PLS 343, Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa

Research Project, Final Draft

A Blessing or a Curse:

How Natural Resources Lengthen Civil Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa?

by Darina Zhunussova

Professor: Karol Czuba

2021
Darina Zhunussova, PLS 343

Introduction

Why do some civil conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa last longer than others? How do natu-

ral resources influence the duration of ongoing wars? Is there a single causal mechanism or are

there many moderating factors impacting the longevity of civil conflicts in the region? For

decades, different scholars, including political scientists, have been speculating about the factors

that determine the onset, the duration, and the end of civil conflicts. In Sub-Saharan Africa, such

factors as Africa’s economic characteristics, climate change, corruption, structural violence are

highlighted as the most explanatory. The variation exists in the duration of civil conflicts in the

region. Some wars are ten to twenty years longer than others: unlike in Mali, where civil wars

lasted several years, civil conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Algeria lasted for ten to twenty

years. As the literature on the regional conflicts suggests, there are far fewer new conflicts occur-

ring in Sub-Saharan Africa but rather the old ones persisting (Straus 2012). For that reason, this

essay finds it crucial to identify means that civil conflicts use to survive and persist. Thus, the

purpose of this research is to examine what influences the duration of existing civil conflicts in

the region.

This paper argues that in the resource-rich states, existing conflicts create corruption-and-

looting-friendly environment which incentivizes actors to support those conflicts, increasing the

length of civil conflicts.

Mechanisms

The mechanism showing that the positive relationship between abundance of natural re-

sources tends and the duration of civil conflicts in the region is as follows: the abundance of nat-

ural resources contributes to the political corruption in the region. Availability of resources in-

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creases the incentive to steal both for governments and rebel groups. With the intensive corrup-

tion in the government, political instabilities, and weak state capacity, rebel groups transform

looting into a habit and become looting-dependent while funding their rebels.

Considering that many empirical studies demonstrate that resources, most likely in con-

nection with abundance, play a role in civil conflict, this mechanism is particularly salient for

Governments and policy makers in the region. Paying more attention to mechanisms introduced

in this research would incentivize policy makers to work on rebel group relations and encourage

change in the aid approach used by the international community. In addition, policy analysts spe-

cializing in questions of ending civil conflicts could place greater emphasis on strategies of inter-

national monitoring and use public naming and shaming strategies to disincentivize actions of

particular states in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Research Design

This research presents a multiple-case study and examines how the same mechanism

works in four different civil conflicts: Angolan civil war, Nigerian civil conflicts, Liberian civil

war, and war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The reason for that is the region's diversity.

That includes ethnic diversity, variation in factors influencing the onset of war, geographical lo-

cation, and others. Even if onsets of civil conflicts in Angola, Nigeria, Liberia and DRC were in-

fluenced by different factors, the presence of natural resources in each region could be the main

reason for conflicts' longevity. The multiple-case study, thus, is more effective in examining two

mechanisms in which natural resources may lengthen civil conflicts.

Angola, Nigeria, Liberia and DRC are chosen for two main reasons. First, all four states

are the hot spot of the resource-conflict link: oil and diamonds in Angola, oil in Nigeria, iron ore,

gold, diamonds, and timber in Liberia, and diamonds and coltan in the Democratic Republic of

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the Congo. Second, a specific study of the Sub-Saharan African region has been neglected with

regard to a comparative study of the resource-conflict’s-length mechanisms noted in the previous

section.

Theoretical Framework

Collier and Hoefer (1998) were the first to open an empirical conversation on the link be-

tween resources and conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their research was on the onset of civil

wars and argued that resource-wealth influences the civil war onset by creating an opportunity of

“greed” for rebel activities. As their idea was expanded further, in the last two decades scholars

examined the influence of resource-wealth on the length of civil conflicts. Three of the main

ways resource-abundance influences length of civil conflicts are via incentivizing corruption

(both in government and among rebel groups), encouraging the presence of external actors in the

region and facilitating looting-dependence.

Several studies have found a positive correlation between the abundance of natural re-

sources in the region and widespread corruption in the government and among rebel groups

(Ross 2003; le Billon 2014; Knutsen et al. 2016; Malaquias 2007). One part of it accounts for

elite rivalry, such as that in Angola (le Billon 2014). The relationship between oil and prolonged

civil wars was a crucial issue in Nigeria, too (Oyefusi 2007), linking it to corruption, too. Here,

oil led to more corruption and hostilities in the civil conflict, it created a vicious cycle of corrup-

tion by the government as well as looked more opportunistic to rebel groups. As a result of re-

gions’ resource-richness, not only did corruption prolong civil wars, so did looting. Although

some studies find that the presence of “lootable resources” in regions does not necessarily corre-

late with the onset of war (Ross 2004; Humphreys 2003), it is linked to longer civil conflicts

more than to shorter ones. Thus, the resource-wealth in the region is not necessarily connected to

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onsets of wars but to their longer duration since resource-dependence creates corruption-depen-

dence and looting-dependence.

