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PLEA BARGAINING IN THE NIGERIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MAJOR

CHALLENGES, AND THE WAY FORWARD by David Anifowose

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 PLEA BARGAINING IN THE NIGERIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MAJOR
CHALLENGES, AND THE WAY FORWARD
Abstract
Several persons have declared openly their disapproval of the practice of plea bargaining, some
have even called for an outright abolishment of the practice. This is solely because of the
challenges faced in the administration of Plea Bargain in Nigeria amongst which is the
discriminatory application of the concept, abuse of the system, and its effect on corrupt practices.
However, regardless of the controversial application of Plea bargaining in Nigeria, Plea bargaining
remains one of the best things that has ever happened to our criminal justice system. But to
effectively maximize the benefits of Plea bargaining in Nigeria, clear sentencing guidelines should
be put in place to reduce the probability of flagrant abuse by the Prosecution, the discriminatory
application of plea bargaining in Nigeria must be curtailed, and lastly, Judges should be allowed
to participate more in the plea-bargaining process. This work examines the problems affecting the
application of Plea bargain in Nigeria, and proffers solutions to them taking into consideration the
application of plea bargaining in other jurisdictions.
Keywords: Plea bargain, judicial participation, guilty plea, discriminatory application,
sentencing guidelines, corrupt practices

Introduction
Criminal procedure in Nigeria is of different stages. It commences from when the police have a
reasonable suspicion that a person has either committed a crime or is committing a crime, then an
arrest will occur, then filling of criminal charges and the bail hearing, through to trial; continues
in the case of conviction, through sentencing, imprisonment and release upon completion of
sentence1. It is important to note that after the filling of a criminal charge by the prosecution, the
accused person is availed the opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser offence or to only one or some
counts or multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that prescribed for the graver
charge. This is known as Plea bargaining.

❖ David Anifowose, Law gradaute (BL in view), davidiyanu592@gmail.com, 09080402559.

1
B Ayorinde & Co, Nigeria: A Reformatory Approach To The Criminal Justice System In Nigeria,
(2018)https://www.mondaq.com/nigeria/public-order/293894/a-reformatory-approach-to-the-criminal-justice-
system-in-nigeria, accessed on the 15th November 2021.
Section 14(2) of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC)2, introduced Plea bargain
into our Jurisdiction. Its provision are as follows:3

Subject to the provision of Section 174 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999
(which related to the power of the Attorney General of the federation to institute, continue,
takeover or discontinue criminal proceedings against any person in any court of law), the
Commission may compound any offence punishable under this Act by accepting such sum of money
as it thinks fit not, exceeding the maximum amount to which that person would have been liable if
he had been convicted of that offence. To compound means to agree for consideration not to
prosecute a crime while it consists of the receipt of some property or other consideration in return
for an agreement not to prosecute or inform one who has committed a crime.4

This aforementioned provision allowed a few high-profile cases instituted by the EFCC to be
concluded on the basis of plea bargaining. The first was the case of the world biggest scam (at that
time) of $242m by certain Nigerians – Mr Emmanuel Nwube, Mrs Amaka Anyemba and Mr
Nzeribe Okoli against a Brazilian banker. The fraudsters obtained the money by promising a
member of the bank staff a commission for funding a non-existent contract to build an airport in
Nigeria's capital Abuja.5 Emmanuel Nwude was sentenced to 25 years, while Nzeribe Okoli was
sentenced to 12 years follows negotiations in which they agreed to plead guilty to 16 of the 91
original charges, and to forfeit assets worth at least $121.5 million to the victims of the scam.
Amaka Anajemba, on the other hand was sentenced to two and a half years in prison in July after
agreeing to return $48.5 million to the Sao Paolo-based Banco Noroeste, which collapsed after the
theft. The second case involved the alleged stealing of about N14b against the former Inspector
General of Police, Mr. Tafa Balogun, 6 who was arraigned for stealing and laundering 100 million
dollars from the police treasury. A 70-count charge was brought against him, and he pleaded guilty
to 8 counts of failing to comply with lawful entries in contravention of section 38(2)(b) of the
EFCC Act. He was convicted and sentenced to a term of six months in jail on each of the eight

3
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, No 1 2004.
4
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, No 1 2004
5
CNET, Nigerian email scammers jailed, available at https://www.cnet.com/tech/tech-industry/nigerian-e-mail-
scammers-jailed/
6
Frn V. Tafa Adebayo Balogun & 8 Ors (Fhc/Abj/Cr/14/2005)
counts and the sentences were to run concurrently. He also forfeited assets estimated to be about
16billion naira, and paid a sum of only 500, 000 on each of the eight counts charges.

