Durr Et Al Explaining Congressional Approval

Explaining Congressional Approval
Author(s): Robert H. Durr, John B. Gilmour and Christina Wolbrecht

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan., 1997), pp. 175-207
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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ExplainingCongressionalApproval*
RobertH. Durr,WashingtonUniversity in St. Louis
JohnB. Gilmour,The College of Williamand Mary
ChristinaWolbrecht,WashingtonUniversity in St. Louis
Theory:Aggregate publicapprovalof theUnitedStatesCongressdeclineswhen

Congress actsas requiredbyitsinstitutional andlegis-
roleas botha representative
lativebody.
Hypothesis:Thepassageofmajorlegislation, vetooverrides,andinternal discord
areall anticipatedto drivedownward publicsupport of Congress.
Methods: Whileprevious analysesofCongressionalapprovalhavereliedonannual
timeseries,we employa measurement thatpermits
strategy us to tapintoover40
differentsurvey itemsadministerednearly300 timesto producea quarterly mea-
sureofapproval, extendingfromthefirst
quarterof1974through thefourthquarter
of 1993.A distributed-lag timeseriesregression modelis estimated to testour
hypotheses.
Results:The analysispresented belowsupports thehypothesis thatcitizens'atti-
tudestowardCongressrespondin theaggregate to vetooverrides,intra-Congress
andthepassageof majorbills.As such,ourresultsstandin contrast
conflict, to
thoseofearlierstudiesofCongressional approval,whichhavetypically reliedon
explanatory variablesthatarebeyondthecontrolof Congress.Approvalis also
showntobe a function ofbotheconomicexpectations andNewYorkTimes'cover-
age of Congress.
While levels of public approvalaffordedthe UnitedStates Congress

indicatesthatCongressional
are generallylow, pollingofcitizens'attitudes
approvalvariesgreatlyovertime.When approvaldeclines,popularexpla-
nationstendto focus on the perceivedfailureof Congressto performits
assignedtasks. If Congresswere to do its job, the commentatorsreason,
aggregateapprovalwould certainlyrise. Scholars,on theotherhand,have
typicallyattributedchangesin Congressionalapprovalto eventsand cir-
cumstancesbeyond the institution'scontrol.Our frameworkfor under-
standingchanges in public approvalof Congresscounterseach of these
perspectives.
We hypothesizethatCongressionalapprovaldeclineswhenCongress
*Theauthors wishtothank JimStimson forgenerouslyproviding and

us withthesoftware
necessary
insight todevelopourmeasure ofCongressionalapproval.We also thankRegina
Baker,DavidNixon,RogerPetersen, andJohnSpraguefortheirvaluablecomments, and
MichelleCaiolaandMadhaviMcCallfortheirtireless datacollection Allofthedata
efforts.
necessary thisanalysisareavailablefromhttp://www.artsci.wustl.edu/-polisci/
toreplicate
papers.html
1997,Pp. 175-207
AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience,Vol. 41, No. 1,January
? 1997bytheBoardofRegentsoftheUniversity ofWisconsinSystem
176 R. H. Durr, J. B. Gilmourand C. Wolbrecht
actsas required byitsinstitutionalroleas botha representativeandlegisla-

tivebody.As therepresentatives ofa diverseandheterogeneous country,
membersseldomfindthemselves in agreement. The resulting conten-
tiousness can permeate Congressional activity,frustratingthosewholook
toCongress fordecisiveactionandmaking theprocessappearoverly politi-
cal andpetty.Whenit does act,particularly on broadissuesculminating
in majorlegislation, theinabilityof theoutcometo satisfy all sidescan
reflectpoorlyon theinstitution. To thepublic,then,theveryactivities
whichcharacterize Congress andthelegislative process-deliberation, de-
bate,anddecisionmaking-causeittoappearquarrelsome, unproductive,
andcontroversial, andthusdiminish itinthepubliceye.In sum,wecontend
thatchangesinlevelsofCongressional approvalarerelatedtocharacteris-
ticsofCongressandthelegislative andrepresentative taskswithwhichit
is constitutionally
charged.
Scholarshavelongnotedthetendency of theelectorateto giverela-
tivelyhighmarksto theirownrepresentatives and senators,whilebeing
withCongressas a whole.Thisdichotomy
less satisfied between legislator
andlegislature has led mostobservers to assumethatelectoraloutcomes
areindependent ofoverallCongressional approval.Thatassumption may
in partbe responsible fortherelativedearthof studiesof Congressional
approval, particularly whencomparedto theacademicattention thathas
beendevotedto thedeterminants ofpublicsupport oftheotherbranches.
Still,publicapproval ofCongress thelegitimacy
reflects accorded thatinsti-
tution, andthus,at leasttheoretically,affects thecapacityofCongressto
go aboutitstasksas a governing body.In addition, recentresearch suggests
thatcontrary to conventional wisdom,attitudes towardCongressmaybe
related toanindividual's opinionofhisorherownlegislator, andthusmay
haveelectoral consequences.
Severelimitations intheavailabilityofdata,bothintermsofquestion
consistency andfrequency ofobservation, havebeena secondobstacleto
thestudyofCongressional approval.Atbest,researchers havebeenforced
to relyon annualdata.If citizensreviseandupdatetheirattitudes about
Congress morethanoncea year,whichwe expecttheydo,annualmeasure-
mentmissesa considerable amount ofvariation. By employing a measure-
mentstrategy proposedby Stimson(1991),we areable to overcomethis
datashortfallandobserveCongressional approvalas a quarterlyphenome-
non.In doingso,our-research provides a muchmoresatisfactory andthor-
oughrepresentation ofchangesinCongressional approval.Withthesedata,
we estimatea simplelongitudinal modelto testthehypothesis thatlow
levelsof Congressional approvalarebrought on by actionsdemanded by
theverynatureoftheinstitution andthelegislative process.Ourfindings
suggestthatthisis indeedthecase.
EXPLAININGCONGRESSIONALAPPROVAL 177
PreviousStudies
Therehas beencomparatively littleresearch on thecausesoffluctua-
tionsin supportand approvalof Congress,in contrast withthe other
branches ofgovernment. Thedeterminants ofpresidential approvalinpar-
ticularhavebeenexaminedat length(cf.,OstromandSmith1992;Mac-
Kuen,Erikson,and Stimson1992; Ostromand Simon1985; MacKuen
1983;Mueller1970).Interest in publicsupport forthepresidency stems
fromthepossibility thatpresidentialapprovalmaytranslate intopowerfor
thepresident or affectelectionoutcomes. Sinceit is individualmembers,
andnotCongressas a whole,whomustrunforreelection, Congressional
approvalhasbeenassumedto lackan electoral connection. Indeed,mem-
bersofCongressmanagetoremainpopularandwinreelection despitethe
low opinionthepublichas of Congressas a whole(Fenno1975;Parker
andDavidson1979).Publicattitudes towardtheSupreme Court,whilenot
as extensively researched as thosetowardthepresidency, have also re-
ceivedscholarly attention (cf.,Tannenhaus and Murphy1981; Caldeira
1986;CaldeiraandGibson1992).Support fortheCourtis believedtobe
important becausetheCourtlacksenforcement powersoveritsowndeci-
sions,and thusmustto someextentrelyon a reservoir of prestigeand
publicsupport togiveforcetoitsrulings. Politicalscientists
havebeenless
interestedin theperceivedlegitimacy of Congressas an institution,and
thusunderstanding thethreatstothatlegitimacy hasreceivedlessattention.
Therearereasonstobelieve,nonetheless, thatpublicapprovalofCon-
gressis importantfortheinstitution anditsmembers. Members ofCongress
may attempt to distancethemselves fromthe institution and even run
againstCongress(Fenno1975),butBorn(1990)findsevidencethatpublic
appraisalsof individual incumbents are influenced by publicapprovalof
Congressas a whole.Representative government rests,moreover, on the
presumption ofthelegitimate authority ofall institutions
andtheapproval
ofthoserepresented. Without support ofthegoverned, thealreadydifficult
processmaybecomeevenmoreso, andthepolicythatemerges
legislative
maylacka senseoflegitimacy (Parker1981;Patterson, Ripley,andQuin-
lan 1992).
Scholarswhohaveexamined Congressional approvalagreethatwhile
publicattitudes towardCongressdisplayconsiderable variationovertime,
theytendstrongly towardtheunfavorable (Parker1981; Patterson and
Magleby1992). A numberof authorssuggestthatthislack of support,
particularlyin comparison to thehighmarksgivenindividual representa-
tivesbytheir constituents,resultsfrom thenature ofthelegislativeprocess:
theslow and complexworkings of Congresslead citizensto perceiveit
as inefficientandunproductive. WhenCongressdoes pass legislation on
178 R. H. Durr,J.B. Gilmour
and C. Wolbrecht
importantpolicyissues,thediversity ofopinions onthebestpolicyposition

