as to status of his call to Jack Campbell in
' --·-·-------···~---
i )~~~~e;nqe; to Peacock - done
Merribeth Bohanan .····-1!): Analysis oftheSightings on Hilton- done
Invisible 2CJ: R~\liew and preparation of the materials as to dandy's hair done in
<. j:irepa~tion for teleconference meeting with expert tonite - done
·.••gt..:ReW~w and preparation of tool identification done in preparation for
;'ir)~~filig with expert this afternoon-" done
Call phone s· 22:' Follow up with Betty as to cqn~rsations with Argentina witnesses-
Jennifer Turner
;d8rM:'< ·
23;' "REquest from Chris to gather materials for Joyce in preparation for
Lori Hocking / r\-ioik:>J{Jrlimine as to statementsduring S!Jarch - done
Tread softly because ... )~{ R~~ew with Chris as to items that I Will like to see at FDLE -done
Nicole Jamieson fS:_,Update to Nancy as to the ~rejects accomplished- done
Sounds like buying st. z?> Careful rei.iew as to chain of custody as .io each item of ei.idence
Sharon Fernandez . ~one, _·
I'm not awake, try later ., .2ft. Jqi'y Questionnaire rei.iewed again -done
· f~- Ac!ditionai research as to the Change of Venue- done
Anthony Perez
3Q. Request that Chri.s prepare emotionally and factually to testify for
Dancing_Bull
h_:~~n~ _~~.t~.e ~n:'o~io_~. ?.~ _c~an_g~ of,~nu~~ ~~n~ , ,__ ·' '· __ , ___ , _·'
)'. th!l
r.hri!": Allrir.h
945
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3/8/2011 Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
Mail Calendar Documents Sites Video more T merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com I J& 1
Mail ESPN.com - Love breaks double-double mark but MaliS win - 2 hours ago
Contacts
Tasks «Back to "Mise" I Remove Jabei"Mi;~ .. /I Report spam Delete .lt...::.:::.::..::_L:=li}l
J More actions I
Compose mail
<Newer
In box New window
Starred
revocation of contract Mise x
Print all
Sent Mail lnes Suber to Nan show details Feb 19 J -R;p;y··--
Drafts
After Dr. Prichard testified as he did in our Hilton case, I am
All Mail requesting that the office sever all ties with this
psychologist. He came to the courtroom and simply was
Computer info.
vicious. He had not factual basis fbr his opinions , he had
Hilton not examined the client, and came to court ant said client
MH Clients was a bad guy without tests and facts. That is pretty bad
and ex bits his vias ... So sorry, I sit here I see no excuse
Mise
for testifying as the did did except for money and that
5 more .. makes this potential expert very questinnable. Do no use
him
Chat
Use free POP access to download your messages to Outlook or devices that support
946 1/1
https://mail.google.com/mail/?rlz=1R6 ...
3/8/2011 Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
Mail Calendar Documents Sites Video ~ l' merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com I! I
Mail Read items rrom any RSS or Atom feed right here. Custo1 Pubfic Defender, 2nd Judicial
Contacts
Tasks « Back to "Mise" \ Remove label "Misc~R;;f,-;;rt.p;;;-r[lef;te;--1 ' - - - - - L - f ,
~r~actions
In box
Starred
Re: Interviewing witnesses Mise x
Print all
Sent Mail lnes Suber to Bet! show details Jan 29 ~----R;piy--- .
Drafts
okay, we are wasting a lot of precious time with all this
All Mail bickering and emailing back and forth. Please disregard
my request that you assist me by contacting these wry
Computer info.
sensitiw witnesses. After all, since some of them
Hilton include the daughter in law, and personal rriends of Ms.
MH Clients Dunlap, I was hoping that indirectly we could maybe just
maybe get to the family. And you somehow haw a gift with
Mise
witnesses. I did not ewn get a chance to explain the
5 more .. assignment to you before all the complaining and bickering
started and the amount of work sitll to be done
Chat unleashed. Thus, I ha~.e decided that instead of going
back and forth writing unnecessary emails and wasting
/Search, add, or invite
precious time, and engaging in bickering and complaining,
I will do the assignment myself sometime ~.ery soon, at
Merribeth Bohanan
night after a jury selection session.. In that way all of rest
lnvlsHJ!e of our efforts can be concentrated on the many things that
all of us still need to do- and I know that we all ha~.e a
You are invisible.
tremendous amount of work yet to be done. I know I do,
Go visible
and I know you do too Betty. But I am confident that we
Call phone will all get through this e~.entually and we will celebrate
chris.ellrich when we will get the jury to recommend life. Thanks. P.S.
Jennifer Turner Paula, MB, Rob and the rest... what other things do you
Lori Hocking want to know about Ms. Dunlap wearing the beads. Check
out the brand new report of Annie White. I think part of
·rread soHiy because ...
discory tendered December 29, 2010.
Nicole Jamieson
Warning .. don't accide ...
Wow... the jury in~.estigation is cool. Remind me to tell
Sharon Fernandez Chris about the good job done but if you see him, let him
l'rn not awal<e. try later know because today Chris had a tough day with my million
Anthony Perez requests to. be in a million places at the same time. A
Dancing Bull tremendous amount of work! I am just going· o~.er the first
Geoff Fischer set of potential jurors. It is virtually one and half inchs
ernail help@flpd2.com thick.
Faye Darn
Also, I was able to get another table to beL shaped placed
Julie Hartwein
at the defense table so that all of us lawyers can ha~.e a
Zachary Lawton seaL As I indicated before, my proposal is that we put Mr.
Hilton in the middle, and that we sit on each side, playing
musical chairs when we ha~.e to present evidence. Wanted
to let you know that Chris already worked this out.
947
https:/jmail.google.com/mail/?rlz= 1R6... 1/1
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com> 1/
51
12
to me
I hate to upset the apple cart even further, but Betty just sounded
off at Andy and said she is not going to participate in the penalty
phase! I sent her an e-mail begging her to reconsider and asking her
to meet later -can you guys be available for that?
948
> individual or entity named. This e-mail may also contain Protected Legal
> Information. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient,
>or not entitled to access this protected legal information, you are hereby
>notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this
> communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this
> communication in error, please notify the sender by replying to the sender
> and then permanently delete this e-mail.
>
>
>
> Betty Fuentes
> Mitigation and Sentencing Specialist
> Office of the Public Defender
>Leon County, Florida (Tallahassee)
> (850) 606 1080 Office
> (850) 491 3593 Cell
> (850) 606 1004 Fax
> Betty.Fuentes@flpd2.com
>
>
L.
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com> 1/
51
12
to me
949
3/20/2017 Fwd: state of mind at the guilt phase- beth.bohanan@gmail.com- Gmail
label:hilton
Gmail More
--------
Friends
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Family to me
1218 Brafforton
Here is my two cents ... before all this started I said they will
Americano introduce the confession and we had to prepare for two different cases
the problem now is that we have fought the evidence as if he was not
CHP there or did not do it. If you change directions you would look
foolish and it will kill whatever chance we might have on the penalty
DFS
side. This is the problem when the defense is going against the
truth, or covering it up. I thought from the beginning that if we
went with that defense the state would be deflated and they would have
• Merribeth nothing. Now we are the ones deflated and looking foolish because they
have all this evidence in posters showing he was there. Frankly it's
tooooooo late .
• Betty Fuentes
>the judge was stupid to allow the search and transport tapes in. At this time, the<
the State has opened the door by the many out of contest statements that frankly <
whether it on behalfof the guilt or the penalty phase. It has been tough to deal witt
evidence of his mental state, and as such I would like to prove that he was impaired
D 950
https://mail.google.com/mail/u!O/?tab=wm#labei/Hilton/134ae637ffeebd4b 1/1
3/20/2017 Fwd: Bob Priester- beth.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmail
label:hilton
Friends
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Family to me
7/29/15
I'll let you know tomorrow.
1218 Brafforton
On Sat, Feb 5, 2011 at 11:40 AM, Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.c
Americana I talked to him today. He will be unable to attend the trial. He cannot travel. He
and apologetic. He was open to having his testimony perpetuated. Please let m
CHP me to hit up Georgia and or Eddie about this?.
DFS
I will of course prepare hirh for the testimony once the date is set.
• Merribeth r·+l
l-.. -"-.1
0
= Click here to Bm2!Y or Forward
• Betty Fuentes
D 951
htlps://mail.google.com/mail/u!O/?tab=wmfflabei/Hilton/134ae659c21b205c 1/1
3/20/2017 Fwd: non preservation of issue- beth.bohanan@gmail.com- Gmail
label:hilton
Gmail
Friends
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Family to me
Americana You do need rest and we need to move fOJward. What's done is done. I believe thE
this jury from the pool we had.
CHP Please don't waste time on another motion. let's get prepared for the witnesses on
DFS
On Wed, Feb 2, 2011 at 11:21 PM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com> wrote:
I Sorry but I feel strongly that we did not preserve the issue and I think we were mL
' cause because they had prior knowledge about the case, and put in he record thai
• Merribeth could tell that I wanted to exercise the peremptory, the last one that we had, and
more except that i did not ask for enough. I tried to consult with you as to how rr
Sorry Paula. I think tomorrow I will file a motion to Strike the Jury becasue tainte
• Betty Fuentes tainted ones.
As it has been my position, I am not prepared for this case. Yesterday we shined
almost lost my voice asking the same questions over and over again and while Rc
' bad. But I think the judge could tell because i will strike and then he will see all o
strike but i am simply sorry that i was not quick in asking for more than three chal
so confused that I was probably speaking in spanish and cussing. and also than~
extra bad for death penalty which was our main concern and elsie and harris said
few at the time or back to back, ad reichert that said that bundy was guilty and he
I will prepare the motion to strike tomorrow, I will put it on the docket to be heard
~:~~!asked to rest. I think he is finaly getting concerned about me. do not worry.
D 952
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/O/?trlb=wm#labei/Hillonl134ae68cc09c3d9a 111
3120/2017 Fwd: Interviewing witnesses beth.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmail
w
label:hilton
Friends
Merribeth Bohanan <merribetli.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Family to me
1218 Brafforton okay, we are wasting a lot of precious time with all this bickering and em ailing back:
daughter in law, and personal friends of Ms. Dunlap, I was hoping that indirectly w•
America no before all the complaining and bickering started and the amount of work sitll to be
bickering and complaining, I will do the assignment myself sometime very soon, at
CHP know that we all have a tremendous amount of work yet to be done. I know I do, an
life. Thanks. P.S. Paula, MB, Rob and the rest... what other things do you want tc
DFS
Wow.•. the jury investigation is cool. Remind me to tell Chris about the good job dor
tremendous amount of work! I am just going over the first set of potential jurors.
• Merribeth
Also, I was able to get another table to be L shaped placed at the defense table so
musical chairs when we have to present evidence. Wanted to let you know that Chr
• Betty Fuentes shoes ... (wow i do not know, now i am freaking out... maybe we can ask the state to
i am not sure about this.
The first part of the jury selection is the publicity part. I doubt it that Hankinson will
Betty to sit in a corner to take notes, but this is not Bateman's case, and I doubt tha
interruptions of any sort. In fact, even during the actual trial, you and Chris are not 1
ask you to do, No doubt. Betty- I will try my best not to ask you to do anything de;
always advanced suggestiions for the guilt phase which were great. I will miss your
This will be my last email on the issue. With me working over 19 hours a day, I nee
yes, it is extremely ridiculous that you even have to write this message sim
D I sent an email to you and asked if you could interview a couple· of family n
rather than him to secure the video.
953
https://mail.google.comlmaillu/OI?tat>=wm#labei/Hiltonl134ae6b4127d01e6 111
3/20/2017 Fwd: Vicky Rowe and Cleo Debag ~ beth.bohanan@gmail.com ~ Gmail
label:hilton
-------------------
Friends
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Family to me
1218 Brafforton I got Georgia to agree to stipulate to the predicate of the Cleo Debag GBI interview
Americana I got in touch with an investigator in the Tampa PD office and Faye is going to scan
object to perpetuating the videotape deposition but may object to its admissibility. (
CHP
c:~::J
DFS
• Betty Fuentes
1.1GB (7%) of 15GB used
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954
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3/20/2017 Fwd: our client- beth.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmail
lnes
Important FYI
Family This was entirely unnecessary and a distraction in the midst of trial. My only point "'
not discussed it with Rob. This is micro-managing.
Acquaintances
This has been a difficult and stressful case for all of us, most of all for you. I don't il
Following I'm glad you got some rest this weekend.
Paula
During the process of preparation, and investigation, I will be the first to agree I in
so that later on , we as a team, can make decisions based on what we know and
accomplished in a timely manner. It is only after the assigned projects have sat f<
has caused sore feelings at times, but I do not know of any other way to investig1
1
"lead" I do not know how else to handle assigrnents when people sit for 3 or 4 rr
because of other work related assignments. All people involved in the unit hav
of investigations on issues that nobody had not dreamed of before for the last thrE
concern for the beads generated additional investigative work. Merribeth has !hot
too take initiatives as to.issues, and Chris probably wishes that I did not because i
well. Julie came into the case and thought of issues that generated additional inv
released because now that I think about it was not included in the list that I had F
caused some complications at first, but I am glad now that I overrode the input ar
assigned to set up the pet scan in this case and you do not know of the amount <
confidential contracts, , etc. and etc., and that caused deadlines to be set becaus•
D was going back and forth. As it turned out; it never became necessary for me to I
in\fcu:::tin~tinnc: Tha nnl\1 reon11irc.mont ic:: th~t V•le:> tc.ll c.~rh nthcr c::n IMt:>
955
Mn nnt M11nli,
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3/20/2017 Fwd: 'Ethan Adams' & Shawn Matthews- beth.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmail
lnes
Circles
It might be best to leave alone but ask the others what they think.
Friends
On Sat, Feb 5, 2011 at 1:26PM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com> wrote:
Family thanks. I have both already. You gave me Shawn's a while ago. I will download
ruse by Mr. Hilton. I wonder if we need to bring this Ethan Adams to testify that I
Acquaintances
D
956
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3/20/2017 Fwd: testimony of Winn- beth.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmail
lnes
Important FYI
Friends
lnes,
Family
I think that we have to figure out this issue factually so we can try to attack it legally
Acquaintances
Following Also - I wanted you to know that I believe the witness is Loretta Mayfield. She is lis
mb
4J) Merribeth On Sat, Feb 5, 2011 at 1:24PM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com> wrote:
the proposed testimony of Winn will destroy both the guilt phase (that was alread)
• Betty Fuentes
I report is Mitchell the same officer that I think I brought to court to say that Hilton ,
I different allergy packets found in different areas,
I would like for you to investigate this matter. Go to the jail and asked that you b€
you. If the intercom is on the at the office~s station, find out what they have to dt
at the station and have to people talk normally at the door of the cell to see if you
Please also notice that there are two different conversations, one on August 21 at
If the state would give him life he would tell them where the head is. Hilton also
room #39? .. This statement was written on 8/21/08 and also signed by Sgt. Terre
1
The only thing that Hilton regrets is getting caught. If he had a second chance h<
' one belonging to him was in Cheryl Dunlap's tire and where her hands and head v
mentioning she was a sunday school teacher and that plenty of guys must have w
Another assigment. My file as to Mayfield was incomplete when I did the cross.
I need to bring up. I will call Darla the court reporter. thanks.
D 957
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lnes
In box
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Starred to me
Circles
They did not list Annie White or Comeau- they did Steven Scott Shawn for the dun
Friends
On Thu, Feb 3, 2011 at 5:37PM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com> wrote:
Family
other witnesses tomorrow
Acquaintances I -daniel prosser
Following -shawn matthews
the rentz that found the body- ronnie, daniel and kelly
-amy gorge to the scene
-annie white to scene
• Merribeth -introduction of pictures - there is one that i cannot find
-autopsy Dr. Clark
-Shawn Matthews -comes to Tallahassee and shows them the Joe Thomas (mig
• Betty Fuentes -William Punuausia processing scene joe thomas and processing car for hairs
-Arnie George and Annie white processing scene
Falsetti as to the charred bones and as to examination of vertebrea
Cecci - as to introduction of knive
Aagard as to the dna
foggy as to the knife
reyland as to the beads
Jeff Brannyon as to stuff found in van (pants, stuff found in dumpster, etc, earner~
Mark Ruddell as to the digital camera
Introduction of the December 3 videos
Murdock as to the dumpster in georgia
comeau as to seeing hilton by the dumspter
Jo ellen brown is the last witness becasue it is the strongest of all.
D 958
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lnes
• Merribeth thanks.
Colleen Shockley
Judicial Assistant to Judge James C. Hankinson
301 S. Monroe Street Room 301F
Ta IIa hassee, FL 32301
(850) 577-4320
(850) 577-4437 (FAX)
SHOCKLEC@Ieoncountvfl.gov
Colleen Shockley .
Judicial Assistant to Judge James C. Hankinson
301 S. Monroe Street Room 301F
Tallahassee, FL 32301
(850) 577-4320
(850) 577-4437 (FAX)
SHOCKLEC@Ieoncountvfl.gov
D 959
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3/20/2017 Fwd: challenges far cause- belh.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmail
lnes
Circles
Friends There were several potential jurors who know about hilton being accussed for a mun
these said that the defenant was probably guilty. The judge seems to make a differ<
Family that they could be fair and that they put all that knowledge aside. At the end of the
needed to go. however, he allowed all of the ones that only heard. We have like 15
Acquaintances the judge will even take the risk, because the rest of the potential jurors are claimin£
Following
• Betty Fuentes
D 960
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3/20/2017 Fwd: Administrative Leave- belh.bohanan@gmail.com- Gmail
lnes
Gmail
-
. ·-··-··-·-··--.,
I-·-·-----··---···"-
. ·-··--
Move to In box
Friends
With extreme gratitude for the hard work you put into the Hilton
Family
trial, I am granting each of you 5 days administrative leave. It is my
Acquaintances hope that you can arrange your schedules to take care of any pressing
work and then take some time off to rest and relax.
Following I thank you for your contribution to Mr. Hilton's defense.
r::::]
~~--·;
• Merribeth +I...J
!L.___
:, Click here to Reply or FOIWard
• Betty Fuentes
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3/20/2017 Fwd: revocation of contract- beth.bohanan@gmail.com- Gmail
lnes
In box
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Starred to me
Friends After Dr. Prichard testified as he did in our Hilton case, I am requesting that the offi<
examined the client, and came to court ant said client was a bad guy without tests a
Family potential expert very questinnable. Do no use him
Acquaintances c::..1
Following
:, Click here to~ or Forward
• Merribeth
• Betty Fuentes
1.1GB (7%) of 15GB used
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3/20/2017 Fwd: rubber bands- beth.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmail
lnes
Gmail '
-·· .... i
Move to In box
Friends chris ... in anticipate that the state will start introducing rubber bands as circumstantio
rubber bands at joe thomas, rubber bands at II wallace, rubber bands where the bay•
Family
c::J
Acquaintances
Following
Click here to Reply or Forward
• Merribeth
D 963
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3/20/2017 Fwd: jury selection- beth.bohanan@gmail.com- Gmail
lnes
In box
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Starred to me
Friends Hi there Rob - I know you have been working on the jury selection questions for the
to change his mind and tell me to do the whole jury selection. Thanks.
Family
Acquaintances Also aside from the normal publicity questions, if you have any input as to the quest
• /vlerribeth
,g, ! Click here to 8gQ!y or FoiWard
• Betty Fuentes
L-----·-·-·-·- "'"'" --· ..... -- "'· -- ·-·· --. ----------- ------ •• -·-··. -
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lnes
In box
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Starred to me
Friends chris -Would you please study the report of Amy George dated January 22 maybe.
van. They are trying to make the analogy that hilton was there because of the alleg
Family in a phanmacy to say how common they are and how many they sell a day or year 01
Acquaintances c::J
Following
:, .!. Glick here to 8&Q1y or Forward
• Merribeth
• Betty Fuentes
1.1GB (7%) of 15GB used
Manage
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3/20/2017 Fwd: Amendment to the Appendix- beth.bohanan@gmail.com- Gmail
lnes
Gmail
Friends On monday, I need to renew the motion to dismiss the indictment based on publici!)
Family On Monday, I need to renew the motion for a change of venue- please put the moti
exhibit. This amendment should be i think appendix iv?
Acquaintances
Following On Monday, I need to renew the motion for a continuance. Please my motion to co
I am copying the lawyers with this email so that you remind me to renew all these rr
D 966
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3/20/2017 Fwd: today's depos ... more... - beth.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmail
lnes
----------------····-------------·--
lnbox Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Starred to me
• Betty Fuentes
D 967
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3120/2017 Fwd: FYI: Deposition tomorrow at 2:00p.m.- beth.bohanan@gmail.com- Gmail
lnes
Friends the state told the judge that the witnesses that we were supposed to still depose ha•
start as to what this is. thanks.
Family
On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 5:43 PM, Faye Dorn <faye.dorn@flpd2.com> wrote:
Acquaintances
Steven Shaw
Following Telephone depo at 2:00. Jan or Georgia, please let me know what# you want us
Thanks and have a wonderful evening!
Faye
• Merribeth
c-,
D 968
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3/20/2017 Fwd:- beth.bohanan@gmail.com- Gmail
lnes
Friends also, Chris is going to add a couple of GBI discs (Forsyth Co. traffic stop and Debag
Family On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 5:07PM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com> wrote:
please be advised that I am preparing a subpoena duces tecum to the custodial o-
Acquaintances
subpoena for the trial and, the evidence will be in the court room because it will b•
Following
we are going to send a big Jist of things that we need to introduce just in case. AI
I ~~~in passing that it might not be a good idea. that is all.
r·--·-·
• Merribeth I, + I
i
··----··J
• Betty Fuentes Click here to Reply or Forward
D 969
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lnes
Acquaintances
Following
• Merribeth
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lnes
Circles
My son remains in the hospital. It is unclear as to what caused all
Friends this. His white blood cells are still elevated. The spinal tap is
causing a horrible headache. The infectious disease doctor does not
Family have all the Jabs back to make determination. We are in limbo as to
what we were exposed to. They are keeping him until all cultures are
Acquaintances
back and his blood count in back to normal. We should hopefully know
Following more tomorrow when the full staff at the hospital is available. Nancy
unless you feel differently, we have been advised to stay away from
people as much as possible until this is figured out. Please Jet me
know your thoughts on Merribeth and my return to Work.
G) Merribeth
• Betty Fuentes
Click here to &ill]y or Forward
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lnes
Friends I know who she is. I have a copy of the report where she is mentioned and will put i1
Family On Fri. Jan 21,2011 at 11:23 AM, Georgia Cappleman <CapplemanG@JeoncounM
Acquaintances I don't know who she is.
-GA
Following
>>> Ines Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com> 1/21/201111:01 AM>>>
~--·--1
it is really hard to find witnesses. Maybe Jan or Georgia will tell us who the real
• Merribeth +i
!L.--.--J
On Fri, Jan 21, 2011 at 10:40 AM, Julie Hartwein <julie.hartwein@flpd2.com> v
• Betty Fuentes Just wanted to let everyone know that Rachel Wisham, 1292 Old Thomasville
I ··--···
L ___ J
972
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ines
Gmail
-----------------·----····-----------------------------------
In box Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Starred to me·
Circles
and another
Friends
- - - - Forwarded message-----
Family From: Billing at Accurate Court Reporting, lnc.--Devonnia Billing Dept. <Billinc
Date: Fri, Jan 21, 2011 at 10:56 AM
Acquaintances
Subject: Transcript of Jerry Cirino taken 1-14-11
Following To: julie.hartwein@flpd2.com, meggsw@leoncounMI.gov
• Merribeth
• Betty Fuentes
. . ---·=-
.. ...,,.,.,_<»Jm.........
-~-
"'" .. r..,,,.,
-"'·-- ...•.... ··-···· .........•..
~ 3831Cirino, Jerry.
D 973
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3/20/2017 Fwd: mandatory meeting on Monday~ beth.bohanan@gmail.com- Gmail
ines
Gmail .j
Move to lnbox
Circles
i know I feel the same way although in addition to meeting we all are working as we
Friends good stuff... And yes, Paula ... they do have a lawyers lounge in the courthouse whe
is the last of the mohicans or is it mohikans..... as far as I am concerned. Probably
Family am determined not to let sharp stomach pains and nausea and headaches distract 1
On Fri, Jan 21, 2011 at 7:50AM, Betty Fuentes <betty.fuentes@flpd2.com> wrote:
Acquaintances
Really? I think we're meeting more than working.
Following
r--·----·1 On Jan 20, 2011, at 12:31 PM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com> wrote:
• Merribeth I + I
L_ ___ j
>there will be a mandatory meeting this coming Monday at 3.p.m. in the conferet
very important. thanks .
• Betty Fuentes
:· (l.
1 .,.. Click here to Reply or Forward
D 974
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ines
Friends well i am going to file a motion to continue today. I do not know if it will be heard tc
to the hearing tomorrow and we have two other lawyers who could take the fried mar
Family unit. Hilton will soon pass and we will go back to norrnal. ........ until the next one cor
Acquaintances
On Wed, Jan 19, 2011 at 8:30AM, Julie Hartwein <julie.hartwein@flpd2.com> wro!<
Following I
there is a schedule conflict withe below for Thursday because we have the FBI Jo
The defendant is presently scheduled for a 9:00a.m. hearing & 1:30 final pretri;
Judge Hankinson will be doing both the hearing AND the final pretrial at 9:00 a.r
Colleen Shockley
Judicial Assistant to Judge James C. Hankinson
301 S. Monroe Street Room 301F
Tallahassee, FL 32301
(850) 577-4320
(850) 577-4437 (FAX)
SHOCKLEC@Ieoncountvfl.gov
ines
r
Gmail I Move to In box
Friends
Unfortunately there is a lot of information about David Tucker that the state has not
Family frankly, I think it might even be necessary for the defense to redepose a couple of s
been disclosed by the State and I will again file a motion asking for the disclosure oi
Acquaintances
schedule the deposition of this witness that was provided to us by the state a couple
Following can engage in deposing him. Please cancel the deposition. Thanks, and again I a1
r~-~-·-·1
• Merribeth i ....+ I
~ ____)
i''
! :, Click here to Rlill!v or Forward
• Betty Fuentes
D
976
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3/20/2017 Fwd: the case- beth.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmai!
ines
Friends The name of the store is Blue Abaca. Call Terry Carley and see if she knows the ov
Family On Man, Jan 10, 2011 at 4:21 PM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com> wrote:
Request for investigation:
Acquaintances
Following - In addition to the investigation request I gave you today, I want the following res
A. As to the missing persons search that you did. I notice that there are individu;
i person that can come to court to testify that they have been missing. For exam pi
• Merribeth the disappearance of her since what time. the same for the rest of the jurisdictior
B. As to the beads- there is a local bead store I think called Blue alcore or som1
• Betty Fuentes manufactures around the world hopefully and how many of those common beads
help so that the owners will help us?
thanks.
i foiWarded the email from Ouaou to you. McClaren was a phone call. But don't yo
an update before the decisions are made. Thanks.
D I, Also, yesterday I talked to Dr. McClaren concerning a new case that came up d•
l had oreoared and aiven to him a huae binder that contained all of the imoortanl
977
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ines
Friends Rob- I need to update you as to what happened December 10. December 10 we h;
hearings dealing with motions in limine and the evidence. The motions to unseal by
Family best to accommodate her as well, so I convinced Mike, Kevin and Georgia to have
hearings together with the motions to unseal since pursuant to the Democrat and W
Acquaintances
close the pretrial hearings as well. That is the 37 page motion that I filed in the cas
Following
The judge as usual was an absolute jerk, but maybe I was the jerk. In any event, ar
motion to recuse him. I have a copy of the entire hearing on CD if you care to hear
of my worries at this point; although writing this update to you has brought to mind i
• Merribeth
Anyways, the judge unsealed several motions ... and one of the motions that he uns•
to the part that was important, he basically yelled at me and told him to get away fr<
• Betty Fuentes
This is what the judge said during the December 10 hearing - going on my recollectic
-if you do not want motions unsealed ...... do not file them
-1 cannot believe that the state would not stipulate to some of these motions ... he di<
- I will no hear any motions prior to trial
-when i was trying to argue the motion to close some of the pretrial hearings which i
because Judge Lewis had gone through that.... and that I was in effect arguing the 1
filed .... (i know it is not going to be granted)
-and I do not remember what else he said and yelled ...
-He kept under seal the motion dealing with the medea I examiner testifying that it w
-He kept under seal the motion dealing with the December 3, but told the press that
-He kept under seal the motion dealing with the charred bones, but told the press th
-Because of all of the above that the judge said and did not say, I sent the JA a me'
ALL pending motions. I also asked her so send us the procedure that this judge foil
hearings, and I am hopeful that we get an answer by Monday morning.
If the answer is that he will hear ALL motions, then I will file a renewed motion to cl
necessary because the Democrat just prepared the Order dealing with the Decem be
So, so long winded, here. If the answer is that he will hear ALL pending motions, It
but we can also take the position as you suggested that the hearing on January 7 is
My plan, without discussing it with you, was to allow you to go very quickly through t
tool mark because that is a very important issue.
978
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ines
Circles
this is an affirmative defense. An affirmative defense has been defined as any dele
Friends engage in the conduct in question. This defense might be inconsistent with an alleg
doubt this will keep my mind occupied for days and weeks. As of right now, I have <
Family
1'"~-1
··------·'
Acquaintances
Following 0
= Click here to &miy or Forward
--,
G) lv1erribeth I +I
L...!
• Betty Fuentes 1.1GB (7%) of 15GB used
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ines
Circles
Friends
Family IMPORTANT: The information contained in this e-mail message is privileged and c
the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or not entitled to access thi
Acquaintances
have received this communication in error, please notify the sender by replying to th•
Following
26 Attachments
,....,........"".....
~
~1;;.~~'"""""""
cn~•m•~...,
P~lto I<IIWI
.. -.-.
··-··-.. ·-------·
Childhood
Thomas Perchoux - We can tape record him again because he can testify that he
was in psychiatric care when young
Victorine Rowe-we have her statement(through me)
Cleo Dabag- (through me)
Teenage years
Roy Cave was in band with him, knows about foster care
Sandy Herman- girlfriend
Beverly Lehmann Hilton-hostile witness but she is his sister
Maria Castelli
Juan Castelli
Early Adulthood
981
Adult prior to and 2005
Maria Linarte- nurse next door to Clairmont address thought he was mentally ill
Chad Smallwood
Justin Wight
Karen Stansbury
Scott Gill
Mildred Stevens
Shaun Faukner
Casey Smith
Robert Schmidt
Tom Roger
Nancy Linkesh
Jail life
982
3/20/2017 Fwd: Lemon Lane~ beth.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmail
ines
Circles
i can appear at 8 30 if need be MB. The depo that day starts I think at 9.
Friends P.S. too bad I left and I was not privvy to what it was said, and Betty took it upon h
taken and now Faye is also been asked to provide and search for all my motions so
Family
God is great! I feel a big relief that part of the job that I had on my list of things to
Acquaintances
client and work real hard. There is still lots more. Hang in there and you will be a
Following you about the decision or not to talk to the family. I respect what you say but I wan!
On Thu, Dec 16, 2010 at 7:19PM, Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.•
Considering this email - I will check with the JAin the AM then and see if we can
I Just had that conversation w/Eddie ... he wants to leave the Motion on the calend
I So ..•.. let me know what Colleen says about the time and I'll put it on the calend;
I __
Merribeth Bohanan
Leon County Public Defenders Office
301 S. Monroe Street, Suite 401
Tallahassee, FL 32301
850-606-1 023
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ines
Friends
Family My family is reiliiY pressuring me to tell them why I cannot even take a few days o1
December 13 to the end of December? If the only important deposition is that of Jc
Acquaintances but even if it can be done, I really cannot see how my second chair cannot handle h:
December4 13 is tomorrow and I will take care of that. December 14 there is a der
Following
Falsetti appears to be off. The other depos that you wanted to set for 20 and the re
GJil Merribeth
r·-~-,
:+ I
'~··¥~--·
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ines
Gmail -J. . . · · · . . . 1 .
Move to lnbox
Circles
There were 79 witnesses from the GB I reports that have not been spoken
Friends to. I called 29 yesterday and spoke to a dozen of them. One is
fantastic, he says that he met him at a laundry (not the Korean one)
Family and he spoke with him several times. He find him to have some
functioning issues that probably were not detected when young. He
Acquaintances
said he knows this because his family owns a school for special kids.
Following He believes that he repeated things because that is what people with
asperger and autism do.
-..
• Merribeth
i
l_ ........ ". ···'-····---·----"-··----~·
D 985
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ines
Circles
do you think you want to attend? Don't you think that your time will be better spent
Friends the Georgia project. What do you say. I am king of worried about this and I though
Family On Mon, Nov 15, 2010 at 1:01 PM, Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.
11 have not found anything of interest in Ga materials as of yet but still have a bun•
Acquaintances
Following Jason Byrd- responded to my email this. AM and said he would send his rates an<
I have not heard from Ms. Wayland, yet. I called and LM on Friday and called ag.
get an email for her from the front desk.
• Merribeth
I On Mon, Nov 15, 2010 at 12:55 PM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@fipd2.com> wrote:
• Betty Fuentes ! did you find anything of interest in the georgia materials,
and did you hear from
D 986
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ines
Circles
As to Number 7 below. You do not need a receipt or a fax to attach to a request. S
Friends
On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 12:20 PM, Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd:
Family 1. The facility sent the agreement with #4 changed.
Acquaintances
2. Once you approve the confidentiality agreement we will send it for their review
Following
3. Joyce said the director will be in on 11/29 to sign it.
4. Do you want to have someone sign theirs today and _get it to them or wait fort
• Merribeth r-~]
5. Called Dr. Wu he is going to look at flights into Tall. for next week and call me
• Betty Fuentes 6. I asked him about the weaning off med's as well as the diet restrictions prior tc
7. Joyce is sending me something in writing today with the rate for the test on it 1
D 987
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ines
Gmail Movetolnbox
Friends Thank you to both of you and the entire capital team for the long
hours and difficult work you are doing on this case.
Family
On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 6:36AM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com> wrote:
Acquaintances
>You do not know how much I appreciate your help during the last two viewings
Following > of the evidence. Your analytical thinking as to what to view because of the
> evidence at hand is amazing. You know the evidence just as well as I do, if
> not better. I forgot durtng the viewings that you were the mitigation
> specialist or an investigator, and instead I started talking to you as if
• Merribeth > you were my cocounsel in this difficult case of ours. Yesterday for example
> was incredible and more so because I felt at a loss and about to collapze
> under pressure when I was given the 190 pages listing the evidence in this
• Betty Fuentes > case. (I feel sad that all of the hard work Chris and his intern did in
> their attempt to organize the items was not able to be used because they
> received it too late and FDLE had spent all day Friday (3 of them) pulling
> the evidence) I wish you will go to law school. The type of input you give
> me as to how to challenge the evidence, what else we need to investigate,
>what we need to disprove and how to argue things is awesome. I will follow
>all of the recommendations you advanced yesterday. Thank you so very much
> Betty. You need to be recognized and the office needs to know who does what
>to assist me and therefore I am sending a copy of this email to Nancy.
>
> P.S. I took the 190 pages home, and I have been going item by item and I
> will provide a list of the items we want to see to Annie White by Monday so
> that our last viewing on November 16 will be productive. Thanks again.
>
D 988
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3/20/2017 Fwd: Information needed- beth.bohanan@gmail.com- Gmail
ines
Friends I am trying to declare the following witness matertal and I want to know what county
Family 1. Harry Deicher- 750 Hammond Drive, building 8, suite 100, atlanta
Acquaintances
2. John Tabor- I think Faye has the address and I believe he is in Fulton County.
Following
3. Jennie Johnson, 7635 Nesbit, Ferry road Atlanta
• Betty Fuentes 6. Ned Dwight Coleman, 70507 4th Street, Covington, Louisiana
D 989
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ines
Friends my only suggestion was that we need to recontact. I did not say what we should sa:
discussed how to do it or what to say. I just wanted to hear from the lawyers and yc
Family
On Tue, Oct 5, 2010 at 3:14PM, Betty Fuentes <betty.fuentes@flpd2.com> wrote:
Acquaintances
I agree that they might want this over and could possibly be ok with plea but havir
Following have to go through appeals
• Betty Fuentes
i do not understand your comment but I am sure there is some reason for~
I'
On Tue, Oct 5, 2010 at 3:00PM, Betty Fuentes <betty.fuentes@flpd2.corr
can try but there is difference in not caring and them helping us get life
> I think we need to attempt to contact the family again to see if we can
1 > I know Betty you tried to contact the Pastor and advised me not to try
I > But as i sit here at home preparing for the depos on Friday and readin!
dad Michael Sr. after the divorce. Can we not contact Michael Sr. to se<
go around that avenue also? Willie told me one day that the sons did nc
they should be contacted to see if we can put the pressure. WCTV got I
continuance. There is lot of work to do. Bill when are you available to d
990
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3/20/2017 Hilton- beth.bohanan@gmail.com - Gmail
ines
-·----·------
In box Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Starred to me
Circles
i am totally confused. I thought Shawn Matthews had seen Hilton at Joe Thomas a
Friends Brown. Read also the report. I am so possitive that it was joe thomas. but i am dot
Family [=1
Acquaintances
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
Following to me
bug expert for what? I do not have a bug expert. Who are you talking about?
----------------------------------·--------
Merribeth Bohanan <merribeth.bohanan@flpd2.com>
to me
-------Forwarded message----
From: lnes Suber <ines.suber@flpd2.com>
Date: Sun, Feb 6, 2011 at 1:56PM
Subject: Fwd: Hilton
To: "Saunders, Paula" <Paula.Saunders@flpd2.com>, Merribeth Bohanan <merribe
D 991
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ABUSED AND DEPRIVED CHILDHOOD:
Mr. Perchoux took him in as a type of foster parent after he was sent to Juv. Hall for
trying to protect his mother. His mother did not allow him back home b/c she would
have had to leave Gary's step dad. His mother lived in the same neighborhood, as Mr.
Perchoux at the time, and yet she did not even come and visit her son. His mother
neglected him and chose to stay with an abusive man rather than take her son back and
repair their relationship. He was worse than abandoned. It was such a traumatic event at
such a tumultuous time for a young man he spent a month in a psychiatric hospital.
She is a witness to a small boy running around in circles screaming in pain with his head
split open. She talks about a horseshoe chunk of his scalp hanging loose from his head.
She witnesses two towels soaked in a manner of minutes from the blood. She knew that
he was gone for several days in the hospital and had over 200 stitches to the injury. Gary
should not have been allowed to play with such a dangerous piece of furniture like a
Murphy bed in the first place. His mother was not paying attention to him.
Mrs. DeBag was the only person that was a constant in his young life. His biological
father wanted nothing to do with him. He did not spend time with him nor did he help
with the expense of raising him. His mother took little interest in him, his schooling or
his welfare. This is indicated by her decision to move him from state to state and school
to school at such a young age. It is impossible to have a sense of security as a child when
you attend 17 different schools in five years. He knew that he was a severely depressed
child when he went to the kitchen and got a knife to slit his wrist at such a young age.
She did not act on this knowledge in the least. She did not take him to see anyone or
even talk to him about what had him so upset. She was totally self absorbed. When she
was not unaware of him and his needs she was abusive to him. She had an inappropriate
relationship with him and blurred all the lines of a nonnal mother and son relationship.
She thought that Gary's mother was not mentally stable. She has mood swings and was
very selfish and materialistic. She was cold to her son. She says that Gary not welcome
anywhere his mother lived and that she ignored him. He would send you photo's and
cards to keep his mother involved in his life but they were ignored. Mrs. Castelli says
Cleo did not want to talk about her son and would get agitated when asked about him.
Gary was left alone while his mother traveled with her husband, Nilo. Mrs. Castelli was
so self-absorbed that she did not offer her any of her brother's things after his death. She
was a witness to the extreme neglect and abuse Gary endured from his mother.
992
CONTRIBUTION TO COMMUNITY OR SOCIETY AS EVIDENCED BY
EXEMPLARY WORK, MILITARY, FAMILY, OR OTHER RECORD:
Sandy Herman Carr- She was in a relationship with Gary during a very difficult time in
both their Jives and yet he was a caring and devoted boyfriend to her. He was there for
her emotionally when she needed him. Be was a good friend to her and helped her to
deal with what was happening in her life at a time when his life was also in shambles.
Brenda Roberts- Mrs. Roberts describes Gary during the two years she knew him as laid
back and calm. He would take her out on dates. They would go to dinner and dancing.
He was polite and well mannered. He took her on picnics. She never felt uncomfortable
around him. He helped her move when she moved during their relationship.
Stephanie Durham- Ms. Durham was 13 years old when Gary came into her life. He
was dating her mother, Connie. He was fun and eccentric. He Jived with them. He
always had a happy personality. He was upbeat with her and was a positive influence to
her. He treated her like a daughter. He would take care of her when she was sick and
provided for her financially. He was nice to her mother. He would cook and they would
all sit down and eat together. She says the one who committed these crimes is a different
individual than the one she grew up with and knew back then. She knows that later in
life he was talking fast and seemed to be barely hanging on to his sanity.
Jen Lee Hee- Ms. Hee talks about the decline of a man who was working and appeared
at least to be stable. Then she sees his dramatic decline. His appearance suffers as well
as his physical dexterity. She notices he cannot hold still and his speech is rapid as well
as his appearing to have difficulty with his movements.
Officer Kim- He noticed that during his encounter with Gary he was a little bit like
confused, a bit out of it. He appeared to be off his medication or crazy because of the
way his demeanor was on the initial approach and while talking to him; It was apparent
that he was unstable at this time in 2006.
993
Mary Pat King - Ms. King encountered Gary while on patrol one evening in the App.
National Forrest. She said his appearance was poor and it was odd for someone to be
waiking in that area at that time. She stopped to talk to him to check on his welfare. She
found him to not respond the way she would expect. She he appeared to talk from
subject to subject almost like a rant. She stated in her log that his lack of cogent speech
lead her to conclude that he had emotional or mental problems. She jotted down in her
notes sig. 20 which is police code for someone who has emotional issues.
Dr. Delscher- In May of 2005 he began seeing this doctor. He found his name in the
phone book. He went to him b/c he was not able to get out of bed and go to work on a
daily basis he felt he could not function. Dr. Delscher believed that most ailments were
from allergies to dairy products and instructed Gary not to eat them. Dr. Delscher told
Gary that he had an autoimmune problem and Cilia Disease. He also diagnosed him with
Firbromyalgia. Dr. Delscher thought Gary needed an MRI and a PET Scan but he did not
send him to either. Dr. Delscher gave Gary vitamin B shots to treat his electric shock
type symptoms down his arms.
Dr. Delscher was aware that Gary had impulse control issues but did not address them.
He thought Gary was mentally ill but did not refer him to a mental health professional.
He appeared manic to him. Dr. Delscher knows that he should have tested Gary for Iyme
disease since on his first visit a tick bit was discussed and then again in 2006 another tick
bite. Dr. Delscher repeatedly mentions that Gary did not have insurance and that is why
he did not refer him for procedures or give him a better form of Ritalin because it was
more expensive.
Dr. Delscher prescribed Gary with various medications that were not appropriate for an
endocrinologist to prescribe per the Ga. Medical Board. The board discusses that there
were no screening for any psychiatric disorders performed. Dr. Delscher was sanctioned
for his improper treatment of Gary and told he could not practice psychiatry again or he
would be in violation of the terms from the Board and his license would be in jeopardy.
994
10/22/2010 Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Ma ...
<< oacK w moox 1 Arcnove 1 Keporr spam 1 Ullete 1 1 MOve to Laoels
Starred
Sent Mail
Drafts Re: Evidence Viewing I Hilton Intox x
All Mail
Faye Dorn to show details 2:39 PM (14 minutes ago) i__~"P!]_=~
Andre Please add a scheduling as to the EVIDENCE VIEWING:
Bordt
Brundidge 11/4/10 Meet at Sheriff's office from 9-5:00
1119/10 Meet at the FDLE from 1-5:00
Chavez
11/10/10 Meet at the FDLE from 9-5:00
CMC's 11/16/10 Meet at the FDLE from 9-5:00
Gay
If you cannot attend, please provide someone to attend for you.
Hill
Hilton Thank you.
James Faye
Lane
On Fli, Oct 22, 2010 at 11:21 AM, Faye Dorn <faye.dorn@flpd2.com>
Legal issues wrote:
McDaniels 11/4/10- Meet at 9:00a.m. at the lobby ofthe Leon County
Sheriff's Office
Mise
11/10/10- Meet at FDLE at 9:00a.m. at the Front office.
Peacock 11/16/10- Meet at FDLE at 9:00 a.m. at the Front office. (Annie
Personal will be on vacation)
Prim
If you cannot attend, please provide someone to attend for you.
Richardson
3 morev j Thank you.
. Faye
Contacts
Tasks
Merlibeth Bohanan
• [search,._add, or in~
You are i nllis ible.
Go visible Reply to all Forward Faye is not available to chat
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<Newer 45 of hundreds Older>
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Fwd: I've had it V<Jrious Issues· HHtou x
In box Print all
Starred Betty Fuentes to me
Tum off highlighting
Sent Mall
Drafts
All Mail
Clients MH Begin forwarded message:
=Closed or Transfered
Mise From: Robert Friedman <robert.friedman@npd2.com>
Various Issues ~ Hilton Date: February 13, 20117:15:25 PM EST
To: Betty Fuentes <betty.fuentes@fipd2.com>
5 more.,
Subject: Re: I've had it
Chat
Betty, i know you are upset about delcher but I appreciate all the work you ha\.E!
done under difficult circumstances for eo,eryone.
Merribeth Bohanan
Sent from my !Pad
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Clients MH
= Closed or Transfered
Mise
On Feb 13, 2011, at 9:42PM, Betty Fuentes <betty.fuentes@ftpd2.com> wrote:
997
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<Newer 128 of hundreds Older)
New window
Interviewing witnesses Various Issues- Hl!ton X
Inbox Print aU
Starred Betty Fuentes to Nancy, lnes, Robert, me show details Jan 28 !_ Reply J
'----'-'-'--j Tum off highlighting
Sent Mail Apparently there m.s some issue with me saying that I could not
Drafts interdew witnesses. I am really so sick of this petty stuff. For
All Man anyone who question my work habits:
Clients MH I worked through the holidays lncludlng days when e\eryone else m.s on vacation.
= Closed or Transfered
Mise
Last Monday when we had a holiday I m.s intef'\riewing the snitch.
Various Issues - Hilton Thursday I work with my son sick until! had to take him to the
5 moreT
My son continues to be on be rest and I ha\e left him alone to work.
Chat
That Thursday I m.s looking at \ideas we ha\e had rore~.er and no one
Search, add, or imite had seen them. Luckly finding one we will be using in penalty.
Menibeth Bohanan Yesterday after working tlll7pm I had to take my daughter to tmh
urgent care and did not get home till 11pm.
You are im1sible. I fell in the shower bruised my shoulder and bled in my arm. Woke up
Go \1sible at 5:30 and went to Miami to interdew witness.
Call phone
My heart m.s beating funny fi"om all the things that I ha\e been dealing with.
Anthony Perez
~- ·
Geoff Fischer
en·\:~!i he!p@lipd2.com
chris.ellrich -·---·------·-- --···---·
Jennifer Turner
Lorl Hocking «Back to Search Results Archive Reportspam Delete Move to In box Labels More actions
Kendra Brown
<Newer 128 of hundreds Older)
Uta\1a Wiggins
Get new mail notifications. Download the Public Defender. 2nd Judicial Circuit Mail Notifier. Learn more
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Re: Interviewing witnesses V(lr!ous Issues" Hl!ton X
In box Print all
Reply .. / ·····-
Starred lnes Suber to Betty, Nancy, Robert, me sflow details Jan 28
Tum off highlighting
Sent Mail yes, it is extremely ridiculous that you ewn haw to write this message sine nobody has
Drafts questioned your work habits, least of all me.
All Mail
I sent an email to you and asked if you could inteNew a couple of family members. You said
Clients MH that you had to go to Miami wtlich I appreciate on behalf of the client. And I am sure Rob
= Closed or Transfered
Mise
appreciates that you went do'Ml rather than him to secure the \ideo.
After you answered that you had to go to Miami, I then sent you a short short email asking if it
Various Issues Hilton
w was possible for you to do it afterwards sometime next weeik. You did not ansVYer. Instead you
5 more ... went to Rob atx>ut it.
Rob sent me an email and said that I should use Chris because you were busy with some kind
Chat
of po"-Ner point that you were working for atx>ut a month incorporating basically all the life of the
!Search, add, or in'.1te J client I know you had mentioned to me how difficult it had been to put this \ideo.
'---------------------
Menibeth Bohanan I wrote back to Rob and i said that these were family members that are wry sensitiw
'Nitnesses like the friends of dunlap and the daughter in law and that you had always insisted in
you being the one to contact these type of witnesses.
You are in'.(slble.
Go lisible The Guilt Phase comes before the Penalty Phase. Adding Jury Selection if we are able to pick
Call phone a jury it will probably be end of February before we address the Penalty phase.
Anthony Perez
~So nobody is questioning your work ethics. I newr had questioned those. I did 'Mite a memo
to Nancy bringing to her attention wtlat I perceiw a di\ision in the representation of Mr. Hilton,
Faye Oom because I still feel that way. The idea was to di\ide w-hat 'Ne all be doing but the idea was newr
Nicole Jamieson to be tenitorial about w-hat each of us is called to do for the client.
Sharon Fernandez ·I did not complain atx>ut your INOrk ethics and I newr said you did not work hard, since, the
I'm nv;· s;•':CJI\t~. hy !2ter penalty phase was build up based on at! of your contact with the witnesses and also In your
Geoff Fischer suggestion that we do the pet scan, my following your recommendation wtlich was not initially
cm~w help@Hpd2.tom
receiwd to good of an idea and finally turning to be the gist of the penalty phase. You ere also
wry instrumental in getting the Deicher order w-hich is the number one stuff in our facorin the
chris.e!lrich
case.
Jennifer Turner
Lori Hocking So if you haw a question as to w-hether I questioned your work habits, the least I can expect
Kendra Brown after we havfng 'NOrked for so long with you is for you to simply come to me and asked me
Lita'via Wiggins straight up and I oould ha\e gladly addressed the issue with you instead of finding yourself
'Mit!ng an email that you yourself consider petty. Moreowr, I also feel that if you could not
accomplish the project that I had asked if you could do, you should haw come to me and
addressed the issue 'Nith me rather than going to Rob. You haw newr been shy In doing this
before and I do not understand the difference now except that I think it is probably based in this
d!l..(sh.P.nP.ss lh~t WP. shnu!rl nnt h~\P.ln this tvne ofc:~sP..
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<Newer 152 of hundreds Older)
~-··c~·~p-~7~--~-~~~-~
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Issues with my son Vnrious Issues" Hilton X
In box Print all
Starre9 Betty Fuentes to Nancy, lnes, Robert, Paula show details Jan 23 l, _ Re=ply_L...I-j
_c_;_
Tum off highlighting
Sent Mail My son remains in the hospital. It is unclear as to what caused all
Drafts this. His white blood cells are still elewted. The spinal tap is
All Mail causing a horrible headache. The infectious disease doctor does not
have all the labs back to make determination. We are in Umbo as to
Clients MH what we .....-ere exposed to. They are keeping him until all cultures are
=Closed orTransfered back and his blood count in back to normal. We should hopefully know
more tomorrow when the full staff at the hospital is a\eilable. Nancy
Mise unless you feel differently, we ha\e been ad....; sed to stay away from
Various Issues Hilton v people as much as possible until this is figured aut. Please let me
5 mare't' know your thoughts on Menibeth and my return to wori<.
Chat
Reply to all Forward
! Search, add, or imHe
L. ''""' ''-'"'"'"''"• ''''""'~--•-•M•-••--·-
j
Merribeth Bohanan
I
•• -:1
You are im1sible.
Go \1slble
Call phone
Anthony Perez
U~;nelnq p,ul:
Faye Dam
Nicole Jamieson
Sharon Fernandez
l'rn nv\ nv;.-;;;ke, t1y :;;:.1<·'-'
Geoff Fischer
<:.':·· ;-p: help@flpd2.com
chris.ellrich
Jennifer Turner
Lori Hocking <Newer 152 of hundreds Older>
Kendra Brown
Uta'.la Wiggins Import contacts from Yahoo, Outlook, and others into your Public Defender, 2nd Judicial Circuit Mail contact list. Leam more
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Fwd: our client
lnbox (1) Print all
Starred Merribeth Bohanan to Betty show details Feb 13
Turn off highligJ:illD.g
Sent Mail FYI
Drafts
All Mall - - FoJWarded message - -
From: Paula Saunders <paula.saunders@Hpd2.com>
Clients MH Date: Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 5:33PM
= Closed or Transfered
Mise
Subject: Re: our client
To: !nes Suber <ines.suber@fipd2.com>
Cc: Robert Friedman <robert.friedman@ftpd2.com>, Bill Mclain <bill.mclaln@Hpd2.com>,
Various Issues- Hilton Menibeth Bohanan <menibeth.bohanan@fipd2.com>
5 more'"
This was entirely unnecessary and a distraction in the midst of trial. My only ~XJint was that
Chat
you had no right to undermine Rob's decision and instruct Faye to contact a penalty phase
: Search, add, or imAte
'--------------···-· -···-·· -··-·-·---
J witness alxlut a subpoena, especially wtlen you had not discussed it With Rob. This is micro~
managing.
Menibeth Bohanan This has been a difficult and stressful case for all of us, most of all for you. I don't intend to
discuss this further until the case is mer.
I'm glad you got some rest this weekend.
