107

CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY : NAGALAND AND MANIPUR

The North-Eastem India has been a grey-area

of the country both before and after the independence
of India. The geo-strategic location of the region
naturally shows the need for an urgent solution to the
problem on a permanent basis. On the other hand, In
view of the ethnic fragility of the population of thg
population of the area, the problem needs to be tackled
cautiously and sensibly.

The North-Eastem region of India is made up

of seven states. They are Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura,
Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal-Pradesh, and Mizoram.
Out of these seven states, the last two attained the
status of statehood in February 1987.

According to the North-Eastem Areas (re-

organisation) Act, 1971, five states and Union
Territories were created in the North-Eastem part
of the country. The five new states are : Assam,
Meghalaya, Tripura, Manipur, and Nagaland, The two
 108

Union Territories are ; Arunacha]. Pradesh, (previously

knovm as NEFA), and Mizoram (Ea«T*r3BRan ed Mizn Hill
District)J

The population of the Nor%-£astem India is ^

around 23 million spread over an aresuoi ap&roximately
25f 300 square kilometers. ImpoiJ«tant td note i&
that not only this region is suiji-oundec^ by foxeign
countries but the vi^ole region iig cazCi,ected with the
rest of India by a small strip o:^ igfid about 14 kilome-
ters wide known as "Siliguri neck".

North-iiast India is strategically innportant' as

mentioned earlier due to common frontiers it shares
with four countries i.e. China in the north, Bliutan
in the West, Bangladesh in the East and Burma in the»
South. Therefore no other part of India occupies such
2
as strategic position as the North-iiast I

The geo-political condition of North-Eastem

India in general and Nagaland in particular has played
an important role in breeding and aggravating an
insurgent movement in this area. This is more or
less true of almost all insurgences situations in
South-h^st Asia which have occured and thrived in
the hilly, tropical forest-infested boarder regions,
where sometimes borders of more than one country
overlaps. The insurgencies in South - East Asia have
another trait in common and that is suspenfikility to
developments, influences and interferences across the
international borders. However, despite these common
traits relevant for functional insurgencies, North-
3
Eastern India has certain unique features of its own.

The aggregation in a complex situation like that

In the hill states of North-xiastem India are ntmierous.
Broadly however, the fonnations may appear tenable
due to Strong Pnrrnyiiial pulls being persistant in the
tribal societies of North-Eastem India with ethnic
consideration wtiich played a major role in the voting
pattern (The sixth-Lok Sabha Election). The question
of regional/tribal "identity" however is related to a
certain level of conciousness found mainly among edu-
cated middle class.

It is obvious that there has been a historical

 110

trend of insurgency activity going on in this part

of the country. And it has been spreading like an
epidemic disease. The problem first started in Nagaland
and erupted with violence in the year 1955, and ultimately
caught up in Mizoram with a full swing in 1968. It has
proliferated in Manipur more extensively in late 1978.
It also touched Tripura with equal amount of violence
in the middle of 1980s.

However, the other states are also not free

from tension. Even Arunachal-Pradesh, vdiich was
spread of insurgency for a long time, has now to
contend with incursions from accross the Burma border
by rebels of the National socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN) led by T.Muivah, a Maoj^ist.^

In the following pages we present the case study

of Nagaland and Ilanipur. It can be noted that insurgency
problem in Mizoram has been solved with the signing
of an accord called "Mizo Accord" on 30 June 1986, And
the problem related to Tripura is yet in a stage of
flux and hence too early to assess.

A. NAGALAND
The problem in Nagland had erupted into violence
 Ill

earlier and intensification took place in the year

1955. Though the symptom of the problem had emerged
long back, it is interesting to note that soon after
the independence of India the policy planners were
well aware of its potential threats. Thus after India
attained independence and Nagaland along with other
tracks of north-eastern hill area became a part of Indian
Union, a conceited move was imdertaken by over ambitions
and politicised section of the Nagas to secede from
India and form an independent country. The seeds of
this seperatism were probably laid when Sir Charles
Pawsey, Deputy Commissioner of Kohima in 1945 established
the Naga Hills District Tribal Councils to vmite the
Nagas in the task of reconstruction after the Ilnd World
War. A small newspaper known as The Naga Nation was
started and later the Naga Herald emerged, which was
subsequently banned in 1953. Zapu Phizo himself and
u.
re
most of Phizo's too lieM;anants seem to have been ori-
ginally initiated into politics by Pdwsey.
6

However, in June 1977 there was a demand for

a seperation of Naga Hills from India. The separatist
 112

idiemand was by no means unanimous. There were three

main groups - one favoured immediate severance of
all ties with India and independence for this land,
and the second, advocated continuance of governmental
relations with India till the Nagas were in a position
to take up the reign of self government, and the third
one wanted Nagaland to be a Mandatory State \inder the
7
British government for a given period.

In the initial stage, the Nagas were persuing

a passive line of action. In June 1947, the Naga^< leade)«
Mr. Z.A. Phizo along with a handful of Nagas, under the
banner of Naga National Council (NNC) held a three
day meeting with the then Governor of Assam the late
Mr. Akbar Hyadri. As a result of the meeting,
specific document was produced. However, Article
9 of Idle document itself became the bone of conten-
tion to the agreement.
The article states:
"The agent of the Government of Indian Union
will have a special responsibility for a period
of ten years to ensure the due observance a
special responsibility for a period of ten
 113

years to ensure the due observance of this

agreement; and at the end of this period, the
Naga National Council will be asked whether
they require the above agreement to be extended
for a further period or a new agreement regard-
Q
ing the future of the Naga people arrived at".

Both the parties interpreted the contents of

the article in different ways. The NNC interpreted
in such a way that implied that the Nagas would have
the right to be separated from India after the comple-
tion of ten years. Thus the negotiation were a total
failure. Had the negotiation been successful, the
situation today might have been different as ame the
example of Sikkim coming into the folds of Indian
Union in a peaceful manner.

After the failure of the negotiation, the Nagas

were still taking up the non-violent line for their
demand. One of the notable examples is that of the
meeting between the Naga delegation and Mahatma Gandhi
on I4th August, 1947. The deligation which had written
a memorandum in the form of a letter to Mahatma Gandhi
 114

prior to the meeting had listed 11 points for

consideration. Thus this letter dated July 16,
1947» was the first document for introducing the
g
Naga case: The eleven points were as follows:

1, 'The Nagas-are from a country from the North-iiast

Frontier of India, which 'lies between two huge
countries namely : India and China*, to use Pandit
Nehru*s words.
2, ?^he Nagas were independent before the British
advent *.
3, 'The Nagas were first attacked by the British
Government in the year 1819. The Nagas fought
the British for 30 years for their independence,
*The last battle was fought in 1879 and the
Nagas were conquered.
4, The Nagas (British subject's) demanded for
independence in 1929 when the Simon's statutory
commission visited Kohima, the head quarters of
Naga hills.
5, The Naga hills has been a totally "Excluded Area"
since 1935 Act came to force.
 115

6. Again in 1946, the Nagas demanded for complete

independence when the British withdraw from India.
7. An interim arrangement on the lines of district
autonomy has been offered to the Nagas by the
authority, and the Nagas have rejected it.
8. The Nagas fought for independence when the British
threatened to take away their independence back
in 19th century.
9. Again the Nagas resisted Japanese with all their
might in 19^4 for independence.
10. The demand for Nagas for independence is not the
opinion of a 'Dewan or Ruler' (the Nagas have no
ruler, and the British are going), it is the will
of the people.
11. The Nagas shall declare their independence on the
15th August, 1947.

