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Institutional pressures and Public sector

auditors
strategic response to auditing
implementation of sustainable
development goals: the role of 403
public sector auditors Received 4 May 2022
Revised 21 June 2022
14 July 2022
Lexis Alexander Tetteh Accepted 23 August 2022
Department of Accounting, Faculty of Accounting and Finance,
University of Professional Studies, Accra, Ghana, and
Cletus Agyenim-Boateng and Samuel Nana Yaw Simpson
Department of Accounting, Business School, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana

Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to explore the role of public sectors auditors in strategically responding to
institutional pressures to conduct a performance audit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
implementation in Ghana.
Design/methodology/approach – To gather in-depth and rich empirical data, semi-structured interviews
were conducted with 12 senior and middle management auditors of Ghana’s Supreme Audit Institution (SAI).
Findings – The findings indicate that the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions, the
government, auditees, political executives and the Audit Service Board all exert institutional pressure on
Ghana’s audit of SDG implementation. In response to these pressures, the SAI deploys acquiescence,
compromise and manipulation strategies that result in the coupling, and in some cases, the loose coupling of
SDG audit practices.
Research limitations/implications – Observation method of data collection would have given the
researchers first-hand knowledge of the role of auditors, the institutional pressures to SDG audit and the
strategic response to the institutional pressures. The authors were unable to accompany the public sector
auditors to their field audits. This would have aided in obtaining more detailed empirical data.
Practical implications – The findings suggest that external and internal factors affect public sector audit of
SDG implementation. Because the SAI of Ghana is dependent on the central government for budgetary
allocation and auditees for miscellaneous logistics, it is under coercive pressure to meet rent seeking demands
of political executives. As a result, SAIs in emerging economies must revisit the other side of accountability by
reinforcing a constructive dialogue with those held accountable, particularly politicians and auditees.
Originality/value – This study’s contribution is the exploration and application of institutional theory and
Oliver (1991) model for responding to institutional pressures to a novel research area, namely, SDG
implementation audit by public sector auditors in an emerging economy.
Keywords Institutional pressures, Strategic responses, SDGs, Public sector audit,
Sustainable development, Ghana
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
Research into the roles of accounting in achieving sustainable development has extended and
become more sophisticated (Gørrissen, 2020), over the three decades since the concept of
sustainable development was first popularised by the 1987 Brundtland Report of the United
Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (UNWCED) as being a
Journal of Applied Accounting
guiding principle to bridge environmental and human development concerns (Bebbington Research
Vol. 24 No. 2, 2023
pp. 403-423
© Emerald Publishing Limited
0967-5426
Galamsey: It is a local Ghanaian term that means illegal small-scale mining in Ghana. DOI 10.1108/JAAR-05-2022-0101
JAAR and Unerman, 2018). The Commission defined sustainable development as “development that
24,2 meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generation to meet
their own needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 45).
Human development has enriched from the adoption of the concept, although not the same
extent globally. Due to this disparity, world leaders adopted 17 Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) in 2015 (Moussa et al., 2022). The SDGs include targets; thus, auditors must be
proactive in reporting on progress towards achieving them. In addition, the framework for
404 the implementation of the SDGs mandates Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) of countries to
provide advice, through assurance engagements, and undertake performance audits of the
SDGs’ implementation in a more transparent manner (Gørrissen, 2020).
SDG-related academic research has emerged in numerous fields, including business and
management (e.g. Acheampong et al., 2019; Abhayawansa et al., 2021). Some of these research
studies identify and develop the effects of committing to an SDG framework in guiding
organisational policy and action (e.g. Abhayawansa et al., 2021). However, research on the
role of SAIs and their contribution to achieving the SDGs has only just started making an
appearance in the accounting literature (Bebbington and Unerman, 2018; Montero and Le
Blanc, 2019; Grrissen, 2020). Also, much of the present literature on factors influencing the
conduct of performance audits of SDG implementation has largely concentrated on what are
described as “success factors or enablers”, with less emphasis paid on how SAIs strategically
response to enablers and constraints to SDG audit (see, e.g. Bebbington and Unerman, 2018;
Le Blancb and Monteroa, 2020). Additionally, most available literature on the factors
(enablers and constraints) affecting SDG audit is in the form of consultant articles based on
personal observation, views and experiences (Le Blancb and Monteroa, 2020).
In terms of enabling factors, the conceptual paper of Le Blancb and Monteroa (2020) posits
that political will and national target ambition are enablers of SDG audit. Similarly, Cohen
and Leventis (2013) add that government/management support improves the achievement of
audit objectives. On the other hand, Hay and Cordery (2021) assert that the existence of
multiple auditing standards makes it difficult for auditors to carry out their responsibilities in
contentious political environments. Also, Le Blancb and Monteroa (2020) note that
governments do not want to invest resources reviewing a policy area that receives little
national attention despite its global importance. Although we acknowledge that the literature
provides crucial insights for countries implementing the SDGs, the majority of this work may
not convince academic scholars and communities due to contextual differences
(Abhayawansa et al., 2021). More importantly, while such studies lack empirical data, the
International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) frequently attempts to
encourage countries to adopt best SDG auditing methods through the use of globally defined
frameworks that ignore context. For this reason, Cordery and Hay (2021) call on academic
researchers to explore how international organisations and national governments use public
sector auditors to address SDG implementation.
In particular, out of the four auditing roles identified by the INTOSAI (Section 2.1), this
study focuses on performance audit of government-implemented programmes that
contribute to the achievement of specific aspects of the SDGs. Thus, the aims of the paper
are in threefold. First, it explores public sector auditors’ role in guaranteeing accountable
governance of SDGs’ implementation for sustainable development. Second, the paper
investigates the institutional pressures that auditors face when conducting performance
audits of SDG implementation. Finally, the paper explores the strategic response to
institutional pressures for auditing SDG implementation.
To address this underexplored subject, the paper combines an exploratory case study and
qualitative approaches (Cordery and Hay, 2021). The research also draws on the institutional
theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and the Oliver (1991) framework to explain how SAIs in
emerging economies interact with external environmental factors and how their strategic
reaction to them affects SDG implementation auditing. This study provides novel insights Public sector
into the public sector auditing and sustainable development literature. It also contributes to auditors
enhance our understanding of how political interference, resource scarcity and other factors
determine the strategic responses employed to audit SDGs in emerging economies.

