W23 ClaimsISResearch

The Ten Basic Claims of Information Systems Research:
An Approach to Interrogating Validity Claims in Scientific Argumentation
Ojelanki Ngwenyama1
Ted Rogers School of Business Management
Ryerson University, Canada
Department of Information Systems, Faculty of Commerce
University of Cape Town, South Africa
ojelanki@ryerson.ca
ojelanki.ngwenyama@uct.ac.za
ABSTRACT
The post-truth culture of corporate fraud, scientific misconduct and misinformation is challenging
the legitimacy of our scientific and democratic institutions. The present environment of public
discourse suggest we need highly developed argumentation skills. If we, as scientists and citizens,
are to protect the legitimacy of our democratic institutions, we will need to vigorously interrogate
claims to truth and knowledge. For such discourse, we will need frameworks that signal our
democratic values and enable us to uphold our professional and citizenship commitments to
science and society. This essay is offered as a contribution to the development of frameworks for
open critical discourse in the IS discipline. The framework and approach to the critical
interrogation of scientific claims outlined here are rooted in works of two eminent scholars of
critical discourse and argumentation, Jürgen Habermas and Stephen Toulmin. The approach is
illustrated with an empirical analysis of three papers published in EJIS.
Keywords: Critical Scientific Discourse; Scientific Argumentation, Testing Scientific Claims;

Critical Theory; Science Communication; Post-Truth
Ojelanki Ngwenyama is a Member of the Academy of Science of South Africa and a Professorial Research Fellow,
1
Department of Information and Analytics, Deakin University Business School, Australia.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446798

1. INTRODUCTION
Science is a collaborative search for knowledge of which the primary mode of collaboration is
open critical discourse (critical debate and argumentation) among peers in scientific communities
(Pera, 1994; Habermas, 1971; Toulmin, 1999; Polanyi, 2000). A fundamental activity of such
scientific discourse is the critical interrogation of explicit and implicit claims that scientists make
when communicating and defending findings from their investigations (Habermas, 1971; Toulmin
1974a; Wittrock, 1985; Rehg, 2009). Popper (1963) has argued that open debate and critical
interrogation of scientific claims are essential to advancing societal knowledge and maintaining
the integrity and legitimacy of scientific institutions. Others also argue that open critical discourse
is essential for maintaining strong democratic societies and institutions (Feyerabend, 1978; Porter,
1995; Pera, 2000; Rehg, 2009; Habermas, 2006; Ceccarelli, 2011). In addition, while science and
scientific knowledge are antithetical to ideology they are often appropriated to serve political and
commercial interests in public discourse (Wittrock, 1985; Hilgartner, 1990). Consequently,
scientific discourse plays a crucial role in the validation and legitimation of societal knowledge
(Wynne, 1992; Phillips, et. al., 2004) and (rationality of) scientific reasoning must be as clearly
established as possible (Hassan et al., 2018; Markus & Rowe, 2018). According to Rehg (2009),
it is via critical discourse that scientific claims obtain legitimacy and acceptability or are rejected
by the community of scientists. He states:
“Scientists put forth such arguments publicly via a range of venues – lectures, preprints
and published articles, internal reports, monographs. In doing so, they expect other
scientists – at the very least, journal referees – to take a critical attitude, asking whether
the evidence and reasoning supports the author’s claims.” (Rehg, 2009, pp. 5).
While many scientists would argue that they implicitly attend to structures of argumentation in
their scientific communications, Rehg (2009) claims that explicit dialogical processes are
necessary for making, defending and assessing the logical cogency of scientific arguments. Pera
(2000) also argues that clear rules and procedures are essential for conducting and adjudicating
scientific discourse. The present climate of strategic manipulation of public discourses with
ambiguous warrants and alternative facts, demands from ethical discussants explicit attention to
structures of argumentation if they are to preserve the legitimacy of institutions of democratic
discourse (Habermas, 2006; Unger 2016).

Scholars have issued cautions about the corrosive impact of the post-truth culture on scientific
discourse (Jasanoff & Simmet, 2017; Vernon, 2017). Nisbet (2017) exhorts social scientist to
deepen their systematic study of the "science of science communication’, arguing that; “[t]he 2016
election should be a wake-up call for the scientific community and its leaders. We are not living
in normal times.” The prevailing post-truth culture of corporate fraud, scientific misconduct,
misinformation and fake news is challenging the legitimacy of our scientific and democratic
institutions (Keyes, 2004; Modreanu, 2017; Lewandowsky, et. al., 2017). Recent studies suggest
that media popularization of ‘junk science’, fraud and manipulation of academic publication
processes are undermining public discourse on science and the legitimacy of scientific institutions
(Ceccarelli, 2011; Fang, et. al., 2012;). Furthermore, scholars argue that fraud and corporate
scandals in the neoliberal capitalist world economy (cf. Volkswagen, Monsanto, Kobe Steel),
misinformation, fake news, unethical experiments and data manipulation now constitute a broader
challenge to the legitimacy of scientific and democratic institutions (Burdick, 2017; Munafò, et.
al., 2017; Pennycook & Rand, 2017; Whyte & Wiegratz, 2016). The post-truth era in which we
live (Keyes, 2004; Higgins, 2016) demands not only vigilance from scientists and citizens, but
skill and competence in argumentation and the critical analysis of claims if we are to execute our
responsibilities to profession and society (Bader, 2014; Jasanoff, 2004; Wittek, et. al., 2017;
Ferrell, & Old 2016). It is important to note here that several decades ago, Branscomb (1985)
pointed out that a primary challenge to the integrity of science was self-deception of scientists.
Therefore, as scientists we must always be clear of what we are arguing about if we are to
minimize discourse distortions. And as Rehg (2009) states: “an argumentation studies framework
can help in the critical assessment of scientific arguments and claims” (ibid, p. 22). Habermasian
discourse ethics illustrate, how ambiguity, lack of specificity about content and context
(characteristics of post-truth discourse), can undermine free and open critical discourse (Habermas,
1993). Clarity about the implied validity claims of scientific argumentation is also essential
because social scientific knowledge is not just technical facts but rhetorical constructions which
can be reconstructed and appropriated to support ideological and commercial interests (Bedeian,
2004; Locke, 2002).
This essay responds to the need for frameworks and systematic approaches for critically
interrogating the communicative practices of science to unearth and test implied validity claims in

order to strengthen and defend scientific discourse against corrosive influences of the post truth
era (Ceccarelli, 2011; Lewandowsky, et. al., 2017; Lupia, 2013; Modreanu, 2017). The essay aims
to contribute to knowledge for scientific discourse within the IS discipline. While our discipline
has a long tradition of vigorous debates on our scientific practices, it lacks frameworks and
processes for guiding scientific discourse. The IFIP WG 8.2 conferences on scientific practices,
starting 1984, where we debated the necessity for diversity in paradigmatic approaches and
research methods (cf. Mumford, et. al., 1985) is an exemplar of these critical debates. Presently,
our discipline embraces a variety of paradigms (Ågerfalk, 2013), methodologies (Chen &
Hirschheim, 2004; Davison & Martinsons, 2011), genres of scientific communication (Rowe 2010,
2011 and 2012), and we are unified by the principles and norms of science (cf. AIS Code of
Conduct, 2014.0224.01). Our commitment to robust scientific practices is also exemplified by
recent debates and attempts to strengthen our critical understanding of evolution in the practices
of science. See for example, historical analyses of the theoretical assumptions of our scientific
discourses (Schultze & Leidner, 2002), IS research paradigms and methods (Chen & Hirschheim,
2004), and editorial ideas about epistemology, methodology and writing norms (De Vaujany, et.
al., 2011 and 2014). Recently, Rowe (2010, 2011 and 2012) has championed genre diversity of
social scientific writing and argumentation strategies and argued their importance to the robustness
and relevance of the IS discipline. Others have focused on how we systematically analyze literature
and communicate contributions to IS knowledge production and accumulation (Boell & Cecez-
Kecmanovic, 2015; Okoli, 2015; Templier and Paré, 2018; Rowe, 2014; Schultze, 2015). The
importance of such debates cannot be overstated; Stahl (2009), Mingers and Walsham (2010),
Truex et. al. (2018) have all argued, that the IS community has an obligation to cultivate open and
ethical critical discourse in our scientific practice.
While the writings outlined above have advanced our understanding on the central importance of
argumentation and critical interrogation of scientific claims, they do not give sufficient attention
to structures of argumentation and principles for critical scientific discourse. In advocating for
more critical philosophical inquiry, Rowe (2018) clearly articulated limitations of IS scientific
discourse and its philosophical impoverishment. This essay contributes to filling this perceived
gap by proposing a framework and approach to critical interrogation of validity claims implied in
scientific communications. In line with Rehg’s argument in Cogent Science in Context (CSC),