meansthata majority ofpeopleremainunsatisfied withCongressional ac-
tion(Davidsonand Parker1972;Fenno1975;Parker1981).Despitethe
popularity ofthesepropositions,attemptstoprovide empirical support have
notbeenforthcoming (fora preliminary
attempt, see ParkerandDavidson
1979).
Efforts toidentifythedeterminantsofshiftsinaggregate Congressional
approvalhavebeenhindered by severedataconstraints.Surveyorganiza-
tionshavefailedtopollpublicopiniontowardCongressin anyconsistent
manner anduse a variety ofdifferentquestionsadministered at irregular,
and ofteninfrequent, As a result,previousstudiesof Congres-
intervals.
sionalapprovalhavebeenforcedto relyon annualmeasurement of the
phenomenon. Parker(1977) assembles30 Congressional popularity survey
itemsintoan annualtimeseries(1945-69) inwhichdataforseveralyears
wereunavailable. Withthesedata,he providesevidenceof relationships
between"Congressional unpopularity" and decliningeconomiccondi-
tions,criticalinternational
events,andpresidentialactivism. Patterson and
Caldeira(1990)examineoscillations inannualCongressional support from
1964to 1984.Theyfindpresidential popularity,consumer sentiment, some
forms ofmediacoverage, andCongressional sessiontobe related toevalua-
tionsofCongressas a whole.
PreviousstudiesofCongressional approvalaremarked bya somewhat
apoliticalquality,as theyemployexplanatory variablesthataremostly, or
evenexclusively, outsideofthecontrolof theinstitution underexamina-
tion.Publicsupport is typically
modeledas a function ofeconomicfactors,
crucialevents,andmediacoverage.Theactivities ofCongressdo notfind
theirwayintothemodelswhichpurport toexplainchangesin itslevelsof
popularity. We seekto remedythisomissionby explicitly incorporating
variablesthatmeasuretheactionsofCongressandassesstheirimpacton
publicattitudes towardthatbody.
MeasuringCongressionalApproval
Overthelasttwodecades,themostfrequently askedsurveyquestion
designed toassesspublicapproval ofCongress hasbeenposedbya number
of organizations:"Do you approveor disapprove of theway (theU.S.)
Congress is handling(doing)itsjob?" Yetthissurveyitemhasbeenadmin-
istereda totalof85 timessince1974,enoughtopermit quarterly
aggrega-
tiononlysince1991.Fortunately, thishas notbeentheonlyquestionof
itskindaskedoftheAmerican publicduringthistimeperiod.Forexample,
theHarrisorganization has askeditsrespondents,"How wouldyourate
thejob beingdone by Congress-excellent, prettygood,onlyfair,or
poor?" fivetimesfrom1974to 1993.If we assumethattheseandother
similarsurvey itemsall tapintothesamephenomenon, namely, thedegree

to whichtheAmerican publicingeneralapprovesofCongress, thenitis
possibleto combinethesedisparatesurveyquestionsintoa singletime
series.Thisis accomplished by invoking thealgorithm usedby Stimson
(1991) to measurethepublicmood.
In an effort to analyzethepublicmoodin theUnitedStates,Stimson
(1991)developsa "dyadratios"algorithm forthepurposeofconstructing
a singletimeseriesofpublicopiniondatabasedupondozensofindividual
seriesandhundreds of distinct surveymarginals. Thismodeling process,
intended to circumvent theproblemsassociatedwiththeinfrequent and
sporadicadministrations of single-issuetimeseriesof opinionpoll data,
permits theidentification of thesharedmovements overtimeacrossall
individual series.'Consider, forexample, twodifferent timeseries,oneask-
ingwhether respondents approve ofthejob Congress is doing,andtheother
howmuchconfidence respondents havein Congressas one amongmany
mentioned institutions. Giventhedifferent natures ofthesequestions, we
wouldnotbe surprised ifeachhad a dynamic ofitsown.It is theshared
movement overtime,however, thatis presumed torepresent citizens'gen-
eralapprovalofCongress.
Withmanysuchseries,each administered on a regularand frequent
basis,theidentification ofsuchsharedvariancemight be as simpleas com-
putingthemeanofall seriesat everytimepoint.Of course,thelackof a
singleseriesadministered on a regularandfrequent basisis therootofour
measurement problem. We lacknot,however, a richcollection ofpartially
overlapping timeseries,each imperfect standing alone,yetvaluableas a
partialmeasurement ofCongressional approval.Stimsonsuggests thatwe
needonlytwoadministrations of a singletimeseriesforit to contribute
to a summary measure. Forexample,ifwe knowthata higher percentage
ofAmericans believethat"Mostmembers ofCongresscaredeeplyabout
theproblems ofordinary citizens"in thethirdquarter of 1990thanin the
third quarter of 1989,suchinformation might helpadvancetheconclusion
thatCongressional approvalwas higherin 1990:3thanone yearbefore.
Obviously, sucha shifton one surveyitemdoesnotconstitute an overall
shiftinCongressional approval. Butifa largenumber ofsimilar movements
in distinctsurveyquestions occursimultaneously, theargument foran ag-
gregate (acrossitems)shift is strengthenedconsiderably. ByusingtheStim-
sonalgorithm, we areableto use over40 different survey items(listedin
theAppendix) administered nearly300 timestoproducea single,quarterly
measure ofCongressional approval, extending from thefirstquarter of1974
through thefourth quarter of 1993 (T = 80).
Ourdatabaseofsurvey itemsis composedprimarily ofquestions con-
cerning theentire Congress. We havechosentoinclude, however, a number
ofsurvey questions
thatproberespondents'attitudes
towardCongressional
leadershipin general,
as wellas particular
leadersofCongress.
Forexam-
ple,a questionaskedfairly
oftenbybothHarrisandtheNationalOpinion
ResearchCenterreadsas follows:
As faras thepeoplerunning ... Congress... areconcerned,

wouldyousay
you have a greatdeal of confidence,
onlysomeconfidence, or hardlyany
confidenceat all in them?
Ourrationale fortheinclusionof thesequestionsis straightforward: we

believethatCongressional leadership is partandparceloftheentire institu-
tion,andthatcitizens'attitudes willbe structured accordingly.Notethatwe
do notincludeanysurveyquestions focusing on a respondent's individual
representatives. Suchattitudes, we believe,willfollowtheirown,distinct
pathsthrough time.
Sincefirst developing thedyadratiosalgorithm, Stimson hasincorpo-
rateda number ofminormodifications (Stimson1994;fora complete de-
scriptionoftheoriginal algorithm see theAppendix ofStimson1991).The
algorithm nowcomputes ratiosbothbackward andforward through time,
averaging theresulting pairof timeseries.Analysts usingthealgorithm
arenowpresented withtheoptiontoinvokea smoothness prior,
designed to
discount one-period deviations froma singleseries'pastandfuture norms.
Specifically, consideran individual surveyitem,thepast(or future) level
ofwhichis somevaluex,andthecurrent valueis x + z. Ratherthanincor-
porating theentire innovation z, thesmoothness prior(4) calculates
instead
theinnovation x + (1 - p) * z. According to Stimson,"Smoothing is
particularly appropriate withsurveymarginals, knownto containrandom
fluctuations fromsampling"(Stimson1994,2). We chose to invokea
smoothness priorof 0.5 in theestimation of ourCongressional approval
timeseries,in effect assuming thatthesmoothed valueofeachindividual
seriesbetter represents itstruelevelthantheoriginal value.Figure1 shows
Congressional approval measured twoways,onewiththesmoothness prior
(0.5), theotherwithno smoothing. As can be seen,thesmoothed series
exhibits somewhat less variancethanthe"original"data.In effect, then,
invoking thesmoothness prioralso servesto compensate forthinspaces
inthedatamatrix; i.e.,a time-pointwithfewer-than-average surveyadmin-
istrationsis nowless likelyto producean outlierin thefinaltimeseries.
Forouranalysis,we use thesmoothed measure.
As is evidentin Figure1, Congressional approvalhas variedsubstan-
tiallyduringthelast20 years.The scale oftheseriesis suchthata value
of 100 represents a midpoint approvalrating. Evidently,Congressrarely
enjoysa highstanding. Yet thelevelofapprovaldoesnotremainconstant
0)
0) co~~ r-- 0o)t