1.1 Contextual background: public sector auditing, parliamentary oversight and the
Supreme Audit Institution of Ghana 405
Ghana’s political system is similar to that of the USA, with the President of the Republic elected
every four years by universal adult suffrage. The 275 members of parliament (MPs) are
separated from the Executive under the principle of separation of powers, but are closely linked
to the Executive through the selection of Ministers, at least half of whom must also be MPs.
As a result of the system, the parliament can hold the central government accountable for
public resources use.
Also, the office of the Auditor-General (A-G) is the primary institutions for oversight,
accountability, monitoring and evaluation of public financial resources. It is mandated by the
1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Audit Service Act 2000 (Act 584) that the A-G should
report on flaws and inconsistencies in the utilisation of public resources to the parliament. For
instance, under Article 187, the A-G must audit and report on the public finances of Ghana
and all public offices, and report to the parliament within six months of the end of the
previous financial year. Furthermore, Section 13(e) of the Audit Service Act additional
empowers the A-G to ensure that public sector programmes and activities are carried out with
respect for economy, efficiency and effectiveness in terms of resources expended and
outcomes achieved. However, under Articles 187(2) and 184 of the Constitution, the A-G’s
report appears to be the only connection between the parliament and AG. The A-G is expected
to be an autonomous entity from the parliament, according to the Constitution.
Unfortunately, all four presidents of Ghana’s Fourth Republic have either removed,
appointed A-Gs at the start of their administrations or demanded that the A-Gs go on leave
before retiring because the A-G’s work makes the government in power unpopular.
Like other Commonwealth countries that use the Westminster model of SAIs, the supreme
auditors in Ghana are appointed as independent officers of the parliament with a fixed term of
ten years on the recommendation of the Public Account Committee (PAC). The attainment of
each of the 17 SDGs requires the promotion of peaceful, universal access to justice,
accountable and inclusive institutions. As governments around the world ramp up their
efforts to accomplish the 2030 Agenda, the role of SAIs in achieving this agenda must be
publicly recognised (Abhayawansa et al., 2021). Additionally, it is important we empirically
unearth the institutional pressures experienced by SAIs when auditing SDG implementation
and their strategic responses.
The choice of Ghana for this study is influenced by the fact that the country has been at the
forefront of promoting SDGs in Africa and the world in the recent past. Indeed, successive
presidents of the country since 2016 have been the co-chairs of the group of SDG Advocates
(Acheampong et al., 2019). Also, a survey of among 34 African countries declared Ghana as
the overall best performer in achieving the SDGs in Africa (Coulibaly et al., 2018). As the first
step towards localising the SDGs in Ghana, the government of Ghana established the SDGs’
Implementation Coordination Committee (SDGs-ICC) in 2016. In 2017, a National Technical
Committee was also formed to help with the localisation and implementation of the SDGs and
Agenda 2063 in Ghana. In 2017, an Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee on the SDGs
was established at the executive level to ensure integration of the SDGs into sector
programmes and budgets. In addition, the SDG Advisory Unit was founded in 2016 in
response to Ghana’s former president’s appointment as the co-chair of the UN Secretary
General’s Eminent Group of SDG Advocates, to support his advocacy for the SDGs.
JAAR Furthermore, Ghana has developed an SDG Budget Baseline Report with frameworks that
24,2 ensure that the financial priorities of national budget are aligned with major SDG targets. The
country’s SDGs Budget Report provides data that enable the government and its partners to
monitor the progress being made on the various goals against the investments made over the
years to ascertain the efficient use of all financial resources. The reporting on government’s
spending on the SDGs is expected to provide both private sector and multilateral
development partners the opportunity to determine which goals require more attention, or the
406 ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), as well as metropolitan, municipal and district
assemblies (MMDAs) that require financial or technical assistance in working towards the
achievement of the goals (Ghana’s 2022 Voluntary National Review Process).
Although the country has been hailed for its progress in implementing the SDGs in Africa
(see, e.g. Coulibaly et al., 2018), there are still setbacks in the implementations, as recorded by
the A-G’s report (Ghana Audit Report, 2019). In attempts for the A-G to perform its
constitutional function to guarantee accountable and effective governance of SDGs’
implementation for sustainable development, there have been instances where the A-G has
to petition the president over what the SAI considers to be unlawful interference in his/her
work by the board chairs of the SAI of the country, which the A-G claims is a violation of the
country’s Constitution (citinewsroom.com, 2018). Further, due to lack of independence, a
newly appointed A-G ended up throw out reports and queries of the removed A-G and issued
an unqualified opinion in favour of the government in power (citinewsroom.com, 2018). This
has highlighted the need to explore the institutional factors influencing auditors’ roles in
ensuring accountable and effective governance of SDG implementation for sustainable
development, as well as the strategic response they employ to complete the audit.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: the next section discusses the
empirical and theoretical literature; Section 3 presents the research context and methodology;
Section 4 presents the findings. Section 5 presents the discussion and the conclusion,
contribution and directions for future research are presented in Section 6.

2. Literature review
2.1 Public sectors auditors’ role in Sustainable Development Goal audits
Many actors are involved in contributing to the achievement of sustainable development,
from governments themselves to international institutions to non-state actors including
academia, think tanks and many others (Cordery and Hay, 2021). SAIs throughout the world
began auditing governments’ readiness to achieve the SDGs shortly after the adoption of the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015 (Montero and Le Blanc, 2019). SAIs
around the world are now conducting performance audits of the implementation of selected
SDG goals and targets to meet the Agenda 2030 (Le Blanc and Montero, 2020).
The UN has dubbed the 2020 decade as “the decade of action” for the SDGs. While it may
appear unrealistic to some to believe that the 17 SDGs can be met by 2030, it is expected that
governments place equal emphasis on the journey to 2030. This means that SAIs’ role is clear
in this regard. Because achieving targets takes time, public sector auditors will monitor
progress and report on the likelihood of achieving them within the estimated timelines.
According to Le Blanc and Montero (2020), auditors must consider the actions taken by public
sector entities responsible for achieving national targets, as well as their interconnections,
coordination and communication mechanisms.
In particular, the INTOSAI Strategic Plan for the period 2017–2022 identifies four
approaches through which public sector auditors can fulfil their role and contribute to the
implementation of SDGs (INTOSAI, 2019, p. 14). These include: (1) assessing
the preparedness of national governments to implement the SDGs; (2) auditing the
performance of activities implemented by the government that contribute to achieving
specific aspects of the SDGs; (3) assessing and supporting the implementation of SDG 16, Public sector
which relates in part to transparent, efficient and accountable institutions; and (4) being auditors
models of transparency and accountability in their own operations, including auditing and
reporting. Out of the four auditing approaches, this current study focuses on the second role.