After the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) Act 2004, the Administration of
Criminal Justice Law, 20077 came to being and made express provisions for the application of Plea
bargaining in Nigeria. The Law was re-enacted in 2011, and later in 2015 a recent Administration
of Criminal Justice Law (Lagos State) was passed into Law. The Anambra State Criminal Justice
System towed the path of Lagos State and enacted theirs in 2010. This, of course, was possible
since under the Nigeria legislative framework it is not the exclusive preserve of the Centre to enact
laws to regulate the Criminal Justice System. Also in 2015, the Administration of Criminal Justice
Act was enacted to provide for the administration of criminal justice and for related matters in the
courts of the Federal Capital Territory and other Federal Courts in Nigeria.

The Administration of Criminal Justice Act was enacted in 2015. Section 494 of the Act,8 defines
Plea bargain as:The process in criminal proceedings whereby the defendant and the prosecution
work out a mutually acceptable disposition of the case; including the plea of the defendant to a
lesser offence than that charged in the complaint or information and in conformity with other
conditions imposed by the prosecution, in return for a lighter sentence than that for the higher
charge subject to the Court’s approval.

Section 270 of the Act9 gave a detailed outline of the procedure for the application of Plea
bargaining in Nigeria. In its 10 subsections, it outlined the processes to be taken for the
administration of Plea bargain in Nigeria, detailing the role of the Prosecution, the role of the
Defendant and the role of the Court in the practice of Plea bargaining in Nigeria. Section 270(2),10
stipulate that the prosecution may enter into plea bargaining with the defendants with the consent
of the victim or his representative during or after the presentation of the evidence of the
prosecution but before the presentation of the evidence of the defense, provides that all the
following conditions are met:

7
Now repealed by the ACJL 2011
8
Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015
9
Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015
10
Ibid
 i. the evidence of the prosecutions is insufficient to prove the offence charged beyond
reasonable doubt,
ii. where the defendant has agreed to return the proceeds of the crime or make restitution
to the victim or his representative
iii. Where the Prosecutor is of the view that the offer or acceptance of a plea bargain is
in the interest of justice, the public interest, public policy and the need to prevent
abuse of legal process, he may offer or accept the plea bargain.

By virtue of Section 270(8) of the ACJA, the presiding judge or magistrate before whom the
criminal proceedings are pending shall not participate in the plea discussion.11Their role is only
to ascertain whether the defendant admitted the allegation in the charge to which he has pleaded
guilty and entered into the agreement voluntarily and without undue influence.12 However, the
Presidential Advisory Committee Guidelines,13 further empowered the court to retain an absolute
discretion as to whether or not it sentences in accordance with the joint written submission from
the parties.14

Challenges faced in the application of Plea bargaining in Nigeria:

1. Discriminatory Application
Plea bargain as it is presently applied in Nigeria is discriminatory against the poor and only serves
the interest of the rich and powerful who can and do use their ill-gotten wealth to negotiate away
their criminality by pleading guilty to charges brought against them by the EFCC in return for
lighter sentences.15 According to Hon. Justice Dahiru Mustapha (CJN rtd.), plea bargain as a novel
concept was invented to provide soft landing for high profile criminals who loot the treasury
entrusted to them.16 The EFCC most especially, has a pattern of entering a plea bargain with high
profile personalities, giving them an out of jail free card, and also allowing them pay back a little