which states: “categories and questions from the study of argumentation can provide a broad
framework or heuristic that will help us critically assess the information and claims issuing from
the empirical sciences” (Rehg, 2009, p. 5), this essay proposes a framework developed upon
principles of critical discourse and argumentation proposed by two critical philosophers Habermas
and Toulmin. The essay illustrates how a framework and approach to the analysis of scientific
discourse based on the central concept of validity claims in Habermas-Toulmin argumentation
theory can be employed to strengthen our approaches for critical discourse and legitimation of
scientific knowledge claims in the IS discipline. It builds on the growing body of pioneering
research efforts to adopt Habermasian critical theory to IS research problems (Lyytinen and Klein,
1985; Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1988; Ngwenyama, 1991; Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997; Cecez‐
Kecmanovic, Klein, & Brooke, 2008; Cukier, et. al., 2009; Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2011; Myers &
Klein, 2011). In Section 2, I lay out the conceptual foundations of the framework and approach.
In Section 3, I introduce and discuss ten validity claims, the analytical strategy and procedure. In
Section 4, I illustrate the approach on a selection of articles from our discipline. And Section 5, I
present concluding comments.
2. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
In Logic of the Social Sciences (Habermas, 1967) and Knowledge and Human Interests (Habermas
1971) Habermas lays out his fundamental ideas on the epistemology of social sciences which he
developed in great detail in later years. Central to his epistemology is the idea that science is an
ongoing critical discourse among a community of engaged scientists who share ethical
responsibility for interrogating and legitimizing all scientific claims proposed by members of the
community. In The Philosophy of Science, (1961) and in later works (Toulmin, 1985, 1999),
Toulmin argues that science is an institutional process comprising norms and shared procedures.
Both Toulmin (1985) and Habermas (1984) agree that a key distinction between scientific and
ordinary discourse is that scientific discourse has “the intention of convincing a universal audience
and gaining general assent (Habermas, 1984; p. 26)”, while ordinary everyday discourse does not
(cf. Toulmin et. al., 1984). Scientific discourse must adhere to a higher standard of critical
interrogation and the testing of implied validity claims. Habermas (1984, cf. p. 26), argues that
such rigor in scientific discourse has three motivations: “(1) the assent of a universal audience; (2)
the attainment of a rationally motivated agreement; and (3) the discursive redemption of validity

claims”. Rigorous interrogation of scientific claims is a fundamental norm of science and the
responsibility of the members of a scientific community (Popper, 1963; Toulmin, 1972; Schroeder,
1997). It is necessary for validating and legitimizing contributions to society’s formal knowledge.
Consequently, Habermas (1984) posits that “[t]he arguments advanced in a scientific discussion
must be presented in an orderly and relevant manner if the initial claims are to be criticized in a
rational manner open to all concerned” (ibid, pp.32). This statement raises three fundamental
questions which are pursued in this essay: (1) What is the context of scientific discourse? (2) What
might qualify as an orderly and relevant manner that would enable rational criticism? (3) What
might this rational criticism entail? In The Construal of Reality: Criticism in Modern and
Postmodern Science (1982) Toulmin states; “any scientist who is fully ‘inside’ a particular
discipline belongs to a special ‘polis’ and his work has a corresponding collective aspect” (pp.
99). And, in Foresight and Understanding (1961), Toulmin contends that scientific inquiry is not
only a project for the advancement of scientific knowledge but also for human self-understanding.
It is an idealization of our capabilities for rational deliberation and collective problem solving, a
force for advancing and maintaining the ‘good life’. Commenting on his deep interest in scientific
discourse, Toulmin clarifies the goal of his work on argumentation as follows: “What I most
wanted to find out was, how it could ever be more "rational" to accept one scientific theory,
cosmology or natural philosophy rather than other” (Toulmin, 1983). In Uses of Argument (UA)
Toulmin (1958), focuses on the micro-level analysis of argumentation and is concerned with the
invariant properties of arguments applicable for interrogating their soundness and substantiality
across all fields of knowledge production. He outlines a general model and principles for the
interrogation of arguments with procedures for: (1) testing and defending claims; and (2)
specifying clear and unambiguous arguments. In UA, Toulmin is primarily concerned with robust
strategies for uncovering ‘good or bad reasons’ authors give to substantiate and defend their
claims when involved in argumentation.
In Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas (1984) outlines a model and principles for free and
open scientific discourse. Habermas’ primary interest is the macro level of discourse; he focuses
on the analysis of structural conditions for ethical argumentation and principles for identifying
systematic distortions (strategic manipulation) that undermine free and open critical discourse. His
central concern is providing norms/ideals and conditions to facilitate ethical critical discourse,

which he characterizes from three perspectives: (1) process, the goal of which is achieving mutual
understanding among discussants; (2) procedural, the goal of which is settling disputes about
claims via rational argumentation; and (3) product or outcome, the grounding or redemption of
disputed claims with valid arguments. Habermas also views argumentation as a vehicle for
collective learning; “the openness of rational expressions to criticism and to grounding merely
points the possibility of argumentation, learning processes, through which we acquire theoretical
knowledge and moral insight…and overcome self-deceptions” (Habermas, 1984; p. 28). But, he
specifically acknowledges the importance of Toulmin’s attention to the micro-level analysis of
arguments and its complementarity to his own macro-level perspective. Habermas states:
“For me the advantage of Toulmin’s approach lies precisely in the fact that he allows for
a multiplicity of validity claims while not denying the critical sense of a validity
transcending spatiotemporal and social limitations. ….Toulmin distinguishes the general
schema in which he holds fast to field of invariant properties of argumentation from the
particular field dependent rules which are constitutive of language games or life-orders of
law, medicine, science, politics…” (Habermas, 1984; pp. 31).
I will return to this point later to discuss how Toulmin’s schema is used in Habermasian discourse
analysis for the critical interrogation of claims in scientific discourse and communication.
2.1 Validity Claims and Scientific Discourse

The principal objective of scientific discourse is the attainment of rationally motivated agreement
among the community of scientists (Habermas, 2000; Pera 2000). Habermas defines four context
independent conditions; sincerity, truthfulness, legitimacy and comprehensibility, as necessary for
ethical scientific discourse. He also argues that these are universal conditions for any discourse
oriented to achieving mutual understanding among participants (Habermas, 1984, pp. 440-441).
Science is a normatively regulated process of social action, in which, scientists oriented to
achieving mutual understanding, engage in discourse to interrogate, test and redeem validity claims
arising from claims to scientific knowledge (Habermas, 1967). For Habermas (2003, p. 108) “the
rational acceptability of validity claims is ultimately based only on reasons that stand up to
objections under certain exacting conditions of communication”. Communicative rationality
requires that competent scientists interrogate validity claims arising in free and open discourse and
make grounded decisions about accepting or rejecting them (Habermas, 1984, 2003). Habermas,
(1984, pp. 38) defines a validity claim as those implied conditions for the validity of the statement

made by the speaker or writer. To interrogate validity claims implied by a statement, the hearer or
reader must first understand the statement, ‘grasp the meaning of what is said’ (ibid, pp. 279),
before proceeding to critical interrogating it. Each member of the scientific community has the
responsibility to carefully consider evidence, warrants and backing of validity claims implied in
scientific communications (conference presentations, journal articles, position papers, opinion
essays, etc.). In making a claim to knowledge, the scientist, who is oriented to achieving mutual
understanding among the community peers, expects to be challenged and must respond to
criticisms. However, if her communication is manipulative (i.e. dishonest, misguiding and
confusing), it cannot be considered a legitimately scientific. In other words, it would not meet the
four conditions of ethical scientific discourse outlined above (cf. Habermas, 1967, 1970 and 1971).
But even if her communication is not oriented to deception, her arguments must still be scrutinized
for scientific legitimacy. As members of a scientific community, we are collectively responsible
to critically interrogate implicit and explicit validity claims of scientific reports in order to combat
systematically distorted communication and self deception. On this point, Toulmin (1985, 1999)
is in full agreement; he views knowledge development as a shared responsibility of the scientific
community (cf. Schroeder, 1997). He views critical discourse in science as a process not only for
developing substantive and authoritative arguments about the particulars of specific scientific
claims, but for obtaining shared agreement about their legitimacy. For Toulmin:
“arguments that arise in such 'cloudy' cases are not formal or rule-governed, they are
none-the-less full of 'reasons', and open to critical examination. In this respect, they
resemble common law arguments - as involving appeals to precedent - rather than code
law arguments, in which some formal procedure is available for settling the issue”
(Toulmin, 1972).
2.2 Analytical Framework for Interrogating Claims

While Habermas (1984) sets out the general principles and framework for critical reflexivity of
scientific discourse, he defers to Toulmin’s analytical framework for the interrogation of validity
claims. The basic concepts of the framework and their structural relationships are illustrated in
Figure 1 below. Toulmin’s theoretical concepts and analytical strategy of argument analysis enable
a competent reader (or discourse participant) “to scrutinize and criticize the rational merits of the
arguments presented” (logical consistency, completeness and defensibility) in order to determine
their substantiality and authoritativeness by direct reference to empirical observations within them.