Natural Resources and Political Corruption in Angola and Nigeria

The civil conflict in Angola, an oil-and-diamond-rich country in the South of Sub-Saha-

ran Africa, once referred to as resulting from ethnic divisions, after decades became central to

elite rivalry. After formal independence was granted to the country in 1975, the Movimento Pop-

ular de Libertacao de Angola (hereinafter MPLA) left-wing political party came to rule Angola.

Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola (hereinafter UNITA) movement was orga-

nized earlier in 1966. At first, UNITA held a Maoist stance ideology, but later on, the movement

adopted an anti-left position as it started cooperating with Portuguese officials against the Soviet-

backed MPLA. Although some agreements were signed and international pressure encouraged

the two sides to stop the fight, the civil conflict is still on. Besides the ideological rivalry that is

explanatory for the onset of war, what might be key for its long duration is Angolan resource

wealth.

The question arises: how exactly did the resource-corruption prolong the civil conflict? It

is argued that the exploitation of oil and diamonds by two groups not only financed but moti-

vated the prolongation of military operations in the region (le Billon 2001). Knutsen et al.

(2016), too, have found that, in the country, mining areas were more exposed to corruption from

the moment mines opened there. With the ongoing resource-corruption that was the most popular

way of financing arms by both groups, stopping the war would be beneficial neither for MPLA

nor for UNITA. As Malaquias (2001) claims, on one side, during the last decade, the governing

MPLA went completely off the goals that were to fight against colonialism, instead, building a

corrupt, nepotistic, and oppressive system of governance transforming into a private property

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that once was public. On the other side, UNITA, which once was regarded as a movement to

overthrow the MPLA for the sake of democracy and people, transformed into a private guerilla

that is now fed only by means of resource-corruption (le Billon 2001).

Resource-corruption created an arms race among rebel groups. The corruption that inten-

sified with the two groups acknowledging the number of resources and money they can extract

from Angola, developed more misallocation of public subsidies leading to a greater economic

downturn (le Billon 2001; Fearon 2004). According to Frynas and Wood (2001), Angola's re-

source wealth, specifically, oil, financed most of the arms purchases by the MPLA. If one of the

rebel groups decided to stop resource-extraction and misallocation, that would not benefit any of

the groups. Firstly, it would not stop the civil war but would strengthen the fighting capacity of

one of the sides, increasing their incentives to proceed. Secondly, it would destroy the sustain-

able existence of one or both of the groups. Thus, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there were not

enough enticements for MPLA and UNITA to drop their weapons and stop resource corruption.

Since the corruption started, none of the groups found ways to end it quickly. Ending that corrup-

tion would prevent the government from keeping its weapons.

The abundant oil revenue helped the government of the country to combat the UNITA

army as well as the South African army. With the availability of oil, MPLA could build a strong

military apparatus to resist these forces. The capital run from the oil enabled the government to

import arms of over 5 Billion dollars in the period between 1993 and 1999 (le Billon 2001).

Arms expenditures were primarily taken from the public budget allocation allowing corruption to

sustain the civil conflict (McMillan 2005). Corruption within the government and amongst rebel

groups for a long time now has been evaluated as a long-term problem that allows for continuous

civil conflicts. In the case of Angola, resource-corruption was not to start the war but to become

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a long-term side effect of the civil conflict. Thus, in Angola, natural resources became that addi-

tional reason for nationalist movements to prolong civil wars.

In Nigeria, the abundance of oil contributed to a vicious cycle of corruption and hostili-

ties during the civil conflict. Some may find the abundance of natural resources linked to the on-

set of civil conflicts in Nigeria, or at least, not unconnected to it. Among important facts, Nigeria

is the largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the mid-90s, the country experienced oil-re-

lated disputes in the Niger Delta, Africa’s most important oil-producing region (Oyefusi 2007).