2.2 Factors that influence performance audit of Sustainable Development Goal

implementation 407
Literature suggests several factors that affect the conduct of performance and compliance
audits of SDG implementation (Le Blancb and Monteroa, 2020; Cordery and Hay, 2021; Hay
and Cordery, 2021). SDG auditing is not the same as regular business auditing. First, SDG
audits have been influenced by both negative and positive factors. One of the challenges to
SDG audits has been discovered to be capacity constraints to conduct performance audits.
Although there is a growing demand for SAIs to assess government initiatives on SDG
implementation (Bebbington and Unerman, 2020), some SAIs lack the authority to do so, and
many others lack the competence due to poor staff composition.
In the INTOSAI Development Initiative Global Stocktaking Survey 2017 (IDI, 2018), 14%
of SAIs said it was difficult to execute performance audit. This technical impediments to SDG
audits may appear to be one of the biggest threats to the auditors. The INTOSAI, however,
assists SAIs in understanding the standards and methodologies that guide SDG
implementation audits. Similarly, Cordery and Hay (2021) state that adequate resources
and management support for staff training will improve SDG audits. The authors explain
that the INTOSAI uses SDG audit pilot projects to educate it members on new technical
demands. In addition to technical challenges, Hay and Cordery (2018) found that inadequate
budgetary support and unclearly defined criteria for assessing auditees’ practices are
variables that threatens public sector audit work. They reasoned that public sector auditing
works well when established policies and procedures are compared to the practices of public
sector entities. Similarly, Wang and Rakner (2005) discovered that full auditee cooperation is
critical since it allows auditors access to documents and properties. Other scholars, on the
other hand, have discovered that auditors’ efforts to assess policy implementation are mostly
viewed as an invasion into the political domain by political executives, which impedes audit
work (G
arseth-Nesbakk and Kuruppu, 2018; Mattei et al., 2021). Similarly, Cesario et al. (2020)
found that Brazilian SAI executes ceremonial and superficial audits to pacify political
pressure. This evidence implies that manipulation is the most active institutional response
since it actively changes audit outcomes.
In many countries, parliaments are charged with ensuring that audit recommendations
are implemented. However, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 2017 study of 150
legislatures/nations, just 66 have established procedures for reviewing audit reports
(Montero and Le Blanc, 2019). This decreases the value of SDG audits in improving national
SDG implementation (Montero and Le Blanc, 2019). Based on the preceding discussions, this
paper also argues that political interference is primarily responsible for decoupling of SDG
programmes from planned targets. This is because, while SDG audits are required by law,
performance audits of the SDG implementations are plagued with political interference not to
make the ruling government unpopular (Moussa et al., 2022).

2.3 Theoretical lens

This paper draws on the ideas of institutional theory and Oliver (1991) model for responding
to institutional pressures. The institutional theory can be used to explain audit practices,
particularly the coercive isomorphism and normative isomorphism (Hay and Cordery, 2018).
This suggests isomorphic forces have fuelled global audit growth. Nonetheless, public audit
and SAIs are structured very differently (Mattei et al., 2021). As a result, we intend to explore
JAAR from auditors’ perspectives about what and who drives change in SDG implementation
24,2 auditing. Such an approach assumes a theoretical framework that can explain change, hence
the employment of both the institutional theory and Oliver’s model.
2.3.1 Institutional pressures for Sustainable Development Goal implementation audit. The
institutional theory stresses that changing institutional environments influence internal
organisational structures (Tetteh et al., 2021). The institutional theory is acknowledged as an
important theoretical lens for exploring public sector accountability and governance reforms
408 in emerging economies (Cordery and Hay, 2021). Moreover, organisations like the SAI of
Ghana require a societal mandate, which can be obtained by meeting societal expectations
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2017, p. 2). Nevertheless, it is also argued that institutions can be
proactive and resist institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; Moussa et al., 2022). Accordingly,
the outcome of any institutional pressures cannot be taken for granted.
Ghana’s development of the SDG Budget Baseline Report, for example, to ensure that the
financial priorities of the national budget are aligned with major SDG targets, is a form of
formal coercive institutional pressure that forces the country to legitimise its relationship
with the international community. In an institutional theory context, pressures will shape the
country’s attitude towards SDG implementation norms. Thus, strong institutional and
governance structures can serve as incentives and pressures for the country’s SAIs to comply
with regulations and adopt best practices in auditing SDG implementation, hence
maximising the country’s ability to meet the SDG agenda within the time frame specified.
SAIs that are under pressure from forces within their institutional environment will try to
gain legitimacy by adopting practices that are similar to other organisations. This is known
as isomorphism and comprises three types: (1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political
influences and the problem of legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard
responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative isomorphism associated with professionalisation
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
For instance, Hay and Cordery (2021) discovered nearly 200 of SAIs’ auditing structures
match with one of the World Bank’s (WB) three models. The WB models are the: Westminster
model, which is derived from the UK and is used by Commonwealth countries like Australia
and Canada (Le Blanc and Montero, 2020). With this model, the A-G is an autonomous body
that reports to the parliament. Second is the court model. This model includes a Court of Audit
with judges and lawyers and is commonly used in Francophone and Lusophone Africa.
Unlike the A-G in Westminster, magistrates are appointed for life (Wang and Rakner, 2005).
The third is the board model. It is similar to the Westminster method, but with a panel instead
of one A-G. The European Court of Audit (ECA), a supranational institution responsible for
auditing European Union institutions, is a good example (Hay and Cordery, 2021). We believe
that applying the institutional theory to this study is critical to determine how any of the audit
models affect the SAI of Ghana’s SDG auditing practices.
INTOSAI also promotes public sector auditing by exchanging knowledge and
professional guidance (normative isomorphism) among its members (Mattei et al., 2021).
G
arseth-Nesbakk and Kuruppu (2018) contend that in democratic jurisdictions with political
competition, politicians ignore SAIs’ role in improving government accountability. This is
because failing to bend the rules to meet their demands will result in their removal. This type
of pressure stems from an organisation’s resource dependence (Reichborn-Kjennerud
et al., 2019).
We also believe that when a country’s auditing goals are unclear, and there are few visible
alternatives, it will be forced to emulate countries perceived to be successful in SDG audit. In
this study, mimetic isomorphism includes international practices imitated by Ghana that
impact SDG implementation auditing and its consequences. The INTOSAI Development
Initiative (IDI) or organisations like the UN could exert mimetic pressure through peer
reviews and capacity building programs (Reichborn-Kjennerud et al., 2019).
 The institutional theory has been criticised for assuming organisations passively react to Public sector
external pressures (Oliver, 1991; Mamat et al., 2021). The institutional theory has also been auditors
criticised for failing to explain organisational self-interest and active agency (Wijethilake
et al., 2017). This is because the theory is unable to explain the process by which
institutionalised ideas and practices are built and disassembled at organisational levels
(Ezzamel et al., 2007; Liguori and Steccolini, 2011). Similarly, Irvine (2011) observed that
institutional theories have overlooked the importance of internal forces at work, notably the
role of agency and power interactions among organisational agents at various levels. Hence, 409
there is the need to employ Oliver’s (1991) model in this study to uncover the strategies that
are used by organisational actors to institutionalise or respond to these pressures in auditing.
2.3.2 Strategic responses to institutional pressures. Oliver (1991) outlines five strategic
responses: acquiescence, avoidance, compromise, defiance and manipulation. Organisations
may “acquiesce’ by fully meeting institutional demands without objection and this is
considered as coupling” (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2017). Second, organisations might
“avoid” institutional pressures by partially detaching technical activities related to
regulatory compliance, a strategy Oliver (1991) calls decoupling. Rather than improving
technical efficiency, the practices imposed on the organisation are essentially ceremonialised
(Mamat et al., 2021). Also, organisations under institutional pressure may “compromise” and
partially satisfy institutional demands. Fourth, organisations will use the “defiance” strategy
to resist institutional demands by rejecting existing standards, regulations and norms. To
“manipulate” institutional demand by exerting authority for outcome to be changed is the
fifth response (Mamat et al., 2021). The tactics used for compromise, defiance and
manipulation strategic responses lead to loose coupling. Meanwhile, loose coupling signifies a
minimal level of coupling (Mamat et al., 2021), where there is “. . . a separation between the
systems used to secure external legitimacy and those used to manage the activities of the
organisation . . . to show a façade of conformity without any real intention to enact change”
(Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007, p. 209).
In the context of this study, SAI auditors may use elaborate rituals to signal acceptance of
change while maintaining their old habits. This could be due to internal opposition from audit
staff who may want to conceal the government’s noncompliance with universally accepted
norms or standards (e.g. nonalignment of public entities’ practices to SDG targets) or fear of
governments depriving SAIs of resources if issued audit reports tend to make the ruling
governments unpopular (Nerantzidis et al., 2022). For instance, in recent research, political
leaders oppose performance audits because they threaten their autonomy (G
arseth-Nesbakk
and Kuruppu, 2018; Mattei et al., 2021). While institutionalised rules may pressure SAIs to
become isomorphic in their audit practices, we argue that these rules sometimes conflict with
acceptable norms in the countries of the SAIs. Thus, due to resource dependency and the need
to avoid sanctions, SAIs are forced to bend the rules to accommodate political demands. This
claim is supported by earlier studies that discovered that due to resource dependency on
government, SAIs are forced to bend rules in combating corruption-related activities in seven
different countries in Europe and Africa (Reichborn-Kjennerud et al., 2019; Cordery and Hay,
2021). This structure has grown widespread among SAIs because, when considering SAIs
specifically, levels of government debt and international aid are examples of factors that
could be utilised to persuade SAIs not to produce qualified reports that will make the
government unpopular. Secondly, because the SAIs rely on government budgetary
allocations, they may not be able to function if the government is sanctioned by the
international community.
2.3.3 Theoretical framework. The theoretical framework of the study is presented in
Figure 1.
The logic behind Figure 1 is as follows: the isomorphic pressures consisting coercive,
normative and memetic from development agencies, regulatory institutions, professional
JAAR Isomorphic Pressures Strategic Responses to Isomorphic Pressures
24,2 ● Coercive Coupling Loose Coupling Decoupling
● Normative ● Compromise
● Mimetic Acquiescence ● Defiance Avoidance
● Manipulation

