USAF AFWIC GlobalFuturesCOVID19

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GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION IN A POST-COVID-19 WORLD:
GLOBAL FUTURES REPORT

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES OF GEOPOLITICAL
COMPETITION IN A POST-COVID-19 WORLD
A COLLABORATIVE ANALYSIS WITH FORESIGHT

PRACTITIONERS AND EXPERTS
Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC)
Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch
June 2020
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
02 Introduction / Executive Summary

Lt Col Jake Sotiriadis, USAF, Ph.D.
Chief, Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch, AFWIC
Jairus V. Grove, Ph.D.
Director, Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies
03 Executive Summary
Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch, AFWIC
04 Strategic Foresight and Futures Studies: A Methodological Approach

Lt Col Jake Sotiriadis, USAF, Ph.D. and Jairus V. Grove, Ph.D.
07 Four Global Scenarios for a Post-COVID-19 World

15 The Future of Geopolitical Competition in Space

Kara Cunzeman
Lead Futurist, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, the Aerospace Corporation
18 The Future of Competition and Autonomous Systems

Major Laura Hunstock, USAF
22 The Future Nexus of Supply Chains and National Security

Jason Schenker
Chairman, The Futurist Institute
26 The Future of Malign Influence Campaigns

Vera Zakem
Senior Technology and Policy Advisor, Technology for Global Security
29 The Future of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Shannon McGurk
31 The Future of Geopolitical Competition in the Middle East

Marwa Maziad, Ph.D.
Visiting Scholar in-residence, Jackson School of International Relations, University of
Washington
38 The Future of the European Union and Implications for Transatlantic Relations
Lt Col Jake Sotiriadis, USAF, Ph.D.
42 Conclusion
About the Authors
Appendix A: Acronym List
G L O B AL F U T U R E S R E P O R T 1
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INTRODUCTION
Lt Col Jake Sotiriadis, USAF, Ph.D., and Jairus Grove, Ph.D.
The COVID-19 pandemic sheds an important light on the criticality of futures-based thinking to move
us beyond conventional assumptions and positions. In today’s chaotic cycle of rapid change, growing
complexity, and radical uncertainty, the national security establishment must develop the skills and
flexibility to adapt to the unexpected. To be sure, the fallout from COVID-19 has revealed overlooked
vulnerabilities for our supply chains, our society, our economy, and—most pertinent for this report—
our national security strategy, which relies on all three.
The primary aim of this report is to disrupt how we conceptualize national security futures. Rather
than arrive at “definitive” conclusions or prescribe budgetary, policy, or force structure
recommendations, this document instead challenges us to consider how the future can defy accepted
probabilities to affect the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force.
We are living far from “equilibrium system,” when novel and even catastrophic change are most likely.
However, in every alternative future—no matter how severe or unexpected—there are always
winners and losers. The organizations best positioned to seize and incorporate the exploits of the
new order will be those with the capability to perceive, learn, and adapt even when the signals from
tomorrow may seem utterly ridiculous today.
Lt Col Jacob S. Sotiriadis, USAF, Ph.D.

Jairus Victor Grove, Ph.D.

Director, the Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies
The University of Hawaii at Manoa
Washington, D.C., June 2020
*The authors’ views expressed in this document are their own and do not reflect official positions or
endorsements of the Department of Defense or the Department of the Air Force.
E
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
We develop four overarching, global scenarios that feature transformation, collapse, discipline, and
continued growth outcomes. These global scenarios do not represent the most probable or likely
outcomes—rather, the report harnesses emerging weak signals from environmental scanning
analysis (that likely seem improbable today) and weaves them into the possible futures of a post-
COVID world.
 Global Future #1 (Transformation) – 2035 “From Bio-hegemony to Bio Supremacy:” The
new “Great Powers” are those states that have achieved superior levels of bio-resiliency vis-
à-vis their peer competitors. National bio-data stockpiles, coupled with a new blend of
capabilities in artificial intelligence, satellite-based imagery, and unprecedented global
connectivity, have raised the premium on fielding networked military forces. Those states that
possess bio-resiliency, along with the capability to instantly make information ubiquitous
across their security apparatuses, dominate the new competition.
 Global Future #2 (Systemic Collapse) – 2035 “The New Warring States Period:” Scholars
label the 2030s as the new “warring states” period—referring both to the ancient Chinese
conflict era as well as the outbreak of the 21st century’s first continental-scale civil war in
China. This marks China’s second civil war in less than 100 years. The most dramatic factor
contributing to this new, global instability is the legitimacy crisis wrought by COVID-19.
Additionally, a second legitimacy crisis emerges around the “truth narrative” itself.
Industrial scale science and medicine—which had doubled life expectancy and nearly ensured
food security in the 20th century—are now widely seen as tools for societal manipulation.
 Global Future #3 (Discipline) – 2035 “Authoritarian Regionalism:” Severe strains on
social order have driven both liberal and authoritarian regimes alike towards highly centralized
and restrictive measures. Surveillance regimes are no longer voluntary. Access to basic
necessities requires consent and cooperation with real-time bio-surveillance as well as
unannounced health checks at home or work. National militaries, and in particular national
air forces, often find themselves replacing commercial supply chains and even the oversight
of production and local distribution of goods to prevent riots and hoarding.
 Global Future #4 (Continued Growth) – 2035 “Endemic Disruption:” States with the
capability to maintain data profiles of their populations and the populations of competitors can
map and predict the intensity and timeline of each new disease outbreak. This capability has
resulted in a kind of stochastic hegemony. While the disease’s mutation cannot be predicted,
once an outbreak begins, states with stochastic hegemony can determine when the
populations and the armed forces of their competitors will be disrupted and how long they will
be vulnerable to attack. The curse and high ground of this ‘rhythmic readiness’ has created
instability and enabled territorial incursions, as states know they have a locked in advantage
for weeks or even months. The U.S. Air Force benefits significantly from the necessity of a
new offset strategy to limit the reliance on troop levels. Less civilian air traffic and greater
access to the skies is limited by the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and long
term, low-orbit surveillance systems.
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STRATEGIC FORESIGHT AND FUTURES STUDIES:

A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
WHAT IS “FUTURES STUDIES”?

Simply stated, futures studies (or strategic foresight) is an academic discipline that seeks to foster
anticipatory thinking to aid decision-making. 1 Foresight practitioners are well-versed in the processes
of identifying weak or emerging signals as well as sources of disruption and societal change agents.
Part and parcel of strategic foresight is the crafting of "alternative futures" (or "scenarios") within the
context of helping an organization or community plan for and move towards its preferred future.
All too often, organizations tend to coalesce around one particular vision of the future, which can
expose major vulnerabilities in strategic planning. As we see today, even expertly calculated
probabilities are of no use when you are fighting your way out of a situation you did not anticipate.
This is why futures studies is not about correctly predicting the future. Rather, it uses multiple
images of possible--even if not probable--futures to test our intellectual arsenal for strategic
adaptation.
HOW DOES THIS DIFFER FROM TREND ANALYSIS OR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS?

Trend analysis shows us what to expect if the present continues; intelligence assessments, on the
other hand, give us likely adversary courses of action based on established patterns of behavior.
Alternative futures can create a virtual training ground for decision-makers who will face adversaries
and global dynamics more complex and more dangerous than we have previously confronted.
As a habit of mind, strategic foresight requires imaginative approaches to design that are often at
odds with organizational cultures requiring high levels of cohesion. In times of radical change—during
pandemics, geopolitical crises, systemic transformations, or major shifts in domestic political
culture—experimentation can appear imprudent. But it is the capacity to develop and maintain
intellectual capital for new thinking that enables us to take the high ground when our security
environment is turned upside down.
WHY DO WE EMPLOY SCENARIO MODELING?

At some level, we are all “futurists” in that we all anticipate outcomes beyond the present. Preparing
for the unexpected is a bit like the time travel equivalent of red teaming.
The goal here is to envision a believable yet unanticipated world and confront the limits/creative
possibilities of existing capabilities. In order to provide the best possible audit of present capacity,
we want to create four distinctive futures that challenge core assumptions about present trends.
1
For more reading on futures studies, see:
Wendell Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies: Human Science for a New Era, Volume 1, Transaction Publishers, 1997;
Jim Dator, World Futures Review, Volume 7, Number 4, December 2015;
Jennifer Gidley The Future: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017;
Richard A. Lum, 4 Steps to the Future: A Quick and Clean Guide to Creating Foresight, (Futurescribe: Honolulu, HI) 2016;
Richard Slaughter, Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, Revised 2020;
Amy Webb, The Signals Are Talking: Why Today’s Fringe is Tomorrow’s Mainstream, (PublicAffairs), 2016.
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THE “FOUR FUTURES” FRAMEWORK

One of the most widely-employed methodologies for crafting alternative futures scenarios is the “Four
Futures” method. Developed by the Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies (or “the Manoa
School”), this model employs four archetypes of the future (see Figure 1).
The “Four Futures” are generic images of the future that recur throughout history, public debates, and
popular culture; but they also stretch the limits of what we think of as logically possible. 2
These four archetypes are:
1. Transformation
2. Collapse
3. Discipline
4. Continued growth
Figure 1 Graphical representation of the Manoa School “Four Futures” Method
Transformation Futures
…address a fundamental shift in the rules of an established order.
We should keep in mind, however, that transformation is a subjective outcome. As such,
transformation futures represent neither a “good” nor a “bad” systemic transformation. For example,
the French revolution was a transformation future, but less enticing for the Ancien Regime than those
storming the Bastille. More importantly, the social logic of authority and legitimacy were never the
same again after the French Revolution. Phenomena such as democracy, populism, and market
economies have intensified freedom as much as they have intensified both the scale and destructive
character of war.
Collapse Futures
…show us the possibility of a sudden loss of order.
They provoke us to consider how we would adapt to a radical change in our expectations or to the
rules of change. Examples of a collapse future are the end of the Cold War or the collapse of the
European colonial system after World War II. Collapse futures highlight that actors must rapidly make
new rules, find new alliances, or find new advantages in a system where the old rules no longer apply.
These collapses can highlight unitary drivers, such as the structure of the international system;
complex collapses like the reversal of globalization; or the dark ages after the fall of Rome. Again,
such outcomes are not necessarily “good” or “bad,” but depend of historical, contextual, and
subjective interpretations.
2
The names of these scenarios partially speak for themselves. However, each and every archetype can have bright and dark variants.
Remember—in every future there are winners and losers. Therefore, the central question is always: “bright and dark for whom?” What
kinds of actors and organizations will succeed in a given future and which are likely to become obsolete or even extinct?
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Discipline Futures
…show us that collapses are not always complete or transformational.
Instead, a new collapse or the loss of a major ordering principle may lead to a period of heavy-handed
control in the place of a previously stable and distributed construct. Consider the period during the
Great Depression through the Second World War—here, the regulating of prices, the freedom of
movement (at times), and the rationing of goods, were all planned and managed nationally because
the market economy failed to accomplish these tasks. However, neither did Capitalism itself collapse,
nor did a revolution take place (as it did in Russia in 1917). The international order was maintained
artificially until a new institution like the Bretton Woods system could be established to manage the
highs and lows of the global economy. Sometimes this is less pragmatic and more forceful—e.g.
states move from republican to imperial models or states collapse and find themselves under
trusteeship. A key insight of this future helps us to consider resource intensive labor and new roles
institutions play when presented with a choice between collapse or survival.
Continued Growth Futures

…show us how different things could be if fundamental principles do not change.
Our goal here is not to presume that situational dynamics will be the same in the future as they are
today, but instead to see what the future might look like if we do not adapt, collapse, or transform.
For example, what does the international order look like if the United States never enters the
“Thucydides Trap” of a showdown with China? What would the consequences of a twenty-year
“almost Cold War” look like? What if we never achieve general artificial intelligence and instead
continue to expand levels of automated but not autonomous weapons deployment? The continued
growth future is meant to show us the costs of inaction rather than surprise us with the unexpected.
HOW DO WE BUILD SCENARIOS?

