Great and Small Poleis in Sicily: Syracuse and Leontinoi

Author(s): Shlomo Berger

Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte , 1991, Bd. 40, H. 2 (1991), pp. 129-142
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4436186

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Franz Steiner Verlag is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 GREAT AND SMALL POLEIS IN SICILY: SYRACUSE AND
LEONTINOI

Greek historians have long been interested in the relations between great
and small poleis. Such relations are studied in conjunction with Athenian
imperialism or Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnese. M. Amit' evaluated
patterns of interstate relations by examining three pairs: Athens and Aegina,
Thebes and Orchomenus, Sparta and Mantinea, all in the "center" of the
Greek world. In the following pages I would like to present a fourth case, from
the periphery of the Greek world: Syracuse and Leontinoi in Sicily. Four
issues will guide our investigation. First, since the two cities are close to each
other, whether their respective position in the region, the way each functioned
and the manner in which each conducted its affairs differ as a result of their
different size and strength. Second, whether the smaller city aware of the
difference and in a constant effort to demonstrate its own independence and
autonomy strove to distinguish and separate itself from the larger. Third, how
and when friction appears, and whether it stems from the cties' different
sizes; which city initiates conflict and its connection to external and internal
problems. Fourth and last, what the shortcomings of a small city are, the
devices by which it defends itself against the power of a great city and the
extent to which the great city can manipulate its smaller neighbour.
The nature of the Greek presence in Sicily explains certain special, local
features absent from interstate relations in mainland Greece. As comparative-
ly new foundations, the Sicilian poleis generally lacked long traditions and a
sense of rootedness in the island. Their political institutions were effected by
unstable social structure and it manifested itself also in the polis' external
politics. We must also bear in mind the ethnic background of the settlers, the
importance of which has been underestimated by some modern scholars ;3 for
in moments of crisis, questions of origin undoubtedly surfaced and they
played a role, if only a tactical one. Finally, we must consider the importance

I M. Amit, Great and Small Poleis, Bruxelles, 1977.

20n the colonization of Sicily see T. J. Dunbabin, The Western Greeks, Oxford, 1948;
J. Berard, La colonisation grecque de l'Italie meridionale et de la Sicile dans l'antiquite, Paris,
19572; A. J. Graham, CAH III2,3.
3 E. Will, Doniens et Ioniens, Strasbourg, 1957; J. H. M. Alty, "Dorians and Ionians", JHS 102
(1982), pp. 1-14.

Historia, Band XL/2 (1991) ? Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
130 SHLOMO BERGER

of tyranny in the Sicilan polis.4 Lo

Their method of governing was ex
institutional practices employed in
ly and unconventionally influenced
I will deal with these issues, as I d
relations chronologically, from the
will be shown that the relations pa
affected also by general developments in Sicily.
First, however, a word about the geographical and physical condition of the
two cities.5 Syracuse is located on the coast, some 35 km. southeast of Leonti-
noi as the crow flies. The roads connecting the cities must have followed the
coast, since from Syracuse it would have had to bypass the hills northwest of
the city (the Epipolai) and than turn westard to Leontinoi. Syracuse lies at
sea-level, Leontinoi some 100 m. higher and the Epipolai rise 500 m. above
sea-level. The coastal road must have passed near the colony of Megara
Hyblaea (destroyed in 483).6 One could also sail to Leontinoi, since from the
sea the city could be reached by a river (Leontinoi?) which was navigable well
into the middle-ages.7 It is to be noted, however, that topography does not
prevent a direct approach from one city to the other. Military forces could
choose almost any route. Hence, one should distinguish military movements
from civic-commercial and otherwise. The proximity and favourable topogra-
phy should have been of prime importance in the cities' relations.

II

There is no indication that Syracuse and Leontinoi had any special relations
or contacts of any sort in the Archaic period, the age of colonization. Besides
the fact that our sources are meagre, another explanation may be found in
their different foundation histories.8 Leontinoi, along with Catane, was foun-
ded by Naxos, itself a newly founded colony, the first in Sicily. Naxos did not
call for help from her mother city but sent her own oecist to found Leontinoi,
and Naxians became the nucleus of the new city. All three cities formed a
triangle of Chalcidians in Sicily, managing to conquer and occupy the most
fertile land in Sicily, the valley of the Symaethus river. They were further