You are inlJsib!e. Paula
Go \isibfe
Call phone On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 1:38PM, lnes Suber <lnes.suber@Hpd2.com> 'NI'Ote:
It appears that the use of the word "lead" has created somewhat of a concern at !east for
Anthony Perez
you, I do not know where the word came from and I do not know why it is used. The wrd
C.:~nci:•f) 6uH
"lead" does not mean I decide and you all obey. In all of my cases, the decisions ha\e been
Faye Dam made by the entire team, and you know that in a 100 percent of the times, the final and
Nicole Jamieson crucial decisions as to how to defend a case, ha\e been made by the team collecti\ely .And
this case was no exception, E\en Nancy participated in the decision of how to argue the
Sharon Fernandez case and how to the defense should be presented at least at the guilt phase. I 'view my role
during trial as wtlate\er the team decides or anyone decides, I obey and respect. E\en
Geoff Fischer during this trial, you told me a couple of times, in the middle of testimony "do not go there
;~ne;il he!p@flpd2.com lnes", and if you 'N<Int to know the thruth now I disagreed with your decision, but I deferred to
chris.ellrich your decision because I value your judgment, your legal expertise and your knowledge of the
law and more importantly, because it concerned an issue that you had argued, and you
Jennifer Turner were concerned that we lose the issue on appeal. During objections at the bench, you 'NI'Ote
Lori Hocking down a word to clue me as to additional arguments to make, and I made them again e\en
Kendra Brown though I knew I had already argued them. MB did the same and I included all those and in
Uta\ia Wiggins fact I moved for a mistrial because I deferred to her decision that she was making. She told
me thank you afteJWards. Rob made the decision that we mo\e for mistrial because of the
treatment of the judge towards me, and I deferred to his decision and suggestion even
though I did not want to face the wrath of the judge on me and the dlsparraging of me. This
is wtlat caused the judge to call me unprofessional which was printed In the paper the next
d1'!v _ I Rm ~urP. vnu know wtiRf it fP.P.Is whP.n nnP. is r:R.!IP.rl unnmfP.ssinnRI on R rP.r:orrl. Roh
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Re: state of mind at the guilt phase
lnbox Print all
Starred lnes Suber to Betty, Paula, Robert, me, bbubs, Nanc~ show details Feb 10
Tum off highlighting
Sent Mail He had not fought the e...;dence as he was not here. The state Is
Drafts pro>Jng that he Is here. Bein9 in tal!a is not important and it does
AI/ Mail to pro\€ that he did it. The defense has been. Look at the e...;dence
od wtlo did it. Can they pro\€ that he kidnapped her. Is he the one at
Clients MH the atm. Is the dna reliable because contaminated. Not enough
= Closed or Transrered
Mise
On 2/10!11, Betty Fuentes <betty.fuentes@fipd2.com> wrote:
> Here is my two cents ... before all this started I said they will
Various Issues ~ Hilton > introduce the confession and we had to prepare for two different cases
5 more ... > the problem now is that we ha\€ fought the e\.1dence as if he was not
> there or did not do it. If you change directions you would look
> foolish and it will kill \Vhate\E!r chance we might ha\€ on the penalty
Chat
> side, This is the problem \Vhen the defense is going against the
> truth, or covering it up. I thought from the beginning that if we
L~.~~.~~:_a~~~ . ~.~~n~A::_·-~·1 > ~Nent with that defense the state would be deflated and they would ha\€
Menibeth Bohanan >nothing. Now we are the ones deflated and looking foolish because they
> hava all this e\ridence in posters showing he was there. Frankly it's
> tooooooo late.
You are imtsible. >
Go visible >
Call phone >
>On Feb 9, 2011, at 11:30 PM, lnes Suber<ines.suber@Hpd2.com> wrote:
Anthony Perez
>
» the judge was stupid to allow the search and transport tapes ln. At this
Faye Dam » time, the client's state of mind will be placed at issue by the state. I
Nicole Jamieson » want all of you to know that i am entertaining an lmo!untary intoxication
>> derense at this time. the State has opened the door by the many out of
Sharon Fernandez >> contest statements that frankly at this time, it makes no difference as to
>> supeficial di>Jsion we have created In this case. We need to pool
Geoff Fischer » together and we all need to work together wtlether it on behalf of the
c:n:ai! help@Hpd2.com >> guilt or the penalty phase. It has been tough to deal with the e...;dence
chris.el!rich >> much less with the di...;siness in our team. Can I beg you one last time to
>> let work together? At this time, I am all for introducing e\4dence of
Jennifer Tumer » his mental state, and as such I would like to prova that he was impaired
Lori Hocking » as a way to dereat the statements. Please let me hear from all of you ..
Kendra Brov.rn >
Uta>Ja Wiggins
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Re: I've had it Various Issues -Hilton x
In box Print all
Starred Betty Fuentes to Andy, bee: me show details Feb 13
Tum off highlighting
Sent Mail I'll sit dooo v.ith you tomorrow
Drafts
All Mail On Feb 13, 2011, at 6:54PM, Andy Thomas <andy.thomas@flpd2.com> wrote:
Clients MH
Betty,
=Closed orTransfered
Mise Can you please elaborate for me? Do you think the mitigation phase is b!ooo?
Various Issues ~ Hilton
Andy
5 moreT
Sent from my iPad
Chat
:~~:~~~:. .~~~~-~~-~~~!~______!
On Feb 13, 2011, at 6:28 PM, Betty Fuentes <betty.fuentes@flpd2.com>
WTOte:think t
Menibeth Bohanan
lri~;,,ibir,,.
I know e\eryone is sick of all these e-mai!s back and forth, so I v.-111
make it quick. I just want to tell e\eryone that it 'Nil! take a miracle
You are in\lsib!e.
for me to 8\ef wor1< Mitigation again. As I sit here on a Sunday
Go \.islble
night preparing v.itnesses and the power point I am supposed to
can phone deli\er I am appalled by what this mitigation has turned into. I can
Anthony Perez not bel!e\e that out of more than 170 people inter.ie'NE!d less that 5
Uar·c>~1(~ E\uH are coming to testify. Not only is this true but the v.-itness that is
Faye Dam the basis of all our mitigation Dr. Deicher Is not confirmed to come
Nicole Jamieson either. It saddens me that while the guilt phase was going on OUR
client sat there alone and v.ith no one speaking to him. This is
1Neekc:nd !11fJio>v !1,% .
vvhere all of this has gone really 'N!'Ong. This Is not a case waiting
Sharon Fernandez
for an appeal this Is a life going dooo the tubes. It is pathetic that
e\eryone from- birth has not helped him v.ith aU his Issues, and here
Geoff Fischer were are doing the same. We see him as a legal Issue not a
;:;:ne•'; help@flpd2.com human being, how sad. I can't do this for the law. I am so sony.
chris.ellrich
Jennifer Turner
Lori Hocking IMPORTANT: The information contained in this e-mail message is
pri~leged and confidential information and Is Intended only for the
Kendra Brovm
use of the lndi~dua! or entity named. This e-mail may also contain
Uta\fa Wiggins Protected Legal Information. If the reader of this message is not
the intended recipient, or not entitled to access this protected legal
information, you are hereby notified that any dissemination,
distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.
If you ha..e recei\ed this communication in error, please notify the
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Fwd: Couple of things
In box Print aU
Starred Merribeth Bohanan to Betty show details Jan 13 i Reply ! Tum off highlighting
Sent Mail FYI
Drafts
AU Mail - - Forwarded message - -
From: Robert Friedman <robert.friedman@ftpd2.com>
Clients MH Date: Thu, Jan 13, 2011 at 8:58AM
=Closed or Transfered Subject: Couple of things
To: Menibeth Bohanan <menibeth.bohanan@ftpd2.com>
Mise
Various Issues ~ Hilton
5 more. Upon reftection, 1will handle Deicher since he is going to lawyer up.
let's meet on 1/18@ 10 am for update on witness contact and lfst of non-stat mitigators.
Chat
L~~:~. ~~~:.-~-i-~~=-·-J
Menibeth Bohanan
Merribeth Bohanan
You are in\isible. leon County Public Defenders Office
Go 'isible 301 s.
Monroe Street, Suite 401
Call phone Tallahassee, Fl 32301
850-606-1023
Anthony Perez
:Janc.iilf.) Bull
IMPORTANT: The information contained in this e-mail message is pri>J/eged and confidential
Faye Dam
information and is intended only for the use of the indi..;dual or entity named. This e-mail may
Nicole Jamieson also contain Protected Legal Information. If the reader of this message is not the intended
recipient, or not entitled to access this protected legal information, you are hereby notified that
Sharon Fernandez any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you
ha\e received this communication in error, please notify the sender by replying to the sender
Geoff Fischer and then permanently delete this e-mail.
<"·: "tiil help@flpd2.com
chris.el!rich
Jennifer Turner
Lori Hooking
Kendra Brown
Uta\ia Wiggins
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Re: Proposed move
lnbox (1) Print aU
Starred Nancy Daniels to lnes, me, Faye, Betty, Chris sflow details 9/30110
Tum off highHghting
Sent Mail lnes, you ob\1ously wrote this e·maillate at night in a negatiw
Drafts frame of mind and I much of it is inaccurate and mischaracterized.
All Mail merely asked you to consider the mow; I did not insist that your
section go to the annex. I told you at the end of our con\ersation
Clients MH that I would wor1< on finding another section to go into the space,
= Closed or Transfered
Mise
That is the end of it.
I beliew I haw praised you and your di\1sion many times for the
miraculous outcomes you haw achie-..ed, and I haw personally told you
Various Issues ~Hilton many times how proud I am of you and the fact that our capital clients
5 more,. ha\e not receiwd the death penalty. I haw great confidence in e-.ery
aspect of your di\1slon's work.
Chat
Search, add, or in~te On Wed, Sep 29, 2010 at 11:35 PM, lnes Suber <ines.suber@ftpd2.com> wrote:
> Dear Nancy - Afer I talked to you about the possibility of capital mo\1ng
Merribeth Bohanan > to the little building accross the street, and the office's rationale that
> it will be good because we do not haw clients \1siting, I went and looked
> at the place just to see if i could be objecti-.e. The offices W"ere closed
You are im1sible. > and all i could hear were kids yelling and screaming. Is there a nursing
Go \1sibte > school downstairs? It was extremely hard with my hurt foot to step ewry
Cal! phone > single step up and down to get to the office space. MB thought it was e-.en
> crazy for me to go with the amount of pain I was haiJng but I told her that
Anthony Perez
> this is wttat I needed to do my health not'Nishstanding.
U;wc,in;.; Dull
>
Faye Dam > 1. My wttole staff declines and objects to the mo-.e because we want and like
Nicole Jamieson > our existing offices and nothing there compares to wttat we ha-.e. It will be
> a demotion for us to go there since W'e do now get paid for wttat we do. We
Sharon Fernandez > 'J.eN our offices as a small pri'J.Iege or at least I do since I ha-.e in my
!';~: r'o; ";'.<~<he, \ry lfo'\(.;-! > opinion, handled the job of t'MJ lawyers for three years, the office knows
Geoff Fischer >about it and not once I haw been praised for the job I do, All i ha-.e
~~r· ';;;: help@Hpd2.com
> recei-..ed from the office for the last three years are put downs and e-.en
> insinuaitions that I am mentally ill. I think I am beginning to belie-.e
chri.s.ellrich
> that i must be mentally ill to handle capital cases alone for o'.er three
Jennifer Turner > years now and successfully fn my opinion, i am sure not yours. We ~Jew our
Loti Hocking > offices as pri\ileges.
Kendra Brown >
Lita\1a Wiggins > 2. Faye and now I haw health issues with walking up the stairs. While
> those issues do not interfere 'Nith our job right now, it is '.ery unfair for
> you to require us to go up stairs. As you said to me, today, the last tfme
> you sprained your foot, you had problems for six months. I am in no way
> conceding that my foot problem affects my ability to be a good lav,.yer. I am
> onlv sRvin(] thl'll WRlkino Eln thP. stl'!lffi. C'.;invin(] R c:oun!P. of hnxP.s full m!oht
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Appreciation lunch various Issues~ Hilton x
lnbox (1) Print au
Starred lnes Suber to me, Chris, Betty, Faye, Robert, Julie show deta~f2!10·T·-·Rep!·y-T-·- l
ha~
Tum off highlighting
Sent Mail Okay. It Is time that I take you out to lunch and appreciate the hard work you done lately, !
Drafts including putting up with this week's high stress on my part and my constant bitching and
All Mail preaching about the condition of our files and how much work we ha~.e at hand. I am sure
tomorrow will be another bad day but maybe next week we can plan a break and go to
Clients MH lunch. Faye can I clear the calendar for Wednesday if e~.eryone can attend lunch? Otherwise
= Closed or Transfered
Mise
it will ha~.e to happen the v.oeek of September 13, JX>SSibly the 15th. Please let me know and
keep on working. we ha~.e two days off next v.oeek, and, I will be working from Tampa on Friday
so you will get a break fium me some next Vv"eek.
Various Issues - Hilton
5 more .. thanks for your hard work. This time the choices are Be!Ja Bella, Oli~.e Garden, Cabos or any
other place you wish to try. Let me know.
Chat
Goodnite all.
Sharon Femandez
Geoff Fischer
~, ,..,;:.i~ help@flpd2.com
chris.e!lrich
Jennifer Tumer
Lori Hocking <Newer 520 of hundreds Older>
Kendra Brown
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Georgia Project
1 message
Thank you very much for the summaries. Now what I would like for you to do as it refers to those documents is
the following:
•Pull all the DNA reports and have Faye or Julie make copies of them so that I can compare to the ones in
Florida.
II pull the interview of tabor at both times and give to faye to copy and incorporate in my file named tabor.
1PJ pull hilton's statements to incoporate in my file ... georgia confusion.
4. Pull the highlighted reports because we either have to copy and give to Betty as it concerns mitigation but in
any ewnt Faye needs to make copies for me and label mitigation.
-1 basically highlighted what is important . Would you follow with that.
Using your book of evidence , 1.0lume one and two, and all these reports track down the evidence here. Where it
was, who collected it and when.
-the knife
-the purple sleeping bag
-blue nylon duffle bag
-the northface
the boots
and all the other evidence that connects him to the evidence. thanks.
-rei north face sleeping bag
-who took the swabs and blood sample from dandy
-who took the swabs and blood sample from hilton, I beliew the officers were present in February.'
1007
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Filing# 80402686 E-Filed 11!vv,2018 02:28:30 PM
0~
STATE OF FLORIDA,
vs
CASE NO.: 2008-CF-697 A
DIVISION: C- HANKINSON
----------------~/
MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING
COURT REPORTER(S) TO TRANSCRIBE
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through the undersigned counsel, and
moves this Honorable Court, to enter an order directing that the 3.851 Post-Conviction
hearing held before the Honorable James C. Hankinson, on October 30-31,2018 and
November 1, 2018 be transcribed by the official court reporter and the costs taxed to
Justice Administrative Commission. The original and two copies of said proceedings are to
be filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Leon County, Florida within forty-five days
RESPECTRULLY SUBMITTED,
//s !:J&,£,.,.:cQr/.~..-4 _ _ __
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar Number 0144680
911 East Park Avenue
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111 Facsimile (850) 792-1113
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
COURT APPOINTED
alexlalramlawyer.com
1008
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy ofthe foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 30 I S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 3230 I, Assistant State
County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 30 I S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 6th day of November, 2018.
Is/Robert A. Morris _ _ _ _ _ __
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQ.
1009
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DIVISION: C- HANKINSON;;; : ..
THIS CAUSE, coming on to be heard upon the Defendant's Motion For Order
Directing Court Reporter(s) To Transcribe of certain proceedings in this cause necessary for
appeal, it is hereby,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Official Court Reporter is directed to transcribe
the 3.850 Post-Conviction hearing held before the Honorable James C. Hankinson on October
30-31, 2018 and November I, 2018 in the above-styled cause. Said notes of said proceedings
shall be filed with the Clerk of the Second Judicial Circuit, Leon County, Florida, within forty-
Further, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the cost of transcribing the above proceedings shall
November,2018. e
DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this~ day of
~
JAMES C. HANKINSON
CIRCUIT JUDGE
STATE OF FLORIDA
vs. VOLUME I
(Pages 1 - 2 66)
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
____________________ ;
1 APPEARANCES
6 and
7 JENNIFER KEEGAN, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
8 PL-01, THE CAPITOL
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1050
9
13 and
14 LUCAS S. LANASA, ESQUIRE
LANASA LAW FIRM, LLC
15 POST OFFICE BOX 10791
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302-2791
16
17 INDEX
18 WITNESSES: PAGE:
19 ANDY THOMAS
22 INES SUBER
25
1 INDEX (CONTINUED)
2 WITNESSES: PAGE:
6 BEATRIZ FUENTES
11 BEATRIZ FUENTES
14
15 EXHIBITS RECEIVED
18 STATE'S:
19 1 9
20
22
23
24
25
1 PROCEEDINGS
2 THE COURT: Be seated, please, folks. we're here in
9 Mr. Morris?
10 MR. MORRIS: Judge, in discussions with Ms. Keegan
11 from the office of the Attorney General, and I think that
9 Your Honor.
10 Secondarily, Ms. Cappleman, Ms. Keegan, and myself
11 have discussed exhibits. I took the liberty of drafting
3 it's misnumbered.
8 will be claim 7.
24 witness.
3 whereupon,
4 ANDY THOMAS
5 was called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, was
6 examined and testified as follows:
7 THE COURT: Have a seat. slide up to the
12 A Andy Thomas.
13 Q Spell your last name.
14 A T-H-0-M-A-S.
15 Q Mr. Thomas, how are you currently employed?
16 A Since January of last year, I've been the Public
17 Defender for the Second Circuit.
18 Q The elected Public Defender 1n this circuit?
19 A Yes, sir.
20 Q And then prior to that point 1n time, how have you
21 been employed previously?
22 A since 2010 --well, I'm sorry, s1nce 2000, I've been
23 1n the office, the Public Defender's office. And I was chief
24 Assistant about 12 of those years, and I was at the time I
25 became Public Defender. I was at the time of the Hilton
1 trial.
2 Q okay. Prior to com1ng to the office of the Public
5 A 1981.
12 for Mike Allen aga1n. I then went to private practice for ten
13 years. I then went to CCRC North between '97 and 2000 doing
14 capital post conviction.
1 that?
2 MS. CAPPLEMAN: Yes, Slr.
15 waived.
16 MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Judge.
17 THE WITNESS: That's to the extent the claims
18 involve that; correct?
19 THE COURT: It's been waived, thank you.
12 the head of it. I did not supervise Ms. Suber. Nancy Daniels
13 supervised Ms. Suber, as currently I supervise Gail Anderson,
14 who is my chief of capital. she reports directly to me and my
20 that work?
21 A well, there was a core team which involved Ms. Suber
1 sometimes expand.
2 Frequently Ines, Ms. Suber, was -- she liked to use
4 help with the cases. And so it was fluid, but there was a
5 core team.
12 A No.
13 Q That would have been between Ms. Daniels as well as
14 whomever the team members were?
23 and then we'll talk about how you became aware of it.
1 was some pan1c go1ng on, was the only way to put it. I did
2 not rece1ve these e-mails directly, I wasn't in the loop, but
12 Q okay. And so --
23 e-mail originally?
24 A Actually, it was -- if I'm not mistaken, it was John
25 Tomasino, who was our administrative director. Nancy and I
4 of the discussion?
12 that I've got the context correct. The late-night e-mail had
13 been sent by Ms. Suber to other members of the team; correct?
14 A Yes.
15 Q And so the concern was -- the content of that e-mail
16 gave r1 se to concern for Ms. Daniels and so she's consulting
17 you as her second 1n charge to what should we do to fix this?
18 A Yes.
19 Q All right. And then it 1s
1 this trial that our capital team was exhausted from prev1ous
2 cases. They had worked on many, many, many cases very hard.
3 The hours they put into Mr. Hilton's case were innumerable.
12 that she was going to speak with and/or counsel Ms. Suber?
13 A That's my recollection, yes, s1 r.
6 what the substance was? I recognize it's been some time, but.
7 A To try and put it chronologically, Mr. Friedman,
19 Q Please.
8 appellate division and never did trial work that I'm aware of.
22 disagreed. But I didn't fight with him. It's not my case and
3 A Totally accurate.
15 of a JUry and saying, when Gary Hilton was seven years old
16 this happened, or-- make it real, okay.
17 One thing we know in capital work 1s that you have
18 to have a narrative, you have to have a story, and you have to
19 weave it together cohesively for the jury to respond to it,
20 for the jury to resonate with it. And the worse the case, the
21 stronger your narrative better be in explaining to the jury
22 why you should not kill this man.
23 Q Did you voice your disagreement to Mr. Friedman?
24 A Probably not. I probably -- I may have said, you
25 sure? I may have, like that, but I did not interject myself
12 don't know. There's no word you can put on it. she looked
13 like somebody had just killed her mother.
14 Because she had all this information and she said,
15 Rob 1S not go1ng to use it. Mr. Friedman 1S not go1ng to use
16 it. And I go, he told me he was going to streamline, but I
17 didn't realize to the extent that I was getting from
18 Ms. Fuentes. And then she just kind of did a laundry list of
19 some of the things they had that weren't being used, like
20 videotaped preserved testimony, any number of things.
21 And, you know, I remember saying, document your
22 file, there's going to be a 3.851, this is coming back. Just
23 make sure you document your file. And then it got to the
24 point where Ms. Fuentes felt like she had to walk out on the
25 case because she could not condone what was happening. And I
12 when you had this encounter with Mr. Friedman from a time line
13 perspective?
14 A It was pretrial; it was pretrial. It was before
1 that may be able to shape, as you put it, why Mr. Hilton
2 shouldn't be killed?
4 the experts. I think I can get most of this in that way. I'm
9 recall.
10 Q okay.
11 A Either that or right before it started. But it
25 Q All right.
16 individuals?
17 A Merribeth Bohanan. she was in the capital division
18 at that time, I believe, as a second chair. There were about
19 five lawyers involved in this thing at this point and then
1 a bit.
2 And she came in and said she wanted to file a motion
3 to withdraw and withdraw from the team also. And I said, you
8 Q okay. And let me back up. Because when you had the
22 Q understood.
3 same time, I thought there were too many lawyers on the case
5 very aligned with and allied with Ms. Fuentes about the view
18 A of course not.
19 Q okay. If you don't mind, explain why not.
24 thought that was dangerous. And the time to change the team
25 would have been before the trial started, not in the middle of
1 it.
2 Q No doubt. And so your perception of Ms. Bohanan's
9 was going, but also she agreed with Ms. Fuentes about all the
10 information that should be coming out.
11 Q And the result of those disagreements mid-trial,
16 Q okay.
17 A she did not res1gn at that time. she wasn't with
18 the office real long after that, but she in fact did come back
19 to work. she just left the trial.
20 Q when you say that she didn't res1gn, was she asked
21 to res1gn or was she terminated based on conduct that occurred
22 during the course of the trial?
23 A I didn't, no.
24 Q Are you aware of the circumstances related to her
25 departure from the office?
1 A Not explicitly.
2 Q Be that as it may, shortly after the trial
8 any others after having spoken with, we've got Mr. Friedman,
9 Ms. Fuentes, Ms. Bohanan, any others that you can recollect?
12 Spencer Hearing.
13 Q You used the word "circus" to characterize what was
14 happening midstream 1n the trial. Explain why you utilized
22 insert yourself into the case, but you came down to make
24 A Yes.
9 detected, and I'm sure Nancy had, too. That they had done too
10 many cases 1n too many counties for too long. Pulled Coy
11 Evans out of the fire, which was a minor miracle, lots of
15 then they have this challenge and then it goes this way. I
16 thought it was psychologically, emotionally devastating to the
17 entire team and I thought they should be changed out.
18 Q And were you part and parcel of the decision making
19 process on the change out or restructuring or reshuffling?
20 A I was, I was.
21 Q In your role as the Public Defender, are there
5 A sure.
6 Q Yes, sir.
7 A -- this is seven years later. I've had a lot of
8 time to think about what went wrong and why. So, but I think
12 some ways.
13 I think they were just -- you know, it's like go1ng
14 for a cross-country drive when you haven't slept for 72 hours.
15 And that's the way it looked and that's the way it felt.
16 Q So after the Hilton trial, there were planned--
17 plans for restructuring and in fact restructuring occurred.
18 were there any other things that were implemented that would
19 safeguard or protect against similar things happening again?
20 A well, I inadvertently put myself in capital so I was
21 -- I didn't know that at the time when I was advocating for
1 team.
2 And then for awhile, we experimented with changing
12 yes.
13 Q okay.
14 MR. MORRIS: Tender the witness, Judge.
20 A Absolutely.
21 Q And your office dedicated considerable resources to
23 A Yes.
25 A Yes.
8 A I would.
9 A oh, absolutely.
10 Q -- every page?
15 A No.
23 the strategy --
24 Q okay.
4 phase?
22 North. And when I came back to the PD's office, he was one of
3 A No.
4 Q -- and strategies? No. so he was just telling you,
5 he wasn't inquiring?
6 A Not really.
7 Q okay.
12 A Yes.
13 Q But didn't intervene because even though you cared
14 about the case and it was an important case 1n your office, it
3 A I did.
5 Q so that's a yes?
6 A Yes.
7 Q And do you know whether Ms. Daniels or Ms. Suber
9 A I do not.
20 work.
21 Q I thought she was fired because she refused to come
23 court?
1 the office because you don't have the authority to tell the
2 lawyer how to do the case.
5 A In my office.
9 A No.
10 Q so you were not 1n her direct chain of command?
11 A Except in Ms. Daniels' absence. And my recall is
3 A No.
8 A Did not.
12 trial?
13 MR. MORRIS: objection, calls for a legal
14 conclusion.
3 1n on that.
9 A No.
10 Q But it was your testimony that you believe
11 Mr. Friedman is not comfortable calling lay witnesses?
12 A Yes.
13 Q okay. And you also touched on Mr. Friedman's
14 qualifications. How would he have been qualified to sit
20 he did appeals 1n west Palm. That would have been a long time
21 ago. That may very well have been. He was in private
4 REDIRECT EXAMINATION
5 BY MR. MORRIS:
3 he's not a monster. He's not the worst thing he ever did.
23 1 s.
4 at the office, how many capital cases had Mr. Friedman been
9 A No.
10 Q Your recollection is that he may have assisted 1n
11 some. Do you know 1n what capacity?
3 to one?
12 A Correct.
13 Q Mr. Friedman becomes second chair; 1s that accurate?
14 A Yes.
18 ran capital.
19 Q And when you say "structured at that time," 1s that
20 different now?
21 A I think it's probably -- you still have to have
9 A I think so.
10 MR. MORRIS: Thank you, s1r.
11 THE COURT: You can step down.
19 minutes.
23 sube r.
24 THE WITNESS: Your Honor, may I have my water?
3 INES SUBER
12 BY MR. MORRIS:
13 Q State your name for the record, please, ma'am.
14 A My name is Ines Suber.
6 A Yes.
7 Q And let me ask you, Ms. Suber, tell me a little bit
23 about, I would say maybe six months at the most, and then I
12 1n.
13 A Prior to my com1ng 1n, the office of the Public
14 Defender assigned -- are you talking about homicides or?
22 A Correct.
24 that division?
8 heard you say is, when I was assigned a death penalty case, I
1 A Correct.
2 Q -- in a direction that the death penalty did not
3 result?
4 A Right.
9 as a young lawyer, and when you would have been relatively new
10 at the Public Defender's office, Randy Murrell would have
11 been
12 A Right.
13 Q -- one of the most sen1or trial attorneys 1n the
14 office?
5 formed?
4 murder case. That was my first one. And then I believe I had
8 there was one more capital case that I went to trial at the
12 Q start to finish?
13 A two for sure.
14 Q okay. And did I hear you correctly in the coy
15 Evans, you said that you were lead counsel and the second
16 chair?
17 A well, 1n the -- what happened 1n the office, the way
18 I perceived it, was that whenever there was a death penalty
19 case and I requested a second chair, there was a lawyer pulled
20 out from the regular duties that they had to assist me as
21 second chair. In the Coy Evans case, Rob Friedman was 1n
22 appeals and he was pulled out of that. And he handled one of
23 the -- he handled a motion dealing with Daubert, the
24 admissibility of some toolmark evidence. And I handled the
25 rest of the trial.
12 A No.
13 Q -- one handling guilt, one handling penalty?
14 A No, no.
5 division of labor was you were to handle guilt, and then she's
15 chores.
16 Q In 2007, 2008, pr1or to the -- just pr1or to the
17 emergence of Mr. Hilton's case, was the structure the same;
18 that you're in charge and people would just be pulled out and
19 assigned or are there lawyers that are specifically assigned?
20 A Sometimes there would be a second chair assigned. I
21 don't recollect the second chair remaining in the office for
22 whatever reason or remaining -- no, scratch that.
23 They remained in the office, but they didn't rema1n
24 1n that particular second chair position for more than s1x
25 months, to my recollection. Like Steve Been would come and
25 Q That's correct.
1 A Yes.
2 Q So tell me, and let's just focus structurally on
3 what things were like. You become aware of Mr. Hilton's case
4 and that Mr. Hilton has been indicted and the State is seeking
5 his extradition?
4 A okay.
6 A Right.
7 Q -- and then you have the resources of Ms. Fuentes as
23 forward, Mr. Hilton arrives here in Leon county. And you and
24 Paula saunders are the people who are in charge of the case;
25 correct?
3 amount of work dealing with the media at that time and the
12 Mr. Hilton arrives, and it's you as first chair, Steve Been as
13 second chair?
14 A Been, Steve Been, yes.
22 A Right.
23 Q okay. And so did you and Mr. Been define what roles
3 A we never did.
4 Q okay. so --
12 time?
13 A Right, right. I felt that I had to be sure -- to
14 ensure that all the work got done.
15 A Bohanan.
8 that time with the PET Scan because there was a big ta-do to
22 A Yes.
25 and something?
1 A 600 witnesses.
3 when was there a point that you sat back and you said, this is
4 how bad the evidence 1s, this is how good the evidence is, and
9 to meet like every month, sometimes even every two weeks. And
12 work to be done.
13 And then we will talk about -- we would obviously
14 discuss the case and what was happening. And then we will
15 meet again and see who was done -- who has done whatever
16 assignment was. That's how -- meetings was a lot of the
17 that go with Mr. Hilton, and any other capital case that I
18 recollect.
19 Q But at some point, regardless of whether you're
20 trying a petit theft case or a death penalty case, there has
21 got to be a decision that's made on what your strategy is or
22 what your defense is; would you agree?
23 A Yes.
24 Q when did you make a decision on what Mr. Hilton's
25 defense was going to be?
6 A Assigned.
7 Q how long before the trial though?
22 time that elapses from Mr. Hilton's arrest and being brought
23 before the court here in Leon county, and when Rob Friedman is
24 inserted into the case, there is not any decision that's made
4 Q okay.
5 A Mr. Hilton wanted to have a trial or have life in
6 pr1son. The State did not offer life in prison. I prepared
7 the case for trial.
8 Q well --
9 A There was
10 Q -- and I understand that you go to a client, and I
20 penalty phase.
21 Q And what -- and that's -- okay. so we didn't have
24 that point?
4 prove everything.
5 So, so I discussed with Mr. Hilton that really what
6 the evidence was -- I discussed that there really was not that
7 much that we could argue during the guilt phase because the
8 evidence, 1n my op1n1on, was overwhelming. That I could
9 concentrate on making sure that all of the evidentiary 1ssues
10 were preserved for whatever purpose later on.
11 But there was one discussion that Mr. Hilton was not
12 pr1vy to. And that discussion was whether or not we use the
13 prescription of Ritalin into mental health, a mental health
14 defense during the guilt phase.
16 have to remember that the whole thing, that the chaos in this
17 case, pardon my language, started the minute the trial judge
18 denied my 90-day motion to continue the case based on my
19 representations to the court that the case was not ready to go
20 to trial. The penalty phase was not ready to go to trial and
21 that we needed at least 90 days to try to get it together, but
22 that was denied.
23 when that happened, we started -- there was a
24 discussion with Nancy about the guilt phase and the penalty
25 phase. what Nancy did was separate -- separate. He
5 at least; and why don't you go to the Judge with me and to the
7 allow us to prepare the case for Mr. Hilton. But that didn't
8 happen.
15 A No.
16 Q No.
17 A Not to my recollection.
18 Q she came after Mr. Friedman came into the case?
19 A That's my recollection.
1 prepared; why don't you go with me? And she obviously did
2 not -- that didn't happen.
8 A Right.
15 and saying, hey, this 1s the way we're going to present the
16 penalty phase. All that was presented was new to me because I
17 was not privy to any preparations.
18 Q well, you were in charge; correct?
19 A I was in charge on paper, but I guess -- but Nancy
20 had assigned Rob Friedman to be in charge of the penalty
21 phase. So he was the lead counsel for the penalty phase at
22 that time.
1 of Mr. Hilton?
2 A Not between Rob Friedman and myself, there was never
3 one.
6 communication or understanding?
8 They were having meetings talking about the guilt phase and
23 between
4 those momentarily.
3 handled -- he was the second chair for the Coy Evans case.
18 A Right.
19 Q But he's not handling the examination, direct or
25 A To my knowledge, he didn't.
4 collateral.
6 A oh, trial.
12 supervisor?
13 A Nancy.
14 Q So not to you?
15 A Not to me.
16 Q So, theoretically, you're reporting to Nancy what
17 you're doing for the guilt phase; Mr. Friedman is reporting to
18 Nancy what he's doing for the penalty phase; correct?
19 A Yes; however, there became a point -- there became a
20 time where I just -- I couldn't -- I just quit talking to
15 those meetings.
16 Q Ms. Fuentes was the mitigation specialist.
17 Presumptively, she would have been reporting to Mr. Friedman;
18 correct?
19 A Yeah, she reported she started reporting to Rob
20 Friedman. when the decision of the office was made that he
21 was the one in charge of the penalty phase, she started
22 reporting to him.
23 Q But she
24 A I believe that she attended the meetings.
4 1n late 2010 and early 2011. How many cases were you
5 handling?
6 A You know, actually, I don't really recollect. I
7 know there was a lot. I know that there was another
8 high-profile case, the Rachel Hoffman case, that required a
9 tremendous amount of work by the office. I know that there
10 was another homicide case that came and I believe it was the
11 German, German national that required a lot of work because
1 motion.
2 A okay. I just couldn't even remember an emergency
8 the table.
1 accurate?
2 A I don't know if it was November, but it's accurate.
20 to trial?
21 A Right.
22 Q Tell me how you don't go to trial.
23 A I told him that he could plead straight up to the
24 court. I probably told him that I didn't see any benefit from
25 pleading straight up to the court because in this particular
4 Q Emerson.
5 A Emerson.
12 trial and what the -- and what was not the benefits of going
13 to trial.
14 Q And you did that -- you had that discussion with
4 him what the guilt phase was going to look like. Then --
18 with Mr. Hilton several times in the -- during the years that
19 I represented Mr. Hilton. However, I did not discuss the
25 asked -- that I will ask Rob to discuss that with him. And I
15 1n the guilt phase of the trial. The decision was that you
16 were going to strategically get the jury on your side and
17 preserve all of the issues necessary by objecting to
23 go1ng on between the lawyers that were not even talking, not
3 that time, I was prescribed xanax. But I'm not sure if I was
5 medication?
8 taking.
10 of the Hilton case, after you've been told not to work more
19 (Pause.)
1 Everybody be seated.
2 You can proceed, Mr. Morris.
6 BY MR. MORRIS:
7 Q Ms. Suber, let's talk about what actually
1 for preserv1ng the record and ensur1ng that those 1ssues were
2 preserved for the purposes of appeal?
4 the trial, wouldn't you agree with me that the case was a
6 A Right.
7 Q There wasn't any, quote, direct evidence?
8 A Correct.
12 Mr. Hilton?
13 A Yes. I think that it was something in the record.
14 I don't recollect exactly what was said in the record because
15 I have not read the record, but there was a particular witness
16 that was called. The first time that I heard that name was
17 when Ms. Cappleman was telling the JUry something either at
18 opening statement or when they was telling the jury what the
19 witnesses were. And I heard a name that didn't -- that didn't
20 register.
21 Then, when Ms. Cappleman called that witness, my
22 recollection is that it didn't -- it didn't register with me
23 and I filed -- I argued that it was a Richardson discovery
24 violation. That's my recollection. It was one important
25 witness.
22 A No, no.
25 if I was not aware, he was not aware because I never told him.
4 A oh, yes.
5 Q And you were not aware of that during the week and a
6 half, two weeks of the guilt phase, up until the end of the
7 trial, essentially?
8 A Right.
15 just took a whole bunch of documents and just would come and
16 dump them on the defense. They called it like, for example,
17 State's Answer No. 6 and dump it; seven, 17, and dump it.
18 In one of those, in one of those -- as it turned
19 out, what I found out is we had the file on it because my
20 investigator Chris Ellrich, even during the, when I was
21 arguing the issue, he approached and gave me the file. And
22 the file only had one p1ece of paper, which it was his, I
23 guess, his testimony or the report. okay.
24 Instead of, I guess, you know I know for a fact
25 that I relied on the State providing to me the correct
4 statement, who was present. And that was never done in this
5 particular case.
8 documents.
5 not happen again. But that doesn't help Mr. Hilton, you know.
9 A That's correct.
10 Q But there are duplicate cop1es that are made for the
11 investigator, the mitigation specialist, whoever the other
19 to
20 A ultimately, it's my responsibility.
21 Q -- be aware of what's in those documents?
22 A Correct.
25 A No.
4 A No.
5 Q okay.
9 come in, are they Bates stamped? Are they indexed? Are they
10 placed in alphabetical order? How are they categorized and
11 organized?
24 kept 1n my office.
3 A Yes.
8 took what.
6 (Attorneys confer.)
7 CROSS EXAMINATION
8 BY MS. (APPLEMAN:
12 A Yes, and I
13 Q when did you
14 A -- you know, and I'm estimating on the times.
22 A Correct.
25 A A lot.
1 Q over 100?
2 A Possibly.
5 that correct?
13 A or maybe four.
14 Q how many jury trials have you done 1n your
15 career?
16 A Hundreds maybe. I just -- I was not prepared. I
17 don't know how many.
18 Q That's okay. over 100 would be fair?
19 A I would say probably over 100.
20 Q And you mentioned that you went to see Mr. Hilton
21 for the first time in January. Is that January of 2008 when
22 he was first arrested 1n Georgia?
4 trial in 2012?
5 A Right.
12 correct?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Entered a plea 1n 2010; 1s that correct?
15 A Yes.
16 Q okay. And how many of the other cases that were
17 listed 1n your motion for continuance went to trial during the
4 case.
3 on Marianne Bordt.
5 A And Travis --
12 out that that was not a case out of our jurisdiction, but it
13 was a case out of I think it was St. Johns or Duval county.
14 There was some work done in the case, in that case.
20 during the same time you represented Mr. Hilton quite a bit.
21 A uh-huh.
1 just don't recollect all the the Angela Prim was reassigned
2 when I actually was about to go into trial. And that ended up
12 A To free up.
13 Q And in fact there were several cases that were
14 reassigned in order to free you up to work on Mr. Hilton's
1 between you and Ms. Daniels back in November of 2010 where she
2 indicated that she had reassigned -- the case names are
5 on Hilton?
18 thing.
19 Q All right. And what about motions, do you know how
22 filed motions. I know that even Bill McLain filed one motion.
19 A Right.
22 Q who was responsible for making sure that you had the
23 resources that you needed to get prepared?
24 A The office, I guess.
1 A Nancy Daniels.
2 Q Did you go to her with requests for additional help
3 or resources?
8 research that.
12 were burned that were found. And they were being said that it
13 was the victim's. And I spent a lot of research as to how
14 they could -- they could determine that.
22 the digital evidence that came into play. There was some
5 A Right.
3 A Yes.
8 Q which means you knew all the other names that were
10 A Right, right.
11 Q And then you went back to your office and looked
22 Q okay. And the remedy that was g1ven to you was you
23 were given an opportunity to talk to the witness?
24 A Right.
3 1n the hallway --
4 A I was --
5 Q instead of deposing?
12 A Yes.
13 Q And what 1s it that you would have done, had you had
14 more time in reference to that witness?
5 A Right.
15 Q But at the time you were being told you would not be
16 granted access
17 A No.
18 Q -- to do that investigation?
20 be vacated, so to speak.
21 Q All right. And were there any other substantive
22 witnesses that were called in the case that you did not know
23 about?
24 A Not to my knowledge.
4 A Yes, yes.
1 A Right.
2 Q --of this trial, your use of any drugs or alcohol.
12 hours; correct?
13 A Right.
14 Q But did you have a mental breakdown at any point
15 A No
16 Q during the pendency of this trial?
17 A not that I recollect that I was -- no, I didn't
20 could do better?
21 A No, I didn't collapse in the courtroom. I didn't
22 collapse in my office. I didn't ask somebody to help me drive
23 to my house. None of that happened.
24 Q Did you find yourself in a mental state where you
25 felt that you could not adequately prepare for or defend this
1 case?
2 A No.
4 of this case?
8 A No.
17 Q what's borderline?
18 A Borderline, sometimes that I ask for mistrials a
19 lot. And, you know, I ask for mistrials a lot and maybe I get
3 Q All right. Did you feel any more stressed out than
6 stressed out with the other cases as well, but I just could
7 not compare because I didn't measure I was not aware that I
8 had to compare. Does that make sense?
9 Q It's been described to me that you always get spun
10 up really tight when it's trial time. would you agree with
11 that characterization?
20 A I did.
21 Q All right. And during the 90 additional days, if
22 you had been granted those days, there would have been some
24 A Right.
1 have or did you plan to take off some time during those
2 holidays?
20 (Attorneys confer.)
21 MR. MORRIS: Judge, Ms. Cappleman and I just
23 (Pause.)
25 whole e-mail?
1 BY MS. (APPLEMAN:
2 Q I want you to read it to yourself.
3 A okay.
4 (Pause.)
5 A okay.
20 A Yeah, but.
21 Q That's okay. That's all I want to ask.
22 A okay.
1 A Yes.
2 Q okay. And you also mention 1n those e-mails that
3 the members of your team are also planning to take some time
6 Q No.
7 A okay.
9 specifically ask you about 1s, you know, you mentioned that
10 you had been feeling burnt out and you had been working quite
11 a bit already, pr1or to the continuance or the denial of the
24 case?
25 A It's not the first time; however, it's one of the
5 Q on several occasions?
10 A Yeah.
11 Q -- 1n the time allotted?
12 A (Nods affirmatively.)
13 Q were you able to take off time for the holidays?
14 That year?
15 A I don't recollect.
16 Q But you definitely didn't take off five weeks; did
17 you?
18 A No.
19 Q Or any weeks?
1 A No.
2 Q Did you ever refuse to let any member of the defense
4 this case?
5 A Refuse the people to v1ew documents?
6 Q Refuse to let members of your defense team, whoever
7 they were at any given time, view materials and files
8 associated with this case?
9 A No, that's not true. I never refused. They had a
10 copy themselves.
11 Q All right. You were asked about Ms. Bohanan and you
15 A No.
16 Q Do you know -- were you present when an incident
17 occurred in court where Ms. Bohanan was speaking to Mr. Hilton
18 1n a way that other members of the team felt was an ethical
19 problem?
20 A I was present.
21 Q All right. And what occurred in that incident?
25 did she have to leave the courtroom. And I said, no, you
3 then after that, I saw Friedman and Andy Thomas coming in and
12 ordinary.
13 Q okay. But whatever that incident was, it was
14 addressed and Ms. Bohanan was not present any longer in the
3 A oh, yes.
6 I first got -- went to meet with Mr. Hilton, and several times
8 Q And what was his behavior like when you observed him
9 on those occasions?
10 A He -- I'm not a mental health expert, but he was
11 mentally disturbed or ill. He would talk and ramble and
25 A Right, yes.
3 trial?
4 A My recollection was that I was.
5 Q How many times did you meet with Mr. Hilton pr1or to
6 his trial?
7 A I'm not sure how many times, but the policy was that
3 progressing I guess.
6 A oh, yes --
11 record about the evidence against Mr. Hilton and how your
24 A Right.
1 plea to go through?
2 A I -- my efforts started before the case was even
18 A No.
19 Q And that was in spite of multiple meetings with
20 myself and/or Mr. Meggs?
21 A Many, many, many requests.
23 A Right.
3 throughout the time that you were prepar1ng for this case 1n
12 things that you thought you could make the most headway on and
13 stick to those; so more of a sniper approach. why did you
14 select
22 they were going to say that he used it for the murder, which
23 was not true. so I needed to object to those.
24 Q All right. And my recollection is that you had some
25 success there because I ended up having to scramble to find
12 client?
13 A Yes.
14 Q You argued that the beads were not a match, that
20 A Right.
21 Q And that the DNA was contaminated; and there was at
1 A Per se, per se that Mr. Hilton told me, Ines, I want
2 you to fight every single evidence, no. But Mr. Hilton wanted
25 Ellrich, and I think Merribeth was there. The whole team was
1 there.
2 And the issue was there because I had started to say
25 against?
15 the evidence that Mr. Hilton had his dog in the Department of
16 Law Enforcement, his dog of many years, Ranger, he still has
17 him there, you know, during the trial.
18 Q okay.
19 A You know, it was just it was just a talk about
20 what to do in the guilt phase is what I -- you know, and the
21 penalty phase.
22 Q Did you feel that something you did during the guilt
23 phase harmed the theory of the penalty phase?
24 A I don't remember having that defense. All I
25 remember having -- saying during the trial was that the
1 evidence did not prove first degree murder and go with it.
2 You know, it is almost like there is a reasonable doubt, you
16 (Attorneys confer.)
17 MS. (APPLEMAN: Nothing further.
18 THE COURT: How long are you going to be,
19 Mr. Morris?
20 MS. MORRIS: Short, Judge.
21 REDIRECT EXAMINATION
22 BY MR. MORRIS:
25 case; correct?
1 A No.
2 Q So there wasn't anything -- in the absence of a
10 A Right, basically.
11 Q And I want to clarify Ms. Bohanan being kicked out
12 of the courtroom.
13 A okay.
14 Q It wasn't the Judge that kicked her out, it was her
23 correct?
24 A That's my recollection.
1 time that you got to November and December of 2010 and January
2 of 2011, the case was not prepared for trial; correct?
12 lead lawyer.
13 Q okay.
14 A Once Nancy Daniels made him the lead lawyer for the
23 was the lead lawyer and I asked for a 90-day continuance and
24 the 1ssue was that the case was not prepared. I was not
25 prepared.
1 Q And was the reason that the case was not prepared is
2 because it was your hope and desire that the case be resolved
3 through a plea and because of that, work was not done on the
4 case?
5 A No, because I was from day one -- the State was not
8 Ms. saunders and all of the people that were associated with
1 wasn't prepared?
2 A No. You know, every time that I went to work
1 But I guess you have a number where you can reach her?
2 MS. CAPPLEMAN: Yes, sir.
8 until 1:30.
1 Honor.
2 THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead, Mr. Morris.
4 or not you can hear the audio. can you hear us okay?
15 microphone?
16 MR. MORRIS: Dr. camp, any change? Dr. camp, you
17 can hear me now?
18 Are you trying to adjust the audio there?
19 UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER: We do have a telephone
3 hear me now?
8 (off-the-record discussion.)
9 (Pause.)
10 (Conference call initiated.)
11 THE COURT: All right. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.
20 DIRECT EXAMINATION
21 BY MR. MORRIS:
23 A Norman M. camp.
1 A C-A-M-P.
2 Q All right. And, Dr. camp, are you presently
3 employed?
20 A university of Tennessee.
21 Q And you obtained an MD from the university of
22 Tennessee?
23 A That's correct.
25 other instances?
20 military?
21 A That would be correct.
15 here.
16 There's two -- there's two lines of records that are
17 pertinent. And one is from the command and the other would be
18 from the medical records. The records from the command are
19 were sketchy. And primarily I had a summary, let me see, of
20 the counseling, a summary from a Captain Poor, who was
21 documenting the information for -- that the application for
22 Mr. Hilton to receive a discharge from the Army, an
23 administrative discharge for unsuitability under the Army
24 regulations that pertained at the time.
25 And so what I had there was a summary of his
8 there and sought help. I don't know how much detail you want
9 me to get into for that. Then I was able to read a -- pardon
10 me, let me back up.
11 From that appearance at the emergency room, he was
4 Army.
4 across the board, which was very out of alignment with his
5 being accepted into the Davy Crockett unit.
6 In June of 1966, despite that, that's one month
7 later, he was promoted from his previous rank of PFC to
8 Specialist Fourth class. And then in December of '66, which
9 is roughly six months later, he received his first counseling
10 from his commander for poor performance.
11 Q Let me stop you for just a moment. when Mr. Hilton
1 for assignment to the Davy Crockett unit. And then after his
2 assignment to that particular unit, he 1s then -- there is
6 A That's correct.
7 Q okay. And then was there any particular result
20 provided?
21 A He was not -- he would have had to have been sent
22 back to the States for that and was not sent back to the
23 States.
24 Q okay. And so we've got evidence of poor results in
1 not?
2 A Correct.
6 A Correct.
7 Q But there's not further elaboration to help you to
9 be?
10 A That's correct. And in this one statement that
11 summarized all these -- now this is also following his
15 unsatisfactory.
16 Q And shortly thereafter, some approximately three and
17 a half, four months later, that's when his second counseling
18 occurs; correct?
19 A No, I don't -- let me see what I've got here. First
22 review?
24 sure the dates are right, but anyway -- 12 March 1967. And
25 the physician who saw him in the emergency room at an Air
7 A Thorazine
8 Q Go ahead, go ahead.
1 Q okay.
2 A I wish I could answer that, but I cannot.
16 anxiety reaction?
17 A There is no -- there 1s no clear correlated
18 information that would help us understand that. There are
19 only hypothesis.
22 conditions were?
3 characterization of those.
12 military. were there any red flags that you were able to
13 observe from other collateral sources that would have been
14 important for the military to have determined exactly what was
1 would have checked out legal records and see, you know, what
2 the consequences of that were. But, incidentally, there was
12 time?
13 A I think the -- I think -- I mean, I guess the answer
14 1s -- well, I'm not even sure I heard you right. I think the
1 until you either make it or don't. And Mr. Hilton made it,
2 with distinction actually.
6 not?
7 A well, I think you're conflating the two
23 Thorazine.
1 and let's talk about your 1ssues and your problems. Dr. simon
2 was an evaluator and a judge and a conduit to administrative
3 action; correct?
4 A He's overseeing -- Dr. simon, best assumption, 1s
1 little bit?
2 Q I guess, based on your rev1ew of the records in
12 hospitalization.
13 But from my sense of what the military wants from
14 someone, I believe that at the point Mr. Hilton came to their
16 the military and was eager to find his way out the exit. And
17 this 1s the exit that seemed most convenient for him.
1 substance abuse.
2 Q well, it's suggested that-- and as you're aware,
10 A I would agree.
11 Q okay. And we don't know exactly the root or the
1 might end up with a pens1on from the Army, which might follow,
2 and so on and so forth. So there is a point of decision that
12 CROSS EXAMINATION
13 BY MS. CAPPLEMAN:
14 Q Hello, Dr. camp.
15 A Hello.
16 Q so you personally have never met nor examined the
17 defendant 1n this case?
18 A Correct.
19 Q Nor have you completed or done any kind of testing
20 on him?
21 A Correct.
25 A Correct.
15 A Correct.
19 false pretenses?
23 false pretenses?
20 correct?
21 A Correct.
1 Q And
2 A I'm sorry, forgive me, with a complaint of
3 hallucinations.
15 Q okay.
16 A so if he ends up anx1ous and agitated, something
17 additional on top of baseline is going on.
18 Q All right. so we've got anxiety and we've got
19 hallucinations, or at least a report of hallucinations?
12 hinge too much off of what I'm labeling them. They also are
13 called major tranquilizers. And shorthand, and of course the
14 greatest utility is for individuals that are suffering with a
15 psychosis.
16 Q okay. And was there any mention anywhere in the
17 records that you reviewed of him being prescribed any Ritalin?
18 A Negative.
19 Q All right. And were you suggesting that the
4 you saw. Do you know what drugs, if any, were being used or
9 Q okay.
10 A That's the only drug that I'm -- that I've heard
11 about mentioned specifically.
6 to be more protracted.
8 Ms. Fuentes.
18 assist you.
19 MR. MORRIS: Yes, Slr.
4 to do it all at once.
5 MS. MORRIS: Yes, s1r, Judge. And we troubleshot
6 enough that I don't have too many speed bumps on the
7 phone.
8 The defense would call Ms. Fuentes.
9 THE COURT: If you'd face the clerk and be sworn,
10 please.
11 whereupon,
12 BEATRIZ FUENTES
13 was called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, was
14 examined and testified as follows:
15 THE COURT: Have a seat. slide up to the
16 microphone, please.
17 DIRECT EXAMINATION
18 BY MR. MORRIS:
19 Q can you state your name for the record, please,
20 ma'am?
21 A Beatriz, B-E-A-T-R-I-Z, Fuentes, F-U-E-N-T-E-S.
22 Q And, Ms. Fuentes, how are you employed?
23 A I am a mitigation specialist.
24 Q okay. And tell me-- I know we're not 1n front of a
25 jury, but tell me what a mitigation specialist is briefly.
9 a mitigation specialist.
19 BY MR. MORRIS:
9 been probably '99. Then I did felonies for a long time. And
10 then in 2000, probably 2001, somewhere around that, the dates
11 might be off, I worked on a murder case, the first murder case
4 do things in-house?
5 A Right.
9 A Right.
10 Q Any particular training that you received above and
11 beyond just the simple boots on the ground, hands getting
22 A Yes.
25 A Yes.
8 Green; and there was Coy Evans without the title; and Meyer
12 trial .
13 Q understood. At the time that Mr. Hilton was
14 arrested and the case came to exist, tell us how the office of
20 Q okay.
21 A That's how it started.
22 Q And when you say that Steve Been was the second, I
23 think that I have different views or definitions of what a
24 second chair means versus what we've heard from the testimony
25 perspective. what exactly -- what was the difference between
1 but Georgia was go1ng to have him take a plea so it would have
2 been just North carolina and Florida.
1 A Yes.
2 Q So you're getting some baseline information from
3 Mr. Hilton to figure out where you need to be going and what
6 You know, you get one person and then they lead you to other
7 people and then -- until you run out of people is basically
8 what it 1s.
15 A Precisely.
1 of the murder.
2 Q And I've been able to show you what's entered into
18 everything that he had done for his whole entire life. They
19 were go ahead.
6 was about seven years old when the Murphy Bed fell on his
7 head. This lady was very old at the time and I didn't know if
8 she might not last past the time of the trial or if she would
15 they had been destroyed. And so she was the only witness that
16 would basically say, yes, this thing happened.
17 Q And I'll come back to the PowerPoint presentation
22 pros and the cons of it. Here are the witnesses that I don't
8 information was also given to Rob and whoever it was that was
1 saw him pr1or to the murder in the Georgia one, not just the
2 Tallahassee one, but so there were people who saw him
3 acting in very odd ways before this case or right after he was
12 A Yes.
13 Q Is there anything that you're able to reference that
14 you're able to give us any specificity of names or who those
1 are not completely the foster care parents, but some of the
2 people that took care of him because they were friends of his
3 mother.
4 And then there is Victorine, V-I-C-T-0-R-I-N-E,
5 Rowe, R-0-W-E. And she's one that was there with the hitting
6 on the head.
7 Q You're talking about the Murphy Bed instance
15 with him and knows him, about him going to actual foster care.
16 Then was Sandy Herman, which was his first girlfriend. Then
17 it was Beverly Lehmann-Hilton. That is his stepsister on his
18 dad's side. And then there was Maria Castelli and Juan
19 Castelli. And I don't really remember what these guys were
20 I didn't write it down, sorry.
21 Then early adulthood was Leo -- Leroy Pruitt. And
22 he was 1n the military with Mr. Hilton.
15 Dr. Bateman, which was the vet that took care of his dog.
16 Then the adult during 2007, these are all witnesses
17 of Mr. Hilton that he used to visit candler Park in Georgia
18 and he was seen -- he was seen acting bizarre. Many times the
19 police were called on him and the police just tell the
20 witnesses that the man 1s crazy, don't worry about it, he's
21 harmless.