 We engineer alternative futures to produce the desired effect—disrupting assumptions and
habits of thinking. However, we do not “invent” the futures. Instead, we populate each scenario
with what we designate as “weak signals” discovered through the extensive efforts of horizon
scanning.
 Weak signals are technologies, behaviors, cultural (and even religious) trends, changes in the
ecosystem or agricultural system, and geopolitical shifts that we may only have a glimpse of.
These weak signals likely seem far-fetched or outright improbable today.
 We should note that today’s “weak signals” are tomorrow’s reality ― technologies like clustered
regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) (which potentially allow malign actors
to develop a new generation of bioweapons), nationalism and state malfunction in well-
established countries, new diseases, new forms of intelligence, the failure of things we depend
on like antibiotics—are all signals which appeared weak sometimes only a few years ago and
are now squarely in the realm of the possible.
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FOUR GLOBAL SCENARIOS FOR A POST-COVID-19 WORLD

Lt Col Jake Sotiriadis, USAF, Ph.D. & Jairus V. Grove, Ph.D.
INTERPRETING THE SCENARIO FRAMEWORK

Framing the future of competition in a post-COVID world means we must first identify the prevailing
sources of macro change today. This is an important process with which to map both the origins of
disruption and their potential effects on our strategic planning. The sources of macro change
represent external phenomena that broadly affect our economy, government structure, and societal
norms. The intensification or deceleration of these major sources of macro change can point us to
weak or emerging signals that deliver insights into alternative futures.
Our report employs in-depth environmental and horizon scanning of key areas that represent
potential sources of macro change for the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air
Force: space, autonomous systems, national security supply chains, malign influence campaigns,
and geopolitical competition in key areas of interest to the United States and our allies. Cataloguing
our horizon scanning data allows us to then “connect the dots” back to the Department and our
service, positioning us to consider potential responses.
WHAT DO THE SCENARIOS REPRESENT?

 We develop four overarching, global scenarios that feature transformation, collapse, discipline,
and continued growth outcomes. These global scenarios reflect the combined insights gleaned
from environmental scanning analysis across all identified areas of macro change.
 Additionally, several sections contain uniquely tailored alternative futures scenarios that
correspond to a particular topic (e.g. the future of competition in space). This allows for a deeper
look into key areas of interest and augments the main analysis in the global scenarios.
 It is critical to note that the global scenarios do not represent the most probable or likely
outcomes—rather, the report harnesses emerging weak signals from environmental
scanning analysis (that likely seem improbable today) and weaves them into the possible
futures of a post-COVID world.
 We turn up the volume on these signals and build futures in which these possible (but low
probability) events could be decisive in changing the world. We believe this creates the
necessary feeling of reality and provides participants with provocative thought experiments that
might actually transpire.
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Figure 2 Mapping Disruptive Shifts (Sourced from Richard K. Lum, "Four Steps to the Future")
DISRUPTION HAPPENS—WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
We cannot solve for future uncertainty—and it is worth re-iterating that futures studies is not about
predicting the future. But the reality is that major systemic disruptions like the current pandemic are
not usually at the forefront of our thought processes. Organizations that find themselves in the midst
of a major disruption typically (and understandably) over-predict or under-predict the lasting effects
the disruption may have on their strategic plans or vision.
Figure 2 (above) characterizes the dilemma of
decision-making in the midst of disruption. In some
cases, a continuation of the pre-disruption order
may ensue; in others, rapid growth, decay, or even System-changing, disruptive events are far
a major transformation may characterize a more common than most people imagine… And
completely different operating environment. The yet most […] people behave as if they live in a
question we must ask ourselves, however, continuous environment, as if their plans and
concerns our ability to “future proof” our strategic business plans and projections are going to be
plans and assumptions in order to allow for relatively linear.
alternative narratives, namely: “how do we build
PETER SCHWARTZ
flexibility via foresight practices into our everyday
plans and projections?” “Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in a Time
of Turbulence”
Ideally, we should endeavor to incorporate
alternative futures into our strategic planning
process as a matter of practice—doing so in the midst of seismic shift becomes too late. In the words
of Ted Newland, a foresight trailblazer at Shell: “the greatest value of the scenarios is that they
created a culture where you could ask anyone a question, and the answer would need to be
contextual … ‘because the business case is positive’ answer was out of bounds.”
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GLOBAL FUTURE #1: TRANSFORMATION

“FROM BIO-HEGEMONY TO BIO-SUPREMACY”
2035 – The new “Great Powers” are

those states that have achieved
superior levels of bio-resiliency vis-à-
vis their peer competitors.
Dynamic changes in immunity and genetic
variability have transformed the way we
manage and protect both intellectual and
human capital. During the previous
decade (2020-2030), national security has
come to be re-defined as a continuous
maintenance of national bio-data Figure 3 World map with WMD hazard symbols superimposed. (Photo from
stockpiles—this is now as important as Wikimedia Commons)
projecting military power. Developments such as real-time contact tracing, genetic profiling,
pattern-of-life analysis for contagion, and AI-enhanced heuristics enable this new reality.
A new security threshold has also been crossed—many in the biosynthesis industry now argue that
the human ecosystem can be programmed, not just predicted. Anticipatory and engineered health
platforms are the new norm, powered by advances in CRISPR technology, real-time body/population
simulations, and the computing power of quantum processors. More importantly, underlying medical
conditions that contribute to morbidity can now be modified. Retroviral biomedia enables us to copy
and paste existing immunities in national populations within a period of weeks or months—rather than
years and/or decades. Genetic and metabolic population management as well as strategic
communications are now facilitated via continental-scale infrastructures across human-machine
interfaces. Some societal groups—for religious or ideological reasons—refuse to be part of the human
bio-security network. But fatality rates among those without access to health informatics and
immunity modulation are comparable to Europe during the Middle Ages.
The multi-decade fight against COVID-19 and other emergent pathogens has transformed life
expectancy into a choice rather than a mere question of fate. For those that can afford continuous,
bio-informatic upgrades, only a handful of degenerative diseases still pose any real challenge. This
new reality has also created unforeseen vulnerabilities—1) the data fueling these systems has now
become a key financial commodity for exploitation; and 2) a population’s metabolism and immunity
are now hackable in real-time—challenging international scientific research and humanitarian aid
efforts. Few desire to leave their respective bio-security networks to travel “off-grid.” Those who do
so face considerable scrutiny as well as long periods of quarantine before being re-admitted to the
network.
Rumors persist about the race for more and more
lethal forms of sabotage through surveillance and
enhancement networks. Steering national, regional,
and even individual genomes from sickness to health
also makes it possible to steer individuals and
groups from health, to sickness, to death. This
complete transformation in bio-hegemony is now
realized via a few keystrokes rather than the slow-
plodding, social engineering of public education or
eugenics. Figure 4 Improving global surveillance of antibiotic resistance.
(Photo from AMR Digital Marketing)
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But global insurgencies have also ensued—militant reactionary groups across the globe continue to
resist the new status quo, which they view as a threat to both human dignity and individual freedom.
The new great powers compete with each other for bio-hegemony, and ultimately, bio-supremacy.
National bio-data stockpiles, coupled with a new blend of capabilities in artificial intelligence, satellite-
based imagery, and unprecedented global connectivity, have raised the premium on fielding
networked military forces. Those states that possess bio-resiliency, along with the capability to
instantly make information ubiquitous across their security apparatuses, dominate the new
competition.
The incredible advances that preserve and perpetuate life in the new microbial environment also
create a new, information-centric high ground, which scales from the nation-state to the single
human genetic fingerprint.
GLOBAL FUTURE #2: SYSTEMIC COLLAPSE

“THE NEW WARRING STATES PERIOD”
2035 - Scholars label the 2030s as the new “warring

states” period—referring both to the ancient
Chinese conflict era as well as the outbreak of the
21st century’s first continental-scale civil war in
China. This marks China’s second civil war in less
than 100 years.
China was the first global power that dramatically failed
to fulfill domestic expectations for public health,
resource management, and improving its citizens’
quality of life. Xi Jinping’s “Neo-Confucianist” model,
which aimed to re-define the CCP as the defender of
Chinese national identity, could not bridge intense Figure 5 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. (Photo by
societal divisions. The economic disparities between (Senior Airman Isaac Johnson/U.S. Air Force)
China’s exploding urban economies and the abject poverty of ethnic minority, migrant, and agricultural
populations became more than the CCP and PLA could manage—particularly as COVID-19 returned
on multiple occasions.
The “Chinese Dream” of the 2020s has turned into a
global nightmare. China’s strategic centerpiece—the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—now exists in name
only. Instead of extending all the way to Europe (as
originally envisioned), the BRI cannot even connect
Beijing to Shanghai. Major infrastructure projects
underwritten by Chinese state-owned enterprises
have ground to a halt in over 90 countries,
contributing to a series of major economic
recessions.
Figure 6 China’s Military Releases Video Aimed at

The bitter civil war in China was a harbinger of other
Hong Kong. (Photo by VCG via Getty Images) conflicts to emerge in the 2030s. Bloody,
secessionist struggles began to take shape
throughout the Middle East and also in several continental states. NATO’s overextension towards
the East in the early 2000s—and a severe breakdown in transatlantic relations in the 2020s—has
shaken the alliance’s ability to honor its commitments. The Eurasian Economic Union has attempted
(with little success) to fill the economic void left by the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia, parts
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of the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Turkey is now a NATO member in name only and a series
of energy wars in the Eastern Mediterranean continue to paralyze the alliance.
The most dramatic factor contributing to this new, global instability is the legitimacy crisis wrought
by COVID-19. While many governments dismissed recurrences of the virus as merely “another flu,”
COVID-19 re-doubled in population saturation and lethality every 6 to 9 months. States in every
region of the world offered a diversity of solutions—from lockdowns, novel drug treatments, travel
bans, and efforts to accelerate herd immunity—but an enduring solution was never found.
These failures created a crisis of legitimacy in the state
itself, as governments were no longer able to deliver their
basic function as guarantors of security.
Additionally, a second legitimacy crisis emerged around
the “truth narrative” itself. Industrial scale science and
medicine—which had doubled life expectancy and nearly
ensured food security in the 20th century—are now widely
seen as tools for societal manipulation. COVID-19’s
“success” as a virus is thought be the result of human
intervention and constant fine-tuning by competing, rival Figure 7 Notional image of a COVID-19 Vaccine.
(Photo by Reuters)
state actors. Rumors persist that a vaccine was actually
found in 2023—however, the means to mass produce it no longer exist. The research team of
international scientists developing the vaccine died in a plane crash that same year—but the cause
and origins of the crash remain undetermined.
This betrayal of trust in the state chipped away at commonly shared beliefs of national obligation that
once held states together. The decade-long collapse—and subsequent years of low intensity war
and pandemic—wreaked havoc on the human population. This severe contraction resulted from
shortages of food and medicine to treat diseases nearly eradicated in the 20th century (polio,
dysentery, typhoid). Basic infections now often result in sepsis.
Non-state and para-state actors have initiated a revolution in
military technology using the broken elements of the more
advanced technological infrastructure that started in the 21st
century. The components of the “internet of things” that was
nearly realized (combined with the drone revolution), now
litter a four-dimensional battlespace: improvised jamming
equipment; hacked smart weapons; cyber terror tools; flying,
digging, and swimming IEDs. Some of these new IEDs use
face recognition capabilities common to phones and
computers of the early 21st century—others employ simple Figure 8 Future Warfare Concept. (Photo by Army
machine learning and AI platforms repurposed from smart University Press)
cars and intelligent refrigerators.
The diminishing pool of healthy individuals to serve in military and security forces has increased
reliance on UAVs, landmines, and other anti-personnel weapons that do not require humans.
Command and control of former national militaries is fragile; international organizations are an
afterthought as states struggle to recreate stability at smaller and more local scales. The states that
are successfully rebuilding have: 1) leveraged natural territorial barriers; 2) managed sustainable
agriculture through automated means; and 3) re-established a sense of community and purpose lost
to more than a decade of isolation, fear, and destruction.
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GLOBAL FUTURE #3: DISCIPLINE

