ASEAN Studies Module

ASEAN AVE.
Introduction to ASEAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
studies
Theoretical perspective of
regionalism
The Development of
ASEAN as a Regional Or-
ganization
The ASEAN Charter
The ASEAN Organization
West Philippine Sea Dis-

pute
Ethnic Violence in Myan-

mar: Case of Rohingya
Coronavirus in ASEAN
Agriculture & Food securi-

ty in Southeast Asia
Module 1 Module 2 Module 3

54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol,
J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts &
Sciences
Module 1
Overview of ASEAN Studies
W ELCOME STATEMENT
This is Module 1, I repeat, this is module 1-

Introduction to ASEAN studies ! Here you will
learn about ASEAN studies both as an academic
field and as an institution. You will also learn
about the development of ASEAN as a regional
institution as well as the concept of regionalism.
Enjoy your trip!
ASEAN AVE.
Module I Module II Module III
O UTCOMES
In this module, you are expected to determine the development of
ASEAN as a regional institution.
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Lesson 1: Introduction to ASEAN Studies
Lesson Outcomes:
At the end of the lesson, student will be able to…
1. Define the scope of ASEAN studies as a discipline.
2. Trace to history and development of ASEAN studies
I. Introduction
Association of Southeast Asian

studies (ASEAN) refers to research and
education on the Historical, Cultural, Social,
Economic, Geographical, and Political
characteristics of the
different states and ethnic groups of countries
in Southeast Asia who are members of ASEAN.
The discipline of ASEAN Studies fosters the
development, acquisition, and sharing of knowledge about the countries and
people of ASEAN and the ways they relate to each other and to the world.
ASEAN studies is a multidisciplinary academic field incorporating
anthropology, religious studies, linguistics, history, politics and governance,
and international relations.
ASEAN Studies undertaken in Southeast Asia itself is comparatively

young. There is a need
to qualify two
categories of ASEAN
Studies in the region.
First, there is ASEAN
Studies offered as a
discipline at the
various tertiary
institutions and
universities in the
region. The second
Figure 1. Group of Southeast Asia people with different race and culture in cute cartoon illustration design representing
ASEAN. Credits: https://www.123rf.com/photo_29336011_stock-vector-group-of-southeast-asia-people-with-different-race- category is the
and-culture-in-cute-car
numerous centers,
institutions and
departments specifically established with the particular objective of
promoting research of the region, whether as a whole or directed at the
different parts often along national-political lines.
In terms of ASEAN Studies as a tertiary course catering to undergraduate
and graduate studies its roots could be traced to the establishment of the
Institute of Asian Studies in 1955 at the University of the Philippines.
ASEAN Studies then, that primarily focused on the Philippines (Philippines
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Studies), was a part of the overall Asian studies program. Following
reorganization and a name-change to the Asian Center in 1968, degrees
were being offered where some students specialized in Philippine Studies. In
1961, although abortive, there were proposals for a School of Southeast
Asian Studies at the University of Malaya, then in Singapore. However, it
was only in 1976 that the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, initiated a
degree program in Southeast Asian Studies.
Relating to purpose-built institutions and centers, the 1960s
witnessed the establishment in 1968 of the Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies (ISEAS) at Singapore with its main focus dedicated to the study of
Southeast Asia. Other centers and institutions in the region that have
Southeast Asia as their main or one of their research agenda include Institut
Alam dan Tamadun Melayu (ATMA, Institute of the Malay World and
Civilization), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Malaysia; Institute of East
Asian Studies (IEAS), Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, Malaysia; Center for
Khmer Studies (CKS), Cambodia; and SEAMEO-CHAT (Southeast Asian
Ministers of Education Organization Centre for
History and Tradition), Myanmar.
ASEAN CITIZENSHIP
According to the ASEAN

Foundation, across all
ASEAN nations, over 75%
of students agreed with the
statement, “I feel that I am
a citizen of ASEAN.”
These statements were
strongest in Laos,
Cambodia, and Vietnam,
and weakest in Singapore
and Myanmar. Nearly
90% of students felt that
membership in ASEAN is
beneficial to their
countries. Nearly 70% felt
that the ASEAN
membership was
beneficial to them
personally.
Source: ASEAN
Awareness of and
Attitudes toward ASEAN:
Summary findings from 10
nation surveyed of
university students.
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Instruction: Fill in the circles with concepts you can

associate with ASEAN studies.
ASEAN
Studies
a. What is the relevance of ASEAN studies in your field/program?
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
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II. Geographical Definition of ASEAN
The boundaries of Southeast

Asia are contested due to historical,
cultural, and linguistic similarities
between some groups in Southeast
Asia and neighboring regions like
India and China. Many scholars of
Southeast Asian studies rely on the
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) to create a concrete
list of nations that fit under the umbrella of Southeast Asia. As of 2016,
members of ASEAN include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao
DPR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Profile of Southeast Asian Nations
1. What is the difference between sovereign state and dependent

territories?
2. Which states are part of Mainland Southeast Asia (Indo-
China), and Maritime Southeast Asia (Malay Archipelago)?
SIGHT SEEING
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Blank Map Test: Identify the ASEAN members

states in the map below.
1. _______________________ 6. ______________________
2. _______________________ 7. ______________________
3. _______________________ 8. ______________________
4. _______________________ 9. ______________________
5. _______________________ 10. _____________________
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III. Brief History of the Southeast Asia
Before and During the Second World War
While the term "Southeast Asia" was first used

in connection with the present region by American
priest and educator Howard Malcom in 1837, the
region presently referred to as Southeast Asia was
split between India and the Far East by Anglophone
scholars prior to the Second World War and de-
emphasized as an area of study due to the presence
of national interests in the region. Initial inquiries
into the culture and traditions of Southeast Asia
were primarily conducted by German and Austrian scholars who had greater
access to the region because
their home countries had no colonies in the region. The strategic
importance of numerous locales in Southeast Asia such as the Dutch East
Indies and the Philippines during the Second World War attracted increased
attention from the West. This newfound attention led to the establishment of
Mountbatten's South-East Asia Command (SEAC) in 1
943, and the publication of the first map of Southeast Asia by the
National Geographic
society in 1944.
Postwar
Immediately
after the conclusion of
the Second World
War, the beginnings
of the Cold War drew
the attention of
United States think
tanks and intelligence
organizations away
from Southeast Asia.
Events such as the
1949 Revolution in
China and fear about
the spread of
communism re-
centered much of the
monetary focus on to
China and the Soviet
Union. This led to two
Colonial Rule in Southeast Asia results: while funding
and the commitment
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of corporations to the area decreased, oversight also decreased; researchers
in the West were free to pursue most avenues of interest without the
objection of their sponsors.
In East Asia
In Japan, Southeast Asian studies became a

more concrete field of study in the period after Southeast Asia: The Path to
Japanese colonization of the region during the Pacific Independence.
War. The Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto 1946 – Philippines (U.S.)
University was founded in 1963, and The Japan Society 1948 – Burma (Great Britain)
for Southeast Asian History was founded in 1966. In 1949 – Indonesia (Netherlands)
the United States, the rise of communism in Vietnam 1953 – Cambodia (France)
1954 – Laos (France)
and Laos brought Southeast Asian studies to the
1954 – Vietnam (France)
forefront of academia and politics. In Korea, academics
1963 – Malaysia (Great Britain)
began forming groups focusing on the region of
1964 – Singapore (Great Britain)
Southeast Asia in the 1990s. In 1991, the Korean
Association of Southeast Asian Studies (KASEAS).
Southeast Asian studies in South Korea focuses mainly on Southeast Asia's
relationship with other regions in Asia, trans-border migration within and
outside Southeast Asia, and the spread of Korean Wave in the region.
Southeast Asian Nations Gain Independence

British Colonies Gain Independence
Britain‘s timetable for granting independence to its Southeast
Asian colonies depended on local circumstances. Burma had been
pressing for independence from Britain for decades. It became a
sovereign republic in 1948. In 1989, Burma was officially named
Myanmar (myahn•MAH), its name in the Burmese language. After gaining freedom, Burma
suffered one political upheaval after another. Its people struggled between repressive military
governments and pro-democracy forces. Conflict among Communists and ethnic minorities
also disrupted the nation. In 1962, General Ne Win set up a military government, with the
goal of making Burma a socialist state. Although Ne Win stepped down in 1988, the military
continued to rule repressively. In 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi (owng sahn soo chee) returned to
Burma after many years abroad. She is the daughter of Aung San, a leader of the Burmese
nationalists‘ army killed years before by political rivals. Aung San Suu Kyi became active in
the newly formed National League for Democracy. For her pro-democracy activities, she was
placed under house arrest for six years by the government. In the 1990 election—the
country‘s first multiparty election in 30 years—the National League for Democracy won 80
percent of the seats. The military government refused to recognize the election, and it kept
Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. She was finally released in 1995, only to be placed
under house arrest again in 2000. Freed in 2002, she was detained again in 2003, leaving
many residents to doubt whether Burma will embrace democracy anytime soon.
Malaysia and Singapore
During World War II, the Japanese conquered the Malay Peninsula, formerly ruled by
the British. The British returned to the peninsula after the Japanese defeat in 1945. They
tried, unsuccessfully, to organize the different peoples of Malaya into one state. They also
struggled to put down a Communist uprising. Ethnic groups resisted British efforts to unite
their colonies on the peninsula and in the northern part of the island of Borneo. Malays were
a slight majority on the peninsula, while Chinese were the largest group on the southern tip,
the island of Singapore. In 1957, officials created the Federation of Malaya from Singapore,
Malaya, Sarawak, and Sabah. The two regions—on the Malay Peninsula and on northern
Borneo—were separated by 400 miles of ocean. In 1965, Singapore separated from the
federation and became an independent city-state. The federation, consisting of Malaya,
Sarawak, and Sabah, became known as Malaysia. A coalition of many ethnic groups
maintained steady economic progress in Malaysia. 8
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CRITICAL THINKING
Answer the following questions:
1. Using your notes, what are the greatest challenges

faced by the following ASEAN nations?
Nation Challenges
1. Philippines
2. Myanmar
3. Malaysia
4.Singapore
1. CLARIFYING. How did World War II play a role in the eventual decolonization
of Southeast Asia?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
2. For each of the name, wright a sentence explaining its significance.
Aung San Suu Kyu
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Corazon Aquino -
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Sukarno -
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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References:
Acharya, A. (2000), Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:

ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, London: Routledge.
Katzenstein, P.J. (2005) A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium,
Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y.
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Lesson 2: Theoretical Perspectives of Regionalism

___________________________________________________________________________
Lesson Outcomes:
1. Define Regionalism
2. Determine the characteristics of regionalism
3. Analyze the advantages and disadvantages of regionalism
Introduction
During the past few decades, there has been a

tremendous surge in regionalism throughout the
international system. This growth has been
stimulated in large measure by the proliferation of
regional institutions, giving rise to substantial
scholarly interest in both their sources and
consequences. Some of this work has been
conducted by economists interested in regionalism‘s
welfare effects and its impact on the stability of the global economic system.
However, there is also a long tradition of work on regionalism in political
science. Scholars of international relations and comparative politics have
generated a sizable literature on the political economy of regionalism.
Researchers have also expressed a lively interest in analyzing international
security from a regional perspective. In this article, we review and analyze
some recent research on regionalism, sometimes referred to as ―the new
regionalism‖ (Hettne 2005). We begin by explaining that regionalism is
usually understood to involve policy coordination through formal
institutions. Often—although by no means always—this coordination occurs
among states located in close geographic proximity. Because much of the
research on regionalism focuses on its economic consequences, we briefly
review that body of work. Then we discuss the political economy of
regionalism and regionalism in security relations. We conclude by outlining
some avenues for future research, placing particular emphasis on the need
for work that links these two topics, improving our understanding of the
political economy of national security in regional contexts (Mansfield &
Solingen, 2010).
ASEAN envisioned the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an

ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural
heritage and bound by a common regional identity. We see vibrant and open
ASEAN societies consistent with their respective national identities, where
all people enjoy equitable access and opportunities for total human
development regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and
cultural background (ASEAN vision 2020).
The ASEAN leaders have a vision to create a common identity in

Southeast Asia by 2020. Considering the recent history of the region, this is
quite significant. A little more than a decade ago, Southeast Asia was
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divided into two blocs, one with the old ASEAN members Thailand,
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Brunei, and the other with
the newest members Vietnam, Laos, Burma/ Myanmar and Cambodia.
Despite integration efforts since the announcement, the region still suffers
from unsolved conflicts and substantial socio- economic inequalities
between, as well as within, the countries. In order to create stability and to
remain in power, the regimes engage in different projects of strengthening
their national identities, which creates contradictory processes within the
countries, as well as between them. The aim of the lesson is to discuss the
issue of regional integration and regional identity-building in Southeast Asia
and to problematize the quest for a regional identity, as stated in the ASEAN
Vision 2020 cited above, by relating the efforts of integration to regional
diversity and to the issue of national identity-building. The quest for a
regional identity is a political (elite) project and that without an
accommodating, inclusive and pluralistic society, a common regional
identity will be hard – if not impossible – to create.
The literature on regionalism and regional integration has so far

primarily focused on regional security and the economics matters of nation-
states, and the interaction and collaboration between the states together
with the development and functioning of regional organizations. The region‘s
violent past, strategic importance, and the last decades‘ exceptional
economic developments can partly explain this. Attempts to measure
regionalism have often focused on quantifiable indicators such as level of
interaction. According to Acharya (2000), regional perspectives on Southeast
Asian politics and international relations are scarce. Also, there is relatively
little written about regionalism from the perspectives of the
conceptualization of regions and regional identity-building in relation to
local and national identity formation processes, and what it takes to
integrate individuals of diverse cultural and ethnic groups into a regional
identity (Jones 2004). This despite the fact that Southeast Asia is a mosaic
of different cultural and ethnic groups, and that it is often pointed out that
globalisation processes increase the risk of ethnic fragmentation.
Accordingly, different bodies of literature will be combined in order to better
understand the complexity of regionalism.
DEFINING REGIONS, REGIONALISM, AND REGIONALIZATION
Despite widespread interest in regionalism, we lack consensus on its

definition. In part, this is because observers do not agree on what
constitutes a region. Regions are frequently defined as groups of countries
located in
the same geographic space; but where one region ends and the next begins
is sometimes unclear. Furthermore, most researchers agree that a region
implies more than just physical proximity, although the additional criteria
that should be used have proven controversial. Among some of the best-
known studies, for example, Russett (1967) defines a region based on
geographic proximity, social and cultural homogeneity, shared political
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attitudes and political institutions, and economic interdependence.
Deutsch et al. (1957) view high levels of interdependence across multiple
dimensions—including economic transactions, communications, and
political values—as determining whether a group of countries composes a
region. Thompson (1973) argues that regions include states that are
geographically proximate, interact extensively, and have shared
perceptions of various phenomena.
Although geography lies at the heart of most of these definitions, some

scholars define regions in nongeographic terms. Behavioral definitions
emphasize that political practice and interaction can alter a region‘s
composition. As Katzenstein (2005, p. 9) puts it, ―regions are po- litically
made.‖ Solingen (1998) subsumes a region‘s boundaries to the respective
grand strate- gies of different domestic political coalitions. The scope of a
region is thus in the eyes of members of the dominant coalition.
Consequently, it is subject to continuous redefinition through expansion
into other regions or through domestic coalitional shifts in grand strategy.
Other nongeographic definitions that are ideational or social-constructivist
stress shared com- munal identities of states within a region (Risse-Kappen
1995; Katzenstein 1997, 2005).
In light of the ontological disagreement over what constitutes a region, it is