22 But it was Maria Linarte. Actually, Maria Linarte
23 was a nurse that lived next door to the Clairmont address
24 where he lived and she thought that he was mentally ill.
25 There was chad Smallwood, Justin wight, W-I-G-H-T, Karen
4 Nancy Linkesh. And all of these people saw him in the woods
6 Meredith.
7 Q So the people who saw him contemporaneous with
20 else's responsibility?
21 A It was originally Ines's responsibility for that and
25 called, but you would have been aware of what some of them had
12 told a lot of the things on the side, what was go1ng on.
13 There was the issue of bringing in some information as far as
14 his drug prescriptions from Delcher into the guilt phase.
15 Q And let me ask you about that. How would that have
16 been accomplished or how would that have been helpful or how
17 did you foresee that being woven into the guilt phase?
18 A well, the way that I saw it is that if we were to go
19 straight not guilty, with all the evidence that we had, it was
20 going to kill any mitigation whatsoever. Because in the rules
21 of mitigating a death penalty case, you never contradict one
22 with another. You don't play one against another. And so we
23 ended up playing one against the other in this case.
24 Q In the most simplistic of facts, I didn't do it, I
25 didn't do it, and then it shifts to the next stage that, okay,
1 he did it
2 A Right.
9 "we?"
15 Ines and Ines was -- said she would consider it, but she did
16 not. And.
17 Q when do you think that was 1n the timeline of
18 things?
25 which handles only death penalty cases. And I did that for
7 Ms. Fuentes --
15 HARRY K. DELCHER
16 was called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, was
17 examined and testified as follows:
18 MR. MORRIS: Dr. Delcher -- ma'am, if I could make
24 DIRECT EXAMINATION
25 BY MR. MORRIS:
15 A Yes.
16 Q Have you had an opportunity to rev1ew any materials
17 or Mr. Hilton's file or anything prior to your testimony
18 today?
19 A Yes.
20 Q okay. And I'm sure that there may be some questions
21 about what you've had the opportunity to review, but how did
22 you first come 1n contact with Mr. Hilton?
23 A He found me through his reading. He was researching
24 and he came to see me, see if I could help him.
25 Q okay. And what was the complaint that Mr. Hilton
4 was muscle pa1n, one was weakness, one was mind wasn't sharp.
5 He thought he had a variant of
6 THE COURT REPORTER: I can't hear him.
7 BY MR. MORRIS:
8 Q I'm going to have to ask you to speak up just a
9 little bit. That he had a variant of what?
10 A He thought he had a variant of multiple sclerosis.
11 Q Thank you. we've got a court reporter here pecking
12 away and she's got to make sure that she hears your answers.
13 Did you have any treating history or were you able
14 to obtain any prior history from another physician as it
19 initial assessments.
22 made the decision to see what I could do and see if what I was
3 A Yup, yes.
6 treat him?
7 A That's correct.
1 A Correct.
2 Q okay. How frequently were you see1ng Mr. Hilton?
15 note was.
16 Anyway, he came to me markedly -- 6/19/06 he had --
17 he just was a totally different man. He was rapid speaking.
18 He looked at me like he clearly was man1c. I questioned
19 whether what I was doing was really working. And he kept
20 com1ng or talking or saying, yes, it's working, he wanted
21 more. And I stuck with him that way, uncomfortable for that
22 last year.
23 Q Let me back up. when you say that he said that the
24 Ritalin was helping or working, was he already taking Ritalin
25 when he came to you or were --
10 A Yes.
11 Q -- 1n your doctor-patient relationship?
15 A Yes.
16 Q okay. Did you do any psychiatric or psychological
17 testing to determine whether -- the appropriateness of the
18 medication?
19 A No, I didn't. I looked at the existing symptoms of
20 fatigue.
21 Q And everybody in the room, Doctor, 1s aware of the
22 circumstances related to the medical board and nobody 1s go1ng
23 to hit you over the head with that and make you re-live all of
24 that. we'll touch on it a little bit. But did you refer him
25 to an outside psychiatrist for any testing to see what the
12 A That's correct.
13 Q And that was the basis of the inception of the
14 prescription for Ritalin; correct?
15 A That's correct.
16 Q okay. And then once that prescription 1s provided,
17 1s he coming back in to the office every month and saying --
18 A Every three months.
19 Q okay, every three months
1 something differently?
2 A Probably if I had known other things, I wouldn't
5 A Right.
4 higher.
5 Q And he's taking Effexor at the same time?
6 A He stopped it after a visit or two. He went off the
7 Effexor.
8 Q Is the --
12 A Correct.
13 Q was the reason for the every three month
14 appointments based on the Drug Enforcement Administration's
15 requirement --
16 A Yes.
17 Q -- as it relates to Ritalin?
18 A Yes.
19 Q Because it's a controlled substance, you're required
22 A Correct.
23 Q Do you have any indication or knowledge as to
24 whether or not Mr. Hilton was doctor shopping somewhere else
18 forward, you treated him for one additional year after that;
19 accurate?
20 A Correct, yes.
21 Q Do you remember when 1n 2007 your relationship
24 7/19/07. And he had lost his job and was now living in the
25 woods.
4 time?
10 time?
11 A Correct.
23 chooses?
24 A Correct.
8 seriously?
9 A That's correct.
15 accurate?
16 A He was reading a lot of literature, as best I could
17 tell, and trying to find what would describe him and would
18 believe what he read.
19 Q And there was a time 1n the inception that
25 what they read. They get all kind of, it could be this, it
5 sw1ng. And the body is what gets better, not the brain. The
8 work, he had no money, and he's mov1ng into the woods. And
23 think he had MS. I wrote down that he might, but it was not
25 Q okay.
22 way, I've just been diagnosed with MS. That's how long it
23 took.
24 Q so the 80 milligram dosage was prescribed to him
25 from June until July of '07 -- June of '06 until July of '07?
1 A Correct.
2 Q And that dosage was prescribed to him despite him
12 with him and I just could not believe he had that behavior.
13 So I don't think I would have necessarily put him 1n a
14 facility as if he might do that in the future. It never
20 Q christmastime of 2007?
21 A Correct.
24 A That's correct.
4 the Ritalin was what they were upset about and thought I gave
23 A Correct.
3 know exactly what they had written or told me I had to do, but
15 A No.
23 A That's correct.
4 CROSS EXAMINATION
5 BY MS. (APPLEMAN:
8 Q Georgia Cappleman.
15 Q okay.
16 A You just see them less frequently.
17 Q okay. And do you have any special training or
18 qualifications in the area of psychiatry?
3 Q when you said you first met with Mr. Hilton, you
6 Q How so?
7 A There was a restlessness to him. He was a laborer
8 that he had a number of ideas that I didn't think were
9 correct.
12 theory of why he was sick and I didn't think any of those were
13 correct.
14 Q So you sensed that he would be a difficult patient?
15 Difficult to treat?
16 A I wasn't positive I could trust what he told me.
17 Q And did you do anything
18 A But he earned my trust.
19 Q -- you do anything to investigate what he told you
23 has been with what he had, we ought to have been able to help
5 A Absolutely.
20 80.
21 Q But the recommended dosage --
22 A Is 60.
23 Q forty to 60?
24 A Correct.
3 the board?
4 A Yes.
15 Q when you saw Mr. Hilton for the last time on July
16 19th of 2007, was he given three months worth of Ritalin
17 prescriptions at that time?
18 A Yes. Am I coming through?
19 Q Yes, sir, I got it. And when he was g1ven the three
22 A That's correct.
25 A Correct.
6 2007?
7 A I have no clue.
10 A No clue.
11 Q The board found that you departed from and failed to
20 A Yes.
21 Q You were also sanctioned for failing to keep records
3 A Yes.
22 A Yes, yes.
1 A I did not --
2 Q All right.
4 Q And you were fined $7500. Did you pay that money?
5 A Yup, yes.
15 he was dangerous.
16 Q okay.
17 A No.
18 Q Thank you.
19 MS. (APPLEMAN: One moment.
20 (Attorneys confer.)
21 MS. (APPLEMAN: Nothing further.
23 REDIRECT EXAMINATION
24 BY MR. MORRIS:
4 max1mum dosage?
9 A That's correct.
12 A Correct.
13 Q so you would have g1ven him a prescription for 30
14 days from July to August, August to September, and September
15 to October.
16 A Correct.
17 Q And if Mr. Hilton had medication, Ritalin, on his
18 person from a prescription that was filled in October with
19 your name on it, that would be sensible; he just wouldn't have
20 taken the medication every day. He would have had leftovers,
21 if you will?
22 A Correct.
3 A That's correct.
3 A I guess --
5 BY MR. MORRIS:
8 A Go ahead.
25 Ritalin is a drug that you can simply quit cold turkey or you
3 s1x weeks.
6 suddenly?
7 A You m1ss the stimulation. You m1ss the focus.
15 with us today.
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
17 THE COURT: All right. Let's take a few minutes and
18 we'll finish up with Ms. Fuentes.
19 (Recess taken from 4:03 p.m. to 4:13 p.m.)
9 this at all?
10 A Right.
11 Q And that's -- your distinction is related to the
15 was go1ng on; and back and forth, back and forth.
16 Q Tell me about -- as we tease out what the strategy
17 was, what were your interactions like with Mr. Hilton? Give
18 me an estimate of how frequently you met with him, talked to
19 him, et cetera.
3 couple of boxes that were found 1n the woods that had all of
23 A No.
24 Q can you preclude the possibility that Ms. Suber had
25 those outside of your presence?
1 A I would say she did not. And the reason for that is
2 because her mindset was made the moment that we basically went
3 because he needed his medicine. They would not give him his
22 A It was forward.
1 strategy when you first meet the client, ever. In fact, you
2 should not even decide what your strategy is until you have
24 A I do.
4 would think or she would be saying. There was one for the
5 guilt phase and one for mitigation. This one was created by
6 me.
7 These are all of the witnesses that were spoken to
8 by me. And in this form, we have at the beginning whether or
9 not a witness is good for mitigation or not. we have the
10 name, we have the address, we have the phone numbers, we have
11 the date that he was contacted, and my notes -- very small
23 A Yes.
24 MR. MORRIS: okay. Judge, at this time, the defense
12 jury?
13 A That was my understanding.
14 Q okay. If I can show you what's already been entered
15 into evidence as Defense Exhibit No. III, and ask you what
16 that is?
17 A That is a copy of the PowerPoint presentation that I
18 was supposed to testify to.
19 Q okay. And let's talk about that. I know that
20 you're not a lawyer, but did you have a witness who was able
21 to speak as to the relevance of particular documents, as to
22 each of the particular frames or slides in the PowerPoint
23 presentation?
18 A No.
3 A Like 80.
4 Q Eighty?
5 A Eighty percent.
20 your understandings?
21 A In charge of which, the guilt or the?
1 the case, essentially Ines had been removed from the penalty
2 phase?
5 personality.
15 moment on, she didn't have any -- she was complaining saying,
16 I don't have time, I don't have time, I don't have time. And
17 so then Nancy, I think, took it on and said, okay, I'll give
18 you Rob, because he's the one that has worked with you before.
19 so here's Rob.
6 guess, lessen the burden on Ines and help her to get prepared?
7 A Right.
9 personalities and nobody can get along and nobody can speak
10 with one another?
11 A Right.
3 her.
12 A Yeah.
13 Q So what interactions are you then having with
14 Mr. Friedman to make certain of preparedness for what you
22 like this. And so you have to treat them all with kid gloves.
25 witness would get all bent out of shape. And they could call
1 me and say, I don't want to speak to this man ever aga1n; I'm
2 not coming. So then I would go to him and said, okay, we're
3 having problems with this. If you like, I will sit here with
4 you while you call them. No. He would just ignore that and
12 things organized?
13 A The only time that I did get involved in the guilt
14 phase is when there was a witness that was either listed or
4 door.
8 have her call me. whoever got to her first between the cop or
9 the people across the street, she called me. And that
10 interview was done on that Saturday prior to her -- to the
11 penalty phase that was about to begin.
22 And he said, well, I just have to tell you, Dr. Delcher is not
23 COml ng.
4 Georgia Board for giving these medications, and has put him
5 high as a kite. And then right after that, he starts
6 committing all these crazy things.
7 And so to me, that was the beginning or putting all
8 together all of the issues that this man had. Here is this
15 there have been human beings prior to this Ritalin that saw
16 him. There were women that were in his van, there were women
17 that went hiking with him. There were women that hung around
18 with him. And none of those witnesses had any problems and
19 were never, ever attacked by this man or anything.
8 A Right.
9 Q -- leading up to that?
10 A There was many times during his life that he was an
11 alcoholic. so he was self-medicating with alcohol. Then he
15 medicine.
16 so it was -- it was not that he was not having
17 1ssues the whole entire way, but he was self-medicating with
18 alcohol. He was self-medicating with other things along the
19 way, even all the way to very young, young.
20 Q when you learned of Mr. Friedman's intention to
21 streamline and not call the lay witnesses or Dr. Delcher, what
22 was your response? what did you do?
23 e-mails in the middle of the night and they are so odd and so
5 A They're both.
9 A No.
12 A Yes.
13 Q okay. so this was the breaking point, this was the
14 end when you learned that this was not going to happen.
15 Explain what your reaction was and what your actions were.
16 A well, the way that I looked at it is that if you
17 make a choice to work these kinds of cases where you have the
18 life of someone at your control --not-- maybe not control,
19 but you have the responsibility for this.
20 And so I had probably the worst decision I've ever
21 had to make. I mean, I had been at the Public Defender's
22 office for 14-and-a-half years. I had a family, I had kids, I
23 had you know, I needed the benefits, I needed all of that.
24 But then I have this man that 1s going to face death.
25 And now it's not up to me, death or not, it's up to
6 A Right.
7 Q -- I understand your rationale --
8 A Exactly.
1 case, they're go1ng to say, they heard it. And so then all of
2 this mess that occurred could possibly be ignored. And so
12 com1ng. And she says, well, you have to come. And I said,
13 I'm sorry, you have not subpoenaed me to come, I am not
14 com1ng.
3 clue what happened in the case. And then I came back. The
12 room and said, Betty, I can fire you so you can get
13 unemployment. And I said, Nancy -- (Witness 1s crying)
14 sorry, I don't need your money; I will quit. And so I did.
24 you?
25 A Yes.
1 Q I mean, you had a lot invested into the case and the
2 mitigation in the case?
3 A I had.
4 Q And when you learned that the mitigation and all the
5 hours that you spent was not going to be presented in the way
6 that you had planned and worked so hard to prepare, you were
7 angry?
23 studies.
25 A No.
12 her, he dragged her into his van. Then he went and he moved
13 her car to be on Capital circle Northwest or southwest.
14 He took her into the woods, he took his -- her ATM
15 card. she gave him the PIN number. At first, it didn't work
16 and then she gave him the PIN numbers. she was still alive.
17 He talked to her for a couple of days there.
18 This is really difficult. I haven't mentioned this
19 story. so -- okay, so he took her and she sat there and she
20 talked to him. And she tried to get him to come to christ.
21 And after he decided that he didn't need her
22 anymore, he did something that was very different than any of
23 the other cases. He came from behind her and she did not
24 know, but he shot her in the back of her head. And she didn't
25 know when it was com1ng.
5 he was very, very high, very manic. And I was writing this
1 A Yes.
2 Q And today on direct, you said there was no
15 A Yes.
3 A No.
3 A For Delcher.
9 A Yes.
10 Q could you tell us a little more about the context of
11 what Dr. Delcher told you in reference to that?
18 A of Hilton.
19 Q And you made record of this conversation 1n the form
20 of a memo; correct?
21 A Yes.
5 was not 100 percent safe around Hilton, and that he was
1 Did that include all the folks on the little three by five
2 cards that you found 1n his stuff?
6 A I tried.
7 Q Did you learn during the course of your
10 A Yes.
11 Q And how did you learn that information?
15 to that event?
19 A I don't remember.
20 Q -- the dad killed by the wife?
6 was killed, but does it sound right that your client would
7 have been in his 20s when the dad was killed? He wasn't a
8 child?
12 A Right.
13 Q Did Mr. Hilton tell you that he was molested or
14 sexually involved with an attorney who was representing him?
15 A Yes.
3 A Yes.
5 allegation?
6 A Yes.
7 Q what did you do?
12 (Attorneys confer.)
13 MS. CAPPLEMAN: No further questions.
14 THE COURT: Redirect.
15 REDIRECT EXAMINATION
16 BY MR. MORRIS:
17 Q Ms. Fuentes, were any of the witnesses that you were
18 prepared to recommend be called or that you had prepared to be
19 called, did they have evidence or information about the fact
22 A Yes.
23 Q And it 1s not so much Mr. Hilton's knowledge of what
24 his father had done as it would be to demonstrate his father
25 had problems, was abusive, psychological issues, substance
3 A Absolutely.
22 I assume.
25 break?
4 9:00?
25 may have the -- and the two that we did today were on the
4 you, Judge.
25
1 CERTIFICATE
2 STATE OF FLORIDA:
3 COUNTY OF LEON:
16
17
18
' . ;)lJ
--------~-------~-------------
19
23
24
25
1276
Filing# 81397703 E-Filed 11/29/2018 02:11:13 PM 267
STATE OF FLORIDA
vs.
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
____________________ ;
VOLUME II
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1 APPEARANCES
6 and
10
14 and
18
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20
21
22
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1 INDEX
2 WITNESSES: PAGE:
3 NANCY DANIELS
9 TRACY RECORD
12 MERRIBETH BOHANAN
21 STATE'S: PAGE
No. 2 403
22 DEFENDANT'S:
No. v 402
23
24 certificate of Reporter 451
25
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1 PROCEEDINGS
2 THE BAILIFF: All r1se. court 1s now 1n sess1on,
3 the Honorable James c. Hankinson presiding.
4 THE COURT: Be seated, please, folks.
5 we are here 1n State of Florida versus Hilton,
6 2008-CF-697. Let the record reflect Mr. Hilton is
7 present with his attorneys.
8 Are we ready to proceed?
9 MR. MORRIS: We are, Judge.
10 MS. CAPPLEMAN: Yes, Slr.
11 THE COURT: You may call your first witness.
12 MR. MORRIS: Defense would call Nancy Daniels.
13 THE COURT: If you would face the clerk and be
14 sworn, please.
15 whereupon,
16 NANCY DANIELS
17 was called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, was
18 examined and testified as follows:
19 THE COURT: Have a seat. slide up to the
20 microphone, Ms. Daniels. And for your edification,
21 yesterday we've already covered that attorney/client
22 privilege has been waived, so I would ask that you answer
23 any relevant questions.
24 THE WITNESS: Okay.
25 DIRECT EXAMINATION
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1 BY MR. MORRIS:
2 Q can you state your name for the record, please.
3 A Nancy Daniels.
4 Q And can I ask you to spell your last name.
5 A D-a-n-i-e-1-s.
6 Q All right. Ms. Daniels, I know what -- what you do
7 presently, but what do you do for a living?
8 A I am a lawyer, and I was a lawyer 1n the Public
9 Defender's office and the elected Public Defender until
10 January of 2017.
11 Q okay. when did you first become the elected Public
12 Defender here in the Second Judicial circuit?
13 A November 13th, 1990.
14 Q so 1990 to 2017?
15 A Right.
16 Q I want to talk to you a little bit about the
17 evolution of what I'll refer to as the capital unit or how
18 capital cases were handled within the office. And let's start
19 back when Mr. Murrell would have been employed 1n your office
20 before he went to the federal defender's office.
21 Just pr1or to Mr. Murrell having left the office,
22 what was the general structure of how capital cases were
23 handled within the office of the Public Defender?
24 A They were assigned on a rotating basis to the felony
25 attorneys.
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13 A Exactly.
14 Q okay. How was the decision made that Ms. Suber
15 should be placed in charge of the capital unit?
16 A she had done just about every kind of job 1n the
17 office. she had been in juvenile. she had been in
18 misdemeanor. she had been in felony, and she had been 1n
19 appeals, and she was a capable attorney.
20 she was very dedicated, organized, and we felt she
21 had the capabilities of taking that job, and she had the
22 interest in it. Not not all attorneys in our office were
23 willing to do capital cases.
24 Q I can't 1mag1ne why.
25 A And she was.
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1 the --what's the second chair doing? who are they reporting
2 to? what are their responsibilities? How are those defined?
3 A The lead decides what tasks are delegated to the
4 second chair.
5 Q so Ms. Suber, in this circumstance, irrespective of
6 who the second chair was, until we get to Mr. Friedman,
7 irrespective of who the second chair was, Ms. Suber would have
8 been responsible for delegating whatever needed to be done;
9 and she would have controlled the decision making, if you
10 will?
11 A Yes. This case, I think, was somewhat different in
12 that from the beginning we designated a lawyer for the penalty
13 phase, and and Rob Friedman took the lead role on that.
14 But it was certainly in conjunction with Ms. Suber. But I
15 I don't have a -- a strong notion that he was subservient to
16 her, if you want to put it that way, or that she was over him
17 in what decision would -- would be made.
18 It was more as trying to be a team -- a team
19 decision-making effort, and we had a lot of team meetings that
20 I attended a lot of. And we tried to make decisions
21 collaboratively without a real hierarchical structure, if you
22 want to put it that way.
23 Q where --when Mr. Hilton's case arose, was it your
24 understanding that Mr. Friedman was initially assigned along
25 with Ines? or did Mr. Friedman come later on in time?
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A Right.
Q okay. So a replacement has to be found, I assume?
A Right.
Q And do you recollect who the replacement was?
A well, I don't -- I don't remember who came 1n what
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1 think Nicole Jamieson was next, but hers was very short,
2 short-term.
3 Q That may have been -- and I'm speculating here --
4 that may have been a result of her having left the office and
5 relocating --
6 A Yes.
7 Q -- to a different city?
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1 the case?
2 A The ma1n 1ssue was there was just more work that had
3 to be done. There was depositions that hadn't been taken.
4 There were forensic matters that hadn't been fully
5 investigated yet. And ...
6 Q And let me ask you about that. obviously, you are
7 1n a management-of-people environment. was that the result of
8 work just simply having not been done and procrastination,
9 essentially; or had work been getting done?
10 A well, a lot of work had been done. There was a lot
11 of work to do. I don't -- I don't have a way of judging
12 whether there was procrastination. You know, Ms. Suber was 1n
13 the office every day working. she did have other case
14 responsibilities on some other ongo1ng cases at the -- at the
15 time.
16 Q Tell me about that. In terms of -- how many cases
17 was she assigned? And I don't know if you know a number, but
18 if you can --
19 A I don't.
20 Q -- quantify it 1n terms of a great number, too many,
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8 A Yes. And
9 Q And so --
10 A I was -- I was kind of trying to say, "where are we
11 on this? what -- what are we doing on this?" I would have,
12 you know, individual conversations with various members of the
13 teams as well, too, along the way. But we would have those
14 meetings, and I was getting the distinct feeling from those
15 meetings that we needed -- we needed more help.
16 I kept hearing, "we haven't taken this deposition
17 yet." Then at the next meeting, "we haven't taken this
18 deposition yet." And it was like, "well, what do we need to
19 do to get this work done? Do we just need another lawyer here
20 or what?"
21 so that's -- that was the background for me calling
22 Ms. saunders into the case. Plus, Ms. saunders and Ms. Suber
23 had worked well together on prev1ous cases. And so because
24 there had been this constant turnover of other attorneys, I
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1 A Yes.
2 Q Let's start with that. How did you deal with that
3 1ssue, that specific component? or were you able to?
4 A well, I was very concerned, and so I -- I -- after
5 the first one that I received, I talked to her. And I said,
6 "Ines, what's going on here? Are you having troubles?" And
7 she she didn't say that she was drinking too much or us1ng
8 any drugs or anything.
9 I said, "well, it sounds like you're -- you're
10 not-- you're up all night, you know, for some reason, and
11 this is -- just doesn't seem like you should be -- you need to
12 rest. You know, and what's going on here? Do we need to get
13 you some help? Do we need to get you into the employee
14 assistance? or do we need to, you know, get you -- get you
15 with your doctor?"
16 And she said, "No. I'm okay. I'm okay. I'm just
17 under pressure; and, you know, I'm not go1ng to get my
18 vacation, so I'm I'm just doing the best I can." And, you
19 know, "I'm okay. I don't-- it's-- it's not like that."
20 And, you know, as far as I could tell, she was still
21 com1ng to work. she was having regular work hours for the
22 most part. But then there was some kind of a hearing that was
23 scheduled where she was late. And, again, I called her in
24 Q Do you know if that -- do you know if that was in
25 front of Judge Lewis or Judge Hankinson?
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1 A I don't. I don't.
2 Q okay.
3 A But I know that, you know, that -- that was one of
4 my really strict rules to the extent I was any kind of micro
5 manager, it was about time and being on time. And I did talk
6 to her about that. "why were you late?"
7 "I just overslept." And, you know, "As soon as I
8 got up, I rushed right here." so-- and she said, "I wasn't
9 that late, and it was -- I wasn't primarily responsible for
10 that hearing anyway." And so I said, "well, don't be late
11 anymore."
12 Q were -- were there other instances of -- of course,
13 it's easy to play Monday-morning quarterback and in hindsight
14 look back. But were there other instances that manifested
15 themselves that gave pause for concern or should have given
16 cause for concern of her being tardy or ill-prepared or not
17 knowing what the subject matter was about? were there other
18 instances?
19 A There was one other thing that got my attention, was
20 an 1ssue came up with a witness who was going to -- I think a
21 jail inmate witness who was going to be a State witness. And
22 the team went into high gear about we've never seen this
23 witness's name before, and it's late discovery.
24 And so, you know, I -- I had occasion to -- to need
25 to look through the file myself. I was -- I was -- it was
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1 not?
2 A communicating, yes. Because I know -- I know we had
3 these meetings, and they were both required to be there and
4 talk, so
5 Now, on the same page, looking back on it, it seems
6 like Mr. Friedman was -- was doing the things he felt he
7 needed to do to prepare the penalty. And it wasn't really 1n
8 that close of conjunction with -- with what Ms. Suber was
9 doing for the guilt phase.
10 Q Mr. Friedman's assignment to the penalty phase was
11 not because of his wealth of experience in capital cases 1n
12 trial, it was-- his assignment was primarily because of his
13 prior relationship with Ms. Suber?
14 A Right. He had been second chair on a case with her,
15 and they had worked well together. And he had an interest 1n
16 learning a lot about penalty phase development, so he had
17 volunteered for that.
18 Q so Ms. saunders gets inserted into the environment,
19 and then there's been some discussion about whether you were
20 in town, out of town, conference, Legislature, whatnot, while
21 the trial was actually going on. what are your recollections
22 of what happens when continuance is denied in January, and the
23 case 1s proceeding to trial? what were your interactions with
24 the trial team then?
25 A I know I wasn't gone for all of it, because I know
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1 change before the trial. But at the time I didn't think they
2 were -- I didn't think -- I just couldn't see the feasibility
3 of trying to change the lead attorney at that point.
4 I think my -- my effort was more, g1ve more help,
5 you know, try to be more hands-on-ship here and -- instead of
6 changing -- changing the leadership, just trying to give her
7 more help and support.
8 Q so Ms. saunders indicated that Ms. Suber was under
9 performing or not performing well during the course of JUry
10 selection? what else do you recollect?
11 A well, I remember -- I don't remember anything more
12 on a specific phase of the trial.
13 Q we -- we had some pretty earth-shattering moments at
14 the resignation or the departure of Ms. Fuentes.
15 A Right.
16 Q The -- Ms. Bohanan. Disappointment
17 A Yes.
18 Q -- 1n presentation of penalty phase?
19 A Yes.
20 Q I've got to 1mag1ne that you became involved 1n
21 those issues?
22 A oh, yes. so that -- that is actually -- you know, I
23 would just say I don't remember exactly how long the trial
24 was. I think it was about two weeks; but when the guilt phase
25 was about to end, I had contacted Ms. Fuentes when she decided
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1 that -- and I think this was maybe -- maybe there was a day or
2 two between the guilt phase and the penalty phase. I believe
3 it was in that break where she said, "I'm not going to
4 present-- I'm not going to present my-- my mitigation."
5 Now, we had been working on this -- she had been
6 working on a mitigation PowerPoint for a very long time. she
7 had traveled all over the place. she had talked with dozens,
8 if not hundreds of witnesses. And this was supposed to be the
9 crowning jewel of the-- of the trial, this PowerPoint that
10 she was going to be bringing all this together, and, you know,
11 portraying all the difficulties in Mr. Hilton's childhood and
12 early adult life, and --
13 Q what was her rationale or her explanation for why
14 all of a sudden she's not going to do this?
15 A she just -- she stated that she didn't agree with
16 the way the penalty phase was was going to be done, and she
17 just couldn't be part of it.
18 Q Your response?
19 A My -- my response was, "Betty, that's -- that
20 doesn't make any sense. You -- you can't possibly not do this
21 at this point. This is we have put all this effort into
22 this. You have to do it. You can't just quit at this point.
23 No, you just can't do that."
24 And she was just, "No, I just can't be part of it."
25 I said, "well , listen, Betty, I don't want it to come to this;
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1 but if you don't do it, you're not go1ng to have a job here
2 anymore."
3 And she said, "well, that's fine then. I'm not
4 go1ng to do it." And I said, "Betty, please reconsider that.
5 Please don't do that. This -- this is -- we've got to do
6 this. This is --
7 Q ultimately
8 A -- this is the thing we've got to do to -- to try to
9 help him at this penalty phase.
10 Q ultimately, though, she did not reconsider?
11 A No, she didn't. And I've heard different things
12 about she -- she said she resigned or that she was fired. I
13 think that technically we allowed her to resign, you know, but
14 she -- I mean, she -- she -- her employment ended because she
15 refused, she was insubordinate. I mean, she refused to do
16 what I told her to do.
17 Q Did she provide you with specifics more than, "I'm
18 disappointed with what's going on in the penalty phase"?
19 A If she did, I don't remember them. I -- I don't
20 I just remember she just kept say1ng, "I disagree with the way
21 Rob is going to do the penalty phase, and I just can't be part
22 of it. And I'm not going to be part of him messing this up
23 and II
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1 for a while.
2 MR. MORRIS: Tender the witness, Judge.
3 THE COURT: why don't we take 10 minutes.
4 (Recess.)
5 THE BAILIFF: All r1se. court 1s back 1n sess1on.
6 THE COURT: Be seated, please, folks.
7 You may proceed, Ms. cappleman.
8 CROSS EXAMINATION
9 BY MS. CAPPLEMAN:
10 Q Hey, Ms. Daniels. Let me follow up on a -- a few
11 questions regarding the team and the structure of the team
12 within the office.
13 The folks that you had on staff that represented
14 Mr. Hilton, would you have considered them to be among the
15 best that your office had to offer at that time in terms of
16 experience and capability?
17 A Yes.
18 Q And you talked a little bit about Ms. Suber and her
19 qualifications and ability. what about Ms. saunders? was she
20 any good as an attorney?
21 A well, very good. she's an excellent attorney,
22 appellate as well as trial, and had a reputation for stellar
23 legal work.
24 Q what about Mr. Friedman? what kind of capabilities
25 did he have?
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1 A He, too, had done very good work in our office and
2 done a lot of different -- had a lot of different assignments
3 and had done well in his assignments.
4 Q All right. And were all of the attorneys that were
5 assigned to the case that ultimately ended up representing
6 Mr. Hilton at trial, did they have a good track record as far
7 as work ethic and putting in long hours?
8 A very much so.
9 Q And did you attempt to g1ve the team whatever it was
10 that they needed, either through financial resources or extra
11 manpower, to be successful in the representation of
12 Mr. Hilton?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Did you have any concerns regarding Ms. Suber's
15 understanding of scientific issues?
16 A No. she had had DNA and ballistics and tool marks
17 and all of that in other cases.
18 Q All right. And had she demonstrated a proficiency
19 1n reference to cross examining those types of witnesses
20 previously?
21 A Yes.
22 Q when you made the decision, pr1or to Mr. Hilton's
23 trial, to reorganize the Capital unit, I think you testified
24 that that was because the capital unit was -- had been working
25 really hard.
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1 A Yes.
2 Q Not due to -- it wasn't due to incompetence that you
3 were thinking of making these changes?
4 A I thought that Ms. Suber was worn down and
5 demonstrating some emotional problems --
6 Q okay. But she was worn down due to --
7 A that came to light during the trial.
8 Q hard work?
9 A Yes.
10 Q And doing good work?
11 A Yes.
12 Q And the emotional problems that you're referencing,
13 the evidence of that is the e-mails that you referenced?
14 A The difficulty getting along with the other lawyers
15 as the case went along. The e-mails
16 Q was the difficulty getting along with other lawyers
17 something that predated Mr. Hilton's case?
18 A somewhat, but it seemed like it got worse.
19 Q And you were Ms. Suber's boss, meaning she directly
20 reported to you, as far as up her chain of command would be
21 you?
22 A Yes.
23 Q All right. And what about Mr. Friedman, would that
24 be the same?
25 A Yes.
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Q Do it this way.
A Yes. No, I didn't do that.
Q okay. or change this?
A Right.
Q okay. so do you know whether your advice was
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7 BY MR. MORRIS:
8 Q Ms. cappleman asked you about Ms. Suber's
9 proficiency with respect to scientific evidence. Do you
10 frequently watch your trial attorneys deal with scientific
11 evidence and expert witnesses?
12 A No.
13 Q And I guess -- let me g1ve you somewhat of a
14 hypothetical. If you have blood that belongs to or is
15 attributed to the Defendant, quintillion times or whatever
16 these DNA reports have; and then you've got other items that
17 have mixtures on them, if you focus on trying to debate the
18 mixture items and say that, oh, that's not this person's
19 blood, then allows the State to drive home the fact that the
20 others are absolutely the person's blood. Do you know whether
21 or not Ms. Suber -- how she handled issues like that in this
22 particular case?
23 A I don't.
24 Q same question as it relates to the tool mark
25 comparison evidence, her familiarity and how she would have
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1 handled that. And you mentioned the Danny Rollins case. The
2 Danny Rollins case had tool mark comparison evidence in it to
3 my recollection. Do you know how she -- Ms. Suber handled it
4 1n this case?
5 A No.
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17 that; Nancy doesn't agree with that and I don't agree with
18 that? would that have kind of been the underlying
19 understanding of that strategy?
20 A I don't know. I -- I expressed it to a few lawyers,
21 but I can't recall it ever com1ng up as -- as an actual
22 decision that had to be made.
23 Q okay. with reference to the PowerPoint, 1s it fair
24 to say that you were not aware of all of the mitigation points
25 that needed to be made on behalf of Mr. Hilton?
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1 A Right.
2 Q Is it likewise fair to say that you wouldn't have
3 been able to pick out the most important slides or know what
4 their relevance was in Mr. Hilton's penalty phase case?
5 A Right.
6 Q You would have needed to rely on either the
7 mitigation specialist, the investigator, or the lawyer to know
8 what's the relevance or the significance of this particular
9 circumstance?
10 A Yes.
11 Q They would be the ones tasked with being able to
12 tell the story of Mr. Hilton's life and what got him to the
13 point that brought him here to this courtroom?
14 A Yes.
15 MR. MORRIS: That's all I have, Judge.
16 THE COURT: Let me clarify something, Ms. Daniels.
17 You you talk about these team meetings. Give me a
18 little idea in the time, let's say in the six months
19 prior to trial so we have a little context, how -- how
20 frequently were these team meetings occurring?
21 THE WITNESS: I'd say at least once a month. Maybe
22 some, as we got closer, closer to three weeks, maybe, or
23 two weeks.
24 THE COURT: okay. And who was involved 1n the
25 meetings?
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1 DIRECT EXAMINATION
2 BY MR. MORRIS:
3 Q can you state your name for the record, please, sir?
4 A christopher Ellrich.
5 Q And spell your last name.
6 A E-l-1-r-i-c-h.
7 Q All right. Mr. Ellrich, how are you currently
8 employed?
9 A I'm chief investigator with the Public Defender,
10 second Judicial circuit.
11 Q How long have you been with the office of the Public
12 defender9?
13 A I interned in 1981. I was hired briefly after that.
14 And then after a three-year stint in the Navy, I was hired
15 back 1n 1985 full-time.
16 Q You may want to slide that microphone back just a
17 hair, just so it doesn't pick up on you breathing. You've got
18 an audible enough voice that I think that we'll be okay.
19 so roughly '84, '85 you came on board with the
20 Public Defender's office?
21 A December of 1985 full-time.
22 Q what was your educational background or your
23 qualifications to become an investigator?
24 A I had a degree 1n criminal -- criminology from FSU.
25 Q what did you do in the Navy?
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1 mitigation specialist.
2 Q In the guilt phase or the penalty phase?
3 A In in both phases.
4 Q okay.
5 A And so, 1n other words, I didn't strictly work guilt
6 phase. In other words, if we needed help in finding somebody,
7 I would, you know, I would help out. or I would
8 Q okay. And did you search and retrieve documents?
9 A Yeah. And I would turn them over to -- to
10 everybody, really. we had kind of a system where everybody
11 got a copy of what I found.
12 Q okay. Tell me about when Mr. Hilton's case had its
13 inception, who was on the team? who was in charge? what was
14 going on?
15 A Ines was 1n charge. Let's see. Steve Been was also
16 on the team. Betty Fuentes was the mitigation specialist. I
17 can't remember if Merribeth Bohanan was on at that time. And
18 that's that's who I remember.
19 Q And I don't want to go through where -- what
20 document requests you made and that sort of thing.
21 A Yeah.
22 Q But Ines was 1n charge, and she's providing
23 direction and directive to each member of the team?
24 A Yes.
25 Q Let's fast forward to the s1x months before trial.
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1 what was the culture of the trial team from the inception of
2 the case leading up to the six months before trial?
3 A This may have been around the time when the trial
4 team was kind of bifurcated, where the -- I can't remember the
5 exact date; but Rob -- Rob and Paula, two other attorneys,
6 were assigned to take over the penalty phase.
7 Q okay. And so --
8 A Rob Friedman and Paula saunders.
9 Q understood. It's your recollection that
10 Mr. Friedman was not assigned from the inception; he was
11 inserted along with Ms. saunders at a later point?
12 A Yes, as I remember.
13 Q why was it -- why did you perce1ve that they were
14 inserted and things were bifurcated, to use your word?
15 A Because it being a very complicated and difficult
16 case with the prospect of the death penalty very likely, I
17 guess the idea was the administration thought that she
18 needed -- Ines needed help.
19 But it was different 1n this way, in that I've
20 always learned that the primary attorney, the first chair,
21 kind of oversaw everything. But in this case, the impression
22 wasn't -- and keep in mind, I wasn't consulted a lot. The
23 impression was, is that the penalty phase got to make and do
24 their own decisions about how they would present things. The
25 guilt phase kind of operated, it seemed to me, separately.
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1 A Right.
2 Q -- and helping Ms. Suber out?
3 A Right. Right.
4 Q How would you characterize Ms. Suber's demeanor in
5 the months leading up to trial in terms of her rationality or
6 stability, et cetera?
7 A she was probably a little harder than normal to deal
8 with. And I -- and -- and and it's hard for me to
9 characterize how much, maybe, more abrasive or, you know,
10 difficult she was being because it kind of ebbed and flowed
11 with me.
12 Q Did you have a different relationship with her than
13 others 1n terms of your working relationship?
14 A oh, yeah.
15 Q You -- were you on the rece1v1ng end of the
16 abrasiveness? or --
17 A Typically, yes.
18 Q okay.
19 A But working with Paula and Rob, you know, it's all
20 business, everything is professional.
21 Q okay. so it would get tempered -- her abrasiveness
22 would be tempered by Paula and Rob's presence in the case?
23 A Right.
24 Q so while she might be angry with you or -- you had
25 an outlet to be able to go and say, you know, I'm frustrated
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1 with Ines; but, you know, here's what I need to do. what do
2 you guys need me to do?
3 A I can't remember doing that specifically. And if --
4 if I did I -- I think it's possible.
5 Q And I'm not saying that you did.
6 A It would have been possible to do that. I can't
7 remember specifically doing that.
8 Q During the course of the trial, there's a fair bit
9 of evidence that there were some pretty major problems that
10 occurred. Do you have any recollection of any particular
11 instances of conduct or your involvement in anything?
12 A Yeah. The one I remember specifically was that
13 Betty wanted the -- Betty Fuentes wanted the penalty phase to
14 go a little bit differently by calling, you know, some
15 witnesses, and Rob didn't agree.
16 I wasn't around -- I -- I wasn't in on that initial
17 decision making. I wasn't really consulted about it. But I
18 remember Betty wanting -- was -- was quitting. And I remember
19 being called into Nancy Daniels' office, and Nancy asked me to
20 talk to Betty, who was on speakerphone.
21 Q You were called into her office?
22 A Yeah. And there were other people around. And I
23 said, "Betty, please don't quit, please." You know, "Please
24 don't do this."
25 And she said, you know, essentially, "I have to."
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1 And Nancy said, "well, you're fired." And then right after
2 that, said, "okay, chris, you're taking over in mitigation."
3 Q what did you -- were you familiar with the vastness
4 of the mitigation?
5 A Not totally, but I was familiar enough to sit down
6 and get smart in it.
7 Q well, were you familiar with Mr. Hilton's youth and
8 upbringing, where that happened?
9 THE COURT: I don't understand your question,
10 Mr. Morris.
11 BY MR. MORRIS:
12 Q were you familiar with ages birth through eight
13 years old, where Mr. Hilton lived and where he went to school?
14 A I believe I would have been then. I'm not now, but
15 I would have been then.
16 Q I wouldn't ask you to name the schools off the top
17 of your head.
18 were you familiar with any traumatic events that
19 happened 1n his life?
20 A I can't remember anything specifically. But, then
21 aga1n, I have data-dumped a lot of the information that I was
22 going through since then, so I my -- my memory --
23 Q well, I guess, maybe an eas1er way of me asking the
24 question 1s: comparatively, Ms. Fuentes -- how familiar were
25 you with the mitigation evidence and the witnesses associated
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1 And Rob would say, okay, well, let's, you know, leave out this
2 or leave out that, or he would kind of edit it.
3 Q I mean, ultimately, once it was assembled, once you
4 had gotten the job done and he approves of everything, what
5 was the game plan to do with the PowerPoint?
6 A That -- that I would present it as a witness, a
7 mitigation witness.
8 Q Did that happen or did it work?
9 A It -- I remember being on the stand and talking to
10 some of the stuff -- I remember it may have been interrupted.
11 I can't remember specifically how it worked. That's a good
12 question. I can't remember that. But it was -- honestly, I
13 can't remember if they allowed it or not.
14 Q okay. Do you have any recollection as to why or why
15 not?
16 A Not right off.
17 Q Did you have witnesses present to be able to testify
18 to the things that were contained in the PowerPoint
19 presentation?
20 A I think Betty had -- had -- previously had made sure
21 that
22 Q But recogn1z1ng that you had to pick up the mantle,
23 did you have sufficient time to be able to get those witnesses
24 and make certain of their availability?
25 A Not that I remember. It would have been very
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1 A Absolute control.
2 Q okay. when you came into the division and
3 specifically to Mr. Hilton's case, what was your understanding
4 of the strategy that would be implemented for Mr. Hilton's
5 defense?
6 A Didn't have an understanding of a strategy.
7 Q Did you come to learn of one?
8 A No. In-- in reviewing my notes, it's sort of-- I
9 don't know what the metaphor is that I want to use, but it
10 was, like, all over the place, you know, you would be working
11 on this, talking about this, just jumping back and forth
12 between different things. There's -- I -- I don't have any
13 notes about any strategy at all or cohesive, integrated
14 strategy.
15 Q And you used the words "integrated" and "cohesive."
16 why do you use those words?
17 A well, naturally, upon com1ng into the division, I
18 did attend a number of training, you know, capital training
19 sess1ons. we did -- I went to the Death is Different
20 conference on my own. And then the team went to intensive
21 capital training in Tampa over several days. And when I say
22 intensive, I mean, you know, it wasn't one of things where you
23 kick off at two. we went from eight in the morning until
24 well, well into after dinner and-- for several days, and it
25 was a bring-your-own- case style sem1nar. And, you know, all
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1 all.
2 Q You -- you referenced that you have notes. Did you
3 retain for yourself your own personal notes from while you
4 were 1n the division?
5 A Yes.
6 Q And so when you reference your notes, you're not
7 referencing notes out of a file; you're referencing notes out
8 of a journal or a logbook in terms of your particular
9 experiences in the division?
10 A Yes. I had -- I had a legal pad for each one of the
11 clients, and so I would take notes as to, you know, court --
12 court appearances, depositions, division meetings.
13 Q when you first entered the case or during your
14 18-month tenure 1n the division, was it ever expressed to you
15 that Mr. Hilton absolutely wants a scorched-earth trial,
16 object to everything, deny everything, and demand strict
17 proof? was that ever explained to you?
18 A No. And when I got into the division, they already
19 had the Hilton case. so as I said, while Ines was away, I was
20 trying to read the voluminous discovery and get up to speed on
21 what was go1ng on with the case.
22 But in reviewing my notes on this pad, and it's
23 probably not entirely comprehensive, but there are several
24 and I don't remember discussing anything with Mr. Hilton about
25 what he wanted to do.
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1 A No.
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1 talk to the fact that maybe I was a little too sensitive. But
2 it seemed like Ines was never happy or satisfied with anything
3 I was doing, and I was never able to sort of air any
4 gr1evances or work through it or, you know, have any real
5 understanding of what I needed to be doing, and it it just
6 became unworkable. I was very, very unhappy in 1n that
7 position after a while.
8 Q so how did you extract yourself?
9 A well, first I went to Nancy to discuss how we might
10 be able to fix it, and that was really the death knell,
11 because that didn't go over too well with Suber. And then
12 after that, we just it was absolutely unworkable. Maybe a
13 month after that I said, "You have to get me out of this. I
14 can't do it anymore."
15 Q so meaning that you tried to fix the situation by
16 going to Ms. Daniels; but when Ms. Daniels suggested to
17 Ms. Suber that something was broken or needed to be fixed,
18 Ms. Suber was not keen on that, and you were viewed the
19 turncoat and the outcast?
20 A Bingo.
21 Q Thank you, Ms. Record.
22 MR. MORRIS: Judge, I'll tender the witness.
23 THE COURT: Cross?
24 They are coming, Ms. Record. It'll be just a
25 second.
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3 BY MS. (APPLEMAN:
4 Q was the Hilton case a case that you all brought to
5 the bring-your-own case seminar?
6 A I do not think so.
7 MS. CAPPLEMAN: one moment, please.
8 (Pause.)
9 MS. CAPPLEMAN: Nothing further, Your Honor.
10 THE COURT: Any redirect?
11 MR. MORRIS: NO redirect, Your Honor.
12 Thank you, Ms. Record, for your appearance.
13 THE COURT: All right. call your next witness.
14 MR. MORRIS: Judge, I do not have any other -- well,
15 I could call Ms. Bohanan, but the difficulty with
16 Ms. Bohanan is we've been provided with some additional
17 records that both Ms. cappleman and I need to review.
18 THE COURT: All right. so -- well, we don't -- we
19 don't need a break until 1:30. I see you have
20 Ms. Jamieson lined up at 1:30. Let's do something before
21 then.
22 MR. MORRIS: I can be ready with Ms. Bohanan. If we
23 can take an early lunch break, we can come back and be
24 ready at that point.
25 THE COURT: Okay. All right. If it will work for
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22 BY MR. MORRIS:
23 Q Could you state your name for the record, please,
24 ma'am.
25 A Yes. It's Merribeth, M-e-r-r-i-b-e-t-h, it's one
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1 Judge Lewis, and when the judges rotated and it became Judge
2 Hankinson, it was apparent that then it was going to actually
3 be a trial 1n January.
4 My understanding from Ines was the parties had
5 agreed to that date, but it was for sure tentative. My
6 opinion, no one thought that was really going to go to trial
7 in January for real. But when-- the judges changes and it
8 was going to be a trial, then it was all hands on deck, and I
9 was brought into the case.
10 Q so once -- once Judge Hankinson had entered the
11 division, the matter was set for trial, it was everybody needs
12 to focus. And then you were brought into the division and
13 made part and parcel of the team?
14 A My recollection is I was part of the capital
15 Division before that, but I had not been on the Hilton case.
16 Q I -- I understand. I got it now. once everybody
17 starts working in the direction of prepar1ng Mr. Hilton's case
18 for trial -- let me ask a question kind of going back in time.
19 Had no one been prepar1ng Mr. Hilton's case for trial?
20 A well, I was on other cases. I know that Prim,
21 Angela Prim was a huge case I did a lot on. Lemon Lane, I did
22 a lot on. The Richardson brothers case.
23 There was a lot of things go1ng on, and I was
24 involved with those, as I said, and not the Hilton case, so I
25 don't know exactly what had been transpiring. what I know is
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1 when I got on, I went to Tracy Record to find out what she had
2 because I was told by Faye Dorn, the administrative assistant,
3 she had all the materials. so when I went to Tracy, I said,
4 "I need," you know, "your files." And she said, "well, I
5 never had discovery for Hilton."
6 Q so Ms. Record had not been provided with discovery
7 for Hilton, at least according to her?
8 A That's what I remember, that there was no such
9 thing. so when I started looking, Faye told me, "well, you
10 can go to the storage room."
11 so I went to the storage room 1n appeals, and I saw
12 this -- just discovery everywhere. And it was literally,
13 like, on copiers, on the ground, like in boxes, like, just
14 everywhere.
15 Q Any rhyme or reason to the organization?
16 A No. so that's why, if there was anything 1n my
17 office, that was what I had collected and tried to make sense
18 of. There was a lot of duplicates, I remember, of the same
19 number of discovery. so I -- I never had a complete set.
20 what I had is what I had gotten out of this room.
21 Q How big of a storage room are we talking about?
22 A It was size of the jury box. I'm not good at
23 dimensions, but about that size. It had copiers and
24 bookshelves.
25 Q And I've got to guesstimate that in order to
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1 information.
2 so I knew that I could either not speak with
3 Ms. Daniels, if I took this position; or if I spoke with her,
4 I had to do it surreptitiously. You know what I'm trying to
5 say.
6 Q I understand the word, yes, ma'am.
7 A without her knowing. And so 1n a sense, I became
8 like an informant at some point during the Hilton case to
9 Ms. Daniels because I was concerned.
10 Q well, tell -- tell me the -- okay. so everything
11 runs through Ines.
12 A Yes.
13 Q was Mr. Friedman a member of the team at that point?
14 A okay. Here is what I remember. I remember
15 Mr. Friedman working on a tool mark motion. I think then he
16 got some other motions dealing with FDLE things. And I was
17 asked to assist him with these. And I would go back to his
18 office, and he would tell me what he was doing or what
19 articles he had read and what experts; and, you know, I would
20 get involved with that.
21 However, that was all I remember his initial
22 interaction being, and he was very frustrated that he didn't
23 have autonomy, and he was still beholden to Ines and would
24 have to have meetings with her to find out numbers and names
25 and who she had spoken to and what was set up for when.
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1 there was a meeting with me and Rob and Betty where there was
2 that big witness list; and we all pared it down, the three of
3 us, to the ones that we thought we were going to use.
4 Q You, Rob Friedman, and Betty Fuentes pared it down
5 to the list of witnesses that Ms. Fuentes recited in the
6 courtroom yesterday?
7 A That's my memory, yes.
8 Q That was the understanding amongst the parties as to
9 exactly -- that was the way that the penalty phase was going
10 to be presented to the jury?
11 A Yes. And I know, I had Faye -- or someone did
12 send them subpoenas, because I talked to them. "Did You get
13 them? will that suffice for you? Do you need help with
14 transportation?" You know, those kind of conversations I had
15 with witnesses. And they were on board when I talked to them.
16 Q Roughly-- help me out. we've got a trial that's
17 right around early February. Give me a -- can you g1ve me an
18 idea on time?
19 A I know it was before the holidays because I wanted
20 to -- I specifically said, "I think we need to talk to these
21 people before Thanksgiving to make sure that -- when they are
22 going to be available in January and to tell them -- you know,
23 get them the trial dates and all that."
24 Q You had made contact with those witnesses
25 individually in making certain that the -- I guess the kinks
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1 meetings about bones and all these things. And every time I
2 said, "why are we doing this? This is -- this is not the
3 1ssues. These are not relevant."
4 okay. I was given a motion to write on the mov1e
5 Deadly Run, which I didn't think was ever going to come in.
6 so, again, I said, why don't I just call Ms. cappleman and see
7 if she's going to bring this in? I think I did, to get her
8 position on the movie. And she said, "I'm not bringing that
9 in." so I don't know why I spent a day or whatever it took me
10 to write this file this motion because it wasn't relevant
11 to the case.
12 Q well, and so I don't forget, initially, the mov1e
13 1ssue, the defense team had won a motion to preclude its
14 introduction. Accurate?
15 A Yes.
16 Q And then the defense team, through its mitigation
17 presentation in the penalty phase opened the door, and it came
18 in?
19 A I don't even know about that.
20 Q That's true. You were not in the courtroom at that
21 point.
22 A No. closing was supposed to begin Tuesday,
23 February 15th. And that was the morning I had a conversation
24 with Mr. Hilton about Betty's leaving, and that was my last
25 final -- I guess I came back down and let him know I was
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1 were not relevant. we had spent all this time on things that
2 I thought weren't relevant.
3 I was concerned that -- I didn't think Mr. Hilton
4 had been spoken to about his options. I didn't think it was
5 my place to do it. I wasn't the lead, and I didn't really
6 know all of the evidence.
7 But what I had seen -- because I did go to FDLE and
8 I did sit there with the DNA person, and I was very active and
9 listened to a lot of evidence, and it was done there for me.
10 And I thought at that point, we should go talk to
11 him and tell him that this 1s going to come in, and this 1s
12 obviously going to, to me, be overwhelming evidence of guilt,
13 and I recommended that he plea, and we have a penalty phase.
14 Q when you say that you recommended, how -- how did
15 you do that?
16 A I recommended it at team meetings. I recommended it
17 to Ms. Daniels. I didn't know that there was any case where
18 that had been done. I had never heard that, but I just knew
19 it was a very cold response when I had brought it up.
20 so my other idea was, okay, well, why don't-- the
21 GBI people have to come to introduce the evidence, so why
22 don't we introduce, then, his prescriptions of Ritalin and
23 Effexor. This wasn't just Ritalin. The Effexor, as I
24 remember from the toxicologist, was a big problem as well. It
25 was the combination of those.
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1 appalled that we had jurors left on that knew that Mr. Hilton
2 was charged with first-degree murder in another state, and
3 that they exhausted their peremptories. The judge gave them
4 more, and they didn't use those to strike those jurors.
5 And that afterward, I was like, what are you doing?
6 why would you leave people on the panel that know the man was
7 charged with murder somewhere else?
8 Q so they moved for cause to get rid of a juror, the
9 judge denies the cause challenge; but at their request, they
10 ask for additional peremptory challenges and don't exercise
11 them on the very witness that they wanted to remove -- or,
12 excuse me, JUror that they wanted to remove?
