Courage

Courage
Oxford Handbooks Online

Courage
Cynthia L. S. Pury, Alice M. Brawley, Shane J. Lopez, and Emily A. Burnett
The Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology, 3rd Edition
Edited by C.R. Snyder, Shane J. Lopez, Lisa M. Edwards, and Susana C. Marques
Subject: Psychology, Social Psychology Online Publication Date: Sep 2016

DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199396511.013.30
Abstract and Keywords
Courage is a well-praised but little-researched virtue, defined as voluntarily facing

personal risk in pursuit of a worthy goal. Scientific research on courage has been steadily
gaining momentum for the past decade. After providing a historical perspective, this
chapter discusses a wide range of topics from modern courage theory. The key
dimensions of courage (volition, goal, and risk) are introduced, and distinct types of
courage are defined, based on how they differ on these key dimensions. Unique features
present in select types of courage are also examined, including felt responsibility to act
and the presence of fear. Several models for conceptualizing and evaluating courageous
actions are reviewed, featuring a comparison of process and accolade courage.
Psychological states and situational factors affecting courageous actions are considered,
including emotional states, personal values, and social influences. Measurement tools for
courage are described and appraised, and future directions for research and practice are
discussed.
Keywords: courage, bravery, valor, values, human strengths
Introduction
Courage has been praised by philosophers as a key virtue, perhaps even the key virtue,
necessary for the full expression of all other virtues (e.g., Johnson [quoted in Boswell,
1791/2004]). For Aristotle (ca. 350 BCE/1999), courage lies between the extremes of
cowardice and rashness. Individual situations and abilities determine cowardice and
rashness, thus leading to the same action being regarded as courageous for one person
and cowardly or rash for another. Stoic philosophers wrote about the courage to choose
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Courage
to maintain one’s integrity in the face of life’s difficulties. The existentialist tradition
examines courage as the act of facing freedom with full awareness of our responsibility
(Putman, 2010).
The types of people and actions praised as courageous change as society changes. For
example, steadfast support of a lost or doomed cause was considered quite heroic in the
early twentieth century, but it may be seen as a sign of inflexibility today (Barczewski,
2009; Knight & Saal, 1986).
Despite changes in the types of actions praised for courage, courage itself is valued
universally across cultures (e.g., Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005). It is also of
societal interest: Google hits of web pages for the terms courage, bravery, or heroism
(about 2,930,000) are about one-quarter as common as those for the terms fear, anxiety,
or avoidance (about 12,200,000).
Interest from psychologists has been more limited. As indexed by PsycINFO on Dec. 18,
2014, courage, bravery, or heroism were key words for 289 peer-reviewed entries,
whereas fear, anxiety, or avoidance were key words for 68,877 peer-reviewed entries; a
ratio of approximately 1:238. Research on courage has gained momentum: over half of all
peer-reviewed studies on courage have been published since 2008.
Early Courage Research

Lord (1918) applied the psychological principles of his time to understand courage, which
he proposed occurs when the instinct of fear is overridden by another, stronger instinct or
sentiment. He described multiple types of courageous actions, based on the type of
opposing instinct or sentiment. In what he called “simpler and lower forms” of courage,
the opposing force is an instinct: anger, sex, or self-assertion. In higher forms of courage,
the opposing force is an acquired sentiment: like love, honor, or duty. Courageous acts
taken for patriotism, a more abstract concept, were regarded by Lord as higher still, with
the highest forms representing a mature philosophy of life, honor of self-respect, religious
faith, and the dignity of persons. The penultimate form of courage, the “courage of
despair” involves the pursuit of a lost cause to which one is supremely loyal and with
which one is self-identified (and fits Barczewski’s [2009] description of Lord’s era).
Influenced by World War I, he discussed the role of courage in training solders and
treating shell-shock. Lord, (a professor in the United States) also argued German soldiers
were pursuing a baser sentiment than Allied soldiers and were thus less courageous.
Other early psychological work also focused on military courage. Gee (1931) sampled
United States Army records from World War I for bravery citations and found five
categories. Individual bravery is acting alone during battle, such as charging a machine
gun nest. Voluntary collective bravery is voluntary membership in a group on a dangerous
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Courage
mission. Line of duty bravery is accomplishing assigned duties while under attack.
Altruistic bravery is saving others despite risk to oneself. Finally, bravery under physical
duress is carrying on with a mission despite wounds.
Shaffer (1947) defined courage as a reduction of fear and used retrospective surveys of
aerial combat fliers during World War II. He found three categories of beliefs or actions
that increased courage: confidence in equipment, crew, and leaders; effective activity;
and social stimulation. External rewards or a broader moral commitment to the war did
not reduce fear; however, similar beliefs did make missions easier.
Deutsch (1961) presented a model of social courage, what most today would call “moral
courage,” as inner conviction divided by punishment potential. Courage can be changed
by changing the inner conviction, the punishment potential, or the perception of either.
Deutsch also proposed both external forces and individual differences might account for
differences in courageous behavior: a later study found teacher ratings of moral courage,
such as standing up for a just but unpopular cause, correlates with moral judgement in
children (Gibbs et al., 1986).
Rachman (1990) returned the focus of courage research to the behaviors of military
personnel and professionals in high-risk occupations. His work is discussed in a
subsequent section on negative emotional states associated with courage.
Features and Types of Courage

