The University of Westminster

Regent Campus

School of Social Sciences, Humanities, and Languages

Multi-ethnic state-building in Kosovo: Challenges and

consequences to its statehood

Total words:13738

A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the

Master of Arts degree in International Relations and Democratic Politics

Altin Gjeta

August, 2019

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Acknowledgements

This research project would not have been possible without the support of my supervisor,
family and friends who stood by me through this very engaging hard work time. Particularly,
I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Aidan Hehir for his constant support throughout the
process. The conversations with him have been very fruitful, particularly at the beginning
stage to clarify and structure my messy ideas. He has also been very kind in checking my
progress and giving feedback while I was writing.

I am grateful and humbly in debt to my family, my parents for their unconditional support
throughout my life and my lovely wife Ada who supported me and took care of our son
Denat while I was away from home for nearly one year. I am very grateful to my brother
Tony, who has been a source of inspiration and strength here in London while I was living
with him. Credits go to my fellows Minn Tent Bo and Pilirani Phiri with whom I shared
happy moments and found a shoulder during the bad ones. I would like to wholeheartedly
thank my friend Hanna Hindstrom for her very valuable help with editing. Lastly, I am
extremely grateful to the UK Government for giving me a unique opportunity by granting me
the Chevening Scholarship award. Without their support it would be impossible for me to
come and study here at University of Westminster.

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 Regent Campus

University of Westminster

Name: Altin Gjeta

Date: 28th of August 2019

MA Dissertation Title:

Multi-ethnic state-building in Kosovo: Challenges and

consequences to its statehood

In confirm that the above-submitted dissertation is my own work and that all
references/sources are duly acknowledged

Signature: Altin Gjeta

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 Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 2

Introduction 5

Chapter I

1. State-building: Liberal interventionist epistemology 9

Building states to build peace 10

Building a liberal state 12

Chapter II

2. Management of diversity as objective and as challenge for state-building

in Kosovo 16

Co(i)nstitutionalisation of multi-(ethnicity) 17

Management of ethnic diversity as challenge for state-building 20

Chapter III

3. Unintended and unprevented consequences to Kosovo’s statehood 25

Emergence of a hybrid peace and a semi-democratic regime 26

A limited state with fragmented sovereignty 29

Chapter IV

4. Conclusions 34

Bibliography 38

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Introduction

The root of the conflict in Kosovo can be traced back as far as the medieval period to the
historical disputes between Serbs and Albanians, (Judah, 2008). Whereas, Malcolm holds that
the source of it can be found at the beginning of the 20th century when Kosovo was
conquered by the Serbia-Montenegro kingdom – “policies of which created a systemic
hostility and hatred on a scale that the region had never seen before”, (1998, p.xvi).
Nevertheless, the modern root of the conflict rest on the oppressive policies of the Milosevic’
regime over Kosovo Albanians during the 1980-s which culminated with the revocation of
Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, (Visoka, 2017). This was followed by a civil resistance which
later escalated into armed conflict in 1998, claiming the lives of thousands people and
displacing about 1 million from their homes. In this context, in March 1999, NATO
intervened militarily giving an end to the conflict after a 78 day air strike campaign. Based on
the UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), the international community deployed in
Kosovo its civil and security missions UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo) and KFOR (Kosovo Force), coupled afterwards with the OSCE
(Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and EU presence.

This year marked the 20th anniversary of the international civil and military intervention in
Kosovo. It has been considered one of the most extensive and ambitious interventions in a
post-conflict territory, (Paris, 2004; Hehir, 2007; Capussela, 2015; Richmond and Franks,
2011). International actors entangled peace-building and state-building to construct from
scratch a liberal state in Kosovo, which was meant to ensure self-sustainable peace. The
rationale behind liberal peace-building is that democracies do not go to war with each other
and are much less likely to face internal insurgency, (Owen, 1994; Doyle, 1983, 2005; Paris,
2004). Hence, since the beginning, international actors aimed to build a liberal democratic
state in Kosovo by envisaging it as a multi-ethnic polity which would be governed
democratically. Yet, it is ironic as Kosovo is far from being a genuine multi-ethnic society
compared to its neighbours. Kosovo, judged by any Balkan standards can be described as a
compact mass of ethnically homogeneous people, (Malcolm, 1998). Nonetheless, the
international community imposed multi-ethnicity to manoeuvre between Serbia’s claims for
state sovereignty over Kosovo and Kosovo Albanians quest for statehood, (Visoka, 2017).
Ultimately, the international community state-building project in Kosovo was driven by the
securitisation paradigm and an obsession to build an idealised vision of the Western state,

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(Hehir, 2011). They granted extensive rights to minorities, such as guaranteed representation
through power-sharing arrangements on central and local levels; local autonomy on
education, cultural heritage, health care and policing. But, this turned out to pose grave
challenges to a new state, with no liberal tradition and with an inter-ethnic war legacy.

On the one hand framing extensive community rights as an objective for state-building posed
too many implementation challenges. First, this was due to Kosovo Serbs unwillingness to
participate and Kosovo Albanian elites’ to deliver; second because of the limited resources of
Kosovo to put them in place. As Hehir puts it “implementing the very ambitious set of
[Constitutional] provisions in full will certainly strain the resources and capacity of Kosovo
significantly”, (2011, p.1081). On the other hand, the power-sharing mechanism seems to
have strained the political processes, impeding reconciliation and democratic governance.
“Power-sharing arrangements have not resulted in pacifying ethnic conflict; rather this
institutional engineering has enabled the seizure of power by ethno-nationalists and the
entrenchment of ethnic hostilities”, (Visoka, 2017, p.72). Kosovo’s state sovereignty in the
North has been a question of Serbian intervention, and there is an absolute lack of cross-
community communication and voting. During the recent local election, candidates from the
Belgrade-backed Serbian List party secured over 90 per cent of the votes, (Begisholli, 2019).
Lastly, political elites have used ethnic rhetoric and fluid interventionism to escape
accountability and bad governance.

Thus, Kosovo still remains a divided society across ethnic lines with repercussions for peace
consolidation, social cohesion and state-society relations; democratic governance; and state
sovereignty. The OSCE Community Rights Assessment Report indicates that “divisions
between communities, between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs in particular, persist”,
(2015, p.6). This is particularly evident in northern Kosovo where the outcome of the
international community’s fluid interventionism policy, its failures of action and non-action
has seen the emergence of a frozen conflict – where ethnic demarcation through Serb parallel
structures has served the purpose of contesting post-conflict state-building. The last European
Parliament report asserts that “despite efforts to integrate the Serb-majority northern Kosovo
into the rest of the country, Pristina still struggles to control the region”, (Russell, 2019, p.1).
This has created a limited state with fragmented sovereignty, therefore prone to external
Serbian intervention which is putting into question Kosovo’s territorial integrity.

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The international state-building in Kosovo has been extensively studied in correlation with its
peace figurations, (King and Mason, 2006; Visoka, 2017; Richmond and Franks, 2011).
Though peace-building and state-building are interlinked, this dissertation thesis will look
closer at the multi-ethnic state-building policy imposed in Kosovo and try to elucidate
challenges and consequences this posed to its statehood. This dissertation thesis hypothesis is
that multi-ethnic state-building imposed in Kosovo posed too many challenges for a new,
fragile state, with no liberal democratic tradition and coming from an inter-ethnic war legacy.
In effect, the failure to face these challenges coupled with the institutionalisation of ethnicity
and fluid interventionism brought about consequences to Kosovo’s statehood. In this regard
the fundamental research question of this thesis is: what are the challenges and
consequences of the multi-ethnic state-building model to Kosovo’s statehood? The
evaluation and analysis of this question is closely entangled with the sub-question of our
thesis; did multi-ethnic state-building fail in Kosovo?

Chapters outline

The first chapter will sketch out the main tenets of liberal state-building interventionist
epistemology which will then help us to better understand the liberal mechanisms employed
by the international community in its state-building project in Kosovo. We shall see here how
the international state-building agenda emerged as a problem solving policy and practice to
the first post-Cold War peace-building generation shortcomings in securing enduring peace in
post conflict settings. State weakness or failure emerged as the key threats to the international
order’s security, thereby making the building or re-building of effective and efficient state
came at the forefront of the international community attention. This worked through a top-
down approach and a Western understanding of the state, thus promoting liberal democracy,
enshrined on market economy, the protection of human and minority rights, good governance
and rule of law, considered the bedrock for domestic and international peace.