Later, the civil conflict of Biafran took place lasting for three years with a fragile post-war peace

period, with both external actors (at least six major oil companies are present in Nigeria -- Shell,

Mobil, Chevron, Elf, Agip, and Texaco), locals, and the government attempting to take control

over the oil reserves. These plethora of opportunities for corruption and illegal bunkering were

open both for the government and rebel groups (Emmanuel 2004). The government has put into

effect a number of oil-related legal mechanisms to protect local communities from adverse con-

sequences of oil production (Oyefusi 2007). Yet the agencies responsible for enabling the effec-

tiveness of the legal mechanisms had almost no control over the Nigerian oil industry. Moreover,

the corruption by the government made it harder to involve in the protection processes (Sore-

mekun 1995).

The case of Nigeria shows that while during civil conflicts the resource may be a curse

for locals, it is a blessing for the local elite in face of a government that extracts and sells these

resources on the world market, gaining more profit, avoiding the end of civil conflicts, and

adding to its prolongation.

Natural Resources and Looting in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia

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As a result of regions’ resource-richness, not only do corruption and external actors' pres-

ence in the civil conflict prolong civil wars, so does looting. The literature on resource curse

refers to the term “lootable resources” to indicate gemstones, drugs, and timber (Ross 2004). Al-

though some studies find that the presence of “lootable resources” in regions does not necessarily

correlate with the onset of war (Ross 2004; Humphreys 2003), it is linked to longer civil con-

flicts more than to shorter ones. Fearon (2004), too, finds that areas of civil wars with the avail-

ability of gemstones, like diamonds, are more likely to last longer than other types of civil con-

flicts. Additionally, assuming that peace agreements are one way to stop the conflict, it was dis-

covered that there were no successful cases of peace accords’ establishment in regions with pre-

cious and easily-lootable resources (Stedman 2001). Azam (2002) examined a theoretical frame-

work for looting in civil conflicts. He contended that soldiers spent half of the time looting the

enemies to steal additional resources and compensate money spent on arms, the other half of the

time is spent on the fight itself. The issue here is that looting here is reciprocal by both rebel

groups creating an arms race, where one side keeps looting incentivizing the other side to follow

the same competitive pattern. Looting tends to occur in countries with easily extractable re-

sources, such as in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Liberia gained independence in 1847. Although at the beginning of its independence

Liberia was a prosperous country with a promising future, the dependence on exports that sus-

tained the country for years led to a decline in market prices for primary goods and civil move-

ments, military coup, and civil war (Ellis 1999). Rather than encouraging the end of a violent and

bloody civil war, such groups as ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) troops were found

participating in looting and intensifying hostilities. The economy of this war is not only deter-

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mined by the activities associated with the illegal extraction of resources but specifically with

easily-lootable ones, including timber, rubber, and diamonds.

In Liberia, looting was one big source of income for a rebel group as well as a source for

the existing capacity of groups (Atkinson 1997). The dependence of civilians on lootable re-

sources precludes the end of the war and prolongs it. The massive looting in Monrovia in 1996

illustrates this. That looting included stealing goods, fuel, timber while using environmentally

detrimental mining methods -- all done illegally. The looting was accompanied by several rebel

groups, involving members of ECOMAG, NPFL, and prevented Liberia from signing Abuja I

peace accord (Atkinson 1997).

Signing the Abuja II peace accord proved to be ineffective, too, and led Charles Taylor,

the elected Commander-in-Chief at the time, to retain his control over the resources of the state.

This created a vacuum for rebel groups, including Liberians United for Reconstruction and

Democracy (LURD) in 2000, and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) in 2003

(Moran and Pitcher 2007). Not to mention the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), United

Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-K), Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL),

and LPC (Liberia Peace Council). In Liberia, these rebel groups altogether proved to financially

rely on looting, avoiding ending of conflict by all costs, and prolonging conflicts.

The civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo also appeared to be devastating. The

decades-long ineffective and corrupt rule of President Mobutu followed a sharp decline in the

economy and the state’s incapacity to enable peace in the country. Besides the widespread loot-

ing of mineral resources, a great number of villages, households, and schools have been looted

since 1998 by a variety of the forces involved in the civil war (Laudati 2013). In 1999, Colette

Braeckman (1999) coined the phrase of a ‘war of loot’ referring to the significance that looting

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turned to play in the civil war of the Democratic Republic of Congo. With a failed attempt to end

the war in 1996, two years later the government faced rebel group movements (Herp et al. 2003).

Most of them were sustained through looting. Montague (2002) claims that coltan, diamonds,

timber, copper, gold, and cobalt became the source for financing most rebel movements. As was

previously theorized by Azam (2002), rebels used looted goods and resources to pay their sol-

diers and compensate for arms’ payments. A violent civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of

Congo is not an exception to that theory.

