Research & Development

R614 A Methodology For Fire Hazard Assessment

Abstract

This paper outlines a methodology for the fire hazard • estimate the consequences of ignited flammable liquid
assessment of offshore platforms. The assessment process is and gas releases
described using a case study. • ensure that arrangements are in place to prevent, control
and mitigate these events
Abbreviations The significant fire hazards are:
• jet, or pool fires from the oil production flowlines;
BD Blowdown • jet, or pool fires from the HP and LP production
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion manifolds;
DHSV Down Hole Safety Valve • jet, or pool fire from the HP and LP separators;
ESD Emergency Shutdown • jet, or pool fires from the oil booster pumps;
HP
• jet, or pool fires from the MOL pumps;
High Pressure
• jet fires from the gas injection and gas lift manifolds;
KO Knock Out Drum
• jet, or liquid fires from the test separator;
LER Low Electrical Room • drilling or production blowout at the drilling rig floor
LP Low Pressure or well completions unit;
LQ Living Quarter • Helicopter engine fire during personnel transfer (Not
LV Level Control Valve covered in this study).
MOL Main Oil Line
Riser hazards will form a major fire hazard risk. Potential
MV Master Valve fire hazards arising from risers and options for their
PDQ Production, Drilling and Quarters mitigation are not discussed in this article.
PFD Process Flow Diagram
P&ID Piping and Instrument Diagram
Methodology
PWV Production Wing Valve
General
TEMPSC Totally enclosed motor propelled survival craft The assessment consists of the following steps:
TR Temporary Refuge 1. Fire hazard identification i.e. jet fire, pool fire, etc.,
SBW Stand by Vessel 2. Estimate hydrocarbon inventories based on isolatable
sections (XXVs to XXVs),
XXVS Emerge
3. Define locations and facilities for control and mitigation
using P&IDs, PFDs, Plot plans and other relevant design
details,
Introduction 4. Define characteristic release sizes to be used in the
assessment,
This paper details the result of a case study of fire hazard for 5. Based on the releases described above, define the
a platform comprising living quarters, drilling and process characteristics of jet fires, predict flames’ length and
units (PDQ) which contain significant quantities of oil and decay with time taking into account no-blowdown and
gas. The assessment identifies credible fire hazards associated blowdown conditions,
with production and export operations for the associated 6. Review the effects of jet, pool fire events,
facilities and utilities on the PDQ platform. From the credible 7. Review the fire protection measures in place, based on
fire hazards, specific design fire events can be selected which the above,
define the required performance of the active and passive fire 8. Make recommendations to reduce the risk.
protection systems.
Event Identification
Using a case study, the author demonstrates a systematic fire There are a large number of fire events that could potentially
hazard assessment method and shows how to identify the major occur. These range from small electrical fires to large process
fire hazard areas and management measures for mitigation. fires. The assessment focused on those fire events that could
have a significant effect on the overall risk levels to personnel,
The objectives of this paper are to: either directly or by escalation (i.e. hydrocarbon fires).
• outline a methodology for systematic fire hazard
assessment Accordingly, process and utility systems with an inventory of
• show how all credible fire scenarios can be identified flammable liquids greater than 5m3 and with a flash point below