1BAoiddV leuoisseiBuo
overtime.We turnnowtoananalysisofthedeterminants
ofCongressional
approval.
ExplainingCongressionalApproval
Congress oftenappearsmessy,argumentative, slow,andconfusing. Its
roleis notsimply topasslaws,butalsotoserveas a forum inwhichelected
representatives canmeettodiscussthegreat(andtrivial) issuesoftheday.
Sometimes thedebatewillbe dignified, butmoreoftenit is not.When
compromises aremade,legislators can pass a law. Often,however, com-
monground is notfoundandCongress willfailtoact.Instead, itsmembers
willengagein thetime-honored activitiesofstalling,mutualblaming, and
finger-pointing. It is notpretty,
butit is democracy at work.
Even whenCongressdoes pass legislation, theprocessand outcome
maybe so unappealing thatpublicrespect fortheinstitution declines. When
a bill passesby a narrowmargin, a substantial portionof theCongress
opposedit,as nodoubtmanyoftheirconstituents didas well.Theserepre-
sentativeswillhaveoffered divisiveamendments in an efforttomodify or
killthelegislation, andwilloften haveengagedinheatedrhetoric denounc-
ingthebill andthemotivesof itssupporters. Bills thatare supported by
largemajorities on finalpassagecan also generate immensecontroversy
enroutetobecoming law.Therecanbe greatdisagreement overthedetails
ofthelegislation andragingdisputesoveramendments. Whenthebillis
putto a finalvote,evenlegislators whoseamendments werenotadopted
maysupport it,although withoutenthusiasm. Mostobservers, whopaylittle
attentiontotheactivities on CapitolHill,willhavetrouble deciphering the
conflicting messagesthatcomefromCongress, andhavelittleidea ofthe
actualmerits ordefects oflegislation.
Buttheywillknowthata billpassed
amidcontroversy, andthatwillnotencourage themto havemuchconfi-
dencein eitherthelegislation or theCongressthatpassedit.
Notonlydoes Congressproducea greatdeal of controversy, it does
so in an exceptionally openandpublicway.Virtually all deliberations of
Congressareopento thepublicandmanyofthemto television cameras.
Whenits members disagree,theydo so as visiblyas theycan, seeking
publicity forthemselves and to discredit theirrivalsand opponents. As
proposalsare shapedin Congress,everydisagreement is magnified and
broadcast, so thatwhenthebargaining andamending aredone,thefinished
productappearsnotas a-coherent wholebutas a patchwork of compro-
mises,eachofwhichwas controversial andto someextentalienating.
Thetheory we wishto testinthispaperis thatCongressis unpopular
forbeingitself, andthatthemorelikeitselfitis,themoreunpopular itwill
become.WhenCongressgenerates majorlegislation, ordisagrees publicly
aboutmatters ofpolicywitheachotherorwiththepresident, itis in some
senseactingas a legislative
bodywithpowerandresponsibility whichmust
acttocarryoutitsduties.Theirony is thatwhenitactslikeitself,
itbecomes
unpopular.Whenit actsless likeitself, itbecomesmorepopular.If true,
sucha finding wouldrootshifts in publicapprovalin theveryessenceof
Congress.
To testthistheory we developthreemeasures ofCongressional activ-
ity.One assesseslegislativeproductivity,
anothertherelationshipbetween
Congressandthepresident, andthethird thelevelofconflictwithin Con-
gress.Theseareall measures ofCongressactingas itwas designedto act
withintheUnitedStatesconstitutional framework: producing legislation,
interacting
withtheexecutive branch,andgivinga fullandfrank discussion
to importantissues.
PassingImportant Legislation
Congress is fromtimetotimecompelled toconsider important andfar-
reachinglegislation.
Inordertoactonissuesofgreatscopeandimportance,
Congressmustnecessarily producea compromise out of thecompeting
demandsthatareinevitably voiced.Themorefar-reaching thelegislation,
thegreater thedin.Rarelyis every,orevenany,sidecompletely satisfied
withtheoutcome.The passageofmajorbillsoftenthusresultsin a large
number oflosers,as wellas a generallevelofdissatisfactionwithwhatis
seenas an overly-compromised, excessively politicaloutcome.We there-
foreanticipate that,contraryto someexpectations, Congresswill suffer
lowerapprovalratings whenit successfully engagesin itsmostessential
themakingofmajorlaws.'
activity,
Ourargument challengesthemoreprevalent viewthatCongress'sun-
popularitystemsfromitsinability tolegislateeffectively.
Brady(1988,2),
forexample, arguesthat"One ofthemajorcausesoftheHouse'sunpopu-
larityhas beenitsinabilityto legislatebroadpublicpolicies."The same
certainlyappliesto theSenateandto Congressas a whole.In thisview,
Congresswillimprove itsstandingwiththepublicbygenerating laws,es-
peciallyimportant laws.
To testthesecompeting hypotheses, we haveconstructed a timeseries
ofmajorlawsenactedbyquarter from1974through 1993.Fortheperiod
'If thecontroversyassociatedwithpassingmajorbillsmakesCongressless popular,

thedefeatof majorlegislation mayhavethesameeffect. Killinga majorbill latein the
legislativeprocessinvolvesall ofthecontroversy ofpassinga majorbill,andmore.We do
notincludedefeatsof important bills as a variablein ouranalysisfortworeasons:our
impression is thatveryfewimportant billsarein factdefeatedon thefloor,
andidentifying
themwouldbe a difficult, uncertainprocess.
1974-90,we use thesetofimportant lawsidentifiedbyMayhew(1991).2

For 1991-93,we attempt to duplicate
his approachourselves.
The listof
billswe classify
as majorfrom1991to 1993areincluded intheAppendix.
MinorLegislation
The overwhelming majorityof billspassedby Congressare neither
important norcontroversial.Rather,theyare designedto do something
goodforsomeone, to fixa problem,
ortobestowa benefit, usuallywithout
annoying anyoneelse.We can supposethatthemoresuchbillsCongress
passes,themorepeoplearehelped,andthemorethepublicwillapprove
of Congress.We presumethatall billsthatarenotmajorbillsareminor
bills,andthatthemoreminorbillsCongresspasses,themorepopularit
willbe.To testthishypothesis,
we counted allbillspassedbyquarter,
from
1974through 1993.
RelationswiththePresident
We anticipate
a relationshipbetweenCongressional approvalandthe
overrideofpresidential
vetoes.We might thinkofa vetooverrideas similar
topassinga majorbill,sincethenecessity foran overridesuggests contro-
versyanddisagreement within thepublicregarding thelegislation.
Further-
more,Congressis rarelyable (orwilling)to muster thenecessary votesto
overridethepresident'svetoofrelativelyminorlegislation.Viewedinthis
light,vetooverrides
willcontribute to negativeassessments of Congress
forthesamereasonsidentified withrespect tothepassageofmajorlegisla-
tion.Thus,evenwhenCongress is successful
inoverriding a veto,showing
an unusuallevelofunityanddetermination, itdoesnothing forCongress'
image.Wetherefore hypothesize thatoverridesofvetoeswillreducepublic
support ofCongress.
InternalCongressionalConflict and Turmoil

in Congressmaybe viewedbythepublicas pettyandunbe-
Conflict
theinstitution,
fitting callingattention
tothepoliticalnature
ofthelegisla-
2Mayhew's(1991,37) approach is designedto identify

legislation
thatis importantin
thesenseofbeing"bothinnovative andconsequential." To accomplish thisgoal,Mayhew
usesa two-prongedmethodology designed toincorporatebothcontemporary andretrospec-
tivejudgments.Forcontemporaryobservations he employstheend-of-the-sessionCongres-
sionalround-upstories
published
intheNewYorkTimesandWashington Post,supplemented
witharticles
andbooksthatcoverparticular sessionsofCongress.Thesecond,complemen-
tarysweeprelieson thelong-termperspectives ofpolicyspecialists(as reflected
in books
andarticles)
as tothoseenactments
thathavebeenmostimportant intheirareaofexpertise.
tiveprocess.Thus,we expectthatincreasing levelsofconflict inCongress

willcontribute to a lowering ofpublicapproval.
Conflict is endemicin Congress, andmeasuring itis problematic. We
havechosentwoindicators thatarebothassociated withparticularly height-
enedconflict inCongress-cloture votestoendSenatefilibusters andvotes
to raiseor extendthefederaldebtceiling.Conflict takesmanyformsin
Congress, andwe do notknowhowtomeasurethemall,butthesearetwo
extremely important formsofconflict, andcanthusserveas a roughsurro-
gatefora measureoftotalconflict withinCongress.
Filibusters occurwhena majority ofsenators attempt topassa billthat
othersenators opposestrongly. The minority engagesin extended debate
andusesotherparliamentary nottovotethebilldownbuttodelay
tactics,
a voteandexhaustthemajority, persuading themto withdraw thebill or
modify it.Mostfilibusters occurin connection withimportant legislation
thatis theobjectofintense disagreement. Thereis nogoodmeansofidenti-
fyingall filibusters, becausesomeofthemareonlythreatened
partly and
notcarriedout.Consequently, we focusinsteadon cloturevotes.We be-
lievethisis a sensiblestrategy, notonlybecausecloturevotesarereadily
counted, butalso becausethepublicneverlearnsoffilibusters thatarenot
thesubjectof a cloturevote.Overtheperiodof thisstudy,therewerea
totalof278 cloturevotes.
Another usefulindicator ofconflict withinCongressis thefrequency
of votesto increasethestatutory ceilingon federaldebt-a law thatsets
a limitonthetotalamount ofindebtedness thatthegovernment mayincur.
Members ofCongress do notliketovotefora debtceilingincreasebecause
theyfeartheirvotecan be construed as support forbudgetdeficits by an
angryelectorate and electoralopponent. The rationaleforhavinga debt
ceilingis thatwhennewgovernment borrowing wouldcause theceiling
tobe exceeded,Congresscouldcutdeficits in ordertoavoidtheawkward-
nessandpoliticaldifficulties associatedwithraisingthedebtceiling.This
neverhappens.Instead,Congresspasses a bill to raisethedebtceiling,
eventhough itis nevereasy.
In timesofheightened conflict, to pass a largeincrease
it is difficult
in theceiling,so Congressresorts to manysmallincreasesinstead.Each
smallincreaseof coursenecessitates thepassageof a newone soon.We
considerall increasesin andextensions ofthedebtceilingto be evidence
ofconflict within Congress. Themoreoftentheyareenacted, we presume,
thehigher thelevelofconflict. A totalof43 debtceilingbillswereenacted
between1974and 1993.Oursummary measureofinternal conflict within
Congress, then,is thesumeach quarter of cloturevotesand debtceiling
bills.
Presidential Approval
In an effortto explainCongressional approval,accounting forthe
aboveactionsofCongressrepresents onlyonepartofthetotalpicture. To
wit,we includea number of additional intended
variables, to resultin a
morecompletely specified
model.Following PattersonandCaldeira(1990),
chiefamongthesevariables is presidential
approval.
We anticipate thatthe
publicstanding enjoyed(or endured) by thepresidentwill "ruboff"on
Congress, andthatthenature ofthecausalrelationshipwillbe dictatedby
whether a giventimeperiodmaybe characterized by dividedpartygovern-
ment.If thepresident andCongressarecontrolled bythesameparty, the
approvallevel of Congresswill riseand fallwiththatof thepresident.
Conversely, ifeachbranchis controlledbya different Congresswill
party,
sufferwhenthepresident is heldin highesteem,andbenefit froma presi-
dentheldinlowregard. We measure approvalviathestandard
presidential
Gallupapprovalitem;forquarters withmorethanone administration, an
averageis calculated.
In orderto accountforthedividedpartygovernment hypothesis, we
multiply approvalby negativeone duringquarters
presidential character-
izedbydividedgovernment. Thisway,a positively-signedcoefficientwill
indicatea positiveassociation duringsame-partyperiods,and a negative
associationduringdivided-party periods.3
Economic Expectations
Scholarsofpresidentialapprovalhavelongassumedthat, becauseciti-
zensholdthepresident accountableforthestateoftheeconomy, economic
evaluations willaffect
thepresident'sstanding amongthepublic.We be-
lievethesameholdsforCongress.Specifically, as economicexpectations
improve, so toowillthelevelofapproval enjoyedbyCongress. Conversely,
Congressional approvalwilldeclineas economicexpectations worsen.
In orderto operationalizeeconomicexpectations, we beginwiththe
long-term businessconditionscomponent oftheUniversity ofMichigan's
IndexofConsumer Sentiment.In ordertocapture thatportionofthistime
seriesdrivenby economicconsiderations, we regressit on fourmeasures
oftheobjectiveeconomy, usingthepredicted valuesas ourfinalseries.4
3Inordertoavoidgenerating a timeserieswhosevariance is dominatedbylargeartifi-
cialjumpsfrompositiveto negativevalues(indicating a transition
pointfromnondivided
to dividedgovernment), we subtract theoriginalseriesfromitsmeanpriorto analysis.
4Isolatingtheeconomicportion oflong-term businessexpectations,
theultimategoal
ofthisexercise, involvestheuse ofthepredicted valuesgeneratedbytheregressionmodel.
Theresulting timeseriesrepresentslong-termbusinessexpectations purgedofthedistorting
effectsof politicalevaluations.
Thismodelingstrategy assumeszerocovariance between
theeconomicand politicalcomponents of businessexpectations.(Thiswouldbe trueby
definition
ifwewerecontent tore-name thepolitical
component the"noneconomic" compo-
Ourfinalmeasurehastwovirtues
thatleaveitwell-suited
forthisanalysis:
(1) itssubjective
component,
long-termbusinessexpectations,
is bothpro-
spectiveand long-term
in nature,5(2) by focusingon thatportionof the
subjectivecomponent drivenby theobjectiveeconomy, we are purging
fromthesurveyitemtheeffects of noneconomic considerations,
suchas
scandalsor theinevitableoptimism accompanying theelectionof a new
president.Figure2 showsthedegreeto whichourmeasuresof Congres-
sionalapprovalandeconomicexpectations tracktogetherthroughtime.
If,as is reasonable
toassume,economicexpectations drivebothpresi-
dentialandCongressional approval,andpresidential
approvalaffectsCon-
gressional itwillbe necessary
approval, toestimatea two-stagemodel.We
choosetodo so inthefollowing manner. A complete modelofpresidential
approvalwillbe estimated,inordertocapture therelationship
between the
president'sapprovallevelandeconomicexpectations. Usingtheestimated
coefficienton economicexpectations,we willre-estimatepresidential
ap-
provalwithexpectations zeroedout.Thismeasureofpresidentialapproval
(subtractedfromitsmeanandmultiplied by negativeone duringperiods
ofdividedgovernment, forreasonsnotedabove)willthenbe usedin our
modelofCongressional approval.
Media Coverage of Congress
IndividualsurveyrespondentswillrarelyformtheiropinionsofCon-
gressfromdirectobservations
ofitsworkings andconduct.C-SPANhas
undoubtedlyincreased
theability
ofcitizenstoobservetheirCongress,
but
evenitsgavel-to-gavel
coverageprovidesonlya limited Mostindi-
picture.
spendverylittletimetuning
viduals,moreover, into C-SPAN,oravailing
nent.We arenot.Theresiduals followa strikinglypoliticalpattern,