410 Factors influencing the roles

of audit staff Performance Audit of Deviation/Achievement of
● Enabling factors SDG Implementation Desired Audit Practices

Figure 1. ● Restraining factors

Theoretical framework
Source(s): Authors’ construct

bodies and government officials translate into enabling and restraining factors that influence
the role of audit staff in discharging performance audit of SDG implementation. Figure 1 also
denotes that the possibility of meeting specific aspects of SDG targets is dependent on
enabling and restraining factors, as well as the strategic response employed by auditors in
carrying out their duties.
Figure 1 further shows that SAI staff facing normative or coercive pressures may use
imitation tactic to respond by performing SDG audit, which Oliver (1991) calls acquiescence.
Similarly, the dotted line in Figure 1 shows how an SAI that follows institutional standards
and criteria for SDG auditing can help achieve specific SDG targets. By contrast, staff of SAIs
facing high political interference and resource dependency are likely to adopt decoupling
strategic behaviours in response to isomorphic pressures (Usang and Salim, 2016). According
to Wijethilake et al. (2017), organisations, in this case SAIs, are likely enact avoidance
strategy. This strategy will decouple SDG audit from formal structures, causing audit
practices to diverge from implemented ones.
Also, when confronted with competing institutional demands, SAI audit staff are more
likely to compromise to appease or balance national interests with international constituents.
However, when SAI staff want to actively resist institutional processes, they are more likely
to use the defiance strategy by selectively applying rules or standards (Mamat et al., 2021).
Finally, Figure 1 shows that SAI staff may manipulate the performance audit goal to
achieve conformity (G
arseth-Nesbakk and Kuruppu, 2018) to satisfy political demands
(Reichborn-Kjennerud et al., 2019). Ultimately, the employment of loose coupling strategic
responses such as compromise, defiance and manipulation may not yield the acceptable audit
norms and outcomes.

3. Research methodology
Since the study is exploratory, we used qualitative methodology to understand the auditors’
roles and the factors that influence SDG audits. As in previous studies, we used a case study
approach to better understand the emerging factors (Tetteh et al., 2021). Yin (2014) states that
qualitative research is concerned with process, context, interpretation, meaning or
comprehension. The primary goal is to describe and understand the phenomenon under
investigation through participant observation and interview. The study used exploratory
study design because the research objectives met Yin’s (2014) criteria.
Interviews provided the study’s data. The study participants were senior and middle
management public sector auditors who audit SDG-related policies and programmes of the
Ghanaian central and local governments. Due to the current COVID-19 global pandemic, field
observation could not be used to obtain first-hand information on the subject to argue the
interview data. The researchers interviewed 12 auditors. Moreover, the interviews were Public sector
conducted through face-to-face, Zoom rooms and WhatsApp. The interviews were recorded auditors
based on the consent of the interviewees.
The primary data collection process began with four SAI officials responsible for auditing the
government’s SDG-related programmes were interviewed, and indicators of institutional
pressures and strategic response were identified during transcription and analysis. These
auditors helped us find more participants for the study. Following that, a snowball strategy was
used to track down those recommended by previous interviewees. Lack of interviews with 411
politicians to confirm or deny some of the allegations levelled against their interference with SDG
audits is one of the limitations of this study, but this is consistent with existing policy and public
administration literature on public sector accountability studies (Sobkowiak et al., 2020).
The respondents were asked the following questions: What functions do you play with
regards advising and auditing government’s preparedness and SDGs’ implementation in
Ghana? What are the country’s most pressing SDG goals and targets, and how is the institution
assisting in achieving these goals and targets? What forms of institutional pressures (e.g.
coercive, mimetic and normative) can influence an SAI to conduct a performance audit of SDG
implementation? How did the SAI respond (e.g. acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance
and manipulation) to institutional pressures for auditing SDG implementation?
Several steps were taken during the data gathering procedure to acquire the trust of our
respondents. We expressly indicated that we were researchers, not “auditors of auditors”,
that our purpose was to better understand the auditing process of the SDGs as it was
performed in the field to produce several research publications, and that complete
confidentiality and anonymity were assured. We also informed them that our research
would provide them with an opportunity to reflect on their work habits, and that they would
perhaps obtain fresh insights into their practices as a result of our findings.
In addition to the interview data, archival research material in this study, which includes
Ghana Voluntary National Review Report on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, the Constitution of Ghana, performance audit report of the A-G of
Ghana’s preparedness for implementation of sustainable development goals, Ghana SDG
Budget Baseline Report, among others, were used to achieve methodological triangulation,
which is a qualitative research approach for testing validity by combining data from multiple
sources (Creswell and Creswell, 2017; Tetteh et al., 2022a, b). For example, we used the
archival material to question and validate some of the interviewee comments (Liguori and
Steccolini, 2011). Overall, our data gathering process and all measures taken allowed us to
acquire information that was rich and trustworthy enough to be considered for study. Table 1
lists the respondents’ positions, interview time and years of experience.
The data were analysed concurrently with the data collection, as is customary in interpretive
research (Walsham, 2006; Tetteh et al., 2021). The research questions had to be revised to reflect
the emerging themes as proffered by Miles et al. (2014). We transcribed the interviews after
carefully listening to the recordings. We further contacted nine of the responders again for
clarification. The analysis was discontinued when no new issues emerged from the data.
Verbatim quotes were used to give the readers the auditors’ perspective on the question. The
inclusion of verbatim quotes will allow readers to better understand the context of the responses
and gain clarity on the researchers’ interpretation of the data (Walsham, 2006). Following that,
the emergent themes were used to organise the findings presented in the next section.

