Robbie Boyd

The Cold War was a period of political clash, international tension and numerous proxy wars,
spanning a substantial period of the 20th century. Its exact onset is a matter of contention; some
historians believing it dates to the period after WWII, others as far back as the Russian Civil War. It is
clear the USA and USSR were the two driving forces of the dispute, yet, the ambiguity around the
origins of the Cold War makes pinpointing a single causation a near impossibility. However, there are
three alternative lines of argument many historians follow. Gaddis places blame on the Soviet Union,
if not solely on Stalin, in his work ‘We Now Know’- arguing that his personality was reflected in his
foreign and military policy. The Soviet leader’s paranoia and violent nature echoed through his
leadership style making international hostility inevitable. In complete contrast, Logevall and Craig
focus on the USA’s self-interest and route to Cold War for domestic ease. They highlight the
economic and social dominance America possessed, allowing the nation choices when dealing with
international policy. Their main argument maintains that a Cold War ensured the best public
reaction for the lowest cost to the US government. McMahon takes a central view, arguing neither
nation can be blamed entirely. Both the US and USSR acted aggressively, but resulting hostility is in
part the fault of unfortunate circumstances and an unstable foundation to their ‘alliance’. Being
reputable historians, evidently all three views have merit, yet: partiality, reliance and validity must
be also be assessed. Logevall and Craig’s argument therefore seems most convincing. Using a
breadth of evidence, they provide a comprehensive analysis of US policy and how this effected the
Soviet position.

Whilst a ‘Post-Revisionist’ historian, Gaddis does pose an argument perhaps more reflective of the
orthodox viewpoint- placing greater weight on USSR involvement. In his work 'We Now Know:
Rethinking Cold War History', he maintains that Stalin’s toxic regime and personality were the root
cause of the subsequent international tensions. However, Gaddis does not entirely vindicate the US-
unlike firm orthodox historians such as Bailey or Applebaum.

Understanding Gaddis’ viewpoint and motives as a historian is crucial in developing an evaluation of

his work. As an American, alive throughout the Cold war, objectivity becomes a problem. This is true
of all ‘history’ in living memory; so, it must be questioned how impartial Gaddis can really be. In the
early part of his career, he did write with a surprisingly strong anti-American sentiment. However, by
the time he writes ‘We Now Know’, new evidence about the Kremlin and organisation within Soviet
Russia had come to light due to Glasnost and the fall of the Berlin Wall. After accessing the Soviet
Archives, it seems that Gaddis’ viewpoint rapidly turned against the USSR. This acute change of
judgement may be either down to his personal shock, or to publicly backtrack on his previously pro-
soviet works. Either way, it could therefore be argued that Gaddis’ subsequent attack on Stalin’s
Rule in ‘We Now Know’ is too damning.

One Crucial argument Gaddis makes, is that authoritarian societies create inevitable clashes. He
argues this is due, in part, to the unmoderated control of their leaders. “It is to be expected that in
an authoritarian state the chief authoritarian’s personality will weigh much more heavily than those
of democratic leaders, who share power”1. This is a concept reiterated throughout the extract,
specifically when describing Stalin’s characteristics and relationship with power. It is of common
acceptance that he was an excessively suspicious and ruthless politician when dealing with
international alliances. However, his vast pre-war purges evidence a paranoia within his own party;

1
Gaddis: “We Now Know” (1997) p.293
and even relationships with his close family were destructive. Gaddis argues this ‘Self similarity
across scale’ means there is little sense in “distinguishing Stalin’s foreign policy from his domestic
practices or even his personal behaviour”2. To the West, horrific events such as the Warsaw uprising
or Katyn massacre came as a shock. Yet, with more insight into Stalin’s personality, it’s no longer
surprising the USSR acted so violently, in fact it’s expected. Fundamentally, Stalin’s nature meant his
actions and reactions when dealing with the US, would never be anything but hostile. Soviet policy
across the 20th century was almost a direct projection of Stalin’s beliefs.