risingwitheachpresiden-
tialelection,
andfalling duringmajorpoliticalscandals.)Iftheyweretocovary, theestimated
effectsof objectiveeconomicconditions on businessexpectations wouldbe biased;andit
followsthatthepredicted values(i.e.,economicexpectations) basedon theeconomicmea-
sureswouldbe incorrect. To testforcovariance, we regressed businessexpectations on the
fourmeasuresof theeconomyand a timeseriesmeasuring attitudestowardgovernment
economicpolicy(fromMichigan'sSurveyof Consumer Attitudes),thelatterservingas a
surrogate forthepoliticalcomponent. We thengenerated predictedvaluesbasedonlyon
thecoefficientsassociatedwiththeobjectivemeasures. Theresulting seriescorrelateswith
theoriginalmeasure ofeconomic expectationsattherateofr = 0.96,suggesting thatcovari-
ancebetWeen theeconomicandpoliticalcomponents is notpresent. Fora morecomplete
accounting ofthismeasurement see Duff(1993).
strategy,
'A number of analystshavedemonstrated thatwithin thecontext ofmodeling voting
behavior, surveyinstruments thattapforward-looking judgments tendto outperform those
thatareretrospective in nature(see,forexample,Kuklinski andWest1981).Furthermore,
we believethata surveyquestiontappingintolong-term prospective judgments is more
likelyto capturethesomewhat "ethereal"notionofeconomicexpectations.
suo!ieloodX3 O!WOUO03
0 0
0 o~~~~~~~~F
0 0
co 0 0 0 oo
U 0
0)
-:
U0
x
W
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CL
Z0
CY)
0)
LO 0 LO 0 LO 0 LO 0 LO
co co N ll (0 (0 LO LO 'IT
IeAOJddV
isuoissej6u00
themselves of variousothermeansof learningaboutCongress.Instead,

theyrelyon intermediaries.
To a largeextent, we believeindividual attitudes aboutCongresswill
be determined bythenatureofmediacoverage.WhenCongressengages
intheprocessofgenerating whenitconflicts
legislation, withthepresident,
andwhenit argueswithitselfoverdebtceilingsandcloturevotes,it will
be themediathattransmit thisinformation to thepublic.If one believed
thatthemediawerefaithful, accurate,and completetransmitters of such
information, onemight arguethattheinclusion ofa separate mediameasure
is redundant. Needlessto say,we arenotbelievers. In anticipation ofdis-
crepancies betweenthereality ofCongressandthecoverageitreceivesin
thepress,we incorporate a measureoftheNew YorkTimes'coverageof
CongressintoourmodelofCongressional approval. Duringtimesofrela-
tivelypositivecoverage,we anticipate thatapprovallevelswillincrease,
whereasnegativecoveragewilldriveCongressional approvaldownward.
In ordertocapture theNewYorkTimes'coverageofCon-
empirically
gress,we relyon theannualTimesIndexofstories. FromJanuary of 1974
through Decemberof 1993,we codedmorethan6,000stories, editorials,
profiles,interviews,
excerpts,pictures,androllcallsconcerning Congress.
Each was codedwithrespectto itslocation, length, andspin.The spinof
a story-that is,whetheritwaspositive, negative, orneutral innature, was
determined subjectivelyby twocoders.6 If a storywas deemednegative,
it was coded -1; positivestorieswerecoded 1, andneutralstorieswere
givena code of 0. Locationwas codedwithrespectto front page,first
section,andelsewhere, withassignedweights(respectively) of 1.0,0.67,
and0.33.Lengthwas coded1.0 forlongstories, 0.67 forthoseofmedium
length, and0.33 forshortstories.A story's"finalscore" was simplythe
product ofitsthreecodes-a long,negative, front-page story,
forexample,
receiveda scoreof -1, whereasa short, positivestoryburiedin section
B was givena scoreof 0.11. For each quarterof ourtimeperiodunder
analysis, theresulting
scoreswereaddedup,producing an overallcoverage
scoreforthatquarter. The finalmeasure,alongwithCongressional ap-
proval,is presented in Figure3.
As canbe seeninFigure3, thetwotimeseriesappeartoexhibit a fair
degreeofcovariance. Furthermore,itis clearthatforthevastmajority of
6Giventwocoders,we can report a measureofinter-coder Thetwoseries