“AUTHORITARIAN REGIONALISM”
2035 - Severe strains on social order have driven

both liberal and authoritarian regimes alike
towards highly centralized and restrictive
measures. Surveillance regimes are no longer
voluntary. Access to basic necessities requires
consent and cooperation with real-time bio-
surveillance as well as unannounced health
checks at home or work.
During the 2020s and early 2030s, COVID-19’s
lethality fluctuated from one percent to five percent.
Additional flash outbreaks of toxic shock syndrome Figure 9 Regionalism Revisited. (Photo by LSE IDEAS)
among children and teenagers saw national health systems, governments, and societies teeter on
the verge of collapse. Communities initially careened from total lock down to insurrection in an effort
to use quarantining for containment. Each lockdown promised a vaccine in exchange for sacrificing
a life outside. But as the virus became fully airborne, contact tracing efforts could not keep up with
the sheer rate of outbreaks. The lack of cooperation from national populations led to the adoption of
increasingly authoritarian measures.
Contagion levels and an inability to treat the now
highly lethal disease have all but halted international
travel. International commerce is intensely politicized
and strict economic nationalism is the political
consensus. Political parties, as they still exist, are
defined by how caustically they seek retaliation
and resource competition.
The loss of both international trade regimes and
global economic interdependence has contributed to
isolationist and belligerently expansionist foreign Figure 10 Hong Kong Protestors and Riot Police. (Photo by
policies around the planet. The hallmark, post-1945 Bloomberg/Getty)
international organizations have long been forgotten and with them any semblance of pre-existing
alliance systems. Regional plunder is a common experience of weak states and freedom of
navigation is fiercely contested. Sea Lanes of Communication are heavily mined, regional and
national waters are patrolled by surface and submarine drones, and air travel is less frequent as it is
increasingly unreliable. Regional mercantilism with highly regulated internal movement and
economic activity characterize international relations.
Non-state actors and break away zones create frequent distractions for the central administrative
states with the resources and power to quell insurrection. In other regions, these dynamics have led
to nearly stateless warzones. Communities as we understood them in the 20th century now only exist
online; these communities fluctuate wildly between nationalistic rage for competitor states/regions
and nihilism, as living in isolation has severely undermined feelings of a positive future.
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Few if any remaining militaries draw a distinction between domestic and international activities, as
martial law under the auspices of a permanent pandemic emergency is the new default. Total collapse
has been averted, and some high-functioning authoritarian
regimes are preferable to others. The measure of a
successful region or state is determined by its ability to
manage strict resource rationing. Labor interruptions and
the nationalization of economies has severely undermined
the stability of agriculture as well as other essential
consumer goods.
National militaries, and in particular national air forces,
often find themselves replacing commercial supply chains
and even the oversight of production and local distribution
of goods to prevent riots and hoarding.
Figure 11 C-17 Globemaster III aircraft delivers
pallets of water and food. (Photo by U.S. Air
Force/Tech. Sgt. James Harper Jr.)
GLOBAL FUTURE #4: CONTINUED GROWTH

“ENDEMIC DISRUPTION”
2035 - States with the capability to maintain

data profiles of their populations and the
populations of competitors can map and
predict the intensity and timeline of each new
disease outbreak. This capability has
resulted in a kind of stochastic hegemony.
While the disease’s mutation cannot be
predicted, once an outbreak begins, states with
stochastic hegemony can determine when
the populations and the armed forces of their
Figure 12 Chinese Military Command Center. (Photo by AP) competitors will be disrupted and how long
they will be vulnerable to attack. The curse and high ground of this ‘rhythmic readiness’ has
created instability and enabled territorial incursions, as states know they have a locked in advantage
for weeks or even months.
Since 2020, long term social distancing has been necessary
to manage COVID-19 and other variants of the original
outbreak. Scientists continue to work on a vaccine, claiming
a breakthrough is just around the corner. Despite early
optimism that warmer temperatures would slow the spread,
little (if any) seasonality emerged. Fortunately, the case
mortality rate of the disease has hovered between 1 and 2
percent. National policy responses now create predictable
rates of spread and timelines for herd immunity after the
outbreak of each new strain.
Figure 13 Russian Presidential Information Center.
The decade of social distancing measures has also taken a (Photo by Business Insider)
significant toll on the labor supply. Chronic illness, work
stoppages, and workplace closures have significantly decreased the reliability of human workers and
military personnel alike. Automated platforms—for everything from production, to shipping, to long
early warning systems, and even long-term military deployments—are increasingly the norm
(although some criticize an overreliance on automation, claiming this was done before certain
UNCLASSIFIED
technologies were reliable). Few if any major breakthroughs in artificial intelligence have taken place
in the last decade. However, the reliability of the human has diminished significantly making machine
learning platforms and heuristic targeting algorithms more acceptable.
Demographic retreat—shorter life spans and lower birth rates—has compensated significantly for the
disruptions in the food supply as well as well as once reliable supply chains. Drives to automation
have encouraged onsite production, increased amounts of industrial 3D printing, and efforts to extract
profit through reduced human labor and transportation costs.
Similarly, the United States military has significantly reduced its basing footprint around the
world. Major staffing shortages, fears of bringing infection home, and allies’ concerns of contagion
have accelerated the isolationist trends that began in the mid-2010s. NATO exists now in name only.
Many confidence building activities and joint operations have been re-tasked to virtual training
environments. Similarly, international organizations like the United Nations play an increasingly
diminished role and often suspend in-person meetings in favor of digital conferences. The world’s
normative legal order has morphed into a series of regional, rules-based systems.
Economic stagnation is also a new reality, endowing
military branches with the first pick of citizens that possess
the most important technical skills. However, with
weakened populations, less economic activity, and
crumbling infrastructure, fewer and fewer “breakthroughs”
are realized. This is a decade of improvement and
recovery rather than the once predicted era of
disruptive transformation.
The U.S. Air Force benefits significantly from the necessity
of a new offset strategy to limit the reliance on troop levels.
Less civilian air traffic and greater access to the skies is Figure 14 F-35 Lightning II. (Photo by Lockheed
limited by the proliferation of UAVs and long term, low-orbit Martin)
surveillance systems. The Air Force, having absorbed what remained of the Space Force after the
2025 budget freeze, is also providing significant power projection and deterrent missions as freedom
of navigation is strained under the pressure of diminished sea-based trade, fishing disputes, and
frequent travel bans.
UNCLASSIFIED
THE FUTURE OF COMPETITION IN SPACE

Kara Cunzeman, Lead Futurist, Center for Space Policy & Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation
OVERVIEW
Space is an increasingly indispensable domain that affects commerce, defense, and our everyday
lives. Pre-COVID-19, progress in the space enterprise was steadily advancing. Space internet and
remote sensing constellations continued to proliferate low-earth orbit (LEO). Venture capital and
private investments flowed into a diverse set of startups. The recent announcement of the Space
Force and associated organizational changes captures how the U.S. military is seeking to respond to
the transforming security environment. The Artemis Program was also advancing towards enabling
a human lunar landing in 2024—today, all of these activities now face major challenges.
Numerous conferences, business summits, and crucial decision-making milestones within the space
industry have been deferred or cancelled. Manufacturing for launch and satellite product lines and
associated supply chains has been significantly disrupted. Small businesses have also been
disproportionately affected; Bigelow Aerospace, for example, recently laid off its entire workforce,
claiming COVID-19 as the primary driver. OneWeb, a major leader in the competition for space-
based internet services, filed for bankruptcy. Boeing, a “too big to fail” anchor of the Aerospace
industry has asked for a multi-billion-dollar bailout.
When (and if) this situation dissipates, do we pick back
up where we left off, or will we be somewhere different?
Are there longer-term impacts or ripple effects that may
unexpectedly surface that could completely change the
known trajectories we have been on?
Our society is now reeling from the severe blow to the
economy—as such, space issues are not first on most
people’s minds today. However, the various domain-
focused insights within this body of work serve as
different lenses, providing deeper glimpses into how the
geopolitical environment could be influencing the United Figure 15 Chief of Space Operations Gen. John
Raymond testifying before the House Armed Services
States’ role in the world. Committee. (Photo by Wayne Clark, U.S. Air Force)
Space is a key pillar of our inquiry to understand what great power competition might look like in a
very uncertain future. Our foresight tools provide us with systematic and structured means for
exploring possible futures in order to make better decisions—even under great uncertainty. In this
section, we examine the space domain using the four futures foresight model: continuation,
discipline, collapse and transformation. These frames help us to envision external factors that we
believe the United States must consider if it desires to prevail in the competition for space post-
COVID-19.
UNCLASSIFIED
POTENTIAL FUTURE A.
Continuation: Business as Usual
Let us for a moment imagine that within the next few weeks
or months, the U.S. and global economies make a rapid
recovery and return to a status which was roughly in line
with the pre-COVID spread. The job market is recovering,
businesses begin recovering, and the months of lockdown
have been left behind. There will likely be some schedule
shifts to government and commercial space programs, but
nothing devastating to overall outcomes. Space will
continue to serve as one of many domains for which
geopolitical and transnational power plays will be made.
Even if the economy and general way of life return to Figure 16 Orbiting satellite and space vehicle. (Photo
“normal,” there are significant challenges that the U.S. will by Carlos Clarivan/Space Photo Library)
need to overcome in order to capitalize on recent space developments for its national benefit. The
problems of congestion in LEO, lack of international norms and behavior, heightened competition and
tensions between the United States, Russia, and China in space, and the still-fragile but budding
commercial space industry will continue to play out. Nonetheless, in this type of environment, the
United States will face roughly the same challenges and opportunities it faced prior to the pandemic.
POTENTIAL FUTURE B.
Discipline: Order and Control
The global economic downturn and restrictions on travel caused by COVID-19 causes a “cooling
period” between international competition, in which the primary focus of most nations shifts to the
health and wellbeing of its citizens and economic solvency. Overwhelmed by internal concerns, the
United States is unwilling to invest in next generation satellite architectures or ventures to the moon.
This might mean the space enterprise will have to figure out how to maximize the lifetime of its current
capabilities and delay its investments for future plans. However, quietly in parallel, peer competitors,
(China for instance) could leverage such a “cooling period” implemented by the U.S. to focus on
investing in key strategic areas for competitive gain.
When the global economy and global competition pick up, the U.S. is “shocked” at the new capabilities
of its competitors with which it now cannot compete. This moment could offer a unique time for subtle,
but meaningful shifts in strategic advantage that perhaps cannot be recovered.
POTENTIAL FUTURE C.
Collapse: Systemic Breakdown
The enduring impacts of the pandemic drive a global
and systemic economic meltdown, worse than what
was experienced in the 2008 financial crisis. As
countries try to jumpstart commerce, there are
recurring waves of the pandemic, which cripples the
medical system. Over 40% of the small businesses in
the space industry alone shut down. Boeing, among
several other heavy hitters of the aerospace industry,
require immense government bailouts. A culmination of
bailouts across industries sends the markets into a spin
as the debt reckoning of the U.S. starts to become Figure 17 Joint Space Operations Center. (Photo by US
clear. The global economy essentially comes to a Air Force)
grinding halt.
UNCLASSIFIED
In this meltdown, the United States realizes how vulnerable and weak its supply chain is, with the
Aerospace industry as no exception. Any commercial business able to continue its manufacturing is
increasingly crippled by the lack of supply and must think creatively about how to outsource—perhaps
by partnering with Mexico or Canada or vertically integrating their business. Many of the planned
activities and systems going up into Earth’s orbit, the moon, or beyond must be reconsidered. In the
2020 general election, the U.S. Space Force and ventures back to the moon become politicized. In
the following months, as the Pentagon begins a full rework of its entire budget, it decides to strip the
Space Force of its authorities and defunds it to account for other duties it must meet in these trying
times. Congress also demands the DoD to cut spending by 30%, focusing instead on domestic
economic growth and priorities. The U.S. decides not to pursue the lunar gateway and cuts NASA’s
budget by half. Space developments essentially move into an “ice age.”
POTENTIAL FUTURE D.
Transformation: High Tech and/or High Spirit Solutions
Promising a major economic recovery, the U.S. cultivates a targeted set of strategies to ensure that
the immense progress made in the commercial space industry over the past two decades is not in
vain. Washington is motivated by other peer competitors’ continue to investments in their own space
industries. Since the U.S. has recognized the importance of the space domain to its vitality on the
global stage, Washington prioritizes this effort even in the midst of economic uncertainty. Similarly,
the U.S. government recognizes the need to accelerate its own space programs so that it can
transform its capabilities in a fiscally constrained environment. In its approach, the U.S. government
decides to invest in a technology pipeline, agile contracting, and strengthening partnerships with the
commercial sector and international players.
This allows the U.S. to spread out responsibilities, alleviate weakness in supply chains, leverage
cutting-edge technologies, and strengthen gaps in areas that require international cooperation such
as debris mitigation, space traffic control, and norms of behavior.
The United States has successfully leveraged the space domain to elevate its strategic posture. In
the meantime, China and Russia must spend the next several years playing catch-up based on the
incredible progress the United States has made in transforming the space enterprise.
SUMMARY
The COVID-19 pandemic can serve as an incredible moment for the United States to reflect and
refocus its vision for the role that space serves in strengthening its strategic posture: where do we
want our efforts in space to be? What have we learned about the strengths and weaknesses of the
space enterprise (and the relative posture of our potential competitors) in this time of great change?
How do we proceed from here given the uncertainty, yet high stakes of possible futures? The space
industry needs to rethink itself. How is it going to spark innovative ways to continue our technology
pipelines and accelerate progress for both its near-Earth as well as human exploration programs,
which we have convinced ourselves are vital to U.S. leadership? If there are missteps along the rocky
budgetary environment, how does the U.S. ensure there won’t be devastating, and possible
irrecoverable setbacks for the space domain and its broader leadership posture?
UNCLASSIFIED
THE FUTURE OF COMPETITION AND AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