4 On the local tyranny, A. Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants, London, 1956, pp. 128-142; H. Ber-
ve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen, Munchen, 1967, pp. 128-163, 221-282.
5 See Prnceton Encyclopedia of Ancient Sites, s.v. "Leontinoi", "Syracus"; H. Drogemuiller,
Syrakus: Zur Topographie und Geschichte einergriechischen Stadt, Heidelberg, 1969.
6See below.
7 Ps. Skylax 13; Dunbabin, p. 197.
8 One cannot overlook the fact that our sources are extremely fragmentary. Nevertheless, the
pattern described is fairly established. The basic source is Thuc. VI 1-5. For modern accounts see
for instance, M. 1. Finley, Ancient Sicily, London, 19792, pp. 15-25; C. Mosse, La colonisation
dans l'antiquite, Paris, 1970, pp. 27-50.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Great and Small Poleis in Sicily 131

reinforced by the two Chalcidian cities on the straits of Messana, Zancle and
Rhegion.9 Thus, as an ethnic group, the Chalcidians controlled the fertile
northeastern corner of Sicily. This may explain also their early prosperity.
Syracuse was founded a shortwhile after Naxos.'" The new colony was plan-
ted by Corinthians (Dorians) on the island Ortygia and the mainland opposi-
te. In contrast to the Chalcidians, the Corinthians happened to choose for
Syracuse the best site for a harbour in the island."
It is clear then, that Syracuse and Leontinoi, although neighbours, avoided
conflict in the earliest stages because of their different path of development.
They avoided clashing as they grew, for their chorai were located in different
directions: Leontinoi's to the west of the city, Syracuse's to the south and
southwest in the fertile basin of the Anapus and Heloros rivers.'2 The Syracu-
sans were busy consolidating their power in the southeastern corner of the
island at least until 598, when they stopped with the foundation of Camanna.
Her other famous colonies, Acrae and Casmenae, were located in this district
as well. These foundations can be seen as Syracuse's conquest of its 'natural'
hinterland or the establishment of its "sphere of influence".13 At the beginning,
territorial conflicts could be easily avoided since there was still enough land
for everybody.
Sphere of influence involved more than territory. Archaeological findings
suggest that Syracuse (and indirectly Corinth) served the local Greek markets
with their pottery.'4 Thus, Leontinoi as well as other Greek cities, could
acknowledge without alarm and apprehension the fact of Syracusan growing
predominance in this market, for the cities had chosen to follow different

9See for instance, Diod. V 2,4; on Chalcidian colonization, G. Vallet, "La colonisation
chalcidienne et l'hellenisation de la Sicile orientale", Kokalos 8 (1962), pp. 30-51; id. Rhegion et
Zancle, Paris, 1958.
10 The foundation dates are debatable. On the one hand, we have the Thucydidean chronolo-
gy, on the other, the chronology suggested by the archaeological findings. The Thucydidean one
remains, however, the basic. See K. J. Dover, An historical Commentary for Thucydides, Oxford,
1970, vol. IV, pp. 198-210.
11 I accept the assertion that a deliberate commercial policy in choosing the site of the new
colony of Syracuse cannot be determined: A. J. Graham, Colony and Mother-City in Ancient
Greece, Manchester, 1964, pp. 218-23. Land was indeed equally important as Finley, p. 17,
asserts. The subsequent development may suggest, however, such a division from an early stage
in the local history, or at least the growing domination of Syracuse of the local markets, through
which Corinth gained indirectly as well. See also below.
12 On the chora of both cities: Dunbabin, pp. 48-64, 121-29; A. di Vita, "La penetrazione
siracusana nella Sicilia sud-orientale alla luce delle piui recenti scoperte archeologiche", Koka-
los2 (1956), pp. 177-210; D. Adamesteanu, "L'ellenizzazione della Sicilia ed il momento di
Ducezio", Kokalos 8 (1962), pp. 167-197; G. Rizza, "Leontini, scavi e ricerche degli anni
1954-55", BdA 42 (1957), pp. 63-73; id., "Siculi e Grechi sui colli di Leontini", Cronache di
archeologia e di storia dell'arte (1962), pp. 3-27.
13 Dunbabin, pp. 16-18; on the role of Acrai and Casmenai, Graham, Colony, pp. 92-93.
14 Dunbabin, op. cit.; J. B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, Oxford, 1984, pp. 140-42; E. Sjogvist,
Sicily and the Greeks, Michigan, 1964, passim.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 132 SHLOMO BERGER

economic paths. This fact permitted co-existence; Leontinoi could without

jealousy or fear recognize Syracuse's commercial 'greatness.

Another variable was present in the Archaic period: Megara Hyblaea. This
colony was situated between Leontinoi and Syracuse and could serve as a
kind of buffer-state. Thucydides places the foundation of Megara Hyblaea
after both Syracuse and Leontinoi. Whereas the development of the earlier
two cities can be described as 'natural', based on mutual 'agreement', Megara
could survive only by diverting resources from both. As long as the three cities
flourished, they could avoid overt conflict. Indeed, the findings in Megara
testify to its prosperity.'5 However, its neighbours were better situated and
better abled than Megara to expand, as was shown earlier, and Megara had to
fight for its existence. Already in 628, pressed by overpopulation, the city sent
out colonists to found Selinus ;16 the city's chora was unable to provide the
basic necessities. In 608, Megara was in war with Leontinoi, which resulted in
the expansion of Leontinoi and the rise of the island's first tyrant, Panaethi-
us."7 In 552, Megara had to support Syracuse in her struggle with Camarina.8
All this testifies to Megara's difficulty maintaining its independence and
autonomy. Finally, in 483, it was destroyed by Gelon, who by then was in
Syracuse.'9 Megara's destruction brought Leontinoi and Syracuse into direct
contact for the first time.