As the General Secretary of the NNC, one Mr.

Sakhrie prepared a note in this fonn of the points of
10
discussion with Mahatma Gandhi. The points are:
1. The Nagas w^re determined to have complete
independence. They are determined not to Join
 116

the union. They will die before loosing their

independence; Will the government of India use
force to bring the Nagas under the (Indian) union.
2. Has anyone under the sun the right to take a vsraiy
their independence? Not with justification. But
is might right?

In the meeting, Mahatma Gandhi told the Nagas

delegates that:

"... Nagas have every right to be independent.

We did not want to live under the dominion of
the British and they are now leaving us. I
want you to feel that India is yours. I feel
that the Naga hills are mine Just as much as
they are yours, but if you say, "it is not mine",
the matter must stop here. I believe in the
brotherhood of mass, but I do not believe in
force or forced unions. If you do not wish
to Join the union of India, nobody will force
11
you to do that." <
After this, the representatives of the NNC met
the Prime Minister Pandit Nehru and referred the demand
for Naga independence. However, the results were not
 117

favourable towards the cause projected by the NNC.

The M C thus, in started seeking the help of the United
Nations by writing a letter to the Secretary General
of U.N, At the same time, Phizo and his followers
crossed over to Burma to establish a link with the
anti government insurgent group in Burma known as the
Jiastem Naga Revolutionary Council (ENRC). Phizo was
incidently arrested by the Burmese government and sent
back to India, and released by the government of India
after a period of time from the jail. From this time
onwards, the Nagas had started an armed insurgency
operation.

In 1955, hostility and violence broke out and

the Army was called and deployed. In the following
year i.e., in 1956, a parallel government in the name
of the "Naga Federal Government (FGN)" was formed with
Phizo as the Chairman. Interestingly, in 1957» when
violence had already erupted, Phizo's man wrote a
letter to the then President of India Dr. Radhakrishnan
quoting their discussions with Mahatma Gandhi. This
 118

had little or no impact on the situation. It may be

of relevance to indicate the organizational set up
of the FGN established by Phizo.

PHIZO'S PARALLEL FRONTS

FEDERALGOVERMMiiNT

TATAR HOHO NAGA NATIONAL COUNCIL KEDHAGE

(PARLIAMENT) (POLITICAL WING) (PRESIDENT)
NAGA WOMEN'S NAGA YOUTH KEDALO
SOCIETY MOVEMENT (VICE PRESIDENT)
ANGS (GOVERNORS) KILONSERS
FOR FOUR STATES OF (MINISTERS)
JAPFU,DIKU, PATKAI
AND HALIP0N3 SUPREME COURT
MIDAN PSYU REGIONAL COURTS
(COMMISSIONER) AREA VILLAGE COUNCIL
PANGTONGES RAZOU PEYUS
(DY.COMi^SSI ONERS) (ASST. COMMI3SI0NERS)
RUNA PEYU
(CHAIRMEN FOR EACH VILLAGE)
I G MAJOR TRIBES
ANGAMI S£MA LOTHA AO CHKESANG PHOM
KONYAK YIMCHUNGER KHIEi'4UNGAN CHANG Rii:NGMA ZELIANGRONG
3ANGTAM
ON THE MANIPUR SIDE
TANGKHUL MAO MARAM ANAL
^Sources: Nirmal Nibedon" The Night of the Guerrillas"
Lanc«rPublicers. New Delhi, 1983.
 119

After fonning this Federal Government, in 1956, Phizo

crossed over to Dacca (then East Pakistan) and made
contact with the Pakistani authorities, Phizo thus :; •
systematically established a full-fledged movement. In
late 1959, the Naga leader managed to fly to the West.
From Zurich, he entered the United Kingdom with the
help of one Rev Michael Scott from the U.K. and opened
an office in London. This "move" has to lay the founda-
tion of propaganda works for Naga demand and bring
them before international community. However not much
of a success was achieved. Rev, Scott continued ser-
ving as a missionary in Nagaland for a long time and
was regularly participating in the Naga problem and
so called the peace efforts. However, he was expelled
from India because of his activities. It is worth
recalling.

That the (then External Affairs Minister Mr.

Dinesh Singh, announced in the Rajya Sabha on
3rd May (1965) that R.V. Scott had been served
orders to leave the country immediately because
the minister stated that "In spite of our
warnings and regrets expressed by him he has
12
continued to adopt a partisan attitude."
 120

Back to the home-front, a series of encoimters

took place between the Naga insurgents and the security
forces. The intensity was high till the end of 1975.
In the year 1975» brought a new chapter in the history
of the Naga problem with the initiative to bring peace
in Nagaland by a body called "Peace Mission" with the
help of the church leaders. With the signing of an
agreement between some representatives of the Naga
rebel and the Government of India at Shi1long known
as "Shillong Accord" on the 11th of November 1975, a
new hope for peace came after a series of hot-confron-
tations. Under this agreement, the Naga Federal
Government (NFG) agreed to recognize the Indian Consti-
tution and solve the Naga problem within the frame
work of the Indian Constitution and thereby surrender
of men and vi weaponsy^^ook place. ^.. " -. While,
the Accord led to the surrender of few per per^sonals
and some weapons in 1976 it however created a faction
leading to the formation of a Maoist group. Thus the
hope for a permanent peace remained illusive.

Shillong Accord of 1975 which astensity caused

 121

a set back to insurgency, also discredited Phizo in

the eyes of the section of the underground leaders.
Although Phizo was in no way a party to the historic
accord. Phizo's helplessness at the critical moment
to safe succession was amply exposed. Thuingaleng
Muivah formed, in 1980, a new millitant faction called
National socialist council of Nagaland (NSCN) and set
its Head Quarters in the Burmese Jungle territory
adjacent to Nagaland, Several important rebel
leaders including S.S. Kapling and Isack Chishi Swu .
also Joined the NSCN under the overall leadership of
Muivah.13

NSCN's guerrilla arms which is estimated to be

around 2,COO men is the biggest among the various
rebel groups. Its strength has been reported to be
increasing. Several hundreds of its men have received
mil^itary training in Lahsa in Tibet and in Yunan
14
Province of China.