In discussing the model and its application to the analysis of formal arguments, Toulmin et. al.,
(1984) state that the main aim was to lay out:
“Those universal ("field-invariant") rules of procedure that apply to rational criticism in

all fields and forums, and those particular ("field-dependent") rules that are appropriate
in law, or science, or business, but not everywhere” (pp.17).
While the model does provide a common standard and approach for challenging, testing and
redeeming claims in scientific discourses, its application requires contextualizing to the
paradigmatic assumptions of the specific discipline. In Introduction to Reasoning, Toulmin et. al.
(1984) present illustrations of its application to arguments in law, humanities, management,
science and everyday conversation.
Figure 1: Toulmin’s Model for Analysis of Arguments (adapted from Toulmin,

1958)
The claim is that which the discussant (claimant) asserts by using some warrant to interpret
relevant evidence in support of it. In scientific discourse the “claimant is expected to present a
well-defined position for her hearers [or readers] to consider and discuss. This offers the audience
or interrogators the opportunity to elicit the additional material normally required before other
people can judge for themselves.” (Toulmin, et. al., 1984, pp. 29). The claimant may attach
qualifiers (conditional moderators) of the claim. Examples of qualifiers are: ‘when’, ‘almost
always’, ‘during’. They specialize the claim to given conditions or boundaries of its applicability.
In the context of the general model, evidence can be empirical observations, generalizations or

propositional statements about classes of entities. The warrant is the theory (principle, rationale)
which the claimant uses to interpret the evidence and make the inferential step to the claim.
Warrants can be ordinary inferential logic (deduction, induction, abduction or retroduction),
theories, methods or generally accepted principles for reasoning with evidence (as in law).
Backing is the set of paradigmatic assumptions or body of knowledge upon which the warrant is
based. For example, in law the advocate would often point to some paradigm case (in the US
context: Roe v. Wade, 1973), within which the theory of reasoning is grounded. In the case of
inferential logics, the proofs serve as backing. In the case of a theory or method serving as a
warrant, the backing is constitutive of the paradigm, worldview and fundamental principles upon
which the theory or method was built. Finally, rebuttals are challenges to the veracity and validity
of the argument and can be levelled at any or all of its elements (claim, qualifier, warrant, evidence,
and backing). The goal of rebuttals is to interrogate, undermine and expose weaknesses in the
argument structure, in other words, to challenge the argument. By systematically analyzing each
element of the argument supporting implicit or explicit claims in a scientific communication, the
competent reader can uncover evidence of distortions (inappropriateness, incoherence,
inconsistencies and incompleteness) that invalidate it. If any of the major elements of the argument
are undermined (claim, warrant, evidence or backing), the argument fails, and is considered
irredeemable (Habermas, 1984). Table 1 presents a list of interrogatives applicable for posing
rebuttals, to analyze and test each validity claim. For example, each validity claim is assessed for
clarity, understandability and coherence, then its core elements, Qualifiers, Evidence, Warrant,
Backing, are analyzed using the interrogatives and clarifications.
Components Rebuttals Interrogatives and Clarifications

Claims Clarity Is the claim clear and understandable?
Originality It the claim original?
Coherence Is the claim coherent?
Qualifier(s) Appropriateness Are the qualifiers too weak given the evidence?
Are the qualifiers too stringent given the evidence?
Evidence Appropriateness Is the evidence appropriate for making the claim given the warrant?
Sufficiency Is the evidence sufficient for making the claim?
Contradiction Is the evidence contradictory to the claim?
Warrant Appropriateness Is the warrant appropriate for reasoning with the evidence to make the claim?
Consistency Is the reasoning with the evidence logically consistent?
Backing Appropriateness Are the background assumptions appropriate for the warrant?
Table 1: Summary of rebuttals and interrogatives used in testing arguments
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3. BASIC CLAIMS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Habermas (1984, pp. 37) argues that explication of a system of validity claims is essential for
specific domains of discourse (i.e. science, art, law). In Truth and justification (Habermas, 2003)
he argues: “the process of [scientific] argumentation warrant the rational expectation that the
relevant information and reasons get “put on the table” and bring their influence to bear on the
outcome” (pp. 108). In his introduction to Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms (BFN), Rehg
notes: discourse ethics require that implied validity claims are surfaced and tested by the
discussants, as this enables ‘limiting discursive efforts to problematic validity claims’ (BFN, 1996,
pp. xvi). Moreover, Toulmin (2006) also argues that the interrogation of scientific arguments
requires that validity claims are surfaced and tested by the discussants (cf. Toulmin, et. al., 1984).
But how exactly are validity claims explicated? To reiterate, validity claims are implied conditions
for the validity of the statement made by a speaker or writer in scientific discourse, for which
Habermas, (1984) suggests rational reconstruction as a method for their explication. Rational
reconstruction serves the epistemic purpose of explicating social norms, theoretical claims and
hypotheses for testing in empirical settings (Habermas, 2003). It is a critical interpretive method
for revealing deep structures of social action (communication and activity) by making and testing
logical inferences about their underlying validity conditions (Habermas, 1979; see also Pedersen,
2008). When applied to the explication of implied claims, the interrogator logically infers
conditions necessary for the validity of the statement then tests the logical coherence of these
counterfactuals (Feteris, 2005; Thompson & Byrne, 2002). For example, when a scientist chooses
a specific methodology for conducting her research, the implied claim is that the chosen
methodology is appropriate for conducting her research. The redeemability of such an implied
claim would require the scientist to provide Evidence, Warrant and Backing, to substantiate her
claim and convince the community of its legitimacy. From this perspective, the ten basic claims
that I propose in this essay explicate the conditions for the validity of those principal decisions we
make when conducting research. They are basic to the investigative and communicative practices
of science.
The ten basic claims (BC):

1. The question that the researcher proposes to investigate is relevant and persisting in
the field of study.
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2. The researcher has demonstrated a command of the literature of the field of study
in which she is attempting to contribute.
3. The theoretical approach/perspective that the researcher has selected for the
inquiry is appropriate for investigating the research question.
4. The researcher has demonstrated a command of the paradigmatic assumptions
upon which the theoretical approach/perspective of research is based.
5. The methodology that the researcher has selected is appropriate for investigating
the research question given the theoretical approach and empirical situation.
6. The empirical situation selected for the inquiry is appropriate for observing the
phenomenon or phenomenal behavior that the researcher is investigating.
7. The methodology has been applied in a systematic manner and carefully
documented to allow for replication or corroboration by other researchers.
8. The results of the research make a contribution to the researcher’s field of study
9. The research has been conducted in an ethical manner: respondent autonomy and
confidentiality is maintained; ethical data collection protocols are observed; no part
of the work has been plagiarized and all sources have been acknowledged.
10. The paper reflects communicative competence: it is carefully argued and written in a
manner that is understandable to the scientific community.
However, while scientists may, in their argumentation, overlook any of these ten validity claims,
they are implied (constitutive of) in the argumentation upon which our scientific knowledge claims
rests, and are redeemable in the scientific discourse. Habermas (1984) argues that being explicit
about the system of validity claims can reduce conflict and the risk of disagreement due to
ambiguity. Furthermore, discourse ethics (Habermas, 2003; Pera, 2000; Rehg, 2009) demand
competent scientists, concerned with achieving mutual understanding within the scientific
community, attend to these claims. Habermas (2003) is clear “the rational acceptability of validity
claims is ultimately based only on reasons that stand up to objections under certain exacting
conditions of communication. If the process of argumentation is to live up to its meaning,
communication in the form of rational discourse must, if possible, allow all relevant information
and explanations to be brought up and weighed so that the stance participants take can be
intrinsically motivated solely by the revisionary power of free-floating reasons” (pp. 108). A
transparent system of validity claims can help to focus the analysis into: “How can problematic
validity claims be supported by good reasons? How can reasons be criticized in turn? What makes
some arguments, and thus some reasons, which are related to validity claims in a certain way,
stronger or weaker than other arguments?” (Habermas, 1984, pp. 24).
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It is important to note here that while the IS discipline embraces diverse research paradigms/
worldviews (Positivist, Interpretive, Action Research, Design Science, and Phronetic), with
varying knowledge interests and employing different methodologies, with regard to scientific
discourse, they share the same implied validity claims (Pera, 1994). Worldviews and discipline
specific assumptions influence what counts as ‘substantive argument’ for justification of a validity
claim, but “the logic of rhetorical arguments delivers the canons that validate such rhetorical
arguments” (Pera, 1994, p. 133). The idea of a universal framework for the rhetorical analysis of
scientific argumentation finds support in the work of many scholars (Habermas, 1984; 2003; Pera,
1994; Rehg, 2009; Toulmin, 1954). Table 2 provides an illustration of how the ten basic claims
can be interpreted across these different IS research paradigms. It is also important to note here
that Lee and Hubona (2009), while accounting for differences in worldviews and discipline
specific assumptions, convincingly illustrated how theory development in Positivist, Interpretive,
Design Science and Action Research are all describable by the singular logic of modus tollens
(ibid, pp. 244, Table 7). As Habermas (1984, pp. 36) argues: “all arguments, be they related to
questions of law and morality or to scientific hypotheses or to works of art, require the same basic
form of organization, which subordinates the eristic means to the end of developing
intersubjective conviction by the force of the better argument.” The interrogation of validity claims
in scientific discourse is not a truth seeking process, but a process of justification that the
arguments offered in support of a claim are a sufficiently rational basis for legitimizing the claim
(Pera, 1994; Rehg, 2009; Toulmin, 1983; Toulmin, et. al., 1984; Habermas, 2003).
3.1 Rationale for Basic Claims

