Reference:

Benton, Ted and Craib, Ian. Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations
of Social Thought. 2nd Ed. New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan, 2011

Chapter 4: Science, Nature, and Society

Section 1: Marxism and Science
→ (1) Marx proposed a philosophical view of history in which private property serves as a
symptom (or expression) of alienation of people (from nature and with one another). Simply
put, science (natural science) then was not really entirely void of any political, moral, or social
influences since it is actually a reflection of such alienation.
→ (2) Marx envisioned a future good society in which the said alienation has already been
overcome, with the artificial distinction between the natural sciences and social sciences
effectively dissolved.
→ (3) From 1840s and onwards, Marx and Engels advanced a view of history in which human
freedom and self-determination are to be won by overcoming class oppression and the limits
imposed by nature, with the latter to be overcome by technological advancement.
→ (4) Although technologies have many benefits, these (technologies) are rather utilized by
the dominant class, who wields the monopoly of the capital needed for the advancement of
technology, to serve their own ends at expense of the other classes.
Section 2: Weber, Merton, and the Sociology of Science
→ (1) While science is traditionally viewed as objective in a sense that it strives to maximize
rationality and do away with any commitments to values, Weber considered it rather
paradoxical that these commitments actually reveal the normative nature of science.
→ (2) In addition to such normative character, Weber suggested the institutional nature of
science in a sense that its direction is actually dictated by public funding, making it a form of
state capitalism.
→ (3) Returning to its normative character and objectivity, Weber held a view similar to the
Marxist that science is objective in the sense that it minimizes external social influences.
→ (4) For Merton (the proponent of the functionalist approach to science), science adheres to
a set of technical and moral norms that insulate it from external distortions and influences.
→ (5) In order to ensure conformity to the technical norms, Merton suggested four moral
norms, which he called institutional imperatives: (1) universalism, (2) communism, (3)
disinterestedness, and (4) organized skepticism.
Section 3: Historical Epistemology and Structural Marxism
→ (1) The French tradition of historical epistemology offers a unique account of science that
is closely related to historical (and social) progress.
→ (2) Their view suggests that scientific disciplines emerged out of the errors and delusions
that precede them.
→ (3) In relation to this approach, the concept of problematics is introduced. This concept
suggests that the discovery of knowledge is centered around certain question or sets of
questions. This suggests that a new different science may emerge if a different set of questions
is posed, making any claims regarding the completeness of science doubtful.
→ (4) As consequence of the concept of problematics, science does not necessarily progress in
steady pace, where scientific knowledge grows gradually through the accumulation of facts.
Rather, epistemological breaks occur where old knowledge is replaced by the new ones.
→ (5) Althusser utilizing the concepts of problematics and epistemological breaks sought to
revive Marxism by suggesting that there are new set of questions that may be asked around the
later writings of Marx.
Section 4: Revolutions and Relativism: From Kuhn to the Strong Program
→ (1) Thomas Kuhn rejected the prevailing view then that science progresses in a linear
fashion, involving the continuous accumulation of knowledge through time. Instead, Kuhn
developed an alternative view. Essentially, he sees the development of science proceeding in
the following steps: (1) first, there is a plurality of approaches with regards to a particular topic;
(2) one of these approaches would then acquire adherents; (3) once consensus is achieved
around an approach, it becomes a “paradigm”; (4) accumulation of anomalies (persistent and
challenging problems that cannot be addressed using the paradigm) leads to crisis; (5) this
crisis would result to the emergence of a plurality of approaches, again.
→ (2) Basically, Kuhn suggested that science progresses in a discontinuous manner, where old
paradigms are replaced by new ones.
→ (3) Feyerabend proposed a rather distinctive view by noting that the key advances in science
were actually generated by violating some of the prevailing rules in scientific method.
Ultimately, this means that there are no methodological principles that delineate science from
non-science, making the superiority claims of science baseless.
→ (4) Returning to Kuhn, his work is considered a good case of showing that science is not
solely determined by logic and evidence; rather, sociological explanations can account for its
progress.
Section 5: Gender and Science: The Feminist View
→ (1) As alternative accounts of science emerge (progression or change of science closely
related to social and historical changes), another movement offered yet another view based on
the criticism of women’s traditional exclusion (or relegation to the sidelines) in the arena of
scientific inquiry.
→ (2) The feminists of the 1960s asserted that a substantial amount of talent is wasted by
ignoring women in the scientific process, suggesting that the feminists believe that women
have the inherent scientific skills and capacity to succeed in the said endeavor.
→ (3) In essence, feminism suggests that science as previously portrayed by some as an
objective inquiry of nature is actually a biased picture of the world mainly drawn by white,
Western men.
→ (4) One important line of feminist analysis of science explores the relationship between the
ideology and practice of science and gender and sexuality, suggesting that changes on gender
relations may lead to a different science.
→ (5) Evelyn Keller, a feminist, wrote that science’s direction was greatly imbued with
masculine attributes, such as, rationality, objectivity, emotion suppression, dominance, and
independence. Hence, similar a similar degree of suppression of emotion, rationality, and
objectivity is found in science dominated by men. Keller was optimistic that a more inclusive
science infused with feminine traits, such as, emotionality, collaboration, and empathy, etc.,
would actually engender benefits for the practice of science.

Prepared by:
Julius E. Aquino, LPT
Cebu Normal University, CCAS-SSD