The NSCN led by T. Muivah came out with an

attestment to Maoism giving an ideological back-up to
Naga insurgency. However, it is still a question as
what extent Maoism could go along with Christianity in
 122

the hills of North Eastern India. It seems that

under the leadership of T. Muivah, a conglomerate of
socialism (Maoist Line) and Christianity has been put
into experiment while India is experimenting democratic-
socialism.

The activities of the NSCN are vast. It uses

all the available resources of the modern world which
are in their disposal. Public support (to some eyipnt)
to the NSCN in Nagaland and some of the hilly areas of
Manipur cannot be ignored. And its relations with the
church is quite obvious.

After T, Muivah, a Tankhul Naga from Manipur's

East District took over the command of the new
Insurgent group called NSCN, the activities of the
Naga insurgent (NSCN) has stepped up in Manipur also,
particularly in Manipur East District. Thus the
presence and activities of the NSCN have almost become
exf&^dtci H-fi yay^dbtrv^ The NSCN ha9:;^the potentiality to
penetrate in the valley of Iraphal too.

The NSCN Initiated its first-violent act in

 123

Manipur in the early 1982 with a successful ambush

at Namthilok in Manipur East District killing 20 army
men of the 21 st Sikh Regiment and €sc&f>ed' with the
captured weapons and ammunitions. The NSCN killed the
Pro-Shillong Accord elements and Pro-Government people.
From November 1982 to May 1983, the NSCN had killed
as many as k such people in Manipur jiiast District alone.
Not only this, but this group started terrorism by
persuing a line of eliminating Naga-public figures in
Manipur. Notable among the victims killed were Mr. Y
Shaiza, ex. Chief Mnisters of Manipur, and Mr. Solomon,
v^o was a member of the Manipur Public service Commission.
The NSCN also attempted on the life of Mr, Rishang
Keishing, the present chief Minister of Manipur on two
occassions.

After the second attempt on the life of the

present Chief Minister of Manipur, "Risisttmce", a
weekly English paper published in Manipur reported on
December 11, 1984 that:

Once more the Chief Minister Rishang Keishing has

cheated the NSCN (National Socialist Council of Nagaland)
 124

Mr. Risbang who rode straight into carefully laid

ambush at Leishi (Manipur East) to address campaign
meeting at Pliungyar (Manipur East) on Saturday last
^ -••• - escaped mm^r%-. The ambush which reportly
lasted about half an hour, however, left four jawans
of the Manipur Refiles dead and seven other including
the D.I.^. (Hills) ehhandabihari ,e»3tt*«4. This
incidentally is the second time that NSCN attempt to
assassinate the chief Minister has aborted. Earlier
in July 1984, a hitman of the NSCN Mr. Ramkhathing
had penetrated the security cordon at the chief Minister's
residence and had entered the official bunglow. Luckily
the Chief Minister was away from his home at that time
attending the Sunday Church service elsewhere. That
would be assasin Ramkhathing was the same man virtio had
gunned down Mr. Yangimaso Shaiza at his home in
Deulaland (Imphal) on the morning of January 30,1984."^^
Thus, the NSCN by such activities has been intensifying
its terrorist activities.'

B. MANIPUR:

It is interesting to note that, among the various

 125

insurgent groups operating in the North Eastern India,

insui-gents in Manipur Valley are Hindus. The valley
of Manipur is inhibited by Meitftvs and the surround-
ing hills by various tribes. Majority of the various
tribes in the hills of Manipur are christians converted
ever since the time of British regime. ,/-.;

The Meiteis are in general vaishnavities of the

Gauriya Cult, but they have not given up their old
traditions of worshipping their ancestors and local
dieties. They have overall conformity with the Hindus
else where in India in the use of s^c»»edL songs, pilgri-
mage to holy places and predominance of the priest-
hood. The entire area populated by them is dot marked
by temples, small or big, usually a small building for
dikihj or dcHi^S?, and a big Mandop for regular congre-
gation. Four temples built by Jai Singh (1759-1798)
in later part of the eighteenth century. Shri Govindajee,
Vijay Govinda, Madan Mohan, and Gopinath examplify
the religious aspirations of the Meiteis,

From times immemorial, Manipur had been an

independent state with the king as the sovereign head.
 126

After the Anglo-Manipuri war of 18911 Manipur fell into

the hands of the British on 27th April 1891 and they
hoisted their flag (Union Jack) a^t Kangla, the Capital
of the State, The state was regranted and from 21st
Aiigust 1391, Manipur became a Suzerain state under the
British (Government, vide publication in the Gazette
of India Notification No. 1700 a, dated 21st August 1391.
The British rule came to an end in India and wtien Manipur
merger-agreement was signed by his Highness the late
Maharaja Bodhchandra Singh of Manipur on 21st September,
1949 at Shillong, the state was integrated with the
Union of India from 15th October 1949. So from 15th
October, 1949, we may take as post integration period
17
for Manipur. '

The first case of insurgency activity in Manipur

was started by a small group of people vdio had gone to
Burma in the early 1950s. This group was given training
by the Burmese rebels. But the idea of the group was
not for a seperate homeland for Manipur, but it was a
part of the Communist movement in India. The group had
come back to Manipur after some time (middle of 1950s)
 127

and settled dovm to normal life as members of the

communist party India. (C.P.I.)

It can be said that the group was well trained

in the use of various fireanns as well as political
Ideologies, They were given proper training on tactics
and strategy of modem guerrilla warfare. Some of them
had got military instructor's course.

In the year 1953» a party under the name of

Revolutionary Nationalist Party CRN?) with an aspira-
tions for more au-^nomy had come up. Some leaders of
this party met Pandit Ivehru vrtien he visited Imphal and
demanded for a separate administrative set up entirely
for Manipur. But Pandit Nehru (according to constant!ve
R, in his book, Manipurl Maid of Mountains, Lancer Publi-
shers, New Delhi, 1981) rejected the demand. This party
later converted the name into Manipur Revolutionary Party
(MRP) with an idea for armed insurgency, but did not get
public support and hence faded away from the scene by
itself.

In 1965, two groups came up. They are United

National Liberation Front (UNLF), a Pan Mongoloid Move-
ment, and Revolutionary Government of Manipur (R.G.M.)
 128

The first group (UNLF),had an idea in having a separate

nation of the Mongoloid races in Eastern India, The
Second Group (RGM) was fairly active in an isolated
manner till the middle of 1970s. It is alleged that
these two groups are of tha same coin.

There was ano"ttier political party having secte-

rian tendency known as "Meitei State Committee" which
had emerged prior to the fourth general election in
1967, This political party had put up some candidates
for the then Territorial Assembly. But all of them
lost their security deposits at the time of elections.