Page 7 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

Research & Development
55°C are included in the assessment. This cut-off is consistent
with IP15 [1].
Process system
The process flow diagrams with associated XXVs are shown
in figures 614.1 and 614.2. The isolatable process sections
assessed together with their relevant locations, dimensions,
volumes, temperatures and pressures are listed in Table 614.1.
The quantities, pressure and temperature of the relevant
hydrocarbon inventories are taken from PFDs, P&IDs and
relevant equipment data sheets.
Release Scenarios
Four leak sizes (5, 18, 50 & 100 mm) are considered. These
sizes are considered to represent all credible releases due to
failure scenarios.
Jet fire analysis
Each release size (as described in the previous paragraph)
is analysed on the basis of an immediate ignition. For a gas
release, the extent of the flame length is evaluated using the
computer program PHAST [7]. Initial flame length is assessed
at the maximum inventory pressure. Flame decays after the start
of the ESD are assessed for 5, 15, 30 and 60 minutes duration
for Blowdown and no-Blowdown cases.
Oil Releases
Having identified the process inventories it is possible to
estimate the size and duration of the associated release events.
An inventory of less than 5m3 is unlikely to achieve a pool
fire, to cause a BLEVE or provide a fire causing damage to the
structural system which could lead to escalation. Consequently
this study considers releases from sections with a sizeable
inventory (i.e. greater than 5m3). Therefore the following
sections which contain oil are not considered:
• Section 1 - Production well (DHSV-MV) (for each
production well)
• Section 2 - Production well (MV-PWV) (for each
production well)
• Section 5 - Test manifold
Oil release events are only determined for the start of an
event, with the duration of a release being estimated based
on the liquid inventory and assuming the process isolation is
successful.
Oil release calculations have been determined using Bernoulli’s
equation [6]. The liquid release rate is assumed to remain
constant until the liquid inventory has depleted; this is a
simplification and the release rate will decline with the loss
in pressure over time. Releases have been determined for four
hole-sizes 5, 18, 50 and 100mm.
The effect of gas Blowdown which reduces the pressure in
isolatable sections, thus reducing the driving force for any oil
release, has not been accounted for in this study. It is recognised
that this will reduce the release rates, but increase the release
duration.
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The results are detailed in Table 614.2.
Pool Fires
A pool fire is a burning horizontal pool of vaporising
hydrocarbon, where the fuel has very little momentum.
However it should be noted that the fuel pool is not necessarily
static and can spread or contract with respect to the release rate
of the hydrocarbon and its burning rate. A pool fire takes time
to develop and cannot be quickly eliminated by isolating the
fuel supply alone.
The model predicts the duration of the fire and the pool diameter.
The pool of hydrocarbon will reach an equilibrium diameter;
this equilibrium is reached when the fuel release rate is equal
to the burning rate of that particular fuel. Hence the pool will
no longer spread, due to the fuel undergoing combustion at the
same rate as the fuel is supplied to the pool. The fire duration
is taken to be equal to the release duration due to the action of
open drains removing liquid from the forming oil pool. If the
release occurs into an area with a curb surround to the size of
the resulting pool will be physically constrained.
According to pool fire tests carried out [6], the heat flux from a
pool fire to an engulfed target was up to 160kW/m2. The main
trend was that heat fluxes were very low below the hot smoke
layer, increasing to about 160kW/m2 inside the layer.
Most of the potential pool fires will originate from fires
restricted by curbs below vessels and large equipment items
and will have local impinging effects on the equipment and
pipework. However, no directional probability or reduction of
heat flux due to flame diluted on impact to equipment is taken
into account. The pool fire sizes based on the release rates
results are detailed in Tables 614.2 and 614.3.
Location of critical/hazardous equipment
Equipment and piping containing hydrocarbon gas or liquid
are considered as hazardous items. Using plot plans and
PFDs (Figures 614.1 to 614.7) the locations of the items on
each deck are identified and assessed based on their relevant
inventories and time of decays. Similarly target areas that could
cause escalation when subjected to a jet fire are identified and
summarised in Table 614.4.
Identification of Fire Hazards
General
It is necessary to determine those fire events that will have
significant effects on the overall risk levels. The major types
of fires are reviewed below.
The fire types present on the installation are:
• Process events;
• Well events, such as blowouts;
• Chemical Fire;
• Accommodation and electrical fire;
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008
Research & Development
Process Fires
The process and drilling areas of the platforms are subdivided
into fire areas. Escalation of an initial fire or explosion to
adjacent isolatable sections within a fire area is minimised
by control (i.e. isolation and Blowdown) and mitigation (fire
fighting and vessel / structural fire protection) measures.
Well Fires
Due to the large numbers of wells involved and the intention
to carry out simultaneous drilling and production operations,
the likelihood and consequences of events is assessed as part
of this study.
Blow-out
The platform wellbay area includes provision for production
as well as gas and water injection, and cuttings re-injection
wells. This assessment is based on 42 production wells with
6 gas injection wells.
A conventional Christmas tree is provided on each well with
hydraulically actuated master and wing valves. In addition
a hydraulically actuated sub-surface down-hole safety valve
(DHSV) will be installed to provide isolation of each well.
On gas injection wells, down-hole annular safety valves will
be provided, which will enable the annulus to be isolated and
prevent flow of lift gas, or production fluid via the annulus to
the topsides.
There is a potential for blowouts to occur during development
drilling, production and during workover operations on the
wells. A blow-out scenario is the result of loss of well control
and the loss of containment of well and reservoir fluids.
The flow rate from an uncontrolled well blowout and the
potential size of an ignited release means that escalation to
surrounding wellheads is likely, the rig conducting the well
entry operation and plant at weather deck level.
For the purposes of this assessment a conservative estimate of
the blowout rate of 5 times the production rate. Based on a
35,000 barrel a day well this equates to 275kg/s.
Chemical Fires
Based on the guidance IP of Model Code of Safe Practice Part
15, chemicals with flash points greater than 55°C have not been
considered in this assessment. They are classified as Class III
[1], and are handled below their flash points and hence are not
considered as a fire risk.
The only chemical identified with flash point below 55ºC is
methanol. Methanol tank (T-42020) is located on the Cellar
deck. The container volume is about 20m3.
Methanol Fires
The methanol storage tank and injection pumps are located
on the Weather Deck level on PDQ, with the main chemical
injection package. The tank contains approximately 19m3 (at
atmospheric pressure) of methanol. The methanol is injected
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into lines to prevent hydrate formation.
Methanol fire is considered to cause only localised damage if
not controlled and escalation to other areas or impairing the
escape routes is extremely unlikely.
The fire protection arrangements include a mobile trolley
containing alcohol resistance foam to enable local fire fighting
for ignited small spills and hydrant outlets.
Methanol tote tanks are used only for transfer purpose and
each has capacity of approximately 4.5m3. There is a bund
around this area and is provided with a drainage system. The
fire escalation event is considered extremely unlikely.
Accommodation and Electrical Fires
Accommodation fires can arise in the cabins, galley or laundry
areas due to smoking in non-smoking areas, equipment
malfunction or unsafe practices. Electrical fires could result
from equipment malfunction or unsafe practices. However, the
consequences of these fires are greatly reduced by the small
amounts of fire fuel available. Safeguards are specified in-line
with common practice.
Sea Surface Fires
Sea surface fires are only considered feasible following ignition
of a major hydrocarbon release such as failure of a separator,
a well blowout or failure of the oil export line. In extreme
cases these scenarios could result in a sea fire that may exceed
TR survivability times and lead to structural collapse of the
platform.
Small releases from the separators will be collected via drain
boxes and routed via the drain lines to the Open Drains Caisson.
Major releases however will overload the open drain system
and be routed overboard either via the deluge overflow lines or
flowing over the edge of the deck. The open drain and deluge
overflow systems are designed to prevent the discharge of
burning oil.
Inventories and Fire Calculations
Basis for Inventory and Fire Size Calculations
The basis of this assessment concerning the number of wells in
operations and the links to the manifolds are as follows:
• There are 42 well slots that are assumed to be in
operation; 21 are linked to the HP manifold and 21 to
the LP manifold;
• 24 production wells are considered to be aided by gas
lift;
• 6 gas injection wells are in operation;
• 1 well is considered to be linked to the test manifold,
with operation considered to occur all the time.
The inventory of small process units has been estimated based
on typical data. In particular the following estimates have been
made:
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008
Research & Development
• heat exchangers inventories have a nominal volume of
0.5m3;
• pump inventories have a nominal volume of 0.5m3;
• compressor inventories have a nominal volume of
1m3;
• filter inventories have a nominal volume of 0.5m3.
The splits between oil, gas and water for certain vessels have
been estimated based on normal operating conditions. In
particular the separators inventories are taken as oil, gas and
water in a 1:1:1 by volume ratio.
Sections inventories and their locations are summarised in
Table 614.2. The corresponding fire sizes assessments are
listed in Table 614.2.
Flames length calculated for isolation and Blowdown cases
are based upon the isolated inventory being depressurised to
below 7 barg within 15 minutes. BD orifice diameters have
been sized accordingly.
Relevant Safety Systems
Blowdown System
Blowdown system is primarily provided to prevent equipment
from pressure rupture in the event of fire. The design of the
blowdown is to depressurise the hydrocarbon gas inventories
to below 100PSIG (6.9Barg) within 15 minutes. This is in
accordance with API521 design code [3].
To maintain a high reliability and availability on demand for
XXVs and BD system, regular proof testing of all components
within the system must be carried out.
It is also important that the internal leak rates through sea line
XXVs be as low as possible. This study is carried out based on
negligible internal leaks from XXVs and LVs.
Guidelines SI 1029 [4] suggests that an internal leak rate less
than 1kg/min XXVs is considered acceptable. Similarly for LVs
with designated XXVs functions an internal leak rate of less
than 0.3ml/min per inch of pipe ID is suggested as acceptable.
The rates larger than these needs to be justified by a further
fire risk assessment.
Detection/Protection Systems, Emergency Response &
Escape Routes
Detection System
Fire and gas detection system will provide automatic
monitoring, alert personnel of potentially hazardous situations,
and allow executive actions to be manually or automatically
initiated in order to minimise the risk of escalation.
Passive Fire Protection
Passive fire protection is generally applied to platform members
and process equipment with risk of being exposed to a jet fire
which may cause structural failure and where the use of active
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fire protection may be ineffective or not practical.
The fire protection is to be provided to achieve protection
of certain structural steel, fire/blast walls, bulkheads and
equipment in order to:
• prevent further release of inventory due to failure under
fire conditions of selected hydrocarbon carrying vessels
for a specified period;
• prevent structural damage or failure which could lead to
escalation of events or impairment of any safety system
functions for a specified period;
• prevent structural damage or failure, which could lead
to impairment of escape and evacuation, for a specified
period.
• protect the asset such that production can be restarted
following a small fire with minimum delay.
The results of findings from this Fire Hazard Assessment study
summarised in Table 614.4 are utilised to assess PFP design
requirement.
Active fire protection
The deluge systems are generally provided in all process areas.
Deluge is generally used to cool the equipment items to prevent
escalation.
Conclusions
Hydrocarbon inventories based on isolatable sections (i.e.
XXVs to XXVs) were marked on PFDs and plot plans. Potential
fire scenarios were identified. The escalations due to fire were
assessed based on the flames’ length and decay with time. These
decays were based on no blowdown and blowdown cases. The
blowdown orifice diameter for each section was calculated
based on the principle that all isolatable sections can be blown
down to 6.9 barg or less within 15 minutes.
For an ignited gas release, the sections taking the longest time
to decay to unstable or no flame (after a successful blowdown)
are gas dehydration, slug catcher, first stage compression, and
fuel gas dehydration. In all areas after a successful BD the flame
will decay to no or low momentum flame within 15 minutes.
HP vessels at full pressure if exposed to direct jet fire could
rupture within 12 minutes and result in escalation. Stress
analysis studies carried out for vessel rupture when subjected
to a jet fire suggests that the applied stress is lower than the
material yield stress during the whole history of the fire i.e. no
rupture for BD cases. This is due to the fact that:
• vessel is designed with a design stress factor (tensile
strength / yield stress) of 1.5 for carbon steel;
• vessel operates with a margin between the design and
the operating pressures;
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008
Research & Development

