Chemical Disasters and Response Planning

Dr. Karthik Gunasekaran

Associate Professor
Department of Medicine -5
Christian Medical College, Vellore
 SCENARIO
• You are a Safety officer of your Plant.

• You receive a call from a worker reporting a person

down, clutching his throat and coughing.

• Upon arrival at the scene you notice several people in

the immediate vicinity also down
– Some are clutching their chests and some are
coughing heavily.
 SCENARIO
• Now people are staggering away from the scene.

• All are complaining of blurred vision & red teary

eyes.
 SCENARIO
• People are starting to run from the scene.

• Some people have lost consciousness.

 OBSERVATIONS OF INCIDENT
• There is no debris, which might indicate a blast

• No smoke or fire is apparent

• There are multiple casualties, without the presence of trauma.

• It was a sudden onset

 OPERATIONAL CLUES

– Symptoms exhibited in multiple casualties that are

normally seen in a single person.
– Multiple casualties for no apparent reason
– Multiple casualties without trauma
– Escalating number of victims
– Escalating symptoms of the victims

▪ Clues that indicate a chemical incident

 SOLUTION

• Observations indicate a toxic chemical agent has

caused the incident

• Symptoms indicate victims have likely been exposed to

a choking agent-

CHLORINE
 WHAT IS THE NEXT MOVE?

• Call in support based on

– Increasing number of victims
– Responder hazard (first response was for a
unknown factor, now there is a chemical hazard)
– Need for additional equipment

• Protect yourself

• Treat the victims

What is a Hazard ?
 HAZARD
• “Any substance/operation that poses an
unreasonable risk to life, property or the
environment.”
Hazardous material:
• “Any substance that poses an unreasonable
risk to life, the environment, or property when
not properly contained.”
 EFFECTS OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

• Any substance that can

result in harmful effects
– Immediate (acute)
– Delayed (minutes or
hours)
– Long Term (chronic)
– Temporary effects
– Permanent effects
EFFECTS OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL INCIDENT
• Methylisocyanate (MIC) incident at
Bhopal, India

• 3,300 people killed immediately;

16,000 after ten years

• 40 tons of MIC released that covered

20 Km2

• Over 500,000 people suffered effects

of gas

• Ground water hazard for ten years

TOXIC CHEMICAL ROUTES OF ENTRY

Skin Eyes

Respiratory
tract
Ingestion

Injection
INTENSITY OF EFFECTS
• Varies by
– Type of chemical
– Exposure (time X amount)
– Physical health
– Age
– Weather (wind, temperature, rain)
SYMPTOMS
• Coughing
• Constricted pupils, red teary eyes
• Bleeding or hemorrhaging
• Strong or unusual smell
• Strange behavior
• Convulsions
• Unconsciousness
 SYMPTOMS

• Difficulty breathing
• Blurred vision
• Runny eyes and nose
• Slurred speech, disorientation
• Skin irritation
• Nausea
• Sudden headache
• Weakness
 SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS
FOR
HAZARDS
MULTIPLE HAZARD CHARACTERISTICS
• Explosive
• Flammable
• Thermally unstable
• Reactive
• Poisonous
• Infectious
• Radioactive
• Corrosive
 SAFETY KEYPOINT #1
• “Always consider the possibility of
multiple hazardous characteristics in
each hazard class.”
 SAFETY KEYPOINT #2
• “Approach all hazardous material
incidents from upwind, upgrade, and
upstream, positioning vehicles and
apparatus headed away from the
incident scene.”
 DISTANCE IS AN ALLY

• Distance Safety Factors

– 100' 1
– 200' 2 times
– 300' 4 times
– 400' 16 times
– 500' 256 times
 STAGING AREA
• A safe haven for personnel and
equipment that allows a 3 minute
scene access from a safe distance
should the incident suddenly
escalate.
 RESCUE CHECKLIST
• The Product
– What are the hazards of the material
involved?
– Is a fire or explosion likely?
– How fast is the product leaking from it’s
container?
– Is the person(s) directly exposed to the
product or it’s vapors?
 RESCUE CHECKLIST
• The Responder(s)
– Does the responder have adequate
training?
– Is appropriate protective equipment
available?
– Are there sufficient personnel present to
provide back-up?
– How long must responders be exposed in
the process of attempting rescue?
– Are the proper tools available?
 RESCUE CHECKLIST
• Physical Factors
– Must the vehicle or entrapping debris be
stabilized?
– Can the flow of product be diverted away
from victim or stopped altogether?
– Is access to the person difficult due to steep
terrain or other reasons?
 SAFETY KEYPOINT #3