The second chapter will show how this liberal state-building interventionism aimed to build
from scratch a multi-ethnic polity in Kosovo. The international community engineered multi-
ethnicity as Kosovo’s new collective identity by envisaging highly ambitious community
rights provisions as a precondition for its statehood. It institutionalised ethnicity as the main
socio-political characteristic and governmentability of Kosovo. As we will explore more
closely later, these high standards of minority rights posed too many challenges, such as

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implementation, strained political processes, impeded decision making and hampered good
governance.

In the next chapter, we shall see how the failure of Kosovo to adequately face these
challenges, entangled with the institutionalisation of ethnicity and fluid interventionism
brought about a mixture of unintended and unprevented consequences to Kosovo’s statehood.
Ethnicisation of the political system, failures of actions and non-actions of the international
community, which was concerned more with stability and security than with long-term
consequences over Kosovo’s statehood, produced a hybrid peace, a semi-democratic regime
and limited state with fragmented sovereignty. Finally, in the last chapter we will try to
reflect upon our findings and draw out some conclusions which may open new avenues for
further research on the field.

Methodology

This research project was conducted though a mixture of theoretical and empirical
methodology. The literature review will help us to better elucidate the theoretical
underpinning of state-building which will then pave the way for detailed analyses of the
international multi-ethnic state-building policy in Kosovo. Through a qualitative analysis, this
study will collect and draw data and opinions from local and international NGO-s and media
reports and policy briefs; international organization and think tank’ reports; legal resolutions;
government and international legal documents. This will enable us to better understand how
multi-ethnic state-building is implemented in practice and further elucidate the challenges
and consequences it has brought about to Kosovo’s statehood. However, admittedly this
study will suffer from limitations and shortfalls. The topic is very complex, entangling an
array of areas of research, from humanitarian international intervention, nationalism, peace-
building, state-building to democratisation and state-formation. In this regard, it is almost
impossible to fully elucidate this assemblage and complexity of agency in a limited number
of words.

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 Chapter I

1. State-building: Liberal interventionist epistemology

Introduction
State-building has become one of the most pressing policy issues facing the international
community over the last two decades. The shift of the international system from the virtual
stability of the bipolar Cold War order to an emerging interconnected system, unveiled state
failure and state’s collapse as ‘black holes’ that may pose severe threats to the security and
stability of the international order. The 1990-s saw regions, starting from the Balkans to sub-
Saharan Africa and south Asia plunging into inter and intra-state conflicts with humanitarian
consequences on a scale never seen since the end of World War II. This led the international
community to embark on peace-building operations in conflict-prone and post-conflict
settings, famously defined in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 An Agenda for Peace as "actions
to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to
avoid a relapse into conflict”, (Cited at Zaum, 2012, p.121).

However, this minimalist approach to the peace-building paradigm designed as measures to

prevent post-conflict settings from sliding back into warfare – soon turned out to exhibit
important weaknesses in properly responding to atrocities, for instance, like in Rwanda or
Bosnia. In this regard, there was an increased realisation among the international community
about the need to ‘bring the state back in’ – thus bringing peace-building and state-building
together. The World Bank’s 1997 report put state effectiveness among its core policy
recommendations, while the 2002 US National Security Strategy summed up that “America
is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones”, (Cited at Chandler,
2010, p.4). This, led prominent scholars like Fukuyama to highlight that “state-building […]
is a crucial issue for the world community today, [because] weak or failed states are close to
the root of the world’s most serious problems, from poverty to AIDS, drug trafficking and
terrorism”, (2004, p. 17).

Nevertheless, the question that followed from this general consensus on the necessity to
‘bring the state back in’ as a vehicle that secures enduring peace was, of course, what kind of
state should be built? As the world was ‘celebrating’ the triumph of liberalism, the answer
was quite straightforward; liberal state – rooted on liberal democracy – synonymous with
good governance, rule of law, human and minority rights strengthened though power-sharing

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institutions, free elections, civil society; and marked-oriented economy. The liberal peace
epistemology behind this rests on the assumption that “the surest foundation for peace, both
within and between states, is a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy […]
an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political and economic
organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict” (Paris, 2001, p.301).
After Bosnia, Kosovo became one of the first post-conflict territories where the international
intervention was driven by these liberal peace assumptions in its multi-ethnic state-building
agenda. Thus, peace-building and state-building were entangled together to address the root
cause of the conflict, namely interethnic antagonism.

This chapter will try to elucidate core tenets of the liberal interventionist paradigm,
entanglements and assemblages that underpin state-building. It will then pave the way for an
analysis in the next chapters with regard to the liberal mechanisms employed in Kosovo; and
challenges and consequences that multi-ethnic state-building posed to its statehood. The first
part of this chapter will focus on the emergence of the international agenda on state-building
as a normative problem solving approach to peace-building, while the second section will
sketch out the main tenets that underpin liberal theory of state-building.

Building states to build peace

The end of the Cold War saw the emergence of multiple crises in different regions of the
world ensued with the rise of international intervention in cease-fire, peacekeeping and
ultimately peace-building operations. The end of these conflicts led to the proliferation of
new states amid the dissolution of federal states like Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, most of
which exhibited persisting weaknesses and fragility. The first generation of peace-building
missions achieved limited peace – in the sense that large scale hostilities did not resume. But
as Paris puts it, “if we use instead the standard of success the establishment of a sustainable
peace – then the picture become less favourable”, (2004, p.6). Therefore, the capacity of
states to secure long-lasting peace came at the forefront of the international community
peace-building agenda. “Policymakers, scholars and practitioners begun to see the state as a
necessary, even vital, part of peace-building and development work”, (Call, 2008, p.61). The
envisaging of the state as the cluster of institutions with capacity and effectiveness to provide
services, goods and security for its population abandoned the rolling back conception of the
sate embedded into the Washington consensus era.

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By the end of the 1990-s and beginning of the 2000-s, there was a common sense among
practitioners and policy makers that failed, weak, or fragile states posed dire challenges to the
security and stability of the international order. Thereby, Ghani and Lockhart contend that “a
number of contemporary global crises have their roots in forty to sixty fragile countries,
[which] provide an ever expanding platform that threatens the entire globe”, (2008, p.23). By
same token, Robinson, asserts that “the breakdown of political authority within states is
major source of conflict and warfare, and humanitarian problems, such as refugee flows that
stem from the conflict”, (2007, p.1). In this context, post-conflict peace-keeping and peace-
building missions once seen as a solution – now were problematised – showing that merely
stopping hostilities and walking way was no longer a viable policy.

What constitutes a weak or a failed state is a question that gets different answers. The World
Bank defines fragile states as those that have weak policies, institutions and governance,
(cited at Lemay-Hebert, 2009, p.25). Whereas, Menocal depicts state failure as “a state’s lack
of authority or control over the whole of its territory and a lack of monopoly over the
legitimate use of violence; persistently weak institutions and governance systems that often
also lack legitimacy in the eyes of the population”, (p. 2011, 1715). However, most
practitioners and policy-makers agree in one point, that the promotion of self-sustainable
peace comes through the complex task of building more eff ective, efficient and inclusive
states, (Gahni and Lockhart, 2008; Fukuyama, 2004).

Thus, the rediscovery of the state as the main vehicle that ensures sustainable peace, ushered
the extensive international state-building as peace-building missions – starting with the
transitional administration of war-torn territories as in Kosovo (e.g. UNMIK), coupled with
the deployment of security forces (e.g. KFOR), international organisations like OSCE and
EU, NGO-s – aiming building or re-building state institutions, and engineering social
construction as a pathway to establish political, economic and social order. This shift from
peace-building interventions to the peace-building and state-building entanglement was
linked with the end of the bipolar Cold War order which crumbled the old ideological
binaries thus heralding the triumph of liberalism; the change of conflict’s patterns from inter-
state to intra-state wars which produced unthinkable humanitarian crises; thus problematising
state sovereignty and giving way to the paradigm of state sovereignty as responsibility
(Caplan, 2005; Chandler, 2006; 2010). Nonetheless, liberal interventionist epistemology is
not merely about building or re-building states. What matters more within this framework is
the shape of the state that should be built to which we will turn now.

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Building a liberal state

Caplan defines state-building as “efforts to reconstruct or in some cases to establish for the
first time, effective and autonomous structures of governance in a state or territory where no
such capacity exists or where it has been seriously eroded”, (2005, p.3). Liberal state-building
framework draws its core assumptions form the Kantian liberal peace paradigm promoted in
his seminal work ‘Perpetual Peace’. In short, here Kant argues that liberal regimes through
representation, constitutional limits of power and free world markets, are the ultimate sources
of sustainable peace, (See Doyle, 1983; 2005). In this vein, UN peace-building programme
and development programmes, the World Bank, experts, other international actors and donors
began to expand towards a broader project of dealing with conflicts through the construction
of the liberal state, (Richmond and Franks, 2011; Paris, 2004).