reliability.
generatedindependently by thecoderscorrelate 0.802.The finalmeasure
at a respectable
is simply
theaverageoftheir twoseries.Furthermore,we canreportthatthefinaltimeseries
withoneforwhichall storiesweretreated
correlates as negative
(i.e.,no subjective
evalua-
tionswhatever)at 0.71. We therefore
believetheresultsreportedbelowarenotdrivenby
subjective
coding.
96BJ9AoD SOW_l )POA MON
U,, ~~
~~~~~0 LO) 0 LO) 0 to)
0 0)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Q
> -0)
o7
C)
E~~~~~~~~
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c
Q~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
U) o U) o e o U) o U)~~~~~~~~~~)
0U
Cu ---- N~~~~~~
0) 0
U)
m co (D~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I
CU t-0)IAodV soisj6o
quarters, theaggregate Timescoverage wasnegative.Thesharply negative

dipintheTimesmeasureof1989:2is theresultofa largenumber ofstories
thatquarter chroniclingthetrialsand tribulationsof House SpeakerJim
Wright.7
Beforecontinuing, itis fruitful
to addressthequestionofwhether the
New YorkTimesmaybe treated as a representativemediumforthesake
ofourstudy. We believeso. A number ofscholars(see,forexample, Cook
1989)havenotedthata greatdegreeofdifference existsbetween thecover-
age ofCongressin localandnational media,thelattertending tofocuson
thebroaderinstitution. Sinceourstudyis aggregated at thelevel of the
entire nation,itis appropriate
touse a nationalmediumsuchas theTimes.
Further, itis well-known thatmanysmaller-market newspapers relyonthe
Timesfortheirnational newscoverage.Finally,ourconcernaboutthede-
greeof divergence betweenprintandbroadcast coveragewas offset by a
preliminary analysisshowingthata similarcodingschemeforbroadcast
stories onthebigthreenetworks (as chronicledintheVanderbilt University
Television NewsArchiveIndex)during themonths of 1991produced very
similardatato thosefromtheTimes forthesameperiod.8 We therefore
concludethatwe mayusetheNew YorkTimesas a medium representative
of all printandbroadcast mediawitha nationalorientation.
Presidential Vetoes
Vetoesarea verypublicmanifestationofa breakdown ofnegotiations
and relationsbetweenCongressand theWhiteHouse. Vetoesgenerally
representan effort
by thepresidentto distinguishhimselffromCongress
on an issueofimportance to someconstituency.
AndwhileCongressmay
gainpointsatthepresident'sexpense,wehypothesize thattheconflictitself
willaccentuatepublicimpressionsofCongress as incessantly
quarrelsome.
Therefore,we anticipatea negative betweenvetoesandCon-
relationship
gressionalapproval.To testthishypothesis,
we includea countofvetoes
foreach quarter.Pocketvetoeshave also been tabulated, but each is
weighted as onlyhalfof a regularveto,due to theirlesservisibility
and
significance.
7Theanalysis
reportedbelowwasconducted withthisoutlier
included. A separate anal-
theoutlying
ysis,treating observation
quarter's as missing,
resultedin virtuallyno changes
beforethesecondor thirddecimalsofcoefficients.
8Thecorrelation
of thetwomonthly serieswas particularly
strong if we treatedthe
AugustmeasurefortheTimes(driven bysixlong,front-page,
negative storiesdetailing
the
troublesofRep.BarneyFrank)as missing: withAugustexcluded, thetwocorrelate at0.81.
IncludingAugustresultsin a correlation of0.37.
coefficient
Scandals
WhereasCongressengagesin debate,legislating, andrelations with
thepresident
byConstitutionalfiat,thereis no suchmandateforscandals.
Yet theypersist,
and we believeit likelythatmajorscandals(i.e., those
involvingCongressionalleadersand/or morethanonemember) willaffect
approval.We therefore
Congressional includein ourmodelof Congres-
sionalapprovalsevendummyvariables, each switchedfromzeroto one
duringthequarterstheir
respectivescandalstookplace.Thesevenvariables
represent
Koreagate (1976:4-1978:4),ABSCAM(1980:3-1982:1),theJim
Wrightscandal(1989:2), KeatingFive (1990:3-1991:4),House Bank
(1991:3-1992:3),thePostOfficeprobe(1992:2-1992:4),anda singlese-
riesfora number of other,smaller,scandals.9
NondividedGovernment
As is notedabove,we anticipate
thatdividedgovernment affectsthe
natureoftherelationship
betweenpresidentialandCongressionalapproval.
We do notbelieve,however, thatthisis theextentoftherelationship
be-
tweendividedgovernment and Congressional approval.For themajority
ofthetimeperiodunderanalysis,dividedgovernment haspersisted.
Stories
ofpublicdissatisfaction
withtheresulting (sometimesreal,sometimesper-
ceived)"gridlock"abound.As such,we anticipatethatCongressional ap-
provalwillexhibit boostattheoutsetofperiodsofnondivided
a temporary
government. Twosuchperiodsoccurfrom1974to 1993,thefirst beginning
inthefirst of1977,thesecondinthefirst
quarter quarterof1993.To capture
thesehypothesizedshort-lived
jumps,we includeinourmodelofCongres-
sionalapprovalonedummy seriesforeachevent,takingthevalueofone
duringthequarter cited.
The CompleteModel
Sinceeconomicexpectations
arehypothesized
to affect
bothCongres-
sionalandpresidential a complete(andrelatively
approval, see
standard;
Beck 1991;MacKuen,Erikson,andStimson1992)modelofpresidential
9Themultiple-scandals
seriesincludes thefollowing:
theGulfOil campaignfundsscan-
dal (1975:4, 1976:3,1976:4);firstrevelationof ABSCAM (1980:1); Wilsonresignation
(1982:1);Page sex scandal,cocainering(1982:3);Page sex scandal(1982:4);Studdsand
ofDellums,Wilson,Goldwater
Crane,druginvestigations (1983:3);StuddsandCrane,Del-
lumsandWilson(1983:4);DanielandSt.Germain (1985:3);investigations
ofusingoffices
toaccumulate personalwealth(1986:1); St.Germain,Wright (1987:2);Wright,
Boner(1987:
4); Wright(1988:2);Biaggi/Wedtech (1988:3);Garcia/Wedtech (1988:4);Coehlo(1989:2);
first ofKeatingFive (1989:4).Source:Congressional
revelation QuarterlyAlmanac.
approval Allthatremains
is also specified.10 is theestimation
ofthesemod-
els. A discussion oftheestimation
strategy
andresultsis presented
below.
Analysisand Results
We anticipate thateachofourendogenous variablesofinterest,
presi-
dentialandCongressional willbe a function
approval, ofcurrent andpast
valuesoftheirexogenous withmorerecent
variables, innovationsaccount-
ingforgreater changethanthosemoredistant.11 As such,we havechosen
to estimatetwo distributed-lag models,invoking theKoycktransforma-
tion.12
Thisestimation eachofourapproval
allowingus toregress
strategy,
variableson itslaggedvaluein addition to thecontemporaneous observa-
tionsof relevantexogenousvariables,presumesthatthecoefficients on
laggedvaluesofexogenousvariablesfollowan exponential rateofdecay.
The interpretation of distributed-lag
modelsestimated via theKoyck
transformationis a straightforwardmatter.Considerthefollowing simple
example,concerning a bivariatemodel:
Yt= P0+ PIXt+ + et.

22Yt-I
The parameter on Xt,PI,captures theimmediate impactof a unitchange

inXtontheexpected valueofYt,andis referred toas an impactmultiplier.
In subsequenttimeperiods,theeffectoftheunitchangeinXtis represented
by,in sequence,PI32, 2 2 and so on. The totaleffectof a unitchange
in Xt,knownas thecumulative multiplier,is equalto P1/(1- P2).
thefirst
Constituting stepinouranalysis, presidential approval is mod-
eledas a function
ofeconomicexpectations andadministration andhistori-
cal eventsdummies, thelattervariablesincludedin an effort to improve
specification.
Resultsarepresented in Table 1.
As can be seenin Table 1, economicexpectations appearto exerta
relativelystrong,
highly effect
significant onpresidential approval. In order
to betterunderstandthemeaningof theestimated coefficients, we may
"0Inaddition
toeconomic expectations,
thepresidential
approval
modelincludesa num-
berof (relativelyatheoretical)dummy variables,
intendedto improvespecification.
They
areas follows:separateinterceptandhoneymoon (6 = 0.85) dummies foreachadministra-
tion;theIraqiconflict(coded1 for1990:4- 1991:2);Watergate (-1 for1974:1- 1974:
3); theIranhostagecrisis(2 for1979:4,1 for1980:1, -1 for1980:2);andan eventsseries
(Mayaguez,1975:2,1; CampDavidAccords,1978:4,1; Reaganassassination attempt,
1981:
2, 1; Iran-Contra,1986:4,-1).
we acknowledge,
"iSuchanticipation, beliesourrelativeignoranceof thefunctional
form(s)relating ourvariablesofinterest.
12Foradditional
information infinite-order
regarding distributed
lag models,see Wood
(1992).
Table 1. Estimating
a Distributed-Lag
Model of
PresidentialApprovalby EconomicExpectations
IndependentVariable PresidentialApproval
Presidential
Approval,-,
b 0.68
(0.07)
p 0.00
EconomicExpectations,
b 0.14
(0.06)
p 0.01
AdjustedR2 0.84
StandardErrorof theEstimate 4.57
N 69
Note:Standard areinparentheses.
errors Dataarequarterly,
1974:
1 to 1993:4.Theestimatedmodelincludedvariables(notshown)
controlling
foradministration
effects,
politicalevents,
Watergate,
theIranhostagecrisis,andtheIraqiconflict.
See n. 11. Nonsig-
nificant
variablesweredroppedfromthemodel.
gaugetheeffects ofa five-point increasein economicexpectations on the

president'sapprovallevel."3Givenan estimated of0.14 on the
coefficient
current levelof economicexpectations, we wouldanticipate, holdingall