I contend that basic norms of scientific discourse and the goal of achieving mutual understanding
in the community of peers require the scientist to explicitly articulate and carefully defend each of
the basic claims 1 through 9. Basic Claims (BC) 1 through 9 are implied by the decision choices
scientists make during design and investigative phase of the research, as such represent the
constitutive logic of scientific inquiry. They are part of a normatively regulated structure of the
scientific enterprise. By illustration, BC1 represents the objective of the inquiry; as such it ought
to stipulate what the researcher wants to discover about the phenomenon or phenomenal behavior
into which she is inquiring. A careful articulation of BC1 would entail a defense of the relevance
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Table 2
Specifying the Ten Basic Claims for different Knowledge Interest and Paradigms of IS Research
Validity Episteme Techné Phronesis
Claims Positivist Research Interpretive Research Action Research Design Research Phronetic research
BC1 No difference No difference No difference No difference No difference
BC3 The theoretical model that The theoretical approach or The theoretical approach or The theoretical approach or The theoretical approach or
the researcher has selected is perspective that the researcher perspective that the design principles that the perspective that the
appropriate for investigating is appropriate for inquiry into researcher has selected is researcher has selected is researcher has selected is
the positivist research the interpretive research appropriate for solving the appropriate for solving the appropriate for investigating
question. question. problem and building a new problem, building a new the phronetic research
theory of action, process or artefact or design theory question.
procedure
BC4 The researcher has The researcher has The researcher has The researcher has The researcher has
demonstrated a command of demonstrated a command of demonstrated a command demonstrated a command demonstrated a command of
the paradigmatic the paradigmatic assumptions of the paradigmatic of the paradigmatic the paradigmatic
assumptions upon which the upon which the theoretical assumptions of the action assumptions of the design assumptions upon of the
theoretical model for the approach for the research is research approach upon science approach upon phronetic approach to the
research is based. based. which the research is based. which the research is based. research is based.
BC5 The methodology that the The methodology that the The methodology that the The methodology that the The methodology that the
researcher has selected is researcher has selected is researcher has selected is researcher has selected is researcher has selected is
appropriate for conducting a appropriate for conducting an appropriate for conducting appropriate for the design appropriate for phronetic
positivist investigating of the interpretive investigating of the an action research research problem under inquiry into the research
research question. research question. investigation of question. investigation. question.
BC8 The new positivist theory or The new interpretive theory or The new theory of action, The new artefact or design The new phronetic
predictive model is better explanation is better than process or procedure is theory is better than explanation is better than
than existing positivists or existing interpretive theories or better than existing theories existing artefacts or design existing phronetic
predictive models explanations of action… theories explanations
14

and persistence of the research question and knowledge interest (descriptive, explanatory,
predictive, prescriptive) of the research. Such a defense is also an explication of why the
community of scientists should invest resources in legitimizing the results. In defense of BC2, the
researcher must demonstrate that she has a detailed understanding of the key problems of the area
in which she plans to contribute. She must demonstrate a detailed understanding of what is known
and what are still unsolved puzzles of the field. As Toulmin explains:
“The 'objectivity' of scientific knowledge makes it possible for us (indeed, requires us) to
distinguish absolutely between disciplinary or factual questions, of the form 'What is
known/established/explained ...?'” (Toulmin, 1972).
In defense of BC3, the researcher should articulate for the scientific community reasons why the
specific theoretical approach/perspective that she has adopted for the inquiry is better than other
options. For example, IS research is multi-paradigmatic (Cushing, 1990; Chen & Hirschheim,
2004; Becker & Niehaves, 2007), encompasses a range of knowledge interest, namely, episteme,
techné and phronesis (Ngwenyama and Klein, 2018) and adopts a variety of methodologies
(Bernroider, et. al., 2013; Davison & Martinsons, 2011). It is important to note here that the term
theoretical approach is inclusive of the various paradigmatic assumptions orienting theory
development in the specific research program. Theoretical approaches/perspectives orient choices
of design theories or principles for design research, models used in positivist theory testing, or
theoretical frameworks used in deductive qualitative research. Theoretical perspectives also orient
the selection of specific logics of empirical analysis in inductive, abductive and retroductive
research (cf. Ngwenyama, 2014). Key questions to be explicated are: Why is the chosen theoretical
approach appropriate for answering the research question about the specific phenomenon? What
does it offer that other theoretical approaches don’t? A defense of BC4 should convince the
scientific community that the researcher has a detailed understanding of the theoretical foundations
(paradigm) of the chosen theoretical approach. What are its important potentials and critical
limitations for the inquiry? In other words, the researcher must demonstrate that she is qualified to
effectively deploy the theoretical approach in a systematic scientific inquiry.
The defense of BC5 must convince the scientific community that methodology chosen by the
researcher is appropriate for: (1) investigating the phenomenon or phenomenal behavior given the
theoretical approach of the research; (2) inquiry into the specific the empirical situation; (3)
15

generating the type of knowledge that is the goal of the inquiry. The researcher must convince the
scientific community that he has a fundamental understanding of the norms and practices of theory
development using the methodology and understand its potential and limitations. The defense of
BC6 must convince the scientific community that the empirical situation chosen by the researcher
is appropriate for the inquiry into the phenomenon or phenomenal behavior of interest. The term
empirical situation is broad and inclusive of field study sites, experiments, or archival data sets.
Presently, the use of bots to manufacture fake data is a challenging problem for researchers using
online data to study electronically mediated behavior. In defense of BC7, the researcher is required
to demonstrate that she has clearly and systematically documented how the methodology was
developed and executed in the research. Clarity is essential in documenting data collection
decisions, protocols and data analysis procedures to maintain an unbroken evidence chain from
data collection through to the generation of knowledge claims. This is essential assessing the
reliability and validity of claims to knowledge contributions.
While a complete defense of BC8 is dependent upon the effective defense of the prior seven basic
claims, there is an important philosophy of science criterion that require explicit attention from the
researcher. The basis for claiming a contribution to knowledge is the principle of inference to the
better explanation (IBE) (Hanson & Toulmin, 1971; Harman, 1965; Thagard, 1978; Day and
Kincaid, 1994). Satisfying the (IBE) criterion requires the author to give a clear and detailed
exposition of how the new explanation of the phenomenon (or aspects thereof) is better than other
explanations available in the existing body of knowledge (Agerfalk, 2014). Explanation is an
inclusive philosophy of science term for all types of theories: descriptive, explanatory, predictive
or normative (prescriptive). Finally, the defense of BC9 and BC10 is largely implicit and indicated
by a clear and comprehensive articulation and defense of BC1 to BC8. Some of the defense of
BC9 might require an explicit response to ethical issues of data collection and use, especially in
social media and big data IS research (Hunter & Evans, 2016; Mauthner, 2018; Light & McGrath,
2010). Furthermore, some of our journals now require explicit acknowledgement concerning
publication ethics (no concurrent journal submissions, etc.). However, as Habermas (1967; 1970,
1993) clearly argues the redeemability of claims requires that members of the scientific community
reading a scientific communication, interrogate and test the validity claims implied or explicit in
the arguments. A competent scientist (or informed citizen) does not passively accept the
16

communication of another but is duty bound to vigorously engage in analysis with the intention to
refute its claims, accepting them only after they survive rigorous analysis (Popper, 1963; Toulmin,
1972; 1974b; 1999). This is a foundational principle upon which the self-reflexive and self-
corrective ideals concerning the advancement of scientific knowledge advances are rooted.
3.2 The Claims Analysis Procedure

As stated earlier, the ten claims are implied in scientific research in the sense that they are
redeemable validity claims of scientific inquiry. The empirical method of reading and analyzing
the text of a scientific communication is critical interpretive with the focus on identifying
violations of the ten claims (Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997; Cukier et. al., 2009). The three-stage
analytic procedure outlined hereafter embodies the essence of Habermas’ principles of critical
interrogation for redeemability of validity claims (Habermas, 1993) and Toulmin’s principles for
the analysis of arguments (Toulmin, 1958, 1985). The analysis of each of the basic claims BC1 to
BC8 will follow this three-stage process to interrogate argument structures at the micro level.
However, BC9 and BC10 are higher level, more general claims, concerned with assessing
sincerity, truthfulness, legitimacy and comprehensibility of the knowledge claim of the
communication. These require an assessment of the corpus of the evidence resulting from the
analysis of BC1 through BC8. In Stage 1, we focus on BC1 to BC8 by empirically analyzing the
text of the publication to identify each claim and its elements described in Figure 1. However,
some of the elements, especially the warrant and backing, may be implied and not explicitly stated.
This requires the analyst to engage in thought experiments to uncover the implied warrants or
backings used to reason with the evidence in support of claim. In Introduction to Reasoning,
Toulmin et. al. (1984) recommend the claim as the normal starting point when analyzing
arguments, and progressing to evidence, warrants and backing; then finally assessing the qualifiers
of the claim in the context of the whole argument. Another important point to mention; while these
elements of arguments are invariant across fields, the meaning of the arguments are field (context)
dependent, and as such must be judged within their appropriate context (Ngwenyama and Lee,
1997; Cukier et. al., 2009). The procedure for the Stage 1 analysis is as follows:
– Claim: Identify the specific claim as the writer has articulated it

– Qualifier: Identify any boundary conditions the author has placed on the claims
– Evidence: Identify any evidence the writer uses to support the claim
17