A variety of definitions of courage include the idea of taking an action despite internal or
external opposition (e.g., Lopez, O’Byrne, & Petersen, 2003; Peterson & Seligman, 2004b;
Worline & Steen, 2004). The greater the opposition, the more likely the action is to be
appraised as courageous, but the less likely the action is to occur in the first place (see
Miller, 2002; Pury & Starkey, 2010). Similarly, although a heightened sense of personal
responsibility seems to be an integral part of at least some courageous actions
(Schilpzand, Hekman, & Mitchell, 2015), awards for courage commonly mention actions
taken that are above or outside one’s normal moral duty (e.g., Chambers, 2004). Thus, in
evaluating courage theory and research, particularly when evaluating opposing states or
traits such as fear or responsibility to act, it is important to distinguish the likelihood of
the actor’s behaving courageously (process courage) from the likelihood of an observer’s
appraising action as courageous (accolade courage: Pury & Starkey, 2010). Empirical
attempts to define courage have concentrated on two major areas: determining the
defining features that all courageous actors or persons have in common (in either process
or accolade courage), and delineating different types or brands of courage.
Necessary Features of Courage
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Rate, Clarke, Lindsay, and Sternberg (2007) investigated implicit definitions of courage
using a variety of techniques. First, participants listed behaviors of ideally courageous
others (Study 1). These behaviors then were rated by a second sample on how
“distinctively characteristic” they were of a courageous person (Study 2). The top
characteristics identified in Study 2 were then used in a card-sorting task to identify
major dimensions of courageous behavior (Study 3). Finally, these dimensions were used
to create vignettes to ensure that the dimensions identified are used by individuals in
judging behavior to be courageous (Study 4). Rate et al. thus proposed four defining
features of courage for adults. The first two are variations on intentional behavior:
willfulness and intentionality, and mindful deliberation. The third was objective
substantial risk to the actor; and the fourth, a noble or worthy end. Fear occupied an
unusual and perhaps intermediary role: although acting despite fear emerged as a
relevant dimension in Studies 2 and 3, it was strongly correlated with risk to the actor in
Study 4 and thus did not uniquely predict ratings of courageousness. Based on
subsequent content analysis, this definition has been simplified to (a) a willing,
intentional act; (b) involving substantial danger, difficulty, or risk to the actor; (c)
primarily motivated to bring about a noble good or morally worthy purpose (Rate, 2010,
p. 62). Retrospective narrative accounts of people’s own courageous actions also support
the removal of both deliberation (Rand & Epstein, 2014) and fear (Pury, Kowalski, &
Spearman, 2007) from the requirements of courage. Other research suggests that
children may have a simpler picture of courage that increases in complexity with age
(e.g., Szagun & Schäuble, 1997).
These three features—intentionality, risk, and noble goal—are subjective, and differ in
their contribution to process and accolade courage.
Types of Courageous Actions
While Rate et al.’s (2007) research examines common core features for all courageous
acts, other research has focused on differentiating among types of courageous actions.
The most commonly mentioned types of courage are physical courage, or facing physical
risks and dangers; and moral courage, or standing up for a moral principle in the face of
social opposition (Lopez et al., 2003). A more recently added third type is called variously
vital courage (Finfgeld, 1999) or psychological courage (Putman, 2004). Both vital and
psychological courage involve transcendence of personal limitations, although vital
courage also can involve very real physical risks associated with medical illnesses. Each
of these three types of courage has a different pattern of risks and difficulties: physical
courage involves physical risks and difficulties, moral courage involves a risk to one’s
social image, and both moral and psychological courage involve internal struggles (Pury
et al., 2007).
Level of risk also can be used to differentiate courageous acts. Extreme risk to life and
limb in pursuit of social values is commonly called heroism (Becker & Eagly, 2004;
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Smirnov, Arrow, Kennett, & Orbell, 2007). The extent to which the mechanisms of
heroism differ from other types of courage is unknown, although preliminary results
suggest that heroic acts may be taken with less deliberation (Rand & Epstein, 2014).
Courage also can be typed by motivation: civil courage is brave action on behalf of moral
norms, taken without regard to the risk to the actor (Greitemeyer, Osswald, Fischer, &
Frey, 2007). Military courage is risking one’s life for the group in a military context (e.g.,
Castro, 2006; Smirnov et al., 2007). Existential courage (e.g., Larsen & Giles, 1976) is
expressing authenticity in the face of a threat to one’s survival or social standing.
Returning to Rate’s (2010) three-part definition (intentionality, risk to actor, and noble
goal), the first element, intentionality, may be presumed to differ in quantity rather than
in quality across different actions. Both risks to the actor and noble goals, however, differ
in both quality as well as quantity. These qualitative differences might reflect the
traditional typology of courage, with expected risk–goal pairings due to the nature of
common situations. Physical courage, for example, requires a physical risk to the actor
and, because saving someone else from physical danger often entails the rescuer’s facing
the same danger, it may often have a goal of saving someone else from bodily harm.
Moral courage, on the other hand, requires that one is standing up to others for a moral
principle, which is likely to require facing the risk of social rejection. Psychological
courage requires a risk to one’s emotional stability (Putman, 2004), which often
accompanies personal growth or wellness. However, blends between the typical risk of
one type of courage and the typical goal of another type of courage also exist. Empirical
support for blended courage has been found in active-duty soldiers seeking mental health
treatment (a goal for personal wellness, associated with psychological courage) despite
the risk of stigmatization for seeking treatment (a risk of social rejection, associated with
moral courage; Pury, Britt, Zinzow, & Raymond, 2014). Blended types of courage can also
be seen in those advocating a morally relevant social change (a goal consistent with
moral courage) despite the risk of physical harm or even death at the hands of those in
power (a risk consistent with physical courage). Likewise, taking car keys away from an
intoxicated friend aims to prevent physical harm to the friend and others (a goal
consistent with physical courage) while risking the friend’s anger (a risk more consistent
with moral courage).
In both process and accolade courage, the assessment of both the risk and the goal is
likely to be subjective. The effect of subjective risk can be seen in the distinction between
personal courage, or actions that are courageous for the specific actor; and general
courage, or actions that would be courageous if performed by anyone (Pury et al., 2007).
Actions high in personal courage, such as someone with a phobia approaching their
feared situation, are courageous just for that individual. Actions high in general courage,
on the other hand, are those taken despite a risk (such as serious physical injury) that
most people would see as risky (Pury et al., 2007).
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Courage
While personal and general courage can be differentiated by subjective agreement