4. Findings
The findings and discussion are presented in this section. During the analysis of the data,
some broad themes emerged in relation to the research objectives. This section presents the
findings in relations to these three themes, namely,
JAAR Number Position Interview duration Number of years worked
24,2
1 Senior auditor 45 min 21 years
2 Assistant auditor general 55 min 12 years
3 Senior auditor 1 h 11 min 8 years
4 Senior auditor 1 h 9 min 11 years
5 Senior auditor 54 min 32 years
412 6 Junior auditor 32 min 6 years
7 Senior auditor 1 h 7 min 14 years
8 Junior auditor 46 min 11 years
9 Assistant director of audit 1 h 17 min 19 years
10 Senior auditor 1 h 18 min 28 years
Table 1. 11 Junior auditor 43 min 9 years
Respondents 12 Senior auditor 39 min 7 years
interviewed Source(s): Authors’ construct

(1) Auditors’ roles in SDG implementation

(2) Institutional pressures to SDG implementation audit
(3) Strategic responses to institutional pressures for auditing SDG implementation

4.1 Auditors’ roles in Sustainable Development Goal implementation

SDG implementation in Ghana was launched on 12 February 2016, with a call to stakeholders
to shoulder their responsibilities for the programme’s success in improving people’s lives
(Ghana, 2018). SDGs’ implementation being critical for national progress (Sobkowiak et al.,
2020), it is crucial to understand how the auditors of the SAI of Ghana ensure their successful
implementation.
The two sub-themes demonstrate the auditors’ involvement in auditing government
preparedness and implementation of the SDGs.
4.1.1 Auditing the government’s preparedness for Sustainable Development Goal
implementation. Ghana is one of 193 nations that signed on to the SDGs in 2015. In
addition to adopting the SDGs, Ghana demonstrated its commitment by organising a
nationwide launch of the SDGs, instilling confidence in the citizens that the goals will be
aggressively pursued to better their lives. Accordingly, the A-G of Ghana, in accordance with
Section 13 of the Audit Service Act 2000 (Act 584) first, conducted an audit to determine the
extent of the government’s readiness for the implementation of the SDGs as part of the SAI’s
role and contribution to Agenda 2030. This is how one of the auditors explained their first
SDG auditing experience:
In 2017/2018, we audited the government readiness to implement the SDGs so I remember we visited
some of the Regional Coordinating Councils in the country. We also visited the National
Development Planning Commission and some Sector Agencies, and some Metropolitan, Municipal
and District Assemblies and many more. So, we carried out analysis on institutional structures, and
performed statistical analysis on data SDGs baseline indicators of the country and matched it with
our criteria set based on the SDG targets and other auditing guidelines to ascertain the country’s
readiness and to also advise the government on the way forward.
One of the auditors also provided an explanation of some of the government activities that
they found challenging to map with the SDG targets, as follows:
Some of government agencies’ standards operations could not be directly matched to any of the SDG
goals or targets. This was due to the fact that those operations were categorised as state protocols.
 Because those functions do not currently connect rationally with any of the individual SDGs, we Public sector
opted to concentrate on government operations that have a direct linkage to the SDG targets.
auditors
To guarantee efficient and successful implementation of the SDGs, the Government of Ghana
must put in place strategies to integrate them into sectoral and local development plans. The
findings reveal that the auditors also aided in identifying the resources, capacities and
monitoring mechanisms required to achieve the SDG goals. However, other agencies could
not be aligned with the SDG targets due to non-availability of data. It was evident that the 413
auditors were unable to obtain information on some government institutions, as
acknowledged by the government itself (see Ghana’s SDG Budget Baseline Report, 2018).
4.1.2 Auditing integration of Sustainable Development Goals into government activities.
The study also discovered that, following the audit of government preparedness, the auditors
later conducted an additional audit to determine the extent to which the government had
integrated the 2030 Agenda into the national context. Regarding the alignment of SDGs with
government activities, an auditor had this to say:
We review the country’s SDG Indicator Baseline annually to see if the targets aligned and integrated
into local government development plans are being implemented in accordance with adopted policies
and procedures.
In addition to the SDG Indicator Baseline review done annually, the findings also show that
the country’s current focus is on SDG goals such as poverty reduction, environmental
degradation, climate change, health, among others (also see Ghana’s SDGs Budget Report,
2020), and that local governments are not doing enough to meet the national baseline and
performance indicators. SDG 13, which addresses climate change, has clearly captured the
country’s and auditors’ attention in recent years. However, little or no action is being taken on
climate change by political leaders (Smith et al., 2021). The auditors were asked to comment
on how they are assisting the country. One of the auditors reveals that:
To meet the requirements of INTOSAI, who also serve as external auditors for member countries
that have signed on to the SDGs, we approach each SDG target one at a time. This includes
addressing the extreme degradation of our forests and water bodies in the country due to activities of
‘galamsey,’ which are now too urgent to ignore.
It was also noted that due to the attitude of politicians and their cronies, auditors are unable to
sometimes raise environmental issues that may have negatively impacted economic
progress. A senior auditor lamented as follows.
Hmmm! the politicians always ask if Ghanaians should suffer from hunger and poverty when
natural resources are available to generate revenue. The SDGs have been promoted, but successive
governments have always been more interested in destroying forests for revenue than preserving
them for sustainable development. They only listen and act on our reports when there are property
destruction and loss of lives.
Environmental issues were only considered in the country’s development strategy when
there was a negative social consequence, such as a death or property loss, said respondents.
While auditors can help achieve SDGs, revenue generation appears to trump sustainable
development in Ghana. Further investigation of the auditors’ role revealed that the COVID-19
epidemic has posed serious threats to the 2030 Agenda. The SDGs are meant to guide
humanity because they cover virtually every aspect of human and environmental well-being.
The COVID-19 exposed the underinvestment in healthcare systems in Africa (Ekwebelem
et al., 2021), and Ghana in particular. An official had this to say:
Our compliance audit reports on health institutions in Ghana that have been politicized gained
attention during the time the Covid 19 pandemic became severe. . . . we conduct compliance audits in
accordance to the IDI guidelines . . . relating to SDG 3 targets [Good Health and Wellbeing]
JAAR to determine whether the health sector, and other institutions are aligning their operations with the
SDG targets.
24,2
The audited entity or other external parties cause several interferences with the SDG audit, which
were discovered when evaluating the auditors’ role in SDG implementation. AFROSAI-E,
INTOSAI and the UN must work with Ghana’s SAI to ensure that these interferences do not
negatively impact the audit timetable and reporting period. We delved deeper to find out what
414 factors/pressures interfere with the SDG audit. The next two sections are findings on institutional
pressures influencing SDG audit and auditors’ strategic responses.