no surprise that regionalism is also a contested concept. One source of
confusion has been the distinction between regionalism and
regionalization. Various political scientists have argued that regionalism is a
political process marked by cooperation and policy coordination, whereas
regionalization is an economic process in which trade and investment
within the region grow more rapidly than the region‘s trade and investment
with the rest of the world (Haggard 1993, pp. 48– 49; see also Gamble &
Payne 1996, Breslin & Higgott 2001, Ravenhill 2009). Pempel (2005, pp. 19–
20) makes a different but related distinction; he defines regionalization as
a bottom-up, societally driven process, whereas regionalism ―involves
primarily the process of institution creation‖ and is the intentional product
of in- terstate cooperation.
Katzenstein (2006, p. 1) defines regionalism as institutionalized practices

and regionalization as ―a process that engages actors.‖ For Hur- rell (1995,
pp. 39–40), however, regionalization is a feature of regionalism.
Regionalization is ―the growth of societal integration within a region and. .
.the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction.‖ This is
akin, he argues, to informal integration or ―soft regionalism,‖ which
involves increasing population flows, multiple channels, and complex social
networks spreading ideas and attitudes. Fawcett (2004, p. 433) defines
regionalism as a policy or a project, while defining regionalization as both a
project and a process, preceding and flow- ing from regionalism.
Alternatively, Marchand et al. (1999) emphasize the globalizing, restruc-
turing context of regionalization. Regionaliza- tion reflects state and
nonstate forces reacting in opposition to globalization, whereas regionalism
concerns ideas, identities, and ideologies related to a regional project.
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Munakata (2006) agrees that regionalism involves institutions established
by governments to promote regional economic integration but emphasizes
the vary- ing degrees of commitment by members. Free trade areas (FTAs)
are considered a solid form of regionalism, whereas regional consultative
bodies that lack legally binding agreements— even if they promote economic
integration— are a looser form.
A wide variety of researchers consider regionalization to be a process

driven by economic or social forces and regionalism to be a political
process. Yet a multiplicity of meanings for each of these two terms re-
mains. The boundaries between regionalism and regionalization remain
porous. On the one
hand, regionalization driven by private actors— economic and otherwise—is

often reinforced by states. On the other hand, bottom-up efforts (domestic
and transnational) may lead to regionalism as the intended or unintended
product of pressures on states. Identifying different sequences of
regionalism and regionalization— and their mutual effects—may be a more
pro- ductive endeavor but it can only be advanced through improvements in
the conceptualization and measurement of ―region,‖ ―regionalism,‖ and
―regionalization.‖
A great deal of research on regionalism has focused on preferential trading

arrangements (PTAs), institutions that provide each member- state with
preferential access to the other participants‘ markets. Many such
arrangements involve states in close geographic proximity (e.g., the
European Union or Mercosur), but some are not (e.g., the FTAs between the
United States and Israel, Chile and South Korea, or Mexico and Japan). In
this article, we pay particular attention to PTAs, which involve economic
policy coordination and cooperation among member-states. Among the
various types of PTAs are arrangements that partially liberal- ize trade
between members; FTAs, which eliminate trade barriers among members;
customs unions, which eliminate internal trade barriers and impose a
common external tariff on third parties‘ products; common markets, which
al- low free movement of factors of production and finished products across
national borders; and economic unions, which are common markets
coupled with a currency union. Because all PTAs attempt to coordinate
trade policy among members, they are usually analyzed as a group.
At the outset, it is important to recognize that, despite contemporary

observers‘ particular interest in PTAs formed during the past half century,
regionalism is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, four waves of regionalism
have taken place over the past two centuries (Mansfield & Milner 1999). The
first occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century and was
largely a European phenomenon (Pollard 1974, Lazer 1999, Pahre 2008).
This wave was associated with the emergence of a liberal international
trading system, since PTAs were networked via most-favored-nation clauses.
A second wave began in the aftermath of World War I. These arrangements
were more economically discriminatory than those formed during the earlier
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wave. Many observers argue that the PTAs established during the interwar
era gave rise to ―beggar-thy-neighbor‖ trade policies, a sharp decline in
world trade, and heightened political conflict (Irwin 1993). Since World War
II, two additional waves of PTAs have occurred. They have proven more
difficult to characterize as either liberalizing or discriminatory than the
first two. One took place in the 1960s and the early 1970s. The second
began duringthe1990s.Overthepasttwodecades, PTAs have become so
pervasive that more than half of all international commerce has come to be
conducted within these arrangements, and almost every country belongs to
at least one. These developments have spurred substantial scholarly interest
in both the causes and effects of economic regionalism.
Origins and Development of Regionalism
The growth and study of formal regional organizations dates

principally from the Second World War and is part of a general pattern of
growth in international institutions. This is important since a study of
regionalism necessitates a parallel study of multilateralism or at least an
understanding of the interdependent relationship between the two.
From a longer perspective, however, regionalism has always been with

us. Re- gions as empires, spheres of influence, or unions of states have been
apparent in different international systems. In the nineteenth century in
particular one can point to the widespread existence of different unions,
leagues and associations, showing how the idea of regional integration is no
new phenomena.13 While such unions flour- ished among European states,
in the Americas the Inter-American System, with its roots in the late
nineteenth century, provides evidence of a set of semi-formal non- European
institutions. Embedded in this American system was the idea of a regional
security regime as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine, which singled out the
Ameri- cas as part of a US sphere of influence. And in Europe, alongside the
economic unions and political projects, security regimes were also evident
as demonstrated by the existence of a ‗concert‘ or balance of powers which
informed understanding of regional order.
Indeed it was the breakdown of this loose regime - the European

concert – in the events culminating in the First World War, that encouraged
world leaders, led by US President Woodrow Wilson, to make the first
sustained attempt at constructing a formal international security
institution: the League of Nations, with important implications for
subsequent institutional development both global or regional.
The League experiment, though intended to be universal, betrayed a

number of regional features, not least that its dominant members were all
European. A reference in the Covenant, in Article 21, to ‗regional
understandings‘, was included to reflect the interests of the United States
in the Americas, though the latter never became a member.14 More
broadly, the League period set the tone for a much wider debate about how
to deal with what Inis Claude would later call the ‗problem of regionalism‘
or how to integrate regional arrangements into the framework of a general
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security organization.15 This debate was overtaken - though not forgotten -
by the events of the 1930s when Europe, and much of the rest of the world,
became embroiled in a new war. At this time it appeared that the League
had failed as a global security institution, and regionalism, whether as an
economic or political process had also been associated with failure or with
expansionist and hegemonic projects like Japan‘s pan-Asian project, or Nazi
Germany‘s pan-European one.
1. Regional Institutions: The First Wave 1945-1965
Despite such negative impressions, the spirit of regionalism was

quickly revived and strengthened against the backdrop of the ending of the
Second World War and the creation of a new set of international
institutions, notably the United Nations and the Bretton Woods/GATT
system. The League‘s example, both positive and negative, closely informed
these developments. Such institutions were constructed precisely to prevent
the social, political and economic upheavals that had taken the world to war
after 1939 and hence to make states more secure. Though few states
questioned the need for more ambitious multilateral institutions, many also
sought to protect their own interests through regional or cross regional
groupings, and it is in this period that the first sustained wave of regional
institution building took place.
Three main types of regional institution can be identified in this

period. First, what are often called ‗multipurpose‘ institutions like the
League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of American States (OAS),
successor to the Inter-American system and the Organization of African
Unity (OAU); second, security alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and
third, institutions with a principally economic focus, notably the early
European institutions and later attempts to replicate them elsewhere.
Already by 1945, multipurpose institutions of the first type,

representing the Americas, Commonwealth, and Arab states had come into
being. And the final design of the UN Charter, like the League Covenant
before it, was directly influenced by states with actual or potential
investments in such institutions. Hence the early reservations of UN
founding fathers about how to deal with regionalism and the possible
dilution of universal aspirations and competence were overcome.16 The UN
Charter, in its final form, endorsed the principle of regional partnership and
action within the framework of the global security organization.17
Institutions of the second type, regional security alliances, notably

NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Rio Pact, SEATO, CENTO and ANZUS, were
established in the 1950s. Rather than the UN-friendly institutions envisaged
by the Charter, these alliances owed their rationale more to the evolving
Cold War system and corresponding attempts by the superpowers to
consolidate their respective spheres of influence, and as such constituted a
blow to multilateralism
Though the five Regional Economic Commissions were an early and
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integral part of the UN, the Charter had little to say about economic
regionalism outside the UN system, or institutions of the third type, those
principal aim was initially to promote regional economic integration.
Multilateral regulation of such institutions was provided through the
GATT, which like the UN, envisaged coexistence with charter friendly or
non-discriminatory regional arrangements.18 Such institutions, with the
Europe leading the way with the creation of the European Community (EC)
in 1958, proliferated in the 1960s such that the world was ‗filled with
proposals for NAFTA, PAFTA, LAFTA... and ever more‘.19
What is striking about this first wave of regionalism, whether in the

area of economics or security, was the fact that it was characterised less
by any new norma- tively informed understanding of regional-multilateral
relationships, more by strictly material calculations of power, security and
interest. Above all it was the post-war balance of power, which quickly
became that of the Cold War, that represented the overriding factor in
determining regionalism‘s early trajectory. If this was self evidently true of
the new security institutions, it was also true both of the multipurpose and
early economic institutions, all of which were mechanisms not only for
promoting the welfare and security of members but also for enhancing the
power and influence of states onto the new global stage. Multilateral
institutions had both empow- ered and facilitated regionalism in certain
ways providing them with a façade of legitimacy, yet their rationale
ultimately lay in the post-Cold War order and international balance of
power.
Also striking were the limited and uneven results of this first wave. Of
the early economic arrangements those outside Europe had mostly failed by
the late 1960s, though a number were later revived in different forms during
regionalism‘s third wave. The multipurpose organizations were similarly
regarded as failures - perhaps somewhat unfairly given the considerable
constraints they faced.20 Developing countries, for example, were able to
use such institutions as platforms for promoting common positions on
matters of importance to their members, such as decolonization and
apartheid (in the OAU) or support for Palestine (in the LAS). The same was
true of a ‗pan‘ Third World institution like the Non-Aligned Movement which
(like the later Group of 77) represented a vehicle for projecting broad
developing country interests onto the international stage. Given the global
context in which such regionalisms developed however, it is unsurprising
that many early institutions lacked capacity and resources. Indeed, only
the two major superpower sponsored alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
enjoyed almost unqualified success in securing their respective regions from
external threats and sustaining the ‗long peace‘ that pre- vailed during the
Cold War.21
2. Regionalism: The Second Wave, 1965-85
Against this backdrop and with the Cold War entering its third
decade, a further and somewhat distinctive round of regional activity took
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place. This was, in part, a reaction to the superpower dominance of the
regional security arena, the disappointing early results of both the
multipurpose institutions and non-European economic institutions and the
changing regional security environment itself. The second wave of institution
building which occurred mainly among developing countries, had an
underlying security focus, and hence was clearly distinguishable from the
earlier wave of economic regionalism that had been inspired by the creation
and successful early years of the EC. It was similar in that it was mostly
sub-regional in scope (with sub-regional here meaning sub-continental, or at
least encompassing a smaller geographical space and fewer states than the
earlier pan-regional groups) though it also included both a pan-European
security institution, the CSCE, and a pan-Islamic one, the ICO. The more
familiar examples of this second regional wave are the As- sociation of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community (SADC), the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC).22
Overall, this second wave was characterized by small steps to improve

regional self-sufficiency and cooperation in a changed regional and global
environment which afforded a little more flexibility to regional actors.
Bipolarity had somewhat loosened in the détente era of the late-1960s to
mid-1970s, while many developing countries had consolidated their
statehood and autonomy. Not all these new institutions immediately
assumed security roles; a number had ostensibly more economic functions
and purposes: the GCC is an interesting case of an institution designed to
meet a new security threat - following the Iranian revolution - whose charter
is cou- ched in mainly economic and cultural terms.23 Still there was a
clear security dimen- sion to this second wave of institution building,
demonstrated by the fact many of these new security groupings were
constructed with a particular local threat in mind: for ASEAN it was
Vietnam, for the GCC, Iran; for SADCC apartheid South Africa.
The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) was similarly conceived as a

vehicle for the containment of Iraq, though its life span was limited following
the latter‘s invasion of a fellow member, Kuwait, in 1990.
These new initiatives, however, were still conditioned by the ever

present constraints of the Cold War. This was of course also true for the
CSCE, a quite different pan-European security enterprise, which by
encouraging East-West convergence in several areas played a facilitating role
in the end of the Cold War.
The results of this second wave, like the first, were mixed, but a
couple of points should be noted. As in the first wave, institutional survival
rates were high: indeed the tally of institutional deaths in the first two waves
is surprisingly small. It includes the non-European US-sponsored
alliances, CENTO and SEATO, the short lived ACC and a number of non-
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European economic institutions, though many of these were later revived in
some related form. Their survival demonstrates not only how they were
valued by their members, but also resilience and flexibility. Many went on to
further develop and expand their economic and security roles as their raison
d‘être was shifted, and indeed enhanced by the new global balance of power
at end of the Cold War.
Regionalism: The Third Wave 1985-Present
Just as the international system had closely defined the parameters

and possibilities of regionalism during the Cold War, it was system change
and its consequences that also helps explain the post-Cold War changes and
developments. Though argu- ably more complex and diverse than previous
regional waves, the new regionalism was no less a response to the shifting
political, economic and security imperatives of the post-Cold War
environment in which states now found themselves. On the one hand, the
example of Europe, the effects of globalization and uncertainty about the
capacity of multilateral institutions all provided incentives to other countries
to fos- ter projects of economic integration, notably the creation of free trade
areas (FTAs). On the other, the removal of Cold War overlay also changed
the parameters of the security domain making regional security more
vulnerable and accessible to local actors.24 Like the earlier waves of
regionalism, the post-Cold War phenomena, widely dubbed the ‗new
regionalism‘ - despite its continuities with the old - has been the subject of
sustained debate and a growing literature.25
At first, there was a distinctly universalistic flavour to the post-Cold