After a quiet period of about 11 years, except

for some stray incidents, a new group known as Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) has emerged in the valley of
Manipur with a flavour of Maoism and Meiteisra. Under
the leadership of one time member of the Revolutionary
Government of Manipur (RGM), Mr. N. Bfshesw&roingh,
the P.L.A. had started its armed activity in the valley
of Manipur in the late 1974. At the same period, many
insurgent groups suddenly came up in the valley of
 129

Manlpur. It can be noted that unlike the Naga

Insurgency, which has got only two factions - N.S.C.N,
and F.G.N, (now insignificant). Insurgency in Manipur
has got a typical characteristic of having so many
group and factions and^ their rank and file and orga-
nizational set up are confusing. The various insurgent
groups operating in Manipur are as follows:

1. P.L.A. (Peoples Liberation Army)

The activities of this group had clearly surfaced

in late 1979 v^en this group attacked a party of B.S.F.
personal in the heart of Imphal tov/n killing and snatch-
ing away anns from the victims. The violent activity
of the PLA was high till the last part of 1982, But
the PLA suffered a set back with the arrest of its
leader Mr, N. Bisheswar Singh on July 6, 1981. Many
of the hard core leaders of the PLA were eliminated
during the arrest of Mr. N, ^^BisheBwar Singh. Another
blow to the PLA was the jpEai of Mr. S. Kunjabihari
Singh in an encounter with the Security Forces on 13
April, 1982. Mr. Kun;3abihari took up the leadership
 130

of the P.L.A. after the arrest of Mr. Bisheswar Singh,

Subsequently the leadership of the P.L.A. has been
taken over by Mr, S, Temba Singh.

The last quarter of 1982 witnessed the departure

of around 85 new recruits to Burma and the Kachin ••
Independent Army (K.I.A.). Recruitment was mostly
reported from rural areas, unlike on earlier occassions,
when the PLA recruits by and large confined to urban
area only. This was a difference in the policy of the
PLA under S. Temba. These recruits were taken across
in the month of November 1982, and there are reports
to the effect that the NSCN has also helped (within
Burma) in taking the PLA recruits to Kachin Independent
Army''^ (KIA)

In the year 1983» the PLA came out with a new

tactic. Instead of attacking the security forces, it
carried out propaganda works in the form of displaying
their flags in various parts at Imphal, planting of
small electronic cum low-calible mechanical devices
etc. used as bobby — traps»
 131

It can be recalled that the former leader of the

PLA Mr. Bisheswar Singh is now a member of Manipur
Legislative Assembly elected from Thongju constitu-
tency in Manipur uriiile he was still in Imphal Jail,
He along with other two former insurgents are now
elected to the Manipur State Legislative Assembly, But
a group under the leadership of Mr, S, Temba Singh is
still in the Burmese territory looking for an appro-
priate time to come back to Manipur.

2. PREPAK (People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak)

Kangleipak is the old name of Manipur, This group

is a Meitei Nationalist group dreaming for a seperate
nation of Manipur by means of armed action. This group
was very active in the valley of Manipur, more vividly
in 1982. The PREPAK has been split into two group in
the year 1980, One group was led by Mr. Maipak Sharma
(now in Jail) and the other t>«e under the command of
Mr. R,K. Tulachandra Singh (now killed by the Security
Forces), The intra-party Confrontation between the
these factions led the PRiiPAK to a oblivation.
 132

3, K.C,P« (Kanglelpak Communist Party) t

This group is a fixture of Melfei revivalism

and communist idea. With the surrender of its 4 top
leaders along with 8 other members with arms and
ammiinition in January 1983, the existence of this small
group has been put off.

4. TRIPLE X

This arganization came to notice in November 1981

\^en it has sent Idireatening letters to some engineers.
Later it has sent threatening letters to the Indian Air
20
Lines in January, 1983» There was no evidence of
direct violent action by this group so far.

This group is said to have been formed by some

stray members from the bigger groups. Nothing much has
heard about it after the middle of 1982. Even the full
form of the abbreviation of T.S.S. has not been known.

6. M.N.F. (Mizo National Front)

The M.N.F*, a well-organized insurgent group of
 133

Mizoram, under the leadership of Mr, Laldenga got its

foot-hold in Manipur South District. After the
signing of "Mizo Accord" »n 1987» and the election in
Mizoram (with the status of statehood of 40 member
Assembly) vriiich btxsught Laldenga to power. As Laldenga
himself is the chief Minister, the MNF has given up
the idea of a seperate Mizo country by coming back to
Parliamentary democracy under the constitution of India.

?, N.S.C.N. (National Socialist Council of Nagaland)

The N.S.CN, is an insurgent group of having a

good organizational set up. This group, as it has
been stated earlier under the head line of "NAGALAND" ,
has got its hold in at least three districts in Manipur.
This group is now the largest and strongest among the
various insurgent groups in North-Eastern India,

g. UNLF (United National Liberation Front)

This insurgent group which has not been heard

for a long time since 1965, has now started operating
in Manipur, This organization started becoming promi-
nent again in the middle of 1986 by lootir^a petrol
 134

pump at Imphal. The leader of this group was said

to be R.K. Meghen Singh. Some of its members have
been arrested after the petrol pump incident. Wow,
this group is keeping a low profile without any
direct armed action,

'S' ^'^*^' (Poirei Liberation Front)

This group was formed after the killing of Mr.

Sudhir Kumar Singh, a former R.G.M, (Revolutionary
Government of Manipur) man by the P.L.A. in the early
part of 1979. This group is known to be a counter-
group to P.L.A,

So far, -tiie various insurgent groups in the

North-Eastem Region of India have not been able to
come under a co-ordinated programe in a very explicit
way, even though there are reports of their helping
each other in their terrorist activities. On the other
hand, it also cannot be ignored that they may co-
ordinate their activities in future. Therefore, it
is essential to have a serious look into the problem
 135

of insurgency in the North-East region (Particularly

Nagaland and Manipur) by not merely countering it by
use of force but by understanding the basic roots
of this political problem to find a permanent solution.

C. BASIC ISSUES OF INSURGENCY PROBLEM IN

NAGALAND AND MANIPUR

The basic causes of the emergence of insurgency

may be combination of many a factors. In case of
the insurgency problem in Nagaland and Manipur, indiich
may not have come up at the same time^yet the genesis
for indulging inviolent activities for achieving
independent status for eachother or seperately, has
been the same. It could be recalled that the
population of the area belong to the same origin of
Mongoloid stock and they joere animist before they
converted into Hinduism and Christianity respectively.
 136

Even now they have not given up many of their old

dLieLti^ and customs. The basic root of insurgency
problem in Manipur and Nagaland are as follows:

1, Problem of Cultural Adjustment

^ e Republic of India is the product of the

Integration of many States. It is a fact that many
States had their own political identity before and
during the British rule. After the British left, the
small areas of the North-ii-ast region were also merged
into the Union of India. But due to different
cultural and historical background, the people of
this area have not been able to adjust themselves
to the national main stream. It is but natural that
people having different background would have different
culture and values and hence display different hopes
and aspirations.