13 A To me there was more than one that was left on the
14 panel that knew he was charged with murder in another place.
15 I don't -- I don't know how you can be fair with that
16 information.
17 Q was -- was there any delineation as to who was
18 responsible for preserving any error that the court may have
19 been making or may have made?
20 A well, I know I couldn't speak because there could
21 only be one lawyer, maybe, talking, I think, was the rule. so
22 it was either Paula or Ines.
23 And I remember going afterward to Nancy and say1ng,
24 "we need to do something. we need to move for mistrial. we
25 need, you know, to tell the court something. we need to file
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1 thorough and measured, and I think she was in this trial. And
2 so there was a whole rigmarole around that.
3 I remember Betty being told to go see this person --
4 it was 1n Pensacola or wakulla, I forget and getting that
5 information.
6 Q Let me -- let me ask you about Ms. Suber's cross
7 examination of witnesses, specifically experts and things of
8 that nature.
9 It would be a fair characterization that she
10 objected to virtually every item of evidence that was
11 introduced during the trial?
12 A Yes.
13 Q During her cross examination, was her cross
14 examination of the witnesses helpful or harmful to the
15 defense?
16 A I thought it was harmful. I thought she brought out
17 information that the State was smart enough, in my opinion, to
18 leave out and to stay away from.
19 Q why why would it have been smart for the State to
20 have stayed away from?
21 A well, I think, why not just have a clean game? why,
22 you know, sully anything if you don't have to. There was
23 plenty of facts, plenty of evidence of guilt to not have to
24 sway into anything else.
25 one example was, at several campsites there were
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1 dogs that were beheaded. This was a whiff in the case that I
2 knew. No one particularly knew who this was attributed to.
3 It could have been said that this was Mr. Hilton and that it
4 was before the murders and, like, a practice or something. I
5 don't know.
6 But I remember that. You remember decapitated dogs
7 as being a part of a case. That was brought up by Ms. Suber
8 when the witness had not brought that up. You know, that's
9 one of those big things that I remember going, oh, my gosh,
10 why would we bring up this issue at all? You know, this is
11 one we would not want to go into and would not be helpful for
12 the JUrors.
13 Q Are there other instances that you can think of off
14 the top of your head that you had similar thoughts, concerns,
15 questions?
16 A I know every day I did, almost every witness. I was
17 just appalled, and I kept a list, and I told Ms. Daniels and I
18 wrote it -- I was told to write it all down and put it in my
19 notes for this very proceeding. And I remember telling
20 Ms. Daniels, "I feel like I'm the scrub nurse, and the doctor
21 is drunk and you're telling me to write notes for the
22 inquest. rr
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1 occur.
2 First of all, when-- when was the decision to,
3 quote, streamline the penalty presentation made and by whom?
4 A I don't know because I found out the day -- it was a
5 Saturday, it would have been the 12th.
6 Q February the 12th?
7 A Yes. That Betty was 1n her office. she was so
8 excited she had found Mr. Hilton's first wife, the one witness
9 she had never been able to find. she got her. she went to
10 tell Rob about how excited she was and found out Delcher was
11 not com1ng.
12 when I saw Rob, my memory is I saw him in the hall
13 that day when he came back from talking to Betty, and he told
14 me, and I said, "oh. when was that decided?" And I guess it
15 had been weeks before, and he had not told me because he
16 didn't want me to tell Betty. And he had not told Betty
17 because he knew she was going to get upset.
18 Q Had you been of the impression up to that point 1n
19 time, to the Saturday prior to the commencement of the penalty
20 phase, that you would be examining live witnesses before the
21 jury?
22 A Yes. In fact, it was actually the Saturday before
23 closing. closing arguments started, my memory is Tuesday, the
24 15th.
25 Q closing of the guilt phase?
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1 phase?
2 A By that point, I had three or four witnesses, and I
3 said "Here's all my notes on them, Rob. I think you can
4 handle it." And he agreed.
5 Q Explain the interaction that resulted 1n you being
6 removed or dismissed from the courtroom.
7 A I don't remember being removed or dismissed from the
8 courtroom. Betty, Saturday, sends an e-mail, I think to the
9 whole team say1ng, "I don't think I can be a part of this."
10 or sunday, I think it was sunday.
11 we had the -- she found out saturday. sunday she
12 sends that. Monday there's a series of e-mails, conversations
13 with Betty over the phone. It's obvious she's not coming
14 back.
15 Tuesday, open1ng -- closing 1s supposed to start. I
16 get here, it's just me and Mr. Hilton and the bailiffs. And
17 for some reason he asked me, "where is Betty?" which was odd
18 because she wasn't always 1n the courtroom, but I guess we
19 were together a lot.
20 And I said, "well, she's not here." I think he
21 asked me ask couple of times, and I said, "she is not coming."
22 And you think I said, "she's left the case."
23 And about the time he starts to ask me why,
24 Mr. Friedman and Ms. saunders walk in. They ignore me, go
25 right to him. He asks them, "where is Betty?" And they say,
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1 "she's very tired." And, "she's been working a lot, and she
2 was overwhelmed." And I could see him be, like, really? I
3 mean, if anyone knows Betty Fuentes, like, for her to just not
4 be at work because she was tired or overworked was ridiculous.
5 Q so the information -- information that Mr. Friedman
6 and Ms. saunders are giving to Mr. Hilton is tantamount to a
7 lie?
8 A I mean, I guess maybe they thought she was
9 hysterical or overworked and lost her mind. I don't know.
10 But they used the word that she had a breakdown. And that was
11 when I went like this to them (indicating). I don't think he
12 could see me. And I was pointing to outside, like, go talk to
13 me out of the courtroom. They did not. They continued
14 huddled against him.
15 And so I went over and said, "Betty had a difference
16 of opinion with the strategy of the case, and she's no longer
17 1n the case." I remember because I was very measured with
18 what I said exactly.
19 At that point Ms. saunders comes to me, so close
20 that I put my hands up because I wanted the bailiffs to be
21 aware that I was not doing anything because she was right here
22 (indicating). Like, I couldn't believe this woman who was 20
23 years my sen1or was, like, basically up in my face. And she
24 screamed, "You get out of here. You're not his lawyer."
25 I said, "No, I think I am. I'm on the case. I was
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1 Q okay.
2 A I did know she was taking some pills. I believe she
3 alluded to they were some kind of anti-anxiety pills --
4 Q But you don't --
5 A -- for panic attacks.
6 Q okay. But you don't have any reason to know or
7 suspect that she was taking any medications other than as
8 prescribed?
9 A well, the late-night e-mails, to me, sounded like
10 someone who was either on some type of medication that made
11 you sleepy or had been drinking or both. But, no, I don't
12 have any direct evidence or personal knowledge of that.
13 MS. CAPPLEMAN: No further questions.
14 THE COURT: Redirect?
15 MR. MORRIS: No, s1 r.
16 THE COURT: All right. YOU can step down. Do we
17 need to keep her any further?
18 MR. MORRIS: No, Your Honor, she can be excused.
19 MS. CAPPLEMAN: No, sir.
20 THE COURT: You're excused. I assume the State 1s
21 1n agreement.
22 MS. CAPPLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
23 THE COURT: All right. Do we have a plan of what
24 we're going to-- I'd like to try to honor Ms.
25 cappleman's request to break around 4:00. Do we have a
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23 BY MR. MORRIS:
24 Q can you state your name for the record, please,
25 ma'am?
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1 school degree.
2 Q were you asked to function in essentially what would
3 be a paralegal capacity? or describe what your work was.
4 A Basically, a paralegal capacity, as well as my years
5 of experience, input on how to do things, organize, tackle
6 such a large volume, things along those lines. Just what I'm
7 really good at and what my training has provided me.
8 Q Do you remember when you were brought into the case?
9 A Let me think for a minute. I wasn't prepared for
10 that one. I would guess about a year before we went to trial.
11 Q okay. so the case went to trial in February of '11.
12 So you're thinking back it up to February of '10 might
13 A That's probably about accurate. I mean, it was
14 it was a transnational situation.
15 Q when you entered the case 1n approximately February
16 of '10, talk to me about the organization of the case, if any,
17 at that point.
18 A As far as the paperwork or as far as the team?
19 Q Yeah. Let's -- let's --we'll talk about both, but
20 let's deal with paperwork first. Discovery and things like
21 that had been ongoing for two years now.
22 A It was a nightmare.
23 Q okay. Describe the nightmare.
24 A Papers all over, duplicates of everything. And by
25 duplicates, I mean, you can get one document in from several
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1 A Yes, s1 r.
2 Q To your-- looking at it, when you're looking at the
3 closet and the desks and things like that, there's not a
4 discovery log; there's not a Bates stamp of documents; there's
5 not an inventory of them; there's not a master list; there's
6 nothing that directs you to particular files or locations of
7 documents?
8 A None of that existed at that time.
9 Q okay. what, if anything, did you do or were you
10 able to do to aid organizationally?
11 A we started putting names on cop1es, because there
12 were so many team members. Another thing we started doing
13 that I personally did for Ms. Suber was I went into her
14 office, took everything in the discoveries in particular and
15 put them in order, realizing she was missing certain copies,
16 had multiple copies of other ones.
17 Q And when you say "discoveries," are you talking
18 about the face sheet that you get from the State that says
19 answer to discovery number whatever and it may list whatever
20 new information has come out?
21 A correct. And whatever may be attached, whether it's
22 pictures, a disk with information on it, whatever.
23 Q So at bare m1n1mum you're getting those in
24 chronological order, 1n date order based on receipt and trying
25 to make sure that we've got all of them?
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1 the trial.
2 A I would guess four to s1x months, but that's a
3 guess.
4 Q so roughly October -- September, October of 2010?
5 A I'm trying to think. Probably in that time frame.
6 Q okay. Initially, who was it that you were reporting
7 to as it relates to the penalty phase?
8 A I kind of reported to several people. Mr. Friedman
9 and Ms. Suber. I was kind of a -- a go-between. I kind of
10 did whatever needed to be done to make stuff happen.
11 Q And that -- that gets us to a segue of who was 1n
12 charge during the different compartments, so let's go back to
13 that because you asked that question.
14 when you first entered the capital unit to assist,
15 who was in charge of the overall team?
16 A Ms. Suber.
17 Q Tell me who the members of the team were when you
18 were injected into it.
19 A If I recall correctly, because there were changes, I
20 believe it was Ms. Suber. I believe it was Merribeth Bohanan.
21 I believe it was chris Ellrich. Betty Fuentes. Faye Dorn, of
22 course. I believe Mr. Friedman at that time, Robert Friedman.
23 And I cannot recall if Ms. Paula saunders was yet involved. I
24 do not think she was at that time. I think she was just
25 being -- you know, things discussed as needed with her.
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1 photocopy things.
2 Q That you -- that you sensed those things?
3 A oh, yes. That was from day one when I first went up
4 to help photocopy documents.
5 Q characterize the environment for us.
6 A Tense. Anxious. Frustrated. Emotional. Stressed.
7 I mean, really any negative word you wish to plug in.
8 Q Did you ever go to your immediate superv1sor or to
9 Ms. Daniels and identify what was happening amongst the ranks,
10 or did you feel that was your place?
11 A whether it was my place or not, I had a job to do,
12 and I was going to do it. So I went directly to Ms. Suber,
13 and I had a closed-door meeting with her and specifically
14 asked her her expectations from me and what she needed from
15 me.
16 And along the way, we got to a point, pr1or to the
17 separation of the guilt versus penalty phase teams, if you
18 will, I would go every morn1ng with a pad of paper and pen,
19 and she and I would meet for at least 15 minutes to go over
20 what she needed from me that day and the conclusions of
21 anything I had completed the day before and where we stood on
22 those. That's how I worked with her, and it worked for her
23 and I, and that is how she and I agreed to function together.
24 Q Taking it a step further, though, you didn't -- you
25 made the observations of the whole group. I understand your
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18 A -- an event --
19 Q Just in general.
20 A -- a series of events?
21 Q Yes.
22 A After several weeks of e-mails, texts, calls, that
23 as those couple of weeks went over, passed by, they became
24 much more incoherent. And, finally, after several nights in a
25 row of multiple, very lengthy e-mails, I mean, like, multiple
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1 want to depose the same witness twice just for two phases,
2 kind of a thing. But there really wasn't communication.
3 Q A two-part question then. up to that point, had
4 there been communication and interface, interface specifically
5 between whomever was developing the penalty phase and
6 Ms. Suber?
7 A Attempts.
8 Q success?
9 A I think it varied on the day, the time, and the
10 person.
11 Q The change was made presumptively for a reason, to
12 place Mr. Friedman in charge of the penalty phase and
13 Ms. Suber in charge of the guilt phase, each supervised,
14 theoretically, by Ms. Daniels. From that point forward,
15 was -- were Mr. Friedman and Ms. Suber communicative with one
16 another?
17 A very nominally.
18 Q To what do you attribute their nominal communication
19 or inability to communicate?
20 A communicating with Ms. Suber at that point 1n time
21 was very difficult.
22 Q And I say respectfully I recogn1ze the fact that
23 your boss or your employer 1s 1n the courtroom, and he's a
24 witness in the case.
25 Ms. Suber was difficult to communicate with.
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1 A Yes, I was.
2 Q And did the parties discuss their, during those
3 meetings, openly and candidly, strategies and who is handling
4 what? or characterize for us what was going on.
5 A Those attempts were made, but a lot of times
6 emotions got 1n the way, and things would get heated, and
7 things would have to be calmed down and then regrouped. And,
8 eventually, the meeting would end after we got to a stopping
9 point.
10 Q To the point of the trial, based on your
11 observation, was there ever any thematic agreement between the
12 guilt phase and the penalty phase, in terms of what the
13 presentation would entail, to the jury?
14 A Are you asking if they were each aware of each
15 other's perspectives of how they were going to present in
16 court?
17 Q Let me ask the question a different way.
18 Did their presentations agree -- did they agree with
19 one another on how each other's presentation should be made?
20 A No.
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1 Ms. Suber was not in agreement with what Mr. Friedman was
2 doing. Mr. Friedman was not in agreement with what Ms. Suber
3 was doing, and to each their own?
4 A To an extent, yes. I do think that there were some
5 agreements on, probably, some certain aspects. But I do know
6 there were some larger disagreements on other aspects.
7 Q How much -- what were you doing to help Mr. Friedman
8 1n preparing for the penalty phase?
9 A Specifically? Like my -- my daily functions?
10 Q Yeah, just some of your daily tasks.
11 A I would take care of subpoenas, serving subpoenas.
12 calling witnesses for depositions. Scheduling depositions.
13 Ensuring we had all the discovery. Making sure he had it all
14 available to him, how he needed it organized, whatever he
15 needed from me.
16 Q I think most lawyers do this with their assistants,
17 I know that I do; but was Mr. Friedman and -- did you guys
18 have conversations of, Hey, what do you think about this
19 issue? And he would ask for an opinion on what you thought or
20 how something should be handled?
21 A I don't know that he per se asked for my op1n1on.
22 we just had open discussions. You know, what's your
23 perspective on something? what's your insight on this? what
24 do you think about that?
25 Q what were your perceptions of how Mr. Friedman
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1 please, s1r.
2 whereupon,
3 STEVEN BEEN
4 was called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, was
5 examined and testified as follows:
6 THE COURT: Have a seat, Mr. Been. For your
7 edification, we've already discussed the attorney-client
8 privilege has been waived. so please answer any relevant
9 questions.
10 THE WITNESS: Okay.
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION
12 BY MR. MORRIS:
13 Q can you state your name for the record, please, s1r.
14 A Steven Been, B as in boy, e-e-n as in Nancy.
15 Q All right. Mr. Been, my understanding is that
16 you're presently retired?
17 A That's right.
18 Q what did you do pr1or to your retirement?
19 A For the -- for 28 years I was an Assistant Public
20 Defender. I did other things before that, but that was what I
21 did before my retirement.
22 Q All here in the second Judicial circuit?
23 A Right.
24 Q Let's talk 1n general about the capital unit, the
25 inception of the capital unit. Prior to Mr. Hilton's case,
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1 what was the Capital unit? what did it look like pr1or to
2 Ms. Suber ever coming into what's described as the capital
3 unit? what did it look like?
4 A I well, I'm not -- I'm not sure how far back you
5 want me to go. I mean, early --
6 Q Just 1n -- 1n the time period pr1or to Ms. Suber,
7 that's it.
8 A In the early nineties, first-degree murders with
9 death not waived were just assigned to felony trial lawyers.
10 we didn't really have a capital unit.
11 I was not personally involved with the capital unit
12 until maybe late 2007, early 2008. At that time, I was in the
13 Felony Trial Division, and Ines Suber and Paula saunders had
14 been, just prior to that, the lawyers doing the capital cases.
15 Ms. saunders, I think, had decided she didn't want to do it
16 anymore, and Ines wanted another second chair, and I offered
17 to do that.
18 Q so when you entered into the picture 1n 2007, 2008,
19 Ms. Suber was the head of the capital unit?
20 A Yes.
21 Q You volunteered to be the second chair of that unit?
22 A Right.
23 Q And there's been some, at least in my mind, some --
24 what what-- what does second chair mean to you?
25 A well, that's a good question.
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1 There may have been other issues. That was certainly the
2 biggest one, the one we spent the most time on while I was
3 there, so I can't -- I can't say I remember other -- other
4 anything else on that.
5 Q okay. was Mr. Hilton already a client when you
6 joined the unit, or did he become a client while you were 1n
7 the unit?
8 A He became a client while I was -- while I was 1n
9 the 1n the unit. when we first visited him, he was
10 incarcerated in Georgia.
11 Q That's what I was go1ng to ask you about. so your
12 first interaction with Mr. Hilton was 1n Georgia. And what
13 was Mr. Hilton's demeanor, disposition, when you first met
14 him?
15 A He was very likable. I liked him. He seemed
16 reasonably intelligent. He seemed very ready to tell us
17 whatever we wanted to know. He wasn't being cagey like many
18 clients often are.
19 Q Forthright, factually?
20 A Yes. That was my impression of him.
21 Q Did he-- did he demand that we're going to trial,
22 come hell or high water, and we're go1ng to challenge every
23 bit of evidence all the way to the end?
24 A No. I never heard him say anything like that. He
25 tended to defer to Ines's judgment on every legal issue. I
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1 was on the team, I had convinced her that we should get a New
2 York Times subscription.
3 And a time came when that needed to be renewed, and
4 I talked to her about it. she was still willing to pay half
5 of a year, New York Times subscription. But other than that,
6 I don't think we talked about the case at all.
7 I decided not to go watch the trial because I felt
8 that my presence might be upsetting or distracting to her, and
9 I didn't -- I didn't want to do anything that might -- I also
10 was busy. I had a full caseload, I was busy. But I didn't
11 want to do anything -- I was interested. I didn't want to do
12 anything that might hurt their chances.
13 I did listen to Mr. Friedman's penalty phase
14 argument, which was somehow being streamed or broadcast or
15 something, from my office. That was the only part of the
16 trial I observed, and that was not in person.
17 Q How did that comport with your knowledge of the
18 mitigation and the penalty phase information that you had to
19 the point of your departure?
20 A well, I was not pleased when I heard the penalty
21 phase argument. I thought it was incompetent. I thought it
22 was, I mean, really bad. It was -- it was a -- more of a
23 legal argument than a Jury argument. Mr. Friedman really 1s
24 not a jury trial lawyer in my op1n1on. And I was surprised
25 that some dramatic things that I had learned about during the
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1 ma'am.
2 MS. KEEGAN: oh. Typically, what I have done in the
3 past is the Florida supreme court relies on the capital
4 record that was provided during the direct appeal for any
5 references there. certainly, if the court's preference
6 is to excerpt any portions of relevance, the court
7 certainly could.
8 MR. MORRIS: I think we're go1ng to be wading into a
9 m1re if we start trying to excerpt. And my
10 recommendation is that I move to incorporate or include
11 the entirety of the trial, jury selection, all the way
12 through, and that be made part of it.
13 THE COURT: well, y'all discuss that. I just don't
14 want to not have thought it through. I want to make sure
15 what the -- that it is clear what the record 1s. It
16 sounds like you've got some ideas. why don't y'all
17 discuss that.
18 MS. KEEGAN: Yes, Your Honor.
19 THE COURT: we can deal with that tomorrow.
20 MR. MORRIS: Yes, Slr.
21 THE COURT: Y'all still want to do 9:00, or do you
22 want to start at 8:30 and make sure we have plenty of
23 time?
24 THE CLERK: You've got a plea at 8:30.
25 THE COURT: What's that?
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1 CERTIFICATE
2 STATE OF FLORIDA:
3 COUNTY OF LEON:
4 I, SUSAN BRYANT, Registered Merit Reporter, do
22
23
24
25
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Filing# 81396632 E-Filed 11/29/2018 02:01:49 PM
Defendant.
____________________ ;
1 APPEARANCES
13
14
INDEX
15
WITNESSES: PAGE:
16
17 ROBERT FRIEDMAN
20
22
23
24
25
1 PROCEEDINGS
2 (Continued from volume II, conducted on 10/31/2018, as
3 follows:)
4 THE COURT: call your next witness, please,
5 Mr. Morris.
8 please, s1r.
9 whereupon,
10 ROBERT FRIEDMAN
11 was called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, was
18 DIRECT EXAMINATION
19 BY MR. MORRIS:
20 Q can you state your name for the record, please, sir?
21 A Robert Friedman.
23 A F-r-i-e-d-m-a-n.
24 Q All right. Mr. Friedman, how are you presently
25 employed?
12 habeus corpus.
13 In 1997, I moved to Tallahassee and I worked at the
14 agency I'm presently associated with, Capital collateral
3 time.
15 A No.
16 Q And you were second chair 1n one capital case, Coy
17 Evans?
18 A Correct. This would have been the second one.
19 Q when you say the second one?
20 A The second one I was second chair on that went to
21 trial in Leon county.
22 Q This would have been the second one?
23 A Correct.
24 Q Okay. And so 1n Mr. Evans' case, what were your
25 responsibilities in Mr. Evans' case?
6 ar1se.
7 The two cases I worked with Ms. Suber, specifically
20 A I believe so.
21 Q she would have been responsible as the mitigation
25 investigator.
12 mitigation, I guess?
13 A I think another important fact was there -- we had a
14 PET scan done on him and there was frontal lobe damage, so
1 Mr. Hilton's case more complex was the fact that the documents
2 in his case, because of the Georgia offense, made the case
3 unbelievably voluminous.
4 Q From '98 to 2014, while at the public defender's
6 A No.
7 Q Did you ever try any felony cases during that period
8 of time?
9 A No.
12 which phase that they're going to handle, and they assign the
13 other phase of the trial to the other lawyer?
14 A I think I -- the way Ines operated was that she took
15 control of the entire case and then divvied out what portions
16 of the case you would do. And, you know, I like I said,
17 Coy Evans was the first time I worked with Ms. Suber, and I
18 previous had, you know, much exper1ence working with experts.
5 Q okay.
3 you had to choose one over the other, would you prefer to take
10 A Correct.
11 Q okay. Let's talk about when Mr. Hilton's case came
12 into the office of the public defender. You said that you
13 first met Mr. Hilton in '09?
17 meeting with Mr. Hilton? And really what I'm trying to get at
18 is, have you been brought into the capital unit now at that
19 point, or were you just assisting on the periphery? Tell me
4 office because I had -- I'd been gone for close to five years
5 now. I did do -- what I would typically do is after I met
6 with Mr. Hilton, I would sit in the parking lot of the jail
7 and I would use an old-school handheld Dictaphone, come
8 back -- and dictate my notes, and I would come back to the
9 office and have it transcribed.
10 And that would be something that I would
11 subsequently send to the experts to see, you know, 1n addition
1 together, I think.
2 BY MR. MORRIS:
1 as time goes by, she makes the decisions as the lead attorney.
2 But, I mean, I think I was brought in to do a lot of penalty
5 how the defense of the guilt phase would be designed, and also
3 A Yes.
4 Q so your interactions with penalty phase witnesses,
9 phone.
10 And just to be clear, as mitigation was being
11 developed in the case and it became more clear which experts
22 got the experts together -- Dr. wu did a PET scan; we had the
23 been it's been said that Ms. Suber was difficult to work
24 with. How would you characterize your involvement with
25 Ms. Suber during the pendency of the Hilton case?
23 the structure still Ms. Suber first chair, you're second chair
24 and focused on penalty phase?
25 A Correct.
1 Q was
2 A And 1n addition to -- you know, I -- you know, I
8 A Right.
8 what her role 1n the case was, quite frankly. I didn't have
23 case, and so there was always pressure with this case knowing
24 that it was unlikely to settle and the pressure became more
25 intense.
12 Q Explain that.
13 A A lot of -- I mean, without g1v1ng you my
14 clinical I don't have a clinical opinion. I'm not a
15 doctor. But there became times where e-mails were being sent
16 out at 2:00, 3:00 in the morning, which, in my opinion,
17 whether it's a -- whether it's a competent opinion or not,
1 took a few days off to get my batteries charged for the, you
2 know, the long -- you know, the duration and preparation. I
22 the proverbial boss of the case? she was the first chair?
25 correct.
3 the case?
4 A I had a couple conversations with Ms. Daniels when I
8 A correct.
15 phase.
16 I would keep in contact -- I would talk -- you know,
3 way to put it, but this case was difficult enough so I said
23 A That 1s accurate.
24 Q Ines 1s now out of the picture and she doesn't have
25 a say 1n your construct of the penalty phase?
23 A Yes.
24 Q Someone would have been instructed, maybe
25 Ms. Hartwein or another assistant in the office, You're
3 A Or chris Ellrich.
4 Q Fair enough. Do you know who was subpoenaed?
9 to testify.
10 There were instances where a lot of the lay
11 witnesses, while they may have been helpful witnesses, what
12 they may have said to Betty and then when I spoke with them to
13 say, you know, will you be willing to come testify on behalf
14 of Mr. Hilton, that became a different story. And I didn't
3 A Reflects that.
4 Q -- reflects
5 A Correct.
3 circumstance that could possibly come out that Mr. Hilton was
4 dangerous.
5 Given the fact, you know, the record shows that he
6 was sanctioned by the Georgia school -- excuse me, Georgia
7 Board of Medicine. I went on -- we had that presented. And I
8 got out all of -- I believe I got all of Dr. Delcher's
9 testimony through the four expert witnesses. It's why you
10 have expert witnesses.
11 with respect to Mr. Tabor, he hated Mr. Hilton. He
8 leaving.
25 files there.
12 Q Yes, sir.
13 A As close in time as possible. And I -- and I may
14 disagree with the term "streamline." You know, I think
1 streamlining. But, yeah, when you use experts, you get a lot
2 of testimony out through the experts. So whatever memos I
5 Q And when you say -- when you make mention of the two
6 mitigators that the supreme court says are the most weighty,
7 that's a more cerebral and legal conclusion, though, that we,
9 cases?
10 A That would be correct. But I think when you do a
11 capital case, or any case really, you need to be cognizant of
15 record the best -- the best I could in the event we didn't get
16 a life sentence.
17 Q So you take issue with my term "streamline." Let's
18 put that aside and not worry about it. But when did you make
19 the decision that those four experts and the lay witnesses who
20 testified were going to testify? You said as close in time to
21 trial as possible?
22 A Correct.
20 witnesses that were called were the only ones that were
21 willing to -- were the only ones that were willing to
4 witness for this period or one witness for that. You know, I
5 tried -- whoever I thought would be helpful is who I called.
6 But that's not to say in subsequent investigation, there may
7 be other witnesses that would be helpful.
12 A Correct.
13 Q But you made the decision to eliminate or exclude
14 them from
15 A Live testimony.
16 Q Correct.
17 A use them through the experts.
18 Q what was the concept of the PowerPoint? what did
19 you find to be the strength of the PowerPoint presentation?
5 consulting with Ms. saunders and Ms. Suber, well, we can't get
9 on direct appeal so --
15 Q Meaning
16 A so we -- so we proffered -- my recollection is we
8 father?
20 volatility of it?
21 A To an extent. And I believe Sandy carr also
5 Q Correct.
12 further presented.
13 But it was -- I believe it did come out 1n the
14 information that was provided to the experts, and I believe
1 you.
2 MR. MORRIS: Right now will be fine.
12 Mr. Hilton not having had a relationship with his father, what
13 witnesses were able to testify to Mr. Hilton's biological
14 father's mental health 1ssues, substance abuse issues, and
8 gave us.
15 who described how many times they moved, all the different
16 schools. And the information was provided to the experts, and
17 I believe most of them spoke to how he moved a lot and how
18 that affected him, as well as --
19 Q when you say most of them, you're talking about the
1 biological father, and the issue with respect to, you know,
2 maternal deprivation or lack of bonding between the mother and
3 Mr. Hilton.
4 Q But there weren't witnesses that were able to
15 his mother?
16 A Give me one second. I believe Castelli talked a lot
17 about how Nilo didn't accept Gary; that she was not a loving
18 mother, not affectionate, cold; never saw Ms. Debag show love
19 to Gary; chose Nilo over Gary; he grew up alone; she was
6 that that came out at the time when he shot the father, but I
7 remember we had much difficulty getting records from Jackson
20 A No. That was his buddy in the band and went to the
21 military. The name is escaping right now, but I know we
22 called one of the witnesses. It may have been -- I don't
23 recall. It may have been Thomas Perchoux. I don't -- I don't
24 remember.
6 did you know to ask Mr. cave about Mr. Hilton having been
7 sexually molested by the attorney that was appointed to
8 represent him?
12 Miami did come out through the experts. I did not request a
13 separate nonstatutory mitigator that Mr. Hilton was sexually
14 abused as a child because there was some qualifiers to this 1n
9 the experts. But, no, we did not call a -- I did not call a
10 separate witness with respect to the military, other than Roy
11 cave saying they went through the military together,
20 Q what about --
21 A -- et cetera.
6 and I didn't think that that would have been a good thing to
7 present.
8 Q well, the drugs -- the drug addiction 1ssue could be
9 used at a mitigator; correct?
10 A Correct. And I think, you know, we -- I think that
11 was something we talked about that was requested and that
3 with her?
4 A I recall that there were -- that there was
3 Dr. Prichard?
6 appeal, and the Florida Supreme court said it was okay because
7 my theory of the case was that generally Mr. Hilton was a
8 law -- you know, may have been odd but he was generally a law
3 A Correct.
23 think, even the witness who -- Ms. Lee from the laundry even
1 presentation to the jury was that Mr. Hilton did not evidence
2 psychological impairments, dysfunctionality. He was a law
3 abiding citizen for the most part up until Dr. Delcher entered
4 the picture?
5 A Right. But it was -- there was also evidence that
6 there -- you know, the fact that he was discharged from the
7 Army one time honorably, another time, under honorable
8 conditions, but there was the evidence of him having
9 psychiatric 1ssues with the auditory hallucinations.
10 And, you know, even as a child or a teenager,
11 although we did not get the records from Jackson Memorial, it
3 agree that there was evidence that Mr. Hilton was -- and I'm
6 age?
7 A Yeah.
12 testified to his life, and I think that Roy cave and sandy
13 carr testified to those years in high school, and Maria
14 Castelli testified as well, which we already discussed about
3 and I let him know, when I get back, I'll talk to you. You
9 A Correct.
10 Q Did Mr. Hilton demand of you and of the defense
11 team, I need a trial and I want you to deny everything, demand
6 evidence.
7 And with respect to what I was doing -- it was also
20 BY MR. MORRIS:
21 Q That dysfunction, 1n your op1n1on, did the guilt
1 would have two lawyers in this case, one conducting the guilt
2 phase and one conducting the penalty phase. You don't want to
3 have a guilt phase lawyer say, oh, he's -- you know, he's
5 really mean that but believe me now. so that's why you have
6 two separate lawyers.
7 Q But that's essentially what happened, isn't it? I
8 know we had two separate lawyers, but that's essentially what
9 happened?
10 A when you say essentially what happened, what are
11 you
4 which would have been admissible but that was not really
5 viable.
6 But this was not the type of case that we were able
7 to get anything -- backdoor any, you know, mental health
8 information through the guilt phase. It was a pure
9 adversarial testing of the State's evidence and make them
10 prove the case. And then I came up and did the penalty phase.
11 Q The adversarial testing of the State's evidence
25 weren't just going to let them-- you know, I say we-- well,
1 yeah, we. we're not go1ng to just let them introduce it.
2 So I remember there were a number of off-the-record
9 one of the biggest issues in the case was the DNA expert and
10 the DNA in the case, and I thought that she could have done a
11 better -- you know, this 1s my own op1n1on. I thought that
23 she was the lead attorney on the guilt phase. But I thought
25 of DNA expert because that was the biggest part of the case,
4 Other than passing notes, you know, Ines was the one calling
6 thought she could have done -- I thought she could have done a
7 better job with that. I mean, like I said, we were limited to
8 notes as best you could and, you know, whispering or, you
9 know-- you know how that goes when you're in trial. But she
10 was solely responsible for the strikes.
11 Q was her questioning of the prospective JUrors on
4 mean, I was aware of the fact that she was sleep deprived, and
5 I don't -- and it was very -- people that have worked with
6 Ms. Suber know she's very meticulous, and most of her JUry
7 selection, you know-- methodical, and I didn't think that was
8 the case here. I thought it was very perfunctory.
9 And, I mean, the only thing she -- I mean, I knew
10 she was sleep deprived so I don't know if she -- I don't know
11 how many days or nights she was -- I don't know any -- I don't
12 have any personal information other than I knew she was sleep
13 deprived.
14 Q was the performance 1n the rest of the guilt phase,
8 There was a lot less communication because that's when we, you
12 that came 1n. And it was, you know, it was like State's, you
13 know, discovery number 25, 28, 32.
14 But there came a point in time 1n those last 60
22 the guilt phase of the so-called snitch in the jail. And, you
4 with cross.
20 A we all could.
21 Q But were you ready?
1 accommodated.
2 Q And you were asked a little bit regarding strategy
23 Q sure.
3 were those discussions that were only had toward the inception
4 of the case?
6 sentence, so yes.
7 Q so yes, what?
9 Q All right.
10 A --that that was-- that would have been the goal.
11 Q And throughout the discussions that you --
15 A Yes.
16 Q In reference to the strategy that you employed for
17 the guilt phase, specifically in reference to the idea of
18 introducing Ritalin as the breaking point or the gasoline on
19 the fire I think is how you referred to it --
20 THE COURT: Are you talking about the guilt phase or
21 penalty phase?
3 A He knew that.
12 of the trial, were you present for any meetings where that
13 idea or concept was discussed?
14 A No. That was something that would have been
4 statutory mitigators.
5 Q Am I correct 1n stating that your thoughts were --
6 or what you wanted to convey to the jurors was while he had
7 issues and problems, including mental health problems, leading
8 up to the Ritalin, the Ritalin is really what turned him from
9 a somewhat sometimes productive member of the community or
10 someone who has some redeeming qualities to somebody who was
11 capable of murder?
12 A Yes.
13 Q Did you have any trouble, during the time that you
14 met with Mr. Hilton at the jail, communicating with him?
15 A No.
5 interaction in Georgia.
6 consultation.
7 Q I understand. was Ms. Suber aware of the incident
15 A Yes.
16 Q Do you agree that lay witnesses can be important 1n
17 achieving this?
18 A Yes.
19 Q Do you have any particular discomfort or fear about
20 exam1n1ng lay witnesses --
21 A No.
22 Q -- as opposed to experts?
23 A No.
3 A Or what?
8 don't know what the witness is going to do. But, I mean, for
23 A Yes.
24 Q Exposed to violence and/or abuse?
25 A Yes.
5 A Yes.
1 PowerPoint.
2 Q All right. And she did find and conduct preliminary
8 A At times.
9 Q If you did not follow up with her, how would you, as
10 the lawyer if you did not go with her to the interview, how
11 would you, as the lawyer, learn what was said in the
12 interview?
13 A I would read her memo, which she always did, and I
14 would contact witnesses on my own.
3 A Yes.
4 s1nce January 2014, so other than the time you got the court
9 A Yes.
10 Q okay. Is it fair to say that the witnesses -- and
11 I'm specifically referring to the witnesses listed on State's
12 Exhibit 2 -- on this list that you did not call, you had some
13 reason for making that decision?
14 A Yes.
3 this list, but I would like to go through and the ones that
9 A Yes.
10 Q All right. And the fifth one, Sandy Herman, that's
11 the same as Sandy carr; correct?
12 A uh-huh.
13 Q okay. Is that a yes?
14 A Yes.
25 A Correct.
15 the military, but I think that was discussed with the Jury
16 through the records and through Roy cave. And it was an
17 unwillingness on his part to testify.
18 Q so Leroy Pruitt was somebody who was 1n the military
19 with Mr. Hilton?
20 A Correct.
21 Q was there anything significant that Mr. Pruitt could
22 add that you did not introduce through Roy cave or the
23 introduction of Mr. Hilton's military
24 A Other than the actual names of the divisions that
25 Mr. Hilton was in in the military. He was of high
4 certain groups --
18 wife had just died. I did speak with him. His wife had just
19 died so that was problematic as well, and I didn't think that
23 have occurred?
24 A That-- well, it didn't occur with Mr. Priester. It
25 was some uncle but that
5 A No.
6 Q And did you feel -- did you have any concerns that
7 eliciting homosexual activity on the part of your client could
8 be negatively viewed by members of the jury?
15 presenting that.
20 Tabor?
21 A He was -- he hated Mr. Hilton. He was very hostile.
4 know you called the laundromat ladies, Jin Hee Lee; correct?
8 the 26th
12 his dogs, but I think that all -- that came out, Mr. Hilton's
13 love of his dogs. I mean, that was --
14 Q okay. So love of dogs generally would be considered
1 Shawn Stewart, Ned Dwight coleman, Pam Burnette, Ray Lung, and
2 Norm collins. Do you have any recollection of those specific
3 witnesses?
20 know if you know the answer to this, but you called an officer
21 King which appears to be from the same time period. Is this a
24 there?
25 A well, they'd be similar to the witnesses previously
1 discussed around 2007, but this would have been closer to the
2 time-- well, if it was-- one of them was around-- it was
4 incident occurred and would have been after this case -- this
12 testify.
13 Q All right. And then jail staff is listed as some
14 testimony that could be given. Are you familiar with what
1 A Presumably, yes.
2 Q And would all of those memos -- were all of those
23 it.
24 Q Okay. But to your knowledge, during the trial --
25 course of the trial or afterwards, it has not come to your
3 witnesses that could have been helpful to your case that you
4 didn't provide to the expert?
1 problematic in my op1n1on.
2 Q okay. That's my next question. You were aware of
3 all three of them and elected not to call them or were not
4 able to call them?
23 A Correct.
24 Q All right. I want to ask you, was it a
25 consideration for you that, in order to make Dr. Delcher
1 appear as the real bad guy here, that it would -- that would
2 be eas1er to accomplish if Dr. Delcher was an empty chair, as
9 oh, the Ritalin made me do it and this is the quack who, you
10 know, prescribed it, I mean, I think that all very clearly,
11 you know, came out.
20 A Correct.
21 Q And the questioning that followed seemed to indicate
23 A Absolutely.
24 Q I want to ask you about Dr. wu bringing up the
25 Deadly Run movie. How did that come to pass?
3 A Yes.
4 Q And she was successful 1n keeping that out?
5 A Correct.
5 experts together, I know when they all came into town and they
8 about, prepare for the case. And it would have been my -- the
12 guess 1n Dr. wu's mind, he did think that this kind of showed
13 the grandiosity. But I but I -- my practice would have
14 been to tell them to not bring it up because it was harmful.
20 taken credit for coming up with that idea, and I don't really
21 know if that's true or false.
1 Q okay. Do you --
15 experts. And then since Ms. Suber had done the motion in
16 limine, it must-- it was discussed that, well, go ahead and,
17 you know, you can argue, you know, the Deadly Run issue.
18 what's the big deal?
19 Q okay.
15 down the road, it'll be available to Mr. Hilton just like, you
18 but this 1s kind of down the road that, you know, we've gone
19 through, you know, juvenile, competency, mental retardation,
20 and the next -- you know, the next thing in post-conviction or
21 death penalty is a bar to -- getting the u.s. Supreme court to
22 do a bar to severe mental illness. But no, I did not file a
23 motion.
24 Q And at the time you had no legal basis to do so?
1 rejected that.
2 Q All right. I want to ask you a little bit about the
3 issue with Ms. Bohanan. I know you said you weren't clear on
6 A Correct.
7 Q Or a portion of it.
15 him you know, I told him that Betty quit, and I think the
16 reason was she was on -- I think I said she was under a lot of
17 stress and she -- or something to that effect.
18 And then all of a sudden, Merribeth, you know, came
19 up there and was like, That's not why Berry -- why Betty left.
20 And Paula and I were sitting there like, whoa. This was a
21 total interference with the attorney-client you know,
22 attorney-client relationship.
23 I ran upstairs looking for Nancy, found John
24 Tomasino instead, and for lack of a better word, Tomasino
25 extracted her from the courtroom. But I thought it was
4 A Correct.
12 Paula saunders, she felt pretty strong about that. And, you
13 know, I think there may have been an off-the-record -- I mean,
14 I do recall Paula, Ines and I, maybe with Judge Hankinson, we
23 withdraw?
24 A Correct.
3 BY MR. MORRIS:
4 Q Mr. Friedman, you were mentioning the Florida
5 Supreme court has routinely rejected claims that are made that
8 A Correct.
20 A Correct.
21 Q -- for the trial court to rule on?
22 However, a Ring claim was made, trial court denied
23 it, and it remains reviewable?
24 A Correct. Although I did say and I do believe that
25 the that will be available to Mr. Hilton to raise in the
3 sort of thing so
4 A Right, we won't.
6 advice?
16 the evidence?
19 at the jury and say, look, the State has the burden of proof
24 end of the guilt phase and say, we don't believe that the
6 Mr. Hilton's van when he was arrested and it says Dr. Delcher
7 on it. could not the question have been asked in the guilt
9 se1ze any pill bottles during your search of Mr. Hilton's van?
13 my head during the guilt phase, but I'm in agreement that that
22 accurate?
24 Q At one point --
15 patient-doctor relationship?
16 A I don't believe so.
17 Q would that not have explained to -- better explained
18 to the jury that the doctor's own conduct led to the doctor
19 believing him to be dangerous?
24 A And medication.
3 BY MR. MORRIS:
4 Q Ask you to look at those three slides. what do
12 life, that would be part and parcel of Mr. Hilton and his good
13 days; correct?
14 A Correct.
3 state that they viewed Mr. Hilton as a father figure and that
12 Q Helpful?
13 A It was good.
14 Q Good. But what of it did you use?
15 A what I could.
16 Q Ms. Cappleman asked you questions about -- that when
17 all of a sudden people are asked to come to Tallahassee to
18 testify in a death penatly case that they become more
19 skittish, or, no, that's a hardship or whatnot. Did you
20 explore the opportunity of having those witnesses appear
21 remotely by video conference or seek leave of the court to do
22 so?
6 things, when they put two and two together -- two to two
7 together, Emerson and Dunlap, they became unwilling witnesses.
25 memorandum from Ms. Fuentes saying that she spoke with Shawn
3 the time period being 1991, 1992, you would have passed that
5 that information?
6 A Presumably, yes.
7 Q Do you not draw any distinction between your expert
1 big argument in the case was attacking the HAC and the CCP,
2 because we argued that the State was trying to extrapolate
2 don't know.
15 record --
8 or evidence?
3 been filed.
10 of law.
11 I know particularly sometimes the attorney general's
6 court's instruction?
7 THE COURT: Yeah. we don't need an order on that.
24
25
1 CERTIFICATE
2 STATE OF FLORIDA:
3 COUNTY OF LEON:
17
18
19
____d.C2g~~~~~~-------
20 LISA A. BABCOCK
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
21 LEON COUNTY COURTHOUSE
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
22
23
24
25
1580
Filing# 81480082 E-Filed 11/.Jv/2018 04:10:05 PM
Defendant.
--------------~----~/
SCHEDULING ORDER
cc:
Eddie. Evans, Assistant State Attorney
Georgia Cappleman, Assistant State Attorney
Robert A. Mortis, Co\1Ilse1 for Defendant
Jertnifer Keegan, Assistant Attorney General
1581
Filing# 83325291 E-Fi1ed 01/14/2019 04:48:49 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff,
Defendant
COMES NOW, the State of Florida, by and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby
submits the State's Postconviction Hearing Closing Arguments. On April 20, 2017, Hilton filed
his Second Motion for Leave to Amend Initial Postconviction Motion and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law (hereinafter "Motion"), raising seven claims. The State filed its answer to
Hilton's Motion (hereinafter "Answer" or "State's Answer") on May 15, 2017. Hilton filed an
Amended Claim 6 on July 21, 2017, and the State filed its answer on August 7, 2017. An
evidentiary hearing was held October 30, 31, and November I, 2018, where Hilton presented
testimony and exhibits to support his Motion. Because the evidentiary hearing did not produce
any evidence that entitled Hilton to relief, Hilton's Motion should be denied. The State submits
Record Citations
Citations to the record are as follows: The direct appeal record shall be referred to by "R"
and followed by the volume and page number; references to Hilton's Motion shall be referred to
1582
by "Motion" followed by the page number; references to the evidentiary hearing transcripts shall
be referred to by "Evid. Hrg. Trans." and the page number. Other references are self-evident
Hilton was convicted of grand theft, and the kidnapping and first-degree murder of
Cheryl Dunlap. The relevant facts concerning the crimes are recited in the Florida Supreme
On February 28, 2008, a Leon County grand jury indicted Gary Michael Hilton
for the first-degree murder of Cheryl Dunlap between December I and December
15, 2007, kidnapping, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and grand theft of currency.
Hilton pleaded not guilty on March 14, 2008. Hilton proceeded to a jury trial
commencing on February 2, 2011.
Cheryl Dunlap, 46, was last seen alive on December I, 2007. That morning,
Dunlap called a friend, Kiana Hill, and made arrangements to have dinner with
her that evening. That afternoon, Dunlap went to Leon Sinks to read, where she
was seen by Michael and Vikki Shirley at approximately 1:30 p.m. The Shirleys
described that Dunlap was wearing jeans and a sweater and carrying a hardback
book Dunlap did not arrive for dinner that evening and was missed at church the
following morning by Tanya Land. Land went to Dunlap's residence and found
her dog, but noticed that her car was missing so she called the police. Steven
Ganey of the Wakulla County Sheriffs Office took the missing person report on
December 3, 2007.
Dunlap's car, a white Toyota Camry, was found on December 3, 2007, on the side
of Crawfordville Highway parked near the woods. The car had deliberate tire
punctures in the sidewall that was later identified as a bayonet piercing. On
December I, the car had received a disabled vehicle ticket from Florida Highway
Patrol Trooper Brian Speigner. Ganey testified that it appeared that someone had
driven into the woods with all four tires intact and punctured the tire after the car
had been parked. Dunlap's purse was recovered in her car, but no money was
found.
Dunlap's Ameris Bank account records revealed that Dunlap cashed a check with
a drive-through teller at 11:17 a.m. on December I. The records further revealed
that three cash withdrawals were made at the ATM at Hancock Bank on West
Tennessee Street on December 2, 3, and 4, 2007, totaling $700. In addition, two
attempted withdrawals were-declined because they exceeded the daily limit. The
video from the security camera at the bank showed that the person making the
1583
transactions was wearing a blue and white patterned, long-sleeved shirt, glasses, a
hat, and a make-shift mask made from tape.
Several witnesses testified that they saw or encountered Gary Michael Hilton
during the time period surrounding Dunlap's disappearance. In late November
2007, George Ferguson encountered Hilton on LL Wallace Road. Hilton asked
Ferguson for a jump start because his van, a white Chevrolet Astro, would not
crank. Ferguson testified that it did not appear to him that Hilton actually needed
the assistance. Ethan Davis provided similar testimony, that sometime in late
November 2007, Hilton stopped him and asked for help starting his vehicle. Davis
declined. Shawn Matthews also encountered Hilton in late November near his LL
Wallace Road camp. Hilton appeared to be familiar with the area and told
Matthews about a nearby sinkhole. On December 1, 2007, Celeste Hutchins saw
Hilton on Crawfordville Highway, not far from Leon Sinks. Hutchins testified
that Hilton was rummaging through a white Camry on the side of the road. On
December 10, 2007, Loretta Mayfield spoke to Hilton at a convenience store on
Crawfordville Highway. Mayfield testified that Hilton was wearing a blue and
white patterned shirt. Hilton was also wearing something on his left side that
looked like a large knife holder. Mayfield testified that the shirt she saw Hilton
wearing looked like the one in the ATM security video. On December 11, 2007,
Stephen Prosser saw Hilton in the Apalachicola National Forest. On December
1584
12, 2007, Michael Travis saw Hilton in the forest near the Bloxham cutoff and
then saw him again on December 14. On December 18, 2007, Teresa Johnson
saw Hilton in Bristol, Florida, where Hilton told her that she looked like Dunlap
and that it was "too bad" about that girl getting murdered.
Sometime between December 18, 2007, and January 1, 2008, Hilton made his
way to Georgia where he kidnapped and murdered Meredith Emerson. Hilton
took Emerson from Blood Mountain and held her for four days before murdering
her. He cooperated with Jaw enforcement in exchange for a life sentence. Hilton
was arrested in Georgia after Stephen Shaw saw Hilton walk to the back of a
convenience store in the direction of the store's dumpsters and called law
enforcement. Law enforcement officers recovered items Hilton was seen
discarding in a dumpster at the convenience store. From the dumpster, law
enforcement recovered a U.S. Forestry citation for unauthorized camping, a knife
and sheath, Hi-Tee boots, some chain, a padlock, gloves, a jacket, a folding
police baton, and a blue backpack. Hilton gave Georgia officials information on
where to find his bayonet on a hiking trail on Blood Mountain in North Georgia.
Later, Jeff Foggy, an FDLE tool mark expert, matched the bayonet to the
puncture marks in Dunlap's tire. Georgia law enforcement also gathered items
from Hilton's van. Items recovered from the van included clothing, jackets,
gloves, camping equipment, duffel bags, two sleeping bags, Hi-Tee boots, a
camera, tobacco rolling papers, Hilton's Georgia driver's license, tape, paper
towels, maps, two BB pistols, a book purchased at a Tallahassee book store, and
dog food.
On February 12, 2008, Sergeant David Graham and Detective Dawn Dennis with
the Leon County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant on Hilton while he
was in custody in Georgia. Hilton's DNA was collected and the entire execution
of the warrant was recorded. Portions of the recording were played for the jury.
On June 6, 2008, Sergeant Graham and two other officers drove Hilton from
Georgia to Florida. Although Hilton was not questioned, he spoke for nearly the
entire five-hour drive, which was recorded. The State also played portions ofthis
recording at trial. Hilton stated:
I'm not all bad. I mean, you got to understand, I mean, I'm sure you can see. I
mean, I'm a [expletive] genius, man. I'm not a-I'm not all bad. I just, you know,
lost my mind for a little bit. Lost a grip on myself, man. What can I tell you? FBI
and everybody else is trying to scratch their head, hey, guys don't get started
doing my shit at 61 years old. It just don't happen, you know. Like there's a retired
FBI (indecipherable) named Cliff Van, Clifford Van Zandt, that keeps getting
himself in the news, talking about me. And he said, this guy didn't just fall off the
turnip truck, he said. You know, in other words, he's been doing this. But like I
told you before, you know, when I saw you before, I said, remember, I said I'd
1585
give you one for free. Nothing before September, okay? I mean, I'm not joking,
okay? I just, I got old and sick and couldn't make a living and just lost, flat lost
my [expletive] mind for a while, man. I couldn't get a grip on it.
Additionally, Hilton made statements to a fellow inmate at the Leon County Jail
that were overheard by Correctional Officer Caleb Wynn. Specifically, Hilton
told inmate Summers that he could answer all the State Attorney's questions if he
would give him a life sentence, that he would reveal where the head was located,
that his bayonet was used on Dunlap's tire, that he would explain how he "pulled
it off' on a busy highway, that he spent a few hours or a few days with Dunlap,
and that he felt no regret other than getting caught.
The penalty phase began on February 17, 2011, during which the state called Clay
Bridges of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. Agent Bridges testified about
Hilton's prior felony conviction-the murder of Emerson in Georgia to which
Hilton pleaded guilty. The State played Hilton's taped conversation with law
enforcement where he described kidnapping Emerson, holding her captive, and
stripping her body naked to remove DNA and fiber evidence. He also stated that
"you either kill them or you get caught."
Hilton presented four expert witnesses who testified regarding his psychological
condition: Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist and clinical director of the Brain Imaging
Center at the University of California, Irvine; Dr. Charles Golden, a clinical
neuropsychologist performing neuropsychological testing and examinations; Dr.
Abbey Strauss, a psychiatrist with special expertise in psychopharmacology; and
Dr. William Morton, a board certified psychiatric pharmacist and professor; and
nine lay witnesses. The State then called Dr. Greg Prichard in rebuttal.
On February 21, 2011, the jury recommended unanimously that Gary Hilton be
sentenced to death for the murder of Cheryl Dunlap.
The trial court held the Spencer 1 hearing on April 7, 2011. The State presented
three victim impact witnesses: (I) Ms. Emma Blount, the victim's aunt; (2) Laura
Walker, the victim's best friend; and (3) Gloria Tucker, the victim's cousin. Hilton
presented no witnesses.
The trial court found that the State had proven six aggravators beyond a
reasonable doubt. Assigning weight to each aggravator, the trial court found: (!)
the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony (great weight); (2) the
murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping (great weight); (3) the
murder was committed to avoid arrest (moderate weight); (4) the murder was
committed for pecuniary gain (some weight); (5) the murder was especially
1586
heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and (6) the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) (great weight).
The court also considered and weighed each mitigating circumstance proposed by
Hilton and found one statutory mental mitigating factor-at the time of the
murder Hilton was under extreme emotional distress (some weight). Under the
catch-all provision, the trial court considered ten mitigating factors, finding that
Hilton established eight of them and rejecting two. The court found: (1) Hilton
grew up in an abusive household (some weight); (2) Hilton abused drugs,
specifically Ritalin (some weight); (3) Hilton was deprived of a relationship with
his biological father (moderate weight); (4) Hilton is already serving a life
sentence so society is protected (some weight); (5) Hilton served his country in
the U.S. military (very little weight); (6) Hilton suffered maternal deprivation and
Jack of bonding between mother and child (some weight); (7) Hilton was removed
from his home and put into foster care when he was a child (some weight); (8)
Hilton grew up in a financially poor family (not proven); (9) Hilton suffered a
traumatic brain injury as a child (some weight); and (10) Hilton suffers from
severe mental defects (not proven).
On April 21,2011, the trial court followed the jury's unanimous recommendation
and sentenced Hilton to death. The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that
the aggravators outweighed the mitigators.
Hilton v. State, 117 So. 3d 742, 746-50 (Fla. 2013) (footnote included).
