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Alyson Lieberman

Professor Suzanne Richard

ENGW1111

25 October 2023

The United States humanitarian intervention in Somalia

Humanitarian intervention has been debated for decades, with no apparent motives for

intervention; citizens and governments have criticized the concept because of a lack of

rules/regulations worldwide. Countries are often motivated by personal interests, such as economic

advantages or genuine humanitarian acts, whether they are right or wrong. As for the case of

Somalia, the humanitarian intervention of foreign countries was detrimental, collapsing the Somalian

government even further. The UN launched an operation to Somalia, which ended as a major failure.

In the same year, the United States intervened. Foreign intervention in Somalia drastically hindered

development economically and socially, especially the intervention from the United States, there

should have been no intervention, the United States made the crisis worse in Somalia

post-intervention. The United States failed to deliver proper humanitarian intervention to Somalia

after there was no longer benefit for the country, along with the United Nations.

Somalia has endured decades of political instability. During the colonization era, Portugal

claimed the land of Somalia. The Portuguese treated the citizens as many other colonial powers did;

they exploited their workforce and made them endure years of slavery. Following the conclusion of

World War II, at the Potsdam conference, the land was given to Italy and other European powers. As

what happens in most colonized countries, grassroots movements developed. Somalia at the time was

split into clans; there was no unitary central government. The foundation of the state of Somalia

proved difficult. The country had no defined borders, one of the contested issues from foreign

influence, such as Ethiopia. Somalia functioned under the rule of clans and the military government
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that took over the weak political elites; they had tyrannical rule. The conditions living under military

rule were worse than when the Portuguese colonized. Human rights were violated countlessly by the

military government on a massive scale. The violations that occurred the most were "unlawfully

killing thousands of unarmed citizens, rape, and the use of civilians as human shields." This is when

the UN and affiliated countries saw the inhuman treatment and political unrest in Somalia and

decided to intervene. (Gibbs, 2000).

Initially, the UN recognized the political instability of Somalia and designated a plan to aid

one of the men fighting for control of the capital city. The UN was hesitant to pick a side in Somalia,

but this quickly changed when they sent an aircraft full of military supplies to one of the men trying

to gain control of the capital city. Somalia was recognized internationally as a corrupt state that

needed political organization; the UN pursued this task, ultimately leading to total failure. The UN

abandoned its off-shore policies and instead "invaded" the country because the situation in Somalia

was considered a threat to international peace.

The UN formed an operation: "The United Nations Operation in Somalia" at the beginning of

April 1992. This organization was utterly disorganized; its task was to improve the living and societal

conditions in Somalia, which did not occur. This was a peacekeeping mission; they were to liberate

citizens against a tyrannical government in order to provide citizens with a new democratic political

system. However, because the organization was so unprepared and disorganized, they failed to

accomplish any of their missions. The UN did not make the effort to organize the political state

efficiently and the reconstruction of state institutions; in fact, their presence exacerbated the

inhumane, at-war conditions in Somalia. The organization was prompted "by all necessary means to

establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."

However, "United Nations personnel had to rely on local militia for their protection." Also, "United

Nations troops in Somalia perpetrated gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law in

1993." (Khayer, 2016).


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These quotes provide evidence for how much the intervention from the United Nations was

an epic failure. It was destined to fail from the start; there was no action plan. The force was tasked

with an unrealistic goal, considering the state of the Somali government and the insufficient effort to

help establish order. After some time, the United Nations ended its organization in Somalia, meaning

their efforts not only made the situation worse, but they did not plan a course of action for Somalia.

The fractured state was left without a stable central government and warfare between clans. During

these months of the UN intervening in Somalia, the United States was debating whether or not it was

beneficial to intervene.