With this in mind, Gaddis highlights that Stalin’s paranoia and desire for supremacy links more
transparently with the USSR’s expansionist tendencies and need for domination across Eastern
Europe. Whilst countries such as Poland had previously succumbed to Russian control, never had
one Soviet leader seized so many satellite states and with such military force. Such rapid
expansionism caused a ripple of fear amongst European countries. America similarly felt threatened,
not for their immediate safety, but economically they relied on Europe to export to. A communist
takeover could undermine American trade and economy by removing its consumerist allies. This fear
of Stalin’s imperialism is evidenced in McMahon’s work when he describes the Western allies as
“increasingly viewing Stalin’s Russia as an opportunistic bully a voracious appetite for additional
territories”3. In his later companion piece 'Dividing the World' published in 'The Cold War' Gaddis
notes how badly this played out in western democracies with their Wilsonian view of collective
security: “co-operation with external allies was clearly to his [Stalin’s] advantage when the Germans
were in sight of his capital, but whether that co-operation would extend beyond Hitler’s defeat was
another matter.”4. However, P. Kennedy highlights that with 20 million civilian deaths, Stalin’s
paranoia and need for buffer states is neither surprising nor unjust. The USSR was left crippled by
WWII - in need of safety and economic support, but instead found itself almost immediately isolated
and threatened by the US and its allies. Furthermore, Craig and Logevall argue that cases where the
USSR were not expansionist and kept their word (such as in Czechoslovakia or Hungary), were
overlooked.

Gaddis also argues that whilst the US should not shirk all blame, they are not the causation. This is
clear when he writes, “This by no mean absolves the United states and its allies of considerable
responsibility of how the Cold war was fought”5. As such a powerful nation the US should never have
begun ‘peripheral conflicts’ in Vietnam or Korea; and perhaps put ‘exorbitant expenditure on
weaponry’ into diplomatic efforts with the USSR. Despite this, Stalin was the deciding factor that
turned political differences into world dividing hostility- Essentially, “as long as Stalin was running
the Soviet Union a Cold War was unavoidable”6. Gaddis makes the point, that whilst German Fascism
died with Hitler, Stalin set up a soviet system so strong it survived his death alongside “his
successor’s half-hearted efforts at ‘De-Stalinization’”7. It took Gorbachev to actively cease fulfilling
Stalin’s world vision, to end the Cold War. This surely can provide evidence that Stalin’s wishes were
a primary factor in starting and maintaining international tension. Gaddis argues that “it is hardly
possible to imagine Nazi or the war it caused without Hitler. I find it increasingly difficult, given what
we now know, to imagine the Soviet Union or the Cold War without Stalin” 8. As the USSR was a
totalitarian state, some blame must be placed solely on its leader. This contrasts to the US, where a

2
Gaddis: “We Now Know” (1997) p.293
3
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003)
4
Gaddis: “Dividing the World” published in ‘The Cold War', edited by Klaus Larres and Ann Lane (2001)\
5
Gaddis: “We Now Know” (1997) p.293
6
Gaddis: “We Now Know” (1997) p.292
7
Gaddis: “We Now Know” (1997) p.293
8
Gaddis: “We Now Know” (1997) p.294
democratic system safeguards any one leader from owning responsibility. Gaddis concludes “who
then was responsible? The answer I think is authoritarianism in general, and Stalin in particular” 9.

With completely opposing view to Gaddis, Craig and Logevall (C&L) are orthodox historians and
provide a more US focused argument. Their joint work ‘America’s Cold War’, unsurprisingly focuses
on US issues: international, but predominantly domestic. Their analysis of US Government policy
making, election campaigns and financial choices, runs as the key theme within their work. Whilst
blame is placed almost entirely on the US, they perhaps view Truman’s actions less as malicious and
more as self-serving. A clear contrast to Gaddis’ view of hostile, Stalin led Russia.

To analyse C&L’s extract, it is necessary to understand their reliability, reasoning and outlook as
historians. Both established academics, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall are highly liberal in their
political view. This is evidenced by their belief the US began, and Gorbachev resolved the Cold War.
However, their interpretation is neither outrageous nor unprecedented. Historian A.J.P Taylor
presented a similar argument over a decade earlier in his brief work “British Prime ministers and
other essays”. Whilst his view was slightly more progressive when published- It aligns to C&L’s later
theory, and fits cohesively with the facts.