Although the evidence is meagre, one can trace the processes of consolida-
tion also in the cities' domestic affairs. In Syracuse, two instances of stasis are
recorded; the expulsion of the Myletidai (Thuc. 6.5.1.), who had joined the
foundation of Himera in the middle of the seventh century;20 another stasis
broke out within the ruling aristocracy and mentioned by Aristotle (Pol.
1303b20) and Plutarch (Mor. 825c).2' We may assume that both cases involved
the working out of the city's basic political and social structure.22 In Leontinoi,
the aristocracy was displaced by a tyranny for the same reasons. Panaethius'

15 G. Vallet, F. Villard & P. Auberson, Megara Hyblaea (Guide desfouilles), Rome, 1983 (esp.
chap. 3, summary of the historical and archaeological material from the city).
16 On Selinus, J. Hulot and G. Fougeres, Selinonte, Paris, 1910.
17 Polyaen. V 47; see also Arist. Pol. 1310b29, 1316a34, Eusebius, Chronic.; Rizza, op. cit.
18 FGrHist 556 F 5.
19 Hdt. VII 156.2; Thuc. VI 4; Polyaen. I 27.3; Insch. v. Olympia, no. 22: it was connected with
the events, but see the reconstruction of D. Asheri, "Rimpatrio di esuli a Selinunte", ASNP 9
(1979), pp. 479-497.
20 On the foundation of Himera, Berard, pp. 257-60.
21 The date of the stasis is unknown. Aristotle says it occurred in the "ancient times" (archaioi
chronot). It is usually assumed that it followed the banishment of the Myletidai. The only
treatment of Syracuse constitution is to be found in W. Huttl, Verfassungsgeschichte von Syra-
kus, Prague, 1929. A recent discussion is found in Roebuck, "Stasis in Sicily in the 7th Century",
Philias Charin (Studies in Honour of E. Manni), vol. VI, pp. 1921-1928.
22 Ibid.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Great and Small Poleis in Sicily 133

tyranny is a symptom of the city's expansion.23 Both cities refrained from

interferring in each other's affairs; Megara was the obvious exception.
The 'age of colonization', which lasted for more than two centuries, deter-
mined the basic pattern of relations between Syracuse and Leontinoi: the
former became the 'great' city, Leontinoi the 'small'. Dunbabin correctly
asserts that Syracuse "'was from the first a great city"..24 One must notice,
however, that until the middle of the fifth century, Syracuse did not dominate
the island politically. Syracuse's power lay in her vast chora, economic
strength and colonies, all of which contributed later to her political superiori-
ty. In the Archaic period, Syracuse did not seek to dominate Leontinoi, which
thus did not feel threatened. Their difference in size did not bring them
together or set them in conflict.
The middle of the sixth century marks a change in Sicilian history. The
colonial movement was practically over, even if new colonies were planned
and sent out. The power of the local aristocracies reached its zenith; they
dominated the cities politically and enjoyed economic prosperity as they
expanded their commercial ties with the native peoples and Greece. Tyrants
began to challenge the aristocratic regimes following the general pattern in the
Greek world. The local tyrants were aggressive and, instead of continuing the
colonizing movement, sought further expansion at the expense of Greek cities.
The first challenge came from Gela at the end of the sixth century.25 Hippocra-
tes tried to form an empire in the eastern 'Greek' region of Sicily. Later, the
Deinomenids moved to Syracuse (485), where they continued the same poli-
cy."6 At the beginning they faced rival tyrants: the Emmenids from Acragas
and the Anaxilaids in Rhegion-Messana.27 They could not, however, compete
with the Syracusan dynasty.
Leontinoi lost her independence for the first time when Hippocrates con-
quered the city in the first decade of the fifth century.28 The tyranny, however,
was short-lived. Hippocrates' death and the succession struggle in Gela saved
the city.29 When Gelon moved to Syracuse in 485, Leontinoi was independent.
But Gelon's first acts as tyrant harmed the Leontines severely, even if indirect-
ly. First, he destroyed Leontinoi's colony Euboia, turning it into a Syracusan
gamson post; then, he removed Megara Hyblaea, the buffer-state.30 Gelon's

23 See note 17.

24 Dunbabin, p. 17.
25 Ibid. pp. 376ff.; Finley, pp. 45-57.
26 Berve, Tyrannis, pp. 142-52.
27 Ibid. pp. 129-36, 155-58; on the Emmenidai see also A. J. De Waele, Acragas Graece, The
Hague, 1971, pp. 109-15.
28 Hdt. VII 154.
29 Diod. X 28; Hdt. Vii 155; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. Vii 15; Plut. Mor. 551f.
30 Hdt. Vii 156; on Sicilian Euboia, Strabo Vi 2.6, X 1.15; E. Manni, Geografiafisica epolitica
della Sicilia antica, Rome, 1981, p. 174.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 134 SHLOMO BERGER

successor, Hieron, extended the conquests, marching north and capturing

Naxos and Catane, the inhabitants of which were transferred to Leontinoi.3'