Broadly understood, the liberal state is synonymous with democratic governance and market-
oriented economy. It is universally held to be inclusive, participatory, responsive and
accountable to its citizens, therefore, it is the bedrock of stability and peace. “Liberal
democracies are believed reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy, because they are governed
by their citizens' true interests, which harmonise with all individuals' true interests around the
world”, (Owen, 1994, p.95). Thus, democracy is considered the suitable political system that
generates and guaranties global sustainable peace. This rests on the democratic peace thesis
that “consolidated democracies do not go to war with each other because they have
institutional constrains upon leaders that make initiating conflict with other countries more
difficult”, (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009, p.11). In addition, these institutions serve as
appropriate mechanisms to remedy potential internal conflicts.

That is why the international community put much more emphasis on establishing liberal
legal frameworks for political institutions, such as writing new constitutions, changing
electoral systems to support power-sharing arrangements that promote more inclusive and
consensual politics. Advocates of international action thus seek to redress the failures of local
political institutions by ‘brokering’ power-sharing arrangements to rebuild a functioning state
through the reconstruction of exclusive ethnic identities into wider, inclusive civic identities,
(Kaufman, 2001). It seems that this was the rationale behind the imposition of multi-ethnic
power-sharing mechanism in post-war Kosovo –which was set to be the pre-condition for
self-sustainable peace. As Jarstad and Sisk assert “the international community favours
power-sharing arrangements because the stakes are high for excluding ex-combatants and

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potential peace-spoilers who may trigger a return to violence and disturb stability during the
post-conflict institutional and social recovery period”, (Cited at Visoka, 2016, p.22).

However, institution-building, be it power-sharing arrangements, electoral system or judical

reform does not exist in a void. Liberal state-building paradigm couples it with the concept of
good governance which is seen, as Chandler puts it “as a silver bullet capable of assisting
states in coping with problems of our complex globalized world, facilitating sustainable
development, social peace, and development of democracy and rule of law”, (2010, p.1).
Thus, good governance got prominent support within UN peace-building agencies,
international donors and experts, (Robinson, 2007). Well-functioning state institutions, their
effectiveness in providing goods and services is deemed to be crucial to sustainable peace. In
this regard, peace is interlinked with the quality of governance – therefore, “in state-building
terms, peace-as-governance focuses on the institutions of state as the basis for the
construction of the liberal peace”, (Richmond and Franks, 2011, p.6).

Apart from state effectiveness, good governance is seen as the bedrock for human and
minority rights protection and state legitimacy through the rule of law principle. For instance,
the UN defines rule of law “as a principle of governance in which all persons, institution and
entities […] are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and
independently adjudicated, which are consistent with international human rights norms and
standards”, (2004, p.4). Within the liberal framework, rule of law is seen as a vehicle that
secures state legitimacy through the protection of human and minority rights. It makes the
state inclusive of all citizens regardless of their ethnic, religious, racial or cultural
background. Thereby, “establishing a legitimate government based on inclusive democratic
governance is the most important precursor of corrective policies […] as groups experiencing
historical social exclusion or deprivation of human rights are unlikely to respond favourably
to policies if they continue to regard the state as illegitimate”, (Stewart and Brown, cited at
Menocal 2008, p.1726). Nevertheless, in Kosovo this policy approach went beyond
international norms and standards, by granting exceptional rights to communities and
moreover the international administration failed to enforce rule of law and ensure security in
parts of Kosovo.

Lastly, liberal state-building epistemology sees democratization congruent with

marketisation. Economic reconstruction of post-conflict settings through open markets and
the liberalisation of the economy is a formula that leads to peace. Ghani and Lockhart in their

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seminal book, Fixing Failed States, argue that poverty and rampant state corruption is one of
the main sources of state collapse and failure which is a breeding environment for insecurity
and instability on the global scale, (2005). Hence, recovery became one of the preconditions
for the transition of failed, war-torn societies to sustainable peace and moreover crucial to the
output legitimacy of local agency and international intervention. With regard to the latter,
Visoka maintains that “economic recovery is considered critical in creating broader popular
support for international peace-building efforts, and in legitimising their running of domestic
affairs in post-conflict societies, (2016, p.23). Ultimately, the economic recovery and
development is used as a carte blanche for extensive international intervention.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen how state-building intervention emerged as problem-solving

policy discourse and practice within the international community which aimed to remedy the
limits of peace-building. First peace-building operations in post-conflict settings soon turned
out to suffer from shortfalls as they failed or solely secured a negative peace. Therefore, the
international community came to realise that establishing merely peace settlements, holding
elections and walking away was not a viable policy anymore toward achieving sustainable
peace. State sovereignty once an undisputable feature of the state, is problematised, becoming
state weakness and state failure the main sources of instability and threats to the post-Cold
War international order.

In this context, there was a growing consensus among practitioners and policy-makers to
‘bring the state back in’ as the main vehicle that generates sustainable peace. This ushered
the rise of an extensive state-building agenda into the post-conflict, war-torn territories.
International actors took all state responsibilities, from security to taxation and customs –
institution and capacity building such as writing new constitutions; establishing electoral
systems; creating power-sharing arrangements to promote ethnic reconciliation and building
civil society.

Hence, state-building worked within the Western framework of understanding the state as a
liberal, democratic and market oriented socio-political unit. This is considered the bedrock
for enduring peace, internationally as democracies do not go to war with each other and
domestically because it is inclusive, responsive and accountable to the public. Finally,
democratic governance is compatible with marketisation which is seen as a formula that leads

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to peace. Kosovo became one of the most extensive liberal state-building projects, after the
international community intervened militarily to put an end to Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing in
the province in 1999. As we will see in the next chapter it imposed a highly ambitious blue-
print which brought about challenges and consequences to its statehood.

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 Chapter II

2. Management of diversity as objective and as challenge for state-building

in Kosovo

Introduction

As we have seen in the first chapter, the protection of human and minority rights is one of the
core principles of liberal peace-building epistemology. In a post-war, divided context, to
avoid violence, political institutions must allow ethnic groups to participate in the political
process, (Sisk, 1996). By same token, the UN Human Development report 2004 highlighted
that people’s cultural identities must be recognised and accommodated by the state –
otherwise “they become one of the greatest sources of instability within states and between
them”, (p.15). The protection of human rights is thus further radicalised towards what
Kymlicka coins as group-differentiation rights; such as territorial autonomy and guaranteed
representation, (1998, 2002). In post-conflict settings, for instance, like Bosnia, South Africa
or even Iraq, these rights are protected by constitutional design of power sharing institutions
and electoral systems which aim to accommodate ethnic and other cleavages, (See Lijphart,
2004).

Nevertheless, the recognition, integration, and protection of minority rights are not enough to
reach sustainable peace settlements, but they are closely interlinked with state-building and
ultimately with statehood. “Protection of minorities have become essential features of modern
liberal-democratic state formation and even more so for contemporary post-ethnic conflict
state-building cases, where political authority needs to be legitimized by all the constituent
peoples, (Calu, 2018, p.87). Moreover, under the new paradigm of state sovereignty as
responsibility, the respect for human and minority rights is paramount to preserve state
sovereignty and gain statehood. This was precisely the rationale behind the Ahtisaari Plan
which granted Kosovo supervised independence. Hence, as Beha asserts, “a key component
of this settlement was the strong guarantees provided to minority communities that their
rights and interests would be protected under the new regime”, (2014, p.86). In the last
instance, it was a deal with Kosovo which would get recognition as long as it incorporated
the Ahtisaari Plan’s provisions into constitution, (Judah, 2008). Therefore, the respect of
human and minority rights has become the bedrock for gaining statehood and ultimately for
exercising domestic and international sovereignty.