11
Agaba J.A., Pratical Approach to Criminal Litigation in Nigeria 3rd ed. (Bloom Legal Temple Press, Lagos
2017) 620.
12
section 270 (10) of the ACJA
13
emanated from the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC) 2016group which is aimed
to support the elaborate provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015
14
Paragraph 4(10) Presidential Advisory Committee Guidelines
15
Linus Y.Akor, Ph.D “Plea Bargain and the anti-corruption Campaign in Nig”, Global journal of
interdisciplinary social science, 2014 Vol.3(4):116
16
Dahiru Mustapha (CJN rtd.) In a speech made at the 5th Annual General Conference of the Section on Legal Justice
of the Nigerian Bar Association at Abuja on November 14, 2011. Cited in “Plea Bargain And Anti-Graft War In
Nigeria by UWAKWE.
sum compared to the amount of money they ought to pay. A vivid example is the case of Tafa
Balogun,17 a former Inspector General of Police (IGP) who was arraigned for stealing and
laundering 100 million dollars from the police treasury. A 70-count charge was brought against
him, and he pleaded guilty to 8 counts of failing to comply with lawful entries in contravention of
section 38(2)(b) of the EFCC Act. He was convicted and sentenced to a term of six months in jail
on each of the eight counts and the sentences were to run concurrently. He forfeited assets
estimated to be about 16billion naira, and paid a sum of only 500, 000 on each of the eight counts
charges totalling N4 million,18 out of the 100 million dollars he was accused of stealing and
laundering. It is shocking to note that the six months’ jail term was served on a hospital bed at the
Abuja’s National hospital. In other words, he never really went to jail.

On the other hand, according to Mr Rauf Aregbesola, Minister of Interior, A total of 50,992 out of
68,747 inmates in Nigerian prisons are awaiting trial.19 To further corroborate this, Vanguard
newspaper published on the 17th June, 2021, that Lagos records 6,800 awaiting trial inmates of the
8000 incarcerated inmates. Mr Adewale Adebisi, the controller of corrections, Lagos state
Command while giving the report, added that aside the inmate awaiting trial, some other inmates
have been on trial for about 10-12 years. It is sad to note here that aside the Attorney General of
Lagos state who recently began a Plea bargain session with the aforementioned inmates, no other
Attorney General have considered this approach even with the incredible number of inmates and
the overcrowded prisons. This obviously begs the question as to whether Plea bargaining in Nigeria
is indeed for everyone or a selected few. It appears to be that since the majority of Inmates,
especially those awaiting trials are poor, no one really cares if they rot in jail, all the prosecutors
seem to be after is offering a plea bargain deal to wealthy criminals. This obviously poses a huge
challenge to the administration of plea bargain system in Nigeria, and should be addressed soon.

3.7.1 EFFECT ON CORRUPT PRACTICES

In the words of Eso, in an interview on the Vanguard Newspaper titled “why plea bargain breeds
corruption”; “they bargain with the judge, bargain with accused person, he returns half of the
money, and then they give some hairy-fairy punishment-go and serve three months in prison and

17
SUPRA
18
Webmaster “Where is Tafa Balogun” Trust, http://dailytrust.com/whereistafawabalogun/ accessed 17/8/21
19
Adeolu Adeyemo-oso“74% of inmates are awaiting trial” https://tribuneonlineng.com/74-of-prison-inmates-
are-awaiting-trial-aregbesola/ accessed 17/8/21
the three, will of course be in the hospital. This is an encouragement for other governors to steal
when they come into office…. look at the issue of Igbinedion of Edo State, who was alleged to have
stolen billions and billions of naira … they asked him to plea bargain, there and then he was fined
three million naira which he picked out of his purse and paid … it sent a notion that it has been
pre-arranged that it will not be more than three million. Now after that they started to gloat and
shed crocodile tears and said the punishment was not adequate … of course, the punishment can
never be adequate when they import this issue of plea bargain …”20 The narrative has always been
that the major essence of plea bargaining is to work as a tool in curbing corruption amongst public
officers who might have a trait of corruption running in their veins. However, flowing from the
mode of application of the concept so far, its effect on corruption has been more of an
encouragement than a “curbing”. Sadly, the statements of the judges outlined above are true, as it
has been seen a plethora of cases that the administration of the Plea-bargaining system in Nigeria
is just an avenue to allow a soft landing for high profile criminals. The following few cases would
be considered to further drive home this point: Alamiesieigha V. FRN,21 Federal Republic of
Nigeria V. Cecilia Ibru,22 and Federal Republic of Nigeria V. Lucky Igbinedion.23
In the case between Alamiesieigha V. FRN,24the former Governor of Bayelsa State Mr Dieprieye
Alamiesieigha was convicted of stealing public assets worth over US$100 million. He entered a
plea bargain in which he was to be imprisoned for two years, and he was ordered to forfeit his
assets (the traceable ones). Interestingly, he served his sentence for just a few hours because
according to the agreement, the sentence was to run from the time he was first arrested.25