Syracuse apparently controlled Leontinoi but did not deprive the city of its
independent status, much less destroy it. Why? Evidently, because the city had
become the center of Chalcidians on the island; the cities of the strais were
then also controlled by the Dorian Anaxilaids.32 Leontinoi was encircled by
Dorians, who resided not only in Syracuse, but also now, in Catane to the
north. Leontinoi was totaly under Deinomenid control, but could not be
destroyed; in Syracuse itself there were already many 'new citizens' from other
destroyed cities.33 Leontinoi, then, had to serve as the center of the Chalcidians
and remain independent, even if not autonomous.

This development is also a clear sign to the ethnic division in Sicily, and its
political importance. The Deinomenids: Hippocrates in Gala, and later his
successors in Syracuse, devised their strategy with regard to the ethnic rivalry:
Hippocrates moved firstly against the Chalcidian cities of the island, and only
then marched on Syracuse (then still a rival of Gala); the Denomenids in
Syracuse planted Dorians in every city they could. It marked the sharp decline
of the Chalcidian cities of Sicily.34

The types of regimes also help illuminate the encounter between the cities.
In Leontinoi, Panaethius deposed the aristocracy in 608 and installed himself
as tyrant. Another tyrant, Ainesidamos, appears at the end of the sixth cen-
tury,35 but presumably the city was released from tyranny and fell under
Syracusan control with the accesion of the Deinomenids. The nature of the
resulting "republican" regime is entirely unknown. But such a government
was less dangerous than a tyranny to the Deinomenids. A small, "republican"
Leontinoi could enjoy independence and restricted autonomy under Syracu-
san control. This becomes clear when one compares the Deinomenid ambiva-
lent relations with the Emmenids in Acragas and the Anaxilaids in Rhegion,
who imposed a real threat to them.36
The introduction of democracy to "all the cities" in Sicily (461) caused
another turn. The regimes in both Syracuse and Leontinoi were nominally

3' Diod. XI 49.1-4.

32 Dunbabin, passim; Vallet, Rhegion, pp. 355-382.
33J. Seibert, "Bevolkerungsfluktuation in den GriechenstAdten Siziliens", Ancient Society
13/14 (1982/3), pp. 36-41.
34 Vallet, RhUgion, pp. 377-82.
35 Paus. V 22.7; Andrewes, Tyrants, p. 130.
36See Finley, p. 47, a table charting the connections between the Deinomenids and the
Emmenids. Further connections can be added: Anaxilas from Rhegion was married with the
daughter of the Himeran tyrant Terillus, who was toppled by Theron the Emmenid; Anaxilas'
daughter was Hieron's second wife. On the relations between Hieron and Theron see Diod. XI
48 4-5. The war between the two tyrants brought the fall of Theron in 472: Diod. XI 53.1-2.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Great and Small Poleis in Sicily 135

democratic, and even if not on the Athenian model, they were both civic, i.e.,
anti-tyrannical.

The removal of tyrannies, and especially the disintegration of the Deinome-

nid "empire" combined with the "General Settlement", brought a change in
Syracusan-Leontine relations.37 First, the demand made in the settlement that
all cities be autonomous could be met only by Syracuse's withdrawal inside
her old borders. This was achieved easily since the new democracy in the city
did not want to bother with an empire. They were afraid of Deinomenid
sympathies, as did indeed surface in Catane; they decided to cooperate with
the Sicel leader, Ducetius, in order to get rid of Hieron's mercenaries.38
Leontinoi could, thus, be on better terms with the Syracusan democracy and
assert greater autonomy in deciding policy. Second, Syracuse was critically
weakened by the provision in the settlement for the banishment of mercena-
ries from all cities. Syracuse was the main victim of this provision and could
no longer, or at least for some time, exercise a strong foreign policy.39 Third,
the requirement that all cities receive back their "old citizens" must, ironically,
have hurt Leontinoi. The Catanians, for instance, returned to their native city,
which resulted in her depopulation. It may be assumed that a new social
structure came into being; a new aristocracy was formed. But the regime was
formally democratic.