The word culture in modem days, could be

 137

interpreted in various ways, A brief summary

observation made by Kroeber and Cyde Kluchokn could
be meaningful. They have stated in their work that

"Culture consists of patterns explicit and

implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and
tr^uasraitted by symbols, constituting the
distinctive achievement of human groups,
including their embodiments in artifacts; the
essential core of culture consists of traditional
(i,e. historically derived and selected) ideas
and especially their attached values; culture
systems may be, on the one hand, be considered
a products of action, on the other hand condi-
tioning elements of further action",21

Fertts hawever explain in a way >diich may be

more acceptable in a broader parameter. He states that:

"If,,, a society is taken to be an organized

aet of individuals with a given set of indiKLduals
with a given way of life, culture is that way of
life. If society is taken to be an aggregate of
social relations, then culture is the content of
those relations. Society emphasizes that human
component, the aggregate of people and their
relations between them. Culture emphasizes the
 138

component a accumulated resources, immateral

as well as material, which people inherit,
imply, transmit, add to, and transmit,"22

Culture, historically quite often, is in the process

of change and adaptation, many a times, from a small
to a bigger one. It will naturally occur only when
there is inter-action between the population. In case
of the North-Kastem India, it seems that the region
is semi-isolated from the rest of India in a geogra-
phical sense.

It could be maintained that "the semi isolation

of the communities living in the hills (North East)
was strengthened by the British attitude of keeping
them insulated from contact with other parts of India
by means of policies like inner-line regulation,
23
extended areas, partially extended areas". "^ It is
surprising to see that inner-line regulation continued
to exist in Manipur till late 19503 and it is still
existing in Nagaland.
2. Problem of Nationalism:

Nationalism is a vital element needed for

 13B

developing the sense of national integration to safe-

guard national security. The question of nationalism
is, infact, one of the most important factor in connec-
tion with the problem of insurgency in the North-Easteni
India.

Although India has had a long history, Indian

24
Nationalism is the product of only last century. It
can he said that the light of nationalism has not been
able to reach in many remote comers of the coxmtry.

Professor L.L. Synde has given a definition of

nationalism. He states that
••,. .Nationalism, a product of political, econo-
mic, social and intellectual factors at a certain
stage in history, is a sentiment of a group of
people living in a well-defined geographical
areas, speaking a common language, possessing a
literature in which aspirations of the nation
have been expressed, attached to common tradi-
tions and customs, vinerating in its own heroes
and in some cases, a common reiigfon". "^ - -*

For a pluralistic country like India, most of the

above points may not go in the same order. But many
 140

nations do exist and stable inspite of having many

plural characteristics. It shows that collective
nationalism is not confined to monolistic nations only.

Though a common language, religion or a common

'^racial*' origin undoubtly helps to produce and
cement the sentiment of nationhood, these things indi-
vidually or together may not be sufficient or necessary,
Many a group whose national sentiments are stronger ?
has diverse language, religion, and race, Switzerland
and Belgium are good examples. The existence of a
nation, however, presuppose some common historical
experiences or in later times, the cherished tradition
of common experiences often fused diverse peoples
into a nation through being subjected to oppression
at the hands of common adversaries. Such has been
the case of thirteen colonies that waged the American
26
war of Independence,

Peter Taylor a political geographer has

observed the following:

"Nations intended to describe on historic

entity where nationalism is the ideology
 141

associated witti this concept, surprisingly

it is the fonas which is more difficult to
pin down (Navari 1981). If we define it
simply as a historic community sharing a
common culture then such entities can be
identified throughout the history."27'

3. Poverty and feeling of NefillRence;

Poverty is a general factor. According to

Oscar Lewis:

On the level of individual, the major chara-

teristics of poverty are a strong -feeling of
marginality of helplessness of independence
and inferiority, and a strong present time
orientation and sense of resignation and
faj^talism. On the community level, lack of
effective participation and integration in the
major institutions of the larger society is one
of the crucial characteristics of the culture
of poverty."

In case of the North-Eastem region of India, the

case has dl«^P««<BBL due to a strong feeling of negligence
among the population against the authority. Such a
feeling has further been accentuated after the Chinese
 142

aggression of 1962, Mr. V.K. Sarin, has cited an

example, of such kind in a rather crude way:

"It could be recalled that during the Chinese

invasion of 1962 right upto the foot hills of
Karaeng closed the plains of Assam, New Delhi
virtually wrote off the entire north-east region
by withdrawing its army to the west of^^Siluguri
neck". The helpless people of the area were
left at the mercy of God, and of course, the
invading CMnese, Shattered by the sad turn of
events, the then Prime Minister Pandit Jawahar-
lal Nehru bit a tearful farewell to the people
of the area. In a broadcast from the All India
RadiOf he veiled my heart bleeds for the people
of Assam. Mercifully the Chinese withdrew into
Tibet much to the relief of the unfortunate
people of the region. The bitter memories of
1962 debacle still rankles* in the mind in the
inhabitants of the area." 29

Such a scenerio has been aggravated slowly by

corruption in various political and administrative
levels. Creating a kind of distruct and disloyalty
to the authority which may be reflected in various forms
 143

of violence, *

Among the various types of "curruptton existing

in the region, the personal corruption charges against
many Ministers and the present chief minister of Ifenipur
is imique. Mr, L.?, Singh, former Governor of Memipur
had asked the C,B,I. to probe into many corruption
charges for misusing public funds against these
political leaders.

The C.B.I, could complete the Investigation for

period of the Janata regime only (197^-1930) because
other relevent documents alleged to have been kept
"50
l o c k e d i n t h e personal safe o f t h e C h i e f M i n i s t e r .
T h e instances o f taking m o n e y f o r giving e m p l o y e m e n t ,
t r a n s f e r o r d e r , p r o m o t i o n , A k a s h bill (to h a n d o v e r
the cheque, before the construction for any work is
done in the P.W.D. department) etc. are fairly well
known to the public.