An initial point C&L make is that America’s stability after the War gave them international
dominance. Compared to the crippled nations of Europe, the USA scarcely needed rebuilding; and in
contrast to an excess of 20 million Russian lives, suffered few fatalities. Perhaps most importantly, by
1944 the US “possessed far and away the world’s largest economy”10, generating four times the GDP
of the USSR11. This gave them the advantage of being able to focus beyond regeneration and base
economic stability, and instead, continue funding their military and developing an Atomic bomb. In
fact, from 1952 the US were spending approximately 400 billion dollars on their military per
annum12. This put them in a position of ‘preponderant power’13 the USSR couldn’t rival. Of course,
this led to Soviet anxieties that Russian land, allied states, and communist ideology were under
threat from the stronger, richer USA. In 1948 for Example: Marshal Aid was deployed; a strong
Deutsche-Mark was implemented in the Western Trizonia; and a 224-million-dollar airlift was
funded14; all of which could only be achieved through USA’s economic supremacy. These actions
from Washington threatened the Soviet position and isolated them further. Where Truman had the
funding to help build a mutual agreement with Stalin, he chose instead to further fuel the Soviet
Leaders’ Paranoia.

The Second and most vital point C&L make, is that the Cold War was a product of American choices.
The key idea in the extract is that international tension was not a result of aggression or fear, rather
a conscious decision of US leaders. One reason the US chose a policy of containment rather than
diplomacy with the USSR was due to the influence of. ……. The next reason Truman entered a Cold
War with the USSR was due to more selfish motives. The president understandably wished to focus
on domestic policy and grow the US economy. He was also concerned that Democrats retained their
political majority in the 1946 mid-term elections.

 Containment on the cheap

9
Gaddis: “We Now Know” (1997) p.294
10
Craig & Logevall: “America’s Cold War” (2009) p.61
11
Craig & Logevall: “America’s Cold War” (2009) p.61
12
Center for Defense Information (CDI): http://www.pogo.org
13
Craig & Logevall: “America’s Cold War” (2009) p.61
14
https://www.britannica.com/event/Berlin-blockade-and-airlift
  Lippmann’s critique

Finally, McMahon offers a third and more balanced perspective. As a true post revisionist historian,
he argues that both sides should accept a share of culpability, therefore neither were wholly to
blame for the causation of the Cold War. In his work “The Cold War: a very short introduction”,
McMahon maintains that relations between the two world superpowers were doomed from the
start, acquitting either side of sole responsibility. Yet, he does highlight that both sides acted
hostilely, in the knowledge that retaliation was unlikely to amount in a ‘Hot War’. Similarly, Tony
Judt presents a well-balanced perspective in his book ‘Postwar’, discussing both western and eastern
factors in the rising conflict. In this way, McMahon and Judt provide a key contrast in judgement to
the prior historians, who offered purely Soviet or US centric arguments.

As a post revisionist Historian, McMahon does offer- to his credit- the most balanced argument of
the historians. His work “The Cold War: a very short introduction” being a more recent publication
has the luxury of hindsight paired with a more expansive range of sources and archives. This is due in
part to the period of ‘Glasnost’, whereby 1990 soviet archives from Stalin’s era were opened up to
the West. Whilst this means McMahon has more data to work with, it also means the perception
and narrative of the Cold War is a well-researched one, and perhaps causes a loss of total
subjectivity. Moreover, it is apparent that McMahon does not extensively investigate Soviet and US
policy. This is perhaps as the purpose of the text is to provide a ‘very short introduction’, but it
means some key factors are missed.