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Hilton raised six claims: 1) the trial court erred
in admitting his statements to law enforcement as they constituted inadmissible Williams rule
evidence; 2) the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Gregory Prichard's testimony regarding
(hereinafter, "aggravator"); 3) the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Prichard to remain in the
courtroom, despite invocation of the rule of sequestration; 4) the evidence was insufficient to
find that the HAC and CCP aggravators were proven; 5) the trial court erred in rejecting the lack
support the ruling; and 6) the death sentence violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The
Florida Supreme Court affirmed Hilton's convictions and death sentence. Hilton, 117 So. 3d at
1587
756. Hilton's petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied on December
On November 25, 2014, Hilton filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief under Rule
3.851. The State filed its answer on January 26,2015. Thereafter, on July 24,2015, Hilton filed a
Motion for Leave to Amend Initial Postconviction Motion and Incorporated Memorandum of
Law, attaching his Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief. The Court granted the Motion for
Leave to Amend Initial Postconviction Motion on July 28,2015, and the State filed its answer on
August 14, 2015. On January 20, 2016, this Court entered a stay pending the Florida Supreme
Court's decisions on the application of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). The stay was
lifted in open court on March 23, 2017. Hilton filed his Second Motion for Leave to Amend
Initial Postconviction Motion and Incorporated Memorandum of Law on April 20, 2014,
attaching his Second Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief. In response to the Court's June
14, 2017 order striking Hilton's Claim 6 for legal insufficiency, Hilton filed an Amended Claim
6 on July 21, 2017. The State filed an answer to Hilton's Amended Claim 6 on August 7, 2017.
An evidentiary hearing was held October 30, 31, and November I, 2018, during which Hilton
At the evidentiary hearing, Hilton presented the testimony of Hilton's defense team
members, including Robert Friedman, Ines Suber, Paula Saunders, Tracy Record, Merribeth
Bohanan, Steven Been, Beatriz (Betty) Fuentes, and Chris EUrich. Hilton presented the
testimony of other members of the Public Defender's Office, including then-elected Public
Defender Nancy Daniels, then-Deputy Public Defender Andy Thomas, and Julie Hartwein,
Friedman's assistant. Per the testimony presented, Suber was lead attorney in the guilt phase,
1588
Friedman was lead attorney in the penalty phase, Fuentes was the mitigation specialist, and
Ellrich was the fact investigator. Saunders, Record, Bohanan, and Been all assisted the case in
smaller roles. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 183, 275-77, 325). Hilton also presented the lay testimony of
Dr. Deicher, the physician who treated Hilton prior to Cheryl Dunlap's murder. Hilton called one
expert witness, Dr. Norman Camp, to testify about Hilton's military records. (Evid. Hrg. Trans.
at 143).
must satisfy a two-prong test, establishing deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 US. 668 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Hilton must show that
counsel made specific errors so serious that s/he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687; Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245, 252 (Fla. 2004) ("a court
deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged
conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct") (quoting
Strickland, 466 US. at 690). Strickland refrained from providing specific guidelines to evaluate
counsel's performance and held "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." 466 US. at 688. To establish prejudice,
Hilton must show that there is a reasonabkprobability that but for trial counsel's deficiencies, he
would have received a different outcome. Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010).
"Judicial scrutiny in these cases must be 'highly deferential' and 'every effort ... made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight"' Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810, 820 (Fla. 2005)
(citing Strickland, 466 US. at 689). The standard for evaluation is not whether an attorney could
8
1589
have done more. Pagan v. State, 29 So. 3d 938, 949 (Fla. 2009). Rather, "[c]ounsel is strongly
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise
performance of an experienced trial lawyer. Chandler v. United States 218 F. 3d 1327, 1316
(11th Cir. 2000); Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F. 3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating, "Our
strong reluctance to second guess strategic decisions is even greater where those decisions were
made by experienced criminal defense counsel."). In line with this standard of deference, an
attorney is not ineffective for strategic decisions that are part of the trial strategy, even if these
decisions appear to be unwise in retrospect "The decision will be held to have been ineffective
assistance only if it was 'so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen
it"' Dingle v. Sec'y Dept of Corr., 480 F.3d !092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Adams v.
Because a court can make a finding on the prejudice prong of Strickland without ruling
on the deficiency prong, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are subject to denial when the
court can determine the outcome of the proceeding would not be affected even if counsel were
deficient. Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 96 (Fla. 2011); Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828 (Fla. 2011);
Walls v. State 926 So. 2d 1156, 1173 (Fla. 2006) (summary denial appropriate on ineffective
assistance of counsel claim where evidence was cumulative). See also Stewart v. State, 801 So.
2d 59, 65 (Fla. 2001) (where the Strickland standard requires establishment of both the deficient
performance and pr~udice prongs, when a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it
is not necessary to assess the other prong). "Failure to sufficiently allege both prongs results in a
1590
summary denial of the claim." Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 758 (Fla. 2007) (citing Thompson
judgement in deciding what mitigation to present and what theme to use. Counsel is expected to
make these decisions only when fully informed by a thorough mitigation investigation. Brooks v.
State, 175 So. 3d 204, 227-31 (Fla. 2015). The Florida Supreme Court has held that counsel may
withhold available evidence when he has a reasonable strategic basis for doing so. Hannon v.
State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1126-28 (Fla. 2006) (holding counsel was not ineffective for failing to
investigate or present certain mitigation because it was inconsistent with the penalty phase
theme); Brooks, 175 So. 3d at 221. Trial counsel's penalty phase theme is not unreasonable
simply because it opens the door to the State's rebuttal evidence. Rigterink v. State, 193 So. 3d
846, 877 (Fla. 2016) (holding trial counsel's "good person" theme was reasonable, despite
opening the door for the State to present rebuttal evidence of bad character).
uniquely stringent standard of prejudice. Proof on the face of the record that specific jurors that
served on Hilton's jury harbored an actual bias is required to demonstrate that Hilton was
prejudiced by counsel's actions during jury selection. Absent such proof of actual bias, a claim
of prejudice in jury selection is based on conjecture about what could have occurred and is
insufficient for Strickland relief. In Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007), the Florida
Supreme Court concluded that a Strickland claim for failing to preserve a denial of a challenge
for cause must establish that an actually biased juror sat on the jury, and such bias must be plain
10
1591
on the face of the record. The court went on to define an actually biased juror as one who is not
impartial; one who is biased against the defendant. Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 324.
A juror is competent if s/he "can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict
solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court."
Lusk v. State, 446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1984). Therefore, actual bias means bias-in-fact that
would prevent service as an impartial juror. See United States v. Wood 299 U.S. 123, 133-34
(1936) (stating, in a case where US. government employees served as jurors in a criminal case
prosecuted by the U.S. government, that the jurors' employment status did not automatically
disqualify them, but the defendant had the ability during voir dire to "ascertain whether a
prospective juror ... has any bias in fact which would prevent his serving as an impartial juror").
The Carratelli requirement for a defendant to establish actual bias extends to various
types of Strickland claims involving jury selection. In Johnson v. State, 63 So. 3d 730 (Fla.
2011), the Florida Supreme Court applied Carratelli to a Strickland claim for failure to
sufficiently question potential jurors on exposure to pretrial publicity. Although some jurors did
not confirm impartiality, actual bias was not plain on the face of the record, and the Court found
In Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2008), the Florida Supreme Court applied
Carratelli to a Strickland claim for failure to challenge and remove three jurors. The Court
rejected the notion that Owen need only show that there was a question about juror impartiality.
Although one of Owen's jurors gave confusing answers about weighing mitigation and said she
would "probably" vote for death, counsel was not ineffective for failing to strike her because
these facts did not establish actual bias on the face of the record. Id. at 550. See Smithers v.
II
1592
State, 18 So. 3d 460 (Fla. 2009) (rejecting Strickland claim where juror indicated, "if they are
guilty without a doubt they should get the death penalty," but that he could vote for life if he
"had to," because actual bias was not clear on the face of the record).
The Merits
Claim 1: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective during the Penalty Phase of
Hilton's Trial
Hilton alleges that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for
compelling mitigation that the defense team possessed, (Motion at 5-6), and for failing to
effectively present the mitigation evidence they used (Motion at 23). The evidence presented at
the evidentiary hearing demonstrates that trial counsel conducted a thorough and complete
investigation of the mitigation in Hilton's case, and trial counsel's decisions about which
evidence and witnesses to present were reasonable strategic decisions. As Hilton has failed to
demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of Hilton's trial, this
Hilton's defense team included Ines Suber handling the guilt phase, Robert Friedman
handling the penalty phase, Beatriz (Betty) Fuentes as the mitigation specialist, and Chris EHrich
as the fact investigator. Paula Saunders, Steve Been, Tracy Record, Nicole Jamieson, and
Merribeth Bohanan were attorneys in the office who assisted in various capacities in preparing
Robert Friedman is a highly experienced trial and appellate attorney who had nearly 25
years of experience when he was assigned to Hilton's case in February of 2009. (Evid. Hrg.
Trans. at 455, 515). He began as an assistant public defender in West Palm Beach where he tried
12
1593
over 50 cases and briefed over 100 appeals. Since then, he handled Jimmy Ryce cases, including
10-12 Jimmy Ryce jury trials, and second chaired the death penalty trial for Coy Evans, during
which he presented all the expert witness testimony and drafted and argued pretrial motions. (Id.
at 455-57).
Friedman testified that he developed a penalty phase strategy as he worked up the case
with Betty Fuentes, the mitigation specialist. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 469-71 ). He had Dr. Joseph
Wu, a neuropsychiatrist, do a PET scan on Hilton and develop an analysis of the traumatic brain
injury he suffered as a child when he was hit by a falling bed frame. He also had Dr. Charles
with the brain injury evidence, and had Dr. Abbey Strauss, a psychopharmacologist do an
analysis as well. ffiL at 470-71; R. 38:97-99; 39:158-59, 214-15). Based on the mitigation that
developed, Friedman's focus was on the two mental health mitigators available under Florida
law: the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct
to the law was substantially impaired, and the defendant was under the influence of extreme
important to focus on establishing them at trial. ffiL at 485-86). His strategy was to show that
because of Hilton's childhood brain injury and lifelong history of suffering emotional abuse, the
overprescribed Ritalin coupled with Effexor he was consuming acted as "gasoline on the fire."
(Id. at 471).
As Hilton describes, (Motion at 5-23), the defense team conducted a lengthy mitigation
investigation before trial. While Hilton alleges briefly that counsel "never did a
13
1594
multigenerational review of mental illness in Mr. Hilton's family" and "failed to investigate Mr.
Hilton's time in the military and the effect this had on him mentally," (Motion at 28) (internal
citations omitted) the evidence developed at the evidentiary hearing demonstrates that the
defense team conducted a competent and thorough investigation. Fuentes, the defense team's
mitigation specialist, conducted the mitigation investigation for Hilton's case. (Evid. Hrg. Trans.
at 185-86). She was employed with the office as an investigator since 1997 and later because a
mitigation specialist for the office around 2001. As a mitigation specialist, she attended Florida
and national death penalty training seminars. (Id. at 180-82). Fuentes was the mitigation
specialist for Hilton's case from its origination and began conducting the mitigation investigation
immediately after his arrest in 2008. (Id. at 184). She testified that she investigated and
interviewed over 300 mitigation witnesses and created memoranda documenting what the
witnesses told her. (Id. at 186-87). She also met with Hilton at the jail for two to three hours per
visit every week during the three years his case was awaiting trial. @at 257).
Hilton did not present any evidence demonstrating that his defense team failed to
investigate the mitigation in his case, including information about his military history and his
family's mental health history. Fuentes' investigation uncovered information about Hilton's
military history, and the changes in his mental health during that time. Friedman testified that he
knew about Hilton's military service and presented that evidence to the jury. He admitted
Hilton's military records as an exhibit at trial and had his expert witnesses testify about Hilton's
prior psychiatric episodes and his mental decline during and after his military service. (Evid.
Hrg. Trans. at 496-97, 525-26; R. 16: disc 7). In fact, Dr. Wu testified in detail about Hilton's
military service in an elite regiment. Dr. Wu explained that Hilton began to "decompensate"
14
1595
during his service, started having auditory hallucinations, was hospitalized for several weeks,
and was ultimately discharged for being unfit. (R. 38: 124-25). Dr. Strauss also testified in detail
about Hilton's military service, his psychiatric hospitalization and treatment, and the decline of
While Hilton presented the testimony of Dr. Camp at the evidentiary hearing to discuss
Hilton's military service and his mental health during his military service, the information Dr.
Camp discussed was the same information the jury heard at trial. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 143-77).
Dr. Camp's testimony was based entirely on Hilton's military records, some of which Friedman
admitted at trial. (Id. at 172; R. 16; disc 7). Dr. Camp's conclusions echoed the testimony of Dr.
Wu and Dr. Strauss, that Hilton's military records reflected the possibility he was suffering from
serious mental illness during his military service. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 170). Ultimately, Dr.
Camp's testimony did not contain any material information that was previously unknown or
Fuentes also developed mitigation regarding traumatic aspects of Hilton's past, including
that Hilton's father, William Hilton, was killed by his wife, that Hilton was sexually abused by
an attorney who had represented him, and that he suffered a serious head injury as a child. (Evid.
Hrg. Trans. at 260-62). While Hilton accuses his defense team of failing to investigate his
family's mental health history during the mitigation investigation, (Motion at 28), he failed to
present any evidence to support this claim. While Hilton did submit sworn statements from
Phillip Kitchen and Elaine Leming discussing their secondhand knowledge of William Hilton's
possible use of drugs or alcohol and violent behavior, Hilton failed to call either of them to
testify at the evidentiary hearing. Additionally, neither of their statements reflect allegations that
15
1596
William Hilton abused drugs or alcohol or suffered from mental illness. Both sworn statements
would have been inadmissible at trial, and the pertinent portions of their statements, if presented
through their live testimony, would have been subject to valid hearsay objections because their
statements merely recounted what other people told them. §§ 90.80l(!)(c), 90.803, Fla. Stat.
(2018). Finally, both Fuentes and Friedman testified that they were aware of William Hilton's
background and the circumstances of his death, and Friedman explained that he provided that
information to the experts working on Hilton's case. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 262, 492-93).
Even if Hilton's team was deficient in failing to investigate evidence of familial mental
health issues and Hilton's military service, Hilton was not prejudiced by it. Overwhelming
evidence supported the six weighty aggravators in this case, including HAC and CCP, including
Hilton's numerous chilling statements and his prior conviction for the factually similar
kidnapping and murder of Meredith Emerson. These aggravators would not have been
outweighed by the mitigation evidence Hilton says should have been investigated. Hilton failed
to provide this Court with evidence of any information that Hilton's defense team failed to
uncover during their investigation. Hilton cannot demonstrate that his defense team conducted a
Hilton claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present available mitigation
evidence and witnesses. Hilton appears to argue that trial counsel should have presented
Although Hilton points to specific witnesses that he believes should have testified at trial, most
of the information that Hilton claims should have been presented through these witnesses was
16
1597
presented at trial through other means. Furthermore, Friedman's decisions regarding what
First, Hilton alleges that trial counsel generally failed to present evidence on Hilton's
Hilton's family; 2 2) Hilton's mother alternately smothering him and neglecting him; 3) repeated
attempts at self-mutilation and/or suicide; 4) childhood illnesses that affected Hilton's mind; 5)
Hilton's adult battle with substance abuse; and 6) Hilton's mental impairment and deterioration
that made him vulnerable to the effects of Ritalin overdose. (Motion at 24, 28). Trial counsel was
not deficient in presenting evidence on these topics. The record demonstrates that evidence on
most of these topics was presented at trial. Dr. Wu, Dr. Strauss, and multiple lay witnesses
testified at trial about Hilton's damaged relationship with his mother, and the way that she
eventually abandoned him. (R. 38:133-34; 39:236-39, 244-46, 390-404; 41:409-512). Dr.
Charles Golden discussed how Hilton had rheumatic fever as a child and such illnesses can have
an impact on the frontal areas of the brain. (R. 39:191-92). Dr. Alexander Morton and Dr. Wu
both testified about Hilton's mental condition and his vulnerability to Ritalin overdose. (R.
38:126-35; 40:299-356). Victorine Rowe presented lay witness testimony on Hilton's childhood
Hilton argues that presenting additional mitigation would have given more context to the
claim that Ritalin affected Hilton's behavior, however, Friedman presented all the helpful
mitigation they had available. At the evidentiary hearing, Friedman testified that he wanted to
stay away from presenting some of the evidence on Hilton's drug use because of the negative
effect it might have had on the jury. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 498, 534). Cleo Debag, Hilton's
2
A discussion of evidence of multi generational mental illness in Hilton's family is contained, supra, page 14-17.
17
1598
mother, provided information on a single isolated incident of Hilton attempting to harm himself
as a child during a recorded interview with law enforcement. (R. 14:2750-51). The team knew
about this information and Fuentes documented it in an internal memorandum that Hilton
submitted at the evidentiary hearing, (Defense Exhibit I-A), but no other evidence of self-
harming behavior was provided by Hilton at the evidentiary hearing. Friedman explained in his
testimony that he provided all the information they had from Cleo Debag to their expert
witnesses to inform their opinions. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 470, 492). Friedman testified that he
read Fuentes' memos on her conversations with all the potential witnesses and then he contacted
those witnesses as well. Many of them were unwilling to testify (Id. at 481-82, 484). Ultimately,
he provided all the mitigation information to their experts and called all the helpful lay witnesses
who were willing to testify. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. 11/01/18 at 481-87, 537, 560-61). Friedman's
method of handling the background information on Hilton was reasonable and there is no
requirement that he call a witness to testify to every little fact in Hilton's background. He made
sure all the background and mitigation information that was collected was provided to the
Importantly, other than the Cleo Debag interview memorandum, Hilton failed to present
any admissible witnesses or exhibits at the evidentiary hearing that addressed these topics.
Therefore, Hilton cannot point to any admissible evidence that was not utilized by the defense
team. What little of these topics was not presented to the jury was trivial in light of the evidence
presented by both the State and the defense team, and it would have had no impact on the
18
1599
To the extent that Hilton relies on Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (lith Cir. 1991)
and Parker v. State, 3 So. 3d 974 (Fla. 2009), to argue that counsel should have indiscriminately
presented whatever mitigation they had, this argument ignores the obligation of counsel to
exercise reasonable judgement. It is entirely proper for counsel to withhold presenting available
evidence or witnesses if the decision to do so is reasonable and strategic. In Parker, the trial
attorney was found ineffective primarily because he did not properly investigate the mitigation in
the case, having only interviewed the defendant, his mother, and his ex-wife. 3 So. 3d at 984.
Similarly, in Cunningham, the trial attorney was found ineffective for failing to properly
investigate mitigation, and for the lack of a tactical reason for excluding the mitigation they
possessed. 928 F.2d 1006, 1018 (lith Cir. 1991). Conversely, in Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d
1109, 1124 (Fla. 2006), the Florida Supreme Court had held that an attorney is not ineffective for
declining to present available mitigation when he had a reasonable strategic basis for
withholding it. Counsel's decision regarding what mitigation to present was a reasonable
Second, Hilton claims his defense team was deficient for not calling enough Jay
witnesses. (Motion at 5, 23, 29). Hilton failed to present any of the Jay witnesses that he now
claims should have been presented, thus he is unable to show that these witnesses were available
and willing to testify under oath in court. To establish ineffective assistance for failing to call
certain witnesses, Hilton must demonstrate that those witnesses were available to testify at trial
and that their testimony would have been admissible. Guardado v. State, 176 So. 3d 886 (Fla.
2015) (holding, "[trial] court properly held that Guardado did not demonstrate deficiency or
prejudice as to [failure to call] the first four witnesses because he did not provide any testimony
19
1600
from these witnesses at the evidentiary hearing"); Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 196 (Fla.
2007) (citing Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2004). To demonstrate that these lay
witnesses were, in fact, available and willing to testify at Hilton's trial, Hilton should have
presented those witnesses to testify at the evidentiary hearing. His failure to do so is fatal to his
claim. Lebron v. State, 135 So. 3d 1040, 1055-56 (Fla. 2014) (claim that counsel failed to present
witness at trial denied when Lebron did not present that witness at the evidentiary hearing).
Even if Hilton had presented these lay witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, his claim
remains meritless. To the extent that Hilton claims the defense team should have called all of
Fuentes' "essential witnesses" at the penalty phase, Friedman had a reasonable strategic basis for
choosing not to call them. At the evidentiary hearing, Fuentes discussed a list she compiled of 34
"essential witnesses" 3 that she believed should have been called to testify at trial. (Evid. Hrg.
Trans. 10/30/18 at 189-93; State Exhibit 2). Saunders testified that while "humanizing" Hilton
before the jury was important, she also agreed that many of the lay witnesses in the case were not
persuasive 4 (State Exhibit 1). Of those lay witnesses, Friedman called or presented video
testimony of Thomas Perchoux, Victorine Rowe, Cleo Debag, Maria Castelli, Sandy Herman
3 Fuentes' "essential witnesses" were Thomas Perchoux, Victorine Rowe, Cleo Debag, Roy Cave, Sandy Herman,
Beverly Lehmann Hilton, Maria Castelli, Juan Castelli, Leroy Pruitt, Bob Priester, Stephanie Duggan, Brenda
Champagne, Dr. Harry Deicher, John Tabor, Jennie Johnson, Shawn Stewart, Ned Dwight Coleman, Pam Burnett,
Ray Lung, Norm Collins, Officer Kim/King, "laundromat ladies," Dr. Bateman, Maria Linarte, Chad Smallwood,
Justin Wight, Karen Stansbury, Scott Gill, Mildred Stevens, Shaun Faukner, Casey Smith, Robert Schmidt, Tom
Roger, Nancy Linkesh, and "jail stall."
4
To the extent that Ms. Saunders testified that humanizing Hilton was especially important because he was
overmedicated at trial and looked like «a zombie," and could not communicate, the other testimony in the case
refutes this. Ms. Suber testified that Hilton was somewhat sedated, but she was always able to have good
communication with him. Before being medicated, Hilton was manic and unable to have rational conversations.
(Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 127-28). Ms. Friedman testified that Hilton was always able to effectively communicate,
despite being medicated. (!d. at 521 ).
20
1601
Carr, Roy Cave, Officer Steve Kim, 5 and Jin Hee Lee. (R. 39:379, 390; 41:409, 506, 512, 518,
530, 554). He also called Scott Gillespie, Stefanie Durham, and Officer Mary Pat King. (R.
At the evidentiary hearing, Friedman was able to recall specific strategic reasons for
choosing not to call several of the witnesses on Fuentes' list. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 528-543). For
instance, he chose not to call Dr. Deicher, the physician who overprescribed Ritalin to Hilton,
because Dr. Deicher thought Hilton was dangerous and he said he was afraid of him. Friedman
believed that testimony would be very harrnful if it came out at trial, so he chose to present
testimony about Dr. Deicher's errors in treating Hilton though expert witnesses and by
submitting exhibits of Dr. Deicher's medical board disciplinary proceedings. (Id. at 482-83,
542). Although Fuentes was very critical of Friedman for choosing not to call Dr. Deicher as a
witness, she confirmed in her testimony that Dr. Deicher told her he was afraid of Hilton. CJ.i at
258). Similarly, Friedman chose not to call John Tabor, Hilton's forrner employer, because
Tabor "hated" Hilton and was a very hostile witness. He did not think having an openly hostile
witness on the stand was wise. CJ.i I 1/01/!8 at 485-86, 556). Instead, Friedman chose to give
Tabor's deposition to his expert witnesses and let them discuss Tabor's accounts of Hilton's
Friedman explained that he could not independently recall why he did not call all of
Fuentes' "essential witnesses," but he had a standard practice of calling witnesses who were
helpful and not calling witnesses who were going to present damaging testimony or present as a
5 The testimony of Officer Steve Kim was transcribed at trial as an Officer Steve King at trial but appears to be the
same person as the Officer Kim listed on Fuentes' "essential witnesses" list. (R 41:529M30; Evid. Hrg. Trans. at
536-37; Defense Exhibit I-A, Officer Steve Kim Memorandum).
21
1602
hostile witness. He remembered several potentially helpful witnesses who ultimately were
unwilling to testify at trial in person or remotely. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 481-87, 537, 560-61).
Third, Hilton's claim that his defense team unreasonably chose to "streamline" his
mitigation phase and only present "bare bones" mitigation due to a preference for expert
witnesses over lay witnesses is meritless. (Motion at 5-6). Counsel is not ineffective for declining
to present cumulative testimony, Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 198-99 (Fla. 2007), or
otherwise declining to present witnesses based on a reasonable trial strategy. Johnston v. State,
63 So. 3d 730, 740 (Fla. 2011). Friedman explained that he did not "streamline" the penalty
phase presentation of evidence but rather, tried to present the best evidence that would make the
greatest impact, given the facts of Hilton's case. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 485-86). He also explained
that he did not prefer expert witnesses over lay witnesses, (Id. at 524-25), and he made his
decisions about who to call based on who would be a good witness and who was willing to
testify. (Id. at 481-87, 537, 560-61). He testified that some of the evidence that could have been
presented, such as Hilton practice of hoarding his dog's toys and keeping dog skeletons and dog
fur was "creepy," and would not have been helpful. (Id. at 503). He did not take his decisions
about which witnesses to call lightly; he consulted other attorneys on his team and made
reasonable strategic decisions about who to call. (Id. at 523; State Exhibit 1). Finally, Friedman
recognizes the importance in developing Hilton's background and family and military history for
the jury, and he believes he did so in this case with the witnesses he had. ffiL at 524-26).
Fourth, Hilton claims that the defense team did not make the best use of the lay witnesses
they did call, specifically Roy Cave and Sandy Herman Carr. He claims that Cave could have
testified to Hilton suffering sexual abuse from an attorney that represented him and to Hilton's
22
1603
awkwardness and bizarre behavior as a teenager. He claims Carr also could have testified about
Hilton suffering sexual abuse and to an inappropriate conversation Hilton had with her many
years later. (Motion at 30-31). Again, while Hilton submitted written statements from Roy Cave
and Sandy Herman Carr to support his claim, Hilton failed to call these witnesses to testify at the
evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that they were willing and available to testify in court on
these subjects. His failure to call these witnesses is fatal to his claim. Booker, 969 So. 2d at 196;
Lebron, 135 So. 3d at 1055-56. Furthermore, the defense team made every reasonable effort to
glean from these witnesses all the relevant information they knew about Hilton, and they cannot
be faulted for a witness's failure to be forthcoming. To the extent that the defense team knew
about some of this information, Friedman made reasonable strategic decisions about how to use
Fuentes confirmed in her testimony that the defense team had no idea that Cave knew
anything about Hilton being sexually abused because he never told them about it (Evid. Hrg.
Trans. at 263). Similarly, Fuentes' memo on her interview of Carr reflects a long and detailed
conversation, during which Carr also never mentioned knowing about Hilton being sexually
abused. (Defense Exhibit I-A). It is not reasonable to hold the defense team responsible for these
witnesses' failures to be forthcoming. Moreover, the failure to have Cave or Carr testify about
the sexual abuse Hilton suffered was inconsequential because that information was presented to
the jury. Friedman provided all the information they did have, including information about
Hilton being sexually abused, to their expert witnesses, and much of that information was
presented to the jury through expert testimony. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 496). He explained that he
was reluctant to Jean heavily on the sexual abuse information because there was information that
23
1604
Hilton's sexual activity with the lawyer could have been in exchange for drugs. (l.QJ.
Presumably, such information would have been harmful if it had been presented to the jury.
Friedman also explained that the objective of calling Carr was to "normalize" Hilton,
(Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 501), so to have her testify to Hilton's bizarre behavior or inappropriate
phone calls with her would have undermined the reason for calling her as a witness. Finally, even
if these witnesses had been mishandled, the jury heard most of the information that Hilton claims
these witnesses should have testified to. The minor points that were never presented to the jury
are trivial and would not have impacted the outcome of Hilton's case.
Fifth, Hilton claims that the defense team failed to present a mitigation PowerPoint
presentation 6 during the penalty phase which would have been helpful to humanizing him before
the jury. To the extent that Hilton argues that counsel was unable to admit the PowerPoint
presentation either because they did not call fact witnesses to authenticate it or because Fuentes
quit in the middle of trial because she disagreed with penalty phase strategy, these arguments are
meritless.
Counsel is not liable for the misconduct of an expert. The Florida Supreme Court has
rejected claims that trial counsel was ineffective for the misconduct or deficiency of an expert.
Guardado, 176 So. 3d at 895-96 (rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate mitigation because expert witness's deficient report did not include it); Dufour v.
State, 905 So.2d 42, 56 (Fla.2005) (counsel is not deficient for relying on the work of an expert
that he has no reason to doubt). The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the effective
assistance of an expert like it does the effective assistance of counseL Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d
1156 (Fla. 2006) (relying on the holding in Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1998),
6
This PowerPoint presentation is referred to as a "video" in Saunders' testimony. (State Exhibit 1).
24
1605
that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee effective assistance of an expert); Silgay v. Peters,
905 F.2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir.). Similarly, such a claim is not cognizable under the Due Process
Clause. Trotter v. State, 932 So. 2d 1045, 1051-52 (Fla. 2006); Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338,
Here, Fuentes was acting in an expert role as the mitigation specialist for the team.
Fuentes was overcome with emotion when testifying at the evidentiary hearing that she disagreed
with Friedman's penalty phase strategy. On the morning the penalty phase of the trial was
scheduled to begin, Fuentes sent an email to Nancy Daniels informing her that she refused to
testify at the trial as planned or assist with the case any further. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 249-51 ).
Through tears, she explained that she did this to ensure that the case would be reversed on
appeal. She believed if she testified, the Florida Supreme Court would not reverse the case, so
The actions Fuentes admitted to at the evidentiary hearing are a shocking departure from
the conduct that one would be expected of a mitigation specialist. This conduct is so far outside
the realm of professional conduct it would not be reasonable for any of the attorneys on the team
to anticipate that it would occur. Guardado, 176 So. 3d at 895-96; Dufour 905 So.2d at 56.
The team responded reasonably to Fuentes' conduct. When Fuentes quit, the team
instructed their fact investigator, Chris EUrich, to finish the PowerPoint presentation of Hilton's
life history and prepare himself to testifY during the penalty phase regarding the mitigation,
whlch he did. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 336-37). While the PowerPoint presentation ultimately was
not admitted at trial, it was because the trial court sustained the State's relevance objections 7 to
many of the photos in the PowerPoint presentation. (R 40:354-76; Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 488-90).
7
§ 90.401, Fla. Stat (2011).
25
1606
Unlike an objection based on other predicates, Friedman could not call a witness to cure the
State's objections. Even if Friedman had called every lay witness Fuentes talked to it would not
have changed the court's rulings as to relevance. Ultimately, Friedman decided, in consultation
with Suber and Saunders, that it was better not to use the PowerPoint presentation at all rather
than to use a "piecemeal" version of it. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 489). This was a reasonable
strategic decision that trial counsel should not be faulted for making.
Additionally, Hilton was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the PowerPoint presentation.
including photos of Hilton's relatives, a photo of a bed like the one that caused Hilton's head
injury, and copies of marriage and birth certificates. (R. 16: disc 7). If this PowerPoint had been
presented to the jury it would not have outweighed the significant evidence in aggravation.
Hilton is not prejudiced by trial counsel's conduct in the penalty phase. Hilton argues that
trial counsel could have somehow prevented the State from introducing their rebuttal evidence of
Hilton's prior bad conduct if they had presented additional mitigation. (Motion at 32). However,
presenting additional background witnesses or evidence would not have cured the State's basis to
present rebuttal evidence. Hilton notes that the basis for introducing Dr. Pritchard's rebuttal
testimony was in response to the penalty phase theme that Ritalin changed Hilton's behavior.
(Motion at 32). But as Friedman explained, the theme they presented was the best option given
the evidence they had. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 468, 470-71). Even if trial counsel had presented the
additional mitigation that Hilton identifies, the primary theme of the penalty phase would have
remained the same and the State would have still been permitted to introduce its rebuttal
evidence. Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court had declined to find counsel ineffective when a
26
1607
reasonable theme opens the door to rebuttal evidence. Rigterink v. State, 193 So. 3d 846, 877
(Fla. 2016).
Hilton claims he is prejudiced by the trial court's rulings rejecting the two mental health
mitigators available under Florida Jaw: that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired, and the defendant
was under the influence of extreme emotional or psychological disturbance. (Motion at 32). The
record refutes this claim. The trial court only rejected one of the mental health mitigators; the
trial court found that the defense proved that the defendant was under the influence of extreme
emotional or psychological disturbance, and gave it some weight. (R. 12:2357-58). Additionally,
the trial court's rulings rejecting the other mitigator was not based on Friedman's failure to
present more evidence, it was based entirely on a finding that the State's expert witness, Dr.
Pritchard was more credible than the defense expert testimony. (R. 12:2357).
Hilton is unable to demonstrate that the outcome of his case would have been different if
counsel had presented the mitigation as he now contends he should have. Overwhelming
evidence supported the six weighty aggravators in this case, including HAC and CCP. Evidence
in aggravation included Hilton's numerous chilling, incriminating statements and his prior
conviction of the factually similar kidnapping and murder of Meredith Emerson. These
aggravators would not have been outweighed by the mitigation Hilton says should have been
presented. Hilton failed to present any of the witnesses he claims were available and willing to
testify at trial. Hilton also failed to produce any admissible evidence that should have been
presented to the jury and was not. Hilton cannot demonstrate that his defense team conducted a
deficient investigation or that he was prejudiced thereby. This claim should be denied.
27
1608
(c) Failure to prepare and effectively use expert witnesses
Hilton claims that trial counsel was ineffective in preparing and effectively using expert
witnesses during the penalty phase of Hilton's triaL Specifically, he claims that trial counsel did
not provide their experts with all the information they needed to fully inform expert opinions;
they did not prepare Dr. Wu to avoid talking about Hilton's involvement in the Deadly Run
movie, which had been excluded under a motion in limine; they did not effectively mitigate the
damage after Dr. Wu brought up the Deadly Run movie; they hired Dr. Strauss; and they failed
to confirm that Hilton had multiple sclerosis. (Motion at 25-31). The trial record and the
testimony at the evidentiary hearing demonstrate that trial counsel was not deficient in their
handling of expert witnesses and that Hilton was not prejudiced by their actions.
First, Hilton claims that the defense team did not properly inform their experts by
providing them all the information they needed, specifically multigenerational mental and
physical health information on Hilton's family and "clear evidence of [Hilton's] mental illness,"
such as his deceased dog's skeleton. (Motion at 29). This claim fails because Hilton was unable
to present any new material evidence or information at the evidentiary hearing that was available
at the time of trial that was not presented to the experts. As discussed, supra, page 14-17, the
defense team conducted a thorough mitigation investigation and Hilton has failed to produce any
new material information that they failed to uncover. Friedman testified that the information they
did have was always provided to his experts and he would regularly update his experts when new
information was developed. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 470-71, 483, 486, 491-94, 497, 502-03, 539-
41 ). Friedman also testified that he did not want some of the evidence of mental illness, such as
Hilton hoarding his dog's toys or skeletons, to come out at trial because this evidence was
28
1609
"creepy." (Id. at 503). The record reflects that the experts were provided the evidence of Hilton's
mental illness because they testified about it at trial. (R. 38:124-35, 144; 39:169, 190-94, 199-
202; 40:236, 239-40, 299-356). Finally, Hilton did not present Dr. Wu, Dr. Morton, Dr. Strauss,
Dr. Golden, or any other expert, to testify that there was any information available at the time of
trial that was material to their opinions but was not provided to them. Hilton failed entirely to
Second, Hilton claims that the defense team failed to properly prepare Dr. Wu to testify,
and as a result, he discussed Hilton's involvement in the Deadly Run movie after this
information had been excluded subject to a motion in limine. (Motion at 29). Friedman's
testimony at the evidentiary hearing demonstrates that he properly prepared Dr. Wu and the other
three experts to testify and he acted reasonably in response to Dr. Wu's mistake. Friedman
testified that he met with all the experts together before trial and would have informed them not
to talk about the Deadly Run movie while preparing them to testify at trial. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at
546-47). He pointed out that his admonition was sufficient for the other three experts and he was
"dumbfounded" when Dr. Wu brought it up, unprompted, during his testimony. (Id. at 546).
Indeed, the record reflects that Dr. Wu's mention of the Deadly Run movie was nonresponsive to
the question Friedman asked him. Friedman asked him about a correlation between Ritalin and
the frontal lobe of Hilton's brain. During his longwinded response, Dr. Wu mentioned Hilton's
claim of involvement in the Deadly Run movie as an example of grandiose delusions. (R.
38: 127-28). It is entirely unreasonable to expect counsel to anticipate that a mention of the
Deadly Run movie would come out in response to the question he asked.
29
1610
Friedman also responded to Dr. Wu's mistake reasonably. It would certainly look bad in
front of the jury for Friedman to object to his own expert witness. Rather, when the State's
expert, Dr. Pritchard brought up the Deadly Run movie, Friedman objected repeatedly, and those
objections were overruled. (R. 41:592, 42:617-28). Hilton claims that Friedman was ineffective
for not calling Samuel Rael, the purported director of the Deadly Run movie, to testify that
Hilton was only minimally involved in the movie. (Motion at 29-30). However, Hilton failed to
present Samuel Rael as a witness at the evidentiary hearing to demonstrate what his testimony
would have been if Friedman had called him as a trial witness. In so doing, Hilton fails to
demonstrate that Rael was available and willing to testify or that he had anything helpful to say.
Booker, 969 So. 2d at 196; Lebron 135 So. 3d at 1055-56. Friedman and the defense team were
not deficient for Dr. Wu's nonresponsive comment about the Deadly Run movie. Considering
the overwhelming evidence in aggravation and the six weighty aggravators in this case, the
mention of the Deadly Run movie would have had no impact on the outcome of Hilton's case.
Third, Hilton claims that Friedman was ineffective for calling Dr. Strauss as an expert
witness because Dr. Strauss had been previously disciplined by a medical board. Friedman had a
reasonable strategic basis for calling Dr. Strauss, and Hilton was not prejudiced by his choice.
Friedman testified at the evidentiary hearing that he used Dr. Strauss because he had worked
with him in the past and gotten successful results in his cases with Dr. Strauss. (Evid. Hrg. Trans.
at 545). He thought Dr. Strauss was particularly good for Hilton's case because he was a
using Dr. Strauss instead of Dr. McLaren, who she had used in the past. However, Friedman
testified that he did not want to use Dr. McLaren because he did not trust him and had seen cases
30
1611
where he thought Dr. McLaren's involvement in the case did harm. Ultimately, Friedman was
able to elicit all the same testimony from Dr. Strauss that he would have been able to elicit from
Dr. McLaren. (JQJ. Hilton failed to present any evidence that Friedman was not fully informed
when he chose Dr. Strauss as an expert on Hilton's case. Friedman's testimony at the evidentiary
hearing reflects a reasonable strategic decision on his part. Furthermore, Hilton has failed to
Fourth, Hilton claims that trial counsel should have confirmed whether Hilton had
multiple sclerosis and did not. He claims that this information would have assisted the defense,
regardless of the result. (Motion at 31). This claim is meritless because testing Hilton would have
had no impact on the case and would have potentially conflicted with defense expert testimony.
If testing Hilton for multiple sclerosis would have been equally impactful, regardless of the
result, it accomplishes nothing to do the testing. One of the defense experts, Dr. Golden, testified
that he saw no evidence of Hilton having multiple sclerosis and that the symptoms were most
likely a result of severe depression. (R. 39: 191). This testimony accomplishes the same result as
introducing a negative test result for multiple sclerosis; Hilton's incorrect self-diagnosis
demonstrates a potential mental health concern. Precisely the evidence Hilton claims should have
been presented was in fact presented. Moreover, Dr. Golden indicated he thought the symptoms
Hilton associated with multiple sclerosis were symptoms of depression, and it is reasonable for
Hilton has failed to demonstrate that his defense team was deficient in its preparation or
execution of the penalty phase of his trial. Hilton has also failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by the defense team's actions. The six weighty aggravators, including CCP and HAC
31
1612
were supported by overwhelming evidence in aggravation. Hilton made numerous chilling
statements, in which he talked about hunting his victims and dismembering them, his prior
conviction for the factually similar kidnapping and murder of Meredith Emerson was also
introduced. There is no question the outcome of Hilton's penalty phase would remain the same.
Hilton alleges that the members of his trial team were divisive and uncooperative,
resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel. (Motion at 34-39). There is no question that there
was some discord within Hilton's trial team, however, the evidence demonstrates it was not to
the severe extent that he alleges. Moreover, while personal conflict and lack of a cooperation is
not ideal, it certainly does not alone establish ineffectiveness; Hilton must allege specific
deficient acts that that there is a reasonable probability that those errors affected the outcome of
his case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-90); Sears, 561 U.S. at 945. Hilton's allegations fall short of
this standard.
Hilton alleges members of his defense team engaged in unprofessional conduct during his
case 8 Many of these allegations center on Suber's conduct, claiming she was very difficult to
work with, would send combative late-night emails to other team members, and was unwilling to
entertain other team member's perspectives on evidence and strategy. While the testimony at the
evidentiary hearing consistently demonstrated that Suber was demanding and very difficult to
work with, this does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. As discussed in more detail,
8 Hilton's allegations of Ms. Fuentes' misconduct are discussed fully, supra. Claim I.
32
1613
infra, every material decision Suber made in Hilton's case was based on reasonable strategy, not
Allegations were made by other team members that Suber may have been using
prescriptions for Xanax or Ambien, or consuming alcohol in a way that interfered with work.
Suber explained that she used to have a prescription for Xanax many years ago but does not
believe she was still taking it while working in the capital division. When she did take Xanax, it
was always at home and never at work. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 90-91). She also confirmed that she
was not consuming alcohol during Hilton's case because she was too busy for recreation. (.!f!J.
However, Suber was taking Ambien to help her sleep. She consulted a doctor about having
trouble sleeping because she was very stressed out about Hilton's case, as is common for
attorneys handling serious capital cases, and he prescribed her Ambien and told her not to work
more than 18 hours per day. (Id. at 89). Daniels testified that she saw no need to remove Suber
from work and saw no signs of drug or alcohol use. (Id. at 314). She was under the impression
that Suber had a prescription for some type of anxiety medication but did not see an issue with
Hilton also alleges that Bohanan was unprofessional in intentionally sabotaging the
demonstrates that after Fuentes quit, Bohanan, apparently in solidarity with Fuentes, told Hilton
that the defense team was not acting in his best interest. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 27-28; State
Exhibit I). Bohannon was removed from the courtroom for her conduct and ultimately was
removed from the case. Saunders believed that the office needed to withdraw based on an ethical
conflict and informed the court in camera. (State Exhibit !). Daniels testified that Thomas
33
1614
evaluated the situation and talked to everyone involved, and ultimately, the office elected to not
withdraw. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 303-04). Friedman also testified that the incident did not rise to
the level that they were obligated to withdraw. (Id. at 551). While Bohanan's conduct is
regrettable and no doubt upset Hilton, there is no evidence that her conduct affected the triaL
Other team members testified that Bohanan's role in the case was minor, so her exit from the
team would have been inconsequentiaL (Id. at 28, 474; State Exhibit 1). Moreover, the office
handled her conduct in a reasonable way by removing her from the courtroom and addressing
The alleged unprofessional conduct did not result in ineffective assistance of counseL
The conduct was not directly related to any legal work that was done in the case. All the
evidence that needed to be presented was, and all of the legal tasks that needed to be performed
were completed. While some level of unprofessional conduct may have existed behind closed
doors, Hilton's team was thorough, they provided adequate representation in court, and made
To the extent that Hilton alleges specific instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, he
is not entitled to relief on those allegations. Ines Suber was lead counsel in the guilt phase of
Hilton's triaL Suber was an extremely experienced capital trial attorney. She began work at the
Public Defender's Office in 1997 and estimates she worked on over 100 capital cases. She
oversaw the capital division from 1999 through the completion ofHilton's·case in 201!. (Evid.
Hrg. Trans. at 10 1-02). She was assigned to the case immediately after his arrest in 2008 and
worked to prepare his case for trial during the three years the case was awaiting trial. (Id. at 102-
03). During initial conversations with Hilton and several conversations thereafter, Hilton
34
1615
expressed a desire to contest guilt and "fight everything" if they couldn't get him a life sentence
plea agreement. (Id. at 68-70, 84, 132-33). The evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there
were no obvious weaknesses to attack in the guilt phase. Because they were unable to secure a
life sentence plea agreement, despite repeated attempts to secure one, and because Hilton wanted
to "fight everything," their strategy was to go to trial and attack whatever weaknesses they could,
First, Hilton alleges that his defense team was not prepared for the guilt or penalty phase
of trial because the team members were not cooperating with each other and team members kept
changing roles or leaving the team. (Motion at 36, 39). Both the trial record ruid the evidence
presented at the evidentiary hearing demonstrate that Hilton's team was extremely prepared
Hilton's team filed well over 100 pretrial motions, including over two dozen motions to
exclude or limit evidence or argument at trial, most of which were filed well before trial. (R.
Master Index at i-xxxi; 3:521-62; 4:648-59, 1120-32, 1152-91; 7:1274-79; 11:1995-2003, 2046-
47, 2077-83). Suber and several team members spent a full two weeks combing through
innumerable of pieces of physical evidence. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 108). They deposed,
interviewed, and investigated approximately 500 State witnesses. (Id. at 66-67, 107, 08, 112-13).
Friedman testified at the evidentiary hearing that they were ready for trial. (Id. at 515). Both
were appointed to Hilton's case well before trial; Suber was appointed to Hilton's case when he
was arrested in Georgia in early 2008, and Friedman testified he was appointed approximately
two years before trial. (Id. 102-03, 505, 515). The fact investigator, Chris Ellrich, and the
mitigation specialist, Betty Fuentes, both conducted exhaustive investigations to assist the
35
1616
attorneys. (Id. at 54, 60, 62, 109, 186-87, 257). Each of them had sufficient time to prepare. (R.
17:01). Although Suber filed for a 90-day continuance in September 2010, (R. 3:450-54), she
requested the continuance partially to take five weeks of vacation, and so other tean1 members
could go on vacation as well. (Id. at 121-23). The denial of the continuance was not a surprise to
the team, as Suber mentioned in an email following the denial that she expected the trial court to
While there were numerous changes in team makeup, most of those changes happened
long before trial, except for Bohanan's and Fuentes' exits. Bohanan and Fuentes left the team
during Hilton's trial, but these exits had little impact. The evidentiary hearing testimony from
Thomas, Saunders, and Friedman was consistent that Bohannon did very little in the case,
making her exist inconsequential. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 28, 474; State Exhibit 1). Fuentes' exit
was also inconsequential because the bulk of her work was building the mitigation investigation,
which was completed before trial, and EHrich was able to step in and finish what little work that
Fuentes had not completed before leaving. iliL. at 186-87, 257, 336).
Lack of cooperation did not prevent team members from fully preparing for trial. Suber
testified that whenever discovery came in, each team member got a copy. She would divide her
copies of discovery into files for each witness that she kept in her office, but any team member
was welcome to borrow her files. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 124-25). The team had regular group
meetings leading up to trial, during which they discussed strategy and shared infom1ation and
discovery. iliL. at 67-68, 80-81, 133-34, 278, 516-17). Although communication between Suber
and Friedman may have been more strained as trial neared, Friedman's assistant, Julie Hartwein,
testified that they remained in contact about the case leading up to trial. (Id. at 422). The case file
36
1617
was reportedly disorganized, but it was a very large case with thousands of items of evidence and
disorganization may have existed, the evidence and trial record demonstrate that the team was
Saunders testified that she had not reviewed all the discovery before trial and had not
read all the witness's statements before they were called to testify. (State Exhibit 1). However, in
a case this size it would be expected that different attorneys would need to familiarize
themselves with different portions of the evidence, based on their tasks. Thomas testified that the
amount of evidence in the case was extremely voluminous, and it was too much for any one
Any lack of preparation on Saunders' part would have had very little impact at trial. Her
role in the trial was minor, only examining a handful of witnesses,' and she was unable to
identify any specific tasks she was unprepared to handle. (State Exhibit I). Ultimately, the
defense team was prepared for trial and Hilton fails to demonstrate otherwise. Hilton failed to
produce evidence of any specific items of discovery that were overlooked 10 or misplaced,
Second, Hilton claims that Suber was generally "ill prepared" in defending his case.
Specifically, he claims that she was ineffective for being late to court, making poor use of her
peremptory challenges during jury selection, 11 and objecting to another attorney on her team in
9
Ms. Saunders conducted the cross-examination of Ofc. David Graham, Mark Cecci, and Norman Gunter. (R.
30:667; 31: 840; 33:1 003). Ms. Saunders conducted the direct-examination of Neil Smith and Adina Schwartz. (R.
33:1016; 36:1390).
10 To the extent that Hilton claims the defense team overlooked the statement of correctional officer Caleb Wynn,
1618
open court. (Motion at 37). The record and evidentiary hearing testimony refute these claims.
The only time Suber was late to court was for a hearing that another attorney on her team was
handling. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 292-93). Suber also explained during her testimony that when she
objected while Friedman was presenting Dr. Wu's testimony, she was trying to tell Friedman to
object to something the State orthe witness had done. (!fL. at 116-17).
Friedman and Saunders testified that Suber did not do a perfect job cross-examining the
DNA or tool mark expert at trial and asked open-ended or confusing questions. However, Nancy
Daniels testified that Suber was very experienced in dealing with scientific evidence and had
dealt with many scientific issues prior to Hilton's case. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 308). Suber also
testified that she prepared extensively to handle the scientific evidence and was prepared to
cross-examine the DNA and tool marks experts. (Id. at 110-12). The record reflects that the
defense team adequately attacked the scientific evidence. The tool mark evidence was challenged
in a motion in limine and Suber's cross-examinations of both experts were thorough and did not
reflect any material flaws. (R. 11 :24-56; 33:11 01-52; 35: 1274-1350).
Third, Hilton claims that "[t]here was also little communication with Mr. Hilton about the
reality of the case against him." 12 Saunders and Fuentes suggested during their testimony that the
defense team failed to communicate adequately with Hilton regarding evidence and strategy.
(State Exhibit 1; Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 232) However, this suggestion is entirely unfounded and is
During Suber's testimony, she explained that Hilton either wanted a life sentence plea
agreement, or he wanted an adversarial trial. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 69, 72). She said that Hilton
12To the extent that Hilton argues the defense team developed a poor guilt phase and penalty phase strategy, this is
addressed more fully, infra, Claim 3.
38
1619
made it clear "from the beginning" that he wanted them to force the State to prove everything.
She made sure Hilton understood that there was not much to argue because the evidence of guilt
was overwhelming. (Id. at 69-70). She also explained to him the potential benefits of going to
trial, as well as the option to enter a guilty plea and just try the penalty phase. (Id. at 82-84).
Friedman also discussed strategy with Hilton, who said, "he wasn't giving up anything for
free" and he wanted them to make the State prove the charges. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 506-07).
Friedman also discussed penalty phase strategy with Hilton and would introduce Hilton to the
experts they were using. His practice was to keep Hilton up to date on case and evidence
developments. (Id. at 507). Daniels also confirmed that her understanding in the defense team
meetings was that Hilton wanted the team to contest everything at trial. (!A_ at 287). As the lead
attorneys on the case, Friedman and Suber are in the best position to testify to their strategy
discussions with Hilton. Their testimony refutes any allegation that Hilton was not adequately
While there is no question that there was some disharmony within the defense team,
Hilton has been unable to show how that disharmony resulted in specific deficient acts. Any
impact the defense team's lack of cooperation may have had on the case would not have changed
the outcome of Hilton's trial. The case included voluminous evidence of guilt, including the
victim's DNA on items Hilton possessed, tool mark evidence matching the cuts in the victim's
car tires to Hilton's bayonet, and Hilton's own chilling and incriminating statements. The six
weighty aggravators in the case were supported by overwhelming evidence as welL The defense
team's level of cooperation would have had no impact on the outcome of Hilton's case.
39
1620
(b) Excessive Workload
Hilton submits that the defense team was working under an excessive caseload and did
not spend as much time on Hilton's case as they needed to. (Motion at 40). Specifically, he
alleges the defense team did not have time to interview all the witnesses and review all the
evidence in the case, including the correctional officer's report documenting Hilton's confession
to another inmate. The only specific error that Hilton alleges is that the defense team overlooked
correctional officer Caleb Wynn's report in the evidence and was unprepared to address his
testimony at trial. (Motion at 4 I). This claim is meritless and should be denied.
Officer Wynn is a correctional officer who was called to testify at trial about
incriminating statements he heard Hilton make while in jail. (R. 34: 1238). The record reflects
that during opening statement, the State referenced the substance of Officer Wynn's testimony,
and Suber objected, stating she was not aware of a listed witness that would present such
testimony. While the State had provided Officer Wynn's statement to the defense among
thousands of other pages of discovery, his name was accidentally not included on the witness
list. (R. 24:44-46). Suber confirmed during the evidentiary hearing that his name jumped out at
her because his name was the only one she did not recognize of the 100 other witnesses the State
listed at the beginning of trial. She was unfamiliar with Officer Wynn only because he had not
been properly disclosed to the defense. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. I I I- I 3). When the witness was later
presented to testify, she objected again, and the court provided her the remedy of delaying the
witness's testimony and giving Suber an opportunity to talk to the witness. Suber elected to talk
to the witness instead of setting a deposition because he answered all her questions. (Id. at I 13-
14).
40
1621
Suber's handling of Officer Wynn's testimony was effective and did not reflect a lack of
preparation. It is not reasonable to expect Suber to know about a witness that was not properly
disclosed to her. Suber raised valid objections regarding Officer Wynn's testimony and
succeeded in excluding a damaging portion of his testimony that he overheard Hilton say he was
"very selective" of his victims. (R. 34:1 237). On cross-examination, Suber questioned Officer
Wynn about his report, gaining a concession from him that every detail he testified to on direct
was not in the reports he drafted, and that he never included the victim's name when
documenting Hilton's statements. (R. 34:1250-51; 1254). Wynn also admitted that he did not
document anywhere on his daily logs that Hilton and the other inmate spoke together on the
dates he claimed Hilton's admissions occurred. (R. 34: 1259-60). These facts demonstrate that
trial counsel was properly prepared to address Officer Wynn's testimony, and was not deficient
Any deficiency in failing to prepare for Officer Wynn's testimony did not prejudice
Hilton. Suber testified that if she had known about this witness before trial, she would have gone
to the jail to look for evidence in the jail layout and audio equipment to attack the likelihood that
Officer Wynn overheard Hilton's statements. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. 10/30/18 at 114-15). With the
recess that the judge afforded her, Suber was able to go to the jail and attempt to conduct that
investigation, but the jail did not grant their request for access because it would require vacating
the detention area. (Id. at 115). This outcome would remain the same even if Suber had known
about the witness sooner. Additionally, Officer Wynn's testimony was not the only evidence
regarding Hilton's incriminating statements. The State presented audio recordings of Hilton's
multiple incriminating statements to law enforcement officers, including that he had not started
41
1622
killing before September and his military training taught him to disassociate from killing people.