The h e a l t h department once purchased Rs, 1.33 crore

worth of non-medical items a t exorbidant r a t e s : a
handkerchief priced a t Rs. 3 i n the market was purchased
for Rs. 30 or a pin for Rs. 800, though t h e market p r i c e
 144

is hardly 50 paise. The C.B.I, Is groping in the

dark because the relevant files are "missing". This
appears to be just the tip of the Ice-berg of corruption
in the state. In angry pix>test against such rempant
corruption, the educated youth of Manipur took up
arms for socio-economic reforms. However, the
politicians were quick in bringing these "misguided
youths" under their wing for their gains* The first
Congress (I) Chief Minister, R«K, Dorendi^, was sacked
by Indira Gandhi vAien his nexus with the insurgents
was proved. In a bid to pass the responsibility, a
senior minister stated in a press conference: "police
officers are financially benefited from insurgency.
The proof is not far to seek. Just see the palatial
buildings constructed by high ranking police officers
yiich are disproportionate to their known income". A
widely circulated vernacular daily Huyen Lanpao edi-
torially commented: "The Police are taking Rs. 15,000
or so if an insurgent, who faces immenent death, wants
to surrender, or an undertrial insurgent does not want
31
to be deported to Jails of other states" The recent
 145

corniption charges a g a i n s t t w o Ministers i n M a g h a l a y a

S t a t e i s interesting. T h e s e t w o Ministers o f M e g h a -

l a y a h a v e b e e n recently c h a r g e d witii b u g l i n g o f
"52
R s , 3 crore i n medical s u p p l i e s . ^

• PERCENTAGE O F L I T E R A C Y A N D E C O N O M I C
BACKWARDNESS(NORTH EASTERN REGION OF INDIA

STATES LITERACY ECONOMIC

BACKV/ARI»JESS

ASSAM 28.7 77.4

ARUNACHAL PRADESH 20.09 100.0
NAGALAND 42.0(1) 100,0
MANIPUR 42.2 100.0
MIZORAM 59.50 100.0
TRIPURA 41.6 100.0
MEGHALAYA 33.2 100.0

SOURCE t Census of India 1981.

The money for the developmental programmes in

these area have not been utilized properly and has

 146

ultimately hampered the developmental works and

created chaos and distrust among the population
against the government. .' /
%
The level of literacy in the seven states of the
North-Eastem India is comparatively high, and on the
other hand, level of economic landerdevelopment is
(in percentage) is 100 percent backward except for
Assam ^ich Is 77.4 percent (Chart as per 1981 census
is given in the next page). In the absence of any
major industrial unit in the area, the employment
prospect is dim, and there is a limitation of employ-
ment options. Against the background of such a picture,
the problem of insurgency in the North-iSastem region
should not be taken as a surprising phenomenon.

•
4. Foreign Hand:
Foreign hand ccMnes when there i s vulnerability
inside the country. The undesirable situation in the
North-Eastem India and i t s strategic location naturally
implies the probability of getting advantage by the
interested foreign p a r t i e s . International p o l i t i c s i s
 147

full of such games. Concepts and ideas enshrined in

International Organizations such as the United Nations,
often became meaningless in the arena of international
politics, ^w ,

The principle of international law about non-

interference in the internal affairs of states has been
given the following interpretation and a more accurate
definition in the declaration on principles of Inter-
national law conceming Friendly Relations Among States
in accrodance with Charter of tiie United Nation (Reso-
lution 2625 ^ XXV of October Zk, 1970, subsequently called
in short the "Declaration of Principles") %riiich was
unanimously adopted at the 25th session of the General
Assembly. This Interpretation of the UN Charter is
binding on all nuclear states. The Declaration on
principles says. That "No State shall organize, assist,
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terro-
rist or armed activities directed towards the violent
overthrow of the regime of another state or interfare
in civil strife in another state..,'^•^ However, all the
 148

words of the UN do not have a legal binding for

the States and the UN cannot force it legally or any
state to follow. Therefore, the initiative of the state
Itself is the most reliable option for safe guarding
their owi national security. As far as the problem of
foreign hand in the sensitive North-Eastern part of
India is concerned, it is quite an obvious reality^

New Delhi has often accused missionaries and some

British administrators of implanting the idea of inde-
pendence among the Nagas, It should be noted that in
1955 the last Baptist missionaries were made to leave
the area.

Zt is an open sfcret that China and Pakistan

^well before the creation of Bangladesh) had been pro-
viding material and other help to the various insur-
gent groups operating in the North-Eastem India, iJtlll,
Chinese attitude towardsv this issue is unpredictable.
The Indian weekly Blitz reported on March 19, 1978, that
Peking, far from scaling down (qualitatively and quanti-
tatively) its arms aid to the hostile Nagas and Mizo
 149

tribes, has actually begun providing ever larger aid

for subversive operations in Nortti-Eastem India,^^ It
is essential to note that

"Given tliis grim scenerio, China*s incursion into

Arunachal Pradesh causes serious alarm, particularly
in the hight of the recent report that it may resume
assisting the insurgents \idiich had stopped doing in
1930. The case for co-ordinated anti-insurgency
measures remains even one discounts this report
as well as the other one in September about 200
NSCN and ULFA insurgents were sighted moving into
"56
China through Kachin area of Burma."
In reference to general anraesty to the Mizo
rebel to be included as a part of the Mizo Accord
(while negotiations of the Accord was going on). Mr.
Laldenga openly said that;
"Mizoram situation is basically different. Hera
we have armed ourselves openly, with foreign
links and we have been like this for 20 years''."^'

The Americans also, on the otherhand, are not

keeping silent, A news item in a soviet magazine named
as "Izvestia" on June 16, 1984 reported thats
 150

"Lasting American plans for the Bailfeani sation

of India, the paper says that v^ile the
Brahmaputra plan invisions the establishment
of a buffer state in India's north-east,
Khali Stan, centred in Pun;3ab, is planned to
be set up in the north-west. According to
the plan, the "South India will become part of
38
the independent, Dravidistan", the paper says"."^
Most of the insurgents in Nagaland and Manipur
in particular started indulging in violent activities
because of poverty, helplessness, lack of employment
opportunities, indoctrination, frustration about
corruption and problem of adjustment to the national
mainstream,instigation from foreign countries etc.
All these elements more or less combined together and
projected itself in the form of separatist movement
with an idea of achieving ethnic nationalism. The
following lines will illustrate the picture more
clearly.

Narrating his hard childhood days after he has

lost his father one former leader of the insurgent
39
group, P.L.A, says that:
 "Being not able to persue further studies after
his Pre-University o^amination in 1968 he used
to stay on petty earning for livelyhood till 1967.
In the early part of 1967» he had gone to Solan
(Haryana) to undergqT training for making thermo-
meter. After completing the training, he came
hack to Manipur but 1 could not get a job despite
his trained hand. Then in the last pat-t of 1968
he Joined the U . N . L J F . After the emergence of
faction in the organisation he along with some
others make a group iand we^t to Bangladesh (then
6ast Pakistan) in 196)9, ai*id came back after 10
days to prepare to se*id a batch ')f AO to 50
youths. After accpmpAishing the taf X he was
arrested by Manipur PoXicfr along vdixi^ some other
youths and released uncner General Amqiesty scheme
in 1972." ^V,^^ ''^'

He attempted :itor getting a Job t® sV^tle down

to normal life. He even approached the Chie^Winister
of the State but nothing materialised. He then went
to Moreh (Manipur boarder) to take up small business
(rice import) to enable him to start a normal peaceful
life with ' his family. He could save around R3.5OO/-
to get himself treated as he was a T.B. Patient in
Pi
Dribugarh Medical College Hos^al in 1975. However,
 152

he was arrested in Drlbugarh by Assam police and

released from ;3ail in early 1976. In July 1976 he
along with 16 of his new group left for China. He
along with his group stayed at Lhasha for 7 to 8 months.
They underwent political indoctrination lectures on
communism.