Syracuse, nevertheless, remained a big threat to democratic and autono-

mous Leontinoi. The subsequent activities of democratic Syracuse did nothing
to reassure Leontinoi. By the end of the fifthies, as the city settled her domestic
problems,' Syracuse renewed its quest for leadership on the island.41 Leonti-
noi was forced to look for a strong and reliable ally, who could meet the
Syracusan challenge. There was no such city in Sicily; by the end of the
fourties, Acragas had given in." Thus, Leontinoi was forced to look outside
Sicily; Athens was the almost inevitable choice, since it was democratic and
Ionian and above all a growing superpower looking for opportunities to cast
its net of influence even further in the Greek world. The date of the Athenian-
Leontine treaty has been debated at length. The existing document, probably a

37 Diod. XI 76.4-6; D. Asheri, "Rimpatrio di esuli e ridistribuzione di terre nelle citta siciliote
ca. 466-61 a.C.", Philias Charn (Studies in Honour of E. Manni), vol. I, pp. 143-52.
38 Diod. XI 76.3; Strabo Vi 2.3; on Ducetius, J. H. Croon, "Ducetius Dux Siculorum", Tijd-
schrift voor Geschiedenis 65 (1952), pp. 301-17.
39 In fact it caused a stasis in the city. The mercenaries did not want to leave, but in the end
were forced to. See Arist. Pol. 1303a-b2; Diod. XI 72.2-73, 76.1-2.
40 Diod. XI 86.4-6.
41 Syracuse took advantage of the "Ducetius affairs" (above note 38) to extend her control over
large Sicels towns in Sicily, Diod. XII 29. Acragas, which joined the battle-field against Ducetius,
did not approve of Syracusan policies towards him, waged a war on Syracuse and was defeated;
Syracuse's last contender for supramecy was removed (Diod. XII 8).
42 De Waele, pp. 116-31.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
136 SHLOMO BERGER

renewal of the treaty, dates from 4

concerning a treaty between Athen
is also a renewal of an existing trea
Sparta seemed imminent." Athen
looked for possible support from th
back to the fourties or even to th
signed also a treaty with Segesta
clearly Leontinoi did not trust th
formation. Moreover, it did not vie
direct and more oppressive contr
the situation was now more fluid and unpredictable. Leontinoi was now
directly responsible for matters that required little of its energy under the
tyrants, such as foreign policy. Thus, the city became acutely aware of its
smaller size and limitations. Its independence was now more fragile than
under the Deinomenids.
Tthe next confrontation between the two cities occurred after the outbreak
of the Peloponnesian war."6 Syracuse attacked Leontinoi at the end of the
summer of 427. Leontinoi seemed to have been an easy target; the immediate
reasons for the attack are not known. Yet, the clash grew quickly from a
bilateral conflict into a full-scale war involving all of Sicily. Thucydides names
the supporters on each side: the Dorians (excluding Camarina) supported
Syracuse, the lonians sided with Leontinoi. They, on the basis of the treaty,
appealed to Athens for help. Gorgias, speaking for the Sicilians, won over the
heart of the Athenian demos with his masterful rhetoric. The Athenians sent a
force to Sicily, but their intentions far exceeded mere support for their ally.
Instead they tried to find ways to exploit the island's wealth for their own
ends. Thus, rather than fighting with Syracuse, they raided the Liparian
islands, interferred in the affairs of Italian Locri and tried to get control over
the straits of Messana. Leontinoi lost its primary importance in the Athenian
mission and is mentioned only by passing. The Athenians regarded it as an
unimportant and "small" city. When, in a moment of crisis, Leontinoi invited
in her formidable ally, she gave up her aspirations and lost the power to make
independent decisions. The ally, having travelled a long distance, was not
concerned with Leontinoi's local problems. Athens' view had a wider focus
and excluded any substantial role for Leontinoi.47

43 ML, no. 64. In 427 the treaty was renewed, Thuc. VI 62.
44 ML, no. 63; on both treaties (with Rhegion and Leontinoi) see T. E. Wick, Athen's Alliances
with Rhegion and Leontinoi", Historia 25 (1976), pp. 288-304.
45 ML, no. 37; for an opposing view on the chronology, H. Mattingly, Chiron 16 (1986),
pp. 167-70.
46 The events, sometimes contradictory, are described by Thuc. III 86; Diod. XII 53-54.
47 Athenian activity in the years 427-24: Thuc. III 88,90,99,103,IV 1,2.24-25,48.6; H. D. West-

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Great and Small Poleis in Sicily 137

The "Congress of Gela" (424) further weakened

cities voted to respect the autonomy of all cities, bu
leave the island, which meant that Leontinoi onc
now the acknowledged local super-power, alone. The increased external stress
had its effects internally. A stasis broke out in the city (somewhere between
424-422) and led to the city's destruction.49 When the Leontines enrolled new
citizens and the demos demanded a redistribution of land, the aristocracy
objected and preferred to apply to Syracuse for help. They were offered
Syracusan citizenship and moved to Syracuse. The demos was driven out of
the city's territory by the Syracusans; some went into exile in mainland
Greece, to Euboia.50 The polis Leontinoi was dismantled and the territory
became a Syracusan outpost. We must emphasize here that the Syracusan
democracy repeated the Deinomenid practice of enfranchising aristocrats and
expelling the demos. This demonstrates also Syracuse's status as a super-
power; her policies were determined by hegemonial concerns rather than
ideology. The small had to yield to the great city.
The polis Leontinoi may not have existed, but Leontines did. Some went
into exile, others, including disillusioned aristocrats in Syracuse, returned to
the ruined city to organize a war against the city's destroyers. Apparently the
Leontine former territory was neither controlled by the Syracusans nor closed
off to Leontines. In 422, they received help from the Athenian generals, who
scouted out the island again.51 Athenian propaganda, as preserved in Thucydi-
des' narrative, emphasizes Athens' obligations to help lonians and thus to
rebuild also the city of Leontinoi. It is obvious that the Athenian expedition
was instigated by Leontine exiles; according to Thucydides, the Syracusans
interpreted the events as such: Leontinoi could (and eventually did) serve as
the base for an Athenian attack on Syracuse.52 The Athenian defeat cancelled
the exiles' claims, and Leontinoi remained in ruins. The Dorians became the
prominent force in Sicily. However, the leaders were now the Syracusan
tyrants.