regarding risks, other types of courage can be differentiated in terms of subjective
agreement about the value of the goals of the action. An extreme form of this, bad
courage, happens when actors voluntarily pursue, despite personal risk, a goal that is
both valuable to them and abhorrent to society (Pury, Starkey, Kulik, Skjerning, &
Sullivan, 2015; Pury & Starkey, 2010). Evidence of bad courage has been found in
retrospective interviews of terrorists (Silke, 2004) and in the prospective or concurrent
published statements of terrorists, spree killers, and those attempting or completing
suicide (Pury et al., 2015).
Psychological Traits, States, and Processes

Associated with Courage
Psychological Traits
In the Values in Action system (VIA; Peterson & Seligman, 2004b), the universal virtue of
courage is characterized by bravery, or not avoiding threat; persistence, or finishing what
one starts; integrity, or acting authentically; and vigor, or approaching situations with
energy. Empirically, persistence, bravery, and integrity seem to be common to a wide
variety of courageous actions, while vigor is not (Pury & Kowalski, 2007).
Negative Emotional States
Many accounts define courage as acting in opposition to a variety of emotional forces,

particularly those of fear. Rachman (1990) examined subjective and physiological fear
responses in courageous populations, such as decorated bomb-disposal operators.
Participants from highly courageous samples commonly had lower subjective and
physiological fear responses to laboratory stressors than participants from less
courageous samples (e.g., Cox, Hallam, O’Connor, & Rachman, 1983; O’Connor, Hallam,
& Rachman, 1985). If courage is a behavioral approach in the face of subjective or
physiological fear, individuals engaging in societally labeled courageous actions might
better be called fearless than courageous. This fearlessness develops much like the
reduction of fear in exposure therapy: trainees for objectively dangerous military jobs
show a reduction in fear and an increase in confidence as training progresses, just as
clients with phobias show reduced fear and increased confidence over the course of
exposure therapy (Rachman, 1990).
The extent to which fear is a part of appraisal of courage may vary with the reference
group. Fear has a positive correlation with personal courage but is unrelated to appraisal
of the general courage of an action (Pury et al., 2007).
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Fear may not be the only emotional state associated with courage: Castro (2006) defines
courage as overcoming a threat that may be accompanied by fear, sadness, or anger.
Whatever the emotional state, however, it has an action tendency that opposes the
courageous action.
Morally Relevant States
Historically, both Lord and Deutsch propose an additional internal state in courage—an
instinct or sentiment for Lord, and an inner conviction for Deutsch—that overcomes fear.
More recently, Rate et al. (2007) found that lay definitions of courage included the pursuit
of a noble goal. Fitting with these findings, the Integrated Theory of Moral Conviction
suggests that the moral significance of a belief greatly affects how an individual thinks,
feels, and reacts in situations involving that belief (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2008).
When a belief is held with moral conviction, it becomes a “moral mandate,” compelling
one to uphold the belief in any situation, regardless of the risks or consequences. What
causes one individual’s moral beliefs to differ from others’? Graham et al. (2011) and
Haidt (2012) explain the differences in individually held moral beliefs by proposing the
five core oppositional foundations of morality: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/
betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. According to these studies, the
level of priority one assigns to each of these five foundations determines what sort of
moral causes one finds most compelling, and therefore which beliefs one would be most
likely to defend through courageous action.
Many recent psychological investigations have highlighted the emotional nature of moral
beliefs (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Haidt (2003) defines
“moral emotions” as feelings that are elicited by violations of one’s moral code and that
motivate behavior to uphold one’s moral convictions. Haidt proposes that violations of
different types of morally held beliefs lead to different specific reactions: the moral
emotions and action tendencies elicited by a moral violation depend on what the moral
subject matter is. Many studies have likewise examined which internal states are present
while taking courageous actions. Greitemeyer et al. (2007) found that the experience of
civil courage commonly includes feelings of indignation and empathy, while Halmburger,
Baumert, and Schmitt (2015) found that anger (rather than personal guilt) is associated
with taking action against an apparent thief. In a process model of the subjective
experience of courage, Hannah, Sweeney, and Lester (2007) propose that a variety of
internal characteristics influence courageous behavior: inner convictions or values, duty,
selflessness, integrity, honor, valor, loyalty, and independence.
Pury et al. (2015) propose that bad courage occurs when an actor holds a socially
acceptable moral belief, but undertakes an extreme, socially unacceptable action for the
sake of upholding that belief. This concept is supported by Skitka and Houston (2001),
who examined the effect of moral convictions on how people reason about fairness, and
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found that the stronger the moral conviction, the less likely people were to care about
procedural justice.
Efficacy-Relevant States
Hannah et al.’s (2007) model also includes somewhat transient states such as self-,
collective-, and means-efficacy; hope, resiliency, and positive emotions. Other research
reveals that courageous actions are commonly associated with feelings of confidence
(Pury et al., 2007; Rachman, 1990). This confidence is positively correlated with ratings
of the general courage of the action and has no correlation with the personal courage of
the action, while fear is correlated with personal courage and has no correlation with
general courage (Pury et al., 2007).
Another efficacy-relevant state—hope, or the ability to develop pathways to reach a

desired goal and one’s perceived agency to reach those goals (Snyder, 2002)—has been
correlated with courage in both theory (Hannah et al., 2007) and empirical observation
(Kowalski et al., 2006; Pury & Kowalski, 2007).
Finally, the accolade of courage for a previous action can depend upon the success of the
action in reaching the goal. More successful actions are seen as more courageous, even
by observers who state that courage does not depend on the outcome (Pury & Hensel,
2010).
Character Development
Believing that one has acted with courage may increase the chance that one will take
future courageous actions. Boyd and Ross (1994) report anecdotal evidence showing
benefits in self-perception and inner resources following describing a past courageous
action. Finfgeld (1999) proposes labeling oneself a “courageous person” promotes vital
courage and personal growth. In the Battlemind model of courage (Castro, 2006),
courageous actions lead to the development of self-confidence and selfless love, which
then lead to further courageous behavior. Similarly, Hannah et al. (2007) propose that
retroactively labeling one’s action as courageous leads to changes in the positive states,
values, and beliefs that make future courageous behavior more likely.
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Social Influence
Zimbardo’s (2007) contextual model of heroism proposes that strong situational