• “In a hazardous material incident you may

have to delay attending to the injured in order
to save the lives of many others”

• Initial actions taken to secure the scene will

save many lives by preventing “convergence”
into the hazardous area.
 SAFETY KEYPOINT #4
• First operational priority:
– Isolate the hazard area and deny entry.
• Establish inner perimeter first.
• Initially establish a large outer perimeter by
closing major roadways into the area by using
incoming response units.
• Downwind perimeters should be 2-3 times
larger than other perimeter boundaries.
 SAFETY KEYPOINT #5

• Only those emergency personnel in the proper

protective clothing, “who are actively performing
emergency operations” are to operate within the
inner perimeter.”

• Must identify minimum perimeter distances to be

utilized by the emergency responders for the
protection of both the emergency responders
and the citizens
 SCENE SAFETY
After surveying the scene:
• Set up zones

HOT
WARM
COLD
Control the scene
 THE HOT ZONE
• Center = center of the incident/explosion
• First perimeter = location of the farthest piece of
evidence
• ‘y’ = distance between the center and perimeter
y

shrapnel y=100 meters

 THE WARM ZONE
• Half the distance
• Likely place for a second device
• Distance between Hot and Warm zone is ‘x’
x

X=50 meters
 THE COLD ZONE
• Where the incident command post is set up
• Choose the point which provides the most
safety
CP
 OPERATIONS FOR CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS
Wind Direction

Security

Medical &
Triage Operations &
Command Safety
Post

Staging
Area
SAFE DEPLOYMENT OF RESOURCES

Maintain safe distances, up wind and up hill, if possible

 CONTROL ZONES
• Recommended mimimum initial isolation distances:
– Minor incident = 150 mtrs
– Major incident = 500 mtrs
– Explosion potential = 800 mtrs
• Isolate in all directions
 SAFETY KEYPOINT #6

• “Recommended minimum safety

perimeter for citizens = 1,000 mtrs
beyond inner perimeter boundaries
in open areas.”
ISOLATION AND DOWN-WIND PROTECTION ZONES

PROTECTIVE
ACTION ZONE

½ DOWN WIND
DISTANCE

INITIAL
ISOLATION
ZONE
Down Wind Distance

½ DOWN WIND
DISTANCE

INITIAL
ISOLATION
DISTANCE
 SAFETY KEYPOINT #7

• “To avoid inhalation hazards, self

contained breathing apparatus (SCBA
)must be properly worn, used and
maintained.”
– Recognize the potential for downwind hazards to
be present;
– Use personnel in the proper level of personal
protective clothing to expand downwind
perimeters to well beyond the hazardous area.
 SAFETY KEYPOINT #8

• “Never eat, smoke or drink at or around

hazardous material incident scenes until you
decontaminate and wash your hands, face,
and hair thoroughly.”
 SAFETY KEYPOINT #9

• “Consult protective clothing compatibility

data to ensure available protective clothing is
compatible with the hazardous material(s)
involved in the incident.”
 SAFETY KEYPOINT #10

“Think of safety with every breath you

take.”
PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
RESPONSE

• Responder Safety • Risk Assessment

• Public Safety • Environmental

Concerns
• Scene Security
• Property
• Hazard Assessment Conservation
 IDENTIFY TRAINING

• Hazardous materials are

classified according
– Primary hazard
– Symbols that identify
classes

• Materials are grouped by

their major hazards
– many will have other
hazards as well
ESTABLISH RESPONSE PRIORITIES
• Low
– Protecting environment,
property or equipment