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Thus, international actors aimed to build a multi-ethnic polity in Kosovo which granted
unusual rights for minorities. Multi-ethnicity was assumed to integrate minorities into its
social and political system and thus tackle the root of the conflict, animosity between
Albanians and Serbs which Holbrooke considered “far greater than any of the so-called
ethnic hatreds of Bosnia”, (Cited at Hehir, 2006, p.201). High minority rights standards were
introduced into the legal framework of Kosovo, first by UNIMK into the Constitutional
Framework for PISG (Provisional Institutions for Self-Governing) and then it was
strengthened by Ahtisaari Plan, incorporation of which was a precondition for Kosovo’s
transition from supervised independence to full sovereignty, (Beha, 2014). Nevertheless, as
we will see more closely below this was a short-sighted policy. First and foremost it was
concerned more with security and stability, and second, it was unrealistic in the long-term
with regard to Kosovo’s statehood consolidation. In the first part of the chapter we will see
how ethnicity was institutionalised into the legal framework of Kosovo, and then in the
second section we will elucidate the challenges this posed to a new, fragile state with no
liberal tradition and coming from a devastating inter-ethnic conflict.

Co(i)nstitutionalisation of multi-(ethnicity)

We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of
non-discrimination and equal protection under the law, (Kosovo Declaration of Independence, 17
February 2008).

Following the international military intervention of NATO in 1999, UN Security Resolution

1244 tasked UNMIK with responsibility to govern Kosovo up to the moment a final
settlement is reached with regard to its political status. Since the beginning UNMIK was
concerned with the management of inter-ethnic relations which were considered fragile
enough to return the conflict in Kosovo. Therefore, UNMIK’s core state-building policy was
what Kymlicka labels as the ‘securitization of ethnic relations’, (2002). Thus, to build a stable
peace, it aimed to build from scratch a multi-ethnic polity by engineering multi-ethnicity as
Kosovo’s new collective identity. Though, it is ironic, as Hehir puts it, “Kosovo’s ‘multi-
ethnic character’ is dubious; while there are certainly many ethnic groups in Kosovo it is
demographically highly heterogeneous, with ethnic Albanians comprising some 90% of the
population”, (2011, 1081). The Statistical Office of Kosovo in 2003 estimated that 88% of
population were Albanians and 7% Serbs, while in 2008 its website showed that Albanians
constituted 92% of the population, Serbs 5,3% and others 2,7%, (Cited at Judah, 2008, p.2).

17
Nevertheless, UNMIK established multi-ethnicity within the Constitutional Framework for
PISG as the defining social and political characteristic of Kosovo.

In its Preamble, Constitutional Framework draws its principles on human rights from an array
of international Human Right Conventions and recognises “the need to fully protect and
uphold the rights of all communities of Kosovo”, (2001, p.8-9). In chapter 4, Rights of
Communities, UNMIK envisaged extensive rights for all communities which aimed to
“preserve, protect and express their ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities”,
(2001, p.11-12). Moreover, it created power-sharing institutions at the central and local levels
to ensure accommodation of all communities with a special focus on Kosovo Serbs.
Minorities were reserved 20 seats, 10 for Kosovo Serbs and 10 for other communities; Roma,
Ashkali and Egyptian, Bosniak, Turkish and the Gorani in the Kosovo Assembly, comprising
of 120 seats, (Section 1, 2001). The same principles of power-sharing arrangements apply to
the Government and Presidency of Kosovo and to the local self-governing institutions. The
rationale behind these power-sharing arrangements was to facilitate the reintegration of
communities and to promote ethnic reconciliation, but they ended up cementing ethnic
identity, (Hehir, 2006).

Moreover, what is striking about the drafting of the Constitutional Framework is that it was a
foreclosed process within international actors. Kosovo Serbs boycotted it totally, while
Kosovo Albanian demands for a self-determination provision fell on deaf ears. So, “local
ownership of the drafting process was fairly limited, (Weller, 2009, p.181). UNMIK even
conditioned the final political status settlement of Kosovo with the fulfilment of minority
rights. "Standards before Status aimed to achieve these goals: its basic principle was that
unless Kosovo was multi-ethnic, it could not aspire to independence”, (Hoxhaj, 2006, p.386).
However, it soon turned out that “Standards before Status” was not a realistic policy –
therefore the Eide report recommended “future status process must be moved forward with
caution”, (cited at Weller, 2009, p.188). In this context, UN Security Council appointed
former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy for Kosovo’s final status talks.
After two years of negotiations the process ended in deadlock – therefore Ahtisaari unveiled
his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement which granted Kosovo
supervised independence, (for details see Ker-Lindsay, 2009).

The Ahtisaari Plan further strengthened the multi-ethnic character of the new state. “Kosovo
shall be a multi-ethnic society, which shall govern itself democratically, and with full respect

18
for the rule of law through its legislative, executive, and judicial institutions, (Article 1,
2007). His Plan dedicated unprecedented focus on minority rights, which he labelled
communities. Article 3 on The Rights of Communities and Their Members lay down the legal
principles that guarantee all community rights in Kosovo. “Kosovo shall establish the
constitutional, legal and institutional mechanisms necessary for the promotion and protection
of the rights of all members of communities and for their representation and effective
participation in political and decision-making processes”, (Ahtisaari Plan, 2007, p.4). In this
regard, it established power-sharing arrangements in central and local levels. It envisaged the
creation of additional municipalities with a Serb majority which would have extensive
autonomy in education, health care, cultural affairs and policing. Though, as Weller asserts,
“the list of rights and obligations did not fully reflect all of the commitments Kosovo had
been willing to accept during the negotiations”, (2009, p.215). The Ahtisaari Plan
promulgated that “the future Constitution of Kosovo shall include, but not be limited to, the
following principles and elements”, as outlined in Annex I and II, (2007, p.11). Thereby, it
became a blue-print for Kosovo state-building, statehood and state recognition.

On 17 February 2008, Kosovar representatives declared Kosovo to be an independent and

sovereign state in full accordance with the recommendations of Ahtisaari Plan. Kosovo
Declaration of Independence vowed to fully implement and adopt legislation, particularly
those that protect and promote the rights of communities and their members, (2008), So,
ostensibly, the Atisaari plan served as a template for drafting the Constitution of the youngest
state in Europe.

The Constitution of Kosovo strongly reaffirmed Kosovo’s multi-ethnic identity, enshrined on

democratic principles of “full respect for the rule of law through its legislative, executive and
judicial institutions”, (Article 3). Multi-ethnic character of the new state is reflected on its
neutral symbols, like flag, anthem and official languages, (Article, 5 and 6). Then, Chapter II
on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms draws the highest standards on protection and
promotion of human rights by calling on an array of international Convention on Human
Rights which are directly applicable in the Republic of Kosovo, (Article 22). This is followed
by Chapter III, Rights of Communities and Their Members, which lay down extensive rights
for all communities and Kosovo’s state responsibilities to implement them. Kosovo’s
constitution kept in place the power-sharing arrangement at the central and local levels.
Communities were reserved 20 seats in the Assembly, 10 for Kosovo Serbs and 10 for other
communities, (Article 64, p.22). It also confirmed the veto-power system in the Parliament

19
and ensured reserved posts in Government, Presidency of the Assembly and on the Municipal
level where communities do not constitute the majority, (Chapter V and VI). The same
principle of power-sharing applied for the Constitutional Court, public administration and
cultural heritage turning multi-ethnicity as a sacred principle. “The 65-page Constitution of
the Republic of Kosovo is replete with references to the preservation of Kosovo’s ‘multi-
ethnic’ character, as though Kosovo was once, and can be again, a harmonious multi-ethnic
polity”, (Hehir, 2011, p. 1079). So, instead of waning ethnic identity, multi-ethnic state-
building policy institutionalised ethnicity as the main socio-political identity and
appropriation power in Kosovo

Furthermore, the drafting process lacked local ownership as it was exclusively devised by the
US office in Pristina, (Weller, 2009, p.245-249). Kosovo Serbs, explicitly the main target of
minority rights provisions boycotted the process under instruction of Serbia, while Kosovo
Albanians were more pragmatic and “embraced minority rights in return for statehood”,
(Beha, 2014, p.92). Such an extensive blue-print, did not also take into consideration the
capacity of Kosovo to deliver these highly ambitious provisions. In this regard, Hehir asserts
“it is clear that the expansive provisions derive from external actors who evidently treated the
constitution as a wish-list with little concern for the capacity of Kosovar society to implement
such provisions”, (2011, p.1080). As we will see below, this highly ambitious constitutional
framework became a heavy burden on the fragile shoulders of a new state like Kosovo

Management of ethnic diversity as challenge for state-building

As Tansey notes, “a key element of Kosovo’s claim to independence, and the international
support it received, was its rhetorical and practical support for democracy and multi-
ethnicity” (2011, p.1515). While domestically, “the ‘state of communities’ was designed to
generate buy-in from the Serb minority, who had rejected Kosovo’s claim to independence”,
Landau, 2017, p.443) Thereby, in a relatively short period of time Kosovo made a good
progress in adopting the community rights provisions into its legal framework. The ICO
(International Civilian Office agreed that “Kosovo has implemented the terms of the
Comprehensive Settlement Proposal”, (2012, p.133). In the same vein, the 2012 OSCE report
asserts that “the framework convention provides communities with substantive protection of
their rights in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life and promotes the
conditions to allow them to express and preserve their culture and identity”, (p.35).
Nevertheless, the community rights framework was too ambitious and unrealistic for a new

20
and fragile country like Kosovo. Therefore, the imposition of such extensive minority
standards to the new polity soon brought about challenges, such as de-facto implementation
of provisions which in turn hampered state legitimacy. In addition, it strained the political
process and undermined democratic governance by hardening ethno-cultural cleavages.

