On Bureaucracy, Trust, and Leadership: A Comparative Analysis Evaluating the

Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of the Philippines’ and Singapore’s

Pandemic Response

In Fulfillment of the Requirements in

QUALTYA: Qualitative Research

Submitted to:
Mr. Celito Arlegue

Submitted by:
Ang, Marriah Nikayla S.
Borromeo, Gabrielle Allende S.
Capistrano, Trixie R.
Dinglasan, Sean Christian B.
Palisoc, Leann L.

OLDI3

August 2022
 DE LA SALLE – COLLEGE OF SAINT BENILDE
College of Diplomacy and Governance
Consular and Diplomatic Affairs Program
3rd Semester, School Year 2021-2022

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Printed Name Signature

Marriah Nikayla S. Ang

Gabrielle Allende S. Borromeo

Trixie R. Capistrano

Sean Christian B. Dinglasan

Leann L. Palisoc

ABSTRACT
 The COVID-19 outbreak has wreaked immediate and severe havoc on all
countries in the world. Individuals are now more vulnerable to threats to their health
and general wellbeing. In an effort to compare the Philippines and Singapore with
regard to the relevant elements—competent bureaucracy, societal trust, and political
leadership—presented by Francis Fukuyama that affect how both governments dealt
with the crisis, this study was evaluated as a comparative case study. The analysis
allowed the researchers to draw conclusions from both situations and made it clear
how the responses of the two countries differed in light of the pertinent contextual
aspects in each country. This study determined that Singapore is much more
successful than the Philippines at combating the pandemic. Based on how Singapore
handled a global outbreak by providing and putting in place the necessary procedures,
the nation is better positioned to do what is required to stop and lessen the virus. On
the contrary, the crisis situation in the Philippines has gotten progressively worse due
to its incompetent leaders and inadequate policy solutions – resulting to a much lower
social compliance and public trust from its citizens. Therefore, this study suggests for
future researchers who want to carry out a similar study to 1) choose a particular
COVID-19 pandemic response from a specific country and evaluate it independently;
2) compare two regional organizations and assess their response to the COVID-19
pandemic (or even other previous global crises) collectively; or 3) examine how
globalization has caused increased COVID-19 transmission amongst countries to
survive the pandemic.

I. INTRODUCTION
 The COVID-19 pandemic has produced a testing ground for diverse government
frameworks in the face of a public health catastrophe, demonstrating enormous
disparities in how different countries operate. These complicated governance concerns
do not have a simple solution. So, what is the source of the variance in results?
Despite the fact that the answer is probably complicated, three important factors—state
capacity, societal trust, and political leadership—stand out from a governance
viewpoint, according to Francis Fukuyama (2021). Political leaders can take positive
action in the aforementioned three connected areas in nations that are caught in a
cycle of ineffectual governance as a result of the pandemic. The first is public policy,
which is also the most urgent, as it will become crucial for developing the kinds of
institutions required to prepare for the next epidemic. It is still possible to enhance or
broaden the strategies being used to address the pandemic's negative effects on
human health, the economy, and society.

Despite the fact that several Philippine legislators lobbied for travel restrictions,
the Philippines was unable to impose any immediate limitations on travelers going to
and from China. However, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte steadfastly continued
to permit certain incoming flights from China. Establishing a national infrastructure to
battle the increasing pandemic through proactive testing, extensive contact tracing, and
targeted quarantines of the majority of affected locations by the first three months of
the year was largely unsuccessful due to a lack of urgency. From March 15 to April 14,
the Philippine government formally proclaimed a lockdown in Metro Manila and the
surrounding areas. The initial lockdown was coined as “community quarantine”, then
later changed to “enhanced community quarantine”. Twelve million people living in
Metro Manila experienced panic buying when they learned that there would be
restrictions on entering and leaving the national capital area and that major sectors of
the country's economy, such as malls, eateries, and public parks, would be closed
under a strict social distancing regime. Due to the state's subpar public health system,
the implementation of the lockdown during the Duterte administration included curfews
and travel restrictions throughout the national capital region and beyond. As a result,
there were many contradicting comments from many authorities. There were
small-scale protests by Manila residents against Duterte's COVID-19 response,
complaints from the state's medical professionals about the lack of necessary
equipment that would protect them; middle-class Filipinos about the lack of support that
would financially help some sectors hard-hit by the lockdown; and struggles for the
underprivileged Filipinos to make ends meet.

On December 31, 2019, cases of pneumonia were discovered in Wuhan City,

Hubei, and reported to the WHO China Country Office. As a result, Singapore activated
its response strategy right away and put non-pharmaceutical measures into place. On
January 23, there was a first confirmed local case. This triggered an expansion of
border control measures to land and sea checkpoints as well as the first meeting of the
entire government reaction taskforce. In times of national need, Singapore built a
network of Public Health Preparedness Clinics (PHPCs), which served as primary
health clinics. All recent tourists from Wuhan City underwent thorough contact tracing
and quarantine. More than 80% of the populace had received all recommended
vaccinations. However, as infection rates grew, they turned into a cause of anxiety and
discord and presented policymakers with a communication challenge. Due of the
necessity to prohibit the bulk of tourists, Singapore had to enact strict quarantine rules
in order to prevent the disease from spreading. However, considering how Singapore
has one of the world's highest immunization rates, the limits on travel inside the city
were inconvenient.

As such, this study examines Singapore's and the Philippines' responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic by taking into account the efficiency of their political leaders, the
citizens' social trust, and the capability of their bureaucracy.

For this matter, the study aims to:

1. Identify the degree of competency of Singapore’s and the Philippines’
bureaucracy
2. Recognize the extent of the public trust towards the governments of Singapore
and the Philippines
 3. Determine the quality of leadership of the heads of states and heads of health
sectors of Singapore and the Philippines
4. Illustrate how competency, public trust, and leadership are related to the
pandemic response success in Singapore and the Philippines

Given that Singapore has always been a considerably more developed nation
than the Philippines before the pandemic started up until the present, the researchers
argue that Singapore is more successful than the Philippines in terms of pandemic
response. Singapore is better suited to offer what is required to contain and mitigate
the virus based on Francis Fukuyama's three considerations. On the other side, the
COVID-19 crisis's growing troubles continue to overwhelm and get out of hand for the
Philippines. The significant difference in country performance with relation to pandemic
response is eloquently shown by the crisis. This research investigates how each state's
capacity to respond to the pandemic has been impacted by its bureaucracy, social
trust, and political leadership in an effort to compare the Philippines and Singapore with
regard to the elements that determine how both governments coped with the problem.

In order to generate more effective work and eventually serve as politicians,

experts, and intermediaries in society, the students who carried out the investigation
will obtain a significant understanding of the current complexity. A person who is
acknowledged as a citizen of their own country is referred to as a Singaporean or
Filipino, for example. By providing them with a clear illustration of the influences that
this study presented, they will be able to better understand how the Philippines and
Singapore conducted actions and initiatives—who handled the pandemic
effectively—and what's actually at the basis of the difference in both states' success.
Additionally, a full comparison of the two nations may be used as a tool in future
research to evaluate the factors influencing how effectively Singapore and the
Philippines dealt with the problem and offered a solution for the good of the entire
nation and its residents.
 What is Governance? (2013), a book by Francis Fukuyama, in which he defines
governance as the degree to which a government can carry out laws and provide
services whether or not that government is democratic. Fukuyama argues, saying that
rather than focusing just on the goals themselves, the effectiveness of governance truly
depends on how the players are engaged to satisfy the needs of their constituents.
This study examines