– Warrant: Identify the logic, model or theory that the writer is using to reason with and
interpret the evidence in support of the claim
– Backing: Identify the basis upon which the warrant is supported
In Stage 2 we are concerned with the claims rebuttal analysis, the objective of which is a vigorous
attempt to refute each of BC1 through BC8 of the research. The focus is on examining: (1) the
validity and strength of the evidence for supporting each claim; (2) the appropriateness of the
warrant as a valid and sufficient basis for analysing the evidence and inferring the claim; (3) the
appropriateness and strength of the backing underlying the warrant. Is the warrant based on solid
background assumptions? While principles of inferential logic can be used as backing for some
warrants, field dependent and paradigmatic assumptions can also serve as backing for warrants.
The objective is to interrogate and judge the appropriateness of the backing for the warrant. The
analysis procedure for this stage involves a systematic examination of the results from Stage 1
using the interrogatives in Table 1. More specifically, each of BC1 through BC8 is analyzed in the
context of the entire discourse and general standards of rational argument (logical consistency,
completeness and defensibility). For a detailed description of general criteria of rational
argumentation, see Toulmin (1958) and Toulmin et. al. (1984). Finally, Stage 3 of the analysis
concerns the interrogation and testing of BC9 and BC10 and judging the sincerity, truthfulness,
legitimacy and comprehensibility of the publication. However, the results from Stage 2 provides a
significant body of evidence upon which the analysis can proceed.
4. Illustrating the Analysis

To illustrate the framework and principles for critical interrogation of the claims, I have selected
three papers published in the European Journal of Information Systems: Bidan et. al. (2012), a
paper employing mixed, positivist and interpretivist methods, and Scheepers et. al. (2006), an
interpretivist paper, and see Appendix A for the third, a DSR paper. These papers are significantly
different in genre and research approach, enabling a demonstration of the applicability of the
analytical approach to diverse styles of scientific communication. In Bidan et. al. 2012, I will
identify in the text if and where the authors have explicitly articulated and defended claims BC1
through BC8. My interest here is in identifying the claim (implicit or explicit) with any qualifiers,
and the evidence, warrant and backing marshalled to support the argument in order to assess its
strength.
18

Illustration 1: Analysis of Bidan et. al., 2012
BC1: On page 288, column 2, the authors explicitly state their research questions and claim an
exploratory inductive approach for the inquiry:
Claim: “With these concerns in mind, we developed an exploratory research plan with
two primary research questions:
RQ1: What are the main IS architectures found in SMEs?
RQ2: What kinds of systems integration approaches are present in SMEs?”
Evidence: “Achieving information systems (ISs) integration, a daunting task for any
organization, is especially challenging for small firms” (para. 1, pp. 287).
“Typical SMEs face difficulties during information technology (IT) adoption
arising from a lack of technical competency and know-how, shortages of
qualified human resources….. (para. 1, pp. 287).”
Warrant: “Although some literature exists on ERP adoption (Buonanno et al, 2005),
SME-specific IS architectural surveys are virtually non-existent” (pp. 298).
In articulating their research questions, they are careful to qualify the focus (set boundary
conditions) of their investigation to IS architectures in SMEs. They provide evidence in defense
of BC1, the relevance and persistence of their questions in paragraph 1 of their introduction, citing
seven other published works in support of their argument. They argue that their study is warranted
because of the absence of IS architecture studies in the empirical situation of SMEs. In the first
half of paragraph 2, they further argue for the economic relevance of their study to SMEs and
society, citing several other published works. In the second half of the same paragraph, they state
why answers to their questions are of value in extending our body of knowledge and are of
relevance to improving efficiency and effectiveness in IS integration in SMEs. The authors do not
explicitly provide a warrant for the economic relevance argument they offer, but the ‘theory of the
efficient firm (Marschak, 1960)’, is implied in their reasoning:
Warrant: “Second, if finding patterns of problems in this population of organizations later

leads to more efficient operations for these firms, then society benefits. In either
case, describing how SMEs approach the problem of IS integration and how we can
best describe their resulting IT architecture in their organizational context (i.e., IS
architecture) is valuable given their economic impact and the sheer numbers of
SMEs.”
19

While seldom mentioned, the ‘theory of the efficient firm’, whose backing is the field of production
economics, is the implied warrant in several defenses of BC1 in IS studies, especially those
dealing with IS strategy and implementation.
With regard to BC2, the authors provide an extensive exposition of prior research on IS
architecture and systems integration as evidenced by their citations of key references. Furthermore,
they cite authoritative sources (including the IEEE standard 1471-2000) to define the phenomenon
and provide a table (Table 2) outlining the various aspects of the phenomenon relevant to their
study. The implied warrant for BC2 is ‘completeness’; the comprehensiveness of their exposition
is demonstrative of their command of the literature on IS architecture.
BC3: In stating their research question on page 288, column 2, the authors claim an exploratory
inductive approach for the inquiry. In defense of BC3 the authors provide the following evidence
and warrant:
Evidence: “Although some literature exists on ERP adoption (Buonanno et al, 2005), SME
specific IS architectural surveys are virtually non-existent. And, since much of the current
literature examines IS integration through the lens of the large-scale enterprise, it is
unclear whether these findings generalize well to the SME.”
Warrant: “Therefore, we thought that having better empirically derived understanding of

how the SMEs approach ISs integration and the way they manage to acquire, husband and
deploy ISs resources into a logical IS architecture would be valuable…” (cf. middle of
paragraph 2).
Given that the authors have chosen an exploratory inductive approach to their research the defense
of BC4 and BC5 can be dealt with together. This is because a defensible execution of exploratory
inductive approach depends on the chosen methodology. The authors chose to use an exploratory
questionnaire and cluster analysis techniques for their research methodology. In their research
method section, the authors argue their claim by providing evidence and a warrant as follows:
Claim: “the research involved an exploratory questionnaire from which was conducted a
kind of cluster analysis, [Evidence]...typically used to describe firms as configurations in
a holistic way (Aldenferder & Blashfield, 1984)”.
Warrant: “…because we do not test propositions drawn from a body of well-developed

theory, we view this research as exploratory.”
20

In paragraph 2 of their data collection (pp. 292, col. 2), the authors explain the process by which
they designed and pre-tested their questionnaire and provided an example of it in the appendix of
the paper. Furthermore, in the section on ‘Data analysis, statistical tool and tests,’ they provide a
defense for BC4 and BC5. They argue that hierarchical cluster analysis is an appropriate inductive
method for analyzing their data to derive valid empirical observations of the types of IS
architectures represented in their 143 survey responses from the SMEs. They also point the reader
to another published application of the method to a similar IS research problem. The authors then
discuss the underlying principles of the hierarchical clustering, and in paragraph 1 in the section
‘Data analysis,…’, they provide four specific reasons for selecting the SPAD.N clustering tool
used for the data analysis. Key elements of their argument in defense of BC4 and BC5 are:
Claim: “we used a hierarchical agglomerate method to define initial clusters”.
“the descriptions of the IS architectures and systems integration are derived through
statistical analysis rather than being derived from a particular theory ex ante to the
research.”
Evidence: “SPAD.N’s cluster analysis approach identifies and systematically sorts,

among the variables included in the model, those (discrete or continuous) that are
statistically
significantly related to a specific discrete variable.”
“Typically, it can be used for answering a complex question such as ‘Is the proportion of
enterprise architecture which are categorized by some integration greater when these EAs
use ERP than when they use a other technology?’ (Rowe & Struck, 1999).”
Warrant: “Why? Because we are looking for commonalities between organizations in

various demographic clusters and we cannot preclude any particular commonality a priori
to the analysis.”
Backing: “This research follows the well-established French school of multivariate

analysis (Lebart et al, 1984) more fully described below.”
BC6: The reader will recall that, in their research questions, the authors stipulated SMEs as the
empirical situation for their study. On examining BC6, we find that the authors use the French
classification scheme which defines SMEs by the number of employees (10 to 3000). They then
present evidence in Table 4 (pp. 294) demonstrating that the distribution of 143 firms in their
sample met the criteria for the French SME classification of 10 to 3000 employees. The
interrogation of the authors defense of BC7 reveals that in the section ‘Data collection…’ they
21

provide evidence using detailed descriptions of how they: (1) selected the empirical situation (a
pool of 600 French firms); (2) designed and pretested the questionnaire; and (3) conducted the data
collection. Then in section ‘Data analysis …’ (para. 2, pp. 294) they provide a step by step
description of how they systematically applied the clustering method in their analysis.
With regard to BC8, a requirement of our interrogation requires that we apply the IBE criterion.
The authors are expected to explicitly outline the evidence in support of the claim that their new
explanation is better than that which currently exists. In the context of the present research, the
authors argued that no studies of IS architectures in SMEs existed, therefore, no empirically
grounded knowledge of the phenomenon existed in the IS literature. The assent of this claim
constitutes a benchmark against which we can apply the IBE criterion to assess their claim that
their findings constitute a contribution to knowledge. A second criterion we must apply in this
evaluation is the knowledge interest (descriptive, explanatory, predictive, or prescriptive) they
claim for their research findings. In explication of BC1, the authors claimed two research questions
with descriptive knowledge interest:
RQ1: What are the main IS architectures found in SMEs?
RQ2: What kinds of systems integration approaches are present in SMEs?”
Furthermore, in the abstract and research method section, the authors made some important claims
about the knowledge interest of their contribution which we are also obliged to test in evaluating
BC8: In the abstract (BC8.1, BC8.2) and research method section (BC8.3) they clarify the
knowledge interests of their research as follows:
BC8.1: “This research provides an empirically derived taxonomy of enterprise

architectural variants of the types often described in the literature for large firms.”
BC8.2: “The contribution of this paper lies not in the identification of the three types but
resides (1) in the description of their distribution in SMEs; (2) in the absence of other
integration/ interoperability types in this population; and (3) most importantly in the
interpretation of the organizational and historical rationale explaining the emergence of
these types in this organizational context.”
BC8.3: “We see this research as contributing to the description of the artifacts and to
furthering the development of taxonomies by which we can establish standardized
terminology and later a theory of those artifacts and their ecosystems (Star & Ruhleder,
1996).”
22