determinants, primarily from negative social forces, can blind actors to inherently
immoral action. When in the midst of such social forces, individuals will be less likely to
see anything amiss with behavior that receives the formal or informal sanction of the
group. Persons acting with apparent moral courage to end immoral group behavior, then,
are most likely to be those who are not influenced by the social forces of the group. Moral
mandates have been found to do just that: multiple studies have observed that believing
in a principle with moral conviction reduces the effects of group influence when it comes
to standing up for and defending that belief (Aramovich, Lytle, & Skitka, 2012; Hornsey,
Majkut, Terry, & McKimmie, 2003).
The well-known bystander effect (e.g., Latané & Nida, 1981) in which people are less
likely to intervene on others’ behalf when in a group than when alone, disappears when
the threat to the potential victim and the actor is more extreme (Fischer, Greitemeyer,
Pollozek, & Frey, 2006). The presence of a more extreme threat to the actor may change
the behavior from one of simple altruism to one of civil courage (Greitemeyer et al.,
2007); thus suggesting that this common social influence may not work for at least some
types of courageous behavior.
Some social forces might reinforce courage: Hannah et al.’s (2007) model proposes that
positive social forces such as interdependence, social identity, cohesion, and
informational influence can promote courageous behavior. Consistent data were reported
by Shaffer’s (1947) observation of the importance of duty to fellow crew members and
observation of calm behavior in others in courageous behavior of World War II flyers.
Finally, observing courageous behavior in others creates its own social influence. Worline
(2004) found that observation of the courageous behaviors of others in the workplace
leads observers to three discernible outcomes. At the individual level, observers report
feelings of inspiration and the possibility of change. At the organizational level, observers
report actual change through what Worline terms creative fractures, when the moral
beauty of a courageous action inspires others to make changes. In a laboratory study,
Nemeth and Chiles (1988) used a modified Asch paradigm in which participants were
asked to name colors amongst confederates who sometimes, as a group, gave incorrect
responses. Participants who had been exposed to an earlier group in which a lone
confederate offered dissenting (and incorrect) answers were more likely to dissent
themselves.
Altruism
Courageous actions are commonly taken to benefit another. Kindness (Fagin-Jones &
Midlarsky, 2007; Pury & Kowalski, 2007) and altruistic motivations (Becker & Eagly,
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2004) frequently accompany courageous actions and actors. It should be noted, however,
that not all actions described as “courageous” benefit others; only those that do are likely
to be high in kindness.
Additionally, courageous actions seem to be more than mere altruism. In a direct

comparison between altruistic actions and civilly courageous actions, Greitemeyer,
Fischer, Kastenmüller, and Frey (2006) compared participant recollections of taking or
failing to take an altruistic action and taking or failing to take a civilly courageous action.
Actions requiring civil courage were perceived more quickly, were riskier and less
dependent on skills, and generated more morally relevant emotions. Moreover, actual
intervention was predicted for civil courage by judgement of responsibility, intervention
skills, negative consequences of action, societal moral norms, and anger; and for
altruistic action by perception speed and empathy. Thus, while altruism and its associated
strength of kindness might be commonly expressed in courageous actions, taking a
courageous action may be different from taking a purely altruistic but low-risk action.
Self-Regulation
Serkerka and Bagozzi (2007) propose a self-regulation model of moral courage within an
organization. In their model, moral courage is a response to an ethical challenge, which is
processed using anticipated emotions, self-efficacy, subjective and group norms, and
emotional response to the means to reach the goal. This processing leads to a desire to
act, which combines with self-regulation to lead to a decision to act, and thence to the
action itself. The self-regulatory processes may be automatic, or they may be conscious
and influenced by self-consciousness and social identity.
Gender Differences
Although men are disproportionately represented in some citations for extreme physical
courage such as the Carnegie Hero Medal, empirical investigations of other types of
heroism (Becker & Eagly, 2004) and subjective reports of courageous action (Pury et al.,
2007) reveal fewer gender differences. The gender differences that have been observed