lake, "Athenian Aims in Sicily 427-24", Historia 9 (1960), pp. 395-402; D. Kagan, 7he Archida-
mian War, Cornell, 1974, pp. 181-9.
48 "The Congress of Gela", Thuc. IV 58-65.
49 Thuc. V 4.2; M. Dreher, "La dissoluzione della polis Leontinoi dopo la pace di Gela", ASNP
16 (1986), pp. 637-60.
50 P. R. Franke, "Leontinische Phygades in Chalkis?", Archaologischer Anzeiger 81 (1966),
pp. 395-407.
51 Thuc. V 4.1-5.
52 See for instance Hermocrates' speech, Thuc. VI 33; for Athenian propaganda supporting the
racial connections between her and Leontinoi and the fact that they come to rebuild the city,
Thuc. VI 20,46.2, 50.4, 63.3, 76.2, 77.1, 84.2; Diod. XII 53.1, 83.1.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
138 SHLOMO BERGER

The rise to power of the tyrants signals a basic change in the pattern of
relations between the cities. Leontinoi lost its independence for long periods
of time; her autonomy was generally ignored. Thus, our discussion shifts
mainly to the use which Syracuse made of Leontinoi in her domestic policy.
Moreover, the nature of the tyrannies makes it clear that private, powerfull
individuals were meddling in Leontinoi's affairs rather than Syracuse as a
polis. Ironically, it did not diminish Leontinoi's problems; Syracuse through
its tyrants became more stronger.
Syracusan history in the fourth century is marked, then, by tyrannies, and
prolonged, cyclical wars with Carthage in which neither sides could force a
decisive victory."3 In 411/10, a battle was fought in Himera. In 406, the
Carthaginians attacked again in western Sicily.54 Many Greeks there fled to
Syracuse. The city could not accomodate everybody and transferred the
refugees to Leontinoi, still a Syracusan stronghold."5 It seems that that territory
tended by Leontine fugitives, was deemed suitable for another group of
Greeks. It was by no means wasteland. Immediately afterwards, Dionysius the
Elder transferred an army into the territory, which supported his request for a
bodyguard and completed his coup d'etat. Diodorus insists that it was still a
Syracusan outpost (phrouron), but on the other hand, it was still called Leonti-
noi.56 A contradiction emerges: the city does not exist politically, but is suited
to serve as a "living quarter" under its old name. It seems that Leontinoi's
proximity to Syracuse saved it from total destruction.
The treaty between Dionysius and the Carthaginians after concluding the
war, in 404, brought a reversal in the city's condition.57 One of the treaty's
clauses stipulated recognition of all Greek cities' autonomy. Thus, Leontinoi
regained also its independence. All the refugees who had gathered in the city
before 404 Geloans and Camarinians - returned to their native cities. In
some respect this episode resembles the events of 461. But this time, it was the
last period of Leontine political independence, although it was also later to be
called Leontinoi. For in 403, Dionysius marched against the Syracusan old
rivals, the Chalcidians, i.e., Leontinoi, Naxos and Catane. His aim was to
control the route to the straits and prepare for the invasion of Italy. Leontinoi
was the first target, but the city proved a stubborn adversary. Dionysius
blockaded the city, but could not overcome the citizens' resistence. He left
then, to subdue the other cities as well as some Sicel towns before returning to
Leontinoi. The Leontines were realistic enough to know that they had little

53 On Syracuse in the fourth century, Finley, pp. 74-106.

54 Carthage in Sicily, L. M. Hans, Karthago und Sizilien, Munchen, 1983.
ss Diod. XIII 113.4.
56 On Dionysius coup, E. Frolov, "Die ersten Unternehmungen und die Machtergreifung
Dionysius des Alteren", Klio 55 (1973), pp. 87-108.
57 Diod. XIII 114.1; see also Xen. Hell. II 3.5.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Great and Small Poleis in Sicily 139

