Kt4

The Essence of Material Substance and the Logical Intentions

The concept of essence in material substances is related to notions of genus, species, and
difference. The notion of a universal cannot apply to essence as it is signified as a part, such as
humanity or animality. Avicenna argues that rationality is not a difference, and humanity is not a
species. The notion of genus or species applies to essence as a whole, as it implicitly contains all
that is in the individual. A nature or essence can be considered in two ways: according to its
proper notion and its absolute consideration, or according to its existence in this or that thing.
The nature of man is absolutely considered abstracts from all existence, without excluding any of
them. The notion of universals does not apply to natures taken in this way, as it does not have the
unity and community required for universals.

The concept of human nature is universal, but it is a particular species within the intellect. The
Commentator's argument that there is a single intellect for all humans is mistaken. Human nature
is predicated on Socrates, not Socrates himself. The concept of species is related to the intellect's
action, but it is not an absolute consideration or an accident. The notion of species is an accident
that follows upon the intellect's existence, similar to the concept of genus or difference.

On the Essence of Immaterial Substances

Essence is found in separate substances, such as the soul, intelligences, and the first cause, God.
However, some philosophers argue that these substances are separate from matter and cannot be
composed of form and existence. Forms are intelligible only if they are separated from matter
and its individuating conditions. Intelligent substances must be immune from matter in every
way, and intelligibility is not impeded by corporeal matter.

The essence of a composite substance is not only its form but also both form and matter. The
essence of a composite substance can be signified as a whole or part, while the essence of a
simple substance is its form only. The essence of a composite substance is not predicated in
every way of the composite thing itself, and the essences of composite things are multiplied by
the division of designated matter.
Essence is distinct from essence, unless there is a unique thing whose quiddity is its own
existence. Intelligences have to have existence besides their form, and an intelligence is form and
existence.