• Moderate
– Attempt rescue of
person(s) with low
probability of survival

• High
– Attempt rescue of
person(s) with high
probability of survival
 HAZMAT
• Developed to address the unique needs of first
responders determining unknown hazards using
observable physical characteristics and signs and
symptoms observed in victims.
• Contains more than 91,000
chemical, biological warfare
(TICs, TIMs, CW agents),
biological agents (bio-weapon
and bioterror agents),
and improvised explosive devices
 SINGLE GAS DETECTORS

• Single-gas personal protection Monitors for

continuous readouts of Toxic gas
Concentrations
 Ammonia
 Carbon Monoxide
 Chlorine
 Chlorine Dioxide
 Hydrogen Cyanide
 Hydrogen Sulfide
 Nitric Oxide
 Nitrogen Dioxide
 Oxygen
 Phosphine
 Sulfur Dioxide
 MULTI GAS DETECTOR

• Combines a
Photoionization
detector(PID) and a 4-gas
Monitor
• It measures oxygen,
combustibles , carbon
monoxide, and hydrogen
sulfide
CHEMICAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT TOOLS

Detection Systems Are

Tools for Critical Decision Making
INTEGRATED DETECTION SYSTEM SOLUTIONS

• Radiation • TICs
• Gamma • Chlorine
• Ammonia
• Hydrogen Cyanide
• CWA’s • Arsine
• Sarin • Methyl Bromide
• Mustard • Ethylene Oxide
• Lewisite • Phosgene
• VX • Hydrogen Fluoride
• Phosphene
 INTEGRATED DETECTION SYSTEM
SOLUTIONS

Wireless Enabled Host Computer Wireless Enabled Area Gas Detectors Wireless Enabled Weather Station

Host Controller Software Server & Share Center

Plume Measurement Software
RADIATION DISASTER
MANAGEMENT
 FORMS OF IONIZING RADIATION

Directly ionizing Particulate radiation

consisting of atomic or subatomic
particles (electrons, protons, etc.)
which carry energy in the form of
kinetic energy of mass in motion

Indirectly ionizing
Neutron radiation
Electromagnetic radiation
in which energy is carried by
oscillating electrical and magnetic
fields travelling through space at
speed of light
 WHAT IS A RADIATION ACCIDENT?

• A situation in which there is an unintentional

exposure to ionizing radiation or radioactive
contamination

• Exposure may be real or suspected

 RADIATION ACCIDENTS

• Radiation accidents include

➢ radiological and
➢ nuclear accidents

• It is more appropriate and practical to use

the term “nuclear and radiological
emergency” for purposes of planning,
preparedness and response
MAIN TYPES OF RADIATION ACCIDENTS: INVOLVED
GROUPS

• Accidents during work - workers

– radiography
– irradiators (sealed sources and accelerators)
• Accidents due to loss of control over radiation
sources - public exposure
– radiotherapy
– orphan sources
• Accidents in medical applications - patients
– misadministration of radiopharmaceuticals
– miscalculation of the dose for radiotherapy
WHERE DO RADIATION ACCIDENTS OCCUR?

• Irradiation facilities
• Material testing (sealed sources)
• Material testing (X-ray devices)
• X-ray and radiotherapy devices (medicine,
research)
• Isotope production facilities
• Unsealed radionuclides (medicine, research)
• Nuclear reactors
• Transportation
 SCALE OF RADIATION ACCIDENTS

• Small scale radiation accidents

– usually involve a small source and few people
– often come to light from observations by primary
care physicians (mainly GPs)
• Large scale radiation accidents
– usually involve a large source term and many
people irradiated/contaminated
– require specialist treatment in both primary and
secondary medical facilities
– can lead to widespread public health action to
mitigate the effects of contamination.
 Objectives of Protection in Nuclear &
Radiological Emergency
• To regain control of the situation
• To prevent or mitigate consequences of the scene
• To prevent occurrence of health effects in
workers and the public
• To render first aid and manage the treatment of
radiation injuries
• To protect the environment and property
• To take into account the need for resumption of
normal social and economic activity.
 Emergency planning zone
• The Emergency Planning Zone defined around the plant up
to 16 km radius provide a basic geographic framework for
decision making on implementing measures as part of a
graded response in the event of an emergency.

• The population around a NPP has been limited by setting

up the exclusion zone and Natural Growth Zone.

• The exclusion zone extends upto a distance of 1.6 km

around the plant where no public habitation is permitted.