One key argument McMahon puts forward, is that the ‘Grand alliance’ was a union destined for
failure, and once broken down led to further and heightened tensions. This can be evidenced by the
extract subtitle itself, ‘a fragile alliance’15 which immediately states relations as a ‘a classic marriage
of convenience’16. In 1945 The Big three were attempting to “sustain the spirit of cooperation” 17.
However, McMahon claims that beyond their common objectives and interests in the short-lived
war period, there was little by means of ideology and future incentives to bind the US and USSR.
American intervention in the Russian civil war- aiding the capitalist, ‘White’ army against the threat
of communist ‘Reds’- would heavily support this notion. Furthermore, both countries leaders had
previously broadcast harsh rhetoric towards their counterparts, Stalin once saying….. . This prior
hostility makes it clear that this was truly not an alliance based on agreement and trust, rather a
“partnership born of awkward necessity and weighed down by a conflict ridden past” 18. In simple
terms, ‘my enemies’ enemy is my friend’, a concept which essentially became foreign policy amongst
the world’s superpowers from 1939-44. This underlying tension provides insight into the rapid
deterioration of the Grand Alliance, resulting in the Western sphere of influence and Eastern bloc. It
is used to argue that without total concession of one side, tensions could only escalate. And as
neither side was particularly willing to concede on political, military or ideological terms, the
outcome moved from: clash of Soviet expansionism and US containment, to Asian proxy wars, to
Nuclear Missile crisis. This escalation of hostility from weak foundations can be seen in practice
through Churchill’s 1946 ‘Iron Curtain’ speech, where he states, “We aim at nothing but mutual
assistance and collaboration with Russia” before continuing “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in
the Adriatic an "iron curtain" has descended across the continent”19. This makes evident the hopeful
15
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
16
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
17
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.20
18
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
19
Churchill: “Iron Curtain Speech” (1945)
but doomed nature of the alliance. McMahon uses a similar example, from Russian delegate
Zhdanov who spoke of “world now divided into two camps”20.

However, McMahon does recognise there were crucial failures made by both the East and Western
powers. One element of failure McMahon argues propelled tensions to Cold War, was the Soviets
inability to comply with the agreed terms at Yalta and Potsdam. Despite agreeing to restricted
spheres of influence under which each power would operate, the USSR expanded it’s territories
through both political pressure and military occupation. This was a direct violation on the
‘Declaration of Liberated Europe’21 and showed an utter disregard by Stalin of the promises made to
the US at Yalta. Partly due to the atrocities that Russia had faced in WWII, yet partly due to his
paranoid nature, Stalin breached the terms in order to form a region of Satellite or ‘buffer’ states-
protecting the heart of the Soviet empire. He imposed “subservient governments on Poland,
Romania and Bulgaria”22, despite the declaration stating that free elections were to be held across
Europe to promote democracy. McMahon offers the “Soviets crude and brutal repression of non-
communist Poles”23 as evidence of Stalin’s transgressions. Nations supposedly liberated from fascism
by the Red Army were now subjugated to communist authoritarianism instead. This of course
sparked concerns from the West, wanting to protect both their own desire to uphold capitalist
values worldwide; as well as their crippled neighbour’s freedom in Eastern Europe.

It is perhaps these apprehensions which spurred diplomat Kennan to write such a damning report in
his ‘Long Telegram’ of 1946; in which he describes “new heights of [Soviet] military power in order
to guarantee external security on their internally weak regime”24. Whilst this played to a fear
amongst the American people of a depraved, Russian dictator; McMahon argues that “Soviet
behaviour alone did not warrant the degree of alarm emanating from Western Capitals” 25. American
politicians chose to overlook the times where Stalin was compliant: holding free elections in Hungary
and Czechoslovakia, or avoiding interference in French and Italian elections. Furthermore, McMahon
argues that America also made some crucial errors which fuelled hostility in the post war years. A
key point of contention caused by the US was the introduction of Marshal Aid. Whilst not a directly
vicious act, Truman’s Doctrine and monetary support for Europe sent clear and threatening
messages to the Kremlin. The President was of the view that countries in times of financial crisis are
more likely to fall to extremism; so, called for the “United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by outside pressure”26 showing his outright contempt for Stalin’s
regime. Moreover, Russia itself was in desperate need of rehabilitation, yet the Marshall aid was
offered only to countries willing to hold democratic elections and free trade. Knowing this
undermined the entire soviet-communist manifest, the US knew they couldn’t accept and so were
essentially withholding aid from their supposed ally. The $13 billion dollar budget given to Marshall
Aid, completely undermined the agreed Soviet Sphere of influence and further entrenched a
European divide. This was highlighted by Molotov who “warned the Marshall plan would ‘split
Europe into two groups of states’”27.