(R. 34:1 180, 1184, 1196-1203). As such, if Suber had known about Officer Wynn's testimony
sooner, it would have had no impact on the evidence that was admitted or the outcome of the
trial.
Furthermore, there is no support for the claim that Hilton's defense team was
overworked. The record reflects that there were nearly thirty-six months between the filing of the
complaint (February 28, 2008) and the start of jury selection (January 31, 2011). (R. 1:39;
17:01). The defense team was able to accomplish an enormous amount of work in Hilton's case.
At the evidentiary hearing, Suber confirmed that the team deposed or interviewed almost 500
State witnesses. They spent two weeks at the evidence hold examining all the items of physical
evidence in the case. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 107-08). Furthermore, they filed well over 100 pretrial
motions, including over two dozen motions to exclude or limit evidence or argument at trial, and
held hearings on a number of those motions. (R. Master Index at i-xxxi; 3:521-62; 4:648-59,
The Public Defender's Office also made every effort to accommodate the workload of
Hilton's defense team. The offtce reassigned approximately five of Suber's cases, including
Angela Prim, Rodrizgus Richardson, and Earl Brundidge. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 105-07). Daniels
also accommodated all of Suber's and Friedman's requests for resources. (.lJL 109-10, 514-15).
Thomas and Daniels both agreed in their testimony that the office dedicated enormous resources
to the Hilton case and made every effort to provide the defense team what they needed. (Id. 34-
35, 308).
42
1623
Even if Hilton were able to demonstrate that his defense team was overworked,
Strickland claims require more than just a showing that trial counsel was overworked. Hilton
must demonstrate with specificity "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687. On the rare occasion a defendant meets that threshold, he or she must also prove that
such an error prejudiced his case. Id. Hilton's allegations of deficiency are defeated by the record
and the testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Any impact the defense team's workload may have
had on the case would not have changed the outcome of the trial. There was voluminous
evidence of guilt, including the victim's DNA was found on items in Hilton's possession, Hilton
made numerous callous and incriminating statements, and the puncture marks in the victim's car
tires matched Hilton's bayonet. This claim is meritless and should be denied.
Claim 3: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Present a Cohesive,
United Defense in the Guilt and Penalty Phases of Hilton's Trial
Hilton alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting a defense theory of
innocence in the guilt phase and admitting guilt during the penalty phase. Specifically, Hilton
claims the penalty phase theory was to blame the overprescription of Ritalin for Hilton's sudden
change in behavior and ultimately, the murder, and such a theory was inconsistent with the guilt
phase defense of attacking the forensic evidence. (Motion at 41-42). This claim is meritless
because the guilt and penalty phase strategies did not conflict with each other and the defense
team's strategies were dictated by the realities of the evidence in the case and Hilton's request
The guilt and penalty phase strategies were reasonable based on the realities of the
evidence in the case and Hilton's request to subject the State's case to adversarial testing. Suber
43
1624
noted that the evidence of guilt was "overwhelming," and there were not many weaknesses in the
guilt phase evidence for them to attack. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 70). The team considered using an
intoxication-induced insanity defense and held a meeting with the whole team and Daniels to
discuss it. Suber testified that it was a defense she wanted to pursue, but after Friedman
conducted research and conferred with a few experts, he determined that it was not a viable
defense in this case. (Id. at 133-34, 518). Such a determination is reasonable. Shellito v. State,
121 So. 3d 445, 453 (Fla. 2013) (holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present an
intoxication defense as it would have been inconsistent with the defense theme). Hilton told the
team several times that he wanted to go to trial and "fight everything" if they could not get him a
life sentence plea agreement. (Ml at 133, 196, 256, 506). When repeated plea negotiations failed,
(Id. at 130), the team worked to develop Hilton's case for trial and ftght the evidence in his case.
Contrary to Hilton's assertion, trial counsel did not argue guilt phase theories, such as
actual innocence or circumstantial evidence, which would conflict with the evidence. Rather,
they attempted to demonstrate that there was reasonable doubt in the State's case. The approach
questions, and focusing on other areas of reasonable doubt, which was a reasonable trial strategy.
(R. 24:47-55; 37: 1529-60). As Suber explained, she did not argue that it was a circumstantial
evidence case, she argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove the allegations. (Evid. Hrg.
Trans. at 94-95). Friedman testified that the trial strategy was a "not guilty" defense, rather than
a claim that he was innocent. (Ml at 508). Moreover, alternative guilt phase theories, like
intoxication-induced insanity were evaluated and abandoned because they were not viable. (Id. at
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508-09). The defense team used the guilt phase strategy available to them, given the evidence
Trial counsel's guilt phase strategy was not inconsistent with the penalty phase. As
discussed, the guilt phase strategy attempted to highlight the weaknesses in the State's case,
rather than argue that he was actually innocent or that the State's case was purely circumstantial.
Both Suber and Friedman agreed that such a strategy is not inconsistent with trying to give
context to Hilton's behavior in the penalty phase. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 95, 135-36, 507-08).
Notably, it is common practice for trial attorneys to have their clients enter a not guilty plea,
proceed to trial on a reasonable doubt defense, and then plea for mercy in the penalty phase.
Raising such a defense did not assert factual innocence in this case, as Hilton appears to allege,
and thus, it was not inconsistent with the penalty phase theory.
Hilton argues his trial counsel's guilt phase strategy was poorly executed, particularly by
objecting too much or by executing poor cross-examination. (Motion at 35, 37). The defense
team's effort in protecting Hilton's rights and preserving issues for appeal was thorough and not
excessive. Hilton discussed with Suber that he wanted her to preserve every evidentiary matter
that she could. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. I 0/30/18 at 86-87). Friedman testified that while juries at times
dislike lots of objections, the State was having issues laying predicates for some of their evidence
and the defense team could not overlook that and just let the evidence in. (Id. at 509-10).
Finally, Hilton has failed to allege any speciftc basis of prejudice. Hilton claims that the
inconsistent theories diminished the defense team's credibility in front of the jury, and the
defense team should have used a different guilt phase theory. (Motion at 42). However, he fails
to identify what guilt phase theory would have a reasonable probability of resulting in a life
45
1626
sentence. Given the voluminous evidence of guilt, including the victim's DNA found on items
Hilton possessed, Hilton's numerous callous and incriminating statements, and the puncture
marks in the victim's car tires that matched Hilton's bayonet, there is no question the outcome of
Hilton's trial would be the same, regardless of the guilt and penalty phase theories. Hilton's
Claim 4: Whether Hilton is entitled to Relief Pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct.
616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016)
Hilton claims that he is entitled to a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136
S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Hilton is not entitled to relief
because the unanimous jury death recommendation, combined with the overwhelming evidence
supporting the aggravators in this case weighed against the uncompelling mitigation, renders any
Hurst error harmless. Hilton's claim is without merit and should be denied.
Harmless error analysis inquires whether the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury would have unanimously recommended death had it been instructed m
accordance with Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d at 68 (analyzing whether the jury's failure to
unanimously find all the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty contributed to
Hurst's death sentence); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 523 (Fla. 2007).
Any Hurst error in Hilton's case is plainly harmless because the jury in his case voted
unanimously to impose the death penalty. While Hilton argues that it is reversible error for the
jury to recommend death without making express findings regarding the existence of sufficient
aggravators and the weighing of the aggravation and mitigation, (Motion at 43-45), this
argument is unsupported by the law. The Florida Supreme Court has consistently found Hurst
error harmless in cases with similar circumstances where the jury unanimously voted to impose
46
1627
the death penalty. See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2016); King v. State, 211 So. 3d 866
(Fla. 2017); Truehill v. State 211 So. 3d 930 (Fla. 2017); Lowe v. State, No. SC12-263 2018
In Lowe v. State, 2018 WL 5095143, *26, the Florida Supreme Court relied in part on the
Lowe's jury instructions in finding that any Hurst error was harmless.
Here, the jury was informed that before it could consider the death penalty, it
must first determine that at least one aggravating circumstance has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt Also, as in Davis [v. State, 207 So. 3d at 142], the
jury was informed 'that it needed to determine whether sufficient aggravators
existed and whether the aggravation outweighed the mitigation before it could
recommend a sentence of death.' Id. at 174. Among other things, the jury was also
informed that, regardless of its findings, it was neither compelled nor required to
recommend a sentence of death.
Id. at *27. Because the jury unanimously recommended death despite the mitigation presented
and being informed that they are never required to recommend death, the unanimous
recommendation was sufficient to conclude that Hurst error was harmless. Id.
The jury instructions in Hilton's case were like those in Lowe. (12:2307-14). Hilton's
jury was instructed that one aggravator must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before they
could consider the death penalty, (12:2309-10), and that the jury must determine whether
sufficient aggravators exist to justify the death penalty and whether the aggravators outweighed
the mitigators. (12:2312). The instructions also advised the jury that they are never required to
recommend a death sentence and cautioned them to "carefully weigh, sift, and consider the
The unanimous death recommendation and the instructions the jury received provide this
Court with the basis to conclude that the jury made the required findings under Hurst As the
47
1628
Florida Supreme Court held in Lowe and numerous other cases, any Hurst error in this case is
Hilton asserts multiple flawed reasons for this Court to depart from the Florida Supreme
Court's decisive precedent. Hilton alleges that the jury instructions diminished the jury's role
under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), by telling the jury their sentence finding was
advisory. (Motion at 49-50). First, these instructions do not mislead the jury because a jury's
sentence finding is advisory; the trial court may depart from a jury's death recommendation and
impose a life sentence when fitting. This did not change following Hurst. See § 921.141(2)(3),
Fla. Stat. (2017) (calling the jury's sentencing finding a "recommendation"). Second, in Truehill,
the Court found harmless Hurst error regardless of the trial court's instruction to the jury that the
verdict was advisory. 211 So. 3d at 955. The Court concluded that Hurst error was harmless
because the jury was instructed on the proper considerations in recommending a sentence and
based on the unanimous recommendation, the Court concluded the jury made the constitutionally
required findings. Id. at 955-57. The jury instructions in Hilton's case reflect the requirements
described in Truehill and support the conclusion that the jury's role was not diminished in
violation of Caldwell.
Hilton argues trial counsel's penalty phase approach may have been different if the jury
instructions complied with Hurst and the trial court may have imposed a life sentence if bound by
the jury findings. (Motion 51-54). These arguments are highly speculative, and the Florida
Supreme Court has not found such arguments persuasive in numerous cases where a unanimous
48
1629
Finally, Hilton claims that harmless error review cannot be applied because there must
(Motion 56-57). Such an argument ignores the fact that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
has not changed after Hurst. Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, required the aggravators be found
beyond a reasonable doubt prior to Hurst and that requirement is unchanged following Hurst.
Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor the Florida Supreme Court have interpreted Hurst
to change the findings that must be found beyond a reasonable doubt before recommending a
death sentence. See Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 642 (2016) (rejecting a claim that the
circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11.
Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court has clearly held that harmless error review applies
to Hurst error. Johnson v. State, 205 So. 3d 1285, 1289-90 (Fla. 2016). Furthermore, the Florida
Supreme Court repeatedly uses unanimous verdicts as a factor in evaluating whether a Hurst
error is harmless. Davis, 207 So. 3d at 177; King, 211 So. 3d at 866; TruehilL 211 So. 3d at 930.
The suggestion that the Sixth Amendment prohibits Florida Supreme Court's use of unanimous
verdicts in evaluating the harmlessness of Hurst errors is entirely unsupported by the law.
Any Hurst error is harmless. Overwhelming evidence support the weighty aggravators in
Hilton's case, including incriminating statements and forensic evidence, and easily outweighed
the unpersuasive mitigation. The jury rendered a unanimous recommendation for death after
being instructed to make the findings required under Hurst. This claim should be denied.
49
1630
Claim 5: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Object to Hilton's
Eligibility for the Death Penalty
Hilton claims that his mental illness makes him ineligible for the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Hilton claims that his death sentence should be vacated
because his mental illness 13 renders him ineligible for the death penalty, and he claims his trial
counsel was ineffective for not raising this claim at his trial. This claim is unripe and Florida law
does not recognize mental illness as a valid bar to imposition of the death penalty.
Article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution prohibits this Court from departing from
the United States Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment rulings. See Correll v. State, 184 So. 3d
478,489 (Fla. 2015) (citing Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 538-39 (Fla. 2011)).
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the Eighth Amendment requires an
age-related categorical bar on imposing the death penalty to offenders who were younger than 18
years old at the time of the offense. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Similarly, in Atkins
v. Vircini!!, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court created a categorical bar to imposing the death
penalty on intellectually disabled defendants. No similar categorical bar exists for defendants
Hilton does not fall into any class that is excluded from imposition of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment, and the United States Supreme Court has never recognized a
categorical bar for imposition of the death penalty due to mental illness. While Hilton attempts to
draw similarities between mental illness and classes that are ineligible for the death penalty, such
as juvenile and intellectually disabled defendants, there is absolutely no basis in the United
States Supreme Court's jurisprudence for his argument Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court
13 Hilton notes various mental conditions relevant to this claim, including brain damage, pervasive drug use in his
youth, multiple sclerosis, schizoaffective disorder, and exhibitions of "bizarre" behavior. (Motion at 61-62)
50
1631
has repeatedly rejected such claims. See Power v. State 992 So. 2d 218, 222 (Fla. 2008)
("[N]either this Court nor the Supreme Court has recognized mental illness as a per se bar to
execution."); Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11 (Fla. 2008); Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 300
(Fla. 2007); Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012). As the Florida Supreme Court
has repeatedly rejected such claims and this Court is bound by the Florida Constitution to
construe its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in accordance with United States Supreme Court
To the extent that Hilton is attempting to allege that his mental illness renders him legally
insane, and thereby incompetent to be executed, such a claim is unripe for review. A claim of
legal insanity, also called a Ford 14 claim, addresses whether a defendant is competent to be
executed, and must be raised pursuant to a specific statutory procedure. Section 922.07, Florida
Statutes, sets fortb the procedure to be followed in raising a Ford claim, vesting the power in the
governor to determine whether a defendant is insane. Rule 3.8ll(c), Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, states, "No motion for a stay of execution pending hearing, based on grounds of the
prisoner's insanity to be executed, shall be entertained by any court until such time as the
Governor of Florida shall have held appropriate proceedings for determining the issue pursuant
to the appropriate Florida Statute." Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1984). As such,
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion arguing that Hilton's mental
illness renders him ineligible for the death penalty because such a claim is without legal merit.
Counsel cannot be ineffective for refusing to raise a frivolous claim. See Lockhart v. Fretwell,
506 U.S. 364 (1993); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. !57 (1986). When asked why he did not file a
1632
motion claiming Hilton was ineligible for the death penalty due to mental illness, Friedman
explained that he did not file such a motion because the Florida Supreme Court has "repeatedly
held that severe mental illness is not a bar to the death penalty." (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 549). As
there was no legal basis for counsel to file such a motion, counsel was not ineffective for failing
Claim 6: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Preserve for Appeal
the Denial of Cause Challenges During Jury Selection 15
Hilton puts forth a conclusory claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
preserve the denial of cause challenges in accordance with Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla.
1990), so that such denials could be raised on appeal. (Amended Claim 6 at 2-3). Hilton's claim
fails because it is facially insufficient, and Hilton is unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced
by counsel's actions during jury selection because no biased jurors sat on his jury.
This claim is insufficiently pled because Hilton has simply made a broad allegation that
trial counsel was ineffective because cause challenges were not preserved. (Amended Claim 6 at
2-3). He does not identify which cause challenges counsel should have preserved, he does not
allege any specific facts to demonstrate prejudice, and he does he identify any biased jurors who
remained on his jury. He simply makes conclusory allegations. To be entitled to relief, the
movant must allege specific facts. The defendant "bears the burden of establishing a prima facie
.case based upon a legally valid claim." Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, I 139 (Fla. 2006)
(explaining that where a movant presents only bare conclusory allegations on several issues,
summary denial was proper). Hilton's claim should be denied as insufficiently pled.
15 This claim is sequentially numbered as Claim 6 but Hilton's Motion, presumably due to typographical error, has
this claim listed as Claim 7. (Motion at 73).
52
1633
Hilton's claim is also meritless. Hilton cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong
because there is nothing in the record that demonstrates that any of the jurors seated in Hilton's
case were actually biased. A Strickland claim related to jury selection requires proof, plain on the
face of the trial record, that an actually biased juror sat in the case. In Carratelli v. State, 961 So.
2d 312 (Fla. 2007), the Florida Supreme Court concluded that a Strickland claim for failing to
preserve a denial of a challenge for cause must establish that an actually biased juror sat on the
jury, and such bias must be plain on the face of the record. The Court defined an actually biased
juror as one who is not impartial; one who is biased against the defendant. Id. at 324. Actual bias
means bias-in-fact that would prevent service as an impartial juror. United States v. Wood 299
Here, Hilton has failed to specifically identify any jurors that were actually biased in his
case, nor does he provide a single citation to the record that supports his claim. Rather, Hilton
simply makes the broad claim that "the face of the record demonstrates bias of jurors sought to
be stricken for cause," without providing specific record citations or naming specific jurors.
Most importantly, the record does not support Hilton's claim that biased jurors sat in his
case. Hilton's jury panel consisted of Jurors Crowell, Sperduti, Hoffman, Williams, Herring,
Bearss, Reichert, Harris, Walker, Godwin, Rice, and Sparks. Booth and Tarof served as alternate
jurors. (R. 23:1075-77). The only jurors serving on Hilton's jury that had been objected to by
counsel were Jurors Crowell and Rice. Although Juror Crowell had been exposed to some media
coverage about Hilton, she unequivocally and repeatedly stated she could set aside anything she
heard about him prior to the case. (R. 17:30-35). All of Juror Crowell's other questioning
reflected no bias, and many of her responses were favorable to Hilton. (R. 22:669, 681-83, 697-
53
1634
703, 754-55, 759, 770, 792-95, 852). During questioning, Juror Rice stated that names in the case
sounded familiar, but other than "something about a kidnapping and a body found in the forest,
or something like that," she didn't remember any details about why the names were familiar to
her. (18:281). Juror Rice confirmed unequivocally that she had not formed any opinion about the
case. (18:280). Juror Rice also indicated she was "for the death penalty," (R. 23:1057), but
confirmed repeatedly that she would not automatically impose the death penalty and would
follow the court's instructions about weighing the aggravation and mitigation in deciding on a
sentence. (R. 23:1060-62). Juror Crowell's and Juror Rice's responses do not reflect actual bias
on the face of the record as required to establish prejudice under Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 312;
Hilton's claim is facially insufficient and he is unable to establish the requisite prejudice
by demonstrating on the face ofthe record that an actually biased juror sat in his case. As such,
Hilton alleges that he did not receive a fair trial due to the numerous errors in his case. He
asserts that the errors complained of in his Motion tainted his case and these errors are not
harmless. (Motion at 74). Cumulative error relief is not warranted in Hilton's case because none
Although Hilton presents this claim as an independent basis for relief, a cumulative error
claim cannot warrant relief unless the trial court finds specific claims of error meritorious. Israel
v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008) (holding where individual claims of error are meritless
16 This claim is sequentially numbered as Claim 7 but Hilton's Motion, presumably due to typographical error, has
this claim listed as Claim 8. (Motion at 74).
54
1635
or procedurally barred, a defendant is not entitled to relief based on cumulative error). Because
all of Hilton's claims are meritless, he is not entitled to cumulative error relief. See Griffin v.
State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003) ("[W]here individual claims of error alleged are either
procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error must fail.); Vining v. State,
827 So. 2d 201, 219 (Fla. 2002) (where the defendant's claims were either meritless,
procedurally barred, or did not meet the Strickland standard, his cumulative error claim
necessarily failed). As all of Hilton's claims are meritless, Hilton is not entitled to cumulative
error relief.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the record and the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing
affirmatively demonstrates that Hilton is not entitled to relief. The State prays this Court deny
Respectfully submitted,
JACK CAMPBELL
STATE ATTORNEY
55
1636
GEORGIA CAPPLEMAN
ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY
Florida Bar No.: 566071
301 South Monroe St., Ste. 475
Tallahassee, FL 32301-1861
capplemang@leoncountyfl.gov
Phone: (850) 606-6062
Co-counsel for the Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished
via the eportal to Robert A. Morris, Esq., alex@ramlawyer.com, Counsel for the Defendant; and
the Office of the State Attorney, SA02_Leon@leoncountyfl.gov; this 14th day ofJanuary, 2019.
56
1637
Filing# 83335402 E-Filed 01/14/2019 10:20:31 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT.
------------------------~1
COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel, pursuant to Rule 3 .85l(f)(5)(E), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and files this
written closing argument supporting the Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Preliminary Statement
The record before the Court is in several different formats and is somewhat complicated
given the length of the proceedings. The transcripts of the trial shall be referred to by use of the
symbol, "T," any necessary volume reference as well as the appropriate page number
designation. The transcripts of the hearing on the motion for post-conviction relief shall be
referred to by use of the symbol "H," any necessary volume reference and the appropriate page
number designation. There are several exhibits that were entered into evidence during the course
of the evidentiary hearing by the State and the Defense. They will be referred to by the exhibit
1638
number as well as any additionally descriptive information that draws the Court's attention to the
reference.'
Counsel has elected not to focus on legal arguments surrounding the application of the
facts to the Jaw or vice versa. The applicable Jaw has already been set forth and argued in
pleadings previously filed. This Court is well aware of the law surrounding post-conviction
proceedings. It is of greater consequence that Counsel highlight factually why trial counsels'
Claim 1: Trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase in violation of
Mr. Hilton's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective counsel.
During Mr. Hilton's penalty phase, trial counsel inexplicably failed to elicit relevant
testimony from witnesses on the stand, completely failed to call other witnesses who had helpful
information, and did not adequately consult with and prepare the expert witnesses. Counsel's
stewardship during the penalty phase was deficient, and these deficiencies prejudiced Mr. Hilton
by not providing the effective counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Trial counsel opted for a barebones, streamlined mitigation presentation during the
penalty phase. This left out much of Mr. Hilton's life history and Jed to a mitigation story that
ultimately hurt Mr. Hilton because it opened the door to the State's harmful rebuttal evidence.
Trial counsel collected historical information about Mr. Hilton's life, which included, among
other things, head injuries, neglect, sexual abuse, suicidal ideations, instability, poverty, and
mental illness. However, the jury never heard a vast majority of this information, including that
1 In candor, post~conviction counsel for the Defendant probably made things more complex with the format of the
exhibits admitted into evidence because they are not "Bates stamped" and must now be referenced by the actual
document within the exhibit.
2
1639
this was not simply a case of Ritalin overuse, but instead Ritalin overuse by a man who was
already impaired and on the cusp of a breakdown. Trial counsel could have shown the jury that
Mr. Hilton's brain damage and mental illness, in addition to his troubled life history, left him
especially vulnerable to the effects of wrongfully prescribed Ritalin. Had trial counsel presented
a more complete picture of Mr. Hilton's life history, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
result of the penalty phase would have been different and the jury would have voted for life.
The evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing in this matter was nothing less than
shocking. Thematically, the trial defense team was not a team at all and all of the sworn
testimony before the Court essentially conflicts with the testimony of others and seeks to point
fingers and cast blame on other members of the defense team. It would take a flow chart
hundreds of yards long to come close to reflecting the absolute disaster of the defense structure
and presentation. Clarence E. Gideon would have been better off representing himself in this
circumstance-' The testimony and the evidence before the Court is truly amazing and unique.
Moreover, it is not incredibly helpful in the Court's proper resolution of this matter.
There is no point in trying to give a citation to the record to explain how the defense team
was organized or structured. Every single witness testified differently as it related to who
became a member of the defense team and when as well as what their responsibilities were along
with the responsibilities of others. The most telling comment that trail counsel (seemingly
responsible for the penalty phase presentation) made during the evidentiary hearing was that the
mitigation specialist's efforts and work were simply "helpful." (H, 560).
'Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) was, of course, the United States Supreme
Court's landmark decision that indigent persons should be afforded counsel under the protections guaranteed in the
6"' Amendment to the United States Constitution.
3
1640
Beatriz "Betty" Fuentes was the mitigation specialist in the Office of the Public
Defender. From the inception of the case, she was on board. (H, 179-184). Ms. Fuentes
developed some 300 different mitigation witnesses and drafted memoranda as it related to each
of the witnesses interviewed as well as prepared a PowerPoint presentation to chronicle the life
of Mr. Hilton. (H, 187-197,230-263, Exhibit I-A, Exhibit IV). Ms. Fuentes testified that that
she developed and prepared witnesses for testimony that would aid in telling the life story of Mr.
Hilton (from birth to the time of the offense). (H, 187-197,230-263, Exhibit I-A, Exhibit IV).
She also testified that trail defense counsel Friedman contacted these witnesses and offended
them to the point of them not be willing to testify. (H, 187-197, 230-263). Mr. Friedman, of
course, denies that he did any of this. (H, 454-552). In the end, Ms. Fuentes resigned her
position from the Office of the Public Defender as a mitigation expert in the middle of trial
because none of the mitigation she had developed were being utilized on behalf of Mr. Hilton.
(H, 187-197, 230-263). Mr. Friedman characterizes all of this as "strategy" and essentially
asserts that all of the evidence that he deemed necessary was able to "come in" through the
experts. (H, 454-552). Every single witness had a different opinion and impression of why Ms.
Fuentes left the case in the middle of trial and under what circumstances. All of them were
negative as it related to Mr. Hilton's defense. The exception was/is Mr. Friedman's general
testimony and expressions that he got everything correct and just simply had to make "tactical
It is helpful to look at the matters that should have been put before the jury in
chronological order and categorical order to gather a better context as to what was available for
Mr. Hilton's defense. Set forth below is a helpful chronology of evidence admitted during the
evidentiary hearing that should have been provided to the jury during Mr. Hilton's trial. The
1641
facts below track the life and circumstances of Mr. Hilton from a narrative perspective and
provide the witnesses who could have and would have testified to the assertions herein.
Mitigating evidence available at the time of trial would have shown Mr. Hilton's life filled
with mental illness, brain injury, childhood abuse and neglect, unstable relationships, and
years of substance abuse.
Cleo Marie Debag nee Reynolds, Mr. Hilton's mother, was born in Calhoun, Georgia, in
1925. She had three siblings, and she was the second oldest. When Ms. Debag was eleven-years-
old, her mother died. A few years later, her father remarried a much younger woman. Ms.
Debag's father and stepmother abused and starved the kids. The parents would put the children
outside without any food, and the children were not allowed to come in. When they were inside,
Ms. Debag's father would hide the food from them. Finally, Ms. Debag's stepmother grew tired
of the children and sent them to live elsewhere. Ms. Debag was left on her grandmother's porch
and eventually moved in with her aunt and uncle. She viewed her aunt and uncle as her parents
after that. Ms. Debag dropped out of school in ninth grade and worked as a dishwasher.
In 1943, Ms. Debag was working as a waitress in a pharmacy when William Esco Hilton carne
in. He asked for permission to take her home, and she agreed. They started dating after this, and
they married three months later on October 2, 1943. Mr. William Hilton was thirty-two, and Ms.
Three months after they were married, Mr. William Hilton left to join the Army. After
this, Ms. Debag and William Hilton never lived together again. They would see each other
sporadically and meet in hotels. Three years after they were married, Ms. Debag got pregnant.
At the time, the marriage was not going smoothly, and Ms. Debag got pregnant intentionally in
1642
the hopes that it would force William Hilton to get them an apartment. Her plan did not work,
William Hilton left his young family and moved to Jackson, Georgia to open a jewelry
store. He actually had another wife in Jackson at the same time that he was married to Ms.
Debag, and he had four more children. At least two of these children were also abandoned by
their father.
Ms. Debag had been hoping for a girl when she got pregnant, so she dressed Mr. Hilton
in girl's clothes for the first few months of his life. She rented out a room in a house and lived
there with him. There was no crib, so he slept in the same bed as his mother. William Hilton was
not providing financial assistance, so they did not have much money. Ms. Reynolds tried to sue
him for child support at one point, but Legal Aid was unable to locate him.
When Mr. Hilton was a baby, Ms. Debag was very attentive. She always had him with
her when she was not working and spent all of her free time taking care of him. She took a lot of
When Mr. Hilton was nine-months-old, Ms. Debag divorced William Hilton. She brought
her baby to the courthouse with her, and he played under the table during the proceedings.
William Hilton would not even acknowledge his son. This was the last time that William Hilton
saw his son. He was later shot and killed by one of his wives, Edna May Hilton, in Lexington,
Ms. Debag continued raising her baby by herself. When Mr. Hilton was one-and-a-half,
he had to go in for tonsil and adenoid surgery. Ms. Debag had to put hot towels on his head
because the pain from his sinuses was so intense. Around this same time, Mr. Hilton also
1643
contracted rheumatic fever. This lasted until he was five-years-old. The doctors told Ms. Debag
not to let Mr. Hilton walk, and after that she carried him until he was three.
Ms. Debag returned to work when Mr. Hilton was two. She made $1.00 per hour and
$25.00 per month. Since Ms. Debag was not making very much money, they either rented out
rooms or lived in housing projects. She would get home very late, so she would make him dinner
and then put him to bed right away. She did not have as much time for her young son, and she
did not get to interact with him as much as she once had. When she did spend time with him,
however, she treated him like a friend instead of her very young child. She was lonely, so she
would talk to Mr. Hilton as if he were an adult and shared personal, mature things with him.
WhEm Ms. Debag could take time off work, she would take Mr. Hilton on trips. She
would take him to see his cousins in Gainesville, Georgia. However, one of his older cousins
threw a mattress on Mr. Hilton and smothered him, almost killing him_ Mr. Hilton was on! y four
at the time.
Even after the sinus surgery, Mr. Hilton continued to suffer from his sinus problems as a
young child. When Mr. Hilton was only five, he was in so much pain that Ms. Debag walked in
on him holding a knife, about to cut his arms. When Mr. Hilton started attending kindergarten, he
Around this time, Mr. Hilton got a pet bird named Pee Wee_ He was very attached to the
bird. Ms. Debag left the window open one day, and the bird flew away. Mr. Hilton spent hours
calling for his bird, who never returned. Though it was an accident, Mr. Hilton blamed his
When Mr. Hilton was in second grade, Ms. Debag transferred for work to Tampa,
Florida. They Jived in a housing project. Mr. Hilton went to daycare when he was not in school,
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but it was not a good one. One day, Mr. Hilton got stuck in a bathroom. When he called for help,
nobody responded. He had to crawl through a window to get out. After that, Ms. Debag started
leaving Mr. Hilton with a neighbor. However, the neighbor tried to throw Mr. Hilton into an
alligator pit, and this terrified Mr. Hilton. He started going to the Boys and Girls Club of Tampa
Mr. Hilton's life changed for the worse in 1955. When he was nine-years-old, his mother
met and married Nilo Debag. Mr. Debag was a horse trainer from Argentina. He traveled around
to different race tracks around the country. One night, he was at a park in Tampa when he came
across Ms. Debag and Mr. Hilton. It was raining, so he offered them a ride and to go get
something to eat. Ms. Debag was still having financial problems, and Mr. Debag had a lot of
money. By this time, Ms. Debag had her own apartment, and Mr. Debag started coming over and
staying the night. Two months after they started dating, Mr. and Ms. Debag got married.
Mr. Hilton's life was very different after his mother's remarriage. He went from having
his mother give him her full attention when she was not at work to her regular! y choosing her
new husband over him. Mr. Debag traveled a lot for work, training and buying horses. Mr.
Hilton's mother would go with him, and when she did this she would leave Mr. Hilton with his
aunt. Mr. Debag became possessive over Ms. Debag, and he wanted her all to himself. Once they
were married for two months, they moved to Toledo, Ohio. They left Mr. Hilton behind, and he
Six weeks later, Ms. Debag moved back to Tampa, and Mr. Hilton returned to her care.
Mr. Debag moved separately to Chicago and then Cleveland. Once Ms. Debag and Mr. Hilton
were back in Tampa, they rented a room within a house. A day or two after they moved in, Ms.
Debag was trying to unscrew a Murphy bed bolted to the floor but could not get under it. She
1645
asked Mr. Hilton to go under the bed, but then it fell on his head. Ms. Debag lifted the bed and
started screaming. The metal bars had cut Mr. Hilton's scalp open. A next door neighbor,
Victorine Rowe, heard the screaming and ran over. She saw Ms. Debag trying to hold bloody
towels over Mr. Hilton's head and to calm down so the towels would stay still. Another neighbor
came over to take them to the hospital. Mr. Hilton was in the hospital for a week, and he received
two hundred (200) stitches in his head. When he finally went back home, his entire head was
bandaged.
Mr. Hilton continued to move around a lot with his mother and stepfather. He changed
schools about every three months. Within a couple years, Mr. Hilton lived in Atlanta, Tampa,
Toledo, Louisville, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and back to Tampa. Mr. and Ms. Debag continued to
pull Mr. Hilton out of school to travel around with him. Mr. Hilton tried to participate in school
activities. For example, in Toledo he became a school patrol; but this was short-lived because he
had to move again. The family went to Tampa, Chicago, Miami, Hialeah, San Francisco, and
back to Hialeah. Between kindergarten and seventh grade, Mr. Hilton changed schools seventeen
times. A few times, he was in school for less than a week. When they were in San Francisco, Mr.
Hilton missed school for a month after a flood prevented him from returning to school.
Mr. Debag lived with the family sporadically. One of the times that they were all living
together in Toledo, about a year after Mr. and Ms. Debag were married, Mr. Hilton started
vomiting a lot. Ms. Debag took him to the doctor, who told them that Mr. Hilton had an ulcer.
The ulcer went away once Mr. Debag was living by himself in Ohio and Mr. Hilton was with his
mother in Florida. Ms. Debag assumed that Mr. Hilton was afraid of Mr. Debag and that is why
he got the ulcer. When Mr. Debag got angry, which was often, he would break and throw things.
One time he tore up one of Mr. Hilton's favorite coats. Ms. Debag told Mr. Hilton not to speak or
1646
respond to Mr. Debag' s outbursts. Ms. Debag suspected that Mr. Hilton and Mr. Debag were
jealous of each other because they both wanted all of her time and attention.
When Mr. Hilton was ten, Mr. Debag left for one of his business trips. While he was
gone, Ms. Debag had a miscarriage. Mr. Hilton was the only one around, and he had to call an
During all this moving around, Mr. Debag brought Mr. Hilton back a Dalmatian named
Muhamad. Mr. Hilton got very attached to the dog and dressed him up for Halloween. He played
with and trained Muhamad. Then, Mr. Debag suddenly took Muhamad away and never brought
him back. Another time, when Mr. Hilton was eleven, they lived next door to a family who got a
puppy. Mr. Debag thought that the family was not taking care of the puppy, so he took it. They
brought the puppy with them when they moved back to Florida. Shortly after the move, the dog
disappeared. Mr. Hilton found the dog's body in a trash can where Mr. Debag had thrown it.
When Mr. Hilton was around eleven or twelve, Ms. Debag came home from work. Mr.
Debag and Mr. Hilton had been home alone together. Mr. Hilton· privately told his mother that
Mr. Debag had tried to take off his pants in front of him. Ms. Debag dismissed it and did not
Mr. Debag cared little about education and thought nothing of pulling Mr. Hilton out of
schooL When the family moved to Puerto Rico, then, they did not enroll Mr. Hilton in school
there. Ms. Debag tried to enroll Mr. Hilton in correspondence school, but she never got the
paperwork in. Mr. Hilton was expected to help Mr. Debag because Mr. Debag had been working
since before he was ten and wanted the same for Mr. Hilton. In Puerto Rico, Mr. Hilton was with
Mr. Debag when Mr. Debag was beaten by other horse trainers. Mr. Debag almost died in the
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Mr. Hilton and Mr. and Ms. Debag returned to Florida when Mr. Hilton was fourteen.
They lived in Miami Beach first, where Mr. Hilton fell out of a tree and broke every bone in his
hand. He did not tell his mother until later that night when he had to tell her because his hand
was so swollen. They moved to Hialeah, Florida next. That year, he got a persistent rash in his
genital area. Ms. Debag treated it at home with boric acid. She also got the same rash, but hers
was treated when she went to the doctor for an unrelated surgery.
Around this time, Mr. Hilton started dating Sandy Herman, a classmate of his. They
mostly hung out after school and did homework together. Mr. Hilton's other friend at that time,
Leonard Scalfani, was two years older than him and had been held back a few times. Otherwise,
Mr. Hilton did not really socialize with any other students. Ms. Herman went to Mr. Hilton's
home a few times, and she met both of his parents. Ms. Debag was nice to her, but Mr. Debag
was distant. She was not sure if he just did not know much English or if it was his personality,
but he would only say hello to her and not much else.
In 1961, Mr. and Ms. Debag separated. This was one of seven times that this happened.
Mr. Hilton and his mother moved into a one bedroom apartment in a motel. On September 5,
1961, Mr. Hilton stopped off at the apartment to try and reconcile with Ms. Hilton. Mr. Hilton
told Mr. Debag to go away, but Mr. Debag refused. Mr. Hilton threatened to call the police if Mr.
Hilton would not go, but this did not faze Mr. Debag. Mr. Hilton had a gun that he had borrowed
from a friend, so next he threatened to shoot Mr. Debag. Mr. Debag still did not leave and
encouraged Mr. Hilton to shoot. Mr. Hilton aimed at Mr. Debag's lower stomach and shot him
there. Ms. Debag chose her husband over her son because she talked to a counselor who said it
was her duty to be loyal to her husband. Mr. Hilton was taken into juvenile custody, and the
attorney appointed to represent him made sexual passes at him and paid him for sex. Mr. Hilton
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ultimately ended up staying with the Kellers, family friends who offered to take Mr. Hilton in.
While Mr. Hilton was in foster care, Ms. Herman went with Ms. Debag to buy a set of
drums for Mr. Hilton. He taught himself to play and started playing with a band, The Famous
Yellow Jackets.
The shooting was in the local papers. Ms. Herman broke up with Mr. Hilton right after.
She changed schools, and the two of them just stopped talking. Mr. Hilton was devastated, and
he had a breakdown. He was admitted to Jackson Memorial Psychiatric Unit. After his release
from that unit, he moved in with Margarite and Thomas Perchoux for six months. Margarite
Perchoux worked with Ms. Debag at the time. They lived two blocks away from Ms. Debag, but
Ms. Debag never came to visit her son. She also did not assist financially.
Ms. Debag left Mr. Debag again shortly after, and Mr. Hilton left the Perchouxs to move
back in with his mother. Ms. Debag took Mr. Hilton to Atlanta with her to meet an aunt who was
. ill. While there, Mr. Hilton met a young woman around his age, Beverly Hilton, who had the
same last name. When Mr. Hilton told his mother, she went to see Ms. Hilton's mother Vema
and discovered that William Hilton had married Vema Hilton while still married to Ms. Debag.
Mr. Hilton was learning for the first time that he had a sister.
When they returned to Florida in 1963, Mr. Hilton taught himself to play the drums and
started playing in a band. This was one of the few times Mr. Hilton seemed happy. Usually, he
was brooding about his home life. When he played in the band, though, he became a different
person and was in a better mood, although he also bragged a lot about his drum skills.
After Mr. Hi! ton joined the band, they usually practiced at Mr. Hilton's house because his
mother and stepfather were rarely home. Even though they practiced there several times per
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week, one of Mr. Hilton's bandmates recalls that he only saw Mrs. Debag a few times and Mr.
Debag once. The few times that Mrs. Debag was around, she and Mr. Hilton had an unusual
The band would play at various clubs. Mr. Hilton drank and smoked marijuana after the
gigs. This was the only time Mr. Hilton really communicated normally, since the marijuana
In general, Mr. Hilton had a high opinion of himself and tried telling others how smart he
was. He did not really have friends so much as acquaintances, and he tried to be sociable but was
very socially awkward. Because of this, the band members came and went. Mr. Hilton was
critical of his bandmates, as he was with others, so a lot of the members quit.
During this time, Mr. Hilton was still upset about his home life, and at times he would
stay with other people. This included a stay an attorney who represented Mr. Hilton on one of his
juvenile charges. The attorney was a male much older than Mr. Hilton, who was around fifteen
or sixteen at the time. One of Mr. Hilton's bandmates, Roy Cave, knew that Mr. Hilton continued
to spend time with this attorney after the case was over. The three of them went to a bar one
time, and they got a motel room with two rooms afterward. Mr. Hilton stayed in the room with
the older attorney, and they had sex. When Mr. Cave confronted Mr. Hilton about this later, Mr.
Hilton explained that his attorney was giving him a place to stay and money or drugs.
Mr. Hilton eventually went on to join a more experienced band. He answered an ad in the
Miami Herald for a band that was looking for a drummer. Mr. Hilton was selected, and he
dropped out of school. He was making money and working late hours, so his mother consented.
Mr. Hilton was only sixteen, however. When the band found out, they had to let him go.
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Witnesses and evidence who were/are crucial to the foregoing:
• Lionel Sonny Hilton (Sonny)- Sonny Hilton is/was Gary Hilton's paternal half-
brother. Sonny had/bas information about his own relationship with William
Hilton, their mutual father. William deserted Sonny's family in the same way as
he did Gary Hilton. Sonny confirms that William had multiple wives and families
at once and did not contribute monetarily. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Hilton,
Lionel Sonny).
• Phillip Kitchen- Mr. Kitchen is a police officer familiar with William and Edna
Hilton. Officer Kitchen worked for the police department in Lexington,
Kentucky. He interviewed Edna Hilton after she shot and killed William Hilton.
Edna said she was tired of the abuse. The prosecutor did not press charges
because it was "self-defense." Officer Kitchen was already involved with
William and Edna before this. He went to their home three or four times on
domestic violence calls. Some of those times Edna had black eyes and bruises.
The police department in general were called about two to three times a year for
five years. Each time, Officer Kitchen could smell alcohol on William's breath,
and one time there were alcohol containers on the lawn. Edna also reported
William had drugs in the house. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Kitchen, Phillip).
• Elaine Leming- Ms. Leming is Gary Hilton's paternal half-sister. Ms. Leming
confirms that William Hilton similarly deserted her mother and siblings. She has
more extensive knowledge about William Hilton's death, including that Edna shot
him in self-defense when William was drunk. She also has knowledge that
William Hilton got hooked on prescription pills while working for a hospital in
Kentucky and had a reputation in his neighborhood for acting erratically while
drunk. Her brother Olin, another one of Gary's half-siblings, shows signs of
mental illness and becomes angry about minor things then refuses to talk to his
family for weeks or months. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Leming, Elaine).
• Nina Reynolds- Mr. Hilton's aunt by marriage. Nina was married to Mr.
Hilton's maternal uncle Don Reynolds before Don passed away. She had
interactions with Mr. Hilton as a child and can confirm that after Gary's father,
William Hilton, abandoned Gary and Cleo. He found another wife while still
married to Cleo, and in fact had a third wife that Cleo did not find out about until
years later. Nina can also confirm that Gary was extremely close with is mother at
that time, and Cleo took her son everywhere with her when she was not at work.
Nina only saw Mr. Hilton a few times in his teens, but he was smart and
handsome and had a life of possibilities. In the 1980s, though, she saw Mr. Hilton
and Cleo again, and Mr, Hilton was unrecognizable. He was unkempt and did not
look the same, and Cleo admitted that she thought Mr. Hilton was addicted to
drugs. Nina also has information about Don and Cleo's upbringing. Their father
beat them with a belt, and their father and stepmother would not allow them to
eat. Don had to sneak food when his stepmother was busy watching soap operas.
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Eventually, all of the children, including Cleo, were shipped off to live with other
relatives. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Reynolds, Nina).
• Exhibit 1-B- Birth record of Mr. Hilton along with his "baby book" that is
interestingly devoid of a great deal of information.
• Exhibit 1-1- The death records of William Hilton and articles related to William
Hilton being shot and killed by his wife in Lexington, KY due to what appears to
be many of the same mental health issues manifested by Gary Hilton.
• Sandra "Sandy" Herman Carr- Ms. Carr was Mr. Hilton's high school
girlfriend. Ms. Carr can confirm that Mr. Hilton joined the military to get away
from an older man making sexual passes at him. She can attest to Mr. Hilton's
lack of close friends in high school and his tense relationship with his mom and
stepfather. Finally, she had a weird incident where Mr. Hilton looked her up
years later and talked to her on the phone for about ten minutes before suddenly
making an inappropriate sexual comment. Ms. Carr was a witness at the trial.
Ms. Carr can conftrm that there was limited and chaotic witness preparation.
• Exhibit 1-H- Mr. Hilton's school records the great number of environments he
was in, his aptitude, but more importantly the instability.
• Roy Cave- Mr. Cave was a high school and Army acquaintance. He attended
high school with Mr. Hilton, and then they were in boot camp together. He
witnessed Mr. Hilton's juvenile attorney sexually exploiting him. The three of
them stayed in a hotel room together. Mr. Cave saw the attorney engaging in
sexual acts with Mr. Hilton. When he asked Mr. Hilton what was going on, Mr.
Hilton explained that this man gave him food and money. Mr. Cave also saw Mr.
15
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Hilton's tense relationship with his mom and stepfather, Mr. Hilton's inability to
make friends because of his weird personality, and his developing marijuana
addiction. Finally, Mr. Cave was a penalty phase witness, and he can confirm that
he received no preparation or guidance from the trial team despite flying in from
Oregon to testify. Of incredible significance is that the defense team had no idea
to ask Mr. Cave about Mr. Hilton's sexual exploitation by his attorney due to a
failure to investigate. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Cave, Roy, Exhibit 1-F, H,
454-570).
• Exhibit 1-C- Court records related to juvenile and adult criminal history.
• Cleo Debag- She testified by video posthumously. The defense team had little
to no knowledge of what to inquire to adequately prepare the perpetuation of
testimony.
*****************************************************************************
With no job and no high school degree, Mr. Hilton decided to join the army. He was only
seventeen, so his mother had to sign a waiver. She did so even though she still described his
behavior as "infantile"
Mr. Hilton went to go say goodbye to Ms. Herman before he left, although they had not
spoken in a while. He showed up at her school during the lunch hour. Mr. Hilton told her that he
had been staying with an older man, and that this man had been making sexual passes at him.
While he did not explain who this man was to Ms. Herman, this was likely the older attorney that
Mr. Cave had seen with Mr. Hilton. Mr. Hilton told Ms. Herman that he was starting to like it
In the army, Mr. Hilton was able to earn his G.E.D. He also continued his passion for
drums and was assigned as the drummer while they marched. He trained as a paratrooper and
had to jump out of a plane for his graduation. During his military training, Mr. Hilton also
developed a fascination with weapons. He requested to join the Special Forces. He was in a
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secret unit, the Davie Crockett Division, which transported nuclear weapons from trucks.
Everyone in the unit had to have a high IQ to get in. Mr. Hilton still did not fit in with the rest of
his unit, though. The unit only had about fifteen members, so the rest of the guys would hang
out with each other and get to know each other. Mr. Hilton was an outcast. He would talk about
things that nobody else wanted to talk about, and he spoke very rapidly. He always wanted to
talk about how smart he was and how he thought he would eventually end up in Special Forces.
During this time, Mr. Hilton was stationed right on the border of communist Eastern Germany.
In 1967, Mr. Hilton spent four and a half weeks in the United States Army Medical
Center Psychiatric Hospital. He said he was losing interest in the military and reported hearing
voices. Eventually, Mr. Hilton was found unfit to be in the military, and he was honorably
discharged.
Mr. Hilton met his flfSt wife, Ursula, when he was in Germany. They married in 1968.
After his discharge, Ursula moved back to the United States with Mr. Hilton, and they lived in an
apartment with Mr. and Ms. Debag. They divorced in 1971 due to irreconcilable differences, and
Soon after his divorce, Mr. Hilton started dating Paulette Goldman. She introduced Mr.
Hilton to Quaaludes, and he became addicted. He confided in Ms. Goldman that his mother had
young woman, Dina Evonne Baugh, came into the company he worked for in 1976 looking for a
job. She moved in with Mr. Hilton almost immediately. She had a son, Cameron, from a
previous marriage, and Cameron lived with them. Mr. Hilton encouraged Ms. Baugh to get her
realtor's license. When she went to get her diploma from the realtor's office, a woman passed out
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in the lobby. Mr. Hilton did not even hesitate in performing CPR on the woman. A year after
they met, Mr. Hilton and Ms. Baugh got married. He took to being a stepfather was the
homeroom dad for Cameroo's class. However, Mr. Hilton also started drinking heavily. He
started drinking to get off the Quaaludes. He would start one addiction to get over another, and
In 1977, Mr. Hilton started a company called Green Light Adverlising. He circulated
brochures that had other people's advertisements printed on them. After the starting the
company, he went to the doctor to get help for his alcoholism. The doctor prescribed Antabuse,
a medicine that is supposed to cause unpleasant effects when any alcohol is consumed.
The marriage to Ms. Baugh was short-lived, and they divorced six months after they
married. Mr. Hilton cried when he signed the divorce papers. He continued to live with Ms.
Baugh for another four months until he found somewhere else to live. Ms. Baugh kept Mr.
In January 1979, Ms. Goldman came to see Mr. Hilton in Atlanta. They had not seen each
other for six years. She was still addicted to drugs. She stayed with him for a week before
leaving, and they did not see each other again after that. Mr. Hilton was an avid runner, and he
started running at Stone Mountain Park in Stone Mountain, Georgia. He fell in love with a police
officer, Sue Ellen Edwards, who worked there. They married in March 1979, two or three
months after they met. Mr. Hilton was Ms. Edwards' fourth marriage. She had two children from
a previous marriage, and Ms. Edwards thought that Mr. Hilton did a good job of walking into a
full family. They bought a house using Mr. Hilton's Veteran's Affairs loan. They divorced seven
months later, however. Even after the divorce, they continued to talk whenever Mr. Hilton was in
Stone Mountain.
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Mter the divorce, Mr. Hilton moved to an apartment building in Tucker, Georgia. He met
a fifteen-year-old girl, Shawn Stewart, who lived in his building. Ms. Stewart's mother was the
building manager. Ms. Stewart was on her school's volleyball team, and she and Mr. Hilton
started running together. Mr. Hilton was also friends with Ms. Stewart's mother. Ms. Stewart saw
Mr. Hilton as a father figure. Even when she left for college a few years later, she would still stay
In 1982, Mr. Hilton went with his mother to visit his maternal uncle and uncle's wife in
North Carolina. The two women went shopping, and Mr. Hilton stayed with his uncle. While
they were there, Mr. Hilton's uncle made sexual passes at him.
Mr. Hilton continued to make other friends during this time. He met Connie Wagoner in
1983, and he moved in with her and her children. Ms. Stephanie Durham Brim, Ms. Wagoner's
daughter, was about eleven when Mr. Hilton first moved in. He would spend time with her and
taught her how to shoot a bb gun. Mr. Hilton started using Quaaludes again when he was Jiving
with Ms. Wagoner. He was eccentric because he was so bubbly and over-the-top, but Ms. Brim
enjoyed having him around. When Mr. Hilton and Ms. Wagoner broke up, it was a peaceful
break and Mr. Hilton moved out. Ms. Wagoner and Ms. Brim went to visit Mr. Hilton in Atlanta
Mr. Hilton was still drinking heavily, and he also started using LSD, marijuana, and other
drugs. His mother refused to come visit him during that time because of his drug use. Also
around this time, Mr. Hilton started running a charity scam. He would call people asking for
donations for his charity, but he was really using the rnoney for himself. He was very good at
this, though, and able to make a living. Mr. Hilton would stop drinking for good in 1989.
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Mr. Hilton randomly decided to reach out to his old high school sweetheart, Ms. Herman.
He called her parents'house and pretended to be an alumni of her high school or college. They
gave Mr. Hilton her home phone number. He called her one day and they had a brief ten minute
conversation where they just caught up on each other's lives. Then Mr. Hilton made an
In 1984, Mr. Hilton retained a lawyer, Samuel Rae!, on a minor charge. Mr. Rae! got Mr.
Hilton out of the charge, and Mr. Hilton was very appreciative. He started offering to help Mr.
Rae! file things or giving Mr. Rae! rides to his meetings. Mr. Rae! found Mr. Hilton endearing,
and the two became friends. Mr. Hilton continued to act strangely. When Mr. Rae! put his
house up for sale and had a house tour, Mr. Hilton went and made up outrageous facts about the
house. He told people that Martin Luther King, Jr. had given a speech there and that it had ties
to the Civil War. Mr. Hilton was such a good salesman that people believed him, and it was
Mr. Rae! and another one of his friends started working on a movie about a serial killer
up in Alaska. Mr. Hilton took an interest in the project. Mr. Rae! gave him small tasks to do
around the set. Later, Mr. Hilton tried to claim more credit for the movie.
Mr: Rae! had a dog when he became friends with Mr. Hilton, and Mf. Hilton was
wonderful with the dog. He would play with the dog and give it hugs and kisses. He would
bring around more expensive brands of dog foods for the dog. He go out and get dog food even ·
when it was snowing. That dog passed away, and around 1990, Mr. Rae! got a golden retriever
named Yuppie. Mr. Hilton treated Yuppie the same way he treated the other dog; he loved him.
When Yuppie was almost a year old, he suddenly went missing from Mr. Rae! 's backyard. Mr.
Hilton was furious and helped Mr. Rae! hang up posters around the neighborhood and search for
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the dog. They were not able to find Yuppie. Mr. Hilton also gradually stopped talking to Mr.
Rae! around this time. They went from talking every day to not talking at all. About a year after
Yuppie went missing and Mr. Hilton stopped talking to Mr. Rae!, Mr. Rae! was driving around
Atlanta when he saw Mr. Hilton out running. Mr. Hilton had a dog with him, a dog that looked
Mr. Hilton continued his life with his dog, now called Ranger. Mr. Hilton was religious
about keeping up with Ranger's shots, and people who observed him during this time said that he
fawned over Ranger. Mr. Hilton took Ranger on vacation with him, including a trip to
Washington, D.C. in 1994. Mr. Hilton went to find the names of the men he had served with.
One of these men had died on his first day of service in Vietnam. Mr. Hilton found it hard to
find places that rented to dog owners. He started living in storage facilities whenever he could
However, Mr. Hilton was also very obsessed with his dog. He collected Rangers'fur in
Ziploc baggies and documented where the fur had been collected from. He noted the dates that
he opened and closed the Ziploc baggies. He kept a journal of Ranger's activities, down to the
date and time that Ranger would do trivial things, such as catching a balL
In 1997, Mr. Hilton was arrested. His mother and Mr. Debag had just been scammed out
of $10,000, so they did not have the money to bail him out Mr. Hilton was upset that his mother
had paid for the scam and would not pay for her own son to get out of jaiL He called his friend
Shawn Stewart, whom he was still friends with. She bailed him out
Mr. Hilton then went and got a job with John Tabor. He worked on and off for Mr.