In the region, resource-looting during the war was claimed to create more rebel groups,

thus intensifying war activities and investing in a prolongation of civil conflicts. New groups that

managed to acquire certain political and social capital during the start of the war found their way

to join the conflict (Hagmann and Peclard 2010). According to Keen (2000), for such newly cre-

ated rebel groups, which first were sustained by looted resources and goods, the wartime activi-

ties became a continuation of the fight for resources creating an alternative way for gaining profit

and power. Baaz and Stern (2008), too, argued that for rebel groups and militias, looting became

an additional livelihood strategy. Thus, in states like Liberia and the Democratic Republic of

Congo, rich on easily-lootable resources, looting became a common way of resource extraction

both as chip support for the existence of rebel groups and financial gain. Under the context of

civil war, as with the case of corruption, giving up on looting was disadvantageous for all the

rebel groups.

Natural Resources, Economics, and Civil War

All the above-mentioned factors that explain the longevity of civil conflicts could also be

supported by the idea of a consequential economic slowdown. Economic underdevelopment, in

turn, has been claimed to be a major factor contributing to civil conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler

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2004; Hendrix and Glaser 2007). In Angola, for instance, as a result of civil wars, political cor-

ruption, indebtedness to external actors, arms expenditure and foreign investments in the oil sec-

tor, the level of GDP per capita returned to its pre-independence level, while the GNP per capita

has been halved since the late 1980s (le Billon 2001). In Nigeria, since the onset of war, the pres-

ence and support of military regime by external factors, the economy was increasingly misman-

aged leading to considerable unemployment rates, failure to follow the National Development

Plan, twofold reduction in manufacturing growth rates, disruption of domestic trade and agricul-

ture (Nafziger 1972). In Liberia, following a decade of economic mismanagement and dictator-

ship in the 1980s, the GDP per capita collapsed in 1889 experiencing a 90% fall in less than ten

years, and by the year 2005, the average income of a Liberian fell fourfold of what it was in 1987

and sixfold of what it was in 1979 (Radelet, 2007). In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the

economic development began a disruption in the late 1980s, following a fall in income and a

15% drop in GDP per capita with a growth rate annual decrease from 3% to 10% (Akitoby and

Matthias 2004). Thus, the economic slowdown as a consequence of corruption, external actor’s

support for violent regimes, and looting might have contributed to the longevity of civil conflicts.

Notwithstanding all cases supporting the negative relationship between resource-richness

and longer civil conflicts, Gabon demonstrates that resource-wealth does not cause or prolongs

civil conflicts but strengthens regimes. Oil-rich Gabon presents an example of how resource-

wealth with institutionalized corruption may result in political stability. It is claimed that the sta-

bility present in the country is the fruition of President Bongo’s ability to build patronage net-

works, and to keep the balance of power in an ethnically diverse country (Fjelde, 2009).

Conclusion

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This paper examined some of the most important factors that influence the existing civil

conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. It discussed how the abundance of natural resources in the re-

gion contributes to the longer duration of wars in the examples of Angola, Nigeria, Liberia, and

the Democratic Republic of Congo. Following mechanisms were identified and explained in the

research essay: the abundance of resources in the region tend to contribute to the longevity of

civil wars via creating a corruption-friendly environment for governments and rebel groups (An-

golan civil conflict, Nigerian civil wars), and giving the green light to looting (civil conflicts in

Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo). Such an outlier as Gabon, similarly a resource-

abundant state, shows that the thesis does not apply to all countries and mechanisms are not gen-

eralizable to the entire Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, these outliers seem to be exceptions

rather than the rule, with very specific backgrounds and leader’s noteworthy capacities to rule

oil-rich countries. The implications of this study would be paying more attention to the resource-

specific corruption and looting among governments and rebel groups in different states of the re-

gion. Considering that this essay examined only four cases, the incentive would be, in the future

research, to encompass more examples of countries that follow the same pattern and identify the

policy implications.

Limitations

As with resources in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is an abundance of literature suggesting

different mechanisms of how resource-wealth influences the length of civil conflicts. Covering

all of the literature was an impossible task. For this reason, this essay focused on two possible

mechanisms only, interconnected and politically salient. Another limitation is that there is an ex-

plicit lack of literature on the relationship between resource-richness and duration of civil con-

flicts. In this essay, I used only one source that focused on this relationship. Additionally, the

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only most important empirical study examining that relationship is relatively outdated (Fearon

2004). Thus, this mechanism explaining the longer duration of civil conflicts in the region needs

further research with a specific focus on Sub-Saharan Africa.

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