• This zone is physically isolated from outside areas by plant

fencing and is under the control of NPP.
• Each emergency plan needs to include the details of the
Nuclear Installation, site maps, demographic characteristics,
site meteorology, nature of land and produce, emergency
organization and responsibilities,
• guidelines for evaluation of emergency, communication facility,
resources and facilities,

• mechanism for declaration and termination of emergency,

action plan for responding to emergency, maintenance and
updating of emergency plan and public awareness programme.

• In EPZ, protective actions are taken as specified in the plan such

as warning & advice, traffic diversion, sheltering, prophylactics
distribution, evacuation, decontamination etc.
 INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY
◼ Inspection of products (non-destructive testing).

• Gamma radiation sources

(Ir-192 or Co-60) are used
to inspect a variety of
materials.

• The vast majority of

radiography concerns the
testing and grading of
welds on pressurized
piping, pressure vessels,
high-capacity storage
containers, pipelines.
The acute dose-dependent effects of beta radiation on skin

0–6 Gy no acute effect

6–20 Gy moderate early erythema

early erythema in 24 hours,
20–40 Gy
skin breakdown in 2 weeks
40–100 Gy severe erythema in less than 24 hours
severe erythema in less than 4 hours,
100–150 Gy
skin breakdown in 1–2 weeks
150–1000 Gy blistering immediate or up to 1 day
 INES
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale
 RADIATION ACCIDENTS BY CAUSE

• Radiation accidents with unknown origin and late

recognition: (e.g. Goiania, 1987; Estonia, 1994;
Georgia, 1997 & 2001; Turkey, 1998/99; Thailand,
2000; Egypt, 2000 )
• Accidents with initially known radiation origin:
(e.g. Iran, 1996; Peru, 1999 )
• Accidental exposure in medical applications:
(e.g. Spain, 1990; Costa Rica, 1996, Panama, 2001)
• Criticality accidents:
(e.g. Sarov, Russia, 1997; Tokaimura, Japan, 1999)

• Major nuclear accident: Chernobyl, USSR (1986)

 CONTAMINATION RİSK

• External contamination:
radioactive material, as dust, solid particles,
aerosols or liquid, becomes attached to
victim’s skin or clothes

• Internal contamination:
occurs when people ingest, inhale, or are
injured by radioactive material
• Metabolism of non-radioactive analogue
determines radionuclide’s metabolic pathway
 EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION
MEASUREMENT
• Proper monitoring of
patient can detect
and measure
• alpha,
• beta or
• gamma emitters;

• radiation type
depends on isotope
in contaminant

Alpha Monitor
DECONTAMINATION
CONTAMINATION SOURCES
İN NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
 INGESTION
▪All swallowed radioactive material enters digestive
tract
➢ primarily from contaminated food and water
➢ secondarily from respiratory tract

▪Absorption from the gastrointestinal tract depends

on chemical make-up and solubility of contaminant

• Elements of high absorption:

• radium (20%)
• strontium (30%)
• tritium (100%)
• iodine (100%)
• caesium (100%)
 INTERNAL CONTAMINATION
MEASUREMENT : DİRECT METHODS

Whole body counters Thyroid uptake system

 Chernobyl reactor accident

Total contaminated surface (> 1 Ci/km2): 1 000 000 km2

Near zone (<100 km): deposition of heavy particles ( Sr, Pu...
Far zone (up to 2000 km) : deposition of volatile elements (I, Cs)
 RADIONUCLIDES RELEASED

Radionuclide Half life Estimated activity

PBq MCi
Sr-89 50 d 20–80 0.6–2.2

Sr-90 28 y 1–8 0.03–0.22

I-131 8d 630–1660 17–45

I-132/Te-132 3d 400–1800 10–50

I-133 20 h 2500 68

Cs-134 2y 18–48 0.5–1.3

Cs-137 30 y 30–90 0.8–2.4
MAIN RADIONUCLIDES CONTRIBUTING
TO HEALTH EFFECTS

iodine - 131 caesium - 137

volatile volatile
T1/2: 8 day T1/2: 30 years
disappears from stays long in
environment in 2 environment
months body elimination in
inhalation and about 100 days
ingestion homogenous
concentrates in thyroid distribution in all
organs and soft tissues
 THYROID CANCER AND IONIZING RADIATION
• Chernobyl accident shows that exposure to iodine isotopes may cause
increase in prevalence of thyroid carcinoma
• In 1990-2000 about 1800 thyroid cancers observed in 18 million
children and adolescents, i.e. under 18 years old, living in the most
contaminated areas of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia
Annual number of cases in
children (<15 yrs old at