Tabor's company, Insulated Wall Systems, for the next ten years. Mr. Hilton's job was to find
leads on people who needed vinyl siding, and Mr. Tabor would do the installation. Mr. Hilton
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lived in a house in Chamblee whenever he was working and then stayed in the storage facilities
when he was not. At other times he was homeless or lived out of his van. On April 12, 2000,
Mr. Hilton was homeless when a tornado hit Atlanta. He had to find shelter in a Motel 6 in
Norcross. He also went off into the woods to live for months.
During his time working for Mr. Tabor, Mr. Hilton had confrontations with his co-
workers and other people who worked in the area. One of his co-workers in the late 1990s, Ms.
Parrott, did what she could to avoid him because of his mood swings. He changed daily and
sometimes hourly. When he was upset, he would slam doors and start cursing. He was on the
phone trying to get leads for Mr. Tabor, and he would scream at people and hang up on them if
they refused Mr. Tabor's services. Ms. Parrott had been with the company longer than Mr.
Hilton and was supposed to train him, but he would get upset with her if she tried to correct him
Another woman who worked in the area, Barbara Speed, worked in an office next to Mr.
Tabor's business for twelve years. Mr. Hilton would come in and ramble on for hours. It was
difficult for her to have a conversation with him because he would bounce around between topics
so much. Even though they did not know each other very well, he would make strange requests
of her, such as asking her to do his laundry or look up people he knew in the military. Mr. Hilton
was also very territorial. She saw him putting up barricades in the parking lot to try and block
Ranger died in 2002. Mr. Hilton was devastated. He started looking through obituary
pages because he found comfort in reading about other people who had suffered loss. Mr. Hilton
was depressed, and he told multiple people, including mere acquaintances, that he was
contemplating suicide. He still had the bags of Ranger's fur and planned to make a blanket out of
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it someday. He also kept Ranger's skin and bones in a tub. He had all of Ranger's toys. He had
In 2003, Mr. Hilton was still distraught over Ranger's death. He saw an ad for a golden
retriever puppy and bought Dandy. Mr. Hilton took Dandy to the same places he had taken
Ranger. He started documenting Dandy's behavior and collecting Dandy's fur in the same way
In the early 2000s, Mr. Hilton's mental health started deteriorating rapidly. He regularly
frequented Candler Park in the Atlanta area, and he had run-ins with other people at the park. He
would yell at people for having their dogs offleash and threaten them and/or their dogs if they
got too close to Dandy. He would get right in people's faces to yell at them. He would make
inappropriate sexual comments in front of women, and he usually chose to talk to women instead
of men. He carried around a baton, and sometimes he had a stick that he sharpened into a knife.
Some of these people were afraid of Mr. Hilton and called the police.
In 2005, Mr. Hilton became convinced that he had multiple sclerosis. He found an
endocrinologist, Dr. Harry Deicher, in the yellow pages and started going to him for prescription
medication. Dr. Deicher noted that he had multiple sclerosis, without doing the requisite testing,
and prescribed Mr. Hilton with medications like Ritalin and terazosin. He later prescribed
Etfexor. The prescription that Dr. Deicher gave to Mr. Hilton was more than three times the
dose recommended by the FDA. He started telling anyone who would listen, including
strangers, about his multiple sclerosis diagnosis. One of the people that Mr. Hilton called to tell
about his diagnosis was his ex-wife Ms. Edwards. He called her to explain that he had told his
mother about the diagnosis, and his mother had blown it off.
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Once Mr. Hilton was on the Ritalin, his behavior became even more bizarre than before.
He became paranoid that Mr. Tabor had stolen $10,000 from him, despite the fact that Mr. Tabor
had loaned him money throughout the years which Mr. Hilton had not repaid. He and Mr. Tabor
got into arguments over the money, and Mr. Hilton left his job. He continued to contact Mr.
Tabor about the money, until finally Mr. Tabor wrote him a check for $2,500 to get him to go
away. Mr. Tabor included a strongly-worded letter with the check, so Mr. Hilton returned the
letter and tore the check in pieces. He showed up at Ms. Stewart's place of employment and
asked her for money. He was spoke even faster than he usually did. He had lost a lot of weight
and some of his teeth were missing. He told Ms. Stewart that he had quit his job and asked for
$800. She gave him the money because he had given her almost the same amount years before
without any hesitation. She was also afraid and wanted him to leave.
Mr. Hilton left to go camping then. At all three of the campsites where the crimes were
committed, witnesses described him as a bizarre man. He paced back and forth, mostly talking
only to himself, almost as if he was in a trance. When he spoke to other people, he was rambling
and changing topics very suddenly. He tried to convince people to come off the path with him.
He was frustrated and ranting about problems he had with the park. Mr. Hilton was wearing an
After the crimes, the police were still searching for Mr. Hilton, and Ms. Stewart saw his
picture on the TV. Mr. Hilton called her for money one more time. This time, she told him no
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Witnesses and evidence who would be/are crucial to the foregoing:
• Paul Pruitt- seFVed in the Anny with Mr. Hilton in the 1960s. Paul was in the
elite Davy Crockett unit with Mr. Hilton for almost a year. Paul remembers Mr.
Hilton as a strange guy who did not really fit in with the rest of the men. The
others in the unit would socialize, and Mr. Hilton would not go out with them.
Mr. Hilton was very opinionated and talked constantly, almost as if he could not
stop talking. He spoke very quickly and was very fixed on his opinions. Mr.
Hilton found himself to be very intelligent and often bragged about his IQ score.
(Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Pruitt, Paul).
• Needham Bateman- Dr. Bateman was the veterinarian for Mr. Hilton's dog,
Dandy. Dr. Bateman provides insight on Mr. Hilton's bizarre behavior whenever
he brought his dog, Dandy, into Dr. Bateman's office in the mid-2000s. Mr.
Hilton was unable to sit still in the waiting room, would just show up
unannounced rather than making appoints, and had a nervous energy. (Exhibit II-
A, Declaration of Bateman, Needham).
• Pamela Burnett-: Ms. Burnett was a park acquaintance. She saw Mr. Hilton
numerous times at Murphy Candler Park between 1998 and 2004 and can attest to
Mr. Hilton's strange behavior. He would talk to himself, drive in circles around
the parking lot yelling at people, and get into verbal arguments with people about
their dogs being off leash. She called the police on Mr. Hilton a couple times, but
they always told her Mr. Hilton was harmless. He also wore camping/hiking
attire, which was unusual for a casual neighborhood park. (Exhibit II-A,
Declaration of Burnett, Pamela).
• Kay Damerow- Ms. Damerow was a park acquaintance. She saw Mr. Hilton at
Murphy Candler Park numerous times in the mid-2000s through 2007. She
recalls that he had a reputation as the "weird park guy" because he was
obsessive compulsive about his parking, wore inappropriate hiking attire to the
park; and being overly aggressive with others at the park. She and her neighbors
called the police on him because of his strange behavior, and the police assured
them that he was harmless. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration ofDamerow, Kay).
• Dr. Harry Deicher- Dr. Deicher was Mr. Hilton's doctor who prescribed the
Ritalin. Dr. Deicher can confirm that he did not follow standard procedure in
prescribing him Ritalin and explains that he did provide Mr. Hilton with a very
high dosage of Ritalin without taking into account the psychological effect. He
confirms the mental and behavioral changes he observed following the increase in
Ritalin dosage, including Mr. Hilton becoming more manic. He also witnessed a
strange episode where Mr. Hilton suddenly became upset with his dog for
virtually no reason. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Deicher, Harry).
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• Joyce Dittmer- Ms. Dittmer was a park acquaintance. She encountered Mr.
Hilton over a number of years at Murphy Candler Park. She noticed his strange
speech pattern, his excessive hiking attire, and his extreme techniques in training
his dog. As a nurse, she had some mental health training, and he came across as
manic and schizoid to her. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Dittmer, Joyce).
• Ronald Miller- Mr. Miller was a park acquaintance. He saw him at Murphy
Candler Park in the years before his arrest. He observed him to be constantly
agitated, only interested in a one-sided conversation, and wore strange clothes to
the park. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Miller, Ronald).
• Heather Parrott- Ms. Parrott was Mr. Hilton's former co-worker. She worked
for Gary in the mid- to late-1990s. She noticed Mr. Hilton's erratic mood changes,
when he would go from being fine to suddenly very mad. She was supposed to
train him, but he thought of himself as superior to her. He would get upset when
customers did not buy what he was selling, and he would scream at them.
Sometimes, he would then get off the phone and scream at her. (Exhibit II-A,
Declaration of Parrott, Heather).
• Philip Darryl Presti (Darryl)- Mr. Presti is Mr. Hilton's ex-girlfriend's son.
Darryl's mother, Connie Wagoner, dated Mr. Hilton for a couple of years in the
1980s. Darryl says that Mr. Hilton suffered from sudden mood changes where he
would suddenly become angry for no reason. He was also addicted to marijuana
and smoked constantly. Other than that, though, Mr. Hilton was very caring and
attentive toward Darryl's mother and teenaged sister, although Darryl himself did
not get along with Mr. Hilton. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Presti, Darryl Philip).
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her sister in Miami, and Ursula wanted to go check on Mr. Hilton because she
was worried about him. She warned Christa that this was not the same man she
had married. When they got there, Mr. Hilton was living in a shack with no
furniture. He was unkempt and lying on pillows on tbe floor. He was high, and
his eyes were rolling around. They only stayed a few minutes. (Exhibit ll-A,
Declaration of Sparks, Christi).
• Barbara Speed- Ms. Speed worked in an office next to Mr. Hilton's employer.
Barbara worked for a realty company right next to John Tabor's siding business,
where Mr. Hilton worked on and off for ten years. He would randomly wander
into the realty company and start chatting with Barbara. He rambled, and his
focus bounced around. Barbara did not want to talk to him, so she would just keep
working. He would not even notice that she was not paying attention to him. He
would also make strange requests of her, such as asking her to do his laundry.
This was weird because tbey were not friends. He did not seem to have any
friends. He was also very territorial and got upset when customers for Barbara's
business would park in the parking lot, even though the realty company and
Tabor's business shared a lot. He even yelled at a customer for trying to park
there once. He used construction cones to barricade certain spaces. He also used
a lot of pot around this time. (Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Speed, Barbara).
• Tom Rogers -Mr. Rogers had a strange encounter with Mr. Hilton. Tom was
hiking with his friend on Blood Mountain. The parking lot was pretty full, so
when tbey were about to leave, Mr. Hilton hurried up to tbem and asked if tbey
were leaving. When he spoke, he was intense and aggressive. When tbey did pull
their car out, Mr. Hilton got into his van and then aggressively pulled into tbe
park His hair was cropped close to his head, and his teeth were either bad or
missing. He had on hiking gear, and he had a lot of garbage bags in his van.
(Exhibit ll-A, Declaration of Rogers, Tom).
• Robert Schmidt- Mr. Schmidt had a strange encounter witb Mr. Hilton. Robert
was hiking on Blood Mountain with his wife and son on December 31, 2007
when he saw a dog coming up the trail off leash. Mr. Hilton was shortly behind
the dog. He was talking in a high pitched, squeaking voice, like he was singing a
nursery rhyme or song. Robert stepped in between Mr. Hilton and his wife and
son because it was weird, so Robert did not want Mr. Hilton around them.
(Exhibit II-A, Declaration of Schmidt, Robert).
• Karen Stansbury- Ms. Stansbury had a strange encounter witb Mr. Hilton.
Karen and her husband were at Amicalola Falls State Park in fall 2007. They
were going up a set of stairs to get to the top of the falls when they came up on
him. Karen was ahead of her husband, and he kept circling her on tbe stairs. He
was talking to himself, almost as if he was singing a nursery rhyme. He also kept
tapping her as he ran by like a child playing tag. It was very childish. (Exhibit ll-
A, Declaration of Stansbury, Karen).
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• Exhibit 1-C- Court Records- Court records related to Mr. Hilton's criminal
offenses and the progression of them.
• Exhibit I-A- Betty Fuentes Memos- The mitigation memos that were prepared
by the expert who was designated to develop mitigation.
• Exhibit 11-C- Dog- The information and documentation related to Mr. Hilton's
fixations and compulsions associated with his dogs.
• Exhibit 11-B- Deicher- The entire file related to Dr. Deicher's health care of
Mr. Hilton, his over-prescription of medications and his ultimate reprimand under
his medical license.
• Exhibit 11-E- Military- The entire military record of Mr. Hilton to provide a
chronology of him evidencing and manifesting detachments from reality and
major mental illness.
• Exhibit 11-D- Medical- Mr. Hilton's medical records that reflected his mental
health and his general health.
**********************************************************
Trial counsel's barebones mitigation presentation was deficient because it focused almost
entirely on the effects of the Ritalin without adequately explaining how Mr. Hilton's
background and mental impairments made him especially vulnerable to the effects of
Ritalin overdose
The undersigned counsel is not convinced that there actually was a strategy. Despite the
abundance of mitigation evidence trial counsel's mitigation specialist had uncovered, Robert
Friedman, lead counsel during the penalty phase, decided he was going to streamline the penalty
phase and call in just as many witnesses as he needed to thread the story together. Right before
the guilt phase started, Betty Fuentes, the mitigation specialist, found out that this meant not
calling Dr. Deicher, the doctor who had over-prescribed Mr. Hilton's medications. Ms. Fuentes
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quit the case at that time because of her frustration with Mr. Friedman's "strategy." She had been
working on a life history presentation. (H, 179-197, 230-266). This left two of the other team
members, attorney Paula Saunders and fact investigator Chris EHrich, to rush to complete the
Once the penalty phase started, Mr. Friedman "streamlined" the penalty phase by relying
mostly on expert testimony. Trial counsel obtained four expert witnesses to testify at the penalty
phase. (H, 454-570). Several crucial factors in Mr. Hilton's life were briefly mentioned once by
an expert without any kind of explanation and details, including but not limited to, the emotional
abuse that Mr.Hilton suffered at the hands of his mother and stepfather, his admission into a
psychiatric hospital, the sexual abuse he suffered as a juvenile at the hands of his attorney,
genetic disorders within the family, Mr. Hilton's history of delusions and hallucinations, and his
years-long battle with rheumatic fever when he was a toddler. All of these warranted further
detail and supporting documents, but trial counsel merely relied on experts' brief references.
Other lay witnesses filled in a few superficial details, mostly via video testimony or over
the phone. By the end of the penalty phase, the jury had not heard much of Mr. Hilton's life
history. The lackluster penalty phase presentation failed to go into: I) the multigenerational
history of mental illness in Mr. Hilton's family; 2) the stark contrast between Mr. Hilton's mother
smothering him as a young child and then neglecting him after her remarriage; 3) Mr. Hilton's
repeated attempts at self-mutilation and/or suicide dating back to age five; 4) the various physical
illnesses that affected Mr. Hilton's mind as a child; 4) his years-long battle with substance abuse
as an adult; and 5) Mr. Hilton's impaired mental state and gradual deterioration throughout his
life that left him vulnerable to the effects of Ritalin overdose. Thus, in comparison to the
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information that was available, trial counsel precluded the jury from hearing how Mr. Hilton got
Trial counsel's performance was deficient because they did not investigate Mr. Hilton's life
history, and they failed to present this mitigating evidence that they did have
By the time of Mr. Hilton's trial in 2011, it was clearly established law that defendants in
capital cases are entitled to an individualized sentencing at the penalty phase. See e.g., Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("[A]n individualized decision is essential in capital cases.");
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 ("[W]e believe that in capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of
the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.");
Raulerson v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 806 (11th Cir. 1984); Barnes v. State, 29 So. 3d 1010,
I 025 (Fla. 201 0). This is achieved by allowing the jury to "consider all relevant mitigating
evidence." Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299,307 (1990). Necessarily, counsel in capital
cases have a duty to reasonably investigate and develop mitigating evidence and present that
evidence to the jury. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); Porter v. Singletary, 14
F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir. 1994) (counsel has a "duty to investigate, develop, and present
mitigating evidence"); Spann v. State, 985 So. 2d 1059, 1069 (Fla. 2008) ("An attorney in a
capital case has a duty to investigate and present to the court and the jury, when applicable, the
professional norms at the time of trial were also clearly developed. The American Bar
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Association had provided multiple guidelines requiring counsel in capital cases to investigate the
client's life history "from conception to the time of sentencing," 2003 Guideline I O.ll(F)(l);
meet with potential witnesses in face-to-face, one-on-one interviews, often more than once, 2008
Guideline IO.ll(C); and hire a mitigation specialist, 2003 Guideline 4.1. This is in addition to
the general requirement that defense counsel in any case provide zealous advocacy to their
clients. Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function 4-1.2(b), Fourth Ed. While the ABA
standards are only guides, they may still help the courts in determining what reasonable
professional judgment was at the time of trial. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 688-89.
Where trial counsel did discover certain evidence but did not present it, "then a
determination must be made whether the failure to put this evidence before the jury was a
performance is "highly deferential," and courts "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." !d at 689.
courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the
norms of professional conduct" Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).
Courts have found counsels' actions unreasonable even where the defense team did
conduct a thorough investigation of their client's background but did not present the mitigation at
trial, made an inadequate presentation, or did not prepare the witnesses to testify. This is because
the failure to present available mitigating evidence "prejudices a convicted defendant's receiving
an individualized sentence." Hardwick v. Crosby, 320 F.3d 1127, 1163 (II th Cir. 2003).
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For example, in Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (lith Cir. 1991), the defense only
presented two witnesses in addition to their client at the penalty phase. !d. at 1016. The lawyers
in the case did not interview these witnesses until the day before and the day of trial, and they
spoke only for a few minutes. !d. at I 017. Once one of the witness took the stand, they only
asked him six questions. !d. At an evidentiary hearing on state post-conviction, it was revealed
that the witness had much more information than had been asked at trial. !d. A head injury the
defendant had suffered was mentioned "only in passing." !d. at I 018. Trial counsel completely
avoided other topics, such as the defendant's intellectual disability. !d. The Eleventh Circuit
found that this undermined "[t]he primary purpose of the penalty phase ... to insure that the
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court vacated a death sentence in Parker v. State, 3 So.
3d 974 (Fla. 2009), where the defense presented a "bare bones" penalty phase and presented the
defendant's life history through the secondhand testimony of defense team investigators rather
than firsthand witness accounts. See id. at 984-85. At first glance, evidence presented during
Parker's penalty phase touched on many of the mitigation themes often found compelling:
These witnesses testified that Parker's childhood was chaotic and dysfunctional. His
father abandoned the family when Parker was only a few months old; his mother was frequently
hospitalized for serious mental problems; he spent his childhood in a series of foster homes; he
was physically and sexually abused; and he has a long history of alcohol abuse and violent
behavior. !d. at 983-84. During the Rule 3.851 evidentiary hearing, however, more details were
provided to support these broader themes. For example, the mother's "serious mental problems"
were actually an ongoing battle with schizophrenia for which she was repeatedly hospitalized.
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!d. at 984. The sexual abuse that had briefly mentioned at trial was at the hands of caretakers and
older children in the community. !d. Moreover, this information came from the actual witnesses
rather than the secondhand testimony of defense investigators. !d. The Florida Supreme Court
found this "fleshed out" evidence should have led to further investigation and been presented at
the trial. See id. at 985. Thus, it is not enough that counsel conduct an investigation and present
a brief summary of a client's life history. The failure to actually present that life history in a
manner that resonates with the jury and provides meaning to the right to individualized
sentencing is deficient.
Here, trial counsel's performance was deficient. Much like Cunningham and Parker, the
pre-trial investigation revealed a number of themes for the defense to go into during the penalty
phase, including: I) the multi generational history of mental illness in Mr. Hillen's family; 2) the
stark contrast between Mr. Hilton's mother smothering him as a young child and then neglecting
him after her remarriage; 3) Mr. Hilton's repeated attempts at self-mutilation and/or suicide
dating back to age five; 4) the various physical illnesses that affected Mr. Hillen's mind as a
child; 4) his years-long battle with substance abuse as an adult; and 5) Mr. Hilton's impaired
mental state and gradual deterioration throughout his life that left him vulnerable to the effects of
Ritalin overdose. However, trial counsel did not present evidence on any of these subjects,
choosing instead to cursorily summarize Mr. Hiltcn's childhood and focus on his head injury
after the Murphy bed incident and the effects of the Ritalin overdose.
Trial counsel completely failed to investigate some major areas altogether. For example,
they never did a multigenerational review of mental illness in Mr. Hillen's family. See 2008
ABA Guideline IO.ll(E)(2)(a) (recommending review extending at least three generations back).
33
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They also failed to investigate Mr. Hilton's time in the military and the effect this had on him
mentally.
Rather than calling the lay witnesses who had firsthand accounts about Mr. Hilton's life,
trial counsel relied heavily on experts to present this information. However, trial counsel had not
provided their experts with relevant background materials so that the experts could conduct an
accurate examination of Mr. Hilton's mental health history. They did not provide the experts
with a multigenerational mental and physical health history for Mr. Hilton's relatives. During
discovery, the defense had received Georgia Bureau of Investigation photos documenting Mr.
Hilton's obsession with his dogs, including a plastic container holding his deceased dog's
remains; Ziploc baggies filled with years of fur he had collected from both dogs as well as
documentation of where and when it had been collected; and detailed journals noting mundane
activities, such as fetching a ball. The experts did not receive this clear evidence of mental
illness and were unable to consider it in their assessment of Mr. Hilton. Consequently, the
experts made vague passing comments to just a few of the traumatic events in Mr. Hilton's life,
and they focused mostly on the Murphy bed incident and the Ritalin prescriptions.
Despite trial counsel's reliance on their experts, they failed to prepare their experts before
the penalty phase. One expert, Dr. Wu, testified to Mr. Hilton's exaggerated participation in the
making of a movie. He testified that he believed this claim to be false and that it demonstrated
Mr. Hilton's grandiosity. R, Penalty Phase, 122. In reality, the movie in question, Deadly Run,
existed, and trial counsel had succeeded on a motion in limine to prevent mention of the violent
film that was produced twelve years before the crimes. After Dr. Wu's mistake, the State's expert
was able to go into the violent nature of the film, testify to its similarities to Mr. Hilton's crimes,
and tell the jury that Mr. Hilton actually had assisted in the making of the film. Trial counsel
34
1671
missed an opportunity to remedy the situation by failing to call Mr. Hilton's friend Samuel Rae!.
Mr. Rae! produced the film, and he would have been willing to testify that Mr. Hilton had a very
minor role of running errands around the set, that he became involved in the film after the script
had already been written, that the story was based on a case up in Alaska, and that the crimes in
the movie bore no resemblance to Mr. Hilton's crimes beyond the fact that they took place in the
woods. The failure to prepare Dr. Wu or fix his blunder with Mr. Rae! 's testimony allowed more
aggravating evidence against Mr. Hilton and affected Dr. Wus credibility. Finally, trial counsel
called Dr. Strauss to testify to Dr. Deicher's unethical behavior in over-prescribing Mr. Hilton.
Because trial counsel had not properly vetted Dr. Strauss before hiring him, however, they did
not know that Dr. Strauss himself had been subjected to disciplinary action for unprofessional
prescription practices. SeeR, Penalty Phase, 265. Because trial counsel relied on these experts
to get in mitigating evidence about Mr. Hilton, the experts' decreased credibility reduced the
Moreover, trial counsel did not make use of the witnesses they called. Roy Cave was
definitely available at the time of trial, as he was one of the witnesses who testified. However,
the defense merely asked him about his time in the band and boot camp with Mr. Hilton. See R,
Penalty Phase, 518-21. In reality, Mr. Cave had witnessed the older male attorney coercing the
sixteen-year-old Mr. Hilton into having sex with him, had information about Mr. Hilton's bizarre
behavior even as a teen and his inability to make real friends, Mr. Hilton's substance use at such
a young age, and Mr. Hilton's rocky, argumentative relationship with his mother that left him in a
sullen mood almost all of the time. Trial counsel also called Ms. Sandy Herman, who dated Mr.
Hilton briefly in high schooL SeeR, Penalty 513-17. They asked her about how kindly he had
treated her in high school but did not ask her about Mr. Hilton's decision to join the army
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because of the strange relationship he had with an older male who was "propositioning" him for
sex, or Mr. Hiltoo's random decision to find her years after they had last seen each other and
sudden inappropriateness with her during that phone call. This information would have been
relevant to establishing Mr. Hilton's long history of mental illness and how vulnerable his mental
state was even before the Ritalin, but trial counsel simply did not present the evidence.
Finally, trial counsel elicited testimony that Mr. Hilton had diagnosed himself with
multiple sclerosis, see e.g., T. Penalty Phase, 120, but they never actually confirmed whether or
not he had it. They failed to do so despite the fact that multiple sclerosis testing could have
helped the defense no matter the result. Multiple sclerosis is a neurological disease and could
have affected Mr. Hilton's mental state. Alternatively, if Mr. Hilton did not have multiple
sclerosis, then he was exhibiting paranoia and frustration about a disease that he did not have, at
By ignoring much of Mr. Hiltoo's history, the jury was unable to understand that Mr.
Hilton was in a vulnerable position mentally for much of his life rather than just after he started
using Ritalin, making him that much more susceptible to the effects of Ritalin abuse and
overdose. This nuance was especially important when Ritalin is a well-known drug, and the
jurors likely associated its use with helping to calm down children suffering from attention
disorders. The jury would not have understood its impact on a mentally vulnerable adult who
became more manic after its use. Trial counsel's failure to make this clear fell below an
Mr. Hilton must also show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient
performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Prejudice exists where "there is a reasonable
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probability that, but for counsefs unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Jd at 694. In reaching a determination on prejudice, courts have looked not just
at the actual death sentence imposed, but also whether or not certain mitigating factors were
rejected, whether the evidence would have rebutted certain aggravating factors, and whether
reviewing courts relied on the lack of evidence to affirm the conviction. For example, in Parker,
the Florida Supreme Court reviewed new evidence presented during the Rule 3.851 evidentiary
hearing and noted that on direct appeal, it had affirmed the trial court's finding of no mitigating
factors because there had not been sufficient evidence to support such a finding. Parker, 3 So. 3d
at 984.
Here, Mr. Hilton was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficiencies in not presenting
compelling, readily-available mitigation evidence. Mr. Hilton has suffered from severe mental
illness for most of his life, but the trial court rejected the statutory mitigating factor that Mr.
Hilton was substantially impaired and could not conform to the requirements of the law, and it
rejected the non-statutory mitigating factor that he suffered from severe mental defects. Despite
the fact that Mr. Hilton's mother made only $1.00 an hour and $25.00 per month and could not
afford an apartment for herself and her son, the trial court rejected the mitigating factor that Mr.
Hilton grew up financially poor. This is because while trial counsel quickly glazed over these
aspects of Mr. Hilton's life, they did not provide the necessary details to actually prove these
mitigating factors. This resulted in the court finding three fewer mitigating factors than actually
existed, and Mr. Hilton was prejudiced by the resulting death sentence.
Indeed, the defense's failure to present a fuller picture of Mr. Hilton's life history actually
assisted the State s rebuttal presentation. Because the penalty phase defense suggested that the
Ritalin was the major catalyst for change in Mr. Hilton's behavior and he had been fine before
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that, the State was allowed to call Dr. Prichard to testify about Mr. Hilton's prior uncharged
offenses, including soliciting money for charity only to keep it himself and the unproven hearsay
allegations that Mr. Hilton had inappropriately touched his ex-girlfriend's daughter. The trial
court admitted this testimony, specifically stating: And I understand that there were a whole lot
of things that came out in the expert's testimony that normally would be, you know, verboten, I
But, the whole theme of the defense expert's testimony was that Mr. Hilton never did
anything wrong until these murders, and that it was a sudden change in his life created by Ritalin
that brought about- it was based on, you know, these medical problems compounded by his
brain damage. And I think that just kind of opens the door. I think the State has the right to
contest that this is in fact the situation. T, Penalty Phase, 520. Thus, unlike in other cases where
courts have found trial counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence because of the
possibility of opening the door to harmful rebuttal evidence, see, e.g., Douglas v. State, 141 So.
3d 107, 121 (Fla. 2012), here, trial counsel'sfailure to present more expansive mitigating
evidence allowed this harmful evidence to come in. This prejudiced Mr. Hilton not only during
his penalty phase, where this evidence effectively rebutted the mitigation presented, but also on
direct appeal. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admission of Dr. Prichard's
testimony because "Hilton's penalty phase defense relied heavily on the assertion that Hilton was
a Jaw-abiding citizen prior to his exposure to Ritalin. Dr. Prichard's testimony was provided in
rebuttal to that assertion." Hilton v. State, 117 So. 3d 742,751 (Fla. 2013). Mr. Hilton was
doubly prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance, and he is entitled to a new penalty
phase.
38
1675
Claim 2: Trial counsel was ineffective because the defense team was in complete
disarray, due to inconsistent preparation, a fractured and divisive team,
unreasonable caseloads, and the unreasonable strategic decisions that
resulted.
Many of the problems before and during the trial were a consequence of the chaotic
nature of the defense team assigned to Mr. Hilton'scase. Throughout its representation of Me
Hilton, the team engaged in eruptive team feuding and undermined each other's strategies. This
led to the repeated shifting of roles, including in the weeks leading up to trial. This chaos reached
its peak when two of the team members withdrew from the case in the middle of the trial. The in-
fighting prevented them from providing the competent assistance of counsel required by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Moreover, the high case load at the Public Defender's Office
at the time also affected trial counsel's ability to effectively represent Mr. Hilton. Accordingly,
1. Trial counsel was ineffective due to the divisive nature of the defense
team.
When the Public Defender's Office was first appointed to represent Mr. Hilton, the office
assigned a standard team to the case: Ines Suber as lead counsel, Steven Been as second chair,
Betty Fuentes as mitigation specialist, and Chris EHrich as fact investigator. They started
receiving discovery, and Mr. Been soon left the division because he could no longer tolerate Ms.
Suber. (H, 431-451) This began a revolving door of attorneys. Robert Friedman was brought in
from the appeals unit to help out. Tracy Record came in as second chair, but she left the unit
within a couple months because she could no longer tolerate Ms. Suber. (H, 346-360). Nicole
Jamieson and Merribeth Bohanon, two other young attorneys in the office, helped out with
39
1676
It became quickly apparent that this case needed to focus on the guilt phase. Ms. Suber
had successfully negotiated plea deals with the State in the past, but such an outcome was not
likely in this case. She continued to try and focused a lot of energy and resources on going
through the physical evidence and consulting with forensic experts. In the meantime, Ms.
Fuentes started an expansive mitigation investigation that would ultimately result in her speaking
As the discovery came in, Ms. Suber did not allow anyone else to have a full picture of
the case. She selected which team members got to go review the physical evidence, mostly
relying on Ms. Fuentes. Other team members made copies of what they did have, but there was
no structure or organization, and no one person other than Ms. Suber knew everything about the
case. As a result, many documents were lost or overlooked. The State started requiring the
defense team to sign a log whenever the prosecutors disclosed evidence after the third or fourth
time that the defense claimed not to have received discovery that had previously been disclosed.
Ms. Suber continued to focus on combating the forensic evidence, and the other team
members started to disagree with her. Ms. Suber was also working long hours and had difficulty
with anxiety, stress and sleeping. Other members of the team reported getting em ails from Ms.
Suber in the middle of the night, between 2:00 and 4:00 a.m. This happened on a regular basis,
and the emails were often rambling and vitriolic; she would chastise them for things they had and
had not done. Many of the team members were concerned that Ms. Suber was under the
influence of drugs and/or alcohol during the pendency of the case as well as potentially in court
proceedings. (State's Exhibit 1, H, 11-50, H, 271-324, H, 346-451, H, 454-570). There was also
little communication with Mr. Hilton about the reality of the case against him. Mr. Friedman was
permanently brought into the team. He was supposed to serve as Ms. Suber's second chair in the
40
1677
guilt phase, and then in the penalty phase, Mr. Friedman would serve as lead counsel and Ms.
Several of the members of the team went to talk to Nancy Daniels, the Public Defender.
They were concerned that Ms. Suber was wasting all her time and energy on the guilt phase, and
that she was going for a futile innocence strategy. Ms. Fuentes had already uncovered the
evidence of Mr. Hilton's downfall after becoming addicted to the Ritalin, and she thought that
they should incorporate that into the guilt phase. Then, even if it did not work to clear Mr.
Hilton of first- degree murder, it would lay the groundwork for the penalty phase. Ms. Daniels
suggested that they recommend this strategy to Ms. Suber, but Ms. Suber rejected this strategy.
Ms. Fuentes was so upset by this that she threatened to quit. Ms. Daniels, and others in the
office, requested her to stay and continue to help. They also reminded her that her place on the
team was as an investigator, and that she needed to do what the lead attorney asked.
In the summer of 2010, about six months before the trial was supposed to start, the team
was confident in getting a continuance. Ms. Suber had already booked a five week trip home to
visit her family, a trip she took every December. Right before they filed the continuance motion,
however, the case changed judges. Judge Hankinson denied the continuance, and they only had a
This caused a complete breakdown in the team. Ms. Suber was devastated that she would
not get to take her trip. She actually tried to go on a five-week trip anyway, but Ms. Daniels told
her she could not take such a long leave before this trial. The case was also not even close to
having a complete investigation. They had started on the minor motions and met with minor
witnesses, but they had not started reaching out to the more significant guilt phase witnesses yet
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at all. Plus, there was still the argument over whether they should present some kind of mental
Once it was clear that the team was not working together, Ms. Daniels put Ms. Suber
solely in charge of the guilt phase and Mr. Friedman solely in charge of the penalty phase. Ms.
Daniels also brought in Paula Saunders from the appeals unit. Ms. Saunders had worked
smoothly with Ms. Suber in the past, and Ms. Daniels thought that it would help Ms. Suber from
feeling ganged up on. The remaining junior attorney, Ms. Bohanon, started off doing tasks for
After this shift, the team was completely fractured. Ms. Saunders ultimately agreed with
Mr. Friedman, and she started working on pretrial motions and the penalty phase. Furthermore,
Ms. Suber felt that Ms. Saunders was there to get her spot on the case, so she did not trust Ms.
Saunders. Meanwhile, Ms. Saunders hoped that Ms. Suber would be able to keep going because
Ms. Saunders did not know enough about the case to take the lead in the guilt phase if Ms. Suber
got pulled from the team. Both sides developed their phases individually. They did not invite
each other to meetings, and they did not collaborate on a theme. Going into trial, the defense
The problems did not dissipate once the trial started. During jury selection, some
members of the team were upset because Ms. Suber requested more peremptory challenges
because of the mass amount of media attention, but then when the court granted them, she did
not use them to get people off of the case. Ms. Suber and Ms. Saunders argued various pretrial
motions, and Ms. Suber was ill-prepared and stumbling in court. She admitted as much, saying
multiple times on the record that they were not prepared to proceed to trial. Once, she even
42
1679
arrived late. Other members of the team were shocked because Ms. Suber had been a great trial
lawyer in the past and was usually eloquent in her arguments to the court
Once the guilt phase started, the consequences of having fractured phases really showed.
Ms. Suber introduced evidence that the penalty phase lawyers would have preferred stayed out
Most importantly, she relied on the fully adversarial innocence defense. She challenged the
overwhelming forensic and physical evidence, ignoring the fact that even if the jury ruled out
one piece, there was still so much left to consider. Ms. Suber also objected to minor issues,
coming off as overly combative. At one point, one defense counsel objected to another defense
counseL Ms. Suber continued her bumbling presentation that had started in the pre-trial motions.
If possible, the penalty phase was even more chaotic. Shortly before the guilt phase,
Robert Friedman, lead counsel during the penalty phase, had mentioned to Andy Thomas, then
Deputy Public Defender, that he was going to streamline the penalty phase and call in just as
many witnesses as he needed to thread the story together. Right before the guilt phase started,
Betty Fuentes, the mitigation specialist, found out that this meant not calling Dr. Deicher, the
doctor who had over-prescribed Mr. Hilton's medications. Ms. Fuentes quit the case at that time.
She had been working on a life history presentation, so Ms. Saunders and Mr. EUrich had to
Ms. Bohanon returned to court the next day to realize that nobody had informed Mr.
Hilton that Ms. Fuentes was no longer with the team, despite the fact that he was closer to Ms.
Fuentes than to anyone else on the defense team. Mr. Friedman and Ms. Saunders then told Mr.
Hilton that Ms. Fuentes was overworked and had had a breakdown. Ms. Bohanon told Mr.
Hilton that Ms. Fuentes had a strategic difference with the others and that she had left, so Ms.
Saunders asked her to leave the courtroom. Ms. Saunders accused Ms. Bohanon of undermining
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1680
the relationship with the client. She also believes she heard Ms. Bohanon telling Mr. Hilton that
they were providing ineffective assistance of counsel. This defeated the months of work they had
put into cultivating a relationship with Mr. Hilton, and Ms. Bohanon was banned from the
Once the penalty phase started, Mr. Friedman "streamlined" the penalty phase by relying
mostly on expert testimony. The experts made vague passing comments to just a few of the
traumatic events in Mr. Hilton's life, and they focused mostly on the Murphy bed incident and
the Ritalin prescriptions. Other lay witnesses filled in a few superficial details, mostly via video
testimony or over the phone. Similar to the guilt phase, several of the witnesses testified to things
that the defense had successfully fought to keep out during the guilt phase. This inability of the
defense team to work as a unit on the case resulted in the defense team's deficient performance.
Because the team could not get along and multiple members left the capital unit while the case
was still going, those representing Mr. Hilton did not have time to review the entire case file.
Other than Ms. Suber, no one on the team saw the entire file because she was possessive about it
and would not let them see it. The constant rotation of team members left the ftles disorganized,
so no one knew where anything was. Some members, such as Ms. Sanders, were appointed to
the case right before trial, and others, namely Ms. Fuentes and Ms. Bohanon, left abruptly in the
middle of trial so that the other members had to quickly step in and perform their work without a
full understanding of the case. This division caused multiple mishaps at trial. The team members
working on the guilt phase had no idea what the team working on the penalty phase was doing.
The penalty phase team later felt that evidence was introduced in the guilt phase that they would
have preferred not to have before the jury. Then, as explained above in Claim l, in the penalty
44
1681
phase, a defense expert in the penalty phase bringing up evidence that guilt phase counsel had
All of this chaos was not the effective assistance of counsel required by the Constitution.
Trial counsel's performance was deficient and prejudiced Mr. Hilton, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687, because he did not have a defense team that agreed on and united around a strategy, and
trial counsel was making decisions about the case without knowing all of the relevant
Trial counsel was ineffective because they had an excessive workload at the time of Mr.
Hilton's trial, which prevented them from dedicating the necessary time and resources to
his case.
The defense team was not working on Mr. Hilton's case in a vacuum, and the Public
Defender's Office had several other high profile cases at the same time. The capital unit at the
time comprised of Ms. Suber as lead counsel and whomever the Office appointed as her co-
counsel. Ms. Fuentes was the mitigation specialist, and Mr. EHrich was the fact investigator.
These four were expected to handle all of the capital cases in the Second Judicial Circuit. At the
time, this included the Rachel Hoffman murder, another case that garnered extensive media
coverage and included a wrongful death civil suit. Another case the office had at the same time
as Mr. Hilton's case was out on St. George's Island, so the team had to drive nearly two hours out
of Tallahassee to meet with witnesses on that case. Ms. Bohanon and Ms. Jamieson were both
involved in that case. Another one of the cases involved an intellectual disability claim, so the
Office expended many resources on the development of that case. Under this pressure, trial
counsel requested multiple continuances once the trial started, all of which were denied.
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1682
This highly centralized workload onto such a small unit prevented the team from
focusing as much attention on Mr. Hilton's case as they needed to. The Florida Supreme Court
"has repeatedly recognized that excessive caseload in the public defender's office creates a
problem regarding effective representation." Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit ofFla. v.
State, 115 So. 3d 261, 282 (Fla. 2013). This is because "[w]hen excessive caseload forces the
public defender to choose between the rights of the various indigent criminal defendants he
Appeals by Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 1990). Indeed,
the Florida Rules Regulating the Florida Bar allow for counsel to withdraw from a case when
"there is substantial risk that the representation of I or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or a third person or by a personal interest of the
lawyer." Rule 4- 1.7(a)(2). Both trial counsefs failure to make use of this rule and the
inadequate representation they provided as a result were deficient performance and prejudiced
Mr. Hilton. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The high workload prevented counsel from
interviewing all of the witnesses they needed to by the time the trial started, and they failed to
review all of the documents in the case. Indeed, they overlooked a report by a correctional officer
who overheard Mr. Hilton confessing to the crime to another prisoner and thus were surprised by
his testimony at trial. Up until that point, trial counsefs defense strategy had been that the State's
case was based on circumstantial evidence. The correctional officer's testimony completely
undermined their strategy, and had they not overlooked the witness, they would have pursued a
more sensible defense or at least would have been prepared to rebut his testimony. This
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and Mr. Hilton's conviction and sentence should be
vacated.
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1683
Claim 3: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a cohesive, united defense
in the guilt and penalty phases.
Trial counsel spent a majority of the guilt phase futilely trying to combat the
overwhelming forensic evidence in this case. Trial counsel's defense strategy was that the State's
case was merely circumstantial, and at some points they even suggested that witnesses had
identified someone else as the main suspect. See, e.g., R, Guilt Phase, 1533 (during closing
argument, Ms. Suber reminds the jury that witness testimony identified a taller man in his 40s
rather than Mr. Hilton as the perpetrator). Then, in the penalty phase, they presented evidence
that Mr. Hilton had committed this crime because he had a mental breakdown after Dr. Deicher
over-prescribed him Ritalin. See, R, Penalty Phase 123 (Dr. Wu testifies that Mr. Hilton "was
never violent until he started to get on Ritalin."). Because trial counsel presented a guilt phase
defense that contradicted the penalty phase defense, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
guilt phase defense that Mr. Hilton was affected by the over-prescription of Ritalin. This would
have been much more reasonable than the denial of guilt the defense actually presented. Indeed,
this is the strategy recommended by the ABA Guidelines. See 2003 Guideline 10.10.1 ("[T]rial
counsel should formulate a defense theory. Counsel should seek a theory that will be effective in
connection with both guilt and penalty, and should seek to minimize any inconsistencies.").
However, Ms. Suber insisted that they go with an adversarial approach and try to undermine all
of the forensic evidence, despite the fact that the evidence in this case was overwhelming and
that even if she succeeded in diminishing one type of evidence, there was still an abundance of
evidence to establish Mr. Hilton's guilt. Trial counsel's decision to deny Mr. Hilton's guilt in the
47
1684
guilt phase and then completely change messages and blame the Ritalin in the penalty phase
diminished their credibility before the jury during the penalty phase.
The Florida Supreme Court has refrained from finding ineffective assistance of counsel
where a defendant asserted that trial counsel should have presented mitigating evidence when
that mitigating evidence was inconsistent with the guilt phase theory. See, e.g., Blanco v. State,
963 So. 2d 173, 179 (Fla. 2007) (denying an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because "the
mitigators Blanco argue[ d] should have been presented at his penalty phase [were] inconsistent
with his theory of the case: that he is innocent of [the] murder"). It stands to reason, then, that it
does constitute ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel to knowingly present
inconsistent guilt and penalty phases. Here, that is just what trial counsel did, and their
representation was ineffective. Mr. Hilton is entitled to a new trial under Strickland. See
Claim 4: Defendant's death sentence violates Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State
Mr. Hilton's death sentence violates Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State. In Hurst v.
Florida, the United States Supreme Court held that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violated
the Sixth Amendment because it required the judge, not the jury, to make the findings of fact
required to impose the death penalty under Florida law. 136 S. Ct. at 620-22. Those findings
included: (1) the aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether
those aggravators were "sufficient" to justify the death penalty; and (3) whether those
advisory jury to render a generalized sentencing recommendation for life or death by a majority
vote, without specifying the factual basis for the recommendation, and then empowered the
sentencing judge alone, notwithstanding the jury's recommendation, to conduct the required fact-
48
1685
finding. ld at 622. The Supreme Court held that before making its recommendation, the jury, not
the judge, must make the findings of fact required to impose the death penalty under Florida law.
!d.
In Hurst v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that, in addition to the principles
articulated in Hurst v. Florida, the Eighth Amendment also requires unanimous jury fact-finding
as to (1) which aggravating factors were proven, (2) whether those aggravators were "sufficient"
to impose the death penalty, and (3) whether those aggravators outweighed the mitigation. 202
So. 3d at 53-59. The Court made clear that each of those determinations are "elements" that
must be found by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt. !d. at 57; see also Jones v. State,
No. SC14- 990, 2017 WL 823600, at *16 (Fla. Mar. 2, 2017). In addition to rendering
unanimous findings on each of those elements, the Court explained that the jury must
unanimously recommend the death penalty before a death sentence may be imposed. Hurst v.
State, 202 So. 3d at 57 ("[B]efore the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the
jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the aggravating factors that were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to
impose death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of death."). The Court further cautioned
that, even if the jury unanimously found each of the elements required to impose the death
penalty satisfied, the jury was not required to recommend the death penalty. ld. at 57-58 ("We
equally emphasize that ... we do not intend to diminish or impair the jury's right to recommend a
sentence of life even if it finds the aggravating factors were proven, were sufficient to impose
49
1686
The Florida Supreme Court also ruled that Hurst claims must be subjected to
individualized hannless error review, and that the burden is on the State to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the Hurst error did not impact the sentence. !d. at 67-68. If the State is
unable to make that showing, this Court should vacate the death sentence.
Because Mr. Hilton's death sentence violates Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State, and
those decisions are retroactive to him, Mr. Hilton should be granted relief from his death
sentence unless the State can prove that the Hurst error was "hannless beyond a reasonable
doubt." In the Hurst context, the Florida Supreme Court has defined "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" as "no reasonable probability that the error contributed to the sentence." Hurst
The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the burden is on the State to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Hurst error did not impact the Mr. Hilton's death sentence.
See Jd at 67-68 ("[T]he burden is on the State, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury's failure to unanimously find all the facts necessary for imposition
of the death penalty did not contribute to [the] death sentence."). The "State bears an extremely
heavy burden" in this context. !d at 68. A court's finding that a Hurst error was harmless will be
"rare." King v. State, No. SC14-1949, 2017 WL 372081, at *17 (Fla. Jan. 26, 2017).
The Florida Supreme Court has indicated that a unanimous jury recommendation is a
factor in Hurst hannless error analysis, but not necessarily a dispositive factor in every case. The
Court has emphasized this principle on several occasions. In Hall v. State, the Court stated that a
doubt" that the Hurst error was harmless, and then assessed other hannlessness factors, such as
the "egregious facts" of the case, reflecting a traditional hannless error analysis that evaluated the
50
1687
aggravation and mitigation. No. SC15-1662, 2017 WL 526509, at *22-23 (Fla. Feb. 9, 2017)
(emphasis added). Again in King v. State, the Court emphasized that the unanimous
recommendation was not dispositive, but rather "begins a foundation for us to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt" that the Hurst error was harmless. 2017 WL 372081, at *17 (emphasis added).
In Woodv. State, No. SC15-954, 2017WL411336,at*l3 (Fla. Jan. 31, 2017), the Court
indicated that a Hurst error in a unanimous-recommendation case would-if the case were not
remand for a new penalty phase because the jury had been instructed to consider inappropriate
aggravators.
The Hurst error in Mr. Hilton's case should not be ruled harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, not only due to the problems inherent in using the advisory jury's recommendation to infer
what fact-finding would have occurred in a constitutional proceeding, but also because the
circumstances of this case reflect, more other unanimous-recommendation cases the Florida
Supreme Court has addressed, a reasonable probability that the Hurst error impacted the
sentence.
In Mr. Hilton's case, the court found the following mitigating factors: (1) Hilton was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime; (2)
Hilton grew up in an emotionally abusive and neglectful home; (3) Hilton abused drugs,
including Ritalin, over a long period of time; (4) Hilton had no relationship with his biological
father; (5) Hilton is already serving a life sentence; (6) Hilton served his country in the military;
(7) Hilton suffered maternal deprivation and lacked bonding of a mother and child; (8) Hilton
was placed in foster care as an adolescent; and (9) Hilton suffered traumatic brain injury as a
child. Given this mitigation, there is a reasonable probability that at least some jurors in a
51
1688
constitutional proceeding, having been properly advised of their role as fact-finder in deciding
whether to sentence Mr. Hilton to death, would have decided that the death penalty should not be
imposed.
The jury's unanimous recommendation in Mr. Hilton's case also does not account for the
likelihood that defense counsel's approach to diminishing the weight of the aggravating factors
and presenting mitigation at the penalty phase would have been different had counsel known that
the jury, not the judge, would be required to unanimously agree on each of the elements required
to impose the death penalty. The impact of the unconstitutional scheme may have begun as early
as jury selection for the penalty phase. Counsel may have conducted his questioning of
prospective jurors differently had he known that only one juror needed to be convinced, as to
only one of the required elements, in order for Mr. Hilton to avoid a death sentence. During the
penalty phase itself, defense counsel's approach may have been different had the jury, rather than
the judge, been required to unanimously find that each specific aggravating factor had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, in a constitutional proceeding, defense counsel may
Defense counsel's approach may also have been different had the jury, as opposed to the
judge, been required to unanimously make the "sufficiency" and "insufficiency" findings
regarding the aggravating factors. In addition, counsel's approach to the mitigation may have
differed in a penalty phase where the jury rendered the findings regarding the weight of
aggravation relative to mitigation. Counsel's thinking also may have been impacted had he
known the jury would be instructed that it was entitled to recommend a life sentence even if it
had unanimously agreed that all of the other elements for a death sentence were satisfied.
52
1689
Counsel may have given different advice to Mr. Hilton, and the decision-making may have been
different.
Given those and other uncertainties about the Hurst error's impact on counsefs strategy
and presentation, the jury's unanimous recommendation does not allow this Court to reliably
conclude that the jury would have unanimously made all of the required findings of fact in a
necessary to establish how counsel's approach may have differed in a post-Hurst penalty phase.
Claim 5: Trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to Mr. Hilton's ineligibility for
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment due to his severe mental
illness.
Claim 6: Trial counsel was ineffective for their failure to preserve for appeal the
denial of cause challenges during jury selection.
Counsel relies on the arguments already asserted in the initial post-conviction motion in
conjunction with the testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing. This issue is more
emblematic of how completely dysfunctional the defense team was in Mr. "Hilton's case. In
short, Jury Selection proceeded over the course of several days. (T. Jury Selection, 1-1 082).
There were numerous "cause challenges" that were asserted during jury selection. Many of them
were granted, but many of them were not. While the defense team made objections to the denial
of cause challenges, the defense team failed to preserve any of these objections for the purposes
of appellate review by utilization of the process outlined in Trotter. The Defendant asserts that
the failure to properly preserve the denial of cause challenges for appellate review was and is
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1690
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
Ms. Suber explains that she made a mistake and that she thought that she had preserved
any error. (H, 50-140). Ms. Saunders explains that she should have been responsible, but
nobody knew who was responsible and she failed in her obligations. (H, 8, State's Exhibit 1).
Mr. Friedman essentially didn't feel he had any obligations and was reliant on others. (H, 452-
570). It is difficult to discern who was trying to preserve error, why they were trying to preserve
error, for what purpose that error was being preserved and by what mechanism. Suffice it to say
that the left hand had no idea what the right hand was doing. All lawyers make mistakes at trial,
but to go through an entire grist mill of objections, cause challenges and peremptory challenges
to only then fail to preserve any appealable issue highlights the complete dysfunctionality of Mr.
Hilton's defense.
Even if each individual claim is insufficient to set aside Mr. Hiltoo's conviction and
sentence, all of trial counsel's errors taken together renders his guilty verdicts and death sentence
unreliable. In considering all aspects of the defense counsel's deficient performance as part of a
cumulative analysis, Mr. Hilton would not have been found guilty of first-degree murder and
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1691
Respectfully submitted,
55
1692
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3~d Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant State
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 14th day of January, 2019.
56
1693
Filing# 84008126 E-Filed 01/28/2019 03:53:36 PM
Defendant.
--------------------~/
ORDER REQUESTING SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
THIS cause coming on to be heard sua sponte, and the court being otherwise
fully advised in the premises, it is heteby,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that withih five (5) days each. party will
simultaneo\lsly submit to the Co\lrt ~'proposed frndings of facts and conclusions of
law" as provided by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.85l(f)(5)(E), and as previously requested by
theCo\lrt.
DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of 1anuary, 2019., in Tallahassee,
Leon County, Florida.
cc:
Eddie Evans, Assistant State Attomey
Georgia Cappleman, Assistant State Attomey
Robert A. Morris, Counsel for Defendant
Jennifer Keegan, Assistant Attorlley General
1694
Filing# 84311851 E-Filed 02/ul/2019 04:17:38 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff,
Defendant.
_________________________cl
COMES NOW, the State of Florida, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby
submits the State's Response to Court's January 28,2019 Order. On April20, 2017, Hilton filed
his Second Motion for Leave to Amend Initial Postconviction Motion and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law (hereinafter "Motion"), raising seven claims. The State filed its answer to
Hilton's Motion (hereinafter "Answer" or "State's Answer") on May 15, 2017. Hilton filed an
Amended Claim 6 on July 21, 2017, and the State filed its answer on August 7, 2017. An
evidentiary hearing was held October 30, 31, and November I, 2018, during which Hilton
presented testimony and exhibits to support his Motion. The State filed its Postconviction
Hearing Closing Argument on January 14, 2019 and Hilton filed his Written Closing Argument
on the same day. On January 28, 2019, the Court issued an Order requesting supplemental
pleadings providing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State submits the
following supplemental pleading setting forth the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
1695
The Merits
Claim 1: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective during the Penalty Phase of
Hilton's Trial
Hilton alleges that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for
failing to conduct a competent mitigation investigation, and specifically for failing to conduct a
"multigenerational review" of Hilton's family's mental illness and failing to investigate Hilton's
military service and the mental health impact it had. (Motion at 28). Hilton's defense team was
not deficient in conducting a mitigation investigation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984); Dingle v. Sec'y Dept. of Corr., 480 F.3d 1092, 1099 (I lth Cir. 2007). Fuentes, the
mitigation specialist, conducted a thorough mitigation investigation and the defense team knew
about all the mitigation related to Hilton's military service and family history, and that
information was presented at trial. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at I 08-87, 257, 260-62, 492-93, 496-97,
525-26; R. 16:disc 7; 38:124-25; 39:242-43). Hilton's expert witness, Dr. Camp, did not testify
to any information that was previously unknown or otherwise not presented to Hilton's jury. (Id.
at 143-77; R. 16:disc 7). Hilton is not prejudiced by the defense team's mitigation investigation.
As Hilton's defense team uncovered all available mitigation, any changes to their mitigation
investigation would have no reasonable probability of changing the outcome of his case. Sears v.
Hilton claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present available mitigation
evidence and witnesses on several topics and for not calling enough lay witnesses. (Motion at 5,
23-25, 29). Friedman, lead trial counsel in the penalty phase, was not deficient in presenting
1696
mitigation because his decisions on presentation of evidence were informed and based on
reasonable strategy. Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245, 252 (Fla. 2004); Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d
730, 740 (Fla. 2011). As Friedman is a highly experienced trial attorney, his strategic decisions
are entitled to additional deference. Chandler v. United States, 218 F. 3d 1327, 1316 (I I th Cir.