A final, more central view both McMahon and Judt offer, is that Germany and its division in the post
war years was the key matter of contention for both the Soviet Union and USA. Whilst of course it
20
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
21
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
22
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
23
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
24
Kennan: “The Long Telegram” (1946)
25
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
26
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
27
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
took underlying hostility and antagonistic actions from either party to escalate Cold War tensions,
the ‘German problem’ is portrayed by McMahon as the predominant factor. Not dissimilar to his
initial point, McMahon highlights that Germany was a driving force of both unity and division
amongst the Grand alliance, no disputes “proved more nettlesome than those surrounding the
peace terms to be imposed on Germany”28. With Germany as a common enemy, East and West were
unified in battle- for instance the west opening a second front to aid Russia. Yet, come the end of
WWII, the allies found themselves divided in peace-time. Judt agrees, arguing that “Just as the war
had been about Germany, so was the peace”29. Each superpower had vastly differing views as to the
German outcome they wanted, therefore the settlements drawn up at Yalta to divide Germany
quickly broke down. This was coined by Churchill as the “Big Question”30. The West, learning from
the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles, wanted to rebuild Germany on a foundation of democracy.
This can be evidenced by McMahon when he explains that the US were “convinced now that the
economic recovery and future prosperity of Western Europe and united states itself, required an
economically vibrant Germany”31. To achieve this, they formed an integrated Trizonia, aided industry
and in 1948 Introduced the Deutschmark in an attempt to overcome financial difficulties. Whilst
perhaps this was done with only good intentions it excluded the Soviet zone, increased Stalin’s
paranoia and led to later struggles in the Capital. The Kremlin on the other hand wanted to cripple
Germany to prevent future threat- therefore they imposed strict communist ideals on their zone and
drained it of resources for use back in equally crippled Russia. Their answer to the US was to create
the Ost-mark and implement the Berlin blockade. Unfortunately, this reaction caused a spike in
hostility, truly dividing Germany and Europe. McMahon describes Germany as now “the single most
contentious diplomatic issue of the war, and the issue destined to remain at the heart of the Cold
War”32.

In conclusion, whilst McMahon provides a compelling argument in “The Cold War: a very short
introduction”, it is not the most extensive or evidence based extract of the three. His most
convincing argument is that the division of Germany (and the issues that caused) meant escalating
tensions between the world’s superpowers were inevitable. This theory fits cohesively with Judt’s
line of argument and together they highlight that Germany developed from an allying force into a
force of division in the Post war years. Yet, in McMahon’s evaluation of Soviet and US causes, he
makes broader judgements without fully investigating causation and reaction. This leads to a more
muddled and subsequently weaker argument towards the middle of the extract. Perhaps a more in-
depth evaluation of US policy to counterbalance that of the USSR could have prevented this. Gaddis
also presents a very clear judgement in “We Now Know: rethinking cold war history”. His most
engaging argument is that Stalin’s hostile personality was directly echoed through his foreign
policies, making Soviet-US relations unavoidably toxic. Yet essentially, this seems to be Gaddis’ only
argument- detracting from the extracts validity. There is little effort to explore further Soviet themes
beyond Stalin, or even develop his short look at US involvement. This leads to an argument that
doesn’t cover all the potential factors and influences. Finally, Craig and Logevall offer the most
convincing argument in their joint work “America’s Cold War”. They provide a fully comprehensive
account of US domestic and international policy and how this caused tensions to escalate
worldwide. Their theories fit cohesively with evidence, and they explore a range of ideas in great
28
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
29
Judt: “Postwar” (2005) p.
30
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
31
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
32
McMahon: “The Cold War: a very short introduction” (2003) p.
depth. The most substantial of C & L’s theories, is that US economic stability, political dominance
and military power allowed them to choose a Cold War as a route of ease. Paired with Lipmann’s
critique and Taylor’s essay on Churchill, this argument holds considerable weight. Moreover, their
numerous other theories, surrounding containment and nuclear power struggle re also
substantiated with evidence. Overall therefore, it can be surmised Craig and Logevall publish the
most persuasive line of argument. In my opinion however, whilst they do consider Soviet issues,
there is a distinct lack of in-depth analysis of USSR policy. As I do believe Stalin’s attitudes played a
certain role in the Origins of the Cold War, the silence on the matter in the extract does prove a flaw
of C & L’s work. Yet this does not detract from the fact that “America’s Cold War” stands as the most
valid and useful extract.

Bibliography

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and Ann Lane, 2001
 Judt T., ‘Postwar’ 2005
 Leonard A., (ed), ‘Unit 3 Option E2: A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944-
90’, 2012
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