Maj Laura Hunstock, USAF, Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch, AFWIC
Lt. Gen. John Thompson, USAF, recently asked Elon

Musk at the February 2020 Air Force Association Air
Warfare Symposium about the future “revolution” in
aerial combat. Musk replied, “Locally autonomous
drone warfare is where it’s at, where the future will be.
It’s not that I want the future to be this, that’s just what
the future will be. The fighter jet era has passed. Yeah,
the fighter jet era has passed. It’s drones.” 3 In the face
of the COVID-19 crisis, the narrative surrounding
autonomous and unmanned systems has the potential Figure 18 Lt. Gen. John Thompson, commander
to change from one of skepticism and distrust to one of of the Space and Missile Systems Center, speaking
rapid adoption. with Elon Musk, CEO of SpaceX, at the Air Warfare
Symposium in February 2020. (Photo by Mike
Tsukamoto, Air Force Magazine)
OVERVIEW
In the face of the COVID-19 crisis, China is using drones and layered autonomous systems to
continue combating the outbreak as well as augment its domestic supply chain. Drones are sharing
information on loudspeakers, carrying signs with QR codes (for no-contact registration purposes),
spraying disinfectant, delivering packages, and taking people’s temperatures. 4 China is making use
of programmed robots for contactless delivery to aid supply chains while preventing a resurgence of
the outbreak. Chinese society seems comfortable with this level surveillance and monitoring in the
name of public health, and is demonstrating high trust levels in autonomous machines. While our
competitors seem to welcome the aid drones and autonomous systems can provide, the United
States domestic population is unlikely to follow suit.
U.S. citizens traditionally have a distrust of invasive governmental surveillance and a general
unwillingness to trade liberty for safety, but how might the current COVID-19 crisis change that? The
effects of the COVID-19 present an opportunity for a shift in accepting more surveillance and
automation in the name of public health, much like the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, did
for airport security procedures. What if these automated or autonomous systems can prevent the
next public health crisis? An ability to quickly reconstitute our societal norms and economic growth
after this crisis may validate an acceptance of more surveillance and trust in autonomous systems.
Historically, Americans have been slow to adopt technologies and advancements that replace human
control with machines. Hesitancy becomes unwillingness in the discussion of autonomous weapons
control. The anecdotal “Terminator Conundrum” or ethical concerns surrounding an independent
machine being able to decide who and when to kill is a common debate surrounding autonomous
weapons systems. Autonomous systems charged with responsibilities such as life and death need
both near perfect information and ethical sensibility, leading many to dismiss the possibility as science
fiction. 5
3
Valerie Insinna, SpaceX’s founder tells US Air Force the era of fighter jets is ending, (Defense News), 28 Feb 2020.
4
Peter Diamandis, Learning from China: 7 Hi-Tech Strategic for Pandemic Containment, (Diamandis Tech Blog), accessed 1
May 2020.
5
Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History, (Public Affairs: New York), 2017, Page 245.
UNCLASSIFIED
The U.S. Air Force took first steps in adopting the

use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) for counter-
insurgency operations such as counter-IED,
armed over watch of troops, and high value
individual (HVI) removal. However, RPA
operations still have a human control element in
every aspect of weapons employment. While
some automation protocols are in place, an RPA
pilot is still very much the pilot in command,
controlling aircraft maneuvers and weapons
employment.
Figure 19 The MQ-1B Predator (left) and MQ-9 Reaper (right) are
In essence, RPA pilots are no different than a
two examples of RPA systems. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st
Class Christian Clausen)
pilot in a manned system, with the exception that
they are not at risk if the aircraft were to crash. In order to maintain this human control element, RPA
operations require a large number of personnel to operate and are restricted to flying in special use
airspace (SUAS) locations within the U.S. without extensive coordination.
While the United States may be uncomfortable with autonomous systems releasing weapons on the
battlefield, peer competitors may adopt a more aggressive approach. The United States’ ability to
shape the norms and standards behind the adoption of autonomous systems will be important in
maintaining a competitive edge in this space.
International humanitarian law requires three core principles for conduct in war:
1. Distinction
2. Proportionality
3. Avoidance of unnecessary suffering
Future autonomous systems charged with employing weapons will need to be able to maintain these
principles.
While promise exists in new machine learning techniques (such as neural networks), these
technologies are far from mature enough to replace human judgement. Controlling the ethical
conversation surrounding autonomous weapons systems internationally will be critical to maintaining
U.S. leadership. As the international discussion evolves, internal policy issues of how the U.S. would
mature and adopt autonomous systems domestically brings to light interesting conflicts.
UNCLASSIFIED
The U.S. Department of Transportation, charged with oversight of the United States’ autonomous
vehicles policies, released updated guidance under “Preparing for the Transportation of the Future”
on January 8, 2020. The number one automation principle called out in the document is “Prioritizing
Safety,” reflecting an inherent distrust of autonomous systems. When defining levels of autonomy,
the document calls out six levels (zero through five) of automation with the highest level still optionally
controlled by a human (see Figure 20 below). 6
Figure 20 SAE International Automation Levels outlined in "Preparing for the Future of Transportation." (Photo from the U.S. Department
of Transportation, January 2020)
As regulations currently stand, commercial use of unmanned flying capabilities are limited in use
partly due to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) restrictions of when and where they can fly.
Unmanned aircraft are viewed as less trustworthy and policy limits them from flying in shared airspace
with manned aircraft. Autonomous cars and drone operations stand to be valuable in solving “last
mile” issues associated with the growing e-commerce market as well as helping alleviate critical
supply chain concerns in times of a public health crisis. However, Americans’ reticence to accept any
machine errors may greatly slow progression in this arena.
Cyber security measures will be a critical enabler of autonomous and unmanned systems for both
military and commercial use. Overcoming resistance to the use of autonomous systems will require
developers to invest heavily in ensuring their systems cannot be hacked or disrupted. Not only will
trust in stand-alone systems be necessary, but also in how such systems will function in the layered
and networked field of autonomy. Thus, any viable way ahead requires a delicate balance between
transparency and protections against outside nefarious interference. In the wake of the COVID-19
pandemic, the employment of autonomous and unmanned systems to mitigate and control health
crises will receive increased attention. Additionally, drones and autonomous vehicles stand to change
the nature and characteristics of employing airpower as the Air Force builds an operations paradigm
of multi-domain Airmen.
6
U.S. Department of Transportation, Preparing for the Future of Transportation: Automated Vehicles 3.0, (U.S. Department of
Transportation), 28 September 2018.
UNCLASSIFIED
POTENTIAL FUTURE A.
U.S. and global economies recover rapidly from the effects of COVID-19. The DOD is able to return
to pre-COVID readiness levels and the defense industrial base bounces back to pre-pandemic norms.
But even if such a future materializes tomorrow, any “bounce back” will take time.
The DOD will likely enter at least a temporary era of budget austerity and hard choices about future
platforms and technologies must be made. This is decidedly not a new problem. The DOD has
acknowledged that it cannot place all capability in high end exquisite systems. As such, any shift that
accelerates autonomous and unmanned technology developments must also reflect the policy
challenges of operating autonomous systems domestically and in military operations. But in the short
term, such a shift does not replace the role of the manned fighter. Funding for autonomous efforts
may be cut in favor of sustaining/reviving existing programs such as the F-35 and next generation
bomber.
POTENTIAL FUTURE B.
The global economic downturn and restrictions on travel caused by COVID-19 results in a shift in
priorities of most nations shifts toward domestic medical and economic concerns. This future
inevitably takes the prioritization and funding away from some defense initiatives, however the
development of autonomous and unmanned systems stands to make great progress as a means to
health monitoring and “last mile” domestic transportation issues. The DOD benefits from private
industry efforts to develop and perfect such technologies, adopting them as off the shelf solutions.
POTENTIAL FUTURE C.
In this future, the effects of the pandemic drive global and systemic economic halt. As countries try
to reopen their economies, they incur new spikes in both virus spread and deaths, overwhelming
medical systems. This continues for some time without any medical breakthroughs in preventative
vaccinations and screening/testing efforts. The defense industrial base is unlikely to survive an
economic failure of this magnitude and massive government bailouts needed for its survival will be
unavailable.
In this bleak version of events, the DOD will face a near dismantling of the defense industrial base
that will cripple technological advancements. Autonomous and unmanned technologies may still be
explored, however, breakthroughs will be greatly limited. Research and initiatives for these
technologies will likely be focused on medical and health applications.
POTENTIAL FUTURE D.
In an effort to combat the next global pandemic, the use of drones and autonomous systems to
contain outbreaks and solve supply chain issues will accelerate their development and mainstream
adoption. Regulation and policy considerations for the adoption of autonomous and unmanned
surveillance, transportation, and even weapons employment on the battlefield will likely be areas of
rapid change and great debate. With this coming acceleration in technology, setting international
norms and standards while leading the way in robust cyber security and protection for these systems
is critical. The United States’ ability to effectively shape these conversations and policy decisions will
translate into competitive advantage on the world stage.
UNCLASSIFIED
THE FUTURE NEXUS OF SUPPLY CHAINS AND

NATIONAL SECURITY
Jason Schenker, Chairman, The Futurist Institute
OVERVIEW
The COVID-19 pandemic has opened the aperture in many ways, revealing open secrets and
overlooked risks—for our society, our economy, and our security. For national security, the
COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the importance of being vigilant with our borders. And it
highlights the risks of overly thin supply chains, as well as the potential downside of being
dependent on the global supply chain for critical goods, like medical supplies, medical
devices, basic necessities, and personal protective equipment (PPE), including gloves and
masks.
SUPPLY CHAIN AS NATIONAL SECURITY RISK

Overly thin levels of inventory as well as long supply
chains present risks to national security in the United
States. Most corporate entities have run their supply
chain inventories exceptionally low. This thin level of
supply produces risks, as does the geographic distance
between trade partners, which introduces a lag time
between which goods can be ordered and received.
As we have seen, this has been critical for medical
devices and PPE. Trade risks were already a national Figure 21 Financial Markets Graph. (Photo from
security issue related to metals for materiel in the United Osborne Clark)
States, which was the critical driving factor behind the
implementation of the U.S. Section 232 tariffs on aluminum and steel. Additionally, the Section 301
tariffs highlighted risks to U.S. national security from Chinese threats to U.S. intellectual property.
Due to the crisis of COVID-19, PPE and medical devices are on the hot list, too. As a result, the U.S.-
China trade war is likely to heat up from current levels, because risks that were previously considered
somewhat fringe are now likely to be accepted as national security risks on a bi-partisan basis. In
other words, both Democrats and Republicans may now come to see having critical goods, including
metals for materiel, PPE for healthcare, foodstuffs, and paper products as important for maintaining
civil order. In some respects, maintaining a secure supply chain is inherently difficult when the goods
come from a country that is too far away for the goods to arrive quickly.
That realization is now going to receive more airtime—more talking space and room for discourse.
So, we may very well see in the near term that both Democrats and Republicans will trip over
themselves in order to support the idea of securing supply chains for critical medical devices, PPE
equipment, foodstuffs, paper products, and pharmaceuticals to prevent the loss of American lives in
the future—and to minimize the potential disruption or devastation of the American economy in the
event of another pandemic.
After all, one of the big reasons we need to slow the spread of COVID-19 in the United States and
“flatten the curve” is because there are not enough doctors, nurses, hospitals, ventilators, gloves,
masks, or other equipment. If we could at least get the equipment piece under control, we may better
protect the economy and the American people in the future.
UNCLASSIFIED
RISK OF EXPLOITATION
The COVID-19 outbreak has also revealed that the United States can be exploited in a pandemic-
type event. Furthermore, if the United States could have been solely targeted it would have
significantly threatened national security. Alternatively, if the United States could have been deceived
into believing that flattening the curve could be beneficial—even when it was not—that, too, could
have presented a risk.
This experience also reveals the vulnerability of the American public to media and social media
messaging and potential manipulation around topics that may or may not be valid. These are risks
presented by psychological operations and subjectivist truth.
In short, the United States from a national security perspective may very well wish to more firmly
shore up technology, healthcare, medical, food, consumables, and other supply chains in order to
ensure maximum stability over time. Additionally, COVID-19 has inadvertently revealed that a
pandemic-level bio attack on the United States could be beyond economically devastating.
If adversaries of the United States were to implement such an attack, they could pair such action with
social media and traditional media disinformation for maximum disruption, political destabilization,
and economic devastation in a way that could completely destabilize the United States as an entity
for at least a brief period of time.
These kinds of risks may sound extreme. But we have also
seen foodstuffs run low. And we have seen the American
populace have to quarantine at home.
On the policy side, the Fed is massively expanding its
balance sheet by potentially adding $4 trillion. Fiscal policy
stimulus in the Coronavirus Air, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act involved a $2.3 trillion package.
These policy actions alone underscore the real costs of
being unprepared.
Figure 22 House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, House
If we were to consider the cost of having just produced
Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, left, and House
more ventilators, masks, and gloves—and if we had simply
Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, right, signing the CARES
Act in March 2020. (Associated Press / Andrew Harnik)
educated more doctors and nurses, those costs would
have likely been infinitesimal compared to the potentially $6 trillion-plus in policy support taken in
order to prevent a collapse of the entire U.S. economy.
“NOISE” FRAMEWORK
When I considered the importance of the COVID-19 pandemic for national security, I created what I
call the NOISE framework, which examines some of the most important factors that contribute to
national security and political stability.
Here is the NOISE framework, and the five critical factors that contribute to national security and
political stability:
Necessities Food, water, power, shelter, safety

Occupations Jobs, vocations, hobbies
Information Access to accurate, complete information
Systems Financial, healthcare, transportation, education
External International relations, military, supply chain, trade
UNCLASSIFIED
As you can see, first come the necessities, which I have included as food, water, shelter, and
safety. If people do not have these, then there are easily risks of political instability.
If these factors are stable, then a country or economy is likely to remain on an even keep. In the most
recent experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about safety and food emerged. Maintaining
the U.S. supply chain and basic services as well as utilities (like power and water) is critical.
Second are occupations. These stem from the notion that people — at the population level — need
things to do. Can people be retired and do essentially nothing? Yes, of course. But as a nation,
people need jobs, vocations, and hobbies. They just need to be doing something.
The need for this stabilizing force is tied to the old notion that “idle hands are the devil’s workshop.”
This became a critical issue during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, as people were forced to
“shelter in place.” Some people could still work, but others were concerned about their jobs. This is
why the CARES Act was so important. Even if people cannot work, they need to know their chance
of still having jobs will remain high after the pandemic ends.
The third element of stability is information. Information is not opinion. Real information is critical
for maintaining order and keeping people calm and aligned with the same interests. Under
information, I have included sharing accurate and complete information. The risks here are
misinformation, disinformation, opinion presented as fact, and subjectivist truth, when the truth is, in
fact, objective.
Fourth are systems. National security depends on the proper functioning of a number of critical
systems, including the financial system, the healthcare system, the transportation system, and the
education system. All of these have been disrupted or are at risk of being disrupted by the COVID-
19 pandemic.
The fifth element of national security stability is the external. This includes international
relations, the existence and ability to deploy the military, the global supply chain, and trade.
Fortunately, some of these core elements, like international relations and the military, have not yet
been disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. But the global supply chain and trade have.
When considering the NOISE framework, it’s easy to see how the COVID-19 pandemic has actually
threatened all of these different pillars of national security and political stability in one way or another.
And these risks justify the Fed’s drastic action to support the credit markets, the federal government
passage of the $2.3 trillion CARES Act to preserve jobs, the daily briefings about COVID-19 directly
from White House staff and administration leaders to share information, and why some supply chain
regulations and laws may change in the future — especially with regard to medical devices, medical
equipment, medications, and PPE equipment.
The COVID-19 pandemic threatened to push U.S. national security to the brink. But we have held
the line so far because of significant and swift action from a wide swatch of vested parties. This will
not be the last time such a risk appears. Thus, shoring up risks in advance could prove critical;
especially because the next incidence might not be an accident.
The following four potential scenarios highlight how national security supply chains may be affected
by future international relations between China and the United States—and create ripple effects in
global supply chains post-COVID-19:
POTENTIAL FUTURE A.
The Hollywood Ending
The international competition between the United States and China becomes deprioritized. The
competition between the United States and China gives way to international peace and
UNCLASSIFIED
collaboration on multiple levels, including scientific research, supply chains, and vaccine
development. All concerns fade about initial COVID-19 data transparency, long-term international
competition, and the Chinese push toward economic, political, and military hegemony over Asia.
This would represent a truly transformational type outcome, given decades-long trends in place and
elevated concerns in the COVID-19 pandemic era.
POTENTIAL FUTURE B.
Trade War Détente
The hopes for an end to the U.S.-China trade war that were high at the end of 2019 are revived in
the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some trade restrictions remain in place, but some are dialed
back. If there are additional future trade restrictions, these may be quite limited. The sense of
economic symbiosis increases, as opposed to a sense of economic competition. This is a
challenging dynamic, as it necessitates an important precondition of reduced competing
counterparty rhetoric. This scenario also requires a reduction of national security concerns about
forced technology transfers, supply chain security, and a propensity for military conflict and
influence in the South China Sea.
POTENTIAL FUTURE C.
The Best of Frenemies
The competition between the United States and China ramps up over a period of quarters or years.
The U.S.-China trade war enters an accelerated phase, in which trade restrictions imposed by the
Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs are augmented by additional tariffs on medical devices and
materials. Competition also manifests itself in additional supply chain restrictions, prioritizing U.S.
consumption of goods from the United States and the NAFTA/USMCA region. Manufacturing
increases as a percent of the U.S. economy. Some technology companies as well as other priority
firms are forced to implement bifurcated supply chains to serve both the United States and China.
Relations between Washington and Beijing are take on an uneasy “frenemy dynamic,” punctuated
by alternating moments of symbiosis and elevated competition.
POTENTIAL FUTURE D.
Destined for Proxy War?
The fallout from COVID-19 leads to an almost immediate direct conflict between the United States
and China. A Congressional inquiry into COVID-19 data sharing as well as exposed medical device
supply chains leads to significant trade restrictions and geopolitical backlash against China.
Supranational organizations like NATO and the United Nations are pulled into the conflict. Feeling
threatened, the Chinese government ramps up its ground game in countries suffering from COVID-
19 to shore up support for its strategic objectives. As Chinese disinformation campaigns, soft policy
diplomacy, and directed influence funding accelerate, proxy wars become almost inevitable.
MANUFACTURING COMPANIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY

In addition to broad-based national security risks that have been revealed by the COVID-19
pandemic, there are also risks associated with disruption to national security vendors.
Some companies that produce goods for national security uses (i.e. airplane manufacturers and
airplane parts manufacturers) could find themselves suffering from challenging economic and
business conditions as part of the slowdown in air travel.
While this is a second-order impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is a critical issue of primary
importance for national security entities. Looking ahead, national security organizations will need
to more aggressively monitor economic and business risks of critical vendors. This is just as
UNCLASSIFIED
true for large publicly traded vendors as it is for startups that provide essential materiel to the defense
industry.
How the government addresses these risks in the future is up for debate and unclear, but one thing
seems certain: even if these kind of national security vendors may not be too big to fail, they may be
too important to fail.
UNCLASSIFIED
THE FUTURE OF MALIGN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS

Vera Zakem, Senior Technology and Policy Advisor, Technology for Global Security
OVERVIEW
In the last twenty years, state and non-state actors have expanded the use of malign influence to sow
distrust in democratic societies and emerging economies:
1. From the early beginnings of the Global War on Terror where the focus was (and continues
to be) in countering terrorist propaganda on and offline;
2. Russia waging a multi-faceted disinformation and malign influence campaign in targeted parts
of the world;
3. China spreading state propaganda to push targeted narratives both to its population and
globally in order to shape geo-strategic competition;
4. Individuals, including fringe elements of society such as white supremacists, spreading
conspiracy theories in order to incite hate and violence.
Our adversaries’ use of malign influence tactics are
not new. However, in the COVID-19 era, we are
seeing a convergence of these actors propagating to
such an extreme. Everyday citizens don’t know where
to turn to for reliable and credible information. While
no one can predict the future, in a post-COVID world,
we will likely both state and non-state actors continue
to exploit vulnerabilities in our society and weakened
institutions, potentially working together as part of
more coordinated influence campaigns. The
disinformation and influence campaigns may occur Figure 23 Disinformation and Propaganda Keyboard
online (mainstream and social media) and proliferate Graphic. (Photo by Observer Research Foundation)
offline to the physical world, with the potential to cause real world harm, abuse, violence, and further
divide fractured societies.
In this “infodemic” campaign 7, (labeled by the World Health Organization), state actors such as
Russia, China, and others will continue to exploit our vulnerabilities and divide democratic societies.
The goal here is to play a “spoiler role,” by using information (as well as political, economic, and
military tools) in order to discredit Western institutions and strategically project and alter elements of
regional and global power balances. In the wake of the global pandemic, Russia will continue to not
only push conspiracies about the origins of the virus, its causes, and treatments, but will amplify
false narratives about the virus, societal and political divisions that originate in America. We will
continue to see Russia use all elements of its malign influence8 tool kit to influence targeted
populations, including the use of state media, online fake personals, cultural, historical, business,
and political channels. Key to Russia’s strategy has been and will likely continue to be adapting and
adjusting its tactics to see what resonates with vulnerable populations and societies.
China, Iran, terror groups, and fringe elements of our society will continue to use the instability and
paralysis caused by the virus to impact geopolitical competition in a post-COVID world for years to
come. In the near to mid-term, we will see China use tactics from Russia’s playbook by spreading
7 John Zarocostas, How to Fight an Infodemic, Volume 395, Number 10225, Page 676, The Lancet, 29 February 2020.
8
Vera Zakem, Paul Saunders, Umida Hashimova, & P. Kathleen Hammerberg, Mapping Russian Media Network: Media’s Role in
Russian Foreign Policy and Decision-making, CNA, January 2018.
UNCLASSIFIED
conspiracy theories about COVID and internal societal divisions in order to sow fear and distrust in
democratic societies. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs), domestic extremists, and global
terrorist movements will likely leverage the instability of COVID-19 to their advantage. We have
already seen white supremacists in the U.S. spread disinformation, recruit followers, and try to foment
a war against minorities. We may see ISIS and other transnational terrorist organizations pushing
disinformation to shape their strategic messaging at the local and regional levels.
Disinformation and misinformation narratives are (and will likely be) effective in shaping the post-
COVID-19 geopolitical competition, primarily because they exploit fundamental weaknesses in our
democratic institutions. In the chaotic COVID-19 era, we will likely see a further weakening of these
institutions. Here, we should include corrupt, partisan, and opaque media institutions; economic
instability marked by a rise in unemployment, weak markets, and poor business performance; and
widespread corruption across media, political, and business sectors. The pandemic creates fertile
ground for both state and non-state actors to strategize, organize, and carry out their influence
campaigns.
LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE

As we look into a post-COVID-19 world, a few key events stand out:
First, the upcoming U.S. election will be a ripe ground for both disinformation and
misinformation campaigns. Of note, we are likely to see combined malign influence campaigns
from state actors and non-state actors alike around COVID and broader issues that we typically see
during an election season. This may include falsehoods about the economy, foreign policy, and
science. In addition, the United States Government (USG) and industry will need to be alert for any
adversarial cyber operations on our election systems,
and disinformation about voting procedures. How the
U.S. election plays out will likely shape global elections
in critical parts of the world. Adversaries will likely take
note and adapt their tactics in order to incorporate
COVID-19 disinformation into their broader influence
campaigns.
Second, we are likely going to see an increase in the
infodemic in 2021, particularly if we see a second or
third wave of the virus, and if full treatment is not
available yet. The disinformation will likely proliferate
about the virus itself, the economy, and our security. We Figure 24 Digital Disinformation. (Photo by AP)
may see a situation where our adversaries will adapt their tactics from what has worked/not worked
in 2020, and employ other approaches. For example, rather than simply create content or amplify, a
probability exists that adversaries may team up in order to wage a broader malign influence campaign
on targeted populations.
Additionally, we cannot talk about the future without giving consideration about the role
technology will play in aiding and countering disinformation and misinformation campaigns.
For example, while social media platforms have been the place where state and non-state actors go
to push their narratives, they have developed strict policies and enforcement procedures to identify,
review, and take down accounts that spread disinformation, abuse, and real-world harm.
Furthermore, social media platforms are erring on the side of transparency to alert customers and
users about what they are seeing and the actions they are taking. That said, adversaries may exploit
technologies that have vulnerabilities and weaknesses in their design to further spread disinformation.
Finally, in the post-COVID-19 world, we are likely going to see technologies developed that aim to
counter infodemic, and assist both platforms and governments in countering adversarial malign
influence campaigns.
UNCLASSIFIED
KEY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND DOD

The U.S. Air Force and DOD as institutions should consider the following regarding the future of
disinformation campaigns in a post-COVID world:
 Geopolitical competition and disinformation is no longer limited exclusively to Russia, China,
Iran, or the VEOs. Rather, we are more likely to see a congruence of these actors either
jointly or independently waging simultaneous, multi-faceted influence campaigns on
targeted populations at a global scale. These campaigns will continue to target all facets
of our society. This will be compounded by the use of offensive cyber operations on targeted
populations.
 Addressing vulnerabilities and “root cause” issues in societies will continue to be crucial.
Through joint special operations, civil affairs, partner training, and working with USG
interagency partners, DOD and USAF will need to focus on stabilizing the operating
environment and strengthening weakened institutions, so that adversaries may be less
successful in their ability to wage influence campaigns.
 DOD and the USAF will need to form partnerships with the technology sector, including
startups developing emerging technologies to identify, disrupt, fact check, and verify
disinformation patterns, and social media platforms. The emergence of new technology
to counter the complexities of malign influence campaigns will flourish. Identifying and
partnering with the requisite entities will help USAF and DOD achieve their objectives of
defeating adversarial malign influence campaigns in a post-COVID-19 world.
Malign influence campaigns by diverse actors are a reality that is here to stay. Developing a strategy,
implementation, and assessment of USAF and DOD efforts will be key to successfully countering
disinformation campaigns and shaping the geopolitical competition in a post-COVID world.
UNCLASSIFIED
THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE

Shannon McGurk, Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch, AFWIC
OVERVIEW
The PRC’s initial goals for the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) were to use state-owned enterprises
with strong links to the People’s Liberation Army to:
1) boost PRC domestic growth; 2) solve internal
demographic problems; and 3) realize the PRC’s
strategy for dominating global economic-security
diplomacy.
The global pandemic has accelerated the export of
China’s worst characteristics, while prompting delays
and disruptions to BRI construction and investment Figure 25 Coronavirus forces Chinese President Xi Jinping
plans. These delays risk years of planning and to don face mask in public. (Photo by 7News.com.au)
hundreds of billions of dollars in PRC economic
diplomacy. Quarantine measures are keeping PRC workers from foreign building sites. PRC and
target country firms supplying BRI projects face acute labor shortages and fears are growing that
Chinese workers will inadvertently spread the virus to new locales. The outbreak of COVID-19 in
Wuhan and its rapid global spread presents China with a series of dilemmas in advancing the
BRI.
THE BRI AND COVID-19

The BRI is the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) international, transcontinental, multi-domain
strategic infrastructure construction project. It includes at least 68 countries with an announced
investment by participants as high as $8 trillion across Europe, Africa and Asia. While originally
envisioned in 2013 to be limited to 60 countries, the CCP has expanded BRI—at the time of this
writing, Italy was announced as the 130th participant country.
The BRI has become an infrastructure financing initiative for a large part of the global economy that
will also serve key economic, foreign policy and security objectives for the Chinese government.
While launched as an infrastructure project, it is now a strategic foreign policy initiative that
showcases China’s alternative vision of global economic and political order with concentric rings
of public and private international stakeholders.
Today, BRI progress is slowing as participants confront COVID-19 and the reality of indebtedness
to the PRC. BRI infrastructure contracts had been awarded almost exclusively to Chinese State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) with strong ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), employed PRC
labor and supplies, and relied on cheap credit from Chinese, state-owned banks to tie participant
countries’ resources and economies back to China.
While it is easy now to infer that PRC divestment in BRI is due to COVID-19 (reports from Beijing
indicated that funding for BRI projects dropped in early 2020 by 80 percent) some of these cuts were
already underway before the pandemic.
UNCLASSIFIED
THE URBANIZATION DILEMMA

The PRC has almost 20 percent of the
world’s population, but only seven percent
of the earth’s water (and nearly 25% of
China’s water is polluted). Chinese
agriculture has not modernized to any
great degree; in fact, China is perhaps
more strategically dependent on imported
food than any great power since Ancient
Rome. Figure 26 Urbanization Dynamics in China. (Photo by Yale Insights)
Growing urbanization has exacerbated the food and water shortages, as urban populations use far
more water than rural societies. Urbanization also creates a demand for more water-intensive food
(such as pork and beef), especially as city-dwellers become more prosperous. China’s urbanization
rate continues to increase: by the end of 2017, some 58.52 percent of its population was urbanized,
compared with only 17.92 percent in 1978.
To combat these critical problems, the PRC needs a profitable strategic outreach project that gives it
access to resources, investment and economies receptive to its exports, chief among which are its
people—the BRI serves to address the aforementioned policy goals.
THE BRI AND A POST-COVID WORLD:

HARSH REALITIES, POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES?
 China’s management of the pandemic is
revealing an urgent need to manipulate
It must have been clear to the CCP
narratives and contort the truth. Some critics
for some time that the BRI is in
suggest the CCP may have launched trouble. In October 2019, the South
COVID-19 to attack the U.S. economy. China Morning Post reported that the
 All BRI participant nations represent sources “total value of new projects across 61
of disruption to China. Falling oil prices, countries fell 13 percent to $126
billion in 2018. Investments fell a
combined with spiraling demographic trends, further 6.7 percent by August 2019.”
run the risk of collapsing the Chinese
economy and straining the CCP’s legitimacy
to the breaking point.
 Chinese health-related initiatives will come under more international scrutiny. Digital Silk
Road efforts will be held to global legal standards, transparency and technical scrutiny. While
greater scrutiny may ultimately strengthen PRC standards and performance, this may come
at a cost that could strain CCP legitimacy.
POTENTIAL FUTURE A.
Continuation: China Plays Not to Lose
China continues BRI economic policy at its most fundamental level, increasing participant nation debt
dependency and using BRI trade relationships to justify infrastructure development that
accommodates PLA deployments. However, the scrutiny of the post-COVID19 world means the
CCP, used to controlling almost every aspect of its initiatives, loses control of the broader BRI
narrative. Loss of control at the speed of effective strategy is not something the CCP is prepared to
weather.
UNCLASSIFIED
POTENTIAL FUTURE B.
Discipline: China Plays to Win
China rebounds from COVID-19, consolidating gains and accelerating the BRI on its pre-COVID-19
trajectory. PLA expeditionary forces deploy along the BRI network. Participant BRI countries with
lower financial reserves and fewer options are hardest hit, leading to BRI governments across the
spectrum tightening control of their respective populations. In this scenario, COVID-19 may serve as
a trigger event for a global financial re-set.
POTENTIAL FUTURE C.
Systemic Collapse: China, Asia or the World?
Demand for international transparency in a post-COVID-19 BRI world becomes a cascade to Beijing.
The CCP is overwhelmed by a loss of information control, decrease in direct influence over BRI
member nations, and the demand signal for openness. China attempts to fulfill higher manufacturing
quality expectations associated with new norms in global trade. European countries lower
protectionist barriers in response to trade competition. In order to compete, Chinese companies must
make higher quality investments in better European companies. The CCP tries to exert greater
influence on these transactions with increasingly less success.
China begins to look outward in order to export its domestic problems. Having already neutralized
resistance in Hong Kong, Taiwan is the first external actor to feel threats to its stability. Exploiting
COVID-19 uncertainty, China attempts to take control of Taiwan using Chinese civilians and civilian
maritime vessels. Advances in algorithmic warfare enable China to employ digital twins of U.S. forces,
equipment and leadership in a disinformation campaign against Taiwan. At the same time, wary of
North Korea’s nuclear capability, China feels compelled to intervene militarily and stabilize the
country.
POTENTIAL FUTURE D.
Transformation: Fierce Competition with Clearer Eyes
Driven to cooperate as well as compete, the CCP scales back global investment, increases the
leverage its banks exert on BRI participant countries, and exploits emerging technologies deployed
in the developing world to mature trade opportunities and BRI interdependence. The CCP sees the
U.S. as an existential threat to manage, but also as a means of political and economic exploitation to
ensure CCP survival. This continues the dangerous dynamic currently in place in which the CCP
simultaneously hates, fears, but also needs the United States. The U.S. slowly rebounds from
COVID-19 and repatriates critical domestic manufacturing. PRC exports decrease from 15% to as
little as 5% of its economy, driving Beijing to access currency reserves and scale back BRI
adventurism. Washington encourages building a mutually respectful and beneficial long-term bi-
lateral relationship, maximizes use of the BRI so both sides win based on realistic expectations,
competition, and cooperation in an agreed upon framework.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
COVID-19 reveals the harsh reality that China launched the BRI to address existential domestic
needs, which, if unaddressed, may contribute to a collapse of the CCP’s leadership. BRI
regression will present renewed opportunities for cooperation with the US as well as further friction
points for competition. This is particularly critical in terms of which strategic narrative—
Washington’s or Beijing’s—is embraced by global opinion post COVID-19.
UNCLASSIFIED
THE FUTURE OF GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION

IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Dr. Marwa Maziad, Visiting Scholar, Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington
OVERVIEW
New fault lines are emerging in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) that reflect a multi-faceted,
regional power competition. Two emerging alliance
networks underscore this new rivalry: 1) The Turkey—
Qatar pan-Islamist alliance; and 2) the Egypt, United
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, statist-
militarized-secularizing pact (also known as the Arab
Quartet). Figure 27 Renewed military competition in the
Middle East. (Photo by Rivista di studi geopolitci)
REGIONAL POWER COMPETITION
 The Turkey—Qatar alliance seeks a regionally hegemonic pan-Islamist project. Relying
on the transnational movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, (and other militant, non-state
actors) the alliance has commissioned mercenary jihadists in Syria, Libya, the Horn of Africa
and the Sahel region of West Africa to topple governments and replace them with Islamist
supporters.
 The Arab Quartet was formed in 2017, as Egypt, the
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain The COVID-19 pandemic has seen
boycotted Qatar, accusing Doha of funding regional the most devastating effects in
Iran, Turkey, and Qatar, where the
terrorism. At its core, the Arab Quartet is advancing
highest levels of contagion are
a statist, militarized, secular, and defensive
recorded.
alternative to the expansionist, ideational projects
emanating from both Turkey and Iran.
 Turkey’s aggressive and reckless foreign policy is pushing a number of broader regional
players toward closer cooperation. Today, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain are
increasingly converging on shared interests with Israel, as well as other southern
Mediterranean, southern European states such as Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and France.
SOURCES OF FUTURE DISRUPTION

A myriad of factors will define the future of geopolitical competition in a post-COVID-19 Middle East.
As we examine today’s emerging regional trends and weak signals, it is imperative to explore sources
of potential disruption that may accelerate or decelerate situational dynamics; for example:
 What might the major shifts in oil markets do to alliances, dynamics, economic outlooks and
competition?
 Is there a real danger that rival, ideational competition in the Middle East will intensify post-
COVID?
 What is the future of the Iranian regime amid various scenarios of regional competition?
 What economic roles might Middle East militaries continue to play in one of the alternative
scenarios?
 How does US/Chinese/Russian/EU engagement in the region contribute to regional
competition?
UNCLASSIFIED
POTENTIAL FUTURE A.
Continuity post-COVID-19 means that geopolitical fault lines look very similar to today. The Turkey-
Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood alliance continues; Ankara and Doha continue to prop up Sunni, Islamist
governments throughout the region. Iran continues its own violent exporting of the Shia Islamic
Revolution, matching Turkey’s, Pan-Islamic, Neo-Ottoman initiatives.
Turkey, however, sees an archenemy in Egypt’s statist, militaristic, and secularizing trends. Qatar
also continues its competition with the UAE. Proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia plague the
region with bloody, violent struggles. Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, however, deepen their
security arrangements with Israel. The reverberations of such alliances are felt throughout the region,
particularly in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and North Africa. In Tunisia, for example, Ennahda Islamists
remain active and in the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia, Al-Shabab militants receive support from
Turkey. Israel and Egypt maintain their mutual understanding and avoid antagonizing each other.
Oil prices’ nosedive is short-lived and does not cripple the Arab Quartet members. Saudi Arabia’s
$320 billion sovereign wealth fund leverages quick trade wins in global markets hit by the pandemic.
The Arab Gulf States’ also rely on their $2 trillion of combined sovereign wealth funds to keep their
economies solvent. Additionally, Saudi Arabia doubles down on further social liberalization as it has
ceased exporting its extremist, Wahhabi doctrines of earlier decades. States like Egypt and Israel—
used to operating in “crisis mode” and adept in employing their militaries to augment logistics,
distribution, and supply chains—are better positioned than other regional powers in dealing with
COVID-19.
POTENTIAL FUTURE B.
Expansionist schemes (primarily Turkish and Iranian)
are considerably hindered and countries in the region
retreat further into their own borders. Restrictions on
immigration and travel are imposed, reflecting a stricter
movement of people and goods within the region.
Immediate effects are seen as Egyptian workers in the
Gulf (a source of much foreign currency remittances)
return home, presenting an economic challenge for
Cairo. State-led economic interventions, however, with
the goal of economic self-sufficiency, become
Figure 28 An Egyptian solider stands guard near the
exceedingly necessary. The resiliency of national Suez Canal. (Photo by Amr Nabil/AP)
centralized supply chains becomes favored over the
efficiency of globalized ones.
Militaries that boast their own industry/business networks (such as those of Egypt) emerge as critical
enablers, emphasizing their role in augmenting civilian supply chains. Thus, in the Middle East, a
military-dominated economic infrastructure becomes necessary for societal survival during
extended periods of economic self-isolation.
Iran finds itself far less capable of supporting its militant elements throughout the region, including
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or Shia militants in Iraq.
Across the region, states employ increasingly pervasive surveillance solutions, leveraging machine
learning and AI applications to monitor their populations’ health data. Here, Israel leverages
controversial tech tools originally designed for tracking terror groups. Additionally, economic migrants
attempting to cross the Mediterranean into Europe are considerably hindered. Tight border controls
UNCLASSIFIED
and maritime cooperation between Egypt, France, Greece, and Italy stand in sharp contrast to
Turkey’s weaponization of Syrian refugees as a hybrid threat to the European Union.
POTENTIAL FUTURE C.
Regimes in Turkey and Iran have run their course and collapse during a critical juncture around the
2023-2024 timeframe. (This year marks the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish
Republic under secularist Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. It also signifies the end of the Ottoman Sultanate
and Islamic Caliphate that had once ruled over the vast lands of the Middle East). Political Islamists
are no longer perceived as the only “democratic representatives” of Muslim-majority polities. The
distinction between Muslims (whether pious, religious or not) and Islamists (who have a hegemonic
political project) is made less opaque within regional society. The Muslim Brotherhood is now in
tatters—its militant surrogates in the region struggle to find adherents to an Islamist ideology that no
longer offers a viable future. Libya is not Islamized under Turkey’s wings.
Turkey and Iran make difficult transitions—in the case
of Turkey, to a revived secular republic; in Iran,
towards a new state seeking to re-connect with its
historical, Persian roots. Both the new Turkey and new
Iran establish closer ties with Egypt and converge on
an ancient civilizational narrative that highlights
renewed regional relationships.
Turkey and Iran also become much closer to Saudi
Arabia, absent the previous competition over regional
hegemony and the monopoly of Islamic religious
authority. Hence, the collapse of pan-Islamist agendas
leads to a breakdown of the old status quo. Qatar Figure 29 Protestors at Iran’s Azadi Tower. (Photo by
Hamed Saber)
jumps ship from its previous alliance with Turkey—
Doha now realizes it can no longer shoulder the immense financial burden and failure of the alliance
project itself.
POTENTIAL FUTURE D.
The Middle East regional order begins to look like post-WWII Europe. Warring parties resolve long-
standing conflicts and respect each other’s borders. While economic integration and a shared
currency eludes the region, the renouncement of expansionism brings a greater focus on domestic
issues. Transcending previous ideological impasses allows for greater investment in education and
healthcare. Middle Eastern countries see a resurgence in national entrepreneurship, technological
innovations, and scientific discoveries.
Tunisia becomes ideologically decoupled from Qatar and Turkey, in their support for Ennahda
Islamists. Gaza becomes the basis for a new, Palestinian State. Its cultural identity stems from being
a coastal Mediterranean city (channeling the ancient Philistines as a people of the sea) instead of an
Islamist identity. . A post-Hamas Gaza is modeled after Singapore, whereas Arab populations in the
West Bank either become citizens of the new Palestinian State (in Gaza) and/or remain in their towns
as permanent residents, but not citizens, of Israel’s increasingly annexed regions, based on Jewish
religious rationale. Turkey returns to a secular republic that looks to the West and eschews
antagonizing its regional neighbors. Ankara renews security cooperation with Israel and resumes
positive relations with Egypt.
UNCLASSIFIED
KEY INSIGHTS/SUMMARY
A new U.S. focus on great power competition identifies China and Russia as the primary threats to
U.S. security. As such, the Middle East region has been essentially relegated to the geopolitical
sidelines. The problem with such a vision, however, is that China and Russia are increasing their
own presence in the MENA region—and are there for the long haul.
Indeed, China and Russia are fueling this competition with Western powers in the Middle East, even
going so far as to establish new ties with traditional western allies to facilitate their presence. The
emerging trends identified in this analysis shed light on alternative scenarios for a post-COVID-19
regional competition.
Given the U.S.’s troubled track record in the region—it is imperative for Washington to recognize the
new fault lines of competition—and their subsequent implications for US interests—in the Middle East
and North Africa.
UNCLASSIFIED
THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
Lt Col Jake Sotiriadis, USAF, Ph.D., Chief Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch
OVERVIEW
COVID-19 is exacerbating pre-existing
fissures in both European solidarity and
transatlantic relations. The well-publicized
struggles within the European Union over
economic, security, and migration policy
highlight the limitations of supranational
organizations in the 21st century.
At the same time, Washington’s adoption of
an “America First” foreign policy has led
many on both sides of the Atlantic to
question the long-standing paradigm of Figure 30 European Union Flag with protective mask. (Photo by
Institute for New Economic Thinking)
transatlantic relations.
 Looking past the pandemic, which emerging trends today lend insights into potential futures
for the European Union and transatlantic relations?
 Does a post-pandemic order look much like the current status quo, or do shifting power
dynamics portend a systemic transformation?
 Which “pressure points” on the transatlantic alliance are being intensified by COVID-19? How
are malign actors—namely Russia and China—leveraging today’s transatlantic discord to
serve their own geopolitical interests?
Emerging from a turbulent decade, the European Union has weathered the Eurozone debt crisis, the
United Kingdom’s BREXIT “divorce” from Brussels, Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine and
annexation of Crimea, a resurgence of populism, and the continent’s worst migration crisis since
World War II.
COVID-19 has hit Europe hard, particularly Italy, Spain, the UK, and Belgium. Since the outbreak,
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a €750 billion ($825 billion)
“recovery fund” aimed at injecting a much-needed economic stimulus into troubled Eurozone
economies. While this represents an important step in the bloc’s pandemic recovery, several member
states (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden) do not support disbursing direct grants and
loans to poorer EU members.
SOURCES OF DISRUPTION
Against the backdrop of this inflection point, let us consider the following sources of geopolitical
disruption to both the European Union (and by extension) to transatlantic relations:
Economic solidarity – The extent to which EU Commission President von der Leyen’s recovery
package is realized will set the tone for further economic integration as well as for political solidarity
within the Eurozone. Absent the implementation of a comprehensive economic stimulus, Brussels
risks repeating the mistakes of the past and leaving the door open to Eurosceptic populists. To be
sure, China also seeks to exploit internal disagreements and sign more European nations onto its
signature “Belt and Road Initiative.”
UNCLASSIFIED
Migration Policy – The EU’s failure to manage its

refugee crisis results in uneven burden sharing across
the bloc—countries on the EU periphery (e.g. Greece,
Italy, and Spain) bear the brunt of refugee incursions.
Populists leverage this issue to sow discord and create
friction within societies, intensifying tensions between
member states and the European Union bureaucracy.
5G Network Infrastructure – The EU will allow
members to decide the extent to which Chinese firm Figure 31 Refugees crossing the Aegean. (Photo by
Antonio Masiello)
Huawei can play a role in their 5G telecom networks.
This decision creates tensions with Washington, which seeks to prevent China from gaining a foothold
in Western telecommunication networks. Additionally, the presence of Huawei in European telecom
networks places Europe at risk of exploitation and espionage by Chinese actors.
Libya conflict – Russia and Turkey are now waging a proxy war in Libya; Turkey is supporting the
Islamist Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, while Russia supports Field Marshal Khalifa
Haftar, a secularist. Individual EU member states are also supporting different sides in the conflict
(e.g. Greece and France are backing Haftar). As the conflict intensifies, the continued involvement
of external powers and conflicting policies among EU members challenges the EU’s (and NATO’s)
ability to manage the conflict and its potentially de-stabilizing repercussions.
EU/Turkey Relations – Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy
eludes a common EU response; earlier this year, waves of
refugees poured into EU member Greece, encouraged and
weaponized by the Turkish government. Turkish claims of
energy rights in the Eastern Mediterranean place Ankara in
direct conflict with EU members Cyprus and Greece as well
as many Western energy companies that seek to do
business in the region. Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-
400 air defense systems resulted in its expulsion from the
F-35 program, exacerbating tensions between
Washington, Ankara, and within NATO itself (of which Figure 32 Turkish energy exploration in the Eastern
Turkey is also a member). Mediterranean. (Photo by Turkish Policy Quarterly)
Democratic backsliding? The governments of Hungary and Poland have enacted nationalistic
policies that run counter to EU norms of the rule of law. In Hungary, President Viktor Orban took
advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to enact legislation that suspends elections and allows him to
remain in power indefinitely. Russian malign influence via social media and disinformation campaigns
intensify populist movements and hinder efforts for further integration of the Western Balkans.
Change/Continuity in US administration? Many of the established norms in the transatlantic
relationship have undergone significant upheaval during the past several years. While US military
spending in Europe has actually increased since 2017, many European political leaders view the
current administration as an impediment to transatlantic relations. This is due to US criticism of
NATO members’ financial commitments, US tariffs against European steel and aluminum producers,
and the characterization of the EU as a “foe.” Thus, the results of the upcoming US presidential
election will cast a wide shadow over the future of transatlantic relations.
POTENTIAL FUTURE A.
Continuation: European Disunion 2.0?
Partial re-openings to accommodate the summer tourist season lead to a resurgence of COVID-19
across the continent. The virus continues to return seasonally and extended social distancing
UNCLASSIFIED
contributes to a significant economic downturn for EU member states. In particular, southern

European countries face massive unemployment. Brussels does push through an economic
stimulus, but much smaller in scale than originally announced. Spain and Portugal sign on as
members of the Belt and Road Initiative, while Huawei makes inroads in several major European
telecom networks. In general, European governments make uncoordinated decisions on defense
spending, retreating to national-level, versus European-scale mechanisms. Russian malign influence
in the Balkans intensifies, complicating further regional integration efforts. New waves of refugees
from North Africa (primarily Libya) exacerbate the EU’s fragile migration efforts.
POTENTIAL FUTURE B.
Discipline: Austerity Redux and Supranational Medicine
The 2020s usher in a massive spike in unemployment across the continent; a failure to adopt best
practices to combat COVID-19 means uneven levels of contagion throughout EU member states.
Calls for a more federalized union gain traction and EU member states cede considerable authority
to Brussels after the signing of the 2028 Berlin protocol. The EU Commission, encouraged by
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Denmark, enacts severe austerity measures aimed at
reducing ballooning budget deficits. The Commission also implements a freeze on the free movement
of peoples, with border controls between all EU states now the new norm. These are enforced by the
new European Border Security Force, which now manages migration and border security efforts. EU
member states must follow strict medical guidelines prescribed by the Commission or risk being cut
off from the now critical EU bio-data network.
POTENTIAL FUTURE C.
Collapse: Revenge of the Nation-State
Recurring waves of COVID-19 coupled with a global depression have crippled the EU’s ability to
manage multiple crises. During the Trump administration’s second term, Washington exits the NATO
alliance, citing a “lack of return on investment” to American taxpayers. Absent a US military presence
in Europe, NATO ceases to exist outside of several office buildings in Belgium. Thousands of Russian
speaking “ex-patriates” begin arriving in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which serve as a pre-cursor
for eventual Russian military incursions to protect “Russian ethnic minorities.” Turkish military
incursions into the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, coupled with increased Jihadist attacks in
Spain from North Africa-based terror groups, are the catalyst for systemic collapse. A lack of
coordinated responses to the crisis by France and Germany fuels a crisis of legitimacy in the
European Union structure itself. Several member states, engulfed in nationalistic fervor and facing
mass civil unrest, withdraw from the European Union. What remains of the Union is a hollow shell of
small, northern European countries unable to exercise control or influence on the international stage.
POTENTIAL FUTURE D.
Transformation: Washington-Berlin-Ankara?
The third wave of COVID-19 in 2029 creates an opportunity for unprecedented transatlantic
cooperation. The new American administration embarks on a major effort to rebuild US-European
relations. The discovery of Chinese spyware and surveillance schemes in several 5G telecom
networks crushes any remaining trust European actors have in cooperation with China. Leveraging
this opportunity, the US establishes a bio-data sharing protocol with the EU, leading to a joint, US-
EU health office that manages and updates populations’ bio-data stockpiles. A hard BREXIT in the
early 2020s severely diminishes London’s role as an international power broker. Adjusting to new
realities, Washington builds upon Germany’s leadership role in the EU and creates a new “special
relationship,” in which Germany becomes America’s most significant political, economic, and security
partner in Europe. Additionally, the defeat of Turkish President Erdogan’s AKP party in the early
2020s accompanies a “secular renewal” in Turkey that sees successive, Western-oriented
governments come to power. The successful resolution of long-standing disputes in the Aegean and
UNCLASSIFIED
Eastern Mediterranean, combined with massive Western investments in the Turkish economy, lead
to Turkey’s accession as an EU member in the early 2030s.
KEY INSIGHTS/SUMMARY
Maintaining relationships with critical allies and partners is a linchpin to the United States’ national
security strategy. In particular, the transatlantic alliance is vital to the maintenance of the liberal,
international order. Expanding US economic and security relationships with the EU and NATO is key
to ensuring global security.
Russia and China are keenly aware of these realities and seek to drive wedges between the Western
allies. The “pressure points” of populist movements (encouraged by Russian malign influence
campaigns) and financial/tech investments from China (including the Belt and Road Initiative)
challenge the current status quo.
Additionally, disruptive conflicts on Europe’s periphery, (e.g. Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean,
Ukraine) which are now overshadowed by COVID-19, may morph into expanded geopolitical crises
for the EU (and US) if left unchecked.
UNCLASSIFIED
CONCLUSION
WEAK SIGNALS, EMERGING TRENDS, AND POST-COVID-19 COMPETITION

As tragic as COVID-19 is for our society—in particular the terrible loss of innocent life—the pandemic
forces us to consider alternative futures in a more comprehensive and methodical way. Many
of the baseline assumptions that underpin our national security strategy and service-level warfighting
concepts are affected—in some manner—by the new strategic environment. The security landscape
of a post-COVID-19 world contains both challenges and opportunities that defy accepted probabilities
for the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force.
We have examined, through environmental scanning, weak signals and emerging trends that lend
insights into future sources of disruption. Our report highlights several key interest areas for the
Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force—future competition in space,
autonomous systems, national security supply chains, malign influence/disinformation campaigns,
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East and in
transatlantic relations.
Geopolitical competition and disinformation are no longer limited exclusively to Russia, China, Iran,
or violent extremist organizations. Rather, we are likely to see a congruence of these actors either
jointly or independently waging simultaneous, multi-faceted influence campaigns on targeted
populations at a global scale. These campaigns will continue to target all facets of our society. As
we continue to focus on great power competition—with China and Russia as the primary threats to
U.S. security—we cannot lose sight of the new, emerging fault lines in the Middle East or complex
crises on Europe’s periphery. The global pandemic has also accelerated the export of China’s worst
characteristics, while prompting delays and disruptions to its Belt and Road Initiative.
In the US homeland, overly thin levels of inventory as well as long supply chains present risks to our
national security. To be sure, the effects of COVID-19 also present an opportunity for a shift in
accepting more surveillance and automation in the name of public health, much like the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, did for airport security procedures.
Ultimately, this report endeavors to enrich, enhance, and encourage ongoing efforts that elevate our
current strategy, conceptualize breakthrough innovations, and drive meaningful change throughout
the department(s). Strategic foresight and futures studies can help us develop the capacity to take
the cognitive high ground when our security environment is turned upside down.
UNCLASSIFIED
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Lt Col Jake Sotiriadis is an intelligence officer with broad experience in defense, intelligence, and
diplomatic policy portfolios. As the Air Force’s senior futurist, his work spans the nexus of disruptive
technology, geopolitical risk analysis, and strategic foresight analytics. He has served as advisor to
the U.S. Ambassador to Germany, intelligence briefer to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, and Deputy Chief of the Weapons and Space Division at the National Security Agency. His
work as a thought leader has been featured internationally in: The Diplomat, Defense News, C4ISR
Journal, China-US Focus, The Daily (Kathimerini), and the Middle East Institute. He holds a Ph.D. in
political science from the University of Hawaii at Manoa and master’s degrees from the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies,
and the Air Command and Staff College. He speaks German, Greek, and Spanish.
Dr. Jairus Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research
Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa. He holds a Ph.D. in international
relations and political theory from Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of Savage Ecology:
War and Geopolitics at the End of the World (Duke University Press, 2019).
Kara Cunzeman is a policy analyst and lead for strategic foresight for the Center for Space Policy
and Strategy at The Aerospace Corporation. In her role, Cunzeman is focused on cultivating a
formalized approach to futures thinking at Aerospace through the strategic foresight Corporate
Strategic Initiative (CSI). Cunzeman received her bachelor’s degree in multidisciplinary engineering
and a master’s degree in aeronautics and astronautics engineering from Purdue University.
Major Laura Hunstock is a Senior Combat Systems Officer (CSO) with over 1900 flight hours in the
RQ-170 and B-1B. Major Hunstock has served both as an Instructor CSO in the RQ-170 and as an
Instructor/Evaluator Weapons Systems Officer (WSO) in the B-1B. Her combat experience includes
85 sorties in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Major Hunstock has served as the Wing
Executive Officer at Creech AFB, Chief of Stan/Eval, and B-1B Flight Commander. She is an Air
University Blue Horizons graduate with a Masters in Airpower Strategy and Technology Integration.
Prior to Blue Horizons she was an Air University Fellow and instructor at the Squadron Officer School.
Major Hunstock graduated from Baylor University with a BA in Political Science.
Jason Schenker is Chairman of The Futurist Institute and the President of Prestige Economics. He
is one of the world's leading futurists and financial market forecasters. Mr. Schenker has been ranked
one of the most accurate financial forecasters and futurists in the world. Bloomberg News has ranked
Mr. Schenker a top forecaster in 43 categories, including #1 in the world for his forecast accuracy in
25 categories, including for his forecasts of the Euro, the British Pound, the Swiss Franc, the Russian
Ruble, the Chinese RMB, crude oil prices, natural gas prices, gold prices, industrial metals prices,
agricultural commodity prices, and U.S. jobs. Mr. Schenker was ranked one of the top 100 most
influential financial advisors in the world by Investopedia in 2018.
Vera Zakem is a Senior Technology and Policy Advisor with Technology for Global Security. She is
a recognized leader, driving strategy at the intersection of global threats, policy, emerging
technologies and innovation, and organizational strategy and operations. Vera is a recognized expert
on Russian influence and disinformation, the impact that technology plays in society and democracy,
terrorism, and human security and stability. Prior to joining as Tech4GS as a Senior Advisor, Vera
led strategy and research at Twitter's operations, leading initiatives to continuously serve Twitter's
customers globally. Prior, she served as a leader in strategy, partnerships, research, and policy
engagement at various think tanks and industry organizations in Washington, DC, including the CNA
UNCLASSIFIED
Corporation, where she spearheaded initiatives on global influence and Russia's indirect approaches.
Vera is a Term Member at the Council on Foreign Relations, was selected as a Young Leader (Class
of 1999) as part of Swiss-American Foundation, and has been recognized by Working Mother
Magazine. She received her M.A. from the Johns Hopkins University, and is fluent in Russian and
Spanish.
Shannon McGurk is a retired Army Ground Cavalry China Foreign Area Officer. While on active
duty, he commanded at the Troop level and served as an Executive Officer at the Squadron level. He
served on the Joint Staff, Army Staff, as the Defense Intelligence Agency China Desk Officer, and as
an Assistant Army Attaché at the U.S. Embassy, Beijing. Upon retirement from the U.S. Army, he
worked throughout the Intelligence and Operations communities for Northrop Grumman, TASC,
ManTech and General Dynamics and throughout the inter-agency community on the Air Staff as an
Air Force civilian. Mr. McGurk recently returned from Afghanistan and is currently working as a Long
Term Analyst and Futurist consultant for the Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability, Strategic
Foresight and Futures Branch. He lives with his wife and children in Virginia.
Dr. Marwa Maziad is Visiting Scholar at the University of Washington’s Jackson School of
International Studies and former Visiting Assistant Professor at Seattle University. She is a regular
Political Commentator on BBC News. Her academic publications focus on US foreign and defense
policies, as well as comparative civil-military relations in the Middle East cases of Turkey, Egypt, and
Israel. Dr. Maziad is also the co-editor of The Arab Gulf States and the West: Perceptions and
Realities—Opportunities and Perils and the author of one of its book chapters “The Turkish Burden:
The cost of the Turkey-Qatar alliance and hard power projection into Qatar’s foreign policy” (UCLA
Center for Middle East Development, Routledge 2019). She received her MA and PhD from the
University of Washington and is fluent in Arabic, French, Turkish, and Hebrew.
UNCLASSIFIED
APPENDIX A: ACRONYM LIST

COVID-19 Coronavirus disease
CRISPR Clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats
DOD Department of Defense
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
HVI high value individual
IED Improvised explosive devise
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LEO low earth orbit
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NOISE necessities, occupations, information, systems, external
PPE personal protective equipment
RPA remotely piloted aircraft
SUAS special use airspace
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
USAF U.S. Air Force
USG United States Government
VEO violent extremist organizations
UNCLASSIFIED
AIR FORCE
WARFIGHTING
INTEGRATION
CAPABILITY
DESIGN | INTEGRATE | DEVELOP | IMPACT

USAF AFWIC GlobalFuturesCOVID19

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GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION IN A POST-COVID-19 WORLD:

GLOBAL FUTURES REPORT

A COLLABORATIVE ANALYSIS WITH FORESIGHT

Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC)

Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch

02 Introduction / Executive Summary

04 Strategic Foresight and Futures Studies: A Methodological Approach

07 Four Global Scenarios for a Post-COVID-19 World

15 The Future of Geopolitical Competition in Space

18 The Future of Competition and Autonomous Systems

22 The Future Nexus of Supply Chains and National Security

26 The Future of Malign Influence Campaigns

29 The Future of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

31 The Future of Geopolitical Competition in the Middle East

Lt Col Jacob S. Sotiriadis, USAF, Ph.D.

Jairus Victor Grove, Ph.D.

Washington, D.C., June 2020

STRATEGIC FORESIGHT AND FUTURES STUDIES:

WHAT IS “FUTURES STUDIES”?

HOW DOES THIS DIFFER FROM TREND ANALYSIS OR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS?

WHY DO WE EMPLOY SCENARIO MODELING?

THE “FOUR FUTURES” FRAMEWORK

Figure 1 Graphical representation of the Manoa School “Four Futures” Method

Continued Growth Futures

HOW DO WE BUILD SCENARIOS?

FOUR GLOBAL SCENARIOS FOR A POST-COVID-19 WORLD

INTERPRETING THE SCENARIO FRAMEWORK

WHAT DO THE SCENARIOS REPRESENT?

DISRUPTION HAPPENS—WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

GLOBAL FUTURE #1: TRANSFORMATION

2035 – The new “Great Powers” are

GLOBAL FUTURE #2: SYSTEMIC COLLAPSE

2035 - Scholars label the 2030s as the new “warring

Figure 6 China’s Military Releases Video Aimed at

GLOBAL FUTURE #3: DISCIPLINE

2035 - Severe strains on social order have driven

GLOBAL FUTURE #4: CONTINUED GROWTH

2035 - States with the capability to maintain

THE FUTURE OF COMPETITION IN SPACE

THE FUTURE OF COMPETITION AND AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

Lt. Gen. John Thompson, USAF, recently asked Elon

The U.S. Air Force took first steps in adopting the

THE FUTURE NEXUS OF SUPPLY CHAINS AND

SUPPLY CHAIN AS NATIONAL SECURITY RISK

Necessities Food, water, power, shelter, safety

MANUFACTURING COMPANIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY

THE FUTURE OF MALIGN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS

LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE

KEY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND DOD

THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE

THE BRI AND COVID-19

THE URBANIZATION DILEMMA

THE BRI AND A POST-COVID WORLD:

THE FUTURE OF GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION

SOURCES OF FUTURE DISRUPTION

THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND

Migration Policy – The EU’s failure to manage its

contributes to a significant economic downturn for EU member states. In particular, southern

WEAK SIGNALS, EMERGING TRENDS, AND POST-COVID-19 COMPETITION

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

APPENDIX A: ACRONYM LIST

DESIGN | INTEGRATE | DEVELOP | IMPACT