else constant,an immediate resultingincreasein presidential
approvalof
0.7%. Whilesuchan increasemaynotseemterribly dramatic,itis impor-
tanttoremember thattheeffect oftheoriginalincreaseineconomicexpec-
tationscarriesforward, albeitin exponentiallydecreasingamounts, so that
thecumulative effect
is equaltoanincreaseofnearly2.2 percentage points
in presidentialapproval.
To placetheseresults inperspective,werefer toa recentstudyofpresi-
dentialapprovalby MacKuen,Erikson,and Stimson(1992). Theirstudy
suggeststhateconomicforecasts drivelong-term businessexpectations,
whichin turnaffectthelevel of approvalexperienced by thepresident.
Ourresultsare consistent withtheirconclusion. Recallthatourmeasure
ofeconomicexpectations amounts to thepredictedvaluesobtained byre-
gressing long-termbusiness expectationson fourindicatorsoftheobjective
economy.In effect, ouranalysisconfirms thatpresidentialapprovalis in
13Forthetimeperiodunderstudy, has a standard

economicexpectations of
deviation
12.54points,an averageabsolutechangeof4.23,andan averageincreaseof4.46.
parta functionofthatportion ofthepublic'seconomicforecasts actually

drivenbytheobjectivestateoftheeconomy.
Withourmodelofpresidential approvalinhand,we turnnowtoCon-
gressionalapproval.The resultsobtainedby estimating a distributed-lag
modelofCongressional approvalarepresented in Table2.14As is evident,
thecoefficient
on presidential approvalis nonsignificant,contraryto our
expectations."5
It maybe that,totheextent presidentialandCongressional
approvalarelinkedat all,itis theresponsibility
sharedbyeachinstitution
fortheoverallhealthoftheeconomy thatbindstheminthepublic'smind.
Whilethecoefficient on economicexpectations is halfthemagnitude of
thatin thepresidential
approvalmodel,theslowerrateof decay(as evi-
dencedbythelargercoefficient on laggedCongressional approval)results
in a cumulativeeffectequal to roughly 80% of thatexperienced by the
president.Ourresultssuggest, then,thatCongressis also judgedby the
publicwithrespectto anticipated economicconditions. Duringtimesof
greatereconomicsecurity, Congresswill benefit froma higherstanding
amongAmericans. Conversely, theanticipationofeconomictroubles will
sendCongressional approvallevelslower.
Returningto Table 2, we see thattheNew YorkTimes'coverageof
Congressdoes appearto affect thelatter'sapprovalratings.Thisresultis
highly andprovedtobe robust
significant, againstalternativespecifications.
In addition
tosimply reporting theactivitiesofCongress tothepublic,this
14ThemodelofCongressional
approvalwasestimated
separately
forthefirst
andsecond
10-year
periodsexaminedinouranalysis.
As indicated
below,results
ofa Chowtestsuggest
over-time
coefficient
stability.
Coefficients
Variable FinalModel 1974:1-1983:4 1984:1-1993:4
Approval,t- 1 0.796 0.741 0.787
EconomicExpectations 0.072 0.070 0.077
NewYorkTimesCoverage 0.207 0.218 0.250
Koreagate -1.291 -0.719
HouseBankScandal -4.686 -3.941
Vetoes 0.244 0.284 0.913
VetoOverrides -0.992 -1.235 -1.621
Internal
Conflict -0.169 0.057 -0.354
MajorBills -0.439 -0.400 -0.593
Sumof SquaredResiduals 611.023 319.196 249.576
ChowTest:F1060= 0.446
"Thisresult
holdsregardless
ofwhether
wetransform
presidential inaneffort
approval
to testourdividedgovernment
hypothesis.
Table 2. Estimating Model of Congressional

a Distributed-Lag
Approval
CongressionalApproval
IndependentVariable Coefficient SE p
CongressionalApproval,-, 0.80 (0.05) 0.00
Presidential
Approvalta
EconomicExpectationst 0.07 (0.03) 0.01
New YorkTimes'Coveraget 0.21 (0.07) 0.00
NondividedGovernment, 1977:1,
NondividedGovernment, 1993:1,
Scandalst
Koreagatet -1.29 (1.09) 0.12
ABSCAMt
SpeakerWrightScandalt
KeatingFivet
House Bankt -4.69 (1.70) 0.00
Post Officet
Presidential
Vetoest 0.24 (0.09) 0.00
Veto Overridest -0.99 (0.55) 0.04
Intra-Congress
Conflictt -0.17 (0.12) 0.09
Major Billst -0.44 (0.28) 0.06
All Billst
Constant 9.38 (3.33) 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.87
StandardErrorof theEstimate 2.98
Lagrange MultiplierTest (4 lags)b 4.69
First-Order
ARCHC 0.79
Second-OrderARCH 2.33
N 79
Note:Standard errors areinparentheses. Data arequarterly,
1974:1to 1993:4.P valuesare
forone-tailedtests.Nonsignificantvariables,indicatedby dashes,weredroppedfromthe
finalmodel.Estimation of thefinalmodelinvolvedtheelimination of variablesvia the
Schwarzcriterion. The resultsof thisiterative processare presentedin Table Al of the
Appendix.
aThepresidentialapproval seriesincludedinthemodelwasdeveloped as follows:Theorigi-
nalserieswasre-estimated withtheeffects ofeconomic zeroedout;theresulting
expectations
serieswasthensubtracted fromitsmeanandmultiplied by-1 during quarterscharacterized
bydividedgovernment.
bTheLagrangeMultiplier Test,herebasedon theBreusch-Godfrey teststatistic,
is usedto
test-for
higher-order(here4 lags)serialcorrelation
intheestimatedresiduals.
Thechi-square
statistic
of4.69 is notofsufficientmagnitude torejectthenullofno serialcorrelation atp
= 0.05.
cThenonsignificant
first-
andsecond-order conditional
autoregressive test
heteroskedasticity
statistics
indicate
thattheestimated
modelproduces oflargeorsmallresiduals.
noclustering
findingsuggests thatthemediaexerttheirown,independent effect onhow

theinstitution is judged.
Turning to ourvariablesofgreatest interest-namely, thosefocusing
onessential activities ofCongress-ourresults support ourgeneral hypoth-
esis.As anticipated, thepassageofmajorlegislation byCongress, as well
as vetooverrides, driveitsapprovalleveldownward. Iftheseresultsseem
implausible, one needonlyconsidertheimpacton publicassessments of
Congress ofthelegislative processregarding thecrimeandhealthcarebills
beforeCongressin thelate Summerof 1994.Whilehealthcarereform
failedto emergefromthe103rdCongress, a crimebillwas eventually en-
acted.The outcome, however, failedto satisfy all interested partiesorthe
publicin general, as evidenced in letters to editorsas wellas a number of
surveys.Thecrimebillconstituted a meaningful deviation fromthestatus
quo,resulting in a substantial number ofopponents. We arethusleftwith
a disenchanted public,unsureofwhether theresulting legislationimproves
ourcollective lot,anda number ofgenuine policylosers.Had a healthcare
reform billpassed,itis difficult toimaginea different reception. It should
notcomeas a surprise thatboththepassageoflegislation andvetooverrides
(constituting essentially similarbehavior)driveCongressional approval
downward.
Thelevelofdiscordexhibited within Congress, as captured bycloture
anddebtceilingvotes,also appearsto adversely affect Congressional ap-
proval,although thecoefficient is onlymarginally significant (p = 0.09).
Finally,as is evident inTable2, thecoefficient onallbillsis nonsignificant.
Interbranch discord, as manifested bypresidential vetoes,mayactually
improvethepublic'sassessment ofCongress. Sucha finding standsinstark
contrastto ourhypothesis thatheightened conflict betweentheexecutive
andlegislature woulddamageCongressional approval.Sincewe aresur-
prisedby thisfinding, we can onlyspeculateaboutitsroots.It maybe,
givenourfinding thatthepassage oflegislation adversely affects theap-
provallevelofCongress, thatthepresident is doingCongressa favor(with
respectto itspublicstanding) by vetoinglegislation. By thesametoken,
to theextentthatthepublicis frustrated by theappearance of stalemate,
itmaybe thatthepresident-not Congress-bearsthebrunt oftheblame
forinaction.
Onlyonescandalappearstohavedriven Congressional approval down-
ward:theHouseBankscandal.All others, as wellas thedividedgovern-
mentdummies, havecoefficients statisticallyindistinguishable fromzero.
Figure4 improves ourabilityto gaugetheimpact ofthree exogenous
variableson Congressional approval.Shownare the relativeexpected
changes(holdingall else constant) resulting fromone vetooverride, the
two
passageofonemajorbill, long,negative, front-page storiesabout Con-
co~~~~~
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
04
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~l
04
CIO~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'
o 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c
t3)~~~~~~~~~0
to ~~~~~04
4-0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(
- 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
gressintheNewYorkTimes,anda five-point increaseineconomic expecta-

tions.Thelatter twoexogenousshockshavecomparable, though opposite,
cumulative onapproval;
effects moredramatic,
however, is thedipinCon-
gressional approvalresulting
fromthepassageof onlyone majorbill,as
wellas a singlevetooverride.
Suchfindings,
ifvalid,cannotbe encouraging
to ourlegislators.
Conclusion
We havesuggested thatshiftsinCongressional approvalcanbe under-
stoodin partas reactions to theactivities andcharacteristics of Congress
itself.Ourresults offer empiricalsupport. Theenactment ofimportant and
consequential legislation,highlevelsof dissension withinthechambers,
andlegislating via thevetooverride all lead to declinesin Congressional