War order which did not immediately suggest an important role for regional
institutions. Just as the two world wars had seen the birth of new
paradigms of global order, reflected in the founding documents of League of
Nations and the UN, the end of the Cold War era was similarly informed by a
renaissance of ideas about the possibilities of universal institutions and
projects and the fostering of global peace. Such notions were picked up in
the rhetoric of the ‗New World Order‘ articulated by US President George
Bush Sr., after the 1991 Gulf War, and in popular works by Francis Fukuy-
ama and others on the end of history, ideology, geography and so on. These
big i- deas were also captured in different understandings of the term
globalization. As in the past, regionalism was viewed positively by some as a
mere stepping stone towards a more integrated world, and suspiciously by
others as potentially obstructive and damaging to broader global
processes.26
Both views contained truths but also tended both to oversimplify and
underesti- mate the diversity of regionalism. Above all the global processes
of regionalism did not form a united project except in that they all
represented responses to changes at the level of the international system.
Three factors however highlighted their importance. First, was the
experience of Western Europe. Though the evidence from Eu- rope on the
eve of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was decidedly mixed, the European
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process could not easily be disregarded. Even if the example of the
European Union was not readily or immediately exportable, it still
represented an important model of how cooperation might be conducted at
the regional level and opened up new perspectives on globalization. And for
the second time in less than thirty years, non- European institutions started
to grow quickly after the Cold War ended, a number building on earlier ‗first
wave‘ experiments in economic integration. And, no less significantly, the
EU, like a number of other institutions, was also poised to move from a
predominantly economic focus to one which further emphasized political
and security cooperation.
Second, and from a more practical perspective, it quickly became clear

that the post-Cold War multilateral structures, given the huge demands
placed upon them, were both inadequate for the task and were highly
susceptible to the interests of core members. Both economic and security
structures would need buttressing. This was revealed at the level of the
international economy when serious financial crises in Asia and the
Americas exposed the shortfalls of international financial institutions and
demanded regional responses. It was also revealed at the level or
international security, most notably in the area of conflict resolution and
peace operations generally. In calling for the revival of Chapter VIII
provision – and hence a more effective partnership between the UN and
regional institutions - UN Secretary-Generals like were not advocating
regionalism per se, but burden sharing.27 The UN, despite the palpable
euphoria that accompanied its early post-Cold War years, lacked the re-
sources and the commitment of major states to act as a global

security provider, leaving vacuums that regional powers and institutions
sought to fill.28
Hence the new wave of security regionalism must be understood in

terms of UN capacity, the relative disinterest of great powers in costly
external interventions and declining salience of the former alliance systems.
Like the new wave of economic regionalism, it represented the further
development of a self help system for weaker states to cope with the changed
international environment, demonstrated perhaps most strikingly in the
security reforms of African institutions. It also permitted stronger emerging
regional powers the scope to set local agendas within a institutional
framework that bestowed greater legitimacy on their actions.
Third, and less tangibly, was the way in which regionalism has
become caught up in the idea of a ‗clash of civilizations‘ as outlined by
Samuel Huntington.29 This at times clumsy, but nonetheless helpful
characterization made the point that ‗civilizations‘, often loose regions,
could not be easily homogenized and had creative and fragmentary power. In
this sense regionalism, construed as a response to the universal other,
merely extended the project that had commenced with the multipurpose
institutions the early Third World regionalisms and the second wave of more
security-focused regionalism in the latter decades of the Cold War.
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Regionalism thus provided states the opportunity to place their distinctive
mark on their own local institutional arrangements. Regionalisms now
bore different labels; not only ‗made in Eu- rope‘, but made in Africa, Asia
and the Americas.
The third wave of regionalism was characterized by diversity of forms

and organizations, a selection of which are presented in Table 1 below.
Like the third wave of democratization, there were few regions which did not
participate in this new wave. New institutions were formed in the Asia-
Pacific region, like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), in
the Americas, the Southern Cone Com- mon Market (MERCOSUR) and in
the former Soviet space, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
China, with the creation Shanghai Cooperation Organiza- tion (SCO), also
entered into regional security arrangements for the first time. Major reforms
were introduced in a number of existing institutions, notably in Europe, the
Americas and Africa, where additional protocols, treaties and conventions
were signed relating to conflict prevention and management, human rights
and democracy. Changes in name - leading to a reshuffling of acronyms -
were introduced to reflect these reforms. A great deal has been written about
the nature and content of this new regionalist moment, its varied and novel
dimensions and its relationship with global governance. However one
regards it the quantitative (and indeed qualita- tive) evidence cannot be
ignored. 30 If one considers one criteria alone: the involvement of regional
organizations in peacekeeping operations the growth in activity is striking.
From a mere handful of such operations in 1990, there were over 20 by
2000, and following a small dip, a further rise after 2006.31
IV. Conclusions: The Contemporary Scene
This short chapter has highlighted the constraints and opportunities

that the international system provides in explaining start up and change in
regional institutions. While new and old scholarship has approached
regionalism from a variety of perspectives, all of which have had their uses
according to time and place, it has been argued here that
rational/institutionalist arguments dominate in explanations of re-
gionalism both past and present. Illustrating this, the chapter has argued
that a useful distinction can be made between regionalism under bipolarity
in the Cold War and regionalism under unipolarity in the post-Cold War era.
In both cases regionalism, whether in economic or security affairs must be
understood as a response to the dominant order, providing states with a
means of balancing against large powers or bandwagoning with them. In
both cases regionalism has also had an interdependent relationship – at
times competitive, at times complementary - with multilateral institutions
and broader global processes. The way in which the numbers, functions and
memberships of regional organizations have shifted in line with global
trends supports this conclusion.
Regional institutions evidently condition the behaviour of their

members and provide parameters for action, but the propensity of
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institutions to switch roles in response to systemic changes suggests also
the close correlation between material interests and collective behaviour.
On the other hand, their survival and maintenance indicate that states do
value institutions and are willing to bear their costs even during periods of
uncertainty and failure.
Under unipolarity the trend towards further regional consolidation is

set to continue. It is both product of and reaction to what Peter
Katzenstein has called the American imperium.39 Given the constraints it
currently faces, a multilateral institution like the United Nations, as
highlighted in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document, is likely to
encourage rather than supplant the roles of regional organizations in the
near future.40 The consequences of the overextension of US power can be
seen in Iraq and elsewhere, demonstrating a growing demand for alternative
sources of action. Strong states will continue to find useful legitimizing roles
for regional institutions, and weak states will also benefit from their
welfare provision and security umbrella. To some extent then, contemporary
regionalism, like regionalism during the Cold War, is on a path dependent
trajectory unlikely to change until some new critical turning point is
reached.
Reference:
Acharya, A. (2000), Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:

ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, London: Routledge.
Fawcett, L. et.al (n.d). Regionalism in World Politics: Past and Present. Oxford University
Press.
Mansfield, E, et.al. (2010). Regionalism. Annual Review of Political Science. 2010. 13:145-
63.
Katzenstein, P.J. (2005) A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium,
Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y.
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Lesson 3: The Development of ASEAN as a Regional

Organization
Lesson Outcomes:
1. Discuss the development of ASEAN.
2. Determine the factors that lead to the conceptualization of
ASEAN.
The Founding of ASEAN
On 8 August 1967, five leaders – the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia,

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – sat down together in
the main hall of the Department of Foreign Affairs building in Bangkok,
Thailand and signed a document. By virtue of that document, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born. The five Foreign
Ministers who signed it – Adam Malik of Indonesia, Narciso R. Ramos of the
Philippines, Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia, S. Rajaratnam of Singapore, and
Thanat Khoman of Thailand – would subsequently be hailed as the
Founding Fathers of probably the most successful inter-governmental
organization in the developing world today. And the document that they
signed would be known as the ASEAN Declaration.
It was a short, simply-worded document containing just five articles. It

declared the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation
among the Countries of Southeast Asia to be known as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and spelled out the aims and purposes of
that Association. These aims and purposes were about cooperation in the
economic, social, cultural, technical, educational and other fields, and in the
promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice
and the rule of law and adherence to the principles of the United Nations
Charter. It stipulated that the Association would be open for participation by
all States in the Southeast Asian region subscribing to its aims, principles
and purposes. It proclaimed ASEAN as representing ―the collective will of the
nations of Southeast Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and
cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples
and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.‖
It was while Thailand was brokering reconciliation among Indonesia,

the Philippines and Malaysia over certain disputes that it dawned on the
four countries that the moment for regional cooperation had come or the
future of the region would remain uncertain. Recalls one of the two surviving
protagonists of that historic process, Thanat Khoman of Thailand: ―At the
banquet marking the reconciliation between the three disputants, I
broached the idea of forming another organization for regional cooperation
with Adam Malik. Malik agreed without hesitation but asked for time to talk
with his government and also to normalize relations with Malaysia now that
the confrontation was over. Meanwhile, the Thai Foreign Office prepared a
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draft charter of the new institution. Within a few months, everything was
ready. I therefore invited the two former members of the Association for
Southeast Asia (ASA), Malaysia and the Philippines, and Indonesia, a key
member, to a meeting in Bangkok. In addition, Singapore sent S.
Rajaratnam, then Foreign Minister, to see me about joining the new set-up.
Although the new organization was planned to comprise only the ASA
members plus Indonesia, Singapore‘s request was favorably considered.‖
And so in early August 1967, the five Foreign Ministers spent four
days in the relative isolation of a beach resort in Bang Saen, a coastal town
less than a hundred kilometers southeast of Bangkok. There they negotiated
over that document in a decidedly informal manner which they would later
delight in describing as ―sports-shirt diplomacy.‖ Yet it was by no means an
easy process: each man brought into the deliberations a historical and
political perspective that had no resemblance to that of any of the others.
But with goodwill and good humor, as often as they huddled at the
negotiating table, they finessed their way through their differences as they
lined up their shots on the golf course and traded wisecracks on one
another‘s game, a style of deliberation which would eventually become the
ASEAN ministerial tradition.
Now, with the rigors of negotiations and the informalities of Bang Saen
behind them, with their signatures neatly attached to the ASEAN
Declaration, also known as the Bangkok Declaration, it was time for some
formalities. The first to speak was the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Narciso Ramos, a one-time journalist and long-time legislator who had given
up a chance to be Speaker of the Philippine Congress to serve as one of his
country‘s first diplomats. He was then 66 years old and his only son, the
future President Fidel V. Ramos, was serving with the Philippine Civic Action
Group in embattled Vietnam. He recalled the tediousness of the negotiations
that preceded the signing of the Declaration that ―truly taxed the goodwill,
the imagination, the patience and understanding of the five participating
Ministers.‖ That ASEAN was established at all in spite of these difficulties,
he said, meant that its foundations had been solidly laid. And he impressed
it on the audience of diplomats, officials and media people who had
witnessed the signing ceremony that a great sense of urgency had prompted
the Ministers to go through all that trouble. He spoke darkly of the forces
that were arrayed against the survival of the countries of Southeast Asia in
those uncertain and critical times.
―The fragmented economies of Southeast Asia,‖ he said, ―(with) each

country pursuing its own limited objectives and dissipating its meager
resources in the overlapping or even conflicting endeavors of sister states
carry the seeds of weakness in their incapacity for growth and their self-
perpetuating dependence on the advanced, industrial nations. ASEAN,
therefore, could marshal the still untapped potentials of this rich region
through more substantial united action.‖
When it was his turn to speak, Adam Malik, Presidium Minister for Political
Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, recalled that about a
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year before, in Bangkok, at the conclusion of the peace talks between
Indonesia and Malaysia, he had explored the idea of an organization such as
ASEAN with his Malaysian and Thai counterparts. One of the ―angry young
men‖ in his country‘s struggle for independence two decades earlier, Adam
Malik was then 50 years old and one of a Presidium of five led by then
General Soeharto that was steering Indonesia from the verge of economic
and political chaos. He was the Presidium‘s point man in Indonesia‘s efforts
to mend fences with its neighbors in the wake of an unfortunate policy of
confrontation. During the past year, he said, the Ministers had all worked
together toward the realization of the ASEAN idea, ―making haste slowly, in
order to build a new association for regional cooperation.‖
Adam Malik went on to describe Indonesia‘s vision of a Southeast Asia

developing into ―a region which can stand on its own feet, strong enough to
defend itself against any negative influence from outside the region.‖ Such a
vision, he stressed, was not wishful thinking, if the countries of the region
effectively cooperated with each other, considering their combined natural
resources and manpower. He referred to differences of outlook among the
member countries, but those differences, he said, would be overcome
through a maximum of goodwill and understanding, faith and realism. Hard
work, patience and perseverance, he added, would also be necessary.
The countries of Southeast Asia should also be willing to take

responsibility for whatever happens to them, according to Tun Abdul Razak,
the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, who spoke next. In his speech, he
conjured a vision of an ASEAN that would include all the countries of
Southeast Asia. Tun Abdul Razak was then concurrently his country‘s
Minister of Defence and Minister of National Development. It was a time
when national survival was the overriding thrust of Malaysia‘s relations with
other nations and so as Minister of Defence, he was in charge of his
country‘s foreign affairs. He stressed that the countries of the region should
recognize that unless they assumed their common responsibility to shape
their own destiny and to prevent external intervention and interference,
Southeast Asia would remain fraught with danger and tension. And unless
they took decisive and collective action to prevent the eruption of intra-
regional conflicts, the nations of Southeast Asia would remain susceptible to
manipulation, one against another.
―We the nations and peoples of Southeast Asia,‖ Tun Abdul Razak
said, ―must get together and form by ourselves a new perspective and a new
framework for our region. It is important that individually and jointly we
should create a deep awareness that we cannot survive for long as
independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act together and
unless we prove by deeds that we belong to a family of Southeast Asian
nations bound together by ties of friendship and goodwill and imbued with
our own ideals and aspirations and determined to shape our own destiny‖.
He added that, ―with the establishment of ASEAN, we have taken a firm and
a bold step on that road‖.
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For his part, S. Rajaratnam, a former Minister of Culture of multi-cultural
Singapore who, at that time, served as its first Foreign Minister, noted that
two decades of nationalist fervor had not fulfilled the expectations of the
people of Southeast Asia for better living standards. If ASEAN would
succeed, he said, then its members would have to marry national thinking
with regional thinking.
―We must now think at two levels,‖ Rajaratnam said. ―We must think
not only of our national interests but posit them against regional interests:
that is a new way of thinking about our problems. And these are two
different things and sometimes they can conflict. Secondly, we must also
accept the fact, if we are really serious about it, that regional existence
means painful adjustments to those practices and thinking in our respective
countries. We must make these painful and difficult adjustments. If we are
not going to do that, then regionalism remains a utopia.‖
S. Rajaratnam expressed the fear, however, that ASEAN would be

misunderstood. ―We are not against anything‖, he said, ―not against
anybody‖. And here he used a term that would have an ominous ring even
today: balkanization. In Southeast Asia, as in Europe and any part of the
world, he said, outside powers had a vested interest in the balkanization of
the region. ―We want to ensure,‖ he said, ―a stable Southeast Asia, not a
balkanized Southeast Asia. And those countries who are interested,
genuinely interested, in the stability of Southeast Asia, the prosperity of
Southeast Asia, and better economic and social conditions, will welcome
small countries getting together to pool their collective resources and their
collective wisdom to contribute to the peace of the world.‖
The goal of ASEAN, then, is to create, not to destroy. This, the Foreign
Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, stressed when it was his turn to
speak. At a time when the Vietnam conflict was raging and American forces
seemed forever entrenched in Indochina, he had foreseen their eventual
withdrawal from the area and had accordingly applied himself to adjusting
Thailand‘s foreign policy to a reality that would only become apparent more
than half a decade later. He must have had that in mind when, on that
occasion, he said that the countries of Southeast Asia had no choice but to
adjust to the exigencies of the time, to move toward closer cooperation and
even integration. Elaborating on ASEAN objectives, he spoke of ―building a
new society that will be responsive to the needs of our time and efficiently
equipped to bring about, for the enjoyment and the material as well as
spiritual advancement of our peoples, conditions of stability and progress.
Particularly what millions of men and women in our part of the world want
is to erase the old and obsolete concept of domination and subjection of the
past and replace it with the new spirit of give and take, of equality and
partnership. More than anything else, they want to be master of their own
house and to enjoy the inherent right to decide their own destiny …‖
While the nations of Southeast Asia prevent attempts to deprive them

of their freedom and sovereignty, he said, they must first free themselves
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from the material impediments of ignorance, disease and hunger. Each of
these nations cannot accomplish that alone, but by joining together and
cooperating with those who have the same aspirations, these objectives
become easier to attain. Then Thanat Khoman concluded: ―What we have
decided today is only a small beginning of what we hope will be a long and
continuous sequence of accomplishments of which we ourselves, those who
will join us later and the generations to come, can be proud. Let it be for
Southeast Asia, a potentially rich region, rich in history, in spiritual as well
as material resources and indeed for the whole ancient continent of Asia, the
light of happiness and well-being that will shine over the uncounted millions
of our struggling peoples.‖
The Foreign Minister of Thailand closed the inaugural session of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations by presenting each of his colleagues
with a memento. Inscribed on the memento presented to the Foreign
Minister of Indonesia, was the citation, ―In recognition of services rendered
by His Excellency Adam Malik to the ASEAN organization, the name of
which was suggested by him.‖
And that was how ASEAN was conceived, given a name, and born. It had
been barely 14 months since Thanat Khoman brought up the ASEAN idea in
his conversations with his Malaysian and Indonesian colleagues. In about
three more weeks, Indonesia would fully restore diplomatic relations with
Malaysia, and soon after that with Singapore. That was by no means the end
to intra-ASEAN disputes, for soon the Philippines and Malaysia would have
a falling out on the issue of sovereignty over Sabah. Many disputes between
ASEAN countries persist to this day. But all Member Countries are deeply
committed to resolving their differences through peaceful means and in the
spirit of mutual accommodation. Every dispute would have its proper season
but it would not be allowed to get in the way of the task at hand. And at that
time, the essential task was to lay the framework of regional dialogue and
cooperation.
The two-page Bangkok Declaration not only contains the rationale for
the establishment of ASEAN and its specific objectives. It represents the
organization‘s modus operandi of building on small steps, voluntary, and
informal arrangements towards more binding and institutionalized
agreements. All the founding member states and the newer members have
stood fast to the spirit of the Bangkok Declaration. Over the years, ASEAN
has progressively entered into several formal and legally-binding
instruments, such as the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia and the 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone.
Against the backdrop of conflict in the then Indochina, the Founding