• ‘required’ vessel strength falls with time as the vessel

pressure drops due to blowdown considerations.

References
1. IP15, Model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum
Industry, Part 15: Area Classification Code for
Petroleum Installations
2. Oreda-1994
3. API 521Guide for Pressure Relieving and Depressurising
Systems
4. Guidance notes in support of the offshore installations
(emergency pipeline valve) Regulation 1989:SI 1029,
Pub. Dept Energy
5. ANSI B16-104-1976
6. SINTEF, Handbook for Fire Calculation and Fire Risk
Assessment in the Process Industry, 1992
7. PHAST, DNV Software for consequence analyses

Acknowledgements
Any resemblance of the case study in this paper is coincidental
and it does not represent any existing of planned installation.
However, data from actual projects are used to make the case
study relevant to the safety professionals. The Tables were
prepared by Dr R. Atarzadeh and drawings were produced by
Stan Burgess whose contributions are gratefully acknowledged.
The author would like to acknowledge reviewers Guillaume

For further information, please contact:

Sirous Yasseri
KBR Engineering

T: +44 (0) 1372 865226

F: +44 (0) 1372 865114
E: Sirous.yasseri@kbr.com

Page 11 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

 Page 12 Table:614.1: Section Inventories

Research & Development

Section Section Equipment Location Dimensions Volume Contents (m3) Pressure Temperature
No. Description (m3) Gas Oil Water (barg) (°C)
1 Production well Conductor Subsea to Wellbay 6” pipe (50m long) 0.9 0.6 0.3 60 43
(DHSV-MV) TOTAL 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.0
2 Production Well Wellhead Mezzanine to Deck Note 2 60 43
(MV-PWV) TOTAL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 HP Manifold/ Flowlines Cellar Deck 21 lengths of 6” pipe (5m 2.0 1.4 0.6 60 43
Separators long)
HP manifold Cellar Deck 20” pipe (30m long) 6.1 4.3 1.8 60 43
HP separator (V-21110) Weather Deck 12m x 3.4m 108.9 36.3 36.3 36.3 60 43
(Note 4) HP separator (V-21210) Weather Deck 12m x 3.4m 108.9 36.3 36.3 36.3 60 43
Test Separator (V-13010) Weather Deck 9m x 2.1m 31.2 10.4 10.4 10.4 60 43
18” Wet Gas Line Weather Deck 18” pipe (80m long) 13.3 13.3 0.0 0.0 60 43
Gas pipeline pig launcher (V-36010) Mezzanine/Weather Deck Note 1
TOTAL 270.4 102.0 85.4 83.0
4 LP Manifold/ Flowlines Cellar Deck 21 lengths of 6” pipe (5m 1.9 0.7 1.2 25 32
Separators long)
LP manifold Cellar Deck 16” pipe (30m long) 3.9 1.5 2.4 25 32
LP separator (V-21120) Weather Deck 15m x 3.8m 170.1 56.7 56.7 56.7 25 32
(Note 4) LP separator (V-21220) Weather Deck 15m x 3.8m 170.1 56.7 56.7 56.7 25 32
TOTAL 346.0 115.6 117.0 113.4
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

5 Test manifold Flowlines Cellar Deck 1 length of 6” pipe (5m 0.1 0.1 0.0 60 43
long)
Test Manifold Cellar Deck 8” pipe (30m long) 1.0 0.7 0.3 60 43
TOTAL 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.0
6 Flash gas Flash gas suction drum (V-31110) Weather Deck 1.7m x 3.6m 8.2 8.2 24 42
compression Flash gas compressor (C-31121) Weather Deck 1.0 1.0 24 42
(Train 1)
Flash gas comp. discharge. cooler Weather Deck 0.5 0.5 59 125
(X-31140)
TOTAL 9.7 9.7 0.0 0.0
7 Flash Flash gas suction drum (V-31210) Weather Deck 1.7m x 3.6m 8.2 8.2 24 42
compression Flash gas compressor (C-31221) Weather Deck 1.0 1.0 24 42
(Train 2)
Flash gas comp. discharge. cooler Weather Deck 0.5 0.5 59 125
(X-31240)
TOTAL 9.7 9.7 0.0 0.0
 Table 614.1: Section Inventories (continued)

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Page 13
Section Section Equipment Location Dimensions Volume Contents (m3) Pressure Temperature
No. Description (m3) Gas Oil Water (barg) (˚C)
8 Oil export MOL pump (P-24120) Cellar Deck 0.5 0.5 25 43
MOL pump (P-24220) Cellar Deck 0.5 0.5 25 43
Oil booster pump (P-24110) Cellar Deck 0.5 0.5 30 42
Oil booster pump (P-24210) Cellar Deck 0.5 0.5 30 42
GUEST Platform oil pipeline pig Mezzanine Deck Note 1
receiver (V-20010)
Oil pipeline pig launcher (V-24080) Mezzanine Deck Note 1
Process line Cellar/Mezzanine Deck 30” pipe (30m long) 3.8 3.8 30 42
TOTAL 5.8 0.0 5.8 0.0
9 Gas lift manifold Flowline Mezzanine Deck 20 lengths of 3”pipe 0.5 0.5 150 45
(5m long)
Gas lift manifold/connection Mezzanine Deck 6” pipe (100m long) 1.8 1.8 150 45
TOTAL 2.3 2.3
10 Gas lift (PWV- Conductor Subsea to Wellbay Annulus 5-6” pipe (50m 0.3 0.3 150 45
DHSV) long)
TOTAL 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
11 Gas injection Gas injection manifold/connection Mezzanine Deck 20” pipe (170m long) 34 34 0 0 380 45
manifold TOTAL 34 34
12 Gas slug catcher From neighbouring platforms Cellar Deck 3m x 9m 41.7 71.7 53 25
(PWV-MV)
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

TOTAL 41.7 71.7 0.0 0.0

13 Gas injection Conductor Subsea to Wellbay 6” pipe (50m long) 0.9 0.9 380 45
(MV-DHSV) TOTAL 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0

14 PDQ fuel gas Fuel gas KO drum (V-48010) Cellar Deck 2.1m x 5.5m 19.0 19. 57.3 43
Fuel gas heater (EEH-48020) Cellar Deck 0.5 0.5 57.3 43
Fuel gas heater (EEH-48030) Cellar Deck 0.5 0.5 57.3 43
TOTAL 20.0 20.0 0.0 0.0

Notes for Table 614.1:

Note 1: This equipment is normally isolated during operation; hence is not considered further in this Fire Risk Assessment
Note 2: The inventory of this item is small; hence is not considered further.
Note 3: The sections 1, 2 and 5 are based on the system being tied to a HP well.
Note 4: Inventory for a separator release is total of “separator”, “manifold” etc.; inventory available for a manifold release is restricted to “manifolds” and “flow lines”
 Page 14 Table 614.2: Gas Release Rates/Flame Lengths

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Section Section Description Case Hole size Release Rate (kg/s) at Time (min) Flame Length (m) at Time (min)
No. (mm) 0 5 15 60 0 5 15 60
3 HP manifold/separators Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.18 0.09 0.02 - 7.5 5.5 2.8 -
Total inventory = 270.4m3 18 2.32 0.95 0.17 - 23.4 15.7 7.3 -
Gas - 6,000kg
Oil - 70,000kg 50 17.9 2.02 - - 58.0 22.0 - -
Water - 80,000kg 100 71.6 - - - 107.4 - - -
P at start = 60 bara Isolation and No 5 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.15 7.5 7.5 7.3 6.9
Temp = 43 Deg.C Blowdown 18 2.32 1.91 1.29 0.23 23.4 21.4 18.0 8.4
50 17.9 3.98 - - 58.0 29.7 - -
100 71.6 - - - 107.4 - - -
4 LP manifold/separators Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.08 0.05 0.02 - 5.2 4.2 2.8 -
Total inventory = 346m3 18 1.07 0.62 0.2 - 16.6 13.0 7.9 -
Gas - 2,400kg
Oil - 96,000kg 50 8.22 1.84 - - 41.0 21.1 - -
Water - 110,000kg 100 32.9 - - - 76.0 - - -
210,000K Isolation and No 5 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 5.2 5.2 5.2 4.9
P at start = 25 bara Blowdown
Temp = 32 Deg.C 18 1.07 0.93 0.7 0.2 16.6 15.6 13.7 7.9
50 8.22 2.79 - - 41.0 25.4 - -
100 32.9 - - - 76.0 - - -
6 Flash gas compression (Train1) Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.08 0.04 0.02 - 5.2 3.8 2.8 -
Inventory = 9.7m3 = 190kg 18 1.01 0.13 - - 16.1 6.5 - -
P at start = 24 bara
50 7.78 - - - 40.0 - - -
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

Temp = 42 Deg.C
100 31.1 - - - 74.1 - - -
Isolation and No 5 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.02 5.2 4.9 4.2 2.8
Blowdown 18 1.01 0.19 - - 16.1 7.7 - -
50 7.78 - - - 40.0 - - -
100 31.1 - - - 74.1 - - -
Page 15 Table 614.2: Gas Release Rates/Flame Lengths (continued)

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Section Section Description Case Hole Size Release Rate (kg/s) at Time (min) Flame Length (m) at Time (min)
No. (mm) 0 5 15 30 60 0 5 15 30 60
7 Flash gas compression Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.08 0.04 0.02 - 5.2 3.8 2.8 -
(Train 2) 18 1.01 0.13 - - - 16.1 6.5 - -
Inventory = 9.7m3 =
190Kg 50 7.78 - - - 40.0 - - -
P at start = 24 bara 100 31.1 - - - 74.1 - - -
Temp = 42 Deg.C Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.02 5.2 4.9 4.2 2.8
18 1.01 0.19 - - 16.1 7.7 - -
50 7.78 - - - 40.0 - - -
100 31.1 - - - 74.1 - - - -
9 Gas lift manifold Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.45 0.088 - - - 10.6 4.82 - - -
Inventory = 2.3m3 = 18 5.78 - - - - 36 - - - -
300Kg
P at start = 150 bara 50 44.6 - - - - 95.8 - - - -
Temp = 45 Deg.C 100 178 - - - - 186.0 - - -
Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.45 0.6 0.08 - - 10.6 8.1 4.9 - -
18 5.78 - - - - 36.0 - - - -
50 44.6 - - - - 95.8 - - - -
100 178 - - - - 186 - - - -
11 Gas injection manifold Isolation and Blowdown 5 1.13 0.29 - - - 16.4 8.5 - - -
Inventory = 34m3 = 18 14.5 2.4 - - - 55.9 24 - - -
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

9600 Kg
P at start = 380 bara 50 112 - - - - 149 - - - -
Temp = 45 Deg. C 100 452 - - - - 291 - - - -
Isolation and No Blowdown 5 1.13 1.12 1 0.9 0.73 16.4 15.5 15 14 12
18 14.5 9.05 3.5 0.84 - 55.9 44.7 28.2 14.8 -
50 112 - - - - 149 - - - -
100 452 - - - - 291 - - - -
12 Slug Catcher on Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.16 0.08 0.02 - - 7.4 5.4 3.0 - -
the neighbouring 18 2.11 0.74 0.1 - - 23.5 14.9 7.0 - -
platforms
Inventory = 41.7m3 = 50 16.4 - - - - 58.3 - - - -
2072Kg 100 65.1 - - - - 106 - - - -
P = 53 bara Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.16 0.154 0.15 1.38 0.113 7.4 7.3 7.1 6.7 6.3
Temp = 25 deg. C
18 2.11 1.44 0.69 0.21 - 23.5 20.0 14.5 8.9 -
50 16.4 - - - - 58.3 - - - -
100 65.1 - - - - 106 - - - -
 Page 16 Table 614.2: Gas Release Rates/Flame Lengths (continued)

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Section Section Description Case Hole Size Release Rate (kg/s) at Time (min) Flame Length (m) at Time (min)
No. (mm)
0 5 15 30 60 0 5 15 30 60
14 Fuel gas system for Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.17 0.08 0.02 - 7.3 5.2 2.8 -
the installation use 18 2.23 0.48 - - 23.0 11.6 - -
50 17.2 - - - 57.0 - - -
100 68.8 - - - 105.5 - - -
Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.08 7.3 7.1 6.7 5.2
18 2.23 0.99 0.2 - 23.0 16.0 7.9 -
50 17.2 - - - 57.0 - - -
100 68.8 - - - 105.5 - - -
15 Gas dehydration Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.173 0.036 0.017 - - 6.7 3.1 2.2 - -
Cellar Deck 18 2.2 0.86 0.126 - - 22.6 14.4 5.72 - -
Inventory = 84.1m3 =
4000Kg 50 17.3 - - - - 60.8 - - - -
P at start = 58 bara 100 69.2 - - - - 118.0 - - - -
Temp = 43 Deg.C Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.173 0.173 0.165 0158 0.145 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.1
18 2.2 1.85 1.26 0.69 0.222 22.6 20.8 17.3 13.0 7.5
50 17.3 3.97 - - - 60.8 31.0 - - -
100 69.2 - - - - 118.0 - - - -
15a 18” Wet Gas pipe Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.17 0.075 7.6 5.3 2.6 - -
from PDQ Across 18 2.2 0.32 - - 24 10.5 - - -
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

Bridge to Cellar Deck

Inventory = 13.3m3 = 50 17.3 - - - - 60 - - - -
663Kg 100 69.2 - - - - 110 - - - -
P = 58 bara Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.05 7.6 6.7 6.3 5.4 4.4
T = 43 Deg.C
18 2.2 0.56 - - - 24 13.3 - - -
50 17.3 - - - - 60 - - - -
100 69.2 - - - - 110 - - - -
16 GUEST Platform gas Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.078 0.2 - - - 4.55 2.4 - - -
slug catcher 18 1.0 0.13 - - - 15.5 5.8
Weather Deck
Inventory = 63.60m3 = 50 7.7 - - - - 41 - - - -
3046Kg 100 30 - - - - 79 - - - -
P at start = 25 bara Isolation and No Blowdown 0.078 0.078 0.076 0.073 0.069 0.062 4.55 4.5 4.3 4.1 3.8
Temp = 21 Deg.C
18 1.0 0.78 0.48 0.22 0.045 15.5 13.7 10.9 7.5 3.5
50 7.7 1.16 - - - 41 16.5 - - -
100 30 - - - - 79 - - - -
Page 17 Table 614.2: Gas Release Rates/Flame Lengths (continued)

Research & Development

Section Section Description Case Hole Size Release Rate (kg/s) at Time (min) Flame Length (m) at Time (min)
No. (mm)
0 5 15 30 60 0 5 15 30 60
st
16A 1 stage comp. suction Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.171 0.08 0.016 - - 6.6 4.6 2.0 - -
scrubber V-37110 18 2.22 0.57 - - - 22.7 11.8 - - -
Inventory= 26.7m3 =
1280Kg 50 17.2 - - - - 60.5 - - -
Weather deck 100 68.6 - - - - 117.6 - - - -
Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.171 0.168 0.15 0.128 0.098 6.6 6.6 6.3 5.7 5.2
18 2.22 1.22 0.37 - - 22.7 17.0 9.6 - -
50 17.2 - - - - 60.5 - - - -
100 68.6 - - - - 117.6 - - - -
16B 1st stage comp. suction Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.171 0.08 0.016 - - 6.6 4.6 2.0 - -
scrubber v-37210 18 2.22 0.57 - - - 22.7 11.8 - - -
Inventory= 26.7m3 =
1280Kg 50 17.2 - - - - 60.5 - - - -
Weather deck 100 68.6 - - - - 117.6 - - - -
Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.171 0.168 0.15 0.128 0.098 6.6 6.6 6.3 5.7 5.2
18 2.22 1.22 0.37 - - 22.7 17.0 9.6 - -
50 17.2 - - - - 60.5 - - - -
100 68.6 - - - - 117.6 - - - -
17 GUEST Platform gas Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.08 0.046 0.017 - - 4.6 3.5 2.2 - -
compression
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

18 1.00 0.34 - - - 15.48 9.2 - - -

Cellar Deck
Inventory = 24.3m3 = 50 7.73 - - - - 41.3 - - - -
640Kg 100 30.9 - - - - 30.9 - - - -
P at start = 25 bara Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.08 0.073 0.066 0.057 0.042 4.6 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.4
Temp = 21 Deg.C
18 1.00 0.530 0.146 - - 15.48 11.4 6.1 - -
50 7.73 - - - - 41.3 - - - -
100 30.9 - - - - 30.9 - - - -
18 Second stage Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.996 0.164 - - - 15.5 6.5 - - -
compression (Train 1) 18 12.9 - - - - 53.0 - - - -
Inventory = 1.5m3 =
425Kg 50 99.6 - - - - 141 - - - -
P at start = 381 bara 100 398 - - - - 274 - - - -
Temp = 138 Deg.C Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.996 0.381 0.057 15.5 9.7 3.9 - -
18 12.9 - - - - 53.0 - - - -
50 99.6 - - - - 141 - - - -
100 398 - - - - 274 - - - -
 Page 18 Table 614.2: Gas Release Rates/Flame Lengths (continued)

Research & Development

Section Section Description Case Hole Size Release Rate (kg/s) at Time (min) Flame Length (m) at Time (min)
No. (mm)
0 5 15 30 60 0 5 15 30 60
19 Second Stage Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.996 0.164 - - - 15.5 6.5 - - -
compression (Train 2) 18 12.9 - - - - 53.0 - - -
Inventory = 1.5m3 =
425kg 50 99.6 - - - - 141 - - - -
P at start = 381 bara 100 398 - - - - 274 - - - -
Temp = 138 Deg.C Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.996 0.381 0.057 - - 15.5 9.7 3.9 - -
18 12.9 - - - - 53.0 - - - -
50 99.6 - - - - 141 - - - -
100 398 - - - - 274 - - - -
20 Fuel gas system Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.171 0.078 0.016 - - 6.6 4.6 2.1 - -
Cellar Deck 18 2.21 0.57 - - - 22.7 11.8 - - -
Inventory=26.7m3 =
1200Kg 50 17.1 - - - - 60.5 - - - -
P at start = 57.3 bara 100 68.3 - - - - 117.5 - - - -
Temp = 43 Deg. C Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.171 0.162 0.150 0.127 0.0966 6.6 6.5 6.2 5.75 5.0
18 2.21 1.21 0.354 - - 22.7 - - - -
50 17.1 - - - - 60.5 - - - -
100 68.3 - - - - 117.5 - - - -
21 First stage Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.171 0.083 0.019 - - 6.6 4.7 2.3 - -
compression
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

18 2.22 0.99 0.19 - - 22.7 15.4 7.0 - -

(Trains 3/4)
50 17.1 3.93 - - - 60.5 30.0 - - -
3
Inventory = 171.4m = 100 68.5 - - - - 117.5 - - - -
8200Kg Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.171 0.171 0.170 0.163 0.158 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.4
P at start = 57.3 bara
Temp = 41 Deg.C 18 2.22 2.0 1.70 1.26 0.73 22.7 21.6 20 17.3 13.3
50 17.1 8.3 1.91 - - 60.5 42.7 21.1 - -
100 68.5 3.72 - - - 117.5 29.1 - - -
22 Second stage Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.996 0.098 - - - 15.5 5.1 - - -
compression (Train 3) 18 12.9 - - - - 53.0 - - - -

Inventory = 1.5m3 = 50 99.6 - - - - 141 - - - -

420Kg 100 398 - - - - 274 - - - -
P at start = 381 bara Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.996 0.381 0.057 - - 15.5 9.7 3.9 - -
Temp = 138 Deg.C
18 12.9 - - - - 53.0 - - - -
50 99.6 - - - - 141 - - - -
100 398 - - - - 274 - - - -
 Table 614.2: Gas Release Rates/Flame Lengths (continued)

Research & Development

Page 19
Section Section Description Case Hole Size Release Rate (kg/s) at Time (min) Flame Length (m) at Time (min)
No. (mm)
0 5 15 30 60 0 5 15 30 60
23 Second Stage Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.996 0.098 - - - 15.5 5.1 - - -
compression (Train 4) 18 12.9 - - - - 53.0 - - -
Inventory = 1.5m3 =
420Kg 50 99.6 - - - - 141 - - - -
P at start = 381 bara 100 398 - - - - 274 - - - -
Temp = 138 Deg.C Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.996 0.381 0.057 - - 15.5 9.7 3.9 - -
18 12.9 - - - - 53.0 - - - -
50 99.6 - - - - 141 - - - -
100 398 - - - - 274 - - - -
25a Gas export Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.17 0.071 0.013 - - 6.6 4.3 1.9 - -
compression, suction 18 2.2 0.71 - - - 22.7 13.1 - - -
scrubber
Inventory=27m3 = 50 17.1 - - - - 60.5 - - - -
1190Kg 100 68.2 - - - - 117.0 - - - -
P at start = 49.7 bara Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.13 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.2 5.8
Temp = 17 Deg. C
This is a future 18 2.2 1.21 0.897 0.353 - 22.7 17.0 14.7 9.4 -
addition, data taken 50 17.1 1.64 - - - 60.5 19.6 - - -
from design 100 68.2 - - - - 117.0 - - - -
25b Gas export Isolation and Blowdown 5 0.17 0.071 0.013 - - 6.6 4.3 1.9 - -
compression 18 2.2 0.71 - - - 22.7 13.1 - - -
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

Inventory = 2.0m3 = 50 17.1 - - - - 60.5 - - - -

167Kg 100 68.2 - - - - 117.0 - - - -
P at start = 107.9 bara Isolation and No Blowdown 5 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.13 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.2 5.8
Temp = 85 Deg.C
This is a future 18 2.2 1.21 0.897 0.353 - 22.7 17.0 14.7 9.4 -
addition, data taken 50 17.1 1.64 - - - 60.5 19.6 - - -
from design 100 68.2 - - - - 117.0 - - - -
U1 HP Flare Drum Isolation and Blowdown 5
Inventory = 84.8m3 18
P at a start = 6.3 bara
Temp = 21 Deg.C 50
100
Isolation and No Blowdown 5
18
50
100
 Page 20

Research & Development

Table 614.3: Oil Release Rates

Section No. Section Hole size (mm) Release Rate (kg/s) Duration (s) Pool Fire Diameter (m) Pool Fire Location
Description
3 HP manifold/ 5 1.17 60000 3.7 Weather Deck
separators
(release assumed 18 15.17 4600 13.3 Weather Deck
to occur from the
separators)
50 117.04 600 22.1/39 Weather Deck/Sea Surface

100 468.17 150 22.1/40 Weather Deck/ Sea Surface

4 LP manifold/ 5 0.71 120000 3.1 Weather Deck

separators
(release assumed 18 9.19 9300 11.1 Weather Deck
to occur from the
separators)
50 70.88 1200 22.1/39 Weather Deck/Sea Surface

100 283.53 300 22.1/78 Weather Deck/Sea Surface

8 Oil export 5 0.84 Note 1 4.4 Sea Surface

18 10.83 Note 1 15.7 Sea Surface

FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

50 83.59 Note 1 43.5 Sea Surface

100 334.35 Note 1 87.0 Sea Surface

Well Blowout 275 (Note 2) Continuous 78 Wellheads/Sea Surface

Notes for Table 614.3:

Note 1: When section is isolated and the pumps stop, the driving force for liquid releases will be the effect of the crude degassing as pressure drops and the effect of gravity, depending
on the location of the release in the system.
Note 2: Blowout flow-rate is based on 5 times the production rate of 35,000 bpd.
 Table 614.4: Hazard Escalation & Management
Page 21

Research & Development

Location Event Description
PDQ/MOL Pump Module 1. Jet/spray/running liquid fire
from oil booster pumps to sea.
2. Jet/spray/running liquid fire
from GUEST Platform 24” oil pig
receiver to sea.
3. Jet/spray/running liquid fire
from closed drains/flare drum to
sea.
4. Jet/spray/running liquid fire
from MOL pumps to sea.
Consequences
Escalation from the oil booster pumps, MOL
pumps or closed drains / flare drum may occur
if the fire can spread to adjacent pumps, plant or
pipework prior to ESD occurring.
Liquid fallout will spill through the grated deck to
sea level and may form a substantial sea fire.
A fire in the MOL pump module may impair the
direct north face egress route to the TR and may
impair the link bridge landing area with heat,
smoke and flame making egress from CP to the
TR impossible.
Escalation of a jet / spray fire from the MOL pump reduce the effects of smoke, heat and flame to plant, structure and personnel.
module to adjacent plant or the manifold module
is possible, in particular if the release is orientated Liquid hydrocarbon will spill through the grated deck to sea level. Potential
east into the manifold module.
Hazard Management Measures
If the F&G and ESD systems function effectively as intended and isolation
and blowdown of the plant are achieved, then escalation between plant in the
MOL pump module and beyond the MOL pump module is less likely.
If burning oil from an oil booster pump or MOL pump fire or from the closed
drains drum is able to spill to sea, a sea fire is possible. But, the available
inventory prior to ESD operating is not considered sufficient to generate
additional escalation paths to the jacket, risers or conductors.
Escalation from the pig receiver is unlikely as the unit is usually empty and
isolated from hydrocarbons. Any activity on the unit requires permit approval
and safety procedures in place.
Firewater application can be used to deluge the general process area and
pool fire sizes will be limited to the plan area of the drip trays situated beneath
the vessels. Firewater application should be sufficient to quench or control a
liquids fire at cellar deck level.

PDQ Manifold Module 1. Jet/spray/running liquid fire The size and containment pressure of the Operation of the F&G and ESD systems functioning effectively as intended
from HP production manifold to inventory within the production manifolds and isolating the plant is critical to the integrity of the platform due to the
sea. provides the opportunity for pressurised jet or inventories available. The ESD system must isolate the manifolds rapidly to
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

2. Jet/spray/running liquid fire
from LP production manifold to
sea.
3. Jet fire from gas injection
manifold to sea.
4. Jet fire from gas lift manifold
to sea.
spray releases. Escalation between manifolds is prevent substantial liquid inventories spraying onto adjacent equipment and
likely given the immediate proximity and density spilling through to sea to form a sea surface fire.
of plant and flowlines in the manifold area.
If a jet fire is directed westerly, the fire will extend
into the MOL pump module from the manifold
module. If the release is easterly the fire will
extend into the wellbay area.

Liquid fallout from a production manifold will

spill through to the sea below and may generate a
substantial sea fire unless the liquid inventory can
be quickly isolated.
 Page 22 Table 614.4: Hazard Escalation & Management (continued)
Location Event Description
PDQ/Wellbay 1. Jet fire from gas injection
flowline to production manifold.
2. Jet/spray/running liquid fire
from oil production flowlines to
sea.
3. Spray/running liquid fire from
methanol storage tank to sea.
PDQ/Wellbay (Continued)
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008
Research & Development
Consequences Hazard Management Measures
Escalation between wellheads is possible given the The wellheads should provide inherent fire resistance to API standards,
immediate proximity and density of neighbouring coupled with operation of the DHSV, wing and upper master valves sufficient
wellheads and production flowlines in the wellbay. to prevent loss of containment from flame impact.
Burning liquid fallout from the wellheads will Operation of the F&G and ESD systems functioning effectively as intended
spill through to the sea to form a substantial sea and isolating the wellheads is critical to the integrity of the platform due to the
surface fire unless the liquid inventory can be inventories available.
quickly isolated.
Vertical escalation upward into the Weather deck area is considered unlikely if
Escalation from a wellhead fire directed west the sections are isolated and blowdown, as fires will not have sufficient size /
into the adjacent manifold module is likely duration to punch through deck.
given the extent of potential releases. The risk
of escalation is significantly increased if more Wellhead access hatches and the deck itself should provide sufficient
than one wellhead is involved. The fire may also resistance for all identified dropped object loads from drilling, well
penetrate up to the Weather Deck area depending completion and platform crane operations.
on the deck hatch arrangements above the
wellheads. If the drilling rig or well completions A release orientated east into the drilling utilities module is mitigated by a fire
unit are operating over the wellheads the fire may rated divisions between the wellbay and drilling utilities module on gridline 4.
also escalate into the drilling rig floor or well
completions unit floor. As methanol is soluble in water standard platform firewater deluge should be
sufficient to extinguish a pool fire contained in the drip tray beneath the tank.
Excessive methanol spillage will spill through the grated deck to sea.
If a jet fire is directed westerly the fire may extend
into the manifold module. If the release is easterly
the fire may extend into the drilling utilities
module. If a jet fire is directed vertically upwards
the underside of the Weather Deck may deflect the
flame laterally east and west into both adjacent
modules.
Escalation from the methanol storage and pumps
is not considered credible with the fire localised
to the package skid. Methanol is soluble in water,
hence a spillage to sea presents no serious safety
issues.
Burning oil from a wellhead will spill to sea
level prior to the ESD operating. In this instance
additional event paths are available, including a
substantial sea surface fire. A sea surface fire may
impair launching of the PDQ TEMPSC and may
impair the stability of the jacket after a time.
Page 23 Table 614.4: Hazard Escalation & Management (continued)

Research & Development

Location Event Description Consequences Hazard Management Measures
PDQ/ 1. Base oil storage tank fire. Escalation from the base oil storage tank or oil drill If the F&G and ESD systems function effectively as
Drilling Utilities Module 2. Oil drill cuttings re-injection tank fire. cuttings re-injection tank is unlikely as the materials intended, then escalation beyond the module housing
3. Spray/running liquid fire from diesel storage and are low hazard and a high energy ignition source is these tanks is unlikely.
distribution to sea. required.
4. Non-hydrocarbon chemical injection skid fire.
Escalation from the diesel distribution and storage
system is unlikely as the diesel is a low hazard
material and a high energy ignition source is required.

No high energy ignition sources are identified in the

drilling utilities module. Diesel will form a serious fire
hazard only if a preceding event tank releases large
quantities of diesel onto a high energy ignition source
such as an existing fire.

Escalation from the chemical injection package is

not considered credible with the fire localised to the
package skid. But the burning chemicals may present
a toxic hazard to personnel egressing along the north
face of PDQ.

Switchgear Room and 1. Pool fire from emergency generator diesel day tank. There are no escalation paths identified for the Appropriate fire detection and protection systems are
LER 2. Electrical fire in electrical switchgear room, LER or emergency generator diesel day tank as the inventory provided in electrical switchroom, LER and workshop
workshop. is small and the deck is plated in this module. using CO2 or powder fire extinguishers, to respond
immediately to a fire and limit escalation.
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

Electrical fires are unlikely to escalate beyond the

equipment where the fire occurs, or beyond the Fixtures and fittings are specified as non-combustible.
compartment in which the equipment is housed.
But the damage to critical service equipment could
escalate a small localised fire into a full production
shutdown.