seem to be due to instrumental requirements for upper-body strength and speed, favoring
males; empathic concern, favoring females; and role differentiation. Occupational roles
protecting the community and society and informal roles protecting the family unit favor
males; informal roles of kin or social relationship aiding specific individuals and formal
occupational roles in which the risks are not a direct outcome of the role (e.g., a Peace
Corps volunteer in a dangerous country) favor females (Becker & Eagly, 2004).
Measurement of Courage
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Self-Report Measures of Courage: Context-Free
The Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS, Peterson & Seligman, 2004a)
includes strengths of courage. The entire VIA-IS measures the 24 different strengths in
the VIA system that load onto the six VIA virtues, including courage. Internal consistency
for many populations appears adequate (e.g., Linley, Maltby, Wood, Joseph, Harrington,
Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2007; Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2004; Peterson &
Seligman, 2004a) and is similar across American, English, and Japanese samples (Linley
et al., 2007; Shimai, Otake, & Park, 2006). Strengths show expected cultural differences
(e.g., Shimai, Otake, Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2006; Linley et al., 2007), as well as
sensitivity to demographic variables of gender and age (e.g., Linley et al., 2007) and to
historical events (Peterson & Seligman, 2003). The measure is commonly scored
ipsatively, with the rank-ordering of strengths within each person reported (e.g., Park et
al., 2004; Shimai et al., 2006). However, the empirical factor structure of the values may
differ from the original number and structure: factor-analytic analyses of the VIA have
found multiple super-ordinate factors, with the original strengths of courage frequently
appearing in different factors (e.g., McGrath, 2014). In an empirical study of VIA
strengths and courageous action, only three of the four strengths that compose the
composite virtue of courage—persistence, bravery, and honesty—were found to be
descriptive of a variety of courageous acts, whereas vitality was not particularly
descriptive (Pury & Kowalski, 2007). In the same study, two other strengths—hope and
kindness—also emerged as highly descriptive of courageous action. The VIA system
assigns those two strengths as components of the super-ordinate values of transcendence
(hope) and humanity (kindness), so investigators using the VIA-IS strengths of courage
might also include the measures of hope and kindness.
The Courage Measure (CM) consists of 12 self-report items (Norton & Weiss, 2009). The
CM asks participants to rate their propensity to act in the face of fear generally, rather
than action in specific situations or specific risks. Sample items include I tend to face my
fears, and Even if something scares me, I will not back down. The scale has a single factor
with good internal consistency. Moreover, CM scores gathered immediately before a
behavioral approach test in participants high in spider fear predicted their performance.
CM scores collected approximately three weeks earlier, however, did not (Norton &
Weiss, 2009).
The CM has also been adapted for use with children (CM-C; Muris, Mayer, & Schubert,
2010). The CM-C consists of 12 items, and again asks for self-report of propensity to act
in the face of fear generally, rather than acting in specific situations or risks. Sample
items include I try to get over my fears and If I am anxious about something, I will do or
face it anyway. Among 8–13-year-olds, the CM-C has good internal consistency reliability;
correlates positively with parent reports of courage, courageous responses to vignettes,
and personality traits of extraversion, masculinity, and openness to experience; and
correlates negatively with agreeableness and self-reported anxiety. In another study, the
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CM-C was positively related to situational courage and sensation-seeking, and negatively
related to situational fear (Muris, 2009).
Other authors, however, have questioned the construct and statistical validity of the CM
(Howard & Alipour, 2014). In particular, the CM uses a definition of courage that requires
the presence of fear, raising the concern that the CM may not adequately differentiate
courage from risk-taking or persistence in the face of fear. Second, the reverse-coded
items of the CM may introduce a second empirical factor into the single-factor scale.
Howard and Alipour demonstrated that the removal of the reverse-coded items resolved
this issue while retaining good internal consistency.
Self-Report Measures of Courage: Specific Contexts
Self-reports of willingness to act in a variety of specific circumstances are used by a