Fathers had the foresight of building a community of and for all Southeast
Asian states. Thus the Bangkok Declaration promulgated that ―the
Association is open for participation to all States in the Southeast Asian
region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes.‖
ASEAN‘s inclusive outlook has paved the way for community-building not
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only in Southeast Asia, but also in the broader Asia Pacific region where
several other inter-governmental organizations now co-exist.
The original ASEAN logo presented five brown sheaves of rice stalks,
one for each founding member. Beneath the sheaves is the legend ―ASEAN‖
in blue. These are set on a field of yellow encircled by a blue border. Brown
stands for strength and stability, yellow for prosperity and blue for the spirit
of cordiality in which ASEAN affairs are conducted. When ASEAN celebrated
its 30th Anniversary in 1997, the sheaves on the logo had increased to ten –
representing all ten countries of Southeast Asia and reflecting the colors of
the flags of all of them. In a very real sense, ASEAN and Southeast Asia
would then be one and the same, just as the Founding Fathers had
envisioned.
This article is based on the first chapter of ASEAN at 30, a publication

of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in commemoration of its 30th
Anniversary on 8 August 1997, written by Jamil Maidan Flores and Jun
Abad.
Further readings in ASEAN History:
ASEAN Conception and Evolution
ASEAN Conception and Evolution

By: THANAT KHOMAN
1 September 1992
The author was the Foreign Minister of Thailand when ASEAN was founded in Bangkok in
1967. This article was reprinted from The ASEAN Reader, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Singapore, 1992.
On 8 August 1967 the ―Bangkok Declaration‖ gave birth to ASEAN,

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, an organization that would
unite five countries in a joint effort to promote economic co-operation and
the welfare of their peoples. After repeated unsuccessful attempts in the
past, this event was a unique achievement, ending the separation and
aloofness of the countries of this region that had resulted from colonial
times when they were forced by the colonial masters to live in cloisons
etanches, shunning contact with the neighboring countries.
In effect this historical event represented the culmination of the

decolonization process that had started after World War II. Following their
victory in the war, the colonial powers tried their best to maintain the status
quo. However, since they had not even been able to ensure the protection of
their territories against the Japanese invasion, how could they justify their
claim to control them again. In their defeat, the Japanese had effectively
undermined colonial rule by granting some form of autonomy or even
independence to the territories they had earlier invaded, thus sowing the
seeds of freedom from the colonial masters. The process of decolonization,
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inside and outside the United Nations, then advanced at a fast pace and led
to the emergence of a number of independent and sovereign nations.
This created an entirely novel situation which necessitated new

measures and structures. Thailand, as the only nation which had been
spared the plight of colonial subjection thanks to the wisdom and political
skill of its Monarchs, felt it a duty to deal with the new contingencies. Pridi
Panomyong, a former Prime Minister and statesman, tried to promote new
relationships and co-operation within the region. I, myself, posted as the
first Thai diplomat in the newly independent India, wrote a few articles
advocating some form of regional co-operation in Southeast Asia. But the
time was not yet propitious. The world was then divided by the Cold War
into two rival camps vying for domination over the other, leading the newly
emerging states to adopt a non-aligned stance.
When, as Foreign Minister, I was entrusted with the responsibility of

Thailand‘s foreign relations, I paid visits to neighboring countries to forge
co-operative relationships in Southeast Asia. The results were, however,
depressingly negative. Only an embryonic organization, ASA or the
Association of Southeast Asia, grouping Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand could be set up. This took place in 1961. It was, nevertheless, the
first organization for regional co-operation in Southeast Asia.
But why did this region need an organization for co-operation?
The reasons were numerous. The most important of them was the fact that,
with the withdrawal of the colonial powers, there would have been a power
vacuum which could have attracted outsiders to step in for political gains.
As the colonial masters had discouraged any form of intra-regional contact,
the idea of neighbors working together in a joint effort was thus to be
encouraged.
Secondly, as many of us knew from experience, especially with the

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or SEATO, co-operation among
disparate members located in distant lands could be ineffective. We had
therefore to strive to build co-operation among those who lived close to one
another and shared common interests.
Thirdly, the need to join forces became imperative for the Southeast Asian
countries in order to be heard and to be effective. This was the truth that we
sadly had to learn. The motivation for our efforts to band together was thus
to strengthen our position and protect ourselves against Big Power rivalry.
Finally, it is common knowledge that cooperation and ultimately

integration s.erve the interests of all- something that individual efforts can
never achieve. However, co-operation is easier said than done.
Soon after its establishment in 1961, ASA or the Association of Southeast
Asia, the mini organization comprising only three members, ran into a snag.
A territorial dispute, relating to a colonial legacy, erupted between the
Philippines and Indonesia on the one hand and Malaysia on the other. The
dispute centred on the fact that the British Administration, upon withdrawal
from North Borneo (Sabah), had attributed jurisdiction of the territory to
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Malaysia. The konfrontasi, as the Indonesians called it, threatened to boil
over into an international conflict as Malaysia asked its ally, Great Britain,
to come to its support and British warships began to cruise along the coast
of Sumatra. That unexpected turn of events caused the collapse of the
fledgling ASA.
While ASA was paralysed by the dispute on Sabah, efforts continued to be

made in Bangkok for the creation of another organization. Thus in 1966 a
larger grouping, with East Asian nations like Japan and South Korea as well
as Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, Taiwan, New Zealand, South
Vietnam and Thailand, was established and known as ASPAC or the Asian
and Pacific Council. However, once again, calamity struck. ASPAC was
afflicted by the vagaries of international politics. The admission of the
People‘s Republic of China and the eviction of the Republic of China or
Taiwan made it impossible for some of the Council‘s members to sit at the
same conference table. ASPAC consequently folded up in 1975, marking
another failure in regional co-operation.
With this new misfortune, Thailand, which had remained neutral in

the Sabah dispute, turned its attention to the problem brewing to its south
and took on a conciliatory role in the dispute. At the time, I had to ply
between Jakarta, Manila, and Kuala Lumpur. After many attempts, our
efforts paid off. Preferring Bangkok to Tokyo, the antagonists came to our
capital city to effect their reconciliation. At the banquet marking the
reconciliation between the three disputants, I broached the idea of forming
another organization for regional co-operation with Adam Malik, then
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Indonesia, the largest
country of Southeast Asia. Malik agreed without hesitation but asked for
time to talk with the powerful military circle of his government and also to
normalize relations with Malaysia now that the confrontation was over.
Meanwhile, the Thai Foreign Office prepared a draft charter of the new
institution. Within a few months, everything was ready. I therefore invited
the two former ASA members, Malaysia and the Philippines, and Indonesia,
a key member, to a meeting in Bangkok. In addition, Singapore sent S.
Rajaratnam, then Foreign Minister, to see me about joining the new set-up.
Although the new organization was planned to comprise only the former ASA
members plus Indonesia, Singapore‘s request was favourably considered.
The first formal meeting of representatives from the five countries -

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand -was held in
the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The group then retired to the seaside
resort of Bangsaen (Pattaya did not exist at that time) where, combining
work with leisure -golf to be more exact -the ASEAN charter was worked out.
After a couple of days, using the Foreign Office draft as the basis, the
Charter was ready. The participants returned to Bangkok for final approval
of the draft, and on 8 August 1967, the Bangkok Declaration gave birth to
ASEAN – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (ASEAN owes its name
to Adam Malik, master in coining acronyms.)
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The formation of ASEAN, the first successful attempt at forging regional co-
operation, was actually inspired and guided by past events in many areas of
the world including Southeast Asia itself. The fact that the Western powers,
France and Britain, reneged on their pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia
promising protection against external aggression, was instrumental in
drawing the attention of many countries to the credibility of assurances
advanced by larger powers to smaller partners. The lesson drawn from such
events encouraged weak nations to rely more on neighborly mutual support
than on stronger states that serve their own national interests rather than
those of smaller partners. For Thailand, in particular, its disappointing
experience with SEATO taught it the lesson that it was useless and even
dangerous to hitch its destiny to distant powers who may cut loose at any
moment their ties and obligations with lesser and distant allies.
Another principle to which we anchored our faith was that our co-operation
should deal with non-military matters. Attempts were made by some to
launch us on the path of forming a military alliance. We resisted; wisely and
correctly we stuck to our resolve to exclude military entanglement and
remain safely on economic ground.
It should be put on record that, for many of us and for me in particular, our
model has been and still is, the European Community, not because I was
trained there, but because it is the most suitable form for us living in this
part of the world -in spite of our parallel economies which are quite different
from the European ones.
However, although we had clearly defined our aims and aspirations,

international realities forced ASEAN to deviate from its original path. Several
developments began to preoccupy ASEAN: the defeat and withdrawal of the
United States from Vietnam and even from the mainland of Asia; the
growing Vietnamese ambitions nurtured by the heady wine of victory; and
the threat of Ho Chi Minh‘s testament enjoining generations of Vietnamese
to take over the rest of French Indochina in addition to the northeastern
provinces of Thailand. Such developments forced ASEAN to turn its
attention to more critical issues, like Cambodia, with the result that
economic matters were almost entirely neglected and set aside.
Although not the original plan or intention of the founders of ASEAN, the
effective and successful opposition to the implementation of Vietnam‘s
Grand Design, using only diplomatic and political means, won a great deal
of plaudits and international credit, lifting it from an insignificant grouping
of small countries to a much courted organization with which more
important states now seek to have contact and dialogue. This has not been a
negligible result. Indeed, ASEAN has greatly benefited from its deviated
performance. ASEAN has now become a well established international
fixture.
While applauding the successes of the Association, it is not my
intention to pass over its weaknesses and shortcomings.
In the first place, the partnership spirit is not fully developed. Some parties
seek to take more than to give even if in choosing the latter course, they may
be able to take much more later on. Indeed, some of them do not hesitate to
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reduce their allotted share in projects, which, in their opinion, would not
immediately bring the highest return, and thus they leave the burden to
other members. In fact, it is common practice at many meetings, to jockey
for selfish gains and advantages, not bearing in mind the general interest.
Nevertheless, the most serious shortcoming of the present system resides in
the lack of political will as well as the lack of trust and sincerity towards one
another. Yet each and everyone in their heart realizes that the advantages of
ASEAN accrue to them all, and no one is thinking of leaving it.
Be that as it may, there is no readiness to admit to these shortcomings. That

is why they put the blame for these deficiencies on the Secretariat which
was set up by the governments themselves. Indeed, they distrust their
subordinate officials to the point that they have not been willing, until
recently, to appoint a Secretary-General of ASEAN, but only a Secretary-
General in charge of the Secretariat.
Whatever problems exist at present, it is not my intention to dwell on them.
They should, however, be resolved as expeditiously and effectively as
possible. Personally, I prefer to look ahead and chart out a course that will
lead to the objectives originally set out, so as to meet the expectations of our
peoples.
The question we should ask is: ASEAN, quo vadis? Where do we go from
here? To this, I would reply that, first of all, we must set ourselves on the
economic track we designed for the Association. This is necessary, even
imperative, now more than ever as the world is being carved into powerful
trade zones that deal with one another instead of with individual nations. At
present, many countries outside our region are prodding us to integrate so
that a single or more unified market will simplify and facilitate trade. That
stands to reason and yet it was only in 1992 when all partners were
convinced of the veracity of the proposition, when the then Thai Prime
Minister, Anand Panyarachun, officially put the idea of an ASEAN Free
Trade Area for discussion at the ASEAN Summit at Singapore. This
meaningful move was logical since ASEAN was born in Thailand. However, it
may take some fifteen years -as requested by some members -before a
rudimentary single, integrated market comes into being.
For the months and years to come, gradual economic integration

should be the credo for ASEAN if we want our enterprise to remain viable
and continue to progress. Otherwise, it may become stagnant, unable to
keep up with the pace of global activity. In spite of the Maastricht setback
where the Danes voted against ratifying the Treaty on European Union, the
European Community will most probably witness sustained expansion with
the addition of former EFTA members as well as a number of Central and
East European countries waiting to join. Meanwhile, NAFTA -the North
American Free Trade Area -is coming into being, parallel to another one
further south of the American continent. Likewise, on the southeast wing of
Europe, Turkey is busy organizing some form of co-operation with the
Islamic states of the Black Sea region of the defunct Soviet Union. All these
activities should be sufficient indication that there is an urgent need for
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ASEAN to scrutinize itself, to update its role, and to implement wider and
more serious organizational reforms -measures that are more meaningful
than simply revamping the Secretariat.
On the non-technical side, political will and the spirit of partnership

greatly need to be strengthened. In the future, competition will be severe.
Political and economic pressure through the use of unilateral measures and
threats will be resorted to without mercy by those who believe in brute force
rather than civilized negotiations, a method which I call ―crowbar‖ diplomacy
proudly proposed by the ―Amazon Warrior‖ before the legislative authorities
of her country. Without appropriate adjustments and improvements, ASEAN
may lose in the race for survival. And time is of the essence. ASEAN, in my
opinion, does not have much leeway to idle or doodle. We should realize that
two or three years are all we really have to implement urgent reforms.
While the pursuit of economic aims, as originally assigned, is