2000); Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F. 3d 1327, 1332 (I lth Cir. 1998). Friedman presented all
the helpful mitigation evidence to the jury, provided all the mitigation evidence to their experts,
called eleven lay witnesses, and made reasonable strategic decisions to withhold unhelpful or
potentially harmful mitigation evidence and witnesses. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 498, 534).
Ultimately, the jury heard most of the evidence that Hilton claims was withheld at trial. (R.
not deficient for declining to present available mitigation or witnesses because he had a
reasonable strategic basis for withholding it. Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1124 (Fla. 2006).
Hilton failed to provide evidence of prejudice because he did not present any of the Jay
witnesses at the evidentiary hearing that he claims should have been presented at trial and did not
present any evidence that would have a reasonable probability of changing the outcome of
Hilton's trial if it had been presented at trial. Guardado v. State, I 76 So. 3d 886 (Fla. 2015);
Lebron v. State, 135 So. 3d 1040, 1055-56 (Fla. 2014). The exclusion of the defense team's
PowerPoint presentation was the result of relevance objections, rather than a failure to present
mitigation, and had no reasonable probability of impacting Hilton's trial because it mostly
contained photos of evidence the jury heard about through other means. (R. 16: disc 7). The
introduction of the State's rebuttal evidence in response to the defense theme that Ritalin affected
Hilton's behavior would not have been excluded if they had presented the mitigation Hilton
1697
claims should have been presented. Finally, the defense counsel is not liable for Fuentes' choice
to quit over objections to Friedman's mitigation strategy because her actions were a shocking
departure from the conduct expected of a mitigation specialist, and the team responded
reasonably to her departure by completing the remainder of her work. Guardado v. State, 176 So.
3d 886 (Fla. 2015); Dufour v. State, 905 So.2d 42, 56 (Fla.2005). This claim should be denied.
Hilton alleges trial counsel was ineffective in preparing and effectively using expert
witnesses during the penalty phase of Hilton's trial. (Motion at 25-31). Hilton failed to present
any evidence on this claim by presenting new diagnoses or expert testimony that were not
presented at trial or by calling the defense experts to testify that they were not properly prepared
for trial. Friedman was not deficient because he exercised due diligence and his decisions were
reasonable and strategic. Friedman provided all available information to his experts and regularly
· updated them on developments, and he exercised due diligence by instructing the experts not to
mention harmful topics. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 470-71, 483, 486, 491-94, 497, 502-03, 539-41,
546-47). Friedman was not deficient in presenting Dr. Wu's testimony because Dr. Wu's
mention of the Deadly Run movie was spontaneous and nonresponsive to Friedman's
questioning. (R. 38:127-28). Friedman's decision to hire Dr. Strauss as an expert witness instead
of Dr. McLaren was a reasonable decision because he did not trust Dr. McLaren and Dr. Strauss
was better-suited to Hilton's case. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 545). Hilton was not prejudiced by the
defense team's preparation and presentation of expert testimony because any changes in the
defense team's preparation and use of experts would not outweigh the overwhelming evidence in
aggravation and the six weighty aggravators in this case. This claim should be denied.
1698
Claim 2: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective due to Disorganization and
Division, Inconsistent Preparation, Unreasonable Caseloads, and Unreasonable
Strategy
Hilton alleges that the members of his trial team were divisive and uncooperative,
resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel. (Motion at 34-39). There is no question that there
was some discord within Hilton's trial team, however, Hilton's general allegations of personal
conflict are insufficient to establish ineffectiveness. Hilton alleges that the defense team did not
get along and that Suber was difficult to work with. These allegations fail to allege specific
deficient acts that present a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of his case.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-90); Sears, 56! U.S. at 945. As such, Hilton is not entitled to relief
Hilton alleges that Suber was ineffective for consuming prescription medication during
Hilton's case in a manner that interfered with her work. (Motion at 35). There is no deficient
performance because Suber's use of prescribed medication did not cause specific errors, and her
use of medication was after work and under the care of a doctor. Allegations that consuming
prescription medication or alcohol may have affected Suber's work is refuted by the record and
the evidentiary hearing testimony presented by Suber and Daniels. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 89, 314).
Hilton cannot establish deficiency or prejudice because he failed to present evidence of specific
deficient acts that present a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of his case. This
Hilton alleges that Bohanan was ineffective for acting unprofessionally and intentionally
1699
Bohanan's conduct, though regrettable, had no reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of
Hilton's trial. Although the evidence demonstrates that Bohanan may have made unprofessional
comments to Hilton about other defense team members, Daniels and Friedman testified at the
evidentiary hearing that Bohanan's conduct did not create a conflict that obligated withdrawal
from the case. (Id. at 303-04, 551). The team responded reasonably to Bohanan's conduct by
addressing any ethical issues and removing Bohanan from the case. Bohanan's exit was
inconsequential to the defense team's performance at trial because her role in the case was
minor. (Id. at 28, 474; State Exhibit 1). As such, there is no reasonable probability that
Bohanan's conduct impacted the outcome of the trial. This claim should be denied.
Hilton alleges that his defense team was not prepared for the guilt or penalty phase of
trial because the team members were not cooperating with each other and team members kept
changing roles or leaving the team. (Motion at 36, 39). There is no deficient performance
because the trial record and the evidentiary hearing testimony establish that the defense team was
extremely prepared for trial and completed an enormous amount of work in the thirty-six months
that the case was pending. (R. Master Index at i-xxxi; 3:521-62; 4:648-59, 1120-32, 1152-91;
7:1274-79; 11:1995-2003, 2046-47, 2077-83; Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 66-67, 107-08, 112-13). Any
Jack of cooperation did not prevent team members from fully preparing for trial, as every team
member got a copy of the discovery and the team had regular group meetings. Hilton is not
prejudiced by whatever lack of cooperation existed among the team members. Bohanan's and
Fuentes' exits had little impact on the case because Bohanan's role was minor and Fuentes' work
was nearly finished when she quit. Any lack of cooperation that may have existed within the
team does not have a reasonable probability of changing the outcome of Hilton's trial given the
1700
overwhelming evidence of guilt and the six weighty aggravators in his case. This claim should be
denied.
Hilton alleges that Suber was ineffective for being generally "ill prepared" in defending
his case, including being late to court, making poor use of her peremptory challenges during jury
selection, and objecting to another attorney on her team in open court. (Motion at 37). Suber was
not deficient in her preparation of Hilton's case because any errors Suber made, such as being
late for court one time for a hearing that another attorney on her team was handling, were minor
errors that do not constitute deficient performance. Suber prepared extensively to cross-examine
the State's scientific witnesses and the record reflects that the defense team adequately attacked
the evidence. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 110-12, 292-93; R. ll :24-56; 33:1!0 l-52; 35:1274-1350).
Hilton was not prejudiced by Suber's performance, as changes in her preparation would have had
no reasonable probability of changing the outcome of his trial in light of the overwhelming
Hilton alleges that the defense team failed to adequately communicate with Hilton "about
the reality of the case against him." (Motion at 35). There was no deficient performance because
Suber and Friedman both communicated with Hilton multiple times about trial strategy and the
evidence in his case, and he repeatedly confirmed that he wanted an adversarial trial. (Id. at 69-
70, 72, 82-84, 506-07). Hilton was not prejudiced because counsel adequately communicated
with him, and any lack of communication would not have a reasonable probability of changing
1701
(b) Excessive Workload
Hilton alleges the defense team was working under an excessive caseload, did not spend
the necessary time on Hilton's case, and overlooked correctional officer Caleb Wynn's report in
the evidence. (Motion at 40-41 ). The defense team was not det1cient due to overwork or failure
to prepare Hilton's case. The defense team had enough time to prepare for Hilton's case during
the thirty-six months Hilton's case was pending and they accomplished an enormous amount of
work during that time. (Master Index at i-xxxi; I :39; 3:521-62; 4:648-59, 1120-32, 1152-91;
7:1274-79; 11:1995-2003, 2046-47, 2077-83; 17:01). The Public Defender's Oft1ce eased the
defense team's workload by reassigning cases and accommodating all resources requests. (Evid.
Hrg. Trans. at 105-07, 109-10, 514-15). Suber was unfamiliar with Otl'icer Wynn only because
be bad not been properly disclosed to the defense. (Id. at 111-13). When Officer Wynn was
presented to testify, Suber responded adequately by raising proper objections and taking steps to
prepare for his testimony. (Id. at 113-14). Hilton was not prejudiced. Suber would not have been
able to exclude or change Officer Wynn's testimony if she bad been aware of it earlier. (!d. at
114-15). Even if they succeeded in excluding Oft1cer Wynn's testimony, it would have no
impact because other evidence of Hilton's incriminating statements presented at trial. (R.
34:1180, 1184, 1196-1203). As such, iftbe defense team had more time to prepare for Oft1cer
Wynn's testimony it would have had no reasonable probability of changing the outcome of
Claim 3: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Present a Cohesive,
United Defense in the Guilt and Penalty Phases of Hilton's Trial
Hilton alleges defense counsel was ineffective because the penalty phase strategy to
blame Hilton's sudden change in behavior on Ritalin overdose was inconsistent with the
1702
reasonable doubt defense used in the guilt phase. (Motion at 41-42). The defense team's
performance was not deficient because the guilt and penalty phase strategies did not conflict with
each other and the defense team's strategies were reasonable given the realities of the evidence
in Hilton's case. Shellito v. State, 121 So. 3d 445, 453 (Fla. 2013); Dingle v. Sec'y Dept. of
Corr., 480 F.3d 1092, 1099 (lith Cir. 2007). The evidence of guilt was overwhelming and
presented few defenses, an intoxication-induced insanity defense was not legally viable, and
Hilton told the team repeatedly he wanted to "fight everything" at trial. (Evid. Hrg. Trans. at 70,
133-34, 196, 256, 506, 518). As such, the defense team's guilt phase strategy to focus on
establishing reasonable doubt was a reasonable trial strategy and was not inconsistent with the
penalty phase strategy. Hilton is not prejudiced by the defense team's choices on strategy
because there is no guilt or penalty phase theory that would have a reasonable probability of
changing the outcome of Hilton's trial, given the voluminous evidence of guilt and six weighty
Claim 4: Whether Hilton is entitled to Relief Pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct.
616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016)
Hilton alleges that he is entitled to a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136
S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Hilton is not entitled to relief
because the jury in his case unanimously recommended death and the Florida Supreme Court has
repeatedly relied on a unanimous death recommendation to find Hurst error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2016); King v. State, 211 So. 3d 866
(Fla. 2017); Truehill v. State, 2Jl So. 3d 930 (Fla. 2017); Lowe v. State, No. SC12-263 2018
WL 5095143, *26 (Fla. Oct. 19, 2018). Hilton's jury was properly instructed that one aggravator
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before they could consider the death penalty, that the
1703
jury must determine whether sufficient aggravators exist to justify the death penalty, and whether
the aggravators outweighed the mitigators. (12:2309-12). The jury was cautioned that they are
never required to recommend a death sentence and to carefully consider the evidence. (12:2313).
The unanimous death recommendation and the instructions the jury received provide the basis to
conclude that the jury made the required findings under Hurst. As such, any Hurst error in this
case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and Hilton is not entitled to relief.
Claim 5: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Object to Hilton's
Eligibility for the Death Penalty
Hilton alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his mental
illness 1 makes him ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. Trial counsel
was not deficient for failing to raise this claim at trial because it is unripe and Florida law does
not recognize mental illness as a valid bar to imposition of the death penalty. Power v. State, 992
So. 2d 218, 222 (Fla. 2008) ("[N]either this Court nor the Supreme Court has recognized mental
illness as a per se bar to execution."); Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1984). Hilton
is not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to raise this claim as raising meritless claims would
not have changed the outcome of his trial. This claim should be denied.
Claim 6: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Preserve for Appeal
the Denial of Cause Challenges During Jury Selection 2
Hilton alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the denial of cause
challenges in accordance with Trotter, 3 so that such denials could be raised on appeal. (Amended
Claim 6 at 2-3). Hilton's claim is facially insufficient because he fails to identify which cause
1 Hilton notes various mental conditions relevant to this claim, including brain damage, pervasive drug use in his
youth, multiple sclerosis, schizo affective disorder, and exhibitions of"bizarre" behavior. (Motion at 61-62)
2 This claim is sequentially numbered as Claim 6 but Hilton's Motion, presumably due to typographical error, has
10
1704
challenges should have been preserved and fails to identify specific jurors that harbored actual
bias. Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1139 (Fla. 2006). Hilton is not prejudiced by trial
counsel's handling of the cause challenges in his case because none of the jurors that served on
his jury harbored actual bias against him. Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2007). Jurors
Crowell and Rice were the only jurors that served on Hilton's jury after cause challenges to
remove them were denied. The voir dire of both jurors reflects that they were impartial. (R.
17:30-35; 18:280-81). As such, Hilton is not prejudiced by their service on his jury. This claim
should be denied.
Hilton alleges that he did not receive a fair trial due to the numerous errors in his case. He
asserts that the errors complained of in his Motion tainted his case and these errors are not
harmless. (Motion at 74). As none of Hilton's individual claims contain any merit, he is not
entitled to cumulative error relief. Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008) (holding where
individual claims of error are meritless or procedurally barred, a defendant is not entitled to relief
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the record and the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing
demonstrates that Hilton is not entitled to relief. The State prays this Court deny Hilton's Motion
in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
ASHLEY MOODY
ATTORNEY GENERAL
4 This claim is sequentially numbered as Claim 7 but Hilton's Motion, presumably due to typographical error, has
this claim listed as Claim 8. (Motion at 74).
II
1705
Is/ Jennifer L. Keegan
JENNIFER L. KEEGAN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Florida Bar No.: 0105283
PL-0 I, The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399- I 050
jennifer.keegan@myfloridalegal.com
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
Phone: (850) 414-3579
Co-counsel for the Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished
via the eportal to Robert A. Morris, Esq., alex@ramlawyer.com, Counsel for the Defendant; and
the Office of the State Attorney, SA02_Leon@leoncountyfl.gov; this I st day of February, 2019.
12
1706
Filing# 84388613 E-Filed 02/v4/2019 04:38:46 PM
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through the undersigned counsel, and moves this
1). This Court entered an order in January 28,2019 requiring counsel for the
2). Counsel has diligently prepared the responsive pleading. However, there is
something that has corrupted the Word file and "scrambled" the work produced. Compounding
matters, the undersigned is ill along with his wife and children.
3). Counsel attended a brief plea hearing this morning in Liberty County and had to
return home. The undersigned asked another attorney to appear on his behalf before this Court
on today' s date.
4). The undersigned would respectfully request a brief enlargement of time until 5:00
p.m., February 6, 2019 within which to file the Court's desired response.
1707
5). The undersigned has contacted Assistant Attorney General Jennifer Keegan and
WHEREFORE, the defense requests this Court enter an order granting an enlargement
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
c/'._., flPN.<d
:,5.75 "' ' ..__X,Y.
//s ::;7ZC-(tef.-r- ,(/ ._ _ _ _ __
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar No.: 0144680
1123 North Bronough Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32303
(850) 792-1111 Facsimile (850) 792-1113
alex@ramlawyer.com
efiling@ramlawyer.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'd Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant State
County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Suite 475, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer
General, PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 4th day of February, 2019.
1708
Filing# 84401998 E-Filed 02/05/2019 08:19:28 AM
Defendant.
--------~------~'
ORDERGRANTINGUNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
THIS CAUS:E h..ving come before the Court ott an Unopposed Motion for EnlargernelJJ:
of Time, and the Court being otherwi~e fully adVised in the premises, it is
ORDEMD ANI) ADJUDGED that the Unowosed Motion for Enlargement .of Time is
hereby GRANTED,. and the defense shall file the Court's tesponse bY 5:00 p.m. onFebruary 6,
2019.
JENNIFER KEEGAN,
ASsistant Attorney General
1709
Filing# 84540488 E-Filed 02fu6/2019 05:47:38 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEFENDANT.
------------------------~/
COMES NOW the Defendant, Gary Michael Hilton, by and through the undersigned
counsel, and files this Response to the Court's January 28,2019 Order and Proposed Findings of
Claim 1: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective during the Penalty Phase of Mr.
Hilton's Trial
Mr. Hilton alleges that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for
failing to conduct a competent mitigation investigation. The evidence adduced at the evidentiary
hearing was not so much focused on "a failure to develop mitigation" as compared to failing to
present the mitigation developed. This issue is somewhat of a "cart before the horse" matter.
However, there is evidence that the defense failed to conduct a competent mitigation
1710
investigation. Matters of seeming importance that should have been thoroughly vetted and
Family History
• Kenneth Caldwell- Mr. Hilton's maternal cousin.
Mr. Caldwell has information on Mr. Hilton's mother Cleo, including her cold
personality and lack of affection with Gary. Mr. Caldwell also has limited
information about Mr. Hilton's stepfather Nilo's dangerous business dealings in
Argentina. He witnessed Mr. Hilton acting strangely in a bar. (Exhibit 2A).
• Lionel Sonny Hilton (goes by Sonny)- Mr. Hilton's paternal half-brother.
Sonny Hilton had information about his own relationship with William Hilton,
their father. William deserted Sonny's family in the same way as he did Gary
Hilton. Sonny confirms that William had multiple wives and families at once and
did not contribute monetarily. (Exhibit 2A).
• Phillip Kitchen- police officer familiar with William and Edna Hilton.
Officer Kitchen worked for the police department in Lexington, Kentucky. He
interviewed Edna Hilton after she shot and killed William. Edna said she was
tired of the abuse. The prosecutor did not press charges because it was self-
defense. Officer Kitchen was already involved with William and Edna before
this. He went to their home three or four times on domestic violence calls. Some
of those times Edna had black eyes and bruises. The police department in general
were called about two to three times a year for five years. Each time, Officer
Kitchen could smell alcohol on William's breath, and one time there were alcohol
containers on the lawn. Edna also reported William had drugs in the house.
(Exhibit 2A).
• Elaine Leming- Mr. Hilton's paternal half-sister.
Ms. Leming confirms that William Hilton similarly deserted her mother and
siblings. She has more extensive knowledge about William's death, including that
Edna shot him in self-defense when William was drunk .. She also learned that he
got hooked on prescription pills while working for a hospital in Kentucky and had
a reputation in his neighborhood for acting erratically while drunk. Her brother
Olin, another one of Gary's half-siblings, shows signs of mental illness and
becomes angry about minor things then refuses to talk to his family for weeks or
months. (Exhibit 2A).
• Donald Stephen Reynolds (goes by Stephen)- Mr. Hilton's paternal cousin.
Stephen Reynolds has some background information on Mr. Hilton's mother
Cleo's upbringing. He is Cleo's brother's son. Stephen was physically abused by
his own father and believes it is because his grandfather was abusive to his
children, including Cleo. Stephen's grandfather kicked his children out of the
1711
house after he remarried because his new wife did not want them. Stephen heard
from other family members that Cleo's second husband, Nilo De bag, was
involved in the mob in Argentina. (Exhibit 2A).
• Nina Reynolds- Mr. Hilton's aunt by marriage.
Nina was married to Mr. Hilton's maternal uncle, Don Reynolds, before Don
passed away. She had interactions with Mr. Hilton as a child and can confirm that
after Mr. Hilton's father, William Hilton, abandoned Mr. Hilton and his mother.
He found another wife while still married to Cleo, and in fact had a third wife that
Cleo did not find out about until years later. Nina can also confirm that Gary was
extremely close with is mother at that time, and Cleo took her son everywhere
with her when she was not at work. Nina only saw Mr. Hilton a few times in his
teens, but he was smart and handsome and had a life of possibilities. In the
1980s, though, she saw Gary and Cleo again, and Gary was unrecognizable. He
was unkempt and did not look the same, and Cleo admitted that she thought Mr.
Hilton was addicted to drugs. Nina also has information about Don and Cleo's
upbringing. Their father beat them with a belt, and their father and stepmother
would not allow them to eat. Don had to sneak food when his stepmother was
busy watching soap operas. Eventually, all of the children, including Cleo, were
shipped off to live with other relatives. (Exhibit 2A).
• The articles and legal information related to William Hilton's death. (Exhibit ll).
Mr. Hilton's Childhood
• Sandra "Sandy" Herman Carr- Mr. Hilton's high school girlfriend.
Sandy can confirm that Mr. Hilton joined the military to get away from an older
man making sexual passes at him. She can also speak to Mr. Hilton's lack of
close friends in high school and his tense relationship with his mom and
stepfather. Finally, she had a weird incident where Mr. Hilton looked her up
years later and talked to her on the phone for about ten minutes before suddenly
making an inappropriate sexual comment. She was a witness at the trial, but she
confirms that there was limited and chaotic witness preparation. (Exhibit 2A).
• Roy Cave - high school and Army acquaintance.
Mr. Cave attended high school with Mr. Hilton, and then they were in boot camp
together. Roy witnessed Mr. Hilton's juvenile attorney sexually exploiting him.
The three of them stayed in a hotel room together and Roy saw the attorney
engaging in sexual acts with Mr. Hilton. Roy also saw Mr. Hilton's tense
relationship with his mom and stepfather, his inability to make friends because of
his weird personality and his developing marijuana addiction. Finally, Roy was a
penalty phase witness, but he confirms that he received no prep or guidance from
the trial team despite flying in from Oregon to testify. (Exhibit 2A).
Mr. Hilton's Military Experience
• Paul Pruitt- served in the Army with Mr. Hilton in the 1960s.
1712
Paul was in the elite Davy Crockett unit with Mr. Hilton for almost a year. Paul
recollects Mr. Hilton as a strange guy who did not really fit in with the rest of the
men. The others in the unit would socialize, and Mr. Hilton would not go out
with them. Mr. Hilton was very opinionated and talked constantly, almost as if he
could not stop talking. He spoke very quickly and was very fixed on his opinions.
Mr. Hilton found himself to be very intelligent and often bragged about his IQ
score. (Exhibit 2A).
Mr. Hilton's Mental Health/Personal Life
• Needham Bateman - veterinarian for Gary's dog Dandy
Dr. Bateman has information on Mr. Hilton's bizarre behavior whenever he
brought his dog, Dandy, into Dr. Bateman's office in the mid-2000s. Mr. Hilton
was unable to sit still in the waiting room, would just show up unannounced
rather than making appoints, and had a nervous energy. (Exhibit 2A).
• Pamela Burnett- a park acquaintance.
Pamela saw Mr. Hilton numerous times at Murphey Candler Park between 1998
and 2004 and can attest to his strange behavior. He would talk to himself, drive in
circles around the parking lot yelling at people, and get into verbal arguments
with people about dogs being off leash. She called the police on Mr. Hilton a
couple times, but they always told her Mr. Hilton was harmless. He also wore
camping/hiking attire, which was unusual for a casual neighborhood park.
(Exhibit 2A).
• Kay Damerow - a park acquaintance.
Kay saw Mr. Hilton at Murphey Candler Park numerous times in the mid-2000s
through 2007. She recalls that Mr. Hilton had a reputation as the "weird
park guy" because he was obsessive compulsive about his parking, wore
inappropriate hiking attire to the park, and being overly aggressive with others at
the park. Kay and her neighbors called the police on Mr. Hilton because of his
strange behavior, and the police assured them Mr. Hilton was harmless. (Exhibit
2A).
• Dr. Harry Deicher- Mr. Hilton's doctor who prescribed Ritalin.
Dr. Deicher confirms that he did not follow standard procedure in prescribing Mr.
Hilton Ritalin and explains that he did provide Mr. Hilton with a very high dosage
of Ritalin without taking into account the effect on Mr. Hilton psychologically.
He confirms the mental and behavioral changes he observed in Mr. Hilton
following the increase in Ritalin dosage, including Mr. Hilton becoming more
manic. He witnessed a strange episode where Mr. Hilton suddenly became upset
with his dog for virtually no reason. (Exhibit 2A).
• Joyce Dittmer- a park acquaintance.
Joyce encountered Mr. Hilton over a number of years at Murphey Candler Park.
She noticed his strange speech pattern, his excessive hiking attire, and his extreme
1713
techniques in training his dog. As a nurse, Joyce had some mental health training,
and Mr. Hilton came across as manic and schizoid to her. (Exhibit 2A).
o Ronald Miller - a park acquaintance.
Ronald saw Mr. Hilton at Murphey Candler Park in the years before his arrest.
He observed Mr. Hilton to be constantly agitated, only interested in a one-sided
conversation and wearing strange clothes to the park. (Exhibit 2A).
o Heather Parrott- Mr. Hilton's former co-worker.
Heather worked for Mr. Hilton in the mid- to late- 1990s. She noticed Mr.
Hilton's erratic mood changes. Heather was supposed to train Mr. Hilton, but he
thought of himself as superior to her. He would get upset when customers did not
buy what he was selling, and he would scream at them. Sometimes, he would
then get off the phone and scream at Heather. (Exhibit 2A).
• Philip Darryl Presti (goes by Darryl)- Mr. Hilton's ex-girlfriend's son.
Darryl's mother, Connie Wagoner, dated Mr. Hilton for a couple of years in the
1980s. Darryl indicates that Mr. Hilton suffered from sudden mood changes
where he would suddenly become angry for no reason. He was also addicted to
marijuana and smoked constantly. Mr. Hilton was very caring and attentive
toward Darryl's mother and teenaged sister, although Darryl himself did not get
along with Mr. Hilton. (Exhibit 2A).
• Brenda Roberts- Mr. Hilton's ex-girlfriend
Brenda dated Mr. Hilton back in the 1980s for about a year. Brenda was nine
years younger than Mr. Hilton. He did not have a lot of money, and this was
when he was running a charity scam. Mr. Hilton smoked a great deal of
marijuana with Brenda. She knew him after he had been married a couple times,
and he always hoped that he would not run into one of his ex-wives who worked
at a park that Brenda and Mr. Hilton often went to. He seemed angry at his ex,
but he never told Brenda why. He also never talked to her about his family.
Brenda was subpoenaed to testify at the trial. She was told that she would be
there for a day and a half at the most. Instead, she waited for three or four days
before the attorneys recorded a statement from her and then told her to go.
(Exhibit 2A).
• Christa Sparks- Mr. Hilton's ex-sister-in-law.
Christa's sister, Ursula, met Mr. Hilton in Germany when he was in the Army.
Ursula was from Germany, and she moved to the States to be with Mr. Hilton.
Ursula divorced Mr. Hilton because he had developed a drug addiction and was
unemployed. Christa met Mr. Hilton after he and Ursula had already divorced.
Christa went to visit her sister in Miami, and Ursula wanted to go check on Mr.
Hilton because she was worried about him. She warned Christa that this was not
the same man she had married. When they got there, Mr. Hilton was living in a
shack with no furniture. He was unkempt and lying on pillows on the floor. He
1714
was high, and his eyes were rolling around. They only stayed a few minutes.
(Exhibit 2A).
• Barbara Speed- worked in an office next to Mr. Hilton's employer.
Barbara worked for a realty company right next to John Tabor's siding business,
where Mr. Hilton worked on and off for ten years. Mr. Hilton would randomly
wander into the realty company and start chatting with Barbara. He rambled, and
his focus bounced around. Barbara did not want to talk to him, so she would just
keep working. Mr. Hilton would not even notice that she was not paying attention
to him. Mr. Hilton would also make strange requests of her, such as asking her to
do his laundry. This was strange because they were not friends. He did not seem
to have any friends. Mr. Hilton was also very territorial and got upset when
customers for Barbara's business would park in the parking lot, even though the
realty company and Tabor's business shared a lot. He even yelled at a customer
for trying to park there once. Mr. Hilton used construction cones to barricade
certain spaces. He also used a lot of marijuana around this time. (Exhibit 2A).
1715
Additional
• Daniel Fendley - producer and lead actor in Deadly Run.
Daniel can confirm that Mr. Hilton only had minor involvement in Deadly Run.
The movie was based on real life events out in Alaska. They stuck as close to the
original story as possible. Mr. Hilton was a production assistant, and he mostly
did minor tasks around the set. He knew Georgia well. His biggest contribution
was picking the filming locations. He may have suggested a couple props and
lines, but nothing major. (Exhibit 2A).
It cannot be said that the defense team did not "investigate" mitigation witnesses on the
developed reveal cursory development. (Compare Exhibits lA with Exhibits IB, IC, ID, IF,
IH, II, 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E). Comparison reveals a lack of depth to inquiry and a complete
The analysis of a competent investigation does not end here. It shifts to the next issue
Mr. Friedman, lead trial counsel in the penalty phase, was deficient in presenting
mitigation. There is no question that Mr. Friedman is an attorney with many years of experience.
However, his experience is not associated with trial work or death penalty trial work. Mr.
Friedman's experience handling death penalty trial work in the guilt phase and/or penalty phase is
very limited. He does have familiarity with the concepts, but little to no practical experience.
(Evidentiary Hearing, 455). He worked as an assistant public defender in West Palm Beach in the
80's and 90's for an 8 year period of time. During that period of time he "tried approximately 50
1716
cases" 1 and "briefed close to 200 cases." (Evidentiary Hearing, 455). Mr. Friedman was then in
private practice for 4 years where he handled state and federal appeals. (Evidentiary Hearing,
455). He moved to Tallahassee in !997 and worked for a year for Capital Collateral Regional
North. (Evidentiary Hearing, 455). Mr. Friedman was employed by the Office of the Public
Defender for the Second Judicial Circuit from 1998 until20!4. (Evidentiary Hearing, 455-456).
During his tenure, he handled one "capital case" where the defendant was declared incompetent to
proceed. (Evidentiary Hearing, 456). He handled appeals, Jimmy Ryce cases and recollected that
Friedman testified that he was "second chair" in the penalty phase of I capital case where he called
"all four witnesses- the expert witnesses in that case. (Evidentiary Hearing, 456). Mr. Friedman
did not have experience in a felony trial courtroom between 1998 and 2014. (Evidentiary Hearing,
460).
Mr. Friedman rejected and did not present virtually all of the mitigation evidence
developed by the mitigation expert assigned to the case by the Office of the Public Defender. He
elected to present evidence "through the expert witnesses" and not present chronological physical
Mr. Hilton alleges trial counsel was ineffective in preparing and effectively using expert
witnesses during the penalty phase of Hilton's trial. (Motion at 25-31 ). Mr. Friedman did not
provide all available information to his experts or regularly update them on developments as he
1 It is unclear what type of cases these may have been, but there is no testimony or evidence that they were capital
cases.
8
1717
testified. (Evidentiary Hearing, 454-570). He could not have done so because there was a failure
to adequately investigate in the first instance. He was completely unaware of a great deal of
information or its significance and had no appreciable ability to ask an expert to evaluate that
which was not known and communicate it to a jury. Likewise, he was not aware of great amount
of information with which to prepare his experts leaving his witnesses susceptible.
There is not a particularly good way to address Claims 2&3 in a succinct manner.
They will be addressed together below.
Claim 2: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective due to Disorganization and Division,
Inconsistent Preparation, Unreasonable Caseloads, and Unreasonable Strategy
Mr. Hilton alleges that the members of his trial team were divisive and uncooperative,
Mr. Hilton alleges the defense team was working under an excessive caseload, did not
spend the necessary time on Hilton's case, and overlooked correctional officer Caleb Wynn's
Claim 3: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Present a Cohesive,
United Defense in the Guilt and Penalty Phases of Hilton's Trial
Mr. Hilton alleges defense counsel was ineffective because the penalty phase strategy to
blame Hilton's sudden change in behavior on Ritalin overdose was inconsistent with the
1718
*********************************************************************
There is not a way of encapsulating the issues in the aforementioned claims in any succinct
The testimony ofthe various members of the defense team evidence anything other than a
"team." Each of them attribute blame to another. Each of them attribute responsibility from one
to the other. Each of them shirk and/or accept responsibility for various issues. There is complete
conflict of who was in charge of who, what, when, how or why. There are allegations of mental
health issues and/or substance abuse issues related to counsel. There is testimony that various
counsel was removed, fired or shuffled at varying points of the case or during the actual trial
because there were known and identifiable problems. The mitigation expert resigned in the middle
of trial because mitigation wasn't being used. There is testimony that members of the defense
team were fired or resigned in the midst of trial because of deficiencies known before and in the
middle of trial. There is testimony related to conflicts of interest and the necessity of withdrawing
from the Defendant's case. There is evidence that vacations were more important than the defense
of the Defendant. The emails between the parties that were introduced into evidence demonstrate
anything but stability (and contempt for the Court). (Exhibit IE). There were numerous capital
cases assigned to the Offtce of the Public Defender with the same parties involved with no clear
definition of responsibility. There was no division of labor or responsibility in this case until the
II th hour. There was no agreement on strategy among the lawyers or the client. Moreover, the
lawyers involved presented inconsistent defenses between the guilt phase and penalty phase. The
lawyers involved were unaware of witnesses and their testimony and/or the gravity of their
testimony.
10
1719
There is genuinely no intelligent way to arrive at findings of fact other than to say that this
is a very rare circumstance where the lawyers simply lost their way. They stopped "lawyering"
for Mr. Hilton and they became more engrossed in their own self-preservation and sense of self.
They jettisoned mitigation. They made things simplistic and streamlined. Everyone wanted to be
finished with a very difficult case. The Defendant did not receive adequate representation. The
jury did not hear or see a presentation that afforded the Defendant an effective defense.
Claim 4: Whether Hilton is entitled to Relief Pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct.
616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016)
Mr. Hilton alleges that he is entitled to a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Mr. Hilton is entitled to relief
because it cannot possibly be said that the error in this case is harmless. While the jury's
recommendation was unanimous, their unanimity was without the benefit of an overwhelming
amount of mitigation. It is likely the jury would have and could have arrived at a different
recommendation irrespective of the fact that the schematic in use at the time has now been found
unconstitutional.
Claim 5: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Object to Hilton's
Eligibility for the Death Penalty
Claim 6: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Preserve for Appeal
the Denial of Cause Challenges During Jury Selection
II
1720
Mr. Hilton alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the denial of
cause challenges. (Amended Claim 6 at 2-3). This is further indication of what is evidenced
above, but not necessarily indicative of the necessity for a new guilt phase.
This claim should be granted given the collision of the deficiencies and problems described
above.
Conclusion:
During Mr. Hilton's penalty phase, trial counsel failed to elicit relevant testimony from
witnesses on the stand, completely failed to call other witnesses who had helpful information,
and did not adequately consult with and prepare the expert witnesses. Counsel's stewardship
during the penalty phase was deficient, and these deficiencies prejudiced Mr. Hilton by not
providing the effective counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Trial counsel opted for a barebones, streamlined mitigation presentation during the
penalty phase. This left out much of Mr. Hilton's life history and led to a mitigation story that
ultimately hurt Mr. Hilton because it opened the door to the State's harmful rebuttal evidence.
Trial counsel collected historical information about Mr. Hilton's life, which included, among
other things, head injuries, neglect, sexual abuse, suicidal ideations, instability, poverty, and
mental illness. However, the jury never heard a vast majority of this information, including that
this was not simply a case of Ritalin overuse, but instead Ritalin overuse by a man who was
already impaired and on the cusp of a breakdown. Trial counsel could have shown the jury that
Mr. Hilton's brain damage and mental illness, in addition to his troubled life history, left him
12
1721
especially vulnerable to the effects of wrongfully prescribed Ritalin. Had trial counsel presented
a more complete picture of Mr. Hilton's life history, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
result of the penalty phase would have been different and the jury would have voted for life.
Mr. Hilton did not receive effective representation and he was prejudiced. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The prejudice Mr. Hilton
suffered was not harmless error pursuant to Hurst and its evolving progeny.
Respectfully submitted,
13
1722
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
Electronic mail: to The Honorable James C. Hankinson, Presiding Judge, Leon County
Courthouse, 3'ct Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, Assistant State
Leon County Courthouse, 4th Floor, 301 S. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL, and Jennifer Keegan,
PL-01 The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 on this 6th day of February, 2019.
14
1723
Filing# 84765255 E-Filed 0211212019 09:28:41 AM
Plaintiff,
Defendant.
--------~--~----~'
ORPER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FQRPOSTCOJWICTIQNRELIEF
1724
Circuit, was appointed to represent Hilton. The Public Defender's Office
continued to represent Hilton throughout the trial and direct appeal proceedings.
On June 6, 2008, Hilton was booked into the Leon County Jail after being
el(tradited from Georgia. Jury trial in this matter started on February 2, 2011. On
February 15, 2011, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to First Degree. Murder,
Kidnapping With Intent To Commit A Felony And To Terrorize, and Grand Theft.
A penalty phase proceeding was conducted on February 17, 18 and 21, 2011. On
February 21, 2011, the juty recommended unanimously that Gary Hilton be
sentenced to death for the murder of Cheryl Dunlap.
On April 21, 20 11, the trial court pronounced a sentence of death and issued
its. sentencing order. The sentencingorder provided that the State had ptoven six
aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt. Weight was assigned to each aggravator,
as follows: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony (great
weight); (2) the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping (great
weight); (3) the murder was committed to avoid arrest (moderate weight); (4) the
murder was committed for pecuniary gain (some weight); (5} the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and (6) the murder
was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) (great weight).
The court also considered and weighed each mitigating circumstance.
proposed by Hilton. and found one statutory mental mitigating factor-at the time
of the murder Hilton was under extreme emotional distress (some. weight). Under
the catch-all provision, the trial court considered ten mitigating factors, finding that
Hilton established eight of them and rejecting two. The court found: (1) Hilton
grew up in an abusive household (some weight); (2) Hilton abused drugs,
specifically Ritalin (some weight); (3) Hilton was deprived of a relationship with
1725
his biological father (moderate. weight); (4) Hilton is already serving a life sentence
so society is protected (some weight); (5) Hilton served his country in the U.S.
military (very little weight); (6) Hilton suffered maternal deprivation and lade of
bonding between mother and child (some weight); (7) Hilton was removed from
his home and put into foster care when he was a child (some weight); (8) Hilton
grew up in a fmancia1ly poor family (not proven); (9} Hilton suffered a traurtlatic
brain injury as a child (some weight); and (10) Hilton suffers from severe mental
defects. (not proven). The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
aggravators outweighed the mitigators .and imposed a sentence of death.
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Hilton raised six claims: 1) th.e trial
court erred in admitting his statements to law enforcement as they constituted
inadmissible Williams rule evidence; 2) the trial c.ourt erred in admitting Dr.
Gregory Prichard's testimony regarding Hilton's past criminal conduct, as it
constituted a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance; 3) the trial court erred in
permitting Dr. Prichard to remain in the courtroom, despite invocation of the rule
of sequestration; 4) the evidence was insufficient to find that the HAC and CCP
aggravators were proven; 5) the. trial court erred in rejecting the lack of capacity
mitigating circumstance and failed to make findings to support. the ruling; and 6)
the death sentence violates Rlng v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), The Florida
Supreme Court affirmed Hilton's convictions and death sentence. Hilton v . State,
117 So. 3d 742 (Fla. 20 i3)c Hilton's petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was denied on December 2, 2013. Hilton v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 68.6
(2013).
As indicated. above, on April 20,. 20 17, Hilton filed his Second Motion for
Leave to Amend Initial Postconviction Motion and Incorporated Memorandum of
1726
Law (hereinafter "Motion"), raising seven claims. The State filed its answer to
Hilton's Motion (hereinafter "Answer" ot "State's Answer") on May 15;2017. On
June 14, 2017, claim six was dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend due
to legal insufficiency. Hilton ftled an Amended Claim (jon July 21, 20l7,and the
State filed its answer on August 7, 2017. An evidentiary hearing was held October
30, 31, and November 1, 2018, during which Hilton presented testimony and
exhibits to support his Motion. The State filed its Postconviction Hearing Closing
Argl.iiiient on January 14, 2019 and Hilton filed his Written Closing Argument on
the same day. On January 28, 2019, the Court issued an Otder requesting
suPPlemental pleadings providing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The State submitted its supplemental pleading on February L, 2019. The
Defendant filed his supplemental pleading on February 6, 2019.
Finding Of Facts And Conclusions Of Law
Claim 1: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective during the Penalty
Phase ofHilton's Trial
1727
knew about all the mitigation related to Hilton's military service and family
history, and most of that information was presented at trial. Hilton's expert witness
at the hearing, Dr. Camp, did not testify to any infonnation that was previously
unknown or otherwise not presented to Hilton's jury. Hilton has proven no
ineffective assistance of counsel in the investigation, nor has he shown any
prejudice by the defense team's mitigation investigation as to any alleged failings.
Any changes to their mitigation investigation would have had no reasonable
probability of changing the outcome of his case .. This claim is denied.
(b)Failure to present available mitigation
Hilton claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
available mitigation evidence and witnesses on several topics and for not calling
enough lay witnesses. Robert Friedman was the lead trial couns.el in the penalty
phase. Friedman is a highly experienced trial attorney, and his strategic decisions
are entitled to due deference based on that experience. Friedman presented all the
help:fill mitigation evidence to the jury, provided aU the mitigation evidence to their
experts, called eleven lay witnesses, and made reasonable strategic decisions to
withhold unhelp:fill or potentially harmful mitigation evidence and witnesses.
Ultimately, the.jury heard most of the evidence that Hilton claims was withheld at
trial. Reasonable attorneys can disagree on the best way to present evidence to the
jury. It was not unreasonable to decide to present the evidence through highly
qualified experts, who were experienced witnesses. Counsel was not deficient
because he had a reasonable strategic basis for withholding the as.serted additional
evidence.
Hilton also failed to prove prejudice at the evidentiary hearing. No
witnesses were presented at the evidentiary hearing that if presented at trial would
1728
have had an.yreasonable probability of changing the outcome of Hilton's trial. The
exclusion of the defense team's PowerPoint presentation was the result of
relevance objections, rather than a failure to present mitigatipn, and had. no
reasonable probability of impacting Hilton's trial because. it mostly contained
photos of evidence the jury heard about through other means. The court's ruling as
to the PowerPoint presentation would have been the same whether Fuent~s was
present or hot. The State's rebuttal evidence in response to the defense theme that
Ritalin affected Hilton's behavior wotHd probably have been admitted under the
presentation Hilton now proposes to present. Finally, the defense counsel is not
liable for Fuentes' choice to quit over objections to Friedman's mitigation strategy
because her action was a departure from the conduct expected of a mitigation
specialist, and the team responded reasonably to her departure by completing the
remainder of her work. This claim is denied.
(c) Failure to prepare and effectively use expert witnesses
Hilton alleges trial counsel was ineffective in preparing. and effectively using
expert witnesses during the penalty phase of Hilton's triaL Hilton failed to present
any evidence on .this claim by presenting new diagnoses or expert testimony that
were not presented at trial or by calling the defense experts to testify that they wete
not properly prepared for trial. Friedman was not deficient because he exercised
due diligence and his decisions were reasonable and strategic. Friedman provided
all available information to his experts and regularly updated them on
developments, and. be exercised due diligence by instructing the experts not to
mention harmful topics. Friedman was not deficient in presenting Dt. Wu's
testimony because Dr. Wu's mention of the Deadly Run movie was spontaneous
and nonresponsive to Friedman's questioning. Friedman's decision to hire and
1729
present Dr. Strauss as an expert witness instead .of Dr. McLaren was a reasonable
decision because he did not trust Dr. McLaren and believed Dr. Strauss was better-
suited to Bilton's case, Hilton has failed to prove any unreasonable deficiency in
preparation of expert witnesses by Friedman. Further, Hilton has failed to prove
that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. It was not proven that any
changes in the defense team's preparation and use of experts would have
outweighed the overwhelming evidence in aggravation and the six weighty
aggravators in this case. This claim is denied.
Claim 2: Whether Trial Counsel Was Ineffective due to Disorganization
and Division, Inconsistent Preparation, Unreasonable Caseloads, and
Unreasonable Strategy
(a)Divisiveness of the Defense Team
Hilton alleges that the members of his trial team were divisive and
uncooperative, resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel. There is no question
that then~ was some discord within Hilton's trial team, however, Hilton's general
allegations of personal conflict are insufficient to establish ineffectiveness. Hilton
alleges that the defense team didrtot get along and that Suber was difficult to work
with. These allegations fail to allege specific deficient acts that present a
reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of his casec As such, Hilton is not
entitled to relief on general allegations of discord.. This claim is denied.
Hilton alleges that Suber was ineffective for consuming prescription
medication and alcohol during Hilton's case in a manner that interfered with her
work. He has failed to prove that this occurred. Therefore, no deficient
perfonnance has been proven. The record of the trial and the evidentiary hearing
testimony presented refute any claim that Suber's representation during trial was
1730
deficient Hilton has also failed to pre~ent evidence of any specific deficient acts
that present a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of his case.
Therefore, prejudice has not been proven. 1bis claim is denied.
Hilton alleges that Bohanan was ineffective for acting unprofessionally and
Intentionally sabotaging the attorney-client relationship. Although the evidence
demonstrates that Bohanan may have made unprofessional colnments to Hilton
about other defense team members, Bohanan's removal from the case was
inconsequential to the defense team's performance at trial because her role in the
case was minor. As such, there is no reasonable probability that Bohanan's
conductimpacted the outcome of the trial. This claim is denied.
Hilton alleges that his defense team was not prepared for the guilt or penalty
phase of trial because the team members were not cooperating with each other and
team members kept changing roles or leaving the team. Hilton. has proven no
deficient performance because the trial record and tile evidentiary hearing
testimony establish that the defense team was extremely prepared for trial and
completed an enormous amount ofwork in the thirty-six months that the case was
pending. Any lack of cooperation did .not prevent team members from fully
preparing for trial, as every team member got a copy of the discovery and the team
had regular group meetings. Hilton was not prejudiced by whatever lack of
cooperation existed among the team members. Bohanan's and Fuentes; exits had
little impact on the case because Bohanan's role was minor and Fuentes' work was
nearly finished when she quit. Hilton has failed to prove any deficient conduct.
Further, he has failed to prove that any alleged lack of cooperation Within the. team
had a reasonable probability of changing the outcome of Hilton's trial. The
1731
evidence as to guilt was overwhelming and six weighty aggravators dictated the
death Verdict in this case. This claim is. denied.
Hilton alleges that Suber was ineffective for being generally "ill prepared" in
defending his case, including being late to court, making poor use of her
peremptory challenges during jury selection, and objecting to another attorney on
her team. in open court. He has failed to prove any unreasonable deficiency.
Further, Hilton has failed to prove that any alleged deficiencies had any reasonable
probability of changing the outcome ofhis trial. This claim is denied.
Hilton alleges that the defense team failed. to adequately communicate with
Hilton "about the reality of the case against him." There was no deficient
performance because Suber and Friedman both communicated with Hilton multiple
times about trial strategy and the evidence in his case, and he repeatedly confirmed
that he wanted an adversarial trial. No deficient conduct was proven. Further,
Hilton has failed to prove that any alleged deficiency as lack of communication
had any reasonable probability of changing the outcome of the trial. This claim is
denied.
(b) Excessive Workload
Hilton alleges the defense team was working under an excessive caseload,
did not spend the necessary time on Hilton's case, and overlooked correctional
officer Caleb Wynn's report in the evidence. The defense team was not deficient
due to overwork or failure to prepare Hilton's case, The defense team had enough
time to prepare for Hilton's case during the thirty-six months Hilton's case was
pending and they accomplished an enormous amount of work during that time.
Su!Jer was unfamiliar with Officer Wynn only because he had not been properly
disclosed to the defense. Any claim as to the discovery violation could have been
1732
raised on appeal and is not a proper subject for postconviction relh:f. When
Officer Wynn was presented to testify, Suber responded adequately by raising
proper objections and taking steps to prepare for his testimony. Hilton has failed to
prove any deficient conduct on Suber's part. Further, Hilton has failed to show
any prejudice. Suber would not have been able to exch.tde or change Officer
Wynn's testimony if she had. been aware. of it earlier. Hilton has not shown that
additional time to prepare for Officer Wynn's testimony would have had any
reasonable probability of changing the outcome df Hilton's trial. This claim is
denied.
Claim 3: Whether Trial Co.unsel was lneffective for Failing to Present a
Cohesive, United Defense in the Guilt and Penalty Phases of Bilton's
Trial
Hilton alleges defense· counsel was ineffective because the penalty phase
strategy to blame Hilton's sudden change in behavior on Ritalin overdose was
inconsistent with the reasonable doubt defense used in the guilt phase, The
defense team's petfbrmance was not deficient because the guilt and penalty phase
strategies did not conflict with each other and the defense team's strategies were
reasonable given the realities of the evidence in Hilton's case. The evidence of
guilt was overwhelming and presented few defenses, an intdxication-induced
insanity defense was not legally viable, and Hilton told the team he wanted to
"fight everything" at trial. As such, the defense team's guilt phase strategy to
focus on establishing reasonable ddubt was a reasonable trial strategy and was not
inconsistent with the pertalty phase strategy. Hilton has failed to prove any
deficient conduct. Further, Hilton has failed to prove prejudice by the defense
10
1733
team's choices on strategy because there was no guilt or penalty phase theory that
would have had a reasonable probability of changing the outcome of Hilton's trial,
given the voluminous evidence of guilt and six weighty aggravators in: his case.
This claim is denied.
Claim 4: Whethet Hilton is entitled to Relief Pursuant to Hurst v.
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla.
2016)
li
1734
Claim 5: Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Object to
Hilton's Eligibility for the Death Penalty
Hilton alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that
his mental illness make-s him ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment. Hilton has offered no plausible evidence in support of this contention.
To the extent, Hilton is contending that he is not currently mentally eligible for
execution, that claim is unripe. Hilton has failed to prove any deficiency on the
part. of trial counsel as to this issue. Further, Hilton has failed to prove how trial
counsel's failure to raise this claim would have changed the outcome of his trial.
This claim is denied.
Claim 6; Whether Trial Counsel was Ineffective .for Failing to Preserve
for Appeal the Denial of Cause Challenges During Jury Selection1
Hilton alleges that trial counsel Was ineffective for failing to preserve the
denial of cause challenges in accordance with Trotter,2 so that such denials could
be raised on appeal. Hilton's claim is facially insufficient because he fails to
identify which cause challenges should have been preserved ancl fails to identify
specific jurors that harbored actual bias. Hilton was given an opportunity to amend
thi!i legally insufficient claim, but the I;Uilendment failed to cure this error. Hilton
was not prejudiced by trial counsel's hanclling of the cause challenges in his case
because. none of the jurors that served on his jury harbored actual bias against him.
As such, Hilton was rtot legally prejudiced by their service on his jury. This claim
is denied.
r. This clailll is sequentially numbered as Claim 6 but Hilton's. Motion, presumably due to typographical error, has
ti)i.s claim listed as Claim 7. (Motion at 73).
>Trotter y, State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990)
12
1735
Claim 7: Cumulative Errorl
Hilton alleges that he did not receive a fair trial due to the numerous errors
in his case. He asserts that the errors complained of in his Motion tainted his case
and these errors are not harmless. Since the court has not found legally deficient
conduct as to any of the claims, he is not entitled to cumulative .error relie£
Assuming deficient conduct, the claims taken in combination do not show a
reasonable likelihood of a different result. Thi.s claim is denied.
For all the reasons as set out above the Defendant's motion is denied.
Defendant is advised that he has 30 days to file an appeal to this Court's
ruling. . . -\-\.A...
DONE AND ORDERED this Ll_ day of February, 2019, in Tallahassee,
Leon County, Florida.
Copies:
Eddie Evans, Assistant State Attorney
Georgia Cappleman, Assistant State. Attorney
Robert A. Morris, Counsel for Defendant
Jennifer Keegan, Assistant Attorney General
3 This claim is s¢quentiallynumbered as. Claim 7 but Hilt<1n"s.Motiort, presumably due to typographical error, has
this claim listed as Claim 8. (Motion at 74).
13
1736
Filing# 86033707 E-Filed 03/07/2019 02:03:45 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DIVISION: FELONY
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,
Defendant.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL
COMES NOW, the Defendant, and files this NOTICE OF APPEAL to the
Florida Supreme Court, to appeal the 3.850 Post-Conviction hearing held on October 30,
31 and November I, 2018 and the Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Post-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, 301 S. Monroe Street,
PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, 301 S. Monroe Street, Suite 401, Leon County Courthouse,
The Capitol Building, PL-01, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, on this 7th day ofMarch, 2019.
!Is f!Jf~£.o/..//t:,/,;, _ _ _ _ _ __
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE
1738
Filing# 86033707 E-Filed 03/07/2019 02:03:45 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DIVISION: FELONY
COMES NOW, the Defendant, pursuant to Rule 9.140, Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and states that the following Judicial Acts are to be reviewed by the Florida Supreme
Court.
I, 2018.
2. The Court's order denying the Defendant's Motion for Post-Conviction Relief
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
/Is §{l,d;,,cS:y/..//tvu;; _ _ _ _ _ _ __
ROBERT A. MORRIS, ESQUIRE for
The Law Offices of Robert A. Morris, LLC
Florida Bar Number 0144680
911 East Park Avenue
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(850) 792-1111 Facsimile (850) 792-1113
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
COURT APPOINTED
alex@ramlawyer.com
eliling@ramlawyer.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, 301 S. Monroe Street,
PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, 301 s. Monroe Street, Suite 401, Leon County Courthouse,
The Capitol Building, PL-01, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, on this 7fh day of March, 2019.
1740
Filing# 86033707 E-Filed 03/07/2019 02:03:45 PM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DIVISION: FELONY
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through the undersigned counsel, and
moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 9.200, Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure, to enter an order directing that the 3.850 Post-Conviction hearing held before
transcribed by the official court reporter and the costs taxed to Justice Administrative
Commission. The original and two copies of said proceedings are to be filed with the
Clerk of the Circuit Court, Leon County, Florida within thirty days ofthe date of the
Court's Order.
1741
RESPECTRULLY SUBMITTED,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, 301 S. Monroe Street,
PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, 301 S. Monroe Street, Suite 401, Leon County Courthouse,
The Capitol Building, PL-01, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, on this 7th day of March, 2019.
1742
Filing# 86075933 E-Filed 03/08/2019 09:42:23 AM
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DIVISION; FELONY
GARY MICHAEL IDLTON,
Defend!lnt.
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ORDER DIRECTING COURTREPORTER(S) TO TRANSCRIBE
TillS CAUSE,. coming .on to be. heard uponthe Defendant's .Motion fotOrder
Directing Court Reporter(s) to Transcribe !!f certain proceedings in this cause necessary for
appeal, it is hereby, .
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Official Court Rep()rter is directed to transcribe
the iL8.50 Post-Convic.tion hearing held. before the Honorable James C. Hankinson on October
.30, 31 and November I, 2018 in the above-styled cause. Said notes of said proceedings shall be
filed with the Cletk of the SetQnd Judicial Circuit, Le()n County, Fl!!rida, within thirty (30). days
Filrther, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the cost of tranScribing the above proceedings shall
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF LEON
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Seal
of said MARCH 15TH, 2019.
GWEN MARSHALL
CLERK AND COMPTROLLER
LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
BY: DAVIDL.HUBERT
David L. Hubert, Deputy Clerk
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