number of different scales measuring courage. The Woodard-Pury Courage Scale
(WPCS-23; Woodard, 2004; Woodard & Pury, 2007) consists of 23 items and four factors:
willingness to act for one’s job or self-interest (e.g., I would accept an important project
at my place of employment even though it would bring intense public criticism and
publicity), willingness to act for one’s beliefs (e.g., If called upon during times of national
emergency, I would give my life for my country), willingness to act despite or on behalf of
specific others (e.g., Intense social pressure would not stop me from doing the right
thing), and willingness to act within a family (I could approach someone whose family
members had just been killed, knowing they were feeling overwhelming grief).
Participants are asked to what extent they would agree or disagree, then asked how much
fear they would feel in that situation. Although the original scoring measured courage as
the product of willingness to act and fear for each situation (Woodard, 2004), the revised
scoring is based solely on willingness to act (Woodard & Pury, 2007). The WPCS-23
appears to have good internal consistency and preliminary validity (Woodard & Pury,
2007).
The Munich Civil Courage Instrument (MuZI: Kastenmüller, Greitemeyer, Fischer, & Frey,
2007) takes a similar approach to measuring civil courage. Respondents indicate their
intention to intervene in three types of situations in which others are threatening their
social beliefs: negative slogans (e.g., In the pedestrian area right wing extremists shout
slogans against disabled and homosexual people), in the workplace (e.g., Some of your
colleagues try to isolate another colleague), and physical violence (e.g., In the subway a
young woman is bothered by two right wing extremists). It has adequate reliability and
validity (Kastenmüller et al., 2007). The MuZI is available only in German at present.
The Courage to Challenge scale (Smith & Gray, 2009) was developed to measure the
degree to which lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) individuals challenge
negative social messages regarding their sexual orientation or gender expression. The
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authors developed an 18-item, single-factor measure with good reliability and construct
validity.
The Sport Courage Scale (SCS; Konter & Ng, 2012) focuses on courage as it relates to
sport experiences. The 31-item SCS consists of five factors: Determination, Mastery,
Assertiveness, Venturesome, and Sacrifice Behaviors, which have shown good internal
validity and test–retest reliability among young (average age = 15.6) Turkish athletes.
Currently, the SCS is only available in Turkish.
Academic courage was proposed by Martin (2011) as an orientation towards academic

performance that comprised simultaneously high levels of perseverance and fear,
measured using the persistence and anxiety four-item subscales of the Motivation and
Engagement Scale–High School (MES-HS; Martin, 2007). These MES-HS subscales have
demonstrated good internal consistency (e.g., Martin, 2007, 2011). Martin (2011) found
no difference between courage and confidence (i.e., high perseverance and low fear) on
many measures of academic performance, but proposed that courage could be an
effective response to fear in academic settings.
Courage in the Workplace
A number of studies have focused on courage in workplace settings. The concept of