4.2 Institutional pressures to Sustainable Development Goal implementation audit

4.2.1 Mimetic pressure. Although Ghana has been a model for SDG-related policy
implementation in Africa (Coulibaly et al., 2018), mimetic isomorphism was discovered to
have an impact on the country’s SDG audit.
As disclosed by the auditors, SDG 13, which addresses climate change, has captured the
country’s and auditors’ attention in recent years. Our findings suggest that mimetic
isomorphism has been responsible for structural changes in SDG audit in the country. An
official revealed that:
Ever since Ghana rolled out the One District One Factory (1D1F) initiative, we as auditors have to
also audit the preparedness of the country towards putting in place policies that will ensure proper
production that will reduce pollution and destruction of the environment. It is not like we do not have
agenda; climate change is now the issue countries in the world are addressing so we must also move
towards the direction of the international community.
Ghana recognises the importance and impacts of climate change, as well as the urgent need to
battle it, and the auditors also recognise the need of safeguarding the country’s development.
The auditors have also demonstrated the need for a balance between achieving social,
economic and environmental sustainability at the same time. However, the SAI has no
authority to enforce the implementation of audit recommendations. The country’s parliament
reviews the reports and make recommendations to the executives of government on the audit
reports issued by the A-G of SAI, unlike other Francophone and Lusophone African
countries, where magistrates serve on the court to inflict penalties or corrections. The
auditors noted that they are unable to reprimand or inflict punishment, which has resulted in
the same problems occurring year after year. This is how one of the auditors lamented:
Although Ghana conducts annual voluntary assessment of SDG implementation, the Auditor
General’s office has no judicial function, so we forward our findings on areas of SDG audit as part of
the report on public institutions to parliament for further action. Then, parliament refers the report to
a multiparty public account committee for public hearings.
Although Ghana has been a model for SDG-related policy implementation in Africa
(Coulibaly et al., 2018), mimetic isomorphism was discovered to have an impact on the
country’s SDG audit. All of these disclosures confirm the country’s imitating successful
economies’ structures due to the belief that those are the SDG goals and targets that the
international communities are currently championing through international conferences, and
for which the country’s president has been a co-advocate.
4.2.2 Normative pressure. Another enabling factor that emerged from the interviews was the
pressure to implement training obtained from international organisations in performing SDG
audit. One of the most important INTOSAI ethical standards is competence in audit work. This
principle requires public sector auditors to adhere to professional standards, be prudent and
maintain skills (AFROSAI-E Performance Audit Handbook, 2013, p. 40). In an endeavour to
develop human capital competencies in SAIs, INTOSAI trained auditors responsible for auditing
SDG-related government policies and programmes. In its 2017–2022 Strategic Plan, INTOSAI Public sector
provided training frequently to members countries and also them to help monitor and review the auditors
SDGs’ implementation in their countries. One auditor, for example, reveals:
During this Covid-19 pandemic, the INTOSAI provided online training to member countries
including Ghana to strengthen capacities for early warning, risk reduction and management of
national and global health risks in the health sector which they dubbed SDG target 3.d.
The growing practise of SDG auditing around the world today can be explained by normative 415
isomorphism (Bebbington and Unerman, 2020). Audit staff or team competency and
proficiency may have a significant impact on the contributions and effectiveness of SDG
audit. Auditors must have the necessary knowledge, skills and other competencies to carry
out the institution’s responsibilities (Cordery and Hay, 2021; Joshi and Karyawati Purba,
2022), and this is exactly what the SAI of Ghana does to survive and persuade the public that
it is a legitimate entity worthy of international support.
4.2.3 Coercive pressure. Our research also shows that the SAI is struggling to fulfil its
constitutional mandate, despite the fact that it would have performed better with adequate
logistic support. A quality SDG audit requires adequate logistical resources, such as paper,
ink and other basic products. These issues are frequent in emerging economies when SAI
annual budgets approved by the parliament do not match actual release (Reichborn-
Kjennerud et al., 2019). In addition, the SAI is unable to successfully audit SDG-related
policies and programmes due to coercive pressures from the government, political executive
and the Audit Service Board. One of the auditors expressed his sentiment as follows:
. . . there were instances where due to lack of independence, a newly appointed Auditor General [A-G]
ended up throwing out reports and queries which also include SDG related programmes such as fight
corruption. The A-G was removed and the new A-G came to issue an unqualified opinion in favour of
the government in power.
It is important to note that, even if the auditors wanted to, their ability to audit SDGs is
subjected to setbacks. Institutional constraints continue to obstruct them. As shown above,
while SDG audits are required by law, performance audits are plagued with political
interference. The study also noted that the president appoints public officials to head public
institutions. Since new leaders enter with their own team and set of conditions, they disrupt
the existing audit timetable. On this constraint, an auditor lamented that:
[. . .] we live in a country where during the evidence gathering stage of SDG related programmes. The
government either deliberately reshuffles appointed ministers and appointees who are to provide the
needed documentation.
Another respondent added that:
Practicing for over two decades, I have found that when a political appointee leaves and a new one
takes over, the new one sideline one with technical brains so that they can have their way or push
political agendas. This is not different in when we started auditing the SDG programmes too.
Another institutional challenges that the auditors encounter in auditing the SDGs is auditees
deliberately delaying or refusing to provide required documents and the auditors reliance on
miscellaneous logistics from the auditees to complete their audit work. AFROSAI-E (2013)
states that an auditor should alert the supervisor, audit manager and, if necessary, top
management if submission of documentation is delayed. Delay in receiving a document
demotivates auditors and makes it impossible to undertake a full investigation. For instance,
an interviewee disclosed that:
Sometimes the entities deliberately refuse to provide documents on time, and sometimes they do not
even keep the source documents at all.
JAAR Further, the study discovered that the auditors frequently rely on auditees to provide
24,2 photocopies of documents, stationery and other necessities during the audit exercise.
Reliance on auditees for miscellaneous logistics opens the door to undesirable setbacks on the
auditors. This damages the public’s perception of government auditors and causes SDG
audits to be delayed or circumvented. The following is how one of the auditors complained:
Our inability to cover all areas of high risk when we audited a school feeding programme, in line with
416 target 1 of SDG 4 was because budget allocated was small, we have plead with the school for
photocopier service . . ..
The findings above show that the SAI has been faced with coercive pressure from regulators,
powerful figures and political executives. This pressure, according to the institutional theory,
is caused by reliance on another organisation for resource (Reichborn-Kjennerud et al., 2019).