In December 1992, the United States was prompted to join the foreign intervention force in

Somalia. There were multiple contributing factors to this decision, one of them being the

phenomenon of the "CNN effect" and a moral obligation to help reconstruct Somalia and provide aid

to the citizens from President George H. Bush and members of his administration. The "CNN effect"

is the media broadcasting images of starving children. Americans became morally obligated because

they witnessed the horrific conditions of a country they could afford to assist. According to Jon

Western, a college professor and political scientist, "CNN got us into Somalia, and CNN got us out."

(Western)

Additionally, the United States finally recognized the situation in Somalia as a dire issue after

Somalia was declared the "World's worst humanitarian emergency" after the famine in 1991.

However, the United States did not become involved until a year later after the State of Somalia had

been declared a state of emergency. Another point Western included as a motivation for the United

States intervention was that "only the United States possessed the capabilities to tackle the crisis."

And, "Somalia was a case where the mission of providing security for humanitarian relief was well

deaned and achievable." However, they were utterly wrong and underestimated the crisis. All of

these factors indicated that the United States should intervene. The United States and Somalia have

had a complicated relationship predating humanitarian intervention. During the era of the Cold War,
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the United States felt threatened by the Soviets because of the location of Somalia. The United States

sent a large sum to the weak Somali government to stabilize the Horn of Africa while Ethiopia was

under Soviet protection. This did not last long; when the United States withdrew financial

contributions to Somalia, the government collapsed, leaving Somalia under the control of a regime

where tribal populations fought against each other in a civil war.

The decision was a long, political debate that required multiple approvals to launch the

mission. The initial operation was designed to "Establish a stable security framework to ensure the

delivery and distribution of relief to aid famine victims." (Western, 2002) However, because the

mission was not adequately planned, officials neglected to prepare for the consequences of

intervention, such as the local tribes who were heavily armed, the desert terrain, and not having an

exit strategy. President Bush acted aggressively, deploying Pakistani peacekeepers to Somalia

supported by the Pentagon. However, officials at the National Safety Council withdrew support from

Somalia to South Africa and Mozambique because they are more geared toward the United States'

"geostrategic interests." Their decision to abandon Somalia demonstrated that the United States was

going to choose the option that best benefits their country.

To conclude the intervention in Somalia, the administration had meetings to decide the plan

of action. It was agreed there were three main options: "1) Increasing financial and material support

for the current UN peacekeeping forces in Somalia; 2) Coordinating a broader UN effort in which the

United States would provide logistical support but no ground troops; and 3) Initiating a US-led

multinational military intervention in Somalia." President Bush decided to intervene in Somalia

through "Operation Restore Hope." The goal was to have enough support from American citizens,

which was successful. Bush received minimal criticism from Americans and launched the operation.

But what citizens did not know was that the process was a political move. Essentially, the United

States intervened in Somalia to gain information about the crisis, but there was no aid. During the

operation, "They captured significant information advantages, there was little or no humanitarian or
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media presence on the ground." The process demonstrated what the true intentions of the United

States were.

The United States decided to intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Somalia for different

reasons, but in the end, the motivation was the potential benefits. Humanitarian intervention, when

initiated correctly, can significantly support a country. As for the case of Somalia, the United States

escalated the crisis and led the government to self-destruct further. Somalia was promised assistance

that was never delivered, further causing a decline in Somali standard of living.
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Works Cited

Gibbs, David N. "Realpolitik and humanitarian intervention: The case of

Somalia." INTERNATIONAL POLITICS-DORDRECHT- 37.1 (2000): 41-56.

https://dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/sites/dgibbs.faculty.arizona.edu/files/somalia.pdf

Glanville, Luke. "Somalia reconsidered: an examination of the norm of


humanitarian intervention." International Affairs 77.1 (2005): 113-128.
https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a178.pdf

Khayre, Ahmed Ali M., Somalia: An Overview of the Historical and Current
Situation (April 27, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2771125 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2771125

Western, Jon. “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and


Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia.” International Security, vol. 26,
no. 4, 2002, pp. 112–142, https://doi.org/10.1162/016228802753696799

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