professional moral courage (PMC; Sekerka, Bagozzi, & Charnigo, 2009) was proposed as
a developable managerial competency applicable to a variety of occupations. PMC
includes five factors of moral agency (e.g., I am the type of person who is unfailing when
it comes to doing the right thing at work), multiple values (e.g., No matter what, I
consider how both my organization’s values and my personal values apply to the situation
before making decisions), endurance of threats (e.g., When I encounter an ethical
challenge, I take it on with moral action, regardless of how it may negatively impact how
others see me), going beyond compliance (e.g., It is important that we go beyond the
legal requirements but seek to accomplish our tasks with ethical action as well), and
moral goals (e.g., It is important for me to use prudential judgement in making decisions
at work). The measure demonstrated convergent and discriminant validity. Harbour and
Kisfalvi (2014) developed the concept of managerial moral courage after they found that a
managerial sample tended to view courage as having a moral dimension. These authors
further identified two types of managerial moral courage: the courage to act, and the
courage to be.
The Organizational Courage Assessment (OCA; Kilmann, O’Hara, & Strauss, 2010)
measures courage in organizations along two factors of acting—measured as the
frequency of observing specific acts of courage—despite fear—measured as the perceived
fear of performing those same specific acts of courage. Along these two dimensions, the
authors identify four types of organizational courage experiences: this two-factor
structure had moderate fit to a cross-validation sample, and the authors found that it
correlated as hypothesized with several structural and environmental workplace
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Courage
variables, as well as with job performance and satisfaction. Other researchers have
focused on the process of taking courageous acts in the workplace: Schilpzand et al.
(2015) found that acts of courage in the workplace consisted of a two-stage process, in
which the individual first determines his or her level of responsibility to act, and then
evaluates the potential social costs of acting. The authors also found that courageous acts
occurred in four types of situations—workplace errors, abuse of power, ambiguous
situations, or a person in need.
Vignettes
Various researchers have asked participants to rate the courageousness of a set of

carefully controlled vignettes (e.g., Greitemeyer et al., 2006, Study 1; Rate et al., 2007;
Szagun, 1992). While this procedure offers excellent experimental control, it measures
the accolade courage associated with appraisals rather than the process courage
associated with action. By contrast, Baumert, Halmburger, and Schmitt (2013) measured
projected process courage. They used vignettes to test whether participants would
intervene in a situation in which another participant stole a mobile phone. These authors
developed a three-item Theft Intervention Measure for use in their study (e.g., I would not
get involved), which measures the courage to intervene in this norm-violation situation.
The measure had good internal consistency.
Other Courage-Measurement Procedures
Because the types of risky situations calling for courage are uncommon and ethical
laboratory replication is difficult, narrative data are commonly collected (e.g., Finfgeld,
1999; Greitemeyer et al., 2006, Study 2; Koerner, 2014; Pury et al., 2007; Pury &
Kowalski, 2007; Worline, 2004). While such narratives provide rich contextual details and
are suitable for exploratory approaches, they also face the limits of self-report. As
commonly used—asking participants for exemplars of courageous action—they probably
measure aspects of both accolade and process courage.
Life data have been used to find samples of individuals who have taken moderately to
extremely dangerous actions, such as living kidney donors (Becker & Eagly, 2004),
volunteers in violent settings (Becker & Eagly, 2004), Holocaust rescuers (Becker &
Eagly, 2004; Fagin-Jones & Midlarsky, 2007), winners of medals for bravery (Becker &
Eagly, 2004; Cox et al., 1983), or workers who are employed in dangerous occupations
(O’Connor et al., 1985). These samples may be difficult to procure, and, as in the case of
more general narrative data, experimental control of them is not possible.
Laboratory Situations
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Courage
Few studies have utilized a controlled, standardized procedure to bring courageous

action into a laboratory setting. Cox et al. (1983) exposed participants to an increasingly
insolvable problem, with electric shock as punishment for an incorrect answer. Fischer et
al.’s (2006) participants believed they were watching a live video feed in which a female
student was harassed by either a threatening or a non-threatening male student, and
their time to intervention was recorded. Nemeth and Chiles (1988) created a modified
Asch paradigm, with participants resisting social pressure to report their own perceptual
experience instead of the group’s experience. Norton and Weiss (2009) asked participants
who were high in spider fear to get as close to a display of taxidermied spiders as comfort
allowed. Each effort examined a different associated factor of courage, and no consistent
efforts have been made to develop a model based on multiple types of observable
performance.
Future Directions
Courage is a basic psychological phenomenon that warrants further investigation before
applications to practice can be developed. To date, process courage has been more
difficult to study than accolade courage, because setting up a convincing but controlled
situation in which someone might or might not behave courageously is quite difficult.
Four other gaps in courage research also need further attention.
How does being courageous affect future life outcomes?