In the case between Federal Republic of Nigeria V. Cecilia Ibru,26 the then Managing Director
and Chief Executive Officer of the defunct Oceanic Bank Plc, Mrs. Cecilia Ibru, entered into
a plea bargain with the EFCC. As atonement for the monumental banking fraud she

20
Jide Ajani, Kayode Ajala & Ola Ajayi “Justice Eso’s last interview: why plea bargain breeds
corruption”https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/10/why-plea-bargain-breeds-corruption-by-kayode-eso/ accessed
17/8/21.
21
(2006)16 NWLR Part 1004 Page 41.
22
Charge No. FHC/L/297C/2009 (unreported).
23
Ehi Eric Esoimeme Esq “Has the Concept of Plea Bargaining Been Abused in Nigeria’s Criminal Justice
System?” Article in SSRN Electronic Journal · January 2014
24
Supra
25
Wikipedia, Dieprieye Alamiesieigha https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diepreye_Alamieyeseigha accessed on 22/8/21
26
SUPRA
perpetrated, Ibru offered to forfeit assets worth N191bn comprising 94 choice properties
across the world including those in the United States, Dubai and Nigeria and accepted a light
prison sentence of six months. Ibru, however, never stepped within the prison four walls as
the trial judge, Justice Dan Abutu, directed the prisons authorities to take her to the highbrow
Reddington Hospital on Victoria Island, Lagos, where she spent the entire prison term on the
claim of being ill. 27

In Federal Republic of Nigeria V. Lucky Igbinedion,28 Mr. Igbinedion was charged with
stealing up to N4.4 billion. But in the ruling given by a judge at the Federal High Court in Enugu,
Mr. Igbinedion was fined only a paltry N3.5 million, with no option of jail time for the egregious
crimes of looting the Edo State treasury for over 8 years. In addition to the fine, Mr. Igbinedion
would lose three properties to the Federal government.29

It's obvious from the above cases, that the application of Plea bargaining so far has nothing in it to
discourage corruption. As a matter of fact, if a person knows that when he embezzles 20 billion
naira, he can pay 15 million naira and walk away as free man, he would definitely be encouraged
to steal even more. So, the application of Plea bargaining in Nigerian needs to be applied more
appropriately, so as to affect the effect on corruption

3.7.2 ABUSE OF THE SYSTEM

No doubt, the administration of the Plea Bargain system in Nigeria has been grossly abused so
far. The aforementioned cases in which plea bargaining has been applied testifies to this abuse.30
It is however imperative to state that one of the major reasons for this abuse is the enormous
power granted to the prosecution, and the limited power accrued to the court to participate in