4.3 Strategic responses to institutional pressures for auditing Sustainable Development Goal
implementation
This section describes how the SAI responds to institutional pressures, as it conducts SDG
audit. A continuum of five strategic reactions to institutional pressures has been advanced by
Oliver (1991): acceptance, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. The study
revealed that the SAI adopts acquiescence and manipulation strategy in responding to
institutional pressures for auditing SDGs.
4.3.1 Acquiescence strategy. The SAI responds to the memetic pressures to SDG audit
using acquiescence strategy. Most participants said that the SAI not only adheres but often
voluntarily exceeds compliance requirements to project the country’s image and retain
financial resources. For example, a senior auditor reveals:
. . . We follow training manuals and comply with guidelines from the UN and other forums to ensure
that our president is not disappointed since he currently serves as Co-Chair of SDG Advocates. I feel
that our level of compliance is the reason why the government continues to receive assistance from
international donors.
The tactic deployed by the SAI is an acquiescence strategy because it implies that the SAI
agrees to the institutional pressures. According to Oliver (1991), widespread adoption of these
practices within an institution would almost certainly result in passive compliance, one of the
acquiescence-related tactics.
4.3.2 Compromise strategy. The study also highlighted instances where the SAI
negotiated and bargained as tactics to compromise strategy in response to coercive
pressures that obstruct SDG auditing. In such circumstances, the SAI frequently chose the
interests of internal constituents over external constituents. In responding to refusal or delay
in the release of documentation, one of the auditors described their actual practices as follows:
Although we have to comply with best auditing standards and practices, when the context demands
that we do otherwise, we have to bend the rules or negotiate if that will help us to get the information
for the audits work.
Another respondent added that:
If responding to the queries will make the government in power unpopular, the auditees refuse to
release documents. There was an instance where we sought court intervention, or bargains with the
audited entity to release records for review.
Collaboration between auditees and auditors simplifies and streamlines the auditing process
for both parties. The loose coupling of SDG standard auditing from actual practices is
consistent with public sector auditing, since Cohen and Leventis (2013) revealed that audit
delays contribute to auditors performing inefficient audit work.
 4.3.3 Manipulation strategy. The study also noted situations where the SAI responded to Public sector
coercive pressures using a manipulating strategy. This strategy is manifesting in the SAI auditors
because the Constitution of Ghana mandates the president to appoint the A-G and other
important members of government to serve on the Board of the SAI. There was an instance
where the A-G had to petition the president over what the SAI considers unconstitutional
interference in the work of A-G by the SAI’s Board Chairs, which the A-G says is a breach of
the Constitution (citinewsroom.com, 2018). One of the auditors also had this to say in attempt
to help achieve SDG 16: 417
We can be toothless at times because politicians make us look bad in the eyes of the public. We issued
audit reports to combat corruption [SDG 16], after which the president requested that the A-G be
placed on leave and later removed. To satisfy the government and his political allies, the current
Acting A-G produced a revised audit report a few hours later.
This manipulation strategy used by the newly appointed A-G is a clear sign of that impedes
human progress, which SDG 16 seeks to combat. The action of the appointed A-G promotes
inequality and stifles national and local economic growth.

5. Discussion
5.1 Institutional pressures for Sustainable Development Goal implementation audit
Institutional pressures for SDG audit that emerged from the findings are mimetic, coercive
and normative. The mimetic pressures stemmed from Ghana’s Westminster model of public
sector audits. This is consistent with Hay and Cordery’s (2018) claim that the Westminster
model is adopted in many English-speaking countries with multi-party government systems.
This implies that the cabinet of ministers consider the recommendations relating to the
alleged violations to implementation of the targets of SDGs and they decide to either act or not
before reporting back to parliament on the decision taken. Also, benchmarking country-level
best practice and learning sustainability best practice from SDG audit forums organised by
the INTOSAI-IDI were the main mimetic institutional pressures influencing SDG audit
practices of the SAI of Ghana.
Given that Ghana’s presidents have been co-chairs of the group of SDG Advocates since
2016, emulating best practices for auditing SDG implementation from these institutions
seems necessary to maintain Ghana’s enviable reputation for leading the campaign for the
development of an SDG Budget Baseline that aligns national budget with major SDG targets
(Coulibaly et al., 2018). The findings support the theoretical assertion that countries may
mimic best audit practices of Commonwealth nations if the parliament insists on using
specific public sector auditing practices for auditing governments (Hay and Cordery, 2021).
In addition to the mimetic pressure, there was another strategy during the early stage of
the COVID-19 pandemic, which explains how struggling for conformance was enacted by the
INTOSAI-IDI. Interestingly, the INTOSAI-IDI built an integrated education and audit
support platform for 3D audits in response to the COVID-19 crisis. The 3D provides online
education, other tools and audit support to all SAI teams worldwide, according to
respondents. As theorised, the practice of the INTOSAI-IDI is a clear importation of expertise
to help assist the SAI of Ghana to conduct compliance and performance in time of pandemic,
which DiMaggio and Powell (1983) referred to as the existence of normative isomorphism.
The coercive pressure that emerged from the findings inspires new thinking and
enthusiasm for cooperation among public institutions, government and the SAI. The prospect
of auditees and political executives cooperating with SDG audit appears to have been met
with resistance, possibly due to the country’s fear of being exposed as a result of its reliance
on foreign aid to promote SDG targets implementation. Over the past few decades, the regular
occurrence of actual audit practices decoupling from enacted practices has contributed to the
JAAR emergence of a large body of literature attempting to identify the factors that influence
24,2 practitioners’ desire to comply or not comply with promulgated professional standards
(Guenin-Paracini et al., 2015).
In this study, while the auditors of the SAI are expected to resist undesirable coercive
pressures and be independent of the government, report to the parliament and be non-
partisan (Grrissen, 2020), it appears that the willingness of the SAI to do so ultimately
depends on their relative “bargaining power” in practise. The revelation is in agreement with
418 the assertion of Bazerman et al. (1997, p. 90) who put forward that “under current institutional
arrangements, it is psychologically impossible for auditors to maintain their objectivity”. On
the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, such a viewpoint allows one to believe that the
problem of independence can be more or less definitively solved by designing alternative
institutional and organisational arrangements aimed at giving public sector auditors more
power to help shape their decisions through better incentives, developing their ethical
cognition or suppressing what causes their self-serving biases.
Among different coercive pressures, the findings revealed that the work of the audit staff
is restrained by factors such as high political interference, resource dependence and failure of
auditee to comply with audit procedures. These delaying tactics have a negative impact on
performance audit of SDG targets, which is something that is extremely important in public
sector auditing. The study further found inadequate approved budgetary allocation by the
government as one of the factors coerced the auditors to rely on auditees for miscellaneous
logistics to perform audit of SDGs. In addition, while the SAI strives to maintain legitimacy
and formal structure by adopting the acceptable frameworks for auding SDGs, political
executives attempt to interfere with audit investigations if the findings threaten the
government’s credibility. This threat to auditing independence is what Mattei et al. (2021)
believe is inevitable in public sector auditing due to resource dependency.