In the latter part of 1977 the group, (except

for two including himself) went back to Manipur. He
had lea'^mt Chinese language to enable him to understand
the attitude of the Chinese. In the month of August
1978, he came back to Imphal and started his activities
and named the organisation as P.L.A. (Peoples Liberation
Army), The activities of the organisation intensified
from early 1979. The organisation started maintaining
contact with other anti Burmese Government groups and
resorted to many violent activities. However, he was
arrested on 6 July, 1981 after a brief encounter with
security forces at Teckcham village in Manipur. During
his interrogation this insurgent leader claims that
"It is not a fact that I did not want to come on terms
with the Government, But the Government had never
 153

taken up any action to bring solution in right path.

The only thing vAiich has brought to public openly
by extremists had been taken and considered by the
government but something deeper should have thought
about vdiat was the source of the violent activities"

Another Insurgent leader of the group PREPAK

says that :
"Having-not able to pwrsue his education prx>perly,
he helped his father in cultivating works during his
childhood days. After passing his matriculation exami-
nation (after his attempt for the third time) he did
Join to a cultural and social organisation with a hope
of a revolution in Ilanipur. He was under the feeling
that outsiders are in upper^in Manipur, In July 1975
he along with 16 of his new group left for China. He
along with his group stayed at Lhasha for 7 to 8
months. They were given political lectures on coramxinism.

He thought that even in the state of Manipur

itself Manipuris are at the mercy of the outsiders.
Blaming the Central Government, he wanted to make
 154

soffle plans so ihat the local people could govern

themselves as a sovereign state. Thus he along with
other youths decided to form an underground orga-
nisation. The next step -was collection of funds.
The organisation bought an old model sten gun for
that purpose and collected, around Rs.500,600,

In the later part of the year 1976, he carae in

contact Vidth R.K. Tullachandra Singh (who Ss now Killed
in the encounter with -the security forces )^and had
talks about i-laoist Co-raiunist and started to come down
to Maoist ideology. ¥ith this idea in mind they
wanted to start a revolution \vith Maoist ideology, 'i-lie
party has been named as PRiiPAK (People Revolutionary
Party of Kangleipak), In the middle of 1979 he along
with R.K. Tullachandra and some other youths of the
organisation went to Tibet via Kathtnandu for Chinese
help. He came back from Tibet to i4anipur in the middle
of 1979 leaving the other youths at Tibet. In the
early part of the follovdLng year he \^s arrested by
Manipur Police.

While talking about his tough time during his

 156

Forces while trying to organise the youths at Sekta

village.

Saying that he had an idea to reform the society

through the path of armed revolution, another insurgent
who belongs to an organisation called U.N.L.F. (United
National Libaration Front) says that :

i
' In the early period of his life, he had no such
idea for armed revolution. His aim in his early life
was to Join the Indian Army through NDA examination.
But due to a oronic problem in his left leg, he was
disappointed. It was in the early part of 1971, when
he was a student of Pre-University in D.M. College,
Imphal that he was indoctrinated to the ideas of
revivalism and Pan-Mongolism. In the year 1975, he
passed both B.A. and B.Sc. final examination from two
different colleges getting distinction in B.A.

He voluntarily Joined the UNLF as a member since

April, 1976, In December 1976, he along with another
person along with a group of about 47 to 48 volunteers
of the iMSCN crossed over to Burma and met the NSCN leader
 157

Mr, Isak Swu. In the last part of May 1977, he came

back to Manipur •with some Naga Insurgents and Joined
the Students Movement of Foreigner's issue from (1977-
80). Then he had contact with some youths from Assam
when the Assam agitation was in full swing. He was
arrestedv by the Security Forces on 23.5.1981, on *«-
way to Burma to contact Mr. T.Muivah of NSCN.'

Similarly narrating the poor economic background

of his family, one of the insurgents of the NSCN (vdio
is now arrested), himself, son of a paster says
that^^
ft ' - • • • > •

Naga nationalism and their dream for a seperate

Naga-country is more valuable and Important than any
other thing. Many Naga youths were recruited to the
NSCN by means of indoctrination. The N.S.C.N, has many
civilian agencies even in the government establishment.
According to this particular insurgent, he and many
others were given lectures about the cause of the
NSCN and its goal for a Naga-country by a Head Master
(who is now expired) of a school.
 158

A new dimension has been added by the growing

cooperation between the various insurgent groups active
in the region. For quite some time men of the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur has been trained in
guerilla warfare by the NSCN at its headquarters at
Challam, beyond the sorarat tract, in North Bunna. The
ULFA, (United Liberation Front of Assam) which was set
up in 1981 by hardcore elements of the Assam movement
acting under the NSCN*s advice, has now about 80 of
its men at Challam, According to a report a couple
of months back, the ULFA and the NSCN had prepared a
Joint operational bank plan to overcome financial diffi-
culties. Besides, the NSCN and the PLA have established

links with the TNV vKhich has its headquarters at Singlum

in the Chittagong hills tract district of Bangladesh.44

The feelings of fraternity have always been a

strong unifying force in the North-^st India. The^--
mdtgenous ethnic stocks of the region were the guiding
force of this conciousness. This factor thwarted the
designs of the -early invaders in the iiorth-East sentiment
of India. In the middle of the first millennium A.D. the
 159

attanpts of Yasovarman of ilalvra (6th century, A.i^.),

I4ahasengupta a successor of the a Great Guptas (6tli
centairy A.D.) the Yasovara^ of KanauJ (8th century,
A.D.) to sub;}ugatQ "tiEie land and its people miserably
failed before the strong determinati<Mi of the people
of Assaa* The Ahoas were also vety ccaiscious of this
bond of fraternity amongst the peoples of both hills
and plains of Assam. Multitudes of warriors from the
neighbouring hills and plains of Assam ^Joined the
histoiilc battle of Saraighat against the Muhaamedons
imder the illustrious Ahom generals. This ideology of
solidality and unity had inspired the Ahoa king Rudra
Singha to visualise a federation of the constituent
IcingdoBtts of the regi<m. At times suspicious and doubts
embittered the traditional ties of relationship but
such designs had failed to produce hanaful effects upon
age old attachments vfeich still survive in spite of
numerous obstacles. Thus in the recant years Assam
>fitn'3ssed within her territocial ^Jurisdictions creation
of a number of states; I^agland in 1^3» Arunachal and
 160

Meghalaya in 1972 and Mlzoram in 1973 (Union Territory)

Besides these there are also some neiglibouring politi-
cal units encircling Assam viz., Tripura, Manipur,
Bhutan, Sikkim and Cooch Behar (Now a district of
West Bengal), But for geographical historical, political
I and Ekjonomic reasons the entire North-JiJast of India
developed a keen desire to assimilate and combine its
diverse elements into a single organic conception.45
Such a background could be utilised by the insurgents,
in the North-Eastem India, on their ovm level. Fortu-
nately, any combined action (by the insurgents in
North-ii)astem India), has not been seen clearly in practice
so far. It can be however said that they are trying
for mutual co-operation among themselves.