27
Sesan “Looters’ plea bargain proposal to FG sparks debate” https://punchng.com/looters-plea-bargain-
proposal-fg-sparks-debate/ accessed 19/8/21
28
FHC/B/11C/2008
29
Saharareporters “Igbinedion gets easy plea-bargain: no jail time, keeps billions in stolen funds, keeps vast
properties”http://saharareporters.com/2008/12/30/igbinedion-gets-easy-plea-bargain-no-jail-time-keeps-
billions-stolen-funds-keeps-vast accessed 19/8/21
30
Dieprieye Alamiesieigha, former Governor of Bayelsa State, was convicted of stealing public assets worth over
US$100 million and got away with imprisonment for two years and an order of asset forfeiture for only those
assets that were traced. Lucky Igbinedion, former Governor of Edo State, was given a fine of less than US$20,000
upon conviction for theft of public assets and breach of public trust. Tafa Balogun, former Inspector-General of
Police, a lawyer, stole assets worth over US$130 million and was sentenced on conviction to imprisonment for a
mere six months. Mrs Cecilia Ibru, Chief Executive Officer of Oceanic Bank, was convicted of stealing assets
worth over $2billion and was sentenced to six months imprisonment, a term that was mostly served in one of the
best hospitals in the country.
the Plea bargain. By virtue of Section 270 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act
2015, the Prosecution is given absolute discretion to consider and receive plea bargain from a
person alleged to have committed an offence.31
Section 270(8) of ACJA,32 clearly provides that the presiding judge or magistrate before whom
the criminal proceedings are pending shall not participate in the plea bargaining process.33
The implication of this is that the Judge is prohibited from the judicial participation of any sort
when the parties are discussing the plea bargain arrangement. The Judge is only allowed to
ascertain whether the defendant admits the allegation in the charge to which he has pleaded
guilty and whether he entered into the agreement voluntarily and without undue influence.34
Even though the Court has the power to decide whether or not the Plea bargain should go
through, the fact that the Court cannot intervene in the initial processes, and only has limited
power even while ratifying the plea bargain, gives the Prosecution a freehand to do whatever
they like, and by so doing abuse the System.
In South Africa for instance, the court has the power to confirm whether the plea-bargaining
agreement complies with the requirement which is set out by the law. In other words, the South
African courts must ensure that the agreement presented before it complies with the laid down
rules and regulations regarding plea bargaining under Section 105A (4) of the South African
Criminal Procedure Act. Further, the South African court does not convict the accused person
upon the finding that the accused is indeed guilty of the offence coupled with his plea of guilty,
the court must consider whether or not the proposed sentence is just. In other words, the Judge
has to consider more than the traditional factors in order to determine the justness of a
sentence.35 In the case of S v. Esterhuizen,36 the court opined that the function of the court in
considering the justness or unjustness of a plea and sentence agreement made under Section
105A,37 encompasses the taking of a broad overview of the facts admitted and the crimes
admitted to having been committed together with the proposed sentence to be imposed, all with

31
This provision is also seen in Section 75 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Lagos State, 2015,
Section 283 of the Administration of Criminal Justice and other Related Matters Law of Ogun State, 2017, and
the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Anambra State 2010.
32
Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015
33
Also seen in ACJL, S76 (5).
34
See ACJA 2015, Section 270 (10), S76 (7) ACJL of Lagos State 2011.
35
Ibid; See also S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A).
36
2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 494-495.
37
South African Criminal Procedure Act
a view to establishing whether the sentence agreed upon and its effective content bear an
adequate enough relationship to the crimes committed taking into account all of the agreed facts,
both aggravating and mitigating, so that it can be said that justice has been served.
Having considered this, and the court opines that the sentence agreed upon by both the
prosecutor and the accused is unjust, the court shall inform them of its findings and the court
shall also offer them the sentence which it considers just.38 This is not so in Nigeria, as the role
of the trial judge in plea bargaining is often limited to an inquiry after the guilty plea is tendered
into the due process requisites of a valid plea. However, Nigerian judges so far has shown great
enthusiasm in doing more. A vivid example is the case of EFCC V. CHRISTIAN NWOSU,39
where the EFCC had a ridiculous plea bargain with Mr Christian Nwosu. The presiding judge
rejected the plea bargain on the grounds that considering the offence of the accused, and the
provisions of the Administration of the criminal justice Act, Mr Christian Nwosu deserves a
better sentence.40 Also, in the case of EFCC v Olademeji Abiola, 41 where the EFCC in the plea
bargain deal accepted a liberal sentence of 6 months for the 5 count charge of false pretense,
possession of fraudulent documents and knowingly sending indecent, offensive and
pornographic pictures preferred against him. The court rejected the plea bargain on the grounds
the punishment is too liberal and that it would not achieve the aim of deterring others from
committing the crime.42 This obviously shows that the prosecution most of the times is the one
responsible for the abuse of the plea bargain system in Nigeria, and if the Judges are empowered
by the law to do more, the issue of abuse of the system would be greatly reduced.
3.7.3 LACK OF A CLEAR SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The lack of clear sentencing guideline in the application of plea bargain in Nigeria, is one of the
major flaws of the system, and a major cause for the misuse of the principle thus far. Without
sentencing guidelines to prescribe a sentencing structure for judges to follow while sentencing