Therefore, we interrogate their proposal for a contribution to knowledge for correspondence with
their claims. In the ‘Result’ section of their paper, we find a defense of BC8 in light of the two
research questions which satisfies BC8.1. The authors state that their empirical analysis, namely
hierarchical cluster analysis, “identified three categories or classes, which we call (1) the ‘Silos
Architecture’, (2) the ‘Partially Standardized Architecture’ and (3) the ‘Mixed Architecture’”. In
subsections labeled accordingly, they provide detailed evidence in the form of descriptions of each
category, satisfying BC8.3. Furthermore, in the subsection ‘Findings in the light….’, they present
summary discussions of how their empirical findings provided satisfactory answers to their two
research questions. With regard to the defense of BC8.2, the three elements of this claim are
satisfied by evidence given in the subsection ‘Interpretation of the three clusters’. In paragraphs
3, 4 and 5 of the subsection (pp. 297), the authors discuss empirically observed historical and
organizational factors associated with each type of IS architecture observed in their study. In the
first paragraph of the same section, the authors provide their reasons (warrant) for claiming their
contribution to knowledge based on the empirical evidence they generated:
Claim: “Following the challenge made by Orlikowski & Iacono (2001), this research takes
the IT artifact seriously and provides a taxonomy of IS architectures and systems
integration.
Warrant: “Having examined how these architectural and systems integration forms arise
in the SME and not the domain of the large-scale enterprise allowed us to propose that the
typologies arising from studies of large firms are not universally applicable to all firms.
In the process, we believe that we have also contributed to theory development via a
clarification of nomenclature definitional confusion around the term ‘IS architecture’ and
of the many different definitions related to the ‘architectural’ construct.”
Finally, we arrive at the interrogation of qualifiers to the knowledge claim that the authors make.
Starting in paragraph 2 of the conclusion, the author’s state and discuss four qualifiers of their
research. The qualifiers are itemized below, see paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 on page 299 for detailed
discussion:
Qualifier 1: “First, surveys on enterprise integration architectures are rare, particularly
in the arena of the SMEs. Therefore, as a first stab at describing and understanding IS
architectures and systems integration typologies in the SME, we had to adjust to surprises
encountered at each step of the process.”
Qualifier 2: “Second, this is the first study of this type examining French firms. It has been
9 years since our initial study, and despite other work in this domain we find that some of
the items that we tested have not been asked in follow-on surveys.”
23

Qualifier 3: “Third, our convenience sample targeted the mid-size market of SMEs, and
thus we note that the mean firm size of our sample may exhibit a sample biased toward the
large–medium size firms rather than the very small firm.”
Qualifier 4: “And fourth, there are suggestions that BI (business intelligence), web
services (Puschman & Alt, 2005), cloud computing and ‘The Grid’ may be making inroads
even into the domain of the SME.”
As stated earlier, BC9 and BC10 are assessed based on the corpus of the evidence compiled in
interrogating BC1 through BC8. If those claims are ‘redeemed’, i.e., have not been refuted by our
critical interrogation, then in the main BC9 and BC10 are also redeemed, and the work gains assent
as sincere, truthful, comprehensible, and legitimate scientific communication. However, if future
interrogation should undermine the claims, then its assent will be withdrawn.
Illustration 2: Analysis of Scheepers et. al., 2006

This paper is chosen for its brevity and difference from the first. However, in order to spare the
reader of another in-depth analysis, I will focus only on BC1, BC3 and BC8 to illustrate aspects
of the strategy for interrogation which was not as prominent in the analysis of Bidan et. al., (2012).
A major difference between these two papers is that the knowledge interest of Scheepers et. al.
(2006), is explanatory. This is stated in the introductory paragraph where the authors mounted a
defense of BC1. Firstly, it should be noted that the authors do not explicitly state their research
question, but imply it in different sections of their paper starting with the introductory paragraph
as follows:
Claim: “In this research, we question how individuals’ satisfaction with mobile computing is
influenced by the multiple contexts of use afforded by these devices.”
Evidence: “A contemporary challenge is to understand and explain users’ satisfaction with

mobile computing technologies, nomadic work practices enabled by these devices (Lyytinen &
Yoo, 2002) and their impact on organizations...
Mobile technologies challenge our current theories of user satisfaction due to their usability
within multiple contexts…”
Warrant: “The mobility of these devices and their multiple contexts of use add several
dimensions to the user satisfaction and organizational adoption problem.”
24

BC3: The authors explain that they have made observations concerning the phenomenon of user
satisfaction which existing IS user satisfaction and technology acceptance theories could not
explain. They argue that the existing user satisfaction and technology acceptance theories were
developed for immovable computing devices, predating mobile technologies, and focus only on
the organizational context. Consequently, they argue that these existing theoretical approaches
were inappropriate for their research.
Claim: “At present, there is, however, no explicit approach for studying these within the
current conceptualization of user satisfaction.”
Evidence: “User satisfaction has been operationalized by a set of measures to assess

broader aspects of organizational IS effectiveness”
“Mobile computing technology use (mandatory or voluntary) transcends the
organizational context and calls upon researchers to revisit underlying assumptions about
how individuals evaluate such technologies.”
“Some technology acceptance researchers suggest that social influences beyond the
organizational context (professional peers, family and friends, computer use at home) can
impact individual acceptance of technology”
Warrant: “Historically, we have based our understanding of user satisfaction on fixed

computing devices situated within a single context: the organization.”
BC8: Once again, in testing the validity of BC8 we are required to apply the IBE criterion. The
authors (Scheepers at. al., 2006) are expected to clearly and explicitly defend the claim that their
new explanation is better than currently existing theories in the user satisfaction literature. The
benchmark for this analysis is the assent of authors’ argument in defense of BC3 (outlined above).
In the section ‘User satisfaction in organizational contexts,’ the authors mount a defense for BC2.
In their defense, they summarize the key aspects of the user satisfaction literature relevant to their
research. They present a carefully argued review of the core concepts of user satisfaction and
technology acceptance theories, outlining their historical development and limit of focus on the
organizational context. With these issues in mind, the authors’ state their explanatory knowledge
interest as follows:
“we question how individuals’ satisfaction with mobile computing is influenced by the
multiple contexts of use afforded by these devices”
They propose extending the contexts of current user acceptance theories to encompass other
contexts, the professional and individual, and two new voluntary use situations. In Figure 1 on
25

page 6, they illustrate with a Venn diagram the new contexts, use situations and relationships of
their conceptualization. They suggest that researchers must address these new contexts to develop
a more comprehensive understanding of factors influencing user satisfaction of mobile devices.
The following are the key elements of their argument to satisfy the IBE criterion and substantiate
their proposed explanation.
Claim: “A richer conceptualization of the interrelated layers of contexts that influence an

individual’s overall evaluation of mobile computing is depicted in Figure 1” (cf. p. 266).
Evidence: “Our findings show that in the case of mobile computing (even in mandatory
use scenarios), user satisfaction is judged by users on more than the use of the technology
within the organizational context.”
“Our results show that the varying social contexts of individual use (individual as
employee, professional, private user, and as member of society) result in different social
influences that can affect the individual’s perceptions of user satisfaction with the
technology.”
“we find that influences pertaining to the organizational context, society-at-large, the
profession, and private context all contribute to users’ overall satisfaction with mobile
computing.”
“We argue that as IT becomes more ubiquitous, it will increasingly be necessary to take
extra-organizational contexts into account when assessing users’ satisfaction, even in
situations of mandatory use in the organization.”
Warrant: “counterintuitive results (such as when users reported an overall satisfaction

with the technology despite expressing numerous negative sentiments) may be explained
by taking into account extra-organizational contextual influences.”
“because the physical mobility of the technology and the new contexts of individual use,
by way of mobility, demand a more dynamic conceptualization.”
Qualifier 1: “First, the mobile computing devices in this study hold the potential for
extended use. This limits the practical implications of this research in terms of application
context because some mobile technologies do not typically offer the option of use outside
the organizational context.”
Qualifier 2: “Second, the two cases incorporate influences that pertain to healthcare
professionals. Further research is needed to assess extra-organizational influences on the
perceptions of individuals toward mobile technologies in other sectors.”
As stated earlier, the analysis of this paper is focused on BC1, BC3 and BC8 with the intention of
drawing a contrast to the analysis of the Bidan et. al., (2012) paper. I wanted to draw the reader’s
attention to stylistic differences in articulating research questions, arguing for the theoretical
26