Arguably, there has been progress in the upper level representation of communities, like in
the Assembly and the Government where there are reserved seats, (OSCE, 2015). They even
became over-represented in the 2010 elections when political parties representing minorities
combined won 25 seats with approximately 55,000 votes, compared to the 170,000 received
by the Democratic League of Kosovo, the second largest party, which gained 27 seats
(ECMI, 2011). Whereas, on the local level the decentralisation process has been a significant
turning point in encouraging the integration of Kosovo Serbs South Ibar into the mainstream
Kosovo civic and political life, (ICO, 2012). However, this has not been reflected in the
lower level of representation and cross-community communication, let alone the integration
of the North. The OSCE report highlights that efforts to promote dialogue, reconciliation,
tolerance and diversity remain weak, and a significant number of incidents targeting
communities’ religious and cultural heritage continue to undermine inter-community
relations, (2012). In addition, the education system remains separate because of language
barriers, and non-Albanian communities continue to be under-represented in the civil service
where the most affected in are the Kosovo Roma, Kosovo Ashkali and Kosovo Egyptian
communities (OSCE, 2015). The decentralisation process is “progressing very slowly, mainly
due to Serbia’s objection to Kosovo’s independence”, (Visoka, 2011, p.33). This explains the
case of North Mitrovica which remains a major flashpoint of inter-ethnic violence and
security incidents continue to affect return sites, (ECMI, 2013a).

This gap between formal community rights provisions and de-facto implementation showed
once again that they were a heavy burden for a fragile state with a terrible war legacy. In part,
poor implementation was due to the bad governance such as crony corruption, weak
institutions and economy, (Capussela, 2015), and the lack of commitment of the Kosovo
Albanian political elite. The legal adviser to the President of Kosovo declared Hehir “that
expecting Kosovo Albanians to welcome the presence of Serbs in Kosovo was unrealistic
given the scale of atrocities perpetrated against Kosovo Albanians in 1999”, (2009, p.190).
Moreover, this is fuelled by the security dilemma in societies coming from an inter-ethnic
conflict where “the fear of the ‘other’ and hate takes long time to heal – if ever – thus

21
undermining both human rights and multi-ethnic state-building”, (Richmond and Franks,
2011, p.125).

Nevertheless, the implementation process was mostly blocked by the Serbian non recognition
policy towards the statehood of Kosovo. Most of the ethnic-Serb populace does not recognise
Kosovo’s sovereignty and has refused to participate in its institutions, (Tansey, 2009; ICO,
2012). With the financial and political support of their kin state Serbia they created parallel
structures in the North to undermine state-building. This has given Serbia a strong hand to
influence the internal affairs of Kosovo. Serbia used parallel structures in Kosovo to “contest
the independence from inside through proactive disobeying the Kosovo authorities and
preventing the extension of domestic sovereignty throughout the territory”, (Visko, 2016,
p.114). This has severely hampered Kosovo’s legitimacy among communities, particularly
among Kosovo Serbs. The trust of the latter in Kosovo’s central institutions ranked around
1.2%-2.3%, (Marku, 2018).

Finally, the power-sharing arrangements have also impeded the political process by
hardening ethnic cleavages. Since the 2010 election none of the political parties has managed
to get the majority to create a stable government. So, the reserved seats in the parliament
“became the existential pillar upon which the ruling coalitions managed to secure thin
majorities in parliament, thus power-sharing arrangement in Kosovo became an impediment
to democracy”, (KSI, 2011, p.67). For instance, in the 2014 and 2017 election, the support of
the community, particularly Serbian List MP-s which is under Belgrade’s control was crucial
to the government formation process. However, the coalition faced internal disagreements
and fierce opposition over major topics – which have “seriously impeded the work of the
government and have slowed down the implementation of its heavy agenda”, (ECMI, 2017,
p.7).

In addition, the power-sharing mechanism has led to the ethnicisation of the political system
which damaged good governance, where Kosovo Albanian leadership camouflaged bad
governance with ethnic rhetoric. According to the Public Impulse Nr.8, the largest problem
Kosovo faces is corruption, high unemployment and poverty, (2014), while international
actors were concerned primarily with security and stability therefore they tolerated corruption
and misuse of office by ethnic elites. In this regard, Visoka contends that “international
missions in Kosovo have inherently preferred stable and authoritarian elites that can deliver
stability and make concessions at the expense of local emancipatory peace and vibrant

22
democracy”, (2017, p.95). Thereby, the power-sharing arrangements have not resulted in
good governance and pacifying ethnic conflict; rather they have fuelled ethno-cultural
divisions. The party system contains only parties that represent one ethnic community or the
other; no party spans the communal divide, (Tansey, 2011). This in turn is has had severe
repercussions for long-term peace and reconciliation as well as on democratic and state
consolidation of Kosovo.

Conclusion

The protection of human and minority rights became one of the core tenets of liberal state-
building policies in post-conflict divided settings. This rests on the assumption that the
integration and accommodation of minorities within the political system through power-
sharing arrangements avoid violence, facilitate reconciliation and boost state legitimacy. In
this regard, the international community aimed building a multi-ethnic polity in Kosovo by
engineering a new collective civic identity as a measure to remedy the root causes of the
conflict and to foster state legitimacy. Thus, the management of ethno-cultural diversity
emerged as an objective for state-building. The international community engaged in top-
down institutional engineering which would reflect Kosovo’s multi-ethnic new identity.
Kosovo’s legal framework became the target of highly ambitious provisions on minority
rights such as guaranteed representation on the central and local level, special protection of
cultural heritage and extensive autonomy for community majority self-governing institutions.

However, it soon became evident that this ambitious blue-print was not a realistic policy for a
new, fragile state with no liberal tradition and with an inter-ethnic war legacy. As we have
seen in this chapter, this was a short-sighted policy as the international community was
primarily concerned with security and stability and did not take into account local agency –
Kosovo’s capacity and commitment to deliver these provisions – and Kosovo Serbs
unwillingness to participate and materialise their community rights. Therefore, a gap between
formal provisions and de-facto implementation emerged. Furthermore, multi-ethnic policy
led to the institutionalisation of ethnicity as the core socio-political identity and appropriation
of power in Kosovo. This has hardened ethno-cultural cleavages and challenged
reconciliation. Ethnicisation of the political system has also strained political process and
undermined the governance of Kosovo. It has hindered Kosovo’s decision making processes,
increased vulnerability to Serbian intervention, and its political elite has used ethnic rhetoric
to escape accountability and bad governance. In the last instance, the failure of the

23
international community and Kosovo to adequately face these challenges and the
institutionalisation of ethnicity have produced long-term consequences to its statehood to
which we will focus on the next chapter.

24
 Chapter III

3. Unintended and unprevented consequences to Kosovo’s statehood

Introduction

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the imposition of a multi-ethnic state-building blue-
print in Kosovo has produced challenges to the new polity, such as the implementation of
ambitious minority rights provisions, strained decision-making processes and undermined
good governance. Moreover, it has “reinforced difference by making ethnicity a basis for
administrative and political delegation, therefore societal divisions were incorporated into the
new polity”, (Hehir, 2009, p.191). In effect, the failure of Kosovo to properly face these
challenges – coupled with the institutionalisation of ethnicity as the core socio-political and
governmentality characteristic of Kosovo brought about consequences to its statehood.

There is a broad peace-building and state-building scholarly debate about consequences of

intervention, stretching from unintended and unanticipated to side effects and unprevented
outcomes, (See Aoi et al, 2017; Paris, 2004; Chandler, 2014a; Visoka, 2016). They generally
agree that there is failure but there is no consensus on the scale and responsibility of the
interveners. For instance Aoi et al defines unintended consequences as “acts that were not
intended when these mandates were adopted or executed”, (2007, p) – while Visoka talks
about unprevented consequences as “failures of non-action and unlearnings across several
cases of interventionism” (2016, p.117). This study holds that multi-ethnic state-building
policy in Kosovo produced a mixture of unintended and unprevented consequences as the
international intervention was characterized by fluidity in the sense that as Visoka contends,
in practice it did not hold a firm policy, (2017, p.34-37). Thus, the international community
ended up governing its intervention’s side effects and failures of actions and non-actions.