38
See South African Criminal Procedure Act, s105A (9) (a).
39
(2016) 17. NWLR (PT. 1541) 226 AT 290
40
The Guardian, by Nan, Court rejects plea bargain for INEC official,
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/328717-judge-rejects-plea-bargain-sends-internet-fraudster-to-
jail.html > accessed on 23rd August, 2021
41
(2019) LCN/1276 (CA)
42
Premiumtimes, judge reflects plea bargain, sends internet fraudster to jail,
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/328717-judge-rejects-plea-bargain-sends-internet-fraudster-to-
jail.html > accessed on 23rd August, 2021
an accused person, it is almost impossible to totally eradicate the misuse of plea bargain by
corrupt officials.
In the United states for instance, Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides for
a two offense-level reduction in exchange for the defendant's acknowledgment that he committed
the charged offense. Paragraph b further provides that if the defendant notifies the authorities of
his intention to enter a guilty plea in a timely manner or he provides the government (prosecution),
complete information regarding his own involvement in the offense he may be entitled to an
additional one-level reduction. This simply means that if for instance, an accused person should
normally be liable for a level 15 offence, which is 18-24 months imprisonment. If he accepts
responsibility as prescribed in Section 3E1., his offence would be reduced by two levels, which
makes it a level 13 offence, now liable to 12 to 18 months imprisonment, as opposed to the earlier
18-24 months. Also, if he provides the government (prosecution), complete information regarding
his own involvement in the offense he may be entitled to an additional one-level reduction; this
reduces the only reduced level 15 offence to a level 12 offence making the defendant now liable
to a 10-16 months sentence.

In the United Kingdom, the 2017 sentence guidelines provides that if a plea is indicated at the
first stage of the proceedings, a maximum reduction of one-third should normally be made. A
plea entered after the first stage should attract a maximum reduction of one-quarter (subject to
several exceptions noted in the guideline). The reduction should decrease to a maximum of one-
tenth if the defendant pleads guilty on the first day of trial. The guideline also provides a limit on
the sentence reduction available in cases of murder.

In india, Section 265E of the Indian Criminal procedure code, provides that while punishing the
accused, the Court, at its discretion, can pass sentence of minimum punishment, if the law
provides such minimum punishment for the offences committed by the accused or if such
minimum punishment is not provided, can pass a sentence of one fourth of the punishment
provided for such offence.

Going by the forgoing, the mode and extent to which a court can approve the reduction of
sentencing is clearly defined in the above Countries. This makes it practically impossible for
abuse, and flagrant misuse of the power of the prosecution and even the Court in ensuring
sentencing. It is advised that Nigeria follow suit in this, by ensuring clear sentencing guidelines
for partakers of a plea bargain

Conclusion and Recommendation

Regardless of the aforementioned problems of Plea bargaining in Nigeria, Plea bargain remains an

advantage to our criminal justice system, as it helps the prosecution gets his conviction, it helps

the accused person to have a chance at making restitution and helps the society as a whole to feel

satisfied that one way or the other, justice will at best be achieved. Plea bargain could also save

cost of prosecution, solve the problem of decongestion of the already overcrowded correctional

centers. However, to effectively maximize these aforementioned benefits of Plea bargaining, the

following recommendations must be adhered to:

1. Clear sentencing guidelines that is able to provide an effective guidance for sentencing,
but flexible to allow departure where the interest of justice dictates should be put in place

to reduce the probability of flagrant abuse of plea bargaining.

2. Prosecutorial guidelines should also be developed to monitor and supervise prosecutors to

ensure that they also do not abuse the process,

3. The discriminatory application of plea bargaining in Nigeria must be curtailed. And thus,
all inmates should be a beneficiary.

4. Section 270(8) of Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, should be modified to

allow the presiding judge participate in the plea-bargaining process, and not only approve

or reject plea bargaining deals, but also recommend to the prosecution which sentence, fine

or approach is most appropriate in the given circumstances.

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