100
90
diagnosis)

80
70
60
50
40 Belarus
30
20 Ukraine
10
0
Russia
1989

1992

1998
1986

1995

Childhood thyroid cancer around Chernobyl in 1986-1998

(children <15 years old at diagnosis)
 LEUKEMIA AND OTHER CANCER

• No significant increase in leukemia or cancer other

than thyroid; solid tumor observed in Chernobyl
cleanup workers

• Tendency for elevated leukemia rates, however,

among those who received significant doses while
working on site in 1986 and 1987. So far statistically
significant leukemia excess reported for Russian
cleanup workers only
 CHERNOBYL CONCLUSIONS

• Radiation burns frequent

• Burns over 50% of body surface
led to death in 19 of 28 cases
• Internal contamination present
in most patients but was
significant in few
• Sepsis was uniform cause of
death
• BMT –very limited indication Severe multiple necrotic-
ulcerative radiation burns in
• Some radiation burns did not
Chernobyl fireman on Day 40
re-epithelialize, required after the accident
surgery
 Japanese Nuclear Accident
(March 11/2011)
• Sendai earthquake and tsunami
• Fukushima nuclear accident.
 A boiling water reactor (BWR)
splits atoms to release
nuclear energy. This energy is
removed from the reactor core
during normal operation and
used to spin turbine blades
connected to a generator that
produces electricity.

A nuclear power plant has entire systems designed to match the

energy produced by the reactor core with the energy removed.
This balance is extremely important because the reactor core
can overheat and release large amounts of radioactivity when
more energy is produced than removed.
Tsunami - the 7 to 10 meter wave hit the coast in the plant area after
the earthquake - have caused the failure of the cooling system (heat
sink).
The cooling of the reactors then depended on the vaporisation of the
water available in the reactor vessel and in the other reservoirs in the
plant.
The steam produced inside the reactor vessel was condensed in the
condensation vessel, whose temperature and pressure began to rise
slowly.
 To vent some steam outside this vessel in order to reduce the
pressure. Unfortunately, the steam appeared to contain some
hydrogen, produced by the oxidation of the overheated fuel
cladding. This hydrogen, vented in the top part of the reactors
buildings, exploded when it came into contact with air.

The presence of hydrogen and of volatile fission products like iodine

and caesium in the released steam suggested that the temperature
of the fuel was such that severe damage of the fuel claddings might
have taken place inside the reactor vessel.
 Protective actions
• Radiation monitoring
➢ Dose rate and beta-gamma contamination
➢ Radioactive releases (concetration in air)
➢ Control of the external and internal contamination of the
population
➢ Control of the contamination of the environment (foods and
drinking water, see water)
 Status after the accident
Results of the measurements :
-Measurement of gamma dose rate and beta-gamma contamination were
taken at more locations.
-The dose-rate results ranged from 2-160 microsieverts per hour, which
compares to a typical natural background level of around 0.1
microsieverts per hour.
-High levels of beta-gamma contamination have been measured between
16-58 km from the plant.
-Available results show contamination ranging from 0.2-0.9 MBq per
square metre.
- Presence of Iodine-131 in milk samples,
-Cesium-137 have been detected in leaf vegetables (spring onions and
spinach),
-distribution of food from the areas affected has been restricted.
Sheltering, evacuation of the population
-the evacuation of the population from the 20-kilometre zone
around Fukushima Daiichi has been successfully completed.

- Japanese authorities have also advised people living within 30

kilometres of the plant to remain inside.

Administration of the iodine tablets

- Recommandation for evacuees leaving the 20-kilometre area
to ingest stable (not radioactive) iodine. The pills and syrup (for
children) had been prepositioned at evacuation centers.
Thank you