It is not surprising that the Union Home Ministry

has paid serious attention to a note by the Director-
General of Police, Assam, apprehending a major offensive
early next year by the insurgent groups active in North-
Eastem India. Co-Operation between the National Socia-
list Council of Nagaland (NSCN), the Tribal National
Volunteers (TNV) of Tripura and people's Liberation
 161

Array of Manipur began at the end of 1984 when a

rautiial assistance agreement was drawn up among them.
It was reinforced when a four-member tactical advisory
committee was set up following a secret meeting among
their leaders in November last year.46

On reports that United Liberation Front of Assam

(ULFA) activists were linking up with NSCN and moving
across into Burma for training, Lt, Gen, Purl said
the link-up could be a way to obtain arms to create
insurgency in Assam. But he maintained, do not see any
united action. Each groups is so diversed. The NSCN,
being the largest could be acting as Big-Brother, but
I don't think there is any threat of this becoming
a large issue.47 But it is convinced that moves are
going on for unified action by the insurgents in the
North-iiastem India.
 162

CHAPTER IV
FOOT NOT^iS

1. R.C. Ma^umdar, H.C. Raychaudhuri, and Kalikinkar

Datta, "An Advanced History of India" (Macmillan
India, Ltd., New Delhi, 1982), p. 990.
2. V.Venkata Rao, "rJorth-Sast India i Problems and
Prospects" in Journal of Abstracts and Review J
Political Science (Vol. III. No. 12, ICSSR,
New Delhi, 1972), p. 306.

3. S.K. Ghosh, "The Gen£sis of Naga Insurgency" Vol.

VII. No.1, Sept.-Oct., ICSSR. op.cit., p. 45.
4. S.K. Chaube, "The Sixth Lok Sabha Election in the
Hill States of North-£ast India" Vol. III. Ko.l.
Jan.-Jime, 1980, ICSSR, op.cit. p. 42.
5. "Indian jiXpress," Bombay, January 9» 1987.
6. Nadeem Haiisnam "Tribal India Today",
(Harman Publications, New Delhi, 1983) p. 127.
7. H.Horam, "Naga Polity" (B.R. Publishing Corporation),
Delhi, 1975, p. 17.
8. Nirmal Nibedan, "Nagaland : The Night of the
Guerrillas" (Lancer Publications, New Delhi,
1983), p. 30.
 163

9. Ibid., p. 31.
10. Ibid., p. 32
11. Luingam Luithui and Nandita Haksar, op.cit., p.9
12. M.Aram, "Peace in Nagaland" (A.H. Publications,
New Delhi, 1974) p. 112.
13. Ma;3or K. Ki^ar, "Nagaland and India's Northern
Security" in Eklavlya : Research Journal. Vol. II.
(University of Grorakpur, 1984). p.2.
14. Ibid., p. 2.
15. "Resistance" Vol. VIII, No.12 (Pan Manipuri
Youth League, Imphal, 1984), p.1.
16. R.P. Singh, "QeoRraphy of Manipur" (National Book
Trust, New Delhi, 1982), pp. 127-28.
17. N. Khelchandra Singh, "Manipuri Language : Status
and Importance" (N.Tombi Raj Singh, Imphal, 1975),
p. 10.
18. Personal Interview with Com/rade Michael (former
insurgent) and confirmed from his personal Dairy.
19. "Administrative Officer's Conference on Law and
Order" (Government of Manipur, Imphal, May 27,
1983), 9*2,
 164

20. Ibid., p. 7.
21. David L. Sills EA. "International Encyclopedia of
Social Sciences Vol. 13, (Macmillan Company and
• Free Press, U.S.A. 1968), p. 528.
22. Ibid., p. 533.
23« S.M. Dube, "Internation of North i:;ast India"
Vol. IV, No. 1-2 I.C.3.S.R. op.cit. New Delhi,
Jan-Dec, 1966, p. 13.

24. L.L. Synder, "The New Nationalism" (Cornell University

Press, New York, 1968), p. 153.
25. L.Randeep Singh, "Insurgency and India's National
Security: North-Eastern India" in Gautam Sen Ed.,
India's Security Considerations in Nuclear Age,
(Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi,
1986), p. 115.
26. Harry M. Johnson, "Sociology ; A Systematic Intro-
duction, (Allied Publishers Private Lted., New
Delhi, 1979), p. 315.
27. Peter Taylor, "Political Geography : World Economy,
Nation-State, and Locality" (Longman, New York,
1985), p. 125.
 165

28. Michael Haralamboa and Robin Harald, "Sociology ;

Themes and Perspectives'* (Oxford University Press,
New Delhi, 1981), p. 154.
29. V.K. Sarin, '^India's North-'ijast in Flames"
(Vikas, New Delhi, 1980), pp. 8-9.
30. Dr. M. Malavya, "Corruption in India" (Affiliated
East-Weat Press, Private Ltd., Mauras, 1985), p. 37.

31. "Gentleman" (Sterling News Papers Private Ltd.,

Bombay, November, 1986), p. 40,
32. "Indian Jaixpress" Bombay, 18 December, 1986,
33. Gennady Alov and Vassily Viktrov, "Aggressive
Broadcasting ; Psychological Warfare" (Novosty
Press Agency, Publishing House, Moscow, 1985), p.143.
34. Zalmay Khalilzad, "Security in Asia : The Security of
Southwest Asia (Gower Publishing Company Limited,
Hants, 1984), p. 88.
35. I.Alexandrov, "Peking's Policy; A threat to Peace"
(Novosty Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow,
1987), pp. 7-8.
36. "Indian Express", Bombay, 9 January, 1987.
 166

37. "India Today" Vol.X.No.19, (Living Media India

Limited, New Delhi, October, 1-15, 1985), p.63.
38. "I.B.S.A. - News Review" Vol. 15. No.6. (I.D.S.A.,
New Delhi, July, 1984), p. 335.
39. Personal Interview with a former leader of
the Insurgent group, P.L.A.
40. Personal Interview with a former leader of the
Insurgent group, PREPAK.
41. Personal Interview with a former leader of the
Insurgent group, K.C.P.;
42. Personal Interview with a fonner active member
of the Insurgent group, U.N.L.F.,.
43. Personal Interview with a former active member of
the Insurgent group, N.S.C.N.
44. "Indian iilxpress" Bombay, 9.1.1987.
45.-Dr. N.N. Acharya, "Historical Documents of Assam
and Neighbouring States: Qrisinal Recorus in
English" (Osmons Publishers, New Delhi, 1983),
pp. XVI-XVII.
46, "Indian ii^ress" Bombay, 25 March 1987.
47. "Indian iibcpress" Bombay, 17 December, 1986.