approach to research and explicitly articulating a defense of the IBE criterion. However, the reader
is encouraged to engage in critically interrogating the remaining claims BC2, BC4, BC5, BC6 and
BC7 in order to compile the evidence necessary for assessing BC9 and BC10 and determining the
redeemability of the research; that is, to assess whether it gains assent as sincere, truthful,
comprehensible, and legitimate scientific communication.
5. Conclusion
This essay responds to calls for systematic approaches to scientific discourse and communications
from the general community of scientists (Ferrell & Old, 2016; Wittek, et. al., 2017), and for ethical
and rigorous critical discourse as part of knowledge legitimation practices by IS scholars (Stahl,
2009; Mingers and Walsham, 2010; Truex et. al., 2018). Contemporary challenges of the ‘post-
truth era’ demand that academics invest in the ‘science of scientific communication’ as a bulwark
against distortions in scientific discourse (Nisbet, 2017; Angermuller, 2018). The centrality of
critical discourse to scientific knowledge production cannot be overstated. As Pera (2000, pp. 63)
argues, “if there is no other accessible way of getting in touch with nature except by putting
forward hypotheses, testing them against empirical evidence, and discussing them in front of a
community……. then rhetoric is no mere a device, but rather the tool of the very constitution of
scientific knowledge”. Recently, Rowe (2018) argued that the IS community has an obligation to
cultivate more open philosophical discourses on the science of IS and its social implications. And
while the IS discipline has deep roots and continued investments in the application language and
communication theory to studying IS phenomena (Goldkuhl and Lyytinen, 1982; Lyytinen, 1985;
Lyytinen and Klein, 1985; Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997; Ågerfalk and Eriksson, 2004; Te'eni,
2006), not much attention has focused on building frameworks for the systematic analysis of our
scientific discourses. The essay responds to this gap by proposing a framework and approach for
identifying and interrogating implied validity claims in IS scientific discourse. The approach is
based on principles of Habermasian critical discourse and Toulminian argumentation which are
concerned with how we can emancipate ourselves from systematically distorted communication.
The framework and approach offers the following important contributions to the analysis and
legitimation of IS scientific claims: (1) A system of ten interlocking basic claims explicating the
conditions for the validity of a core set of arguments that IS researchers must make and defend
concerning the principal decisions involved in conducting and communicating their research.
27

Putting these claims on the table enables transparency of the discourse and focused attention on
problematic validity claims. (2) The procedures for interrogating validity claims provided in this
essay enables a common standard for rigorous analysis of scientific argumentation across all
paradigms and genres of IS research. Having a common understanding of the evidence, warrants
and backing necessary to defend the ten basic claims can enable a critical reflexive approach to
examining the principal decisions we make in our scientific practice. The procedures can also
enable a process of scientific discourse that is critically reflexive, self-correcting and accessible to
all participants. (3) Adopting common standards of rational scientific argumentation based on
clear principles for normative assessment of arguments rooted in philosophy of science can serve
to improve our scientific communications and further strengthen our credibility in the broader
community of scientists. Kelly (2010) argues that critical discourse is essential to the generation
and legitimation of scientific knowledge across epistemic communities and society, and as such
philosophy of science and discourse should be foundations of every scientist’s training and practice
(see also Besley & Tanner, 2011). Lack of a basic understanding of philosophy of science and
critical argumentation can often result in gaps in the logic of science, instrumental rationality and
the inability to provide ‘good reasons’ in defense of scientific knowledge claims. In advocating
for improving our standards of critical discourse, Rowe (2018, p.389) states:
“Whether for inquiry or exposition, the method of philosophising is critical discourse in which
members of the community discuss particulars of challenging existential issues and hammer out
reasoned positions about them that cannot necessarily be codified in episteme.”
The contemporary climate of public discourse demands of us vigilance in consuming information

and discursive engagements with others. While the Internet has enabled more democratic access
to information and possibilities for expanding our horizons of interactions, these potentials are
accompanied by risks of deception and the general impoverishment in critical public discourse
(Cukier et. al., 2009; Sorial, 2015). It is noteworthy that lying and creating distortions concerning
the subject and evidence of a debate are pervasive strategies of manipulation in contemporary
public discourse. It is easy to fall victim to misinformation and manipulation if one is lacking in
skills of argumentation and critical inquiry (Pennycook & Rand, 2017; Kelly, 2010). Powerful
stakeholder influence on scientific research and discourse, manipulation of journal reviewing
processes, and the growing numbers of predatory journals all threaten the legitimacy of science
(Burdick, 2017; Robinson & Latham, 2013). We are also facing problems of junk science
28

perpetuated by commercial interests (Burdick, 2017; Ceccarelli, 2011), fake news and data
fabrication by bots (Lazer, et. al. 2018; Zigmond & Fischer, 2002), as well as data quality problems
in big data archives (Boyd & Crawford, 2012) and unethical big data experiments (Hunter &
Evans, 2016; Panger, 2016). These developments constitute challenges not only to the legitimacy
of science but to democratic institutions, public discourse and rational public policy decision
making. Feyerabend (1978), Polanyi (2000), Pera (2000), Habermas (2003), Rehg (2009) and other
contemporary critical philosophers all emphasize the importance of nurturing critical discourse in
science, not just for the sake of professional interactions, but for maintaining the legitimacy and
viability of open democratic institutions (cf. Popper, 2013). In The Open Society and Its Enemies
(Vol. 1, 1945), Popper cautioned us to be watchful of attacks on the ‘open society’ whose goal is
the liberation of the critical powers of individuals. In Popper’s view, the institution of science and
its principle of free and unencumbered critical discourse is a pillar of the Open Society, and a
bulwark against totalitarianism. However, he could not foresee how open access to information
via the Internet and social media would enable an intensive assault on our scientific and democratic
institutions. The general climate of public discourse demands that responsible individuals embrace
competencies for testing the validity of implicit or explicit claims in our communicative
interactions. The framework and approach outlined in this essay, can be emancipatory (Habermas,
1993); it can assist us in conducting systematic critiques of our scientific reports with a view to
overcoming the potential for self-deception that Branscomb (1985) articulated.
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35

Appendix A
Illustrating Basic Claims analysis of Design Science Research
Umapathy, K., Purao, S., & Barton, R. R. (2008). Designing enterprise integration solutions:
Effectively. European Journal of Information Systems, 17(5), 518-527.
BC1: Is the question that the researcher proposes to investigate relevant and persisting in the field
of study?
The authors explicitly state a research question and provide evidence and warrants for its relevance
and persistence:
Claim: “we investigate whether knowledge for conceptual design of enterprise integration
solutions, which is rarely codified, can, in fact, be accessed and reused; and
whether such reuse contributes to more effective design outcomes. (pp.519, para,
1, ln. 3)”
Evidence: “The design of large and complex enterprise integration solutions is a difficult
task. It can require solutions that are unique because of constraints from the
current set of legacy applications. Design knowledge for enterprise integration
solutions is, therefore, difficult to articulate and reuse. In particular, the nature
and form of knowledge for conceptual design of integration solutions is difficult
to pin down” (pp. 518, ln 1, abstract).
“Few efforts in prior research have attempted to codify conceptual knowledge

for designing enterprise integration solutions. One significant exception, which
in essence represents repeated patterns observed in practice, abstracted and
articulated, are the Enterprise Integration Patterns (EIP). These patterns1 are
abstract, that is, they do not provide implementation code or wrappers” (pp.
519, para, 3, ln 8-15).
Warrant: Hohpe &Woolf, 2004; Barros et al., 2005.
Backing: None
BC2: Has the researcher demonstrated a command of the literature of the field of study in which
she is attempting to contribute? No! The authors research is in the area of the language action
approach to modeling, but they don’t seem to have sufficient knowledge of the body of work in
this area that goes back to 1982. They cite only three papers Lind & Goldkuhl, 2001; Moore, 2001;
Goldkuhl & Agerfalk, 2000.
In the section: Designing enterprise integration solutions, the authors briefly discuss Business
Process Models and tools used for modeling and understanding integration requirements. Again,
the discussion is narrowly focused with scant evidence (8 citations) of a command of the literature:
Claim: “Integration requirements are often represented in the form of Business Process
Models (BPMs) (Aalst et al.,2003b), which embody a control-flow perspective
(WfMCTerminology,1999). They represent different tasks that must be performed,
and actors such as individuals and legacy systems that perform these tasks. The
36