approval.On theotherhand,presidential vetoesappearto exerta positive
impacton Congressional approval,contrary to our expectations. While
presidential approvalwas foundtobe nonsignificant in ourmodelofCon-
gressional approval, thisfindingsuggests thattheactivities oftheexecutive
brancharestillrelevant to publicattitudes towardCongress.
Unlikepreviousstudies, we haveoffered evidencethatpublicopinion
toward Congress is insomesubstantial measure determined bytheactivities
ofCongress itself.Previousworkonpublicattitudes towardCongress, and
thepresident as well,has reliedon explanatory variablesthatarelargely
or entirely beyondthecontrolof thoseinstitutions. Ourresultssuggesta
verydifferent, andfroma democratic standpoint, muchhealthier relation-
shipbetween institutionsandthepublicthatelectsthem, oneinwhichinsti-
tutions arepresumably influencedbypublicopinion, butalsoinwhichinsti-
tutions can,bytheiractions,affect opinionas well.
Congressional approval,however, appearsto present us withan inter-
estingirony.WhenCongressacts as it was constitutionally designedto
act-passing majorlegislation and debating theissuesof theday-it is
rewarded bythepublicwithlowerlevelsofapproval.Whenconflict with
thepresident is so greatas toresultin vetoes,andthusoftenstalemate, its
esteemin thepubliceyerises.Whilepunditsandpollsoftenportray de-
clinesin Congressional approvalas indications of thatbody'sfailings, if
nota crisisof thepoliticalorder,ourresearchsuggeststhatdecreasesin
Congressional approvalare,in part,simplya reaction to Congressdoing
itsjob. We believethisis animportant finding, as itgrounds Congressional
unpopularity in essentialaspectsofthelegislative process,notin failures
of Congressto comport itselfproperly. Thisinterpretation contradictsan
important strand ofCongressional criticism whichholdsthatCongress'low
publicesteemis theresultofCongressional failurestoactona broadlegis-
lativeagenda.
200 R. H. Durr,J.B. Gilmour
and C. Wolbrecht
Of course,one shouldnotexpectCongressto takeadvantage of the

findings of thispaperto increaseits publicapproval.Congressis nota
homogeneous bodywitha uniform desiretobe morepopular.Suppose,for
example, thatthemajority partydecidedthatitwouldbe better offifCon-
gressas a wholeweremorepopular, andendeavored thereforetominimize
conflict.
Theminority partywouldprobably concludethattheirchancesof
winning controlof Congressincreaseas Congressbecomesless popular,
andtheywouldrespondby doingall in theirpowerto keepthelevelof
conflicthigh.Givenitscurrent politicallandscape, itis highly unlikelythat
Congresswillbe of a singlemindanytime soon.
Havingshedlighton thedeterminants ofCongressional approval, the
othersideoftheequationdemandsscholarly attention as well.Future work
shouldinquireintotheconsequences of changing attitudesforCongres-
sionallegitimacy, thelegislativeprocess, andelectoral outcomes. We might
expect,forexample,thatdipsin Congressional approvalwilldissuadethe
mosttalented andqualified ofAmericans from seekingsuchoffices, encour-
age retirements,resultin a reducedincumbency advantage, oractuallyin-
spirevotersto "throwthebumsout." Shifting Congressional approval
mightalso shapethecontext in whichlegislation is forged,affecting the
risksmembers arewillingtotakeandtheprobability thatsignificantlegisla-
tionwillbe produced.
"We have alwaysbeen unpopular,"said House SpeakerNicholas
Longworth of Congressin 1925.Yet, whilegenerally low, ouranalysis
indicatesthatCongressional approvalexperiences substantialvariation.
Ourresearch suggests thattheobserved variation inCongressional approval
can to somedegreebe accounted for,andthatsomeportion ofit maybe
attributedto thecomplexanddivisivelegislative decisionmaking process
thatcharacterizes Congress.Congressional approvalcan therefore be un-
derstood as a byproduct ofCongress'constitutionally-defined roleandthe
public'sperhapsunrealistic expectations. Ironically, whenCongressper-
forms itsfunctions oflawmaking anddeliberation, itis debasedintheeyes
ofthoseit is intended to represent.
Manuscriptsubmitted16 June1995.
Final manuscriptreceived12 December 1995.
APPENDIX
Elementsof CongressionalApproval
Listedbelow are all surveyitemsused in thesummaryCongressionalapproval
measure.Followingthequestionwording thatem-
is thesurveyorganization(s)
ployedtheitem,therangeof datesforwhichit was asked,thenumber of times
it was administered, of theitemwiththefinalCongressional
andthecorrelation
approvaltimeseries.'6
Do youapproveordisapprove
ofthewayCongress/the
U.S. Congressis handling/
doingitsjob?
Gallup,CBS News/New YorkTimes,MarketOpinionResearch,
ABC News/
WashingtonPost,YankelovichClancyShulman,CBS News,ABC News,
WirthlinGroup,Hartand TeeterResearchCompanies;1974:2-1993:4;85
observations;0.969.
Do youapproveordisapproveofthewayCongress/the U.S. Congressis handling/
doingitsjob? (Subpopulation:
Registered
voters)
CBS/NewYorkTimes,HartandTeeterResearchCompanies, PeterHartand
BreglioResearchCompanies;1982:4-1992:2;7 observations;
0.847.
Howwouldyouratethejob beingdonebyCongress-excellent, prettygood,only
fair,or poor?
LouisHarrisandAssociates;1974:1-1990:3;5 observations;
0.903.
How wouldyouratethejob Congress hasbeendoingso farthisyear-excellent,
prettygood,onlyfair,orpoor?
Louis Harrisand Associates; 1975:1-1975:3; 2 observations;1.000.
How wouldyouratethejob donethispastyearby Congress-excellent,
pretty
good,onlyfair,orpoor?
LouisHarrisandAssociates,
ABC News/LouisHarrisandAssociates;1977:
4-1978:3; 2 observations;- 1.000.
Howwouldyouratethejob beingdonebyCongress-excellent,pretty
good,only
fair,orpoor?(Subpopulation:
Likelyvoters)
ABC News/Louis HarrisandAssociates,
LouisHarrisandAssociates;1980:
1-1984:2; 4 observations;0.621.
How wouldyouratethejob donebyCongressthisyear-excellent,
pretty
good,
only fair,or poor?
Louis HarrisandAssociates;1982:2-1989:4;2 observations;
1.000.
Therehasbeenquitea lotinthenewslatelyaboutCongress. How wouldyourate
thejob thepresent is doingon thewhole-as excellent,
Congress good,onlyfair,
orpoor?
Roper Organization;1975:2-1983:2; observations;0.859.
How wouldyourateCongressonthesamescale(ifyouhavea favorable
opinion,
namea numberbetweenplusoneandplusfive-thehigherthenumber,themore
16Eachcorrelation
coefficient as theitem'sfactor
maybe interpreted loadingscore;its
squareas a communityestimate.
Itemswithnegative do notcontribute
correlations to the
estimationofthefinalmeasure.
APPENDIX (continued)
favorableyouropinion.If youhavean unfavorable opinion,namea number be-
tweenminusone and minusfive-thehigherthenumber themoreunfavorable
theopinion)?
Gallup;1991:3-1991:4;2 observations;-1.000.
(I'd likeyouropinionof somepeopleand organizations. As I readfroma list,
pleasetellme whichcategory on thiscardbestdescribes
youroverallopinionof
whatI name.Probably, therewillbe somepeopleand organizations
on thislist
thatyouhaveneverheardof.)How wouldyoudescribeyouropinionof ... Con-
gress?(Choicesareveryfavorable, mostlyfavorable,
mostunfavorable,
veryunfa-
vorable,can'trate,andneverheardof.)
Gallup,PrincetonSurveyResearchAssociates;1985:2-1993:1;7 observa-
tions;0.892.
I am goingto readyoua listof institutions
in Americansociety.Wouldyoutell
me howmuchconfidence you,yourself,
havein eachone-a greatdeal,quitea
lot,some,or verylittle... Congress.
Gallup, ABC NewslWashingtonPost, ABC News, WashingtonPost, Los
AngelesTimes;1978:2-1991:4;14 observations; 0.690.
I am goingto readyoua listof institutionsin American society.Wouldyoutell
me howmuchconfidence you,yourself,
havein eachone-a greatdeal,quitea
lot,some,or verylittle... Congress.("None" responseis voluntary)
Gallup,CBS/NewYorkTimes;1975:2-1993:1;11 observations; 0.673.
Would you tell me how muchconfidence you, yourself,
have in: Congress?
(Choicesarea greatdeal,quitea lot,some,andverylittle.)
Gallup;1980:4-1981:3;2 observations; 1.000
Do youhavea greatdeal,quitea lot,some,orverylittleconfidence in Congress?
Los AngelesTimes;1991:4-1993:2;5 observations; 0.262.
As faras thepeoplerunning ... Congress. .. areconcerned, wouldyousayyou
havea greatdeal ofconfidence, onlysomeconfidence, or hardlyanyconfidence
at all in them?
LouisHarrisandAssociates, NationalOpinionResearchCenter; ABC News/
LouisHarrisandAssociates, MoriResearch, Inc.,GordonS. BlackCorpora-
tion;1974:1-1993:1; 35 observations;
0.792.
I wouldlikeyouropinionon howmuchtrustand confidence youhavein some
institutions.(Respondentsindicated
theirlevelofconfidence by selectinga point
on a scale of one to seven.) . . . Congress.
OpinionResearchCorporation;
1977:2-1983:2;3 observations;
-0.927.
Do you have a lot of confidencein . . . Congress . . . when it comes to dealing
withtheeconomyandinflation,someconfidence,
orpractically
no confidence
in
them?
SkellyandWhite;1974:3-1976:1;4 observations;
Yankelovich, 0.298.
Whenitcomesright downtoit,howmuchconfidencedo youhavein ... Congress
... whenitcomesto doingsomethingabouttheenergyproblem-a lotofconfi-
dence,someconfidence,
ornorealconfidence?
(Subpopulation:
Registeredvoters.)