In this chapter we will argue how this interventionism and multi-ethnic policy created long-
term consequences to Kosovo’s statehood such as a hybrid peace; a semi-democratic regime;
and a limited statehood with fragmented sovereignty. Institutionalisation of ethnicity within
the political system enabled seizure of power by ethno-nationalists who rather than
facilitating reconciliation, fuelled ethno-cultural division and misused power, thus creating a
hybrid peace and a semi-democratic regime. The division in Kosovo has always been
entangled with territoriality and statehood. Nevertheless, multi-ethnicity enshrined in
decentralisation and power-sharing arrangements did not adequately address this division. On

25
the ontrary, it hardened ethnic lines and became a mechanism that jeopardised Kosovo’s
sovereignty.

Emergence of a hybrid peace and a semi-democratic regime

The international community envisaged Kosovo as a multi-ethnic polity which would be

governed democratically – aiming that this would promote political moderation and
transform inter-ethnic cleavages into reconciliation. The locus of multi-ethnic policy lied on
power-sharing arrangements which granted political elites the power to shape peace and the
state. However, in divided societies, this is highly likely to produce counterproductive effects
as “ethno-cultural diversity translates into political fragmentation, [so] political claims are
refracted through the lens of ethnic identity and political conflict is synonymous with conflict
among ethno-cultural groups”, (Choudhry, p.5). Therefore, the multi-ethnic policy embedded
into the power-sharing institutional political system entrenched the ethno-cultural elite’s
conflicts within society.

The ethno-nationalist elites seized the power in Kosovo and advanced their irreconcilable
agendas, Kosovo Albanians quest for statehood, while Kosovo Serbs boycotted the peace-
process and state-building to prevent Kosovo’s statehood, (Visoka, 2017). This hampered
reconciliation because local elites increased ethnic rhetoric to gain and preserve power. The
institutionalisation of ethnicity as Blumi puts it made that “one’s anti-Serb or anti-Albanian
credentials become of great political value in the context of a Kosovo divided discursively
along ethnic lines”, (p.272). So, in such circumstances there is no space for political
moderation, as “there is no possibility of being rewarded for moderate policies by member of
other ethnic groups”, (Choudhry, p.22). Thereby, there was no cross-community voting and
the Kosovo ethno-nationalist elite transmitted its divisive politics to the society and spoiled
interethnic communication. The UNDP Public Pulse report nr. 2 and nr. 6 show that overall
over half of Kosovars of all ethnicities (59%) have had no interethnic contact within the past
three months and that only 35% of Kosovo Serbs are ready to work and live in the same town
with Kosovo Albanians, (2011; 2013). In this regard, presumably power-sharing mechanisms
have not improved inter-ethnic relations and did not facilitate cross-community
communication as was expected. To the contrary, has enabled ethno-national elites to solidify
their power and exploit state institutions by shaping their own narratives of peace and
statehood.

26
Thus, the outcome of multi-ethnic institutional engineering has been a hybrid peace where the
root causes, namely inter-ethnic animosities, are neither addressed nor overcome. Inter-ethnic
relations remained rather tense and was taken hostage by the ethno-nationalist elite’s
conflicting agendas, and ultimately of inter-state relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The
Serbian de-recognition campaign and the emergence of border correction plan last year
escalated tensions and nationalist rhetoric on both sides, (Russell, 2018). In this context, the
2018 UNDP Public Impulse report on Kosovar youth perception of the interethnic relations
shows that both groups consider interethnic situation tensed, (p.42-43). The hybrid peace
figuration is particularly prominent in northern Kosovo “manifested in the persistence of
insecurity evident in the inter-ethnic confrontation, attacks against civilians […] and the
physical separation of communities”, (Visoka, 2016, p.117). Mitrovica, the northern city of
Kosovo became the symbol of ethnic division through Ibar River.

Arguably, the multi-ethnic policy has not produced the intended outcome of building a
sustainable peace and a new civic collective identity in Kosovo rather it has ended up
creating hybrid forms of peace and a frozen conflict in the North. For Richmond and Mitchell
hybrid forms of peace, encompass “potentialities and constraints of agencies […] tactics and
ways of resisting vis-a-vis the universalizing ethics and logics of international actors, (p.3).
Ethnicisation of political institutions has enabled local agency to resist and transform the
interveners’ state-building goals – thus impeding inter-ethnic reconciliation, social cohesion
and state-society relations – which as Migdal argues represents a threat to the building of
legitimacy and domestic sovereignty and therefore may be a source of permanent state
weakness, (2001).

Forms of multi-ethnic state-building hybridity stretches also to the democratic governance of

Kosovo, defined as the situation where “liberal and illiberal norms, institutions, and actors
coexist” (Jarstad and Belloni, 2012, p.1), thereby creating a semi-democratic regime. There is
no common scholarly definition of what constitutes a consolidated democracy, although for
Linz and Stepan “it is the political situation when democracy becomes the only game in
town”, (1996, p.5). Nevertheless, the institutionalisation of ethnicity within the political
system of Kosovo empowered ethnic elites who reinforced ethnic cleavages and misused
state institutions at the expense of Kosovo’s democratic consolidation. Whereas, the
international community’s policy pendulum shifted towards stability, thereby, trading
democracy for security.

27
Prior to the declaration of independence, the international community’s agency was in a
stronger position, so it used its leverage towards democratic institution building which would
be the foundation of the new polity. In this vein, Tansey asserts that “UNMIK has played an
instrumental role in democratic regime-building through holding elections and reorganizing
and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous
self-government”, (2007, p.134). However, democratic consolidation was limited by
uncertainty of the future political status of Kosovo and its inter-ethnic division over the state-
building process. In this regard, Linz and Stepan argue that an agreement of what constitutes
the demos and an overlap of state and nation facilitates democratisation, therefore
“democracy requires statehood and without a sovereign state there can be no secure
democracy”, (1996, p.19). Though Kosovo declared independence in 2008, it continued to be
a contested statehood internally and externally because of Serbia’s non-recognition policy.

The Ahtisaari blue-print was meant to build an inclusive and democratic polity. Nonetheless,
power-sharing arrangements did not contribute to the strengthening of democratic practices
as they handed power to peace and democracy spoilers. Visoka puts this succinctly, “power-
sharing has encouraged mono-ethnic political parties […] and held inter-ethnic relations
hostage to the political interests of a handful of political elites that were also affected by
corruption and misuse of political office”, (2017, p.95). Kosovo cannot hold truly free and
fair elections and a culture of impunity has emerged, (KIPRED, 2012; 2016). Last year the
annual Freedom House report ranked Kosovo as a partly free country and highlighted that its
institutions remain weak and rampant corruption has given rise to deep public distrust in the
government, (2018). This has ostensibly undermined state legitimacy among citizens of
Kosovo, as Cheng and Zaum, argue “the legitimacy of a post-war state and the health of its
political institutions are likely to be undermined by corruption” (2012, p.8).

Thereby, multi-ethnicity resulted into a counterproductive policy, concerned more with

stability, which then led the international community to extend their intervention beyond their
mandate. In this context, they started using disguised forms of intervention to mitigate the
unintended outcomes and failures. Thereby a ‘local-international partnership’ emerged where
the former gained legitimacy form the latter in exchange for stability. For international actors
“political stability and loyalty of [Kosovo] political leadership has been more important […]
than the effective functioning of the justice and law enforcement mechanisms” (Zogiani and
Bajrami, 2015, p. 33). Arguably, in these circumstances the international community ended
up governing its failures of action and non-action through covert fluid interventionism.

28
A limited state with fragmented sovereignty

Decentralisation became the cornerstone of multi-ethnic state-building in Kosovo. It was first

introduced by UNMIK into the Constitutional Framework for PISG, (2001) – then the
Ahtisaari Plan dedicated it unprecedented attention by granting minorities extensive
competences on the municipal level in areas such as health care, policing, education, cultural
heritage. Moreover, it foresaw the creation of new Serb-majority municipalities which can
cooperate with other Kosovar municipalities on issues of mutual interest and with
municipalities and institutions, including government agencies of Serbia, (Annex III, 2007).