chance to resist the Syracusan tyrant. They decided, therefore, to surrender

and accept Dionysius' offer to move to Syracuse and receive Syracusan
citizenship.58 Again, the events of 422 were repeated, even if not identically.
Apparently, the bad memories from this episode were forgotten, although one
must not forget that the Leontines acted under severe pressure.
Dionysius, however, did not intend to leave the city uninhabited. From
Diodorus we may learn that in 396, the Syracusan tyrant took the initiative to
resettle the city.59 He needed the wheat from the city's fertile chora, from
which we can deduce that the area was populated. Moreover, in the same
year, Dionysius offered the city to rebellious Greek mercenaries as a substitute
for their suspended salaries. The mercenaries accepted the offer because the
land was fertile and promised rich returns. They moved into the territory and
divided the land among themselves. Thus, in 396, a new Leontinoi was
founded. But we must note that it was no longer Chalcidian. Rather, it was
composed of a mixed population dependent on Syracuse and loyal to Diony-
sius the Elder. The decline of Chalcidian elements can be discerned also in
cities like Messana, where Doric and other groups were introduced by the
Syracusan tyrant.' Thus, the ethnic factor was removed from relations be-
tween Syracuse and Leontinoi.
The transformation of Leontinoi is connected also to a larger development
in the west, namely the hegemonial power of Dionysius the Elder in Sicily and
Southern Italy. His influence extended to territories outside Syracuse, which
were directly under his control, and beyond. Within his "empire", the status of
the cities varied; the closer the city was situated to the center (Syracuse), the
more important it became. So with Leontinoi: it had all the features of a Greek
polis, as Polybius could assert two hundred years later,6' but politically it
enjoyed a different status. The city's aim was to be as free as possible from the
center in its domestic affairs, while relinquishing almost any claim to indepen-
dent foreign policy. From the Syracusan point of view, Leontinoi geographi-
cal vicinity had also a domestic importance; Leontinoi was practically incor-
porated into Syracusan affairs.
As for the rest of Dionysius' reign (396-367) and that of his son, Dionysius
the Younger (367-357), Leontinoi disappears from Diodorus' and others'
narratives. The fall of the dynasty in 357, opens a new epoch of unrest, and
Leontinoi's return into the pages of history; it is evermore dependent on the
great city and the occurrences which take place there. The city's population
derived from Syracuse's reshuffling of its civic-body. As in the past, Leontinoi
also provided Syracusan exiles a place of refuge as well as a basis for activity

s8 Diod. XIV 14-15; Ziegler, "Leontinoi", RE., col. 2045.

59 Diod. XIV 58.1, 78.1-3.
60 Diod. XIV 78.5.
61 Polyb. Vii 6.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
140 SHLOMO BERGER

against the then present rulers of their cit

tyranny, scared away by Dion's march on the city, escaped to Leontinoi; in
fact many of them had already property there. They preferred to save their
fortunes rather than the troubled tyrant. Indeed, as Dion proceeded to occupy
Syracuse, the refugees became even more alienated from Dionysius the Youn-
ger and announced Leontinoi's abandonment of him. This was a severe blow
to the tyrant, besieged in Ortygia. Dionysius, with his stout supporter Philistus,
tried to recover Leontinoi but failed. The Leontines, assisted by Syracusans
drove them away. Soon thereafter, in 355/4, the city received the fleeing Dion
and his mercenaries, who had lost their popularity in Syracuse to Heracleides.
It would be interesting to know who the leaders of Leontinoi were and how
the city was ruled, but no facts are available.62 The sources make clear,
however, that Leontinoi was closely involved in Syracuse's problems. The year
after Dion's assassination, in 353, a group called "The Friends of Dion" tried
to topple Dion's murderer and the new tyrant of Syracuse, Callippus. When
they failed, they fled to Leontinoi.63 Several months later, another contender to
the throne found greater success. Hipparinus left his lodging in Leontinoi,
conquered Syracuse and became its new tyrant.'M Then, in 347/6, Dionysius
the Younger managed to seize power for the second time, expelling the
previous tyrant, Nissaeus, and forcing a section of the local aristocracy to
leave; the exiles found refuge in Leontinoi.65 There they met the next tyrant of
Syracuse, Hicetas, who had once been custodian of Dion's wife and sister and
moved to Leontinoi for unknown reasons. He held a high rank there; some
say he was the local tyrant.'6 Further, from Leontinoi the exiled aristocrats and
Hicetas (who later changed his mind) invited Timoleon to the rescue of
Syracuse. His last battle for Syracuse's independence was against Hicetas. The
defeated tyrant returned to Leontinoi, where he had come from in the first
place. Timoleon tried to attack him there, but failed and left. Nevertheless, as
he completed the mission to free Syracuse from its unrest, he moved to free the
other Greeks of the island from tyranny and granted them eleutheria; the
Leontine population he moved again to Syracuse. Presumably he found its
leaders and inhabitants dangerous enough to his regime, and so brought them
to where they could be closely watched.67 Leontinoi's proximity played, yet
again, a decisive role.
Leontinoi nevertheless, survived. It was one of the cities Agathocles visited