SkellyandWhite;1977:2-1979:3;2 observations;
Yankelovich, 1.000.
EXPLAINING
CONGRESSIONAL
APPROVAL 203
(I'm goingtoreadyounamesofseveralgroupsandpeoplewhoareactiveinpublic
affairs.
I'd likeyouto rateyourfeelingstowardeachone as eitherverypositive,
somewhat positive, somewhat
neutral, orverynegative.
negative, Ifyoudon'tknow
thename,pleasejustsayso.) The U.S./United StatesCongress.
HartandTeeterResearchCompanies;1993:1-1993:3;4 observations; 0.964.
(I'm goingtoreadyounamesofseveralgroupsandpeoplewhoareactiveinpublic
affairs.
I'd likeyouto rateyourfeelingstowardeachone as eitherverypositive,
somewhat positive, somewhat
neutral, orverynegative.
negative, Ifyoudon'tknow
thename,pleasejustsay so.) The U.S./United StatesCongress.(Subpopulation:
Nationalregisteredvoters.)
HartandTeeterResearch Companies; 1992:2-1992:3;2 observations;
- 1.000.
(I'm goingtoreada fewstatements. Foreach,canyoupleasetellmeifyouagree
ordisagreewithit,orif,perhaps, youhaveno opinionaboutthestatement.) Most
members ofCongresscaredeeplyabouttheproblems of ordinarycitizens.
ABC NewslWashingtonPost; 1982:3-1989:2;3 observations; 0.619.
members ofCongresswilltellliesiftheyfeelthetruthwillhurtthempolitically.
ABC NewslWashingtonPost; 1982:3-1989:2;3 observations; 0.997
members ofCongresscaremoreaboutkeepingpowerthantheydo aboutthebest
interestsofthenation.
members ofCongressmakea lotofmoneybyusingpublicofficeimproperly.
members ofCongresshavea highpersonalmoralcode.
ABC NewslWashingtonPost; 1982:3-1989:2;3 observations; -0.354.
How wouldyou ratethejob SenatorBob Dole as MajorityLeaderis doing-
excellent,prettygood,onlyfair,orpoor?
Louis HarrisandAssociates;1985:2-1985:4;2 observations; - 1.000.
How wouldyouratethejob SpeakerThomasP. "Tip" O'Neill as Speakerofthe
Houseis doing-excellent, prettygood,onlyfair,orpoor?
(Letmeaskyousomespecifics aboutthejob Congressis doing.)How wouldyou
rateCongresson bringing thecountry outof recession-excellent,pretty good,
onlyfair,orpoor?
rateCongresson controlling inflation-excellent,
prettygood,onlyfair,orpoor?
LouisHarrisandAssociates;1974:1-1975:3;4 observations; 0.163.
rateCongressonworking forpeaceintheworld-excellent, prettygood,onlyfair,
orpoor?
rateCongresson handling taxesandspending-excellent, prettygood,onlyfair,
orpoor?
rateCongresson handling theenergy shortage-excellent, good,onlyfair,
pretty
orpoor?
Louis HarrisandAssociates;1974:1-1975:3;3 observations; -0.706
rateCongressonproviding adequatehealthinsurance-excellent,
prettygood,only
fair,orpoor?
Louis HarrisandAssociates;1975:1-1975:3;2 observations; 0.000.
(Letmeaskyousomespecifics aboutthejob Congressis doing.)Howwouldyou
rateCongresson keepingtheeconomy healthy-excellent, good,onlyfair,
pretty
orpoor?
Louis HarrisandAssociates;1974:1-1975:3;4 observations; -0.231.
rateCongressoninspiringconfidenceingovernment-excellent, prettygood,only
fair,orpoor?
Louis HarrisandAssociates;1974:1-1975:3;4 observations; 0.667.
(Letmeaskyousomespecifics aboutthejob Congressis doing.)Howwouldyou
rateCongresson keepingtheU.S. strong militarily-excellent,
prettygood,only
fair,orpoor?
Louis HarrisandAssociates;1975:1-1975:3;2 observations; 1.000
(Do youagreeordisagreewiththefollowing statements?)Thosewe electtoCon-
gressin Washingtonlose touchwiththepeoplepretty quickly.
CBS News, Gallup, ABC NewslWashingtonPost, ABC News, Washington
Post; 1978:3-1992:4;5 observations; 0.963.
(Letmeaskyouabouta number ofdifferenttypesofleaders.)As faras thepeople
in chargeof running.. . Congress. .. are concerned,do you feel thattheyreally
knowwhatmostpeopletheyrepresent or servereallythinkandwant,or do you
feeltheyare mostlyoutof touchwiththepeopletheyare supposedto lead or
help?
Louis HarrisandAssociates;1975:3-1977:4;2 observations; -1.000.
In general,comparedto theroleof thepresident, do you feelthatCongressis
playingtoostrong a rolein determining foreignpolicy,tooweaka role,or about
therightrole?
Louis HarrisandAssociates,Gallup,CBS News/New YorkTimes;1974:4-
1990:4;8 observations; 0.534.
Howwouldyouratethehonesty andethicalstandardsofthepeopleinthesediffer-
entfields-veryhigh,high,average,low,or verylow?Congressmen.
Gallup;1976:2-1977:3;2 observations;1.000.
Howwouldyouratethehonesty andethicalstandardsofthepeopleinthesediffer-
entfields-veryhigh,high,average,low,or verylow? Senators.
Gallup;1976:2-1977:3;2 observations;
0.000.
Wouldyouratethelevelofethicsandhonesty ofCongressas excellent,
good,not
so good,or poor?
ABC NewslWashington Post,ABC News; 1989:2-1993:3;3 observations;
0.881.
How wouldyouratetheoverallperformance andaccomplishments ofthisyear's
Congress-oneofthebest,aboveaverage,or one oftheworst?(Subpopulation:
Nationalregistered
voters.)
HartandTeeterResearchCompanies, PeterHartandBreglioResearchCom-
panies;1990:4-1992:2;3 observations;
1.000.
Major Bills, 1991-93
Thefollowing
is a listofthelegislative
actsincluded
as majorbillsfrom1991
to 1993. Legislationincludedas majorbills from1974 to 1990 can be located in
Mayhew(1991).
1991
Continuationof fast-track
tradeprocedures,1991:2
IntermodalSurfaceTransportationAct, 1991:4
FederalSupplementalCompensationAct(unemployment benefits),
1991:4
CivilRightsActof 1991,1991:4
Resolution
TrustCorporationRefinancing
Act(savingsandloanbailout),1991:4
ConventionalForcesin EuropeTreatyImplementationAct (humanitarianand
weaponsdismantlementaid fortheformerSovietUnion),1991:4
1992
Dire Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations
Act (post-L.A.riotsurbanaid),
1992:2
Unemployment Amendments
Compensation (long-term
joblessbill),1992:3
CableTelevisionConsumer Act(cablereregulation),
Protection 1992:3
ReclamationProjects Authorizationand AdjustmentAct (Westernwater bill),
1992:4
FreedomforRussianandEmerging
EurasianDemocracies
andOpenMarkets
Sup-
portAct, 1992:4
1993
FamilyandMedicalLeave Act,1993:1
NationalVoterRegistration
Act(MotorVoter),1993:2
HatchActReform Amendments, 1993:3
NationalServiceTrustAct,1993:3
OmnibusBudgetReconciliationAct,1993:3
SupplementalAppropriations
fortheNew IndependentStateof theFormerSoviet
Union Act, 1993:3
NorthAmericanFree Trade AgreementImplementation Act (NAFTA), 1993:4
BradyHandgunViolence PreventionAct (Brady bill), 1993:4
ResolutionTrustCorporationCompletionAct (savings and loan bailout), 1993:4
Table Al. SummaryofModel Reductions

Variable Removed b Removed t-Statistic
Removed 6 Schwarz*
None 3.10 17.392
Nondividedgovt.,no. 2 -0.35 -0.10 3.07 16.707
Nondividedgovt.,no. 1 3.63 1.07 3.08 16.340
Presidential
approval 0.01 0.14 3.05 15.687
Scandals -0.16 -0.17 3.03 15.058
Wrightscandal 0.62 0.15 3.01 14.446
Post Officescandal 0.80 0.34 2.99 13.871
KeatingFive scandal 0.87 0.60 2.97 13.361
ABSCAM scandal 1.74 1.21 2.98 13.073
Bills 0.01 0.82 2.98 12.632
*TheSchwarzcriterion presentedhereininvolvestheminimization oftheexpression[RSS
+ K(log t)02]/T. Whenattempting to droptheone remaining nonsignificant the
variable,
Koreagatescandal,thestandarderror
oftheestimate increasedandtheadjusted
R2decreased.
We therefore decidedto leavethevariablein thefinalspecification.
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Explaining Congressional Approval

Author(s): Robert H. Durr, John B. Gilmour and Christina Wolbrecht

Theory:Aggregate publicapprovalof theUnitedStatesCongressdeclineswhen

While levels of public approvalaffordedthe UnitedStates Congress

*Theauthors wishtothank JimStimson forgenerouslyproviding and

actsas required byitsinstitutionalroleas botha representativeandlegisla-

importantpolicyissues,thediversity ofopinions onthebestpolicyposition

similarsurvey itemsall tapintothesamephenomenon, namely, thedegree

As faras thepeoplerunning ... Congress... areconcerned,

Ourrationale fortheinclusionof thesequestionsis straightforward: we

0) co~~ r-- 0o)t

'If thecontroversyassociatedwithpassingmajorbillsmakesCongressless popular,

1974-90,we use thesetofimportant lawsidentifiedbyMayhew(1991).2

InternalCongressionalConflict and Turmoil

2Mayhew's(1991,37) approach is designedto identify

tiveprocess.Thus,we expectthatincreasing levelsofconflict inCongress

nent.We arenot.Theresiduals followa strikinglypoliticalpattern,

themselves of variousothermeansof learningaboutCongress.Instead,

6Giventwocoders,we can report a measureofinter-coder Thetwoseries

quarters, theaggregate Timescoverage wasnegative.Thesharply negative

Yt= P0+ PIXt+ + et.

The parameter on Xt,PI,captures theimmediate impactof a unitchange

gaugetheeffects ofa five-point increasein economicexpectations on the

13Forthetimeperiodunderstudy, has a standard

parta functionofthatportion ofthepublic'seconomicforecasts actually

Table 2. Estimating Model of Congressional

findingsuggests thatthemediaexerttheirown,independent effect onhow

gressintheNewYorkTimes,anda five-point increaseineconomic expecta-

Of course,one shouldnotexpectCongressto takeadvantage of the

Table Al. SummaryofModel Reductions

Fenno,Richard F. 1975."If,As RalphNaderSays,Congress is 'TheBrokenBranch,'How

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