Preliminary data suggest that the picture may not be entirely positive: interviews of
former militia members and bomb-disposal technicians about their own courageous
behaviors found few if any personal benefits to courageous acts (Walshe & Briner, 2008).
The important goals pursued by these samples, however, may have been societal rather
than personal. It may be that courageous actions taken specifically to pursue important
life outcomes at an individual level, such as education, medical or fertility treatment,
career advancement, or even aiding a loved one rather than unknown others, might lead
to an increased likelihood of personal benefit.
How does culture affect courage?

Views of risks, worthwhile goals, and even potentially the voluntariness of an action can
depend upon the cultural context. Currently, cross-cultural data on courage are extremely
limited. While Dahlsgaard et al. (2005) found that courage was not explicitly mentioned in
three Eastern traditions (Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism), traditional Chinese
medicine does suggest a specific bodily location for courage—the gallbladder (Yu, 2003).
Smirnov et al. (2007) describe military heroism as an evolved trait based our evolutionary
ancestors’ warlike past: thus, prior cultural conditions may have shaped our genetic
propensity today.
How does accolade courage affect others?
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Courage
Learning about courageous actions of others may inspire courageous actions in the
observer (e.g., Nemeth & Chiles, 1988; Worline, 2004). As these honors continue, they
might be expanded to include more awards for moral and perhaps even psychological
courage in pursuit of socially valued goals. The effect of acknowledgement of
unsuccessful courageous actions should also be considered, as current awards for
courage do not typically acknowledge unsuccessful actions (Pury & Hensel, 2010; Pury &
Starkey, 2010).
How can (and when should) practitioners intervene to increase courage?

As positive psychologists learn more about courage, the mechanisms that we find can be
used to create interventions to increase courage. Culture may also affect ways in which
people attempt to increase their own courage, and these culturally diverse practices may
inform future courage interventions (Biswas-Diener, 2012). However, the ethical
implications of asking someone to risk harm to themselves for a larger goal, as well as the
existence of bad courage, suggest that the moral good of courage interventions might not
always be a given.
Conclusion
Recent studies on the psychological processes involved in courageous action provide a
promising foundation. To date, these efforts have concentrated on the development of
shared, empirically supported definitions of courage, typologies of courage, and related
features. Measures of individual differences in courage and of courageous behavior are
being refined, and models are being developed and tested. We expect a bright future for
courage research, including applications to practice after definitions, measures, and
models gain empirical support.
Future Questions
1. How does being courageous affect future life outcomes?
2. How does culture affect courage?
3. How does accolade courage affect others?
4. How can (and when should) practitioners intervene to increase courage?
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Cynthia L. S. Pury
Cynthia L. S. Pury, Clemson University
Alice M. Brawley
Alice M. Brawley, Clemson University
Shane J. Lopez
Shane J. Lopez Clifton Strengths Institute School of Business University of Kansas

Lawrence, KS
Emily A. Burnett
Emily A. Burnett, Clemson University
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Courage

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Courage

Oxford Handbooks Online

Subject: Psychology, Social Psychology Online Publication Date: Sep 2016

Abstract and Keywords

Courage is a well-praised but little-researched virtue, defined as voluntarily facing

Keywords: courage, bravery, valor, values, human strengths

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Early Courage Research

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Features and Types of Courage

Necessary Features of Courage

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Types of Courageous Actions

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

While personal and general courage can be differentiated by subjective agreement

Psychological Traits, States, and Processes

Negative Emotional States

Many accounts define courage as acting in opposition to a variety of emotional forces,

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Morally Relevant States

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Another efficacy-relevant state—hope, or the ability to develop pathways to reach a

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Zimbardo’s (2007) contextual model of heroism proposes that strong situational

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Additionally, courageous actions seem to be more than mere altruism. In a direct

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Self-Report Measures of Courage: Context-Free

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Self-Report Measures of Courage: Specific Contexts

Self-reports of willingness to act in a variety of specific circumstances are used by a

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Academic courage was proposed by Martin (2011) as an orientation towards academic

Courage in the Workplace

A number of studies have focused on courage in workplace settings. The concept of

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Various researchers have asked participants to rate the courageousness of a set of

Other Courage-Measurement Procedures

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Few studies have utilized a controlled, standardized procedure to bring courageous

How does being courageous affect future life outcomes?

How does culture affect courage?

How does accolade courage affect others?

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

How can (and when should) practitioners intervene to increase courage?

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Chambers, D. R. (2004). A Century of Heroes. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh

Deutsch, M. (1961). Courage as a concept in social psychology. Journal of Social

Finfgeld, D. (1999). Courage as a process of pushing beyond the struggle. Qualitative

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Koerner, M. M. (2014). Courage as identity work: Accounts of workplace courage.

Lord, H. G. (1918). The psychology of courage. Boston, MA: John W. Luce.

Subscriber: Freie Universitaet Berlin; date: 15 November 2018

Martin, A. J. (2007). Examining a multidimensional model of student motivation and