5.2 Strategic responses to institutional pressures for auditing Sustainable Development Goal
implementation
The SAI’s strategic response to institutional pressures matched three of Oliver’s (1991) five
strategic responses. As a result, acquiescence, compromise and manipulation were the
emerged strategies.
Regarding the acquiescence responses, it is clear that the strategy was driven by the
country’s desire to maintain its outstanding status of having its successive presidents as co-
chairs of SDG Advocates in Africa. It was also found that the SAI was influenced by best
practices of Commonwealth countries’ sustainability auditing to meet global standards. To
execute this strategy, the SAI was mostly using compliance tactics, and in many situations,
over-complying with institutional demands, such as regulatory conditions and voluntary
SDG implementation review (see Ghana’s 2022 Voluntary National Review Process), to
project the country’s enviable records for creating awareness and instigating the
achievement of the SDGs similar to the assertion of Acheampong et al. (2019). As revealed
by the study, the audit staff attending INTOSAI-IDI SDG audit seminars and following best
practices was often used to respond to some of the coercive and normative pressures for SDG
audit to gain certain self-serving benefits such as social support and resource from
international partners.
The responses of the interviewees also suggest that there are few instances where the SAI
had to use compromise tactics such as negotiation and bargaining in response to coercive
institutional pressures. For instance, in an attempt for the SAI to produce in a timely manner
an audit report of SDG implementation so that the PAC can fulfil its constitutional mandate,
the SAI used negotiation through court order to compel the release of documents for audit.
This finding is in agreement with earlier studies that found negotiation is one of the
compromising tactics used in response to the unbearable pressures within the institutional Public sector
environment (e.g. Oliver, 1991; Wijethilake et al., 2017). Surprisingly, when the auditors are auditors
unable to obtain further evidence due to political executive’s non-disclosure, they
compromised auditing practices by pacifying them without following the due process of
SDG audit. This compromise strategy, according to Mamat et al. (2021), leads to a loose
coupling of established best practice.
The final response strategy employed by the SAI is manipulation. Oliver (1991) indicates
that manipulating strategy may be implemented using co-opting tactics through the 419
connections of influential people, such as politicians. Consistent with earlier studies (e.g.
Oliver, 1991; Wijethilake et al., 2017), the current study revealed resemblance of the use of
manipulation to respond to coercive pressure from political executives and cronies during the
audits. For example, the auditors highlighted that the A-G sometimes modifies the purpose of
the performance audit to retain legitimacy and appease competing political logics. The
findings imply that the best SDG audit procedures are being implemented loosely, which
would have a negative influence on the achievement of SDG targets.

6. Conclusion, contribution and suggestion for future studies

SDG implementation audits have the potential to shed light on successes and limitations of
government action to implement specific SDG targets. In this paper, we have focused on three
aims: public sector auditors’ role in guaranteeing accountable governance of SDGs
implementation for sustainable development; institutional pressures faced in the
performance audit of SDGs; and the strategic response to institutional pressures for
auditing SDG implementation. The paper drew on the institutional theory and Oliver’s model
for strategic responses to institutional pressures to explore and explain how and why SAIs of
emerging economies interact with their external environmental factors, and how their
strategic response affects SDG audits.
The study’s findings lead to three broad conclusions. First of all, the results showed that
the SAI always conducts performance audit on SDG implementation, as one of the ways to
ensure accountable governance of SDG implementation for sustainable development in
Ghana. A plausible explanation might be that the country, among other things, wants to
continue to earn its enviable reputation as being an advocate of SDG implementation agenda
in the African settings. In Ghana, successive presidents of the republic since 2016 have been
the co-chairs of the group of SDG Advocates (Acheampong et al., 2019). Also, a survey of
among 34 African countries declared Ghana as the overall best performer in achieving the
SDGs in Africa (Coulibaly et al., 2018). These two achievements probably make it more
interesting to conduct voluntary audits of SDG-related programmes of the government by
developing an SDG Budget Baseline Report with frameworks that ensure that the financial
priorities of the country’s budget are aligned with major SDG targets.
Secondly, institutional pressures on the SAI to guarantee accountable audit of SDG
implementation for sustainable development are increasing. The SAI therefore seems
sensitive to both internal and external stakeholder pressure for SDG audits. The primary
mimetic institutional pressures impacting the SAI’s SDG audit practices include
benchmarking country-level best practice and learning sustainable best practice from
INTOSAI and UN SDG audit conferences. Also, online education and INTOSAI-IDI audit
support to all SAI teams worldwide were the normative pressures that shape SDG audit in
Ghana. Further, the INTOSAI, governments, auditees, political executives and the Audit
Service Board all exert coercive auditing pressures on the SAI. It has also been argued that
public sector audits that rely on central government for resources are vulnerable to coercive
political pressure and control (Hay and Cordery, 2021), implying that political accountability
usually takes precedent over professional accountability (G
arseth-Nesbakk and Kuruppu,
JAAR 2018) in SAIs. Regarding the third objective, the study finds that the SAI actively responds to
24,2 these pressures using acquiescence, compromise and manipulation strategies leading to
coupling, and in some cases, loose coupling of SDG audit practices in the SAI.
This paper contributes to current research mainly in two ways. First, the research also
draws on the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and the Oliver (1991)
framework to explain how SAIs in emerging economies interact with external environmental
factors and how their strategic reaction to them affects SDG implementation auditing. This
420 study provides novel insights into the public sector auditing and sustainable development
literature. Second, this empirical work adds to the limited knowledge of why and how SDG
implementation results depart from desired outcomes in emerging economies, and
specifically in Ghana. In doing so, this study complements the more general analysis of
how external and political factors influence public sector auding deviations (see, e.g. G
arseth-
Nesbakk and Kuruppu, 2018; Cordery and Hay, 2021; Hay and Cordery, 2021). In particular,
these results highlight that political executives often interpret unfavourable SDG audit
opinions as an invasion into the political domain. We therefore argue that it is not because
public sector auditors in emerging economies lack the necessary skills to conduct
performance audits of SDG-related programmes. Instead, the interference of political
executives is primarily responsible for the loose coupling of SDG programmes from the
desired targets.
For practice, the findings imply that the degree to which actual SDG audit procedures
conform with or deviate from enacted ones is contingent on the strategic response utilised by
public sector auditors. Because the SAI of Ghana is financially dependent on the central
government and on auditees for miscellaneous logistics, the SAI is under coercive pressure to
fulfil its responsibilities. Additionally, our analysis indicates that while the SAI has full
operational independence under Ghana’s constitution, it lacks operational independence in
practice due to the president’s appointment of the A-G. As a result, SAIs in emerging
economies must revisit the other side of accountability by reinforcing a constructive dialogue
with those held accountable, particularly politicians and auditees.
The study also emphasises the importance of audit independence and strict
adherence to the international framework for auditing SDGs when it comes to policy.
On this note, the study emphasises that INTOSAI’s influence remains limited as a result
of political interference in audit work, and that it requires increased institutional
recognition if it is to be effective in harmonising SDG audit globally to promote
sustainable development. On this note, we suggest that auditors face a dilemma not only
between self-economic interest and professional values, but also between professional
competence and professional values. Public sector auditors understand that if they are to
work diligently and efficiently, they must avoid pacifying political executives. However,
by not pacifying them, they risk the chance of receiving adequate budgetary allocation
to perform their roles. Of course, this does not mean that no organisational and
regulatory efforts should be made to limit the interference of auditees and political
executives. However, it should be noted that auditors’ power over auditees is not solely
or even primarily dependent on the possession of predefined resources or any structural
changes. In the field, the power relationship between auditors and auditees is primarily
context-dependent.
One limitation of the study is that the data are limited to self-selected written responses to
the auditors and those called to give oral evidence. In future studies, data triangulation may
be used to report evidence from additional stakeholders, such as INTOSAI officials, finance
ministries and auditees. Finally, future SDG implementation and accountability studies
should use quantitative methods to investigate the significance of institutional pressures and
strategic responses to SDG audit.
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Corresponding author
Lexis Alexander Tetteh can be contacted at: tetteh.lexis@upsamail.edu.gh

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