tasks are logically interlinked to form the end-to-end process (Zhu et al., 2004),
(pp.519, para, 2 and 3)”
Evidence: “Aalst et al., 2003a; Aalst et al.,2003b; Zhu et al., 2004 Popkin, 2005; Ouyang
et al., 2007; Lam, 2005; Hohpe &Woolf, 2004; Banavar et al., 1999”
Warrant: None.
Backing: None.
BC3: Is the theoretical approach/perspective that the researcher has selected for the inquiry is
appropriate for investigating the research question?
In the section: Knowledge reuse for designing enterprise integration solutions, the authors claim
Speech Act Theory and Action Types as their theoretical approach and provide limited evidence
and warrants (Lind & Goldkuhl, 2001; Moore, 2001; Goldkuhl & Agerfalk, 2000) for their
appropriateness. They also presented a model (Figure 1) illustrating how speech acts can be used
to map actions to patterns of design knowledge. And in Figure 2 the authors illustrate how
enterprise integration patterns can be modeled using speech acts.
Claim: “we have argued for the appropriateness of speech acts as an effective mediator
for this purpose”. (pp.520, para, 2, ln. 2)”
“we utilize action types that reflect the performers’ intent for performing the task.
These action types correspond to high-level business actions that the actor
performs through means of communication directed toward other actor(s).
Evidence: “Speech acts distinguish between illocutionary acts (actions performed by the
speaker) and perlocutionary acts (intended effects on the hearer). They
represent a bridge between the two perspectives because they can be (a) mapped
against control-flows (with their focus on sequences of tasks) as well as (b) used
to augment messaging primitives with semantic content”. (pp.520, para, 2, ln.
4)
“Our approach to facilitate reuse of design knowledge related for conceptual

design of enterprise integration solutions uses the mapping described above
(and shown in Figure 1)” (pp.520, para, 3, ln. 1) .
Warrant: “We build our argument on the premise suggested by speech act theory (Searle,
1969) that language can be used not only as a signification of a situation or
fact, but also to perform action (Goldkuhl & Agerfalk, 2000).” (pp.520, para,
2, ln. 3).
Lind & Goldkuhl, 2001; Moore, 2001;
37

Backing: None
BC4: Has the researcher demonstrated a command of the paradigmatic assumptions upon which
the theoretical approach/perspective of research is based? NO! The authors claim Speech Act
Theory and Action Types for their theoretical approach/perspective but do not discuss these
theories or their paradigmatic assumptions.
BC5: Is the methodology that the researcher has selected appropriate for investigating the research
question given the theoretical approach? The authors claim design science as their methodology,
but do not discuss the appropriateness of design science to their research question. The design
science methodology has two phases: (1) prototype development; and (2) prototype evaluation.
Claim: “The research follows design science guidelines in which we describe a research
artifact, and evaluate it to assess whether it meets the intended goals (pp.518,
abstract, ln. 4)”
Evidence: “The design artifact we have developed to facilitate this assistance to the
designer includes a knowledge base (Sowa, 2000) that captures relationships
and constraints among concepts such as task, action types, speech acts, and EI
Patterns” (pp. 521, para 3).
“Design science principles suggest that theoretical constructs embodied in the
artifact should be evaluated to demonstrate the appropriateness and utility of
their usage (Hevner et al., 2004). In our case, this means that effectiveness of
the use of speech acts to access and reuse conceptual design knowledge (i.e.,
EIP) should be evaluated. Toward this end, we compared integration solutions
obtained with the aid of speech acts against those obtained without the aid of
speech acts (Eickelmann & Richardson, 1996) following a controlled
experimentation strategy (Shadish et al., 2001) (pp. 522, para 1)”.
Warrant: Carlsson, 2006; Heavner, et al, 2004; Johannesson and Perjons, 2001;
Eickelmann & Richardson, 1996; Shadish et al., 2001.
Backing: None
BC6: Is the empirical situation selected for the inquiry is appropriate for observing the
phenomenon or phenomenal behavior that the researcher is investigating? Yes! The researchers
used a randomized experiment with student subjects from a course to test their hypothesis that:
design solutions produced by Speech Act based support will have fewer errors than those
produced with Speech act based support
38

Claim: “The experimental procedure involved randomized repeated samples with different
versions (with and without speech acts) for an online retailer warehouse
replenishment process of a fictional online retail company. (pp.522, para 4)”
Evidence: “The subjects were recruited from a pool of students enrolled in an ‘Advanced
Enterprise Integration’ course (second in a two-course sequence), which
provides deep understanding of integration techniques across multiple
application settings. (pp.522, para 5)”
“The subjects were provided a detailed BPM and requested to design an

integration solution by accessing and selecting appropriate integration patterns
with the aid of the research prototype” (pp.522, para 4).
“To test the research hypothesis, three separate two-sample t-tests were
performed for each dependent variable (Montgomery, 2001) using SPSS”
(pp.522, para 4). .
Warrant: Montgomery, 2001; Moody et al., 2002

Backing: None
BC7: Has the methodology been applied in a systematic manner and carefully documented to
allow for replication or corroboration by other researchers? The authors provide a detailed
discussion of how the applied the principles of design science in their research.
Claim: “Design science principles suggest that theoretical constructs embodied in the
artifact should be evaluated to demonstrate the appropriateness and utility of
their usage…
In our case, this means that effectiveness of the use of speech acts to access and
reuse conceptual design knowledge (i.e., EIP) should be evaluated.
The evidence for this would be provided by the relative effectiveness of integration
solutions (pp.518, abstract, ln. 4)”
Evidence: “Our approach to facilitate reuse of design knowledge related for conceptual
design of enterprise integration solutions uses the mapping described above
(and shown in Figure 1).
Integration requirements are described in BPMN models that capture the
logical execution of tasks along with the performer of each task…..
To further reduce the search space (and sometimes to identify the one
appropriate pattern), we utilize action types that reflect the performers’ intent
for performing the task….”
Warrant: Carlsson, 2006; Heavner, et al, 2004; Johannesson and Perjons, 2001; Lind &
Goldkuhl, 2001; Tvedt & Collofello, 1995
Backing: None
39

BC8: Do the results of the research make a contribution to the researcher’s field of study? It is
difficult to assess! The authors claim their speech act based modeling mechanism was effective
at reducing errors, but there were already others Speech Act based modeling mechanisms such as
DEMO (and modeling kernels ISLDS/SEM) but these were not discussed. The authors don’t
show how their proposal is better than other existing modeling environments that use Speech Act
theory and action types. What they do demonstrate by their experiment is that speech based
modeling is more effective than no mechanism.
Claim: “This paper provides a rationale for using a speech acts-based mechanism for
accessing and selecting appropriate integration patterns, followed by an
assessment of the mechanism based on a controlled experiment for which two
different versions of the research prototype were used” (pp. 525, para 5).
This evaluation shows that the speech acts-based mechanism is effective at

reducing design errors, and thereby produces quality solutions. (pp.525, Para 3)”
Evidence: “Our analysis involved two-sample t-tests on the data gathered to test the
hypothesis that the solutions produced using the research prototype with speech
acts contains fewer design errors than the research prototype without speech
acts. (pp.525, Para 3)”
In Table 4 the authors present the significant results of t tests comparing the
evaluation of the prototype use (analysis of error rates) in modeling the solution
with and without the speech act mechanism
Warrant: For the evaluation; Central Limit Theorem of Statistics (expected random
normal distribution of errors).
Backing: None
BC9: The research has been conducted in an ethical manner: respondent autonomy and
confidentiality is maintained; ethical data collection protocols are observed; no part of the work
has been plagiarized and all sources have been acknowledged. Yes! The authors describe their
data collection protocols.
BC10: Does the paper reflect communicative competence: it is carefully argued and written in a
manner that is understandable to the scientific community? No! The paper fails, there are gaps in
the argumentation that undermine the quality of the research communication. The authors fail to
defend BC2 and BC4, and offers a weak defense of BC3. Furthermore, the lack of attention to
BC2 makes it difficult to assess the contribution to the field.
40

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The Ten Basic Claims of Information Systems Research:

An Approach to Interrogating Validity Claims in Scientific Argumentation

Keywords: Critical Scientific Discourse; Scientific Argumentation, Testing Scientific Claims;

Department of Information and Analytics, Deakin University Business School, Australia.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446798

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2.1 Validity Claims and Scientific Discourse

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2.2 Analytical Framework for Interrogating Claims

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“Those universal ("field-invariant") rules of procedure that apply to rational criticism in

Figure 1: Toulmin’s Model for Analysis of Arguments (adapted from Toulmin,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446798

Components Rebuttals Interrogatives and Clarifications

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The ten basic claims (BC):

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3.1 Rationale for Basic Claims

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3.2 The Claims Analysis Procedure

– Claim: Identify the specific claim as the writer has articulated it

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4. Illustrating the Analysis

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Warrant: “Second, if finding patterns of problems in this population of organizations later

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Warrant: “Therefore, we thought that having better empirically derived understanding of

Warrant: “…because we do not test propositions drawn from a body of well-developed

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446798

Evidence: “SPAD.N’s cluster analysis approach identifies and systematically sorts,

Warrant: “Why? Because we are looking for commonalities between organizations in

Backing: “This research follows the well-established French school of multivariate

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446798

BC8.1: “This research provides an empirically derived taxonomy of enterprise

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Illustration 2: Analysis of Scheepers et. al., 2006

Evidence: “A contemporary challenge is to understand and explain users’ satisfaction with

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Evidence: “User satisfaction has been operationalized by a set of measures to assess

Warrant: “Historically, we have based our understanding of user satisfaction on fixed

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446798

Claim: “A richer conceptualization of the interrelated layers of contexts that influence an

Warrant: “counterintuitive results (such as when users reported an overall satisfaction

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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446798

The contemporary climate of public discourse demands of us vigilance in consuming information

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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3446798

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