62 On Dion, Diod. XVI 9-20; Plut. Dion; H. Berve, Dion, Wiesbaden, 1956.
63 Diod. XVI 36.5; Plut. Dion 57; H. D. Westlake, "Friends and Successors of Dion", Historia
32 (1983), pp. 163-64.
64 Diod. XVI 36.5; Plut. Dion 58; Polyaen. V 4; Westlake, "Friends. . .", p. 166.
65 Strabo VI 1.8; Plut. Tim. 1.4;Justin. XXI 3.9-10; Westlake, "Friends.. ..", pp. 167-68.
66 Diod. XVI 68; Plut. Tim. 9.2; Westlake, "Friends.. .", pp. 168-70.
67 Diod. XVI 82.4,7; on Timoleon, A. J. H. Talbert, Timoleon and the Revival of Greek Sicily,
Cambridge, 1971.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Great and Small Poleis in Sicily 141

and robbed, when, in exile (ca. 320), he tried to assemble a force to install
himself as tyrant in Syracuse.68 When, in 311, Hamilcar advanced into eastern
Sicily, Leontinoi joined other cities supporting him against the Syracusan
tyrant. His failure did not mark the end of the opposition in Sicily to Agatho-
cles. In 309, while Agathocles was in Africa, Leontinoi joined another anti-
Syracusan coalition, headed by Acragas.69 For a while Leontinoi was relieved
of Syracusan raids into its territory, but the hour of success was short. When
Agathocles returned from Africa (305) and reorganized his army, he could
disperse the coalition. Defeating his most dangerous enemy, Deinocrates,70
Agathocles consolidated his rule over Sicily. It remained under Syracusan rule
until the Roman conquest. In 289, after the death of Agathocles, another
Leontine tyrant, Heracleides, is briefly mentioned; Leontinoi is also mentio-
ned with other cities as the initiators of Pyrrhus' invitation (Diod. XXII 8,5;
Plut. Pyrr. 22). But later the city was under the control of Hieron II. It is
obvious that Leontinoi lost any real capacity to maintain any form of autono-
my. It remained a Greek community, a polis; it exported Greek culture but did
not have any real political significance. Leontinoi's fate represented the
downfall of the "classical" Greek polis in the west.

IV

In conclusion, we may review several stages in the history of the relations

between Syracuse and Leontinoi. The first was amicable and characterized by
non-interference. Both cities were busy organizing their own affairs following
their foundation: determining domestic structure and consolidating their cho-
ra. This process took more than a century. In this first stage, there was no
difference between the great and the small polis, proximity created no pro-
blems, friction could be avoided and ethnic differences could be overlooked.
Yet, once the process reached completion, a new type of encounter emerged.
The Greek cities were no longer mere colonies, Greek colonies in a hostile
zone.
In the second period we may discern two components: tyranny and demo-
cracy. The forrner consists of the "old tyranny" in the late sixth and the first
half of the fifth century, and the "new tyranny", which begins in the age of
Dionysius the Elder. Squeezed between these two epochs is a democratic
"interlude".7' The tyrannies in Sicily, especially during the "new" tyranny, are

68Just. XXII 2.2.

69 See S. Berger, "P. Oxy.XXIV, 2399 and the Opposition to Agathocles" ZPE 71 (1988),
pp. 93-96.
70 On Deinocrates see also, Niese, "Deinokrates (3)", RE, col. 2391-92.
711 adapt here the appropriate title from Finley, ch. 5. I wish to thank Prof. M. Amit and Prof.
D. Mendels for reading early drafts of the article. My special thanks to Dr. J. Price, Middlebury
College, for his generous assistance with this article.

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 142 SHLOMO BERGER

characterized by their drives for conquest and expansion. This started with
Phalaris of Acragas in the middle of the sixth century and continued down to
Agathocles and Hieron the Second in Syracuse. In the process, cities became
"great" and "small". The growing intensity of inter Greek relations brought to
the surface all dormant sources of conflict: different ethnicities, economic
ambitions and varying political affinities. The tyrants provided another impe-
tus. They were mainly interested in securing their position and strengthening
their power, and were ruthless in doing so; they pressed the small cities into
their service. Thus, the small cities had limited ability to remain independent;
sometimes it was completely impossible. The case was different during the
democratic interlude. The "great" city, as a "republic", could not but consent
to civic interests and institutionalized politics. Furthermore, independence
and autonomy were considered a basic right of every Greek city. Theoretical-
ly, the small city had the same structure as the great one. But relations between
great and small cities were marked by the same problems, only the solutions
were different. Leontinoi could approach Athens and seek an agreement by
appealing to common ethnic background. This was apparently out of the
question when Leontinoi was dominated by the Syracusan tyrants. The rules
of the game were totaly different. Thus, the rise and fall of tyrants, as revealed
in the case of Syracuse, were important landmarks in the history of inter-polis
relations. As time passed by, however, the power of the small city diminished.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem/Amsterdam Shlomo Berger

This content downloaded from

82.199.213.103 on Sat, 02 Dec 2023 19:16:09 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms