Urban Green Commons Insights On Urban Co

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JGEC-1118; No. of Pages 13
Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx
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Global Environmental Change

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha
Urban green commons: Insights on urban common property systems

Johan Colding a,b,*, Stephan Barthel a,b,c, Pim Bendt a, Robbert Snep d, Wim van der Knaap e,
Henrik Ernstson b,f
a
The Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Box 50005, Stockholm, Sweden
b
Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Kräftriket 2B, Stockholm, Sweden
c
Department of History, Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
d
Alterra, Wageningen UR, PO Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands
e
Wageningen University, Land Use Planning Group, PO Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands
f
African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town, Environmental and Geographical Science Building, Upper Campus, Rondebosch, South Africa
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Article history: The aim of this paper is to shed new light on urban common property systems. We deal with urban
Received 1 March 2012 commons in relation to urban green-space management, referring to them as urban green commons.
Received in revised form 30 April 2013 Applying a property-rights analytic perspective, we synthesize information on urban green commons
Accepted 6 May 2013
from three case-study regions in Sweden, Germany, and South Africa, and elaborate on their role for
biodiversity conservation in urban settings, with a focus on business sites. Cases cover both formally
Keywords: established types of urban green commons and bottom-up emerged community-managed habitats. As
Property rights
our review demonstrates, the right to actively manage urban green space is a key characteristic of urban
Common property systems
green commons whether ownership to land is in the private, public, the club realm domain, or
Urban green commons
Ecosystem management constitutes a hybrid of these. We discuss the important linkages among urban common property
Biodiversity conservation systems, social–ecological learning, and management of ecosystem services and biodiversity. Several
benefits can be associated with urban green commons, such as a reduction of costs for ecosystem
management and as designs for reconnecting city-inhabitants to the biosphere. The emergence of urban
green commons appears closely linked to dealing with societal crises and for reorganizing cities; hence,
they play a key role in transforming cities toward more socially and ecologically benign environments.
While a range of political questions circumscribe the feasibility of urban green commons, we discuss
their usefulness in management of different types of urban habitats, their political justification and
limitation, their potential for improved biodiversity conservation, and conditions for their emergence.
We conclude by postulating some general policy advice.
ß 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction residents and citizens to actively rework urban nature in ways that
support ecological processes, while allowing for a collective caring
There is increasing concern on how to design more ecologically of pieces of land in the city. Taken together urban green commons
sustainable cities. Those discussions gaining most prominence are work against three dominant trends in cities – those of
architectural, or technical, including green buildings, green roofs, privatization of land, lowering contact between people and nature,
or the investment in low-carbon energy systems. In this paper we and the impoverishment of ecological habitats and functions.
argue that an often-neglected dimension of sustainable city- Through our case studies we hope to point toward an area of
making lies in how property rights are configured. In particular we research and practical development of more sustainable city-
compare cases in different countries that have managed to create making.
what we refer to as ‘urban green commons’, areas that allow Indeed, it has been suggested that the mechanisms behind the
privatization of common land in the 16th century also pertain to
modern-day cities. The privatization of public land in cities is
currently so pervasive that property-right scholars regard it as a
* Corresponding author at: The Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Royal
global phenomenon (Webster, 2003; Lee and Webster, 2006). An
Swedish Academy of Sciences, PO Box 50005, Stockholm, Sweden.
Tel.: +46 8 6739500; fax: +46 8 152464.
economic explanation is that urbanization results in scarcity of
E-mail address: Johanc@beijer.kva.se (J. Colding). land in cities, accompanied by an increase in land prices with a
0959-3780/$ – see front matter ß 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.05.006
Please cite this article in press as: Colding, J., et al., Urban green commons: Insights on urban common property systems. Global Environ.
Change (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.05.006
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2 J. Colding et al. / Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx
subsequent subdivision of land that favors the growth of private 2. Background

land ownership (Barzel, 1997; Lee and Webster, 2006). In this
argument, privatization leads to more efficient exchange, equating 2.1. Property rights and natural resource management
to a lowering of transaction costs – or the costs of creating and
policing contracts that establish ownership over a commodity (e.g. Property-rights regimes (Table 1) comprise rights to resources
land) (North, 1990; Webster, 2002). and the rules under which those rights are exercised, representing
Without taking adequate measures, loss of public domains key institutions for controlling stocks and flows of natural
could lead to that an increasing majority of people is denied the resources (Hanna et al., 1996). By the term institutions, we mean
opportunity to practically engage with ecosystems in their the rules and conventions of society that coordinate human
immediate surrounding (Colding, 2011). This could spread interaction, including formal constraints (rules, laws, constitu-
‘environmental generational amnesia’ among burgeoning urban tions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions and
populations (Miller, 2005), which in turn could affect policies to self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement character-
effectively deal with the global loss of ecosystem services (MA, istics (North, 1990; Colding and Folke, 2001). Institutional scholars
2005) climate change, and influence aspirations of human societies claim that no single type of property-rights regime can be
to reconnect to the biosphere (Folke et al., 2011). prescribed as a remedy for resource overuse and environmental
The purpose of this paper is to shed new insights on urban degradation; rather policy should focus on establishing regimes
common property systems. As the work of Elinor Ostrom reveals, that are designed to fit the cultural, economic, and geographic
natural resources throughout the world can be successfully context in which they are to function (Ensminger, 1993; Hanna
governed by common property systems that are different from et al., 1996).
private or state property regimes, contradicting claims that natural Common property regimes, which is the focus of this paper, are
resources need to be privatized or be controlled by the state or else systems of social arrangements that regulate the maintenance and
face destruction due to collective action problems. Most common consumption of common-pool resources. Due to that common-
property studies have centered on rural settings, e.g. village pool resources generally are subject to the problems of congestion,
woodlots, pastures, and irrigation water systems (Ostrom, 1990), overuse, pollution, and potential destruction there is a need to
community-managed forests (Alcorn and Toledo, 1998), pastoral devise and enforce rules that avoid such mischievements and/or
systems (Niamir-Fuller, 1998), and local fisheries (Hanna, 1998; impose limits for use (Colding and Folke, 2001). In common
Acheson, 1988). When it comes to urban settings there exist property regimes, control and management rights to resources are
remarkably fewer studies. For example, a subject online-search of in the hands of an identifiable community, or a group of users, that
the Digital Library of the Commons (in February 2011) reveals that may craft their own institutions for management of the resources
only 110 of all available papers on common property (i.e. 1.4%) deal within given legislative forms of society (Berkes and Folke, 1998;
with ‘urban commons’. Berkes et al., 2003). Hence, users in such systems manage resources
In this paper we deal with urban commons in relation to urban collectively by way of a wide array of rules-in use, norms and social
green-space management, referring to them as urban green mechanisms (Berkes et al., 2003; Colding et al., 2003; Ostrom,
commons. Applying a property-rights analytic perspective, we 2008). Membership may either be formally defined or according to
synthesize information on urban green commons from three case- ex post criteria such as residence or acceptance by existing
study regions in Sweden, Germany, and South Africa. They include members in the group. Another important characteristic of
studies on allotment areas in Stockholm, community gardens in common property regimes is that the users have the right to
Berlin, and emerging forms of urban commons in the post- exclude outsiders, in recognition of that the right to exclude also is
apartheid city of Cape Town. We also discuss the potential of urban the right to include (Webster, 2007). Moreover, ownership to land
green commons in densely populated areas, with a focus on is often vested in the community or groups of users, although in
business sites based on Dutch site analyses. reality such ownership is often contested, e.g. in the case of
We draw on previous case studies by the authors, supplemen- indigenous land rights (Alcorn and Toledo, 1998; Colding and
ted by a review of relevant information in the economic literature Folke, 2001).
(e.g. Webster, 2002; Lee and Webster, 2006) and the common Most natural resources can be classified as ‘‘common property
property literature (e.g. Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1989; Berkes et al., resources’’ (or, common-pool resources). A common-pool resource
2003). We begin by presenting a background on the major (CPR), is categorized by two attributes: non-excludability and
concepts and issues dealt with herein, including providing a subtractability, meaning that exclusion (or control of access) to the
definition of what we mean by the term ‘urban green commons’. resources is problematic and individual use of it is capable of
Next we deal with examples of urban green commons from the subtracting from the welfare of other users (Berkes, 1989).
case-study regions. Based on reviewed cases, we synthesize and
discuss some critical features of urban green commons based on 2.2. Congestion and separation of attributes in public domains of cities
analyses of bundles of property rights (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996)
and theories on congestion of public domains (Lee and Webster, Two dimensions are fundamental for understanding the
2006). We move on to discuss the applicability of urban green instability of public domains in cities. One is congestion, referring
commons in urban settings, conditions for their emergence and to the degree of competition within a public domain, or ‘‘the
conclude by postulating some general policy advice. numbers of individuals who jointly consume it, and the range of
Table 1
Types of property-rights regimes with owners, rights and duties. In the property-rights literature, resources can be controlled and managed under four types of property-
rights regimes: common property, state property, private property, and open access.
Regime type Owner Owner rights Owner duties
Private property Individual Socially acceptable uses; control of access Avoidance of socially unacceptable uses
Common property Collective Exclusion of non-owners Maintenance; constrain rates of use
State property Citizens Determine rules Maintain social objectives
Open access (non-property) None Capture None
Source: Hanna et al. (1996).
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J. Colding et al. / Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 3
tastes amongst those individuals (or groups)’’ (Lee and Webster, Table 2
Bundles of property rights associated with positions. The five property rights in the
2006, p. 34). When congestion (or crowding) generates excessive
table are independent of one another, but are frequently held in the cumulative
costs such as costs for queuing and for resolving conflicts between manner arranged as shown. They include the rights of access (i.e. ‘‘the right to enter
users, then there is likely to be pressure to reform property rights a defined physical area and enjoy non-subtractive benefits’’); withdrawal (‘‘the right
and subdivide the public domain either into private domains or to obtain the resource units or ‘‘products’’ of a resource’’); management (‘‘the right to
smaller public domains (e.g. club realms) (Webster, 2007). When regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improve-
ments’’); exclusion (‘‘the right to determine who will have an access right, and how
public domains become congested, they need governing in such a that right may be transferred’’); and alienation (‘‘the right to sell or lease either or
way that use rights become clear and enforceable; however, to both of the above collective-choice rights’’) (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996, p. 133). The
design, create and administer such a system of rights (i.e. bundles of property rights are held by individuals with different positions and
transaction costs) is a costly business, and if costs for establishing named accordingly.
such rights are politically or financially too high, ‘‘then the public Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized Authorized
domain remains contested and unsubdivided and effectively user entrant
becomes unsustainable’’ (Lee and Webster, 2006, p. 36). Access X X X X X
There has been a rapid emergence of club-based organization of Withdrawal X X X X
public land in recent decades, e.g. the rise of privately governed Management X X X
‘common-interest housing developments’ and gated communities. Exclusion X X
Alienation X
According to the 2001 American Housing Survey, about 6% of all
Source: Adapted from Schlager and Ostrom (1992, p. 252).
U.S. households were located in developments behind walls and
fences (Solecki and Leichenko, 2006). Gated communities are
globally increasing, such in growing economies like China, South Firstly, while people may hold entrance rights to public land in
Asia and India. Club-based organization of public land may cities, they lack the bundles of rights related to withdrawal,
sometimes include whole miniature cities having their own management, exclusion and alienation over such land (Table 2). In
securities, financial, and business headquarters (Lee and Webster, common property regimes, most rights to a core resource are
2006). These shifts toward privatization in urban areas also include vested in the members of the local community or group of users.
the provisioning and management of urban infrastructure and Therefore, equating urban commons to open public places is
other services. deceptive as such spaces could more correctly be classified as
Another critical dimension of public domains is the separation of ‘public realms’, i.e. all the areas in cities to which the public holds
attributes, which is likely to occur if it is cost-effective and a entrance-rights to.
sufficient demand for this exists. For example, use rights to a lake Secondly, a common property system is ideally excludable by
can be separated and allocated to various groups of consumers by virtue in that the local community or group of users that make it up
dividing it in different recreational spaces such as for wind surfers, hold the right to exclude outsiders in the use and management of
fishing spots, and swimming areas. In a congested public domain, the core resource (Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 2008). Otherwise such a
markets and governments will strive toward a separation of such management system would be characterized as an open access
attributes (Lee and Webster, 2006). system, and could eventually face the tragedy of the commons
The separation of attributes in public green spaces often occurs (Hardin, 1968).
when costs for maintenance become too high for local govern- Thirdly, it is essential to highlight the fact that public realms in
ments. There are several instances of green spaces having cities not only become private property, but increasingly fragment
degraded due to governmental underfunding (Greater London into many smaller publics, each of which can be characterized as a
Authority, 2001; Kassa, 2008; Colding, 2011). To fund park collective consumption club, or a ‘club realm’ (Webster, 2002, 2007).
maintenance, local governments may open up for several types of A club realm supplies ‘club goods’ that are excludable but not non-
private establishments such as cafés and amusement areas (i.e. rivalrous, at least not to their members or until a point where
separation of attributes). While income from rents and property congestion occurs (Table 2). Examples of club realms in cities range
taxes make park restoration and management feasible, this often from gated communities, condominiums and housing collectives, to
results in transformation of parts of green space into built-up micro spaces in cities such as elevators and roof top terraces (see e.g.
areas (Colding, 2011). In this way, a gradual or sequential loss of Webster, 2002; Landman, 2002). Since these examples are part of a
green areas occurs in cities, following the cascade impact of small collective ownership regime, club realms therefore come much
decisions. closer to a definition of what ‘urban commons’ constitute (see e.g.
Blomley, 2007). However, for the purpose of this paper, we think it is
2.3. Urban green commons useful also to distinguish between private organization and collective
organization of club realms. The former involves private territorial
The literature dealing with ‘urban commons’ is quite rich in governance of club realms, and includes privately built, managed
normative statements of what the term ‘commons’ means, with and governed neighborhoods such as most gated communities
many scholars avoiding any precise definition of the term. For where the developer typically is the initial owner and that often
example, Campbell and Wiesen (2009, p. 11) describe urban involves contracting entrepreneurs in management of the commons
commons as public open spaces that is ‘‘publically accessible, (see e.g. Lee and Webster, 2006; Landman, 2002; Blandy et al., 2006).
nonexcludable, and managed through shared governance’’. Land- While gated communities, arguably, could be governed and
forms they include in this definition are parks, community gardens, managed collectively, empirical research suggests that members
building exteriors, vacant lots, and public housing campuses. In in such communities more often than not lack control over
dealing with community gardens, Linn (1999) describes urban management (Blandy et al., 2006).
commons as ‘‘shared natural environments’’, and Kassa (2008) and Collective organization of club realms, in contrast, is conducted
Blomley (2007), describe them as urban public spaces. However, in by collective governance, involving a multiple set of users that
order to relate urban commons to the common property literature partake in decision-making and practical management of the
(Ostrom, 1990), we think it is useful to provide a more precise realm. This difference in the right to manage may be subtle, but
definition of the term, and regard notions of commons as ‘‘public’’ carries immense significance when it comes to natural resource
or as ‘‘nonexcludable’’ as quite misleading. A number of critical management in cities and is a central feature of the urban green
assertions will therefore be made here. commons dealt with in this paper.
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Fourthly, while ownership to land may be important for long- may not hold small-sized huts. Allotments mainly provide cultural
term sustenance and performance of urban commons, it is by no ecosystem services to lot holders, but also provisioning services
means a central criterion in our definition of the term. The like vegetables, fruits, and ornamental flowers.
literature dealing with urban commons provide quite a rich mosaic
of different ownership regimes, ranging from more clear forms of 3.1.1. Property-rights characteristics of allotments in Stockholm
private, public and collective ownership systems to more In Stockholm a local municipality predominantly owns allot-
diversified forms of ownership of open spaces in cities (see e.g. ment land with leaseholds stipulated on a long-term basis (up to
Webster, 2007). As the cases of urban green commons dealt with 25 years). The local allotment association decides to whom rights
herein indicate, they encompass both publically and privately to land should be granted. Contracts could only be signed by
owned lands. residents living in multi-family dwellings within the municipality,
Lastly, the groups that hold collective governance rights to indicating an adherence to the original ideals behind allotments,
urban green commons may craft their own institutions, rules-in- namely to improve health conditions for city-inhabitants in
use, for management of the resources and ecosystem services outdoor environments. In allotments with huts, the buyer
contained within them, although these need to match broader purchases the cabin and pays an annual fee in rent for the plot.
legal frameworks in society (Berkes and Folke, 1998; Berkes et al., Hence, the buyer can sell the cabin when terminating the contract.
2003). In urban settings such stewardship groups have been Allotments represent an organized form of urban common
described as ‘green-area user groups’ that employ a wide variety of property systems in which the public realm has been subdivided
informal institutions in managing natural resources (Colding et al., into smaller club realms. They exemplify microhabitats of
2006). collective-choice arenas in cities that effectively deal with the
Following from the assertions made above, we define urban problem of congestion through designs of fixed sizes and numbers
green commons as physical green spaces in urban settings of of individual plots and by way of fees that determine leasehold
diverse ownership that depend on collective organization and rights. In this way, allotment areas resemble gated communities,
management and to which individuals and interest groups although organization and management of land are collectively
participating in management hold a rich set of bundles of rights, based and do not involve outside entrepreneurs in management.
including rights to craft their own institutions and to decide whom Lot-holders become formal members in the allotment association
they want to include in management schemes (Colding and in which they hold equal votes and shares. The association in turn
Barthel, 2013). acts on behalf of the plot holders in different administrative
matters such as to negotiate lease agreements with the munici-
3. Cases of urban green commons pality, or to assist in evaluating prices for cabins and associated
equipment when owners wish to sell their holding. Allotment
3.1. Allotment gardens associations hold democratically elected chairmen and commit-
tees with on-going annual meetings. They negotiate about how to
In the Stockholm region green spaces are predominantly owned run the associations, such as how to handle rule breakers, allocate
and managed in either private or municipal forms (Colding et al., labor on the commons, regulate water, and how to deal with
2006), with only a few landforms comprising collective green- landholders (Barthel et al., 2010a,b).
space management. Allotment gardens represent the most common While allotment gardeners hold the operational-level property
form, providing opportunity for a wider set of residents to manage rights of ‘‘access’’ and ‘‘withdrawal’’ (Table 2), they also hold the
land in cities (Fig. 1). Europe holds some 3 million allotment right to ‘‘manage’’ their own plots relatively independently,
gardens (Barthel et al., 2013), consisting of individual garden plots although such management is framed by the collective-choice
of equal size within a demarcated piece of urban land that may or rights of the association, which in turn holds the right of
Fig. 1. Södra Årstalunden – an allotment area in central Stockholm. As of year 2006, there were 128 different allotment gardens in greater metropolitan Stockholm.
Source: Colding et al. (2013). Photo: Stephan Barthel.
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Fig. 2. The network of allotments in Stockholm city is hypothetically functionally connected by invertebrate metapopulations. City parks, cemeteries, and other inner city
green areas may benefit from pollination by bumblebees in allotment areas due to that foraging distance between allotments and other city-green habitats is small. The circles
around allotment areas have each a 1.0-km radius, which means that they are within the foraging range of most bumblebees.
Source: Colding et al. (2006).
‘‘exclusion’’ (i.e. the right to determine who will have an access Allotment areas were also found to support a different
right to the plot and how that right may be transferred), including community structure of seed dispersing and insectivorous birds
letting out the lot to another party (Oddsberg, 2011). Exclusion of than publically managed green spaces. Moreover, gardeners hold
outsiders is often physically embodied in that fences or hedges more knowledge about ecological dynamics than staff responsible
surround an allotment area. While outsiders have the right to enter for maintenance and management of public parks and cemeteries
the common areas in most allotment areas (i.e. walking paths, etc.), (Andersson et al., 2007). This includes knowledge about interac-
entering individual gardens is a violation subject to the law of tions between organisms, the interplay between organisms and
trespassing and is thereby subject to fines in common law. site-specific abiotic conditions, as well as knowledge about
ecological processes (Table 3).
3.1.2. Ecological determinants of allotment gardening Barthel et al. (2010a,b) refer to allotment gardens as
Similar to resource management in common property systems communities-of-practice (Wenger, 1998) that involve acquisition,
of local communities (Colding and Folke, 2001), the small size of transmission, and modification of ecological practices and local
allotments and the high number of people within the same piece of ecological knowledge. Oral communication is key for the
land provide for effective monitoring of rules-in-use; hence, transmission of ecological knowledge in allotment gardening with
provide the suitable conditions for informal institutions to become 57% of the respondents reported to learn about management
effective in dealing with conflicts and for monitoring of rules-in- practices during daily talks with other gardeners, in comparison to
use, enforced by way of social pressure (Colding and Folke, 2000). 18% that learn about gardening by talking with external experts.
There are, for example, strong norms to exclude pesticides and Newcomers tap into the community-of-practice primarily through
synthetic manure in gardening activity. The effectiveness of such conversations with experienced neighbors, and through teaching
norms is evident in that 91% of the gardeners feel that their by appointed mentors.
neighbors want them to act in accordance with them (Barthel et al.,
2010a,b). 3.2. Community gardens
Besides allowing for both cultural and provisioning ecosystem
services, allotment areas contribute to the generation of regulating Unlike allotments, community gardens are more unstable club
ecosystem services. For example, Andersson et al. (2007) found realms, often representing an interim use for vacant land awaiting
that the indirect effect of management practices in allotment areas construction (Colding, 2011). For example, less than 2% of the
contributes to support pollination in the Stockholm region, and community gardens in the U.S. were permanent a decade ago (Linn,
Colding et al. (2006) showed that allotment areas in the inner city 1999). In the U.S., the duration of garden lot-leases have been
of Stockholm are functionally connected in terms of pollination specified in authorizing laws, and may range from 5 years
(Fig. 2). This is due to that many allotment gardeners cultivate (renewable) in Seattle, to 2 years in Boston, and as short as one
some flowers with the only intent to feed pollinators and improve growing season in New York (Schukoske, 2000).
nesting opportunities for wild bees. The enhanced pollination In contrast to the more formal character of allotment gardens,
service feeds back to the gardeners, since pollination underlies the community gardens have a tradition of being self-organized by
generative capacity of flowers, fruits, and many vegetables, which stakeholders within a community (Ruitenbeek and Cartier, 2001).
are the prime concern of gardeners. Their origin has also been linked to the emergence of guerrilla
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Table 3
Aspects of local ecological knowledge – a comparison among different urban green spaces and the ecological knowledge held by the claimants of these areas.
Knowledge about Allotment gardens Cemeteries City parks
Interactions between organisms Predator-prey processes; pollinator- Predator-prey processes; pollinator- Parasite-transmitter-host processes;
plant processes; competition processes; plant processes; species as habitats to pollinator-plant processes; species as
parasite-transmitter-host processes; other species habitats to other species
critical life-stage processes
Interplay between organisms and Crop rotation for enhanced harvest, Increasing microclimate for
site specific abiotic conditions avoiding disease, and fertilizing the soil; decomposers
using decomposers as indicators of soil
health and fertility; increasing
microclimate for decomposers;
interaction between microclimate and
organisms
Spatial ecological processes Gardens as important feeding areas for
pollinators from surrounding areas;
migration of species
Source: Andersson et al. (2007).
gardens in New York City in the early 1970s (Schmelzkopf, 1996). lack of public funds to maintain them. Thus, various forms of
Although community gardens hold older origins in human history, temporary usage (Zwischennutzung) proliferated across the city as
modern community gardens constitute heterogeneous environ- brown fields and former industrial areas were turned into skate-
ments that integrate environmental restoration, community parks, cultural centers, and wild green spaces. As fiscal cuts also
activism, social interactions, cultural expression, and food security impacted funding for public parks, local politicians began making
(Krasny and Tidball, 2009). calls for civic engagement in management of green spaces (Rosol,
2010).
3.2.1. Community gardens in Berlin Congestion of urban green space was not the case in Berlin after
The city of Berlin has between 25 and 35 community gardens the fall of the wall. This provided opportunity for the emergence of
(Fig. 3); the number varying depending on classification criteria, community gardens since they reduced transaction costs on behalf
and ranging in size from 100 m2 to 30,000 m2 (Bendt, 2010). When of local governments to manage unused urban space. Hence, and as
the first community gardens emerged in West Berlin in the early property-rights theory would predict, the fragmentation of the
1980s, urban green space constituted a frontier in conflicts public realm toward club realm organization made such a shift
between local governments skeptical of civic engagement and feasible. This development was paralleled by some shifts in
social movements critical of the state control over urban space planning policies toward favoring entrepreneurial strategies,
(Rosol, 2010). People lobbied local authorities for more green competition, and business development over traditional welfare
space, sometimes taking action themselves through greening back functions such as the provision of collective services (Rosol, 2010).
yards or squatting public land to stop development (Rosol, 2010). For example, the state-owned company ‘GrünBerlin’, which now
Although authorities generally responded with skepticism, some runs several of the major parks in Berlin, represents a case of
gardens succeeded in establishing self-determined green spaces on private organization and territorial governance of land.
public land. An additional variable influencing the fate of community
Although struggles over urban space continue today in Berlin, gardening is the changing conditions of the real estate market,
several factors have changed dramatically. The fall of the Berlin where rapid privatization of publicly owned land is taking place as
wall and the subsequent unification of the city created an the state of Berlin struggles to finance its deficits. A major factor in
abundance of unused urban spaces (Brachen), paralleled by a dire this process was the creation in 2001 of the ‘‘Liegenschaftsfond’’ – a
Fig. 3. Prinzessinnengarten in Berlin. The garden represents a PAC-garden and is managed as a social enterprise. Photo: Pim Bendt.
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state-owned private company mandated to manage and market themselves. As such they offer innovative alternatives to tradi-
the entire stock of publically owned land (Bendt, 2010). Its creation tional top-down planning schemes that promote broader social–
meant that local district authorities (bezirks) lost control over ecological learning.
public property in their burrows. Now any development of public Bendt et al. (2013) combined the social learning approach
space for collective services must be motivated to and approved by offered by communities-of-practice (Wenger, 2000) with a property
the ‘Liegenschaftsfond’. For community gardens with interim rights analysis, in studying PAC-gardens in Berlin. Based on
contracts on public land, this means that backing by local extensive fieldwork and in-depth interviews, PAC-gardens were
government is not enough for long-term tenure to be secured. found to be communities-of-practice that promote four broader
Community gardens on hitherto undeveloped private land face learning streams among participants, including: (1) learning about
similar challenges as real-estate development is becoming gardening and local ecological conditions; (2) learning about self-
increasingly profitable. organization and social integration; (3) learning about the politics
of urban space (i.e. learning which arises out of negotiation and
3.2.2. PAC-gardens in Berlin friction concerning the use and development of space in Berlin);
Due to the self-organizational emergence of community and (4) learning about social entrepreneurship (Bendt et al., 2013).
gardens in Berlin, they display a high diversity of institutional PAC-gardens thus hold valuable lessons for collaborative urban
organization and structure. An interesting category of community planning (e.g. Healy, 1989) that seek to incorporate a wider set of
garden is public-access community gardens (Bendt, 2010; Bendt civic stakeholders in the design and formation of physical places in
et al., 2013). Most public-access community gardens (hencefor- cities beyond traditional power elites.
ward abbreviated as ‘PAC-gardens’) represent gardens that are
located on publicly owned land (e.g. by the local municipality), 3.3. The emergence of urban green commons in Cape Town
open for anyone at all times, collectively managed by various
interest groups, and in which formal obstacles for ad hoc The history of land rights is a distinct feature in the post-
participation by the public are absent or very low (Bendt et al., apartheid city of Cape Town (South Africa), as many inhabitants
2013). Membership is either formally defined or according to ex carry lived memories of being forcefully removed, or were
post criteria such as residence or acceptance by existing members designated to live in certain areas. Public or common rights did
in the group. For example, Lichtenrade Volkspark and Bürgergarten de facto not exist in the past for many South Africans. For example,
Laskerwiese are PAC-gardens with formal associations (vereins) the intense conflicts over land rights in Cape Town played out
with boards and chairmen. In contrast, Rosa Rose holds no official within an extremely unequal urban geography and with high
structures and decisions are taken in an ad hoc manner. In unemployment and informal settlements, and also in regards to
Prinzessinnengarten, which is also a social enterprise, the founders nature conservation, involving a small but biologically very diverse
ultimately make decisions, but in everyday practice various vegetation system, including fynbos (Ernstson et al., 2010). In the
participants make decisions on an ad hoc basis. following we describe the emergence of an urban green common in
PAC-gardening may also involve management of whole park- an area that was previously classified as ‘colored’, in which citizens’
lands (e.g. Lichtenrade Volkspark). This means that any city- mobilized civic and state resources in an open-ended experiment
inhabitant holds access rights to these parks and can partake in to configure management and property rights for civic-led
their maintenance. Hence, PAC-gardens could be viewed as ecological rehabilitation (Ernstson, 2013; Ernstson and Sörlin,
inclusive club realms with no membership constraints. However, 2013).
and as property-rights theory would predict, the benefit stream for
participating in gardening activities need to be secured and 3.3.1. Bottom Road to Princess Vlei – a ‘Blueprint’ of empowerment
outweigh the costs for those participating. To solve the problem of and ecological rehabilitation
congestion, a ‘separation of attributes’ has therefore occurred in In year 2005 the City of Cape Town re-zoned the Northern shore
PAC-gardens in that land has been further subdivided into different of Zeekoevlei – a seasonal lake and wetland area – into smaller
types of cultivation beds that determine rights to gardening parcels of land that were bought by people from Grassy Park
(Table 4). sharing experiences of oppression and marginalization during
It will be interesting to follow the further fate of PAC-gardens. apartheid (Ernstson, 2013; Ernstson and Sörlin, 2013). The land
Hypothetically, they will evolve into more formalized governing had been used as a rubbish dump for a decade and was overgrown
systems as congestion of people within them increases. Presently, with ‘non-indigenous’ vegetation. While building their houses,
PAC-gardens are open at all times for anyone to participate in residents agreed to create something different: instead of putting
gardening activities. up security walls in between their houses, marking and protecting
their private property, they would rehabilitate the fynbos and
3.2.3. Social–ecological learning in PAC-gardens wetland ecosystem and create a community garden to be open for
By intertwining gardening with wider sets of social, cultural the public. The original idea was to construct, as residents put it, a
and economic practices, PAC-gardens create heterogeneous ‘‘blueprint’’ for community gardening that could inspire other
learning environments that provide an institutionally diverse set derelict green spaces so as to ‘‘beautify and dignify’’ and ‘‘correct
of local arenas for experimental place-making by citizens the imbalances of apartheid’’ (Ernstson, 2013). In putting this idea
Table 4
Different types of access to cultivation beds in PAC-gardens. While overall lands (often parklands) are collectively maintained and managed by an interest group in PAC-
gardens and to which the public is granted access, a certain proportion of land is devoted specifically to gardening activities, involving both individually and collectively
managed cultivar beds as well as public beds.
PAC-garden Public beds Collective beds Individual beds Public individual beds
Rosa Rose x x
Bürgergarten Laskerwiese x x
Lichtenrade Volkspark x
Prinzessinnengarten x
Source: Modified from Bendt et al. (2013).
G Model
into practice, meant to elaborate on property- and management 3.3.2. Institutional experiments
rights. Given the different type of ownership rights to land at the four
While the city had kept the area closest to the shoreline as sites, it is useful to treat them somewhat separately. While the land
public property, the nine residents signed an agreement with the around Bottom Road and Last Road went from public land for
city’s conservation managers that made it possible for residents to nature conservation, to private land, the network turned this into a
integrate the public shoreline area as part of the rehabilitation hybrid between a club realm and public land. The allocation of
project, while the city, seeing the opportunity for fynbos management rights was intertwined with the separation of
rehabilitation, provided plants and labor for clearing and planting. attributes, and with the vegetation and the physical layout of
Through continuous learning, a spokesperson for the residents the land determining property-rights bundles. Closest to houses,
became heavily involved in the design and landscaping of the area, residents kept grass and lower vegetation, which marked the land
establishing working relations with the city, state agencies, and the they view their own to manage, and to which the public cannot
residents and gained management rights to the rehabilitation site access unless granted permission (although neighbors continu-
for the residents. During 4 years, some 50,000 plants were planted ously are permitted entrance rights). Closer to the shoreline, the
(and ‘weeds’ were uprooted) at Bottom Road, attracting pollina- shear density of breast high fynbos vegetation alongside walkways,
tors, dragonflies, birds, and toads, as well as people through the benches and barbeque places, works to separate conservation
adding of walkways, benches, and barbeque places (Fig. 4). attributes from public recreational attributes. Management is here
As the network of partners proved that a rubbish dump could be carried out by the residents through voluntary work, paid workers,
turned into a fynbos rehabilitation site, new residents were and occasionally with support from local government. A problem
enrolled along the close-by Last Road through establishing a of congestion could arise with too many public visitors, which is
similar agreement. This was followed by a non-written agreement partly dealt with through having a single access gate, which is
to hand over management rights to the residents of an un-used possible since Bottom Road is a cul-de-sac. A rule-in-use has been
square, which turned into the Ecogreen Park within 2 years, and established making the residents’ spokesperson the port of call for
which now holds a space for community gatherings, birthday the public when arriving with a large party. For instance, school
parties and children playing soccer. In 2008 the network shifted classes, elderly homes and companies contact the spokesperson for
toward the much bigger wetland and public open space known as arranging access (often paired with a tour in which the
Princess Vlei, which held cultural relevance for a much larger spokesperson share lessons to spread the ‘blueprint’). Manage-
community. A 3-year agreement for ecological rehabilitation was ment for the Ecogreen Park resides with the residents and within a
signed with local and national government agencies. While perimeter of fynbos vegetation, a barbeque place and grass field
simultaneously fighting plans to build a shopping center at helps to separate activities.
Princess Vlei, the network received media interest and expanded At Princess Vlei the institutional setting is different, and quite a
by way of further including local residents as well as local and challenge to govern due to its sheer size. While the former sites
citywide civic organizations. covered less than a hectare, the Princess Vlei project now covers 6–
7 ha, possibly more. It borders hundreds of residential properties
and a major road, increasing the problem of congestion. Apart from
neglect from city management, the area has also degraded due to
that cars drive around freely and people arrange barbeques
randomly in the area, which has been paralleled with criminal
activities. To improve conditions, the Bottom Road network
formalized into a civic organization that was given management
rights to the areas during 3 years by the city. A smaller part was
initially used for planting fynbos, followed by physical modification
of the terrain, such as setting up road blockages for cars and
designation of spaces for barbeque. An open-air concert arena is
presently in the making. Several interest groups have been
integrated in management activities of the wetland park, and
through an ‘adopt-a-plot’ scheme school children have been given
the responsibility of planting and maintaining fynbos vegetation,
including removing ‘weeds’ and watering. Apart from alleviating
costs for management, this aims to educate and spread the
‘blueprint’ from Bottom Road, while strongly embedding the
wetland park in the wider community.
4. Discussion
4.1. Urban green commons as designs for re-connecting urban people

to nature
As this review of cases demonstrates, the right to actively

manage land is a key feature of urban green commons whether
ownership to green space is in the private, public, the club realm
domain, or constituting a hybrid of these. Examples dealt with here
are compared according to which bundles of rights to nature they
Fig. 4. Bottom Road in Cape Town. The site is managed as an urban green common
hold, as presented in Table 2 (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996), and
that made it possible for residents to integrate the public shoreline as part of a
rehabilitation project for native fynbos vegetation (below). Bottom Road attracts cover both more formally established types of urban commons and
pollinators, dragonflies, birds, and toads, as well as people through the adding of bottom-up emerged community-managed habitats. All urban
walkways, benches, and barbeque places (above). Photo: Henrik Ernstson. green commons presented here depend on collective organization
G Model
Table 5
Management regimes and bundle of rights to different examples of urban nature areas. (x) = rights to part of the area, e.g. some cultivation beds are only for members while
others are public. All urban green commons have some regulations that handle the problem of congestion, whilst increasing the opportunity for individuals in cities to have
management and access rights to urban ecosystems relative publically or privately managed green spaces.
Management regime Private State Common property regimes (urban green commons) Bottom Road
common
Examples of urban Residential Street Parks Allotment Rosa Rose Bürgergarten Lichtenrade Prinzessinnengarten (Cape Town)
green spaces garden alleys gardens (Berlin) Laskerwiese Volkspark (Berlin)
(Stockholm) (Berlin) (Berlin)
Land ownership Private State State State Private State State State Private/state
Bundles of rights Owner Entrant Entrant Proprietor Claimant Claimant Claimant Claimant Owner/claimant
to urban nature
Access X X X X X X X X X
Withdrawal X X X X X X X
Management X X X X X X X
Exclusion X (x) (x) (x) (x) (x) (X)
Alienation X (x) (X)
Regulation of Yes None None Yes Yes Yes Yes Limited Yes
congestion
Membership fee None None None Annual None Annual Annual None None
Public entrance None Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
rights to area
Queue system None None None Yes None None None None None
and management of land and resources. As evident from Table 5, public space (Table 5). The common feature in these examples is
urban green commons provide for more bundles of rights to urban that users of a wider proportion of civic society are enabled to
ecosystems than state-managed land such as public parks and connect with urban nature in urban green commons by labor.
street alleys. While urban green commons allow for public As this review of cases demonstrates, the right to actively
entrance rights to these areas, regulation of congestion to these manage land is a key feature of urban green commons regardless of
lands differ in separation of attributes, e.g. in the form of providing ownership rights to green space. Hence, designs of urban green
different access to cultivation beds (Table 4) and membership fees commons could be very useful in providing for spaces through
in PAC-gardens. This is perhaps not surprising since PAC-gardens which people can engage urban nature. In parallel with other
all are self-organized ‘bottom-up’ in close fit to cultural and social interventions, urban green commons could integrate a greater set
contexts. While the public has only entrance rights to parks and of people in cities to actively care for urban ecosystems. This could
street alleys, there are in urban green commons possibilities for lay start counterbalance what Pyle (1978) referred to as extinction of
people to take part and care for nature in urban space. Users in all experience, a process whereby cities and suburbs relinquish their
PAC-gardens can be considered claimants as landowners can evict natural diversity and citizens gradually grow more removed from
them at any time and since they do not hold any rights to sell land personal contact with physical forms of nature in cities.
nor property (Table 5). In comparison there is much less diversity Indeed, there are studies showing that people’s perception of
in allotment gardens, since they often are of much older origin and nature is in great part established through direct interaction with
local allotment associations are formally organized hierarchically natural systems (Kahn and Friedman, 1995; Kahn, 2002), and that
into regional and national allotment unions that frame manage- there are positive linkages between outdoor recreation, active land
ment rights in local gardens (Barthel et al., 2013). management and environmental concerns (Theodori et al., 1998;
Allotment holders can also be considered as strong proprietors McKinney, 2002; McDaniel and Alley, 2005; Barthel et al., 2010a,b).
since they hold rights to exclude the public from their plots, and as Here we argue for interdisciplinary approaches when addressing
they hold the right to sell cabins and other materials if they decide how urban institutional designs for collective action in green areas
to decline or are evicted from the garden. All have membership fees may interact with the cognitive frames that people construct about
and a queue system as ways to handle congestion (Table 6). House their relationship to the biosphere, an area with great potential for
owners on Bottom Road, Cape Town, have alienation rights as they scholars interested in urban planning and design (Colding and
can sell their private property. However, they cannot sell the state- Barthel, 2013).
owned shoreline area, where they hold only the bundles’ of rights
associated with claimants (Table 6). Further, through the collective 4.2. The potential of urban green commons for biodiversity
contract with the city, any new owner need to continue as partner conservation: the case of business sites and corporate land
in the rehabilitation project (e.g. they cannot build a wall around
their property). Hence the Cape Town example provides an Diversity in property-rights regimes may diversify ecosystem
innovative hybrid of a collectively managed urban green common management in cities that in turn could lead to positive
where parts are privately owned, while the shoreline area is a biodiversity outcomes (Table 3). Opportunities to manage
Table 6
Bundle of rights to nature from a citizen-perspective in relation to different landforms. Urban green commons increase the opportunity for individuals in cities to have
management and access rights to urban ecosystems relative publically managed green spaces. (x) = partial rights.
Residential garden Street alleys Parks Allotments PAC-gardens Bottom Road common
Access X X X X X X
Withdrawal X X X X
Management X X X X
Exclusion X X (x) X
Alienation X
Governance type Private Public Common
G Model
biodiversity in places where people live and work have received are actively involved in the management of natural areas (e.g.
increased attention lately (Miller and Hobbs, 2002; Colding, 2007; forest, swamp, grassland) surrounding factories and business
ICLEI, 2008; Snep et al., 2009, 2011). However, urban green buildings.
commons have so far been relatively unexplored in terms of their Companies that stimulate nature conservation at their proper-
role in biodiversity management (Colding and Barthel, 2013). One ties provide them with a way to demonstrate their corporate
reason may be that urban wildlife as such is not as easily perceived environmental responsibility (Kelly and Hodge, 1996). According
as an urban green ‘resource’ beneficial to citizens, as obvious as to Cardskadden and Lober (1998), companies indicate that their
food (allotment gardens) or recreation opportunities (PAC employees involved in the management of wildlife habitat at
gardens). A second reason for not recognizing a role for Urban business sites were found more committed to their employer. Also,
green commons in urban biodiversity management is that urban positive effects on community relations and an improved
wildlife conservation is normally considered as a public task and relationship with regulators were recorded. Thus, because of the
thus implemented in public spaces like urban parks and greenways co-management aspect, the habitats at business sites may be seen
(managed by local authorities). However, there is a specific as potential urban green commons that provide benefits for people,
situation in which (urban) biodiversity conservation can be biodiversity and profit.
discussed from an urban green commons perspective specifically
at business sites and corporate land. 4.3. Limitations of urban green commons
Business sites (e.g. business districts, industrial estates and
industrial areas) abound in urban landscapes and represent areas Urban green commons have in a number of studies been shown
designated by local or regional governments to accommodate to promote place making in cities, community empowerment,
multiple firms (Snep et al., 2011). They are often located near city social integration, democratic values, health benefits, cultural
peripheries, close to highways and other infrastructure (Frej et al., diversity, and the increase of property values (Colding and Barthel,
2001). Corporate land is land owned by a specific company, 2013). While there might be many reasons for up-scaling urban
situated at a business site (parcel) or stand-alone (when some green commons in cities and suburbs, they also pose challenges
larger companies have their own location). Business sites and that deserve attention. In contrast to most public green spaces in
corporate land hold features that could provide a basis for small to cities, urban green commons allow for a larger bundle of property
medium-sized urban biotopes (1–5 ha) that could be managed as rights becoming vested in urban citizens (Table 5). Yet, when land
urban green commons with a real potential to support flora and rights to public green spaces become specified to certain
fauna. For example, the early-successional vegetation at business collectives, it means that exclusion of people could be inevitable,
sites can provide habitat for a variety of endangered species, such in recognition of that rights to include also entail the right to
as breeding birds, amphibians and insects (Snep and Ottburg, exclude (Webster, 2007). This is especially important in situations
2008; Snep et al., 2009) (Fig. 5). Snep et al. (2011) explored the when congestion is high. Hence, it may be ethically awkward for
potential of Dutch business sites as additional habitat for urban policy makers to justify urban green commons on public
metapopulations of endangered butterflies and found that more land, especially in cities or parts in cities that lack sufficient green
than 400 business sites (11% of all Dutch sites) could substantially spaces. It is perhaps no wonder why public parks are relatively
strengthen butterfly metapopulations that are under pressure and abundant in cities today, as this has to do with that conflict over
thus held a substantial potential to contribute to butterfly use rights are lower by such designs, suggesting that public parks
conservation. Furthermore, these business spots can be important involve less transaction costs on behalf of local governments.
patches into larger landscape biodiversity networks. However, when urban green commons are adopted at vacant land
In Japan companies like Sony, Toyota and Fujitsu actively work parcels, or as part of green roofs or private property, their political
on biodiversity conservation at their corporate land, already since justification is less problematic.
the 1970s. Sony and Toyota have their own forest at their plant. In Considering that much public lands in cities become privatized
the USA, the Wildlife Habitat Council started in 1988 to support for economic reasons, it is worth emphasizing that common
companies like General Motors, Ford, IBM and Du Pont with property systems could be a viable option for governments to
conservation activities. In all cases, employees of the companies consider when they lack funding for green space management
Fig. 5. Early-successional vegetation can be found on derelict land and vacant lots at business sites (left). This vegetation attracts pioneer species like the Natterjack toad (Bufo
calamita) (right top) and the Palearctic oystercatcher (Haematopus ostralegus) (right bottom). Photo: Robbert Snep.
G Model
(Greater London Authority, 2001). As described herein, this was the pertinent and emerging problems such as socio-economic change,
approach taken in Berlin through the development of civically or when cities shrink in terms of population, or become too densely
managed Bürgerparks. Many urban green commons hold potential built and therefore lack green spaces that force citizens to squat
to reduce management costs on public lands due to that they draw vacant lands (Colding and Barthel, 2013).
on volunteer-based management and by the self-interest of the
participants. 5. Conclusions
A more general consideration, and perhaps especially so in
post-colonial settings, is to elaborate on how urban green The aim of this paper has been to shed new light on urban
commons can come to animate a wider debate in cities on who common property systems. As illustrated by the synthesis of cases
can claim knowledge concerning how, where and by whom urban covered herein of both formally established types of urban
nature can be managed and protected (Ernstson, in review). For commons and bottom-up emerged community-managed habitats,
example, in Cape Town, the ‘‘blueprint’’ of Bottom Road has there are important linkages among urban common property
transformed ‘‘colored’’ residents from having no stake in the area of systems, social–ecological learning, and management of ecosys-
nature conservation to becoming capable stewards of ‘degraded’ tem services and biodiversity. The right to actively manage urban
neighborhood spaces that instead have become spaces of green-space is a key characteristic of urban green commons
possibility and community renewal. Whereas expert-based whether ownership to land is in the private, public, the club realm
conservation has tended to concentrate capital and labor to domain, or constitute a hybrid of these. Several benefits could be
bounded nature reserves in Cape Town, such a mode can be associated with urban green commons, such as reducing costs for
challenged in that it does not contribute to empowerment, or urban ecosystem management, serving as designs for reconnecting
embeds ecosystems as part of communities and cities. Further- people to the biosphere by offsetting extinction of experience in
more, outside the experiments of finding viable institutional cities. As also pondered upon, the emergence of urban green
arrangements for property rights, urban green commons could commons seems to be critical to deal with societal crises and in the
play a role in facilitating a discursive shift that alerts decision- reorganization of cities; hence, they seem to play an important role
makers and the public to the idea of cities being ecologically living in transforming cities toward more socially and ecologically
systems, and that nature and culture cannot be separated benign environments. While political questions may circumscribe
(Ernstson, 2013). urban green commons, they appear to be particularly useful in
management of smaller land parcels, as part of green roofs, or as
4.4. The importance of property-rights diversity and the emergence of part of private property holdings such as business sites and
urban green commons university campuses, where their political justification may be less
problematic. Alternatively, they could play a role for management
While a range of political questions circumscribe the feasibility of public green spaces that do not face the problem of congestion
of urban green commons in different cultural settings, public but face mismanagement by local governments.
participation in urban green commons ultimately depends on the Based on the insights conveyed herein, it would be tempting to
opportunities that existing property-rights arrangements provide. advise policy makers and planners to foster policies for a wider
Colding and Barthel (2013) argue that a certain level of property- design of urban green commons in cities. However, we refrain from
rights diversity is necessary in order to match peoples’ preferences such policy advise at this stage, and suggest that an up-scaling of
for participating in urban green commons. For example, many urban green commons be framed in more experimental frame-
individuals find it hard to partake in more formalized organized works that draw on adaptive learning in order to reduce potential
urban green commons, like allotments, which require considerable undesirable policy outcomes. A relevant question in this context is
commitments and duties in participation. In contrast, PAC-gardens to ask how far one may be able to up-scale urban green commons
allow for much looser frameworks of participation. before they become bureaucratic and over-organized. Moreover, is
Due to the self-emergence origin of many urban green there a critical size of urban green commons, related to the number
commons (e.g. community gardens), it is worthwhile to further of people participating, or the size of an area? These are questions
study under what conditions their self-organization is likely to that need to be addressed in conjunction to other open research
occur. As argued by Colding and Barthel (2013), bottom-up driven questions. Thus, we recommend that urban green commons
and self-emergency of many urban green commons is likely during become initiated in conjunction with further research on them. For
periods of socio-economic disruptions, such as when cities become example, studies for elucidating principles for dealing with
depopulated, or during reorganization of cities. For example, the potential conflicts in the design of urban green commons would
fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent unification of the city be a valuable contribution to increase knowledge about them.
created an abundance of unused urban spaces (Brachen) that made Elinor Ostrom’s work on long-enduring institutions could here be
PAC-gardens feasible. Moreover, community gardens and allot- instrumental for the testing of research assumptions and in
ment areas tend to increase in number in times of social hardship formulation of future research explorations.
in order to increase food supply as witnessed in several Policy makers should, however, be cautious about the potential
contemporary U.S. cities and during the depression and the two implications of a too strict formalization of a bottom-up approach
world wars in Europe (Barthel et al., 2013; Colding and Barthel, that many urban green commons represent. Rather than imple-
2013). While the availability of physical urban spaces is a crucial menting them in a top-down fashion, decision makers should
factor for the proliferation and spread of urban green commons in facilitate means for assisting bottom-up driven initiatives in
cities, the role of social movements and networks (Ernstson and recognition of that it is ultimately the participants themselves that
Sörlin, 2009) should not be underestimated as a primary source for hold the means to carry such projects forward. There currently
the spread of Urban green commons as illustrated in the case of exists ample land in cities to which urban residents could be given
Cape Town. management rights. In this context urban green commons could
This poses the interesting proposition that the emergence of animate a wider debate in cities regarding local participation of
urban green commons has a close fit to the reorganization of cities. citizens. Institutional scholars, resource managers, planners and
Framed within the context of resilience science, they seem to hold policy makers hold an important role in molding such aspirations
particular bearing during the release and reorganization phases of to ensure that they provide benefits for both people and
the adaptive renewal cycle, i.e. when cities need to address biodiversity.
G Model
In acknowledgment of that public lands in cities become Colding, J., Barthel, S., 2013. The potential of ‘Urban Green Commons’ in the
resilience building of cities. Ecological Economics 86, 156–166.
increasingly privatized, policy makers need carefully consider Colding, Folke, J., Elmqvist, C., 2003. Social institutions in ecosystem management
what this means in terms of sustaining urban social–ecological and biodiversity conservation. Journal of Tropical Ecology 44, 25–41.
systems. In this context, urban common property systems could Colding, J., Lundberg, J., Folke, C., 2006. Incorporating green-area user groups in
urban ecosystem management. Ambio 35, 237–244.
play a pivotal role in shaping such economic driven development Ensminger, J., 1993. Culture and property rights. In: In Hanna, S., Folke, C., Mäler, K.-
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Elmqvist, T., 2010. Urban transitions: on urban resilience and human-dominat-
Acknowledgments ed ecosystems. Ambio 39, 531–545.
Ernstson, H., 2013. Re-translating nature in post-apartheid Cape Town: the material
This research is part of the SUPER-project within the URBAN- semiotics of people and plants at Bottom Road. In: Heeks, R. (Ed.), Actor-
Network Theory for Development: Working Paper Series. Institute for Devel-
NET program, funded by the European Commission’s Framework 6 opment Policy and Management, SED, University of Manchester, Manchester. ,
Programme under the European Research Area Network (ERA- ISBN: 978-1-905469-67-3, http://www.cdi.manchester.ac.uk/resources/ant4d/
NET) initiative. Johan Colding’s, Stephan Barthel’s, and Henrik documents/ANT4DWorkingPaper4Ernstson.pdf.
Ernstson, H., Sörlin, S., 2009. Weaving protective stories: connective practices to
Ernstson’s research has been funded through support and grants articulate holistic values in Stockholm National Urban Park. Environment and
received from the Swedish Research Council for Environment, Planning A 41, 1460–1479.
Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning (FORMAS). Thanks also Ernstson, H., Sörlin, S., 2013. Ecosystem services as technology of globalization: on
articulating values in urban nature. Ecological Economics 86, 274–284., http://
to Mistra (the Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research) www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800912003746.
for support to the Stockholm Resilience Centre. Folke, C., Jansson, Å., Rockström, J., Olsson, P., Carpenter, S., Chapin, F., Crépin, A.S.,
Daily, G., Danell, K., Ebbesson, J., Elmqvist, T., Galaz, V., Moberg, F., Nilsson, M.,
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JGEC-1118; No. of Pages 13

Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Global Environmental Change

Urban green commons: Insights on urban common property systems

2 J. Colding et al. / Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx

subsequent subdivision of land that favors the growth of private 2. Background

Regime type Owner Owner rights Owner duties

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6 J. Colding et al. / Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx

Knowledge about Allotment gardens Cemeteries City parks

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4.1. Urban green commons as designs for re-connecting urban people

As this review of cases demonstrates, the right to actively

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