This policy aimed integration of minorities, notably Kosovo Serbs, within Kosovo’s
institutional system. However “instead of constituting segmental autonomy and self-
government, decentralization […] only reinforced enclavization and segregation of Serb
community”, (Baliqi, 2018, p.60). In this regard, the international community’s goal to build
a multi-ethnic polity ironically solidified ethnic division by creating mono-ethnic units within
Kosovo, which hampered functioning of the state and became a tool to contest Kosovo’s
sovereignty. This is arguably due to the different conceptions of multi-ethnicity between the
international community, Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. The former saw multi-
ethnicity through the lens of securitisation, while Kosovo Albanians embraced it in return for
statehood and Kosovo Serbs were held hostage by Serbia’s non-recognition and bargaining
policy in gaining as much as possible from Kosovo, (Visoka, 2016; Beha, 2014). This
entanglement of agency created a limited statehood in Kosovo.

For Krasner and Risse, a “limited statehood concerns those areas where central authorities
lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions, the legitimate monopoly over
the means of violence and some of the functions have been assumed by external actors”
(2014, p.546-549). Kosovo has constantly exhibited patterns of a minimalist statehood, with
limited legitimacy, a weak scope and strength of state in the northern part of its territory.
Ironically, the international community’s aim to build a multi-ethnic polity stands in contrast
with its inability to promote reconciliation, enforce rule of law, particularly in northern
Kosovo and tolerating Serb parallel structures. These failures of international administration
became a casus-belli for Serbia to put in place its contestation policy through parallel
structures which took the attributes of the state by providing public services and obstructed
the integration of Serb community in Kosovo, (Visoka and Beha, 2015). Nevertheless, the
international community considered parallel structures non-events, as they were more

29
concerned with short-term stability and security. In this regard, Visoka asserts “the UN and
NATO had the knowledge, authority and resources to prevent the emergence of Serb parallel
structures, they did not challenge them for the sake of stability”, (2016, p.104). This
assemblage of failures and non-actions created path-dependences with severe repercussions
over Kosovo’s long-term sovereignty.

In this context, integration of Serb-majority municipalities became Kosovo’s biggest

challenge after it declared independence in 2008. Kosovo Albanian saw the Ahtisaari Plan as
the only solution to the integration of the North within its institutional framework, (Visoka
and Beha, 2015). Although the Ahtisaari Plan “was implemented to a large extent in the south
of Kosovo, the four northern Serb-majority municipalities remained in limbo […] refusing
any formal cooperation with Kosovo institutions”, (Beha, 2014, p.88). Out of Kosovo’s state
authority, the North plunged into lawlessness where smuggling and organised crime thrived,
while ICG (International Crisis Group) report highlights that EULEX failed to control the
northern border with Serbia, did not prevent smuggling, was ineffective in fighting crime in
Mitrovica and implemented only what Belgrade permitted, (2012a). Thereby, Serbia kept
using Kosovo Serbs in the North, jeopardising Kosovo’s statehood through boycotting
Kosovo’s institutions and financing parallel structures – even using Kosovo’s constitution
which permits Serbian funding in coordination with Pristina. “The boundaries between
Kosovo’s institutions and the parallel ones run by Serbia in Kosovo are often porous, where
many Serbs draw two salaries, one from each state”, (ICG, 2012b, p.2) – while Serbian
money that support Serbian police and court systems directly undermine Kosovo’s integrity,
(ICG, 2011). In this regard, Kosovo lacked any authority to implement its policies, control
and enforce the rule of law in the North, turning it into a black hole within its territory.

Hence, multi-ethnic state-building in Kosovo operated under irreconcilable intentions

between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs which curtailed Kosovo’s sovereignty and
conditioned its statehood to inter-state relations with Serbia, whereas the international
community protracted its intervention through overt and covert instruments to remedy its
failures of action and non-action. Ostensibly, with no other means in hand to break the
stalemate in the North, Pristina had no other choice but to engage with the EU’s facilitated
dialogue for normalisation of relations with Belgrade which ended by with signing of the
2013 and 2015 Brussels agreements. These agreements enhanced the competences of Serb-
majority municipality’s by envisaging the creation of Association of Serb-majority
municipalities in Kosovo in exchange for dissolution of the Serb parallel structures, (Russell,

30
2019). Though this initially facilitated the incorporation of Serb parallel structures into
Kosovo’s institutional framework, it entrenched interethnic cleavages, and transformed the
character of Kosovo to a bi-national unfinished state, (Deda 2013).

The Brussels agreements have not addressed the underlying problem in northern Kosovo, the
Kosovo Serb contestation and Serbia’s non-recognition policy. To the contrary, they
strengthened ethnicity into Kosovo’s political life and Belgrade became the main player over
Kosovo’s sovereignty. For instance, during the 2013 local elections, Belgrade sponsored
Civic Initiative “Srpska” won 49.42% of the votes in the North (Deda, 2013), securing 9
municipalities “where Serb citizens will never recognize the independence of Kosovo”
(ECMI, 2013b). This has given Serbia a huge leverage to make inroads into Kosovo’s
internal affairs and undermine its sovereignty. The EU-facilitated dialogue strengthened the
control of Belgrade over the new Serbian political leadership in Kosovo and their political
attitude towards Kosovo institutions (BPRG, 2015). Once again ethnicastion handed the
power to ethno-nationalist elites, who rather than facilitating integration obstructed the
functioning of the state. Thereby, “the newly Belgrade-backed leaders in their north of
Kosovo refuse to respect Kosovo’s law; demanded their by-laws to be status-neutral; and
rejected Kosovo’s state symbols”, (Visoka, 2017, p.201). So, the international community’s
fluid interventionism attempts to mitigate failures of their actions and non-actions left the
Serb dominated northern Kosovo in limbo, under shared sovereignty, which as it seemed with
the emergence of the border correction plan last year, may force Kosovo to grant more
concessions in return for domestic sovereignty and international recognition.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen how multi-ethnic state building coupled with the international
community’s fluid interventionism brought about consequences to the statehood of Kosovo,
such as the emergence of a hybrid peace, a semi-democratic regime and a limited state with
fragmented sovereignty. This came from the different conceptions of multi-ethnicity between
the International community, Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. The former was more
concerned with short-term security and stability rather than with long-term consequences for
Kosovo’s statehood, while Kosovo Albanians traded multi-ethnicity in return for statehood
and Kosovo Serbs were held hostage by Serbia’s contestation, non-recognition and
bargaining policy over Kosovo. This assemblage of agency produced a mixture of unintended
and unprevented consequences to Kosovo’s statehood.

31
The international community’s aim to build enduring peace in Kosovo through a multi-ethnic
policy produced unintended outcomes, namely a hybrid peace and a frozen conflict in the
northern Kosovo. Power-sharing arrangements institutionalised ethnicity as the main socio-
political identity and appropriation of power in Kosovo therefore it excluded any possibility
for political moderation. In this context, identity politics became the dominant narrative of
Kosovo’s political landscape. This notably, handed the power to ethno-nationalist elites, who
exploited ethnic division to gain and preserve power which gave them agency to resist and
transform the interveners’ state-building goals and shape their distinctive narratives of peace
and statehood. In this context, their divisive ethnic rhetoric resonated within society, thus
undermining reconciliation, social cohesion and state-society relations which jeopardised
Kosovo’s state legitimacy and become a source of state weakness.

In addition, the institutionalisation of ethnicity within Kosovo’s political system did not
strengthen democratic practices, contrary it resulted into a counterproductive policy. Power-
sharing arrangements empowered ethnic elites who hardened ethnic differences and misused
state institutions at the expense of democratic consolidation. Kosovo suffered from election
rigidity, high rates of corruption, nepotism and weak institutions which increased its citizens
distrust to the government. Though the international community was aware of these, it did not
intervene for the sake of security, thus trading democracy for stability.

Finally, the international community’s fluid interventionism closely interlinked with its
failures of actions and non-actions, has produced a limited state with fragmented sovereignty.
It envisaged decentralisation and segmental autonomy with extensive rights for communities
as its core multi-ethnic state-building policy which would integrate minorities, notably
Kosovo Serbs, into Kosovo’s institutional framework. Nevertheless, this generated
counterproductive effects, solidified ethnic division by creating mono-ethnic units which
hampered the functioning of the state and became a tool to contest Kosovo’s sovereignty.
Although there were positive developments in the Southern Ibar River Serb-majority
municipalities, where Kosovo started to exert authority, in contrast northern Kosovo
remained out of its state control. The international community was incapable of ensuring rule
of law and security in the North and moreover tolerated Serb parallel structures in exchange
of stability. This created path-dependences and arguably turned Serbia into the main player
regarding Kosovo’s sovereignty. Kosovo was then ‘forced’ to work with the international
community and Serbia to integrate the North into its institutional framework, while Kosovo
Serbs and Serbia used this as a bargaining chip to gain as much as possible from Kosovo. The

32
outcome of this triangular agency has been the institutionalisation of Serbian influence in the
northern Kosovo, using Kosovo Serbs to turn Kosovo into a dysfunctional state and push
forward its partition plan.