essential, it does not mean the Association should abandon the considerable
political gains it has made. On the contrary, ASEAN should continue to
build upon the prestige and recognition that the outside world has accorded
it. The results of ASEAN‘s past performance especially in the resistance
against Vietnamese military conquests and territorial expansionism, as well
as the unqualified success in preserving peace and stability against all odds,
are evident. Without doubt, ASEAN must strive to consolidate these assets
which will complement its efforts on the economic side. In other words, the
arduous task ahead for the Association will be a double- or triple- track
endeavour which can be crowned with success provided that the
weaknesses mentioned earlier are remedied and all the members, for their
own good and that of their people, decide to carry out their duties and
obligations with determination and a sense of purpose.
On the other hand, we should foresee that, in time to come, not only
will ASEAN have to face the difficult task of creating and maintaining
harmony among its members who have different views, different interests,
and are of different stages of development -factors that in the past have
made the adoption of needed reforms so uneasy -but ASEAN will also have
to cope with the extremely complicated problems of dealing with hard-nosed
opponents and interlocutors among the developed countries.
Finally, as with all organizations and entities, ASEAN will have to realize
that it will not be nor can it be the ultimate creation. In truth, it should be
only a stepping stone, a preliminary or intermediate stage in the process of
international development. As the world progresses, so will ASEAN. At this
juncture, everyone within the Association is aware of this reality. It should
be prepared to move on to the next stage and raise its sights towards wider
horizons. Some nascent possibilities like PECC (the Pacific Economic Co-
operation Council) and APEC (the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation
forum) are already in existence and more or less ready to bloom into
something more stable and viable. So far, ASEAN members have not been
willing to merge with the new entities, for various reasons, the most
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important of which may be a lack of conviction in the latters‘ viability.
Perhaps correctly, ASEAN members prefer to wait for more convincing
indications assuring them of their capacity to survive. They continue to
insist that ASEAN remains the nucleus from which peripheral relationships
might radiate. This is not an unwise approach, apparently dictated by
realism and caution in view of the audacity and increasing arrogance of
certain major powers. A precipitous decision may result in undesirable
entanglement or worse strangulation. Nevertheless, it may be wise for
ASEAN not to lose sight of two important countries further to the south of
Asia -Australia and New Zealand. If and when, they should express a clear
willingness and desire to playa genuine partnership role, they should be
welcome to join in any common endeavour. Their contribution will
undoubtedly increase the strength and capacity of our existing and future
co-operative undertakings, thus enabling us to meet with every chance of
success in future encounters and negotiations with similar entities of other
continents.
Lately, ASEAN has taken up a new assignment by engaging in

discussions on security matters, more precisely on the Spratly Islands
which are claimed by a number of nations, including Vietnam and the
People‘s Republic of China. The dispute threatened to erupt into an armed
conflict after concessions for oil exploration were granted by the People‘s
Republic of China to some American oil companies. If one or more
contestants resort to violence the dispute may degenerate into an ugly
conflict thereby disrupting the peace and stability of the region. For that
reason, Indonesia has already been moved to organize ―workshop‖
discussions to explore the possibility of an acceptable solution.
In the light of the Spratly problem, the ASEAN members prepared a draft
―Code of International Behaviour‖ which rules out any resort to violence.
This draft was tabled at the Manila Ministerial Meeting in 1992 which
approved it, as did the PRC and Vietnam, a dialogue partner and a signatory
of the ASEAN Treaty on Amity and Co-operation respectively. This was what
ASEAN could do, although it was only a moral gesture. Obviously, it could
not obtain from the main parties to the dispute, a categorical pledge not to
resort to violence. It may not be much. It was nevertheless better than
nothing and certainly better than to bury one‘s head in the sand. It is hoped
that in this, as in any other case, wisdom and restraint will prevail.
What will ultimately be the fate of ASEAN?

To this question, I am ready to offer a candid reply, forgetting my role as a
co-founder of the Association. My faith in the usefulness and ―serviceability‖
of ASEAN cannot and will not diminish. If anything, members will find it
beneficial to strengthen it. This is the rationale. In the post Cold War world,
the Western countries find it fit to assert with little restraint or moderation
their ascendancy and dominance, and some even seek to establish their
hegemony over the entire world by claiming undisputed leadership in a so-
called New World Order framework because of the absence of Soviet
challenge and rivalry. The ultimate result would be that other nations will,
ipso facto, become nothing but mere pawns of different size. The smaller
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ones will shrink still further and become even smaller and less significant.
In fact, they will count less on the world scene than before the advent of the
New World Order. Therefore, if they do not combine their minuscule
strength, they will lose all meaning. Now the only place where they can do
something with a measure of success is none other than the ASEAN forum.
Therefore, for our own interests, we cannot afford to be oblivious of this
plain truth and fail to act accordingly.
ASEAN Motto
The motto of ASEAN is “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”.
AIMS AND PURPOSES

As set out in the ASEAN Declaration, the aims and purposes of ASEAN are:
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a
prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations;
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for
justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the
region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific
and administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and
research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and
administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their
agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the
study of the problems of international commodity trade, the
improvement of their transportation and communications facilities
and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;
6. To promote Southeast Asian studies; and
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing
international and regional organisations with similar aims and
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among
themselves.
Reference:
ASEAN. Org.
Thanat Khoman, ―ASEAN Conception and Evolution‖, in the ASEAN Reader,

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1992.
S. Rajaratnam, ―ASEAN: The Way Ahead‖, in The ASEAN Reader, Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1992.
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C
Sciences
LOSING STATEMENT
You have learned about ASEAN and have traced its

development. By now you should understand the reasons and
the circumstances behind the effort of the Southeast Asian
countries in establishing a regional institution such as ASEAN.
Despite the overwhelming diversity in terms of culture, religion
and political landscape, the countries in Southeast Asia opted to
emphasize unity to promote sustainable peace and development
in the region. Next Stop-ASEAN organization.
36
54 Hours in Southeast Asia Casulla, R.R.K. Necosia, R.I.M. & Belderol, J.V.S
IS 106: ASEAN Studies General Education Dept. College of Arts & Sciences
Module 2
The ASEAN Organization
W ELCOME STATEMENT
This is Module 2-The ASEAN organization! In
the previous module you have learned about the
development of ASEAN. In this module you will
have an in-depth view of the ASEAN
organization. The next station is your final
deestination-Issues and Challenges in Southeast
Asia.
ASEAN AVE.
O UTCOMES
In this module, you are expected to examine the ASEAN’s
structure, membership, purpose, significance, and future challenges.
37
Lesson 1: The ASEAN Charter
Lesson Outcomes:
1. Identify key events in the development of the ASEAN Charter
2. Determine the salient features of the ASEAN Charter
3. Use the principles in the ASEAN Charter to argue for or against the
membership of Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea in the ASEAN
Since its establishment in 1967, the

ASEAN operated without a formal charter
until 2008. It has managed its affairs with
a minimum of formality, with few legally
binding arrangements, and with relatively
weak regional institutions. ASEAN’s
founding document was a two-page
―Declaration.‖ It had no criteria for
membership other than location in
Southeast Asia and adherence to some general principles of international
behavior. Most ASEAN agreements, even those that are technically binding,
have been dependent on the voluntary compliance of member states. There are
no mechanisms for calling member-states to account in case of non-compliance
with binding agreements. The ASEAN Secretariat, the closest thing that the
association has to an executive, remained weak in terms of formal powers.
With the promulgation of the ASEAN Charter, a legal framework for the
regional bloc was established. It transformed ASEAN to a legal entity with clear
objectives and structure. It also established ASEAN norms, rules, and values,
sets clear targets for ASEAN and presents accountability and compliance for its
member states.
The ASEAN Charter was adopted at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November
2007. The intention to draft the Charter had been formally proposed at the 11 th
ASEAN Summit held in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Ten
ASEAN leaders, one from each member state, called the ASEAN Eminent
Persons Group (EPG) were assigned to produced recommendations for the
drafting of the charter. At the 12 th ASEAN Summit held in January 2007 in
Cebu, Philippines, several basic proposals were made public. On November 14,
2008, Thailand’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador
Don Pramudwinai deposited the document with ASEAN Secretary-General,
Surin Pitsuwan, in New York. Almost a month after, the Charter came into
force and was launched on December 15, 2008 in Jakarta, Indonesia.
38
December 15, 2008 – ASEAN Headquarters, Jakart a,

Indonesia. ASEAN Foreign Ministers gathered at the ASEAN
Secretariat to celebrate the entry into force of the ASEAN
Charter.
November 20, 2007 – 13 th ASEAN Summit in Singapore.

During the 40th anniversary of its founding in 1967, the
ASEAN Charter was signed. The HLTF composed of one
representative from each of the 10 Member States. It contains
13 Chapters, 55 Articles, and 4 Annex. It will now be ratified
by the ASEAN Member Nations.
December 6, 2006 – 12 th ASEAN Summit in Cebu,

Philippines. The EPG endorsed a report building on ―ASEAN
Vision 2020‖ to the ASEAN Leaders. The report contained
observations, recommendations, and recommended draft
language for the new charter. The Cebu Declaration on the
Blue Print of the ASEAN Charter was issued. The High Level
Task Force (HLTF) for the Drafting of the ASEAN Charter
received its mandate on the same day. That mandate came
with a strict timetable: have the Charter ready for signature at
the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore.
December 12, 2005 – 11 th ASEAN Summit Declaration in

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The Eminent Persons Group of the
ASEAN Charter (L-R): Dr. Aun Porn Moniroth (Kingdom of
Cambodia), Nguyen Manh Cam (Socialist Republic of Vietnam),
Professor S. Jayakumar (Republic of Singapore), Ali Alatas
(Republic of Indonesia), Tun Musa Hitam (Chairman,
Malaysia), Fidel V. Ramos (Republic of the Philippines),
Khamphan Simmalavong (Lao People’s Democratic Republic),
M.R. Kasemsamosorn S. Kasemsri (Kingdom of Thailand), Dr.
Than Nyun (Union of Myanmar), Phein Dato Lim Jock Seng
(Brunei Darussalam). The EPG was mandated to make
recommendations for the ASEAN Charter, after 40 years of
existence.
August 8, 1967. The ASEAN Founding Fathers, Adam Malik of

Indonesia, Narciso R. Ramos of the Philippines, Tun Abdul Razak of
Malaysia, S. Rajaratnam of Singapore and Thanat Khoman of
Why di d i t take at Thailand, sat down together in the main hall of the Department of
l east 40 years for the Foreign Affairs building in Bangkok, Thailand, and signed a
document. The document that they signed would be known as the
ASEAN to create and ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration). This short, simply-worded
document containing just five articles, established an Association of
enforce i ts Charter? Regional Cooperation among the Countries of Southeast Asia to be
known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
39
SIGHT SEEING
Go the ASEAN official website, https://asean.org/ and study the ASEAN Charter. Write the
salient features of the Charter based on the following identified areas.
PREAMBLE
PURPOSE
PRINCIPLES
MEMBERSHIP
IMMUNITIES &
PRIVILEGES
40
The Road to ASEAN for Timor

Leste & Papua New Guinea
The Accession of Papua New Guinea (PNG)
The Accession of Timor Leste
PNG is no father away from the ASEAN
In 1999, following the United Nations-sponsored act
HQ of Jakarta. It forms half of the huge island of
of self-determination, Indonesia relinquished control of
New Guinea, with Indonesia’s Papua province
East Timor (Timor Leste). It became the first new
comprising the other half. ASEAN recognized
sovereign state of the 21st century on May 20, 2002. In
that PNG is part of the region when it gave PNG
2002, it was recognized as an observer of ASEAN. In
observer status in 1976. Since then, it has
2005, East Timor expressed its desire to be a member of
waited for 35 years for permission to become a
ASEAN by 2010. By December 2007, President Jose
full member.
Ramos-Horta restated that joining was a top priority and
Violent crime, political instability, poor
he hoped to join by 2012. By 2009, Thailand supported
infrastructure, discriminatory laws and unskilled
East Timor’s membership of ASEAN by 2012.
labor are obstacles to this happening, as well as
East Timor officially applied for membership in
the fact that the country is closer, culturally and
ASEAN on March 4, 2011. In 2012, Indonesia pushed for
geographically, to the Pacific Islands to its east
them to be granted ASEAN membership but other
and that it is historically and financially tied
member states such as Singapore and Laos, have
more closely to Australia in the south.
objected on the grounds that East Timor is not yet
As early as 1987, one obstacle is PNG’s
developed enough to join (East Timor has by far the
membership in the Pacific Islands Forum
smallest GDP in ASEAN, less than 15% of that of Laos).
(formerly South Pacific Forum), an inter-
In June 2013, the Philippines pledged support for East
governmental organization that aims to enhance
Timor’s ASEAN membership. However, by November
cooperation between countries and territories of
2013, U Aung Htoo, ASEAN Affairs Department Deputy
the Pacific Ocean. In 2009, the country asked for
Director, said that Timor Leste would not be ready to join
the support of the Philippines in its ASEAN bid,
in 2014 since they do not have an embassy in all 10
however, no official response was heard, as it
current ASEAN member states, a necessity for
was election time that year. At present,
membership.
Indonesia is the only ASEAN member supporting
In 2015, East Timor stated that it is now ready
PNG’s membership. A grassroots level of support
to join the association any time since it has fulfilled two
exists in the Philippines, although there is
major requirements for ASEAN membership: the country
caution due to PNG’s discriminatory policies on
was located in the region and it had opened embassies in
human rights, notably on LGBT rights and the
ASEAN member countries. The Philippines re-echoed its
issue of West Papua. Singapore, Malaysia, and
support for East Timor’s accession to ASEAN on the
Brunei have shown dissatisfaction over PNG’s
same year.
economic status which has hindered its
In 2016, Indonesia announced that Timor-
acceptance in ASEAN. Thailand, Vietnam and
Leste’s ASEAN Membership bid might be realized in 2017
Cambodia have shown displeasure towards anti-
since the feasibility studies on Timor Leste’s stability,
LGBT laws in PNG, as well as PNG’s lack of
security, economy and culture will be finished by the end
action over the issue of West Papua.
of 2016. In the middle of 2016, Cambodia announced
that they support Timor-Leste’s membership in ASEAN.
Read more articles to answer these questions:
In late 2017, it was declared that Timor Leste’s
1. Why is the Philippines a strong
accession would not take place. This is mostly because of
its lack of human resources, as pointed out by supporter of Timor Leste’s membership
Singapore. Despite this, it was announced that East to ASEAN?
Timor Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri will continue East 2. What is the issue on West Papua that
Timor’s participation in ASEAN as observer during the seems to be an issue for ASEAN
summit. The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and countries to support PNG’s
Cambodia reiterated Timor-Leste’s membership
membership?
application during the summits, however the other 6
ASEAN member states led by Singapore did not support 3. Singapore seems to not favor the
the move. membership of both countries to
In 2018, the Philippines was in talks with ASEAN? Why do you think so?
Brunei, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam regarding the 4. What are the merits of accepting and
approval of Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN. Talks rejecting the application of Timor Leste
were also set with Malaysia and Singapore, but both 41
and PNG, based on the ASEAN Charter?
nations rejected the proposal again. Singapore, the
ASEAN chair for 2018, noted that Timor-Leste’s
membership will be tackled during the year, but its
accession as a member will not be approved, pushing the
Lesson 2: The ASEAN Organization

Lesson Outcomes:
1. Discuss the significance of the ASEAN identity and symbols
2. Explain the roles of the different organs in the ASEAN Organization
3. Cite the external relations established by ASEAN with other nations
I. The ASEAN Identity and Symbols