Utilities 1. Pool fire from fire pump diesel day tank. There are no escalation paths identified for the fire
Module pump diesel day tank as the inventory is small and the
deck is plated in this module.
Living Quarters 1. Cooking related fire in galley. Fires in the living quarters are unlikely to escalate Appropriate fire detection and protection systems are
2. Fixtures and fittings fire in accommodation cabins beyond the compartment where the fire occurs. provided in all compartments, in particular the galley,
and offices. storerooms and cabins, and in common passageways
3. Chemicals related fire in stores. or compartments using fire extinguishers, to respond
immediately to a compartment fire and limit
escalation.
 Page 24 Table 614.4: Hazard Escalation & Management (continued)
Location Event Description
Power Generation 1. Jet fire from main power
generators.
Drill Support Offices 1. Fixtures and fittings fire in
drilling support offices.
Drill Derrick and well 1. Shallow gas blowout at drilling
completions unit rig drill floor.
2. Production blowout at well
completions rig floor.
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008
Consequences
Fires involving the main power generators are
not expected to escalate beyond the generator
skid given the size of the available fuel inventory
and the isolation of the generator sets from
surrounding plant. However the LQ is directly
exposed to a fire from the main power generators.
The impact to the operation of the PDQ from
the loss of one main generator set due to a small
localised fire could cause a production shutdown
of the platform.
A fire in a main power generator may prevent
egress using the northern or southern egress routes
at Weather Deck level.
Fires in the drilling support offices are unlikely to
escalate beyond the compartment where the fire
occurs.
A blowout scenario is the result of loss of well
control and the loss of containment of well and
reservoir fluids.
The flowrate from an uncontrolled well blowout
and the potential size of an ignited release means
that escalation is likely to surrounding wellheads,
the rig conducting the well entry operation and
plant at weather deck level. A blowout may impair
the LQ, TR and link bridge.
Research & Development
Hazard Management Measures
Operation of the F&G and ESD systems functioning effectively as intended and
isolating the plant is critical to prevent escalation of a localised power generator
skid fire to the adjacent power generator and to prevent direct impingement of
flame onto the LQ.
Turbine fires can be mitigated using water mist.
Well crews who cannot evacuate to the TR using the northern or southern egress
routes at Weather Deck level can descend to cellar deck level using the stairway at
the west end of PDQ and enter the TR from this deck level shielded by the Weather
Deck above.
Heat and smoke detection in all compartments and passageways. CO2 or powder
fire extinguishers provided to allow immediate response to a compartment fire and
limit escalation.
As the blowout is a result of loss of well control, mitigation measures centre on
evacuating personnel from the installation as quickly as possible.
Firewater application can be used to deluge the drilling rig floor and general
wellbay area to reduce the effects of smoke, heat and flame to plant, structure and
personnel.
Prior to the blowout occurring, sufficient well kill fluid should always be available
to prevent loss of control of the well, with well control mechanisms specified for
the full wellhead pressure.
Northern and southern egress routes provide direct escape to the LQ and TR for
the well crews, Weather Deck crew, crane operators and technicians at Weather
Deck level. Personnel can also make their way down to cellar deck level using the
northern and southern stairways at the west end of PDQ where they can access the
TR is provided with H60 rated on sides and upper level and at this level is shielded
by the Weather Deck above
 Table 614.4: Hazard Escalation & Management (continued)
Page 25
Location Event Description
Separator Module 1. Jet/spray/running liquid fire from HP production
separators.
2. Jet/spray/running liquid fire from LP production
separators.
3. Jet/spray/running liquid fire from test separator to sea.
Flash Gas 1. Jet fire from flash gas suction drum.
Compressor Area 2. Jet fire from flash gas compressor.
3. Jet/spray/running liquid fire from Sangachal oil
export pig launcher to sea.
FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008
4. Jet fire from GUEST Platform gas export launcher.
5. Jet fire from fuel gas KO drum.
6. Jet fire from fuel gas heaters.
Helideck 4. Helicopter engine fire during personnel transfer.
Consequences
The size and containment pressure of the inventory
within the separators (HP and LP) provides the
opportunity for pressurised jet or spray releases, or pool
fires. Escalation between separators is likely given the
immediate proximity of neighbouring vessels, from a
spreading oil pool beneath the vessels, or from direct
flame impingement from a jet or spray fire.
A burning oil pool can spill over the extremities of
the separator deck into lower areas of the platform, in
particular the MOL pump and manifold modules. The
link bridge or bridge landing area may also be exposed
to burning oil from the separators raining down and
preventing evacuation across the link bridge.
The drilling utilities module and flash gas compressor
area and northern crane pedestal are also exposed to
direct flame impingement from a separator fire.
Escalation of a jet/spray fire from the flash gas
compressor or flash gas suction drum to adjacent plant
or the separator module is possible, in particular if the
release is orientated east into the separator module.
Personnel injury if helicopter crashes onto helideck or
occupants trapped in helicopter.
Research & Development
Hazard Management Measures
Operation of the F&G and ESD systems functioning
effectively as intended and isolating and blowing down
the plant is critical to prevent escalation between the
separators and beyond the separator area. If significant
oil inventories are released these can spill into the lower
areas of the platform impairing egress routes and the
link bridge landing area.
The separator deck is designed with a curb surround to
capture and drain the contents of at least one separator
combined with the flowrate of the firewater system in
the separator module.
Deluge can be used to control jet/spray fires and quench
pool fires. Fire extinguishers should be used for small
leakage fires only.
A separator release orientated east towards the drilling
derrick is mitigated by the fire rated barrier between the
separator module and the drilling derrick on gridline
M2.
If the F&G and ESD systems function effectively as
intended and isolation and blowdown of the plant is
achieved, then escalation between plant in the flash gas
compressor area and beyond the flash gas compressor
area is less likely.
Escalation from the pig launchers is unlikely as the units
are usually empty and isolated from hydrocarbons. Any
activity on the units requires permit approval and safety
procedures in place.
The helideck will be manned during helicopter landing
and take off by a helicopter landing officer and at least
two firemen manning the helideck firewater systems.
Firewater monitors with foam application capability
can be used to smother a helicopter fire and the area
immediately around the helicopter and across the
helideck. Firewater hoses can be used to supplement the
operation of the monitors.
Helideck is protected by wheeled CO2 and powder
extinguisher system at each exit.
Research & Development

Figure 614.1

Page 26 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

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Figure 614.2

Page 27 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

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Figure 614.3

Page 28 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

 Figure 614.4

Page 29 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

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Figure 614.5

Page 30 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008

 Figure 614.6

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Figure 614.7

Page 32 FABIG Newsletter Issue 50 - April 2008