33
 Chapter IV

4. Conclusions

This research project’s findings indicate that multi-ethnic state-building posed too many
challenges to Kosovo and brought about a mixture of unintended and unprevented
consequences to its statehood. The imposition of a multi-ethnic state-building blue-print
coupled with fluid interventionism to mitigate its failures of action and non-action resulted in
a counterproductive policy with regard to long-term consequences to Kosovo’ statehood. The
outcome has been the emergence of a hybrid peace, a semi-democratic regime and limited
statehood with fragmented sovereignty.

A we have seen in the first chapter liberal state-building epistemology emerged as a problem
solving practice and discourse to address the shortcomings of the first peace-building
generation after the end of the Cold War which crumbled the old ideological binaries,
heralded the triumph of liberalism, changed conflict’ patterns and problematised state
weakness as a threat to global security. This embarked the international community on
construction and re-construction state missions, mirroring the Western state model enshrined
on liberalism, democracy and free market – considered the bedrock for enduring internally
and externally peace. However, liberal state-building practices exhibited limits and pitfalls
which resulted in the emergence of critiques of liberal interventionist scholarship. For
instance, Ignatieff asserts that “we do not actually know how to make states work in non-
liberal societies that are poor, divided on religious or ethnic lines or lacked a substantial state
tradition in the first place” (Cited at Chandler, 2014b, p.151). On the other hand, Paris though
a proponent of liberal peace acknowledges the limits of liberal interventionism and advocates
for institutionalisation before liberalisation, (2004). While Chandler argues that this critique
negates hegemonic and securitisation interests of interveners, problematises only the limited
knowledge of liberal interveners and inability of the non-liberal subjects to understand and
assume interveners transformation template, (2014). “The external interveners have had much
more status quo aspirations, concerned with regulatory stability and regional and domestic
security, rather than transformation”, (Chandler, 2014, p.148). These assemblages of the
limits, shortfalls and distinct interests of liberal interventionism reflect the shortcoming of
state-building in Kosovo.

34
The international community “identified ethnicity as both the cause of conflict and then as a
solution to peace-making”, (Visoka, 2017, p.71). It co(i)nstitutionalised ethnicity as the core
socio-political and governmentability characteristic of Kosovo which posed too many
challenges, such as the implementation of high standards minority rights, impeded decision
making process and hampered good governance. The high standards minority rights resulted
in a heavy burden on the fragile shoulders of a new state like Kosovo with low state capacity
and an unwillingness of the Kosovo Albanian elite to deliver and the Kosovo Serbs to
participate and materialise their rights.

On the other hand, though there was progress on the upper level of political representation of
communities, this has not reached the lower political levels and other areas of concern such
as education, cultural heritage and cross-community communication. In addition, power-
sharing arrangements strained political process and decision making as they became
communities, notably Kosovo Serbs, king makers of the government formation. “Any
political suggestion from Kosovo Serbs first goes to Belgrade for approval and then it is
presented in the parliament”, (Visoka, 2017, p.93). Finally, ethnicisation of the political
system undermined good governance of Kosovo. It empowered ethno nationalist elites who
misused state institutions, while the international community turned a blind eye in exchange
for stability. The imposition of an ambitious minority rights framework did not take into
account local agency, the Kosovo’s capacity and commitment to deliver these provisions,
Kosovo Serbs unwillingness to participate and materialise their community rights – and most
importantly Serbia’s contestation and non-recognition policy.

The failure of Kosovo to adequately face these challenges, coupled with the ethnicisation of
Kosovo’s political system and the fluid interventionism aimed at mitigating failures of action
and non-action, created a hybrid peace; a semi-democratic regime and a limited statehood.
The international community identified power-sharing arrangements as the cornerstone of
multi-ethnic state-building in Kosovo. However, power-sharing institutions sheltered ethno
nationalist elites who exploited ethnic division to gain and preserve power, gave them agency
to resist and transform the intervener’s state-building intentions and shape their own
narratives of peace. In this regard as Roeder and Rothchild argue, organising political society
along ethnic lines risks fuelling ethnic division and delaying any prospect for reconciliation
and progressive transformation towards an integrative citizenry (Roeder and Rothchild,
2005). The outcome of this has been a hybrid peace, where ethno nationalist elites transmitted
their divisive rhetoric to the society. Moreover, the institutionalisation of ethnicity has not

35
strengthened democratic practices. Contrary, this has co-opted ethnic elites into state
institutions. In this regard, Horowitz asserts that “ethnic entrepreneurs manipulate inter-
communal distrust to consolidate political power among members of their own ethnic group,
thereby encouraging other ethnic groups to respond which brings about a democratic system
divided along mutually exclusive ethnic lines”, (Cited at Paris, 2004, p161-162). Ethno
nationalist elites in Kosovo used ethnic rhetoric to disguise misuse of office and bad
governance, while international actors trading of democracy for stability opened avenues for
establishing a semi-democratic regime in Kosovo.

Lastly, the institutionalisation of ethnicity and the international community’s fluid

interventionism has produced a limited statehood with fragmented sovereignty. The
international community was concerned more with stability, so it tolerated ethnic division
and Serb parallel structures in northern Kosovo which obstructed Kosovo Serbs integration
into Kosovo’s institutions. “For years, the international community told Pristina to be patient,
and leave the North to us while Serbia has been allowed to undermine Kosovo’s
sovereignty”, (ICG, 2012a, p.4). The Ahtisaari Plan’s segmental autonomy only reinforced
ethnic division by creating mono-ethnic municipalities which hampered functioning of the
state and became a tool that strengthened Serbia’s hand to exert agency and to try to turn
Kosovo into a dysfunctional state.

This ‘forced’ Kosovo to negotiate its authority in the North with Serbia through the EU
mediation. However, as we have seen in the third chapter, the Brussels agreements reinforced
more ethnic demarcation, created a bi-national state, thus marginalising other minorities
living in the North and co-opted Serbian backed Serb local ethnic elites into Kosovo’s
institutional framework, thereby practically institutionalising Belgrade as a key player over
Kosovo’s sovereignty. Last year four Mayors of Kosovo-Serb majority municipalities
resigned in protest of Kosovo’s 100% increase in tariffs on Serbian imports after its
aggressive de-recognition campaign. ‘From today, there is no Pristina-system in the North’,
said the president of Serbian List, Goran Rakić, (WEB, 2018), revealing the impotence of
Kosovo in northern Kosovo. In this regard, Kosovo’s authority in the North became
vulnerable vis-à-vis Serbian contestation, non-recognition policy and ultimately its partition
plan.

These assemblages of challenges and consequences to Kosovo’s statehood show that multi-
ethnic state-building in Kosovo has failed to build a multi-ethnic and democratic polity.

36
Kosovo still remains divided socially, politically and territorially along ethnic lines. The
emergence of a so-called border correction plan last year, allegedly along ethnic lines, is at
some extent a telling feature of the failure of multi-ethnic state-building policy in Kosovo,
(For correction border plan see Gray, 2018). Though not yet universally endorsed, the idea is
gaining western support and as Hehir puts it, the border changes reveal Kosovo’s true worth
to its international donors, (2018). The US Presidents National Security Advisor, John
Bolton, declared in Kiev last year that “the US policy is that if the two parties can work it out
between themselves and reach agreement, we don’t exclude territorial adjustments,” (Cited at
Rudic, 2018). This confirms the fluid interventionism of the international community which
continues to keep stability and security at its top agenda and not the fate of Kosovo’s
statehood.

In addition this indicates that multi-ethnic state-building was not a realistic policy and keeps
bringing challenges and consequences to Kosovo’s statehood. Though the controversial
border correction idea has lost the last years’ momentum it still stands as a Damocles sword
over Kosovo’s sovereignty and statehood. To conclude, the prospect of Kosovo’s statehood
consolidation seems to remain deeply linked with the international community ambivalences
and interests, its domestic political processes and interstate relations with Serbia.

37
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