Chapter XI of the ASEAN Charter
enumerates the identity and symbols of the
organization.
A. ASEAN Identity. ASEAN shall promote
its common ASEAN identity and a
sense of belonging among its peoples
in order to achieve its shared destiny,
goals and values (Article 35).
B. ASEAN Motto. One Vision, One Identity, One Community (Article 36).
C. ASEAN Day. The eighth of August shall be observed as ASEAN Day (Article 39)
ASEAN HYMN/ANTHEM
Article 40
The Asean Way / Original Version

Mr.Kittikhun Sodprasert, Mr Sampow Triudom,
ASEAN FLAG ASEAN EMBLEM Mrs.Payom Valaipatchra
Article 37 Article 38
Raise our flag high, sky high
Guidelines on the use of the ASEAN Flag Guidelines on t he Use of the ASEAN Emblem
1. The ASEAN Emblem shall be the Embrace the pride in our heart
1. The ASEAN Flag is a symbol of Member
States’ unity and support for the official emblem of ASEAN.
2. The ASEAN Emblem represents a ASEAN we are bonded as one
principles and endeavours of ASEAN
stable, peaceful, united and dynamic
and is a means to promote greater Look-in out to the world.
ASEAN awareness and solidarity. ASEAN. The colours of the Emblem --
2. The ASEAN Flag represents a stable, blue, red, white and yellow -- represent
the main colours of the state crests of For peace, our goal from the very start
peaceful, united and dynamic ASEAN.
all the ASEAN Member States.
The colours of the Flag – blue, red, And prosperity to last.
white and yellow – represent the main 3. The blue represents peace and
colours of the flags of all the ASEAN stability. Red depicts courage and
dynamism, white shows purity and We dare to dream we care to share.
Member States.
yellow symbolises prosperity.
3. The blue represents peace and stability. Together for ASEAN
Red depicts courage and dynamism, 4. The stalks of padi in the centre of the
white shows purity and yellow Emblem represent the dream of
ASEAN's Founding Fathers for an
we dare to dream,
symbolises prosperity.
4. The stalks of padi in the centre of the ASEAN comprising all the countries in
Southeast Asia, bound together in
we care to share for it’s the way of ASEAN
Emblem represent the dream of
ASEAN’s Founding Fathers for an friendship and solidarity.
ASEAN comprising all the countries in 5. The circle represents the unity of
Southeast Asia, bound together in ASEAN.
friendship and solidarity.
5. The circle represents the unity of
ASEAN
What is t he common
SIGHT SEEING
message of t he ASEAN
42
symbols in t er ms of t he
ASEAN Ident it y?
II. The ASEAN Organs

A. ASEAN Chair
According to
Article 31 of the
ASEAN Charter, the
Chairmanship of
ASEAN shall rotate
annually, based on
the alphabetical
order of the English
names of Member
States. A Member
State assuming the
Chairmanship shall
chair the ASEAN
Summit and related
summits, the ASEAN
Coordinating Council, Organizational Structure of the ASEAN Secretariat
the three ASEAN
Community Councils, relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and senior
officials, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives.
B. Secretary-General (SG) of ASEAN
The Secretary-General of ASEAN is appointed by the ASEAN Summit for
a non-renewable term of office of five years, selected from among nationals of
the ASEAN Member States based on alphabetical rotation. The Secretary-
General of ASEAN. The SG is assisted by four Deputy Secretary Generals (DSG)
from the different ASEAN Community Councils. The four DSGs shall be of
different nationalities from the Secretary-General and shall come from four
different ASEAN Member States.
C. ASEAN Community Councils
The ASEAN Community Councils comprise Council of all the three pillars of
ASEAN: (1) ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, (2) ASEAN Economic
Community Council, and (3) ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council.
D. ASEAN Coordinating Council
The ASEAN Coordinating Council comprise the ASEAN Foreign Ministers and is
held at least twice annually to prepare for the ASEAN Summit. In accordance with
Article 8 of the ASEAN Charter, the following are the roles of the ACC: (1) prepare the
meetings of the ASEAN Summit, (2) coordinate the implementation of agreements and
decisions of the ASEAN Summit, (3) coordinate with the ASEAN Community Councils
to enhance policy coherence, efficiency and cooperation among them, (4) coordinate
the reports of the ASEAN Community Council to the ASEAN Summit, (5) consider the
annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of ASEAN, (6) consider the report
43
of the Secretary-General on the functions and operations of the ASEAN Secretariat

and other relevant bodies, (7) approve the appointment and termination of the Deputy
Secretaries-General upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General, (8) undertake
other tasks provided for in this Charter or such other functions as may be assigned by
the ASEAN Summit.
E. ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies
ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies shall: (a) function in accordance with
their respective established mandates, (b) implement the agreements and
decisions of the ASEAN Summit under their respective purview, (c) strengthen
cooperation in their respective fields in support of ASEAN integration and
community building, (d) submit reports and recommendations to their
respective Community Councils.
F. COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO ASEAN

Each ASEAN Member State shall appoint a Permanent Representative to
ASEAN with the rank of Ambassador based in Jakarta. The Permanent
Representatives collectively constitute a Committee of Permanent
Representatives which shall: (a) support the work of the ASEAN Community
Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, (b) coordinate with ASEAN
National Secretariats and other ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies; (c) liaise
with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat on all subjects
relevant to its work, (d) facilitate ASEAN cooperation with external partners;
and (e) perform such other functions as may be determined the ASEAN
Coordinating Council.
G. ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS BODY
In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter
relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. This ASEAN
human rights body shall operate in accordance with the forms of reference to be
determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.
H. ASEAN FOUNDATION
Each ASEAN Member State shall appoint a Permanent Representative to
ASEAN with the rank of Ambassador based in Jakarta. The Permanent
Representatives collectively constitute a Committee of Permanent
Representatives which shall: (a) support the work of the ASEAN Community
Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, (b) coordinate with ASEAN
National Secretariats and other ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies; (c) liaise
with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat on all subjects
relevant to its work, (d) facilitate ASEAN cooperation with external partners;
and (e) perform such other functions as may be determined the ASEAN
Coordinating Council.
44
Conduct a SWOT Analysis of the ASEAN Organizational Structure.

Analyze the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the
ASEAN structure.
SWOT ANALYSIS
45
 ASEAN Re gional Fo rum

(AR F): Launched in 1993, the
twenty-seven-member
multilateral grouping was
developed to facilitate
cooperation on political and
security issues to contribute
to regional confidence -
building and preventive
diplomacy. The forum
represents a wide array of
voices—including ASEAN, its
dialogue partners, North
Korea, and Pakistan, among
others—yet it is often mired in
geopolitical disputes that limit
its effectiveness.
 AS EAN Pl us T h r ee:
The consultative group
initiated in 1997 brings
together ASEAN’s ten
members, China, Japan, and
South Korea. The grouping
was characterized as ―the
most coherent and
substantive‖ pan-Asian
grouping― by Evan A.
Feigenbaum and Robert A.
Manning in a CFR report.
 East Asi a S um m i t
(EAS ): First held in 2005, the
summit seeks to promote
security and prosperity in the
region and is usually attended
by the heads of state from
ASEAN, Australia, China,
India, Japan, New Zealand,
Russia, South Korea, and the
United States. ASEAN plays a
central role as the agenda-
setter. ―The summit remains
the only opportunity for the
president of the United States
to sit down and collectively
engage his Asia-Pacific
counterparts on the main
political and security issues of
the day,‖ write Vikram Singh
of the Center for American
Progress and Lindsey Ford of
the Asia Society Policy
Institute.
46
ASEAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS

The APT seeks to promote greater
cooperation in economic and many functional
areas amongst the ten ASEAN Member States
ASEAN has cultivated close cooperation with and its three partners, namely, China, Japan
countries and organizations outside the and the Republic of Korea, thus contributing to
region in numerous fields such as trade, greater stability and prosperity in the East Asian
investment, human resource development, region. The EAS serves as a forum for strategic
science and technology, education, drug dialogue amongst the ten ASEAN Member States
trafficking and anti-terrorism. These are and its key partners, namely, Australia, China,
done through the frameworks of ASEAN+1 India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New
(with its 1O Dialogue Partners -- Australia, Zealand, the Russian Federation and the United
Canada, China, India, Japan, The Republic States, and seeks to reinforce an ASEAN-
of Korea, New Zealand, the Russian centered regional architecture for the wider Asia-
Federation, the United States, and the Pacific region.
European Union, as well as with the United
Nations), ASEAN Plus Three and the East ASEAN also has sectoral dialogue
Asia Summit (EAS). relations with Pakistan and Norway. Papua New
Guinea is a Special Observer to ASEAN. In
- ASEAN-Australia Dialogue addition, ASEAN has cultivated ties with a
Relations number of regional groupings such as the
established in 1974 Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the
- ASEAN-New Zealand Dialogue Gulf (GCC), the South Asian Association for
Relations established in 1975 Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Economic
- ASEAN-Canada Dialogue Relations Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Southern
established in 1977 Common Market or MERCOSUR, the Rio Group
- ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations and its successor the Community of Latin
established in 1977 American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the
- ASEAN-Japan Dialogue Relations Pacific Alliance.
established in 1977
ASEAN also seeks to play a more
- ASEAN-UNDP Dialogue relations
proactive role in the global community of nations
were established in 1977 and has by contributing to addressing the key regional
since been succeeded by the and global challenges to humanity. In so doing,
ASEAN-UN comprehensive ASEAN will continue to promote a common
partnership ―ASEAN voice‖ in multilateral fora and to engage
- ASEAN-US Dialogue Relations actively with global partners to promote shared
goals.
established in 1977
- ASEAN-the Republic of Korea Read more articles to answer these questions:
1. What is the most significant ASEAN
Dialogue Relations established in
External Relation? Why?
1991 2. For the Philippines, what is the most
- ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations important bilateral relations we have
established in 1995 and why?
- ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations
established in 1996
- ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations
47
References:
https://asean.org/press-release-asean-foreign-ministers-to-celebrate-the-entry-into-
force-of-the-asean-charter-at-the-asean-secretariat-asean-secretariat-9-december-
2008/
Koh, T., Manalo, R.G., Woon, W. (2009). The Making of the ASEAN Charter. Singapore:
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. [PDF]. Retrieved from
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789812833914_fmatter.
Severino, R.C. (2005). Framing the ASEAN Charter: An ISEAS Perspective. Singapore:
ISEAS Publications
Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter
Arno Maierbrugger. "Expanding ASEAN: Five candidates and their options | Investvine".
investvine.com. Retrieved 2019-02-19.
Luke Hunt, The Diplomat. "Papua New Guinea Eyes ASEAN | The Diplomat".
thediplomat.com. Retrieved 2019-02-19.
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/154860/papua-new-guinea-asks-
rp-support-for-asean-membership-bid/story/
Aung, Nyan Lynn; McLaughlin, Tim (7 November 2013). "Timor Leste on the ASEAN
waiting list". The Myanmar Times. Retrieved 20 December 2013.
Padden, Brian (29 March 2011). "Indonesia Supports East Timor's Bid to Join
ASEAN". Voice of America. Retrieved 20 February 2013.
Thailand to support East Timor's membership of Asean, East Timor Law and Justice
Bulletin, 13 January 2009, accessed on 27 November 2009
Hunt, Luke (27 May 2016). "East Timor Hopes for ASEAN Membership by 2017". The
Diplomat. Retrieved 24 February 2017.
Singapore and the Philippines express support for Timor-Leste's bid for ASEAN
membership after Official visits". Government of Timor-Leste. 19 June 2013.
Retrieved 20 December 2013.
"Timor Leste application for ASEAN membership still being studied - chairman's
report". InterAksyon. 2017-11-16. Retrieved 2017-11-26.
Official Website of the ASEAN. https://asean.org.
Osborne, Milton (2010; first published in 1979). Southeast Asia: An Introductory

History Allen & Unwin. ISBN 978-1-74237-302-7.
"ASEAN Member States". ASEAN WEBSITE. https://asean.org.
48
ASEAN Community in Figures (ACIF) 2013 (PDF) (6th ed.). Jakarta: ASEAN. Feb 2014.
p. 1. ISBN 978-602-7643-73-4.
Park; King, Seung-Woo; Victor T. (2013). The Historical Construction of Southeast

Asian Studies: Korea and Beyond. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
ISBN 9789814414586.
Emmerson, Donald K (1984). "Southeast Asia: What's in a Name?". Journal of

Southeast Asian Studies. 15 (1): 1–21. doi:10.1017/S0022463400012182. JSTOR
20070562. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/asean-association-southeast-asian-nations
49
C LOSING STATEMENT
You have learned about the reasons behind the establishment of ASEAN.
As an “ASEAN Citizen”, I hope that you will live those principles and start
to care not just our country but also our neighbors.
50
Module III
Contemporary Issues & Challenges
W ELCOME STATEMENT
This is Module 3, your final point! Brace yourself; it’s going
to be a little rough! In the previous module you had an in-
depth view of the ASEAN. Now its time to see how did
ASEAN respond to transnational issues affecting the
region.
ASEAN AVE.
O UTCOMES
In this module, you are expected to assess the contemporary issues
and challenges in the ASEAN Regional Bloc.
51
Lesson 1: WEST PHILIPPINE SEA DISPUTE
Lesson Outcomes:
1. Analyze the West Philippine sea dispute
2. Determine the response of ASEAN to the West Philippine Sea
dispute.
I. Origins of the South China Sea Dispute
The dispute on the territorial features in the West Philippine Sea is

rooted in the region's deep colonial
past. South China Sea is a maritime
trade route, before the colonies are
present in the region. In the early
16th century the colonial control over
the region began. They arrived in the
South China Sea with a view to setting
up regional trading stations and
suppliers of natural resources.
In 1877-the British colony of Labuan, an island north of Borneo, granted

a license to plant the British flag on the Spratly Island for a group of
businessmen to use it for commercial purposes. The group’s search for guano
stopped after a killing incident, hence no flag was planted. In April 1930,
during the second expedition to the Paracels and Spratlys by the ship La
Malicieuse, France declared its formal possession of the Paracels and Spratlys
by hoisting a French flag on the highest point of an island called Ile de la
Tempete.
On 26 July 1933-France officially proclaimed its jurisdiction over the

Paracels and Spratlys and took over the archipelagos in physical possession.
Japan was the first to protest against French declaration of sovereignty in
1933. The Japanese control over the archipelago was limited to economic
ambitions, it made no claim for sovereignty until it protested against French
claims and forcefully occupied the Paracels and Spratlys in 1939.
In the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan declared that it "waives all right,
title and claim to the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands." However, it did
not specifically specify the status of the Paracels and Spratlys' sovereignty after
the Japanese renunciation. At the other hand, the Cairo Declaration (1943)
declared that all the territories that Japan had seized from the Chinese, such
as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, should be returned to the
Republic of China "This Declaration removed Paracels and Spratlys from the"
robbed territories to be returned to China. Nevertheless, the status of the
Paracels and Spratlys was still not established. In addition, the Potsdam
52
Declaration declared that, "the terms

of the Cairo Declaration shall be
applied and the jurisdiction of Japan
shall be limited to the islands of
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushsu,
Shikoku and the minor islands we
decide."
Map of West Philippine Sea. Retrieved from shorturl.at/asyH4
China and Taiwan, under the
Cairo Declaration, assimilated the Paracels and Spratlys with those issued to
them. Vietnam based its statements on the invasion and declaration of France.
In addition, they reaffirmed their claims, as the Cairo Declaration removed
from China the Paracels and Spratlys as Japanese stolen land. Considering the
lack of clarification in the status of the two island groups after the end of the
Second World War, the Philippines treated them as terra nullius, or belonging
to none, thereby allowing other countries the right to make claims.
The Paracels
The Paracels includes the Amphitrite

and Crescent groups and several other
islands and features adjacent to them. It
covers 305 square kilometers in area. The
closest distances from the Paracels to
Hainan Island in China and Ly Son Island
in Vietnam are roughly 140 nautical miles,
respectively, and 123 nautical miles.
Spratlys
The Spratlys also encompass a Image of Paracel and Spratly Islands .Retrieved from
much larger 160 square kilometer area. shorturl.at/nvGRZ
The shortest distances from the coastal
states to the middle of the Spratlys are roughly 200 nautical miles from the
Point of Brooke in the Philippines, 330 nautical miles from the southern coast
of Vietnam, 247 nautical miles from the coast of Malaysia, 405 nautical miles
from the southern islands of the Paracels archipelago, 540 nautical miles from
the Hainan Island of China, 860 nautical miles from the southern coast of
Malaysia.
The future development in the South China Sea of rich natural resources
is serving as a significant contributing factor to the nature of the conflict.
There are 125 billion barrels of oil in undiscovered deposits, and 500 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas. Is one of the richest fishing grounds in the world, with
many varieties of fish such as round scads, sardines, big-eye scads, mackerel,
and tuna (Chinese National Offshore Oil Company ,November 2012). Malaysia
has developed a diving facility successfully in the Swallow Reef and China is
53
also preparing to develop its tourism industry in the Paracels. Vietnam sent a
party of tourists to the Spratlys, too.
South China Sea's economic importance has made it a major source of

dispute between claimant states. The unresolved conflict over the jurisdiction
of the territorial features and their waters has made the claimant states resort
as much as possible to assertive means of extracting resources and managing
maritime spaces. Incidents involving disputes with fishing vessels recently
have been on the rise, exacerbating regional tensions.
Geo-Strategic Importance of the South China Sea
It is the geostrategic value

that is generally the principal
reason for the parties to
strengthen their argument over the
Spratlys and the Paracels. The
South China Sea is the key to the
world's ocean, the trade hub, and
a security barrier for many littoral
states. The South China Sea is
inside the overlapping area of
control between China and the
United States. The South China
Sea's geo-strategic importance has
turned the conflicts in the South
China Sea from a regional to an
international conflict. It has
gradually become a strategic
chessboard for the presence and
Image South China Sea. Retrieved from shorturl.at/nHNPV
involvement of big power.
Public opinion or nationalism may act as a major barrier to some sort of

compromise towards the dispute over the South China Sea. Public opinion
about the conflicts has also
skyrocketed in both Vietnam and
the Philippines.
Anti-China rallies broke out in

Vietnam and the Philippines
following some of China's assertive
activities in the South China Sea
in 2011, especially when a group
of Chinese law enforcement boats
harassed the seismic surveillance
vessels in Binh Minh.
54
Image of 9-dash line. Retrieved from shorturl.at/fsNS3
In China there has been a significant revival of the mindset of the Middle
Kingdom, known as "Tianxia," based on a book published in 2005 by Zhao
Tingyang titled "The Tianxia System: A Theory for the World Institution."Within
the ideology of "tianxia," the Chinese claimed that there was no conflict in the
South China Sea between China and the littoral states because Southeast
Asian states were historically vassals of China. The South China Sea has long
been under China's sphere of control where it has "historical privileges" and
"sovereignty." As "tianxia" – meaning the world as a whole belongs to the
Chinese emperor who set his own laws on the way the world was run.
Development of International Law
Three sets of international law governing the South China Sea dispute.
1.The Territorial Acquisition Law;
Under this, a territory title may be acquired in five modes: occupation,

prescription, designation, conquest, and accession
2. The Law of the Sea;
Codified under customary international law and three United Nations-led

conferences on maritime law.
3. The Law on Dispute Settlement;
No international judicial body has compulsory jurisdiction to settle a

dispute without the consent of the States concerned as regards the
question of sovereignty.
China's Coastal States 9-dragged Lines Gobble Up EEZs. China's claim

to 9-point lines covers 85.7 percent of the entire South China Sea. The legal
basis for the dashes was not clarified in China. There were no set coordinates
at the dashes. Under Art. 2(3) of the UN Charter.
“All Members shall resolve their international disputes by diplomatic

means in such a way as not to endanger international peace and stability, and
justice”.
Moreover, CHAPTER VI of the PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33 states that the
―..parties to any conflict susceptible of jeopardizing the preservation of

international peace and security shall, first of all, pursue a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation , conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
recourse to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.”
55
All States that surround the South China Sea and assert jurisdiction
over the South China Sea islands are parties to UNCLOS. UNCLOS believes
who has jurisdiction over land territories, including offshore islands, is well
established. This sets out what maritime areas States may demand from their
land territories and islands, and the rights and duties of coastal states and
other states in the various maritime zones.
If a State is a party to UNCLOS, it consents in writing to the prohibitions

on conflict settlement in UNCLOS Part XV. The general principle in Part XV is
that when a dispute occurs between two parties concerning the interpretation
or application of a provision in UNCLOS and the dispute cannot be resolved by
consultation and negotiation, either party to the dispute may bring the dispute
unilaterally before an international court or arbitral tribunal (Art.286,UNCLOS)
and the court or tribunal 's judgment is legally binding.
Neither China nor the Philippines has made a declaration indicating a

preference for a particular court or tribunal. Therefore, the Philippines initiated
arbitral proceedings against China pursuant to Annex VII. In 1996, China
made a formal statement pursuant to Article 298 stating that it does not
recognize the scheme of compulsory procedures requiring binding judgments
on any of the types of conflicts referred to in Article 298 in Section 2 of Part XV
of UNCLOS. The Philippines opened Annex VII to Arbitration on 22 January
2012. On 19 February 2013, the Chinese Foreign Minister's spokesperson
addressed a query from the press, stating that China declined to consider the
note and its accompanying notice and returned it to Manila
Philippines v. China South China Sea arbitration
1.The Philippines sought a declaration that the countries’ respective rights and
obligations regarding the waters, seabed, and maritime features of the South
China Sea are governed by UNCLOS. As such, China’s claims based on any
―historic rights‖ to waters, seabed, and subsoil within the nine-dash line are
contrary to UNCLOS and invalid.
Holding: UNCLOS ―comprehensively‖ governs the parties’ respective rights to

maritime areas in the South China Sea. Therefore, to the extent China’s nine-
dash line is a claim of ―historic rights‖ to the waters of the South China Sea, it
is invalid.
Reasoning: Whatever historic rights China may have had were extinguished
when UNCLOS was adopted, to the extent those rights were incompatible with
UNCLOS.
2. The Philippines sought a determination as to whether certain land features

in the Spratly Islands claimed by both China and the Philippines are properly
characterized as islands, rocks, low tide elevations (LTEs), or submerged
banks.
56
Holding: None of the features in the Spratly Islands generates an EEZ, nor can
the Spratly Islands generate an EEZ collectively as a unit. As such, the
Tribunal declared certain areas are within the Philippines’ EEZ and not
overlapped by any possible Chinese entitlement.
Reasoning: The baseline of analysis is what the features can sustain in their
―natural condition‖ .Based on historical evidence; none of the features in the
Spratly Islands can sustain either a stable community of people or economic
activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely extractive in
nature. The current presence of personnel on the features is dependent on
outside support and does not reflect the capacity of the features in their
natural condition.
3. The Philippines sought a declaration that China violated UNCLOS by

interfering with the Philippines’ rights and freedoms within its EEZs.
Holding: China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its EEZ. It did so
by interfering with Philippine fishing and hydrocarbon exploration;
constructing artificial islands; and failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from
fishing in the Philippines’ EEZ. China also interfered with Philippine
fishermen’s traditional fishing rights near Scarborough Shoal . China’s
construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands, as well
as illegal fishing and harvesting by Chinese nationals, violate UNCLOS
obligations to protect the marine environment. Finally, Chinese law
enforcement vessels unlawfully created a serious risk of collision by physically
obstructing Philippine vessels at Scarborough Shoal in 2012.
4. The Philippines sought a declaration that China’s recent actions, specifically

its land reclamation and construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands
after the arbitration was commenced, violated the obligations UNCLOS places
on states to refrain from conduct that ―aggravates and extends‖ a dispute while
dispute resolution proceedings are pending.
Holding: China has aggravated and extended the disputes through its
dredging, artificial island-building, and construction activities.
Reasoning: While these proceedings were pending, China has built a large
island on Mischief Reed, an LTE within the Philippines’ EEZ; caused
irreparable harm to the marine ecosystem; and permanently destroyed
evidence of the natural condition of the features at issue. There are no
provisions in UNCLOS on how to determine which State has the better claim to
sovereignty over a disputed territory. UNCLOS only sets out what maritime
zones can be claimed from land territory (including islands), as well as the
rights and jurisdiction of States in such maritime zones.
57
The Role of ASEAN
In 1992, the first ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, adopted at
the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, took no sides and instead emphasized the
non-use of force and urged all parties, whether these were ASEAN member
states or China, to exercise restraint in order to create a positive climate for
eventual resolution. In 2004, ASEAN and China agreed on an action plan, and
guidelines for implementation in 2011.
―ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea‖ released on 20 July

2012 reaffirming ASEAN’s commitment to:
1. The full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the

South China Sea (2002);
2. The Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of

Parties in the South China Sea (2011);
3. The early conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea;
4. The full respect of the universally recognized principles of the International

Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS);
5. The continued exercise of the self-restraint and non-use of force by all

parties; and
6. The peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with universally

recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
58
Base from the discussions above, answer the following

questions.
1. What are the bases of China’s claim over West Philippine Sea?
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
_________________ ___________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
2. What are the claims of the Philippines over West Philippine Sea?
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
3. How did the ASEAN respond to the dispute in the West Philippine
Sea?
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
59
References:
Billo, Jing Huang and Andrew (2015). Territorial Disputes in the South China
Sea. Palgrave Macmillan.
Carpio, A. (2017). The South China Sea Dispute: Philippine Sovereign Rights and
Jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea.Retrieved from
https://archive.su.edu.ph/assets/media/2017New%20Folder/Philippine%20Sovereign
%20Rights%20and%20Jurisdiction%20in%20the%20West%20Philippine%20Sea%20The
%20South%20China%20Sea%20Dispute%20by%20Senior%20Associate%20Justice%20A
ntonio%20T.%20Carpio.pdf
Charter Of The United Nations. (n.d.). Retrieved July 27, 2020, from
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/charter-of-the-united-nations
Lo, C. (1989). China's policy towards territorial disputes: The case of the South
China Sea islands. London: Routledge.
Shicun, Wu.(2013).Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development

in the South China Sea. Cambridge: Chandos Publishing.
"United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." n.d.
Williams, Robert D. (2016). Tribunal Issues Landmark Ruling in South China

Sea Arbitration. Lawfare.
60
Lesson 2: ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN MYANMAR: CASE

OF ROHINGYA
Lesson Outcomes:
1.Analyze the issue on the ethnic violence in Myanmar
2.Determine the proper response of ASEAN to the issue on ethnic
violence in Myanmar.
Brief Historical Background
As Burma gained independence in

1948, the former British colony held all
the resources to maintain Britain's
political structure. The parliamentary
structure subsided until the coup
d'état of General Ne Win on March 2nd
1962. Since then on isolationism and
nationalism have become the driving
ideals of the new military government
in Burma. The state progressively closed off to the world as the military Junta
became more and more powerful. Burmese people lost voting rights, freedom of
speech and several other important civil liberties. Amid this political
oppression, numerous rebel groups were born, fighting for their basic human
rights, but mostly for the survival of their ethnic group.
In 1947, in preparation for independence, the Panglong Agreement,

considered the founding treaty of the present Union of Burma or Myanmar,
was signed between the post-colonial rulers and the minorities in order to
guarantee their people's recognition, autonomy and right to be included in the
democratic process. Given the importance of Myanmar's ethnic groups, the
inclusive agreement was quickly forgotten after Aung San, one of its
instigators, was assassinated and the military took over the government.
Also opposing the Panglong process was the decision to make Buddhism the
state religion of Burma in 1961 due to the existence in Myanmar of a small
minority of Indian Muslims who felt threatened by this assimilation attempt. In
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government violently repressed mass
protests seeking to restore democracy and secure minority rights. During that
same period, a number of ceasefires were signed between Burma and the
armed rebels, although there was no disarmament or progress on ethnic
issues. The military regime's refusal to back down, even after the National
61
League of Democracy (NLD) victory during the 1990 elections, triggered

significant national discontent.
The Case of Rohingya
Many of Burma’s indigenous Muslims

live in Rakhine State, on the Western coast
next to the border with Bangladesh.
Rohingya are however considered to be
stateless, because the Myanmar Government
officially considers the ethnic minority to be
illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. The
persecution has forced nearly one million
Rohingya to flee into Bangladesh since 1977,
with many more seeking refuge in other
countries. Other Muslim countries have
opened their doors to the refugees, with some
choosing to flee to India, Pakistan, Malaysia Myanmar: Major ethnic groups. Retrieved from
and Indonesia. shorturl.at/stzKQ
Rohingya people claim they are descendants of Muslims who came to

Myanmar centuries ago, maybe Persian and Arab merchants. In Bangladesh,
they speak a language similar to the Chittagong Bengali dialect. Many in
Myanmar are reviling the Rohingya as illegal immigrants and they suffer
systemic discrimination. The Government of Myanmar views them as stateless
persons and forbids them citizenship. Stringent restrictions have been placed
on Rohingya people’s freedom of movement, access to medical assistance,
education and other basic services. According to Human Rights Watch, the
Burmese government refused citizenship to any Rohingya people who could not
claim that their ancestors were settled in the country before 1823, the start of
British invasion of what is now Rakhine State (also known as Arakan). Almost
400,000 Rohingya people in the country of Myanmar have been forced to flee
from their homes to another country nearby, Bangladesh, because of fighting
in the state where they live.
In 1982, Myanmar didn’t recognized Rohingya as part of their ethnic

group and stripping them of citizenship. Hence, Rohingya babies born since
1994 were refused with birth certificates. There were also longstanding
restrictions upon freedom of movement and denial of access to healthcare,
employment opportunities and higher education. National Registration Cards
(NRC) was issued after independence, to the Muslim minority of Rakhine. The
following observation was subsequently made by the NRC:
"Holding this certificate shall not be treated as a definitive evidence of
citizenship."
62
No more NRCs were given to the Rohingya starting in the 1970s, and the
old NRCs were confiscated. The 1982 law on nationality, which was strongly
criticized by the United Nations, decreed that all Burma residents would have
to reapply for citizenship. Under this rule, new color-coded NRCs were
released, and the Rohingya were no longer qualified for full citizenship
promised by the pink NRCs, setting the groundwork for making the Muslim
minority, first second-class citizens, and later stateless.
Ethnic tensions have simmered in the Rakhine state for decades, with
occasional outbreaks of violence. Nine police officers were killed by armed men
in October 2016, accused by officials of being Muslims. 87,000 Rohingya
Muslims fled to Bangladesh amid the subsequent turmoil and government
troops increased their presence in the state of Rakhine. A senior UN official
alleged that the Myanmar government sought to rid the country of its Muslim
minority – an accusation repeatedly made by human rights groups. The
government denies the charge.
Myanmar further raised the number of troops in Rakhine in August, after

having been found hacked to death by seven Buddhists. The troop build-up
triggered warnings of a fresh wave of aggression. The current violence is seen
not only because of the size but also because of the presence of the new
insurgent Rohingya group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, as a major
escalation. It says the attacks on government forces were an act of self-
defence. In the last national and local elections, the Rohingyas were denied the
right to citizenship and even the right to self-identify, and were deprived of
their voting rights. They are also subject to many restrictions in day to day life:
banned from travelling without authorization and prohibited from working
outside their villages.
They cannot even get married without permission from the authorities,
and, because of movement restrictions, they lack sufficient access to livelihood
opportunities, medical care and education. The number of children per couple
is theoretically restricted to two but, because it cannot be enforced, there are
thousands of children without any administrative existence.
Rohingya children in Myanmar face low birth weight, obesity, diarrhea

and reproductive obstacles on reaching adulthood, according to a 2016 study
published in the medical journal "The Lancet‖. Rohingya have a mortality rate
of up to 224 deaths per 1000 live births, more than four times the average for
the rest of Myanmar (52 per 1000 live births), and three times the average of
living in the Rakhine state's non-Rohingya areas (77 per 1000 live births). The
paper also found that 40% of Rohingya children in Myanmar camps suffer from
diarrhea five times the diarrhea rate of internally displaced persons.
On 25 August, when rebels targeted government forces, violence broke

into northern Rakhine province. In response, Buddhist militia-backed security
forces launched a "clearance operation" that killed a minimum of 1,000 people
63
and made more than 300,000 escapes their homes. The UN's top human rights
official said on September 11 that the military response to insurgent attacks
was "clearly disproportionate," and cautioned that Myanmar's persecution of its
Rohingya minority appears to be a "textbook illustration" of collective action.
Refugees have been thinking of massacres in towns, where soldiers are being
attacked and their homes burned.
According to the Govt, the Rohingya burned their own houses, killing
Buddhists and Hindus, an argument echoed by some locals. The military
targets militants, including the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (Arsa), the
organization that claimed responsibility for the August attacks, it says. Satellite
analysis by Human Rights Watch has shown evidence of fireside damage in
urban areas populated by Rohingyas, in addition as in isolated villages.
What does the government say?
The government has said it is

targeting militants who are responsible
for attacks on the security forces
which are terrorists the bulk of those
killed. This also claims that Rohingya
is burning their own villages – an
argument that was challenged by
journalists who reported seeing new
fires burning in villages that Rohingya
people had abandoned. The
government has also accused foreign
aid workers of helping to besiege a
village in Rakhine state by "terrorists".
The assertion has been condemned by
aid workers, who fear for their health,
as being dangerously reckless. The word Rohingya is particularly dangerous for
the Burmese Government. The crux of the issue lies therein: The Burmese fear
that an independent Rohingya state along the Bangladesh border will come at
the cost of Rakhine territory. The Burmese military, which has cracked down
on civilians from Rohingya, sees this as a possible region of aggression by
groups such as ARSA. "This apprehension inside the West is extremely
profoundly felt and not understood — and it comes from a true place rooted in
the past of Burma," Mitchell said. Indeed, Maung Thway Chun, the editor of a
hardline Buddhist nationalist newsweekly, told Rangoon-based journalist Joe
Freeman: "[W]e don't want Muslims to swallow our country ... they 're not going to end
up targeting just Rakhine. they're going to also invade Chin State or Irrawaddy region,”
he said, touching on two states located to the immediate south and northeast
of Rakhine. ―Then this country will be a Muslim country. It's such a shame for us
that the land we inherited from our former generations are going to be lost in our
time.” That may sound absurd in an exceedingly country with a 4 percent
64
Muslim population, but it’s an argument that several Burmese make, pointing
to ARSA’s growing presence in Rakhine and surrounding areas. Bangladesh
has watched the group's aggression on its soil with growing concern, and has
suggested military operations against it with Burma.
Base from the discussions above, answer the following

questions.
1. What is the root cause of the problem in the case of the Rohingyas in
Myanmar?
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
2. What is the stand of the government of Myanmar in the issue?

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
65
References:
Department of Population Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population.

2015. MYANMAR The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census Census
Report Volume 2-C. Accessed May 19,2018.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-
burma/540513/
Keling, et al. 2010. A Historical Approach to Myanmar’s Democratic Process.

Journal of Asia Pacific Studies.
Khodaee Gh, Emami Moghadam Z, Khademi Gh, Saeidi M. (2015) Healthy Diet
in Children: Facts and Keys. Int J Pediatr.
Mahmood SS, Wroe E, Fuller A, Leaning J. (2016) The Rohingya people of

Myanmar: health, human rights, and identity. Lancet 2016; 1– 10. PMID
27916235. Doi: 10.1016/S0140- 6736(16)00646-2.
Ratcliffe, Rebecca. (2017) Who are the Rohingya and what is happening to
Myannmar. Accessed May 19,2018. https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2017/sep/06/who-are-the-rohingya-and-what-is-happening-in-
myanmar
Sakhong. 2012. The Dynamics of Sixty Years of Ethnic Armed Conflict in Burma.
Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies Analysis Paper No.
The World Factbook – Burma. Cia.gov. Archived from the original on 4

November 2010. Retrieved 4 May 2016
66
Lesson 3: CORONAVIRUS IN ASEAN
Lesson Outcomes:
1.Determine the effects of coronavirus in the ASEAN region.
2.Determine the responses of ASEAN to the CoVid-19 pandemic.
Introduction:
The CoVid-19 previously termed
as 2019-nCOV or novel coronavirus
acute respiratory illness, was initially
identified within the city of Wuhan,
Hubei Province, China on December
2019 where there have been emerging
cluster of individuals with cases of
pneumonia. The outbreak became more
widespread, suggesting person-to-
person transmission. Soon, COVID-19
spread to distant city centres and other countries, as people moved primarily
by travel. To assist flatten the curve, various non-health measures were strictly
implemented and ranged from travel restrictions, strict social distancing,
community quarantines to lockdowns. Other counter health measures revolved
around strengthening testing, contact tracing, diagnostics, and treatment.
Indeed, the Covid-19 became a worldwide pandemic affecting not just the
rich countries but also countries with poor or limited capability to fight the
health threat. Geographic region has always been a hotspot for the emergence
of latest infectious diseases. The region was hit hard by previous epidemics
like SARS, Avian Flu, and also the H1N1 Influenza virus and now the CoVid-
19. Nevertheless, the pandemic has forged stronger regional cooperation and
coordination among ASEAN’s Member States and partners.
67
68
69
1.In 5 sentences, summarize the responses of ASEAN to the threats

brought by CoVid-19 in the region.
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
2. As a ―batang ASEAN‖, how did you contribute to combat the threats

of Covid-19 pandemic?
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
70
References:
Fernando, F. M., De la Rosa, J. E., & Castro, M. Q. (2020, May). Covid-19: A collective
response in ASEAN. The-ASEAN Magazine Issue 1 May 2020, (1), 30-35.
Risk Assessment for International Dissemination of ... - ASEAN. (n.d.). Retrieved July 20, 2020,
from https://asean.org/storage/2020/02/COVID-19_Report-of-ASEAN-BioDiaspora-
Regional-Virtual-Center_8June2020.pdf
Timeline of WHO's response to COVID-19. (n.d.). Retrieved July 20, 2020, from
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline
71
Lesson 4: AGRICULTURE & FOOD SECURITY IN

ASEAN
Lesson Outcomes:
1.Analyze the issue on agriculture & food security in ASEAN.
2.Determine the proper response of ASEAN to the issue on food security
in the region.
Introduction:
Food security is generally

understood as access to adequate food to all
households at all times to enable them to
lead a healthy and active life. On the other
hand, food insecurity is associated with
poverty, ignorance and stagnant economic
growth (Team,2019). It is important to review
the status of the region in terms of food
security. Read the article below and answer
the questions that follow.
Food security a key issue for ASEAN

The ASEAN Post Team
12 March 2019
In 2015, the world’s leaders came together to pledge the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development. The 2030 Agenda is a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet,
and ensure all people enjoy peace and prosperity through global partnership. Built on the
achievements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for 2000-2015, it is monitored
against a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These SDGs target achievements
in poverty and hunger eradication, health and wellbeing, education, gender and economic
72
inequalities, conservation, climate change, innovation, sustainable consumption, and peace and
justice.
One of the key features of the SDGs is the interconnectedness of the goals. No one goal can be
fully achieved without progress in the others, and efforts towards achieving one goal almost
always will impact the progress of others. The failure to plan for one SDG may also decelerate
or render ineffective planning and implementation of national initiatives for other goals.Food
security, for example, underpins the achievements of all other SDGs. Primarily, it is targeted
under SDG 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote
sustainable agriculture. In turn, the fulfilment of a population’s food, energy, and nutritional
needs, as well as advancements in sustainable agriculture, provide for conducive conditions to
improve health, mental and labour capacity, sustainability of cities and urbanisation. This further
strengthen efforts towards industry building, levelling the playing field for poorer communities,
women’s participation in work and society, responsible consumption and production, and
reducing conflicts. At the same time, the attainment of SDG 2 depends largely and impacts
absolutely on the achievements in clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy,
climate action, life on land, and life below water.
73
An example of the interlinkages between food insecurity and the different SDGs can be seen in
Lao PDR. According to Lao PDR’s Voluntary National Review of the 2030 Agenda, around 33
percent of children under five in the country were reported to be stunted and nine percent
wasted in 2016/17. Stunting is a manifestation of chronic or long-term hunger, while wasting is a
manifestation of acute hunger such as those experienced during a famine or crises. In Lao
PDR, these manifestations show a strong influence of inequalities associated with poverty and
ethnicity, as well as rural-urban disparity.
Stunting in rural areas without road access is twice that in urban areas. Stunting in children from
some highland ethnic groups is nearly double that of children from lowland groups. Stunting
amongst children from the poorest households are three times higher than those from the
richest households. Stunting amongst children of uneducated women are four times higher than
children of mothers with at least a secondary education. All these manifestations prove strong
and direct interconnectedness between SDG 2 and other SDGs on poverty, education, income
inequalities, gender, sustainable communities, infrastructure, partnership, and more.
More needs to be done
Having previously achieved its MDG target of halving the proportion of undernourished or
hungry people – from 42.8 percent in 1990 to around 18.5 percent in 2015 – Lao PDR now is
committed to reducing the high prevalence of underweight and stunting amongst its children.
This is demonstrated through its National Zero Hunger Challenge launched in May 2015, as well
as the Agricultural Development Strategy, National Nutrition Strategy, and the National Socio-
Economic Development Plan.
Lao PDR authorities last week set a target to increase farmland in 2018-2019 from 177,000
hectares to 185,000 hectares. In another effort to ensure food security and commercial farm
production, the Japanese government will be providing another grant to the Lao government for
improvement of the Irrigation Agriculture Project at Tha Ngon farmland in Xaythany district,
Vientiane, in a project expected to start this month.
74
While handling the current drivers of hunger, ASEAN countries also need to keep an eye on
changes to the climate. ‘The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018’ report
published by the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) last year
reported an increase in the prevalence of severely food insecure people in the region,
increasing from 7.3 percent or 46 million people to 10.1 percent or 65.8 million people between
2014 and 2017. The trend, observed in three consecutive years, is largely driven by the adverse
effects of climate conditions on food availability and prices.
The derailment of efforts to achieve Zero Hunger can and will have adverse impacts on national
aspirations and development trajectories. At different levels of development, ASEAN countries
need to not only look at specific challenges facing their respective nations, but also come
together to learn from each other’s experiences. Just as how all SDGs are interconnected,
ASEAN’s success in attaining all SDG goals too is dependent on how effectively member states
work together towards common goals.
75
1. During the community quarantine/ lockdown due to CoVid-19, what are

the programs or activities present in your community to ensure that
there are enough foods in everybody’s table? List at least 3 and provide a
brief description of the programs/activities.
a.__________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
b. ____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
c. ____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
76
References:
Annex 2: Food Security in Southeast Asia - Achievements and the Unfinished Tasks. (n.d.).
Retrieved July 20, 2020, from http://www.fao.org/3/ab981e/ab981e0b.htm
Team, T. (2019, March 12). Food security a key issue for ASEAN. Retrieved July 20, 2020,
from https://theaseanpost.com/article/food-security-key-issue-asean
77
C
LOSING STATEMENT
You have reached your final destination. I hope that the course widened
your perspective, from national to international. Keep it in mind that we are
not a lone country. Every move that we make, we think of our neighbors
first, taking into consideration our differences in order to have a
harmonious relationship with them. That is the essence of regionalism.
That is the essence of ASEAN. Because we have One Vision, One Identity,
One Community.
78

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ASEAN AVE.

The ASEAN Charter

The ASEAN Organization

West Philippine Sea Dis-

Ethnic Violence in Myan-

Agriculture & Food securi-

Module 1 Module 2 Module 3

This is Module 1, I repeat, this is module 1-

Module I Module II Module III

Lesson 1: Introduction to ASEAN Studies

Association of Southeast Asian

ASEAN Studies undertaken in Southeast Asia itself is comparatively

According to the ASEAN

Instruction: Fill in the circles with concepts you can

a. What is the relevance of ASEAN studies in your field/program?

II. Geographical Definition of ASEAN

The boundaries of Southeast

Profile of Southeast Asian Nations

1. What is the difference between sovereign state and dependent

Blank Map Test: Identify the ASEAN members

III. Brief History of the Southeast Asia

Before and During the Second World War

While the term "Southeast Asia" was first used

In Japan, Southeast Asian studies became a

Southeast Asian Nations Gain Independence

Answer the following questions:

1. Using your notes, what are the greatest challenges

Acharya, A. (2000), Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:

Lesson 2: Theoretical Perspectives of Regionalism

During the past few decades, there has been a

ASEAN envisioned the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an

The ASEAN leaders have a vision to create a common identity in

The literature on regionalism and regional integration has so far

DEFINING REGIONS, REGIONALISM, AND REGIONALIZATION

Despite widespread interest in regionalism, we lack consensus on its

Although geography lies at the heart of most of these definitions, some

In light of the ontological disagreement over what constitutes a region, it is

Katzenstein (2006, p. 1) defines regionalism as institutionalized practices

A wide variety of researchers consider re- gionalization to be a process

hand, regionalization driven by private actors— economic and otherwise—is

A great deal of research on regionalism has focused on preferential trading

At the outset, it is important to recognize that, despite contemporary

Origins and Development of Regionalism

The growth and study of formal regional organizations dates

From a longer perspective, however, regionalism has always been with

Indeed it was the breakdown of this loose regime - the European

The League experiment, though intended to be universal, betrayed a

1. Regional Institutions: The First Wave 1945-1965

Despite such negative impressions, the spirit of regionalism was

Three main types of regional institution can be identified in this

Already by 1945, multipurpose institutions of the first type,

Institutions of the second type, regional security alliances, notably

Though the five Regional Economic Commissions were an early and

What is striking about this first wave of regionalism, whether in the

2. Regionalism: The Second Wave, 1965-85

Overall, this second wave was characterized by small steps to improve

The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) was similarly conceived as a

These new initiatives, however, were still conditioned by the ever

Regionalism: The Third Wave 1985-Present

Just as the international system had closely defined the parameters

At first, there was a distinctly universalistic flavour to the post-Cold

Second, and from a more practical perspective, it quickly became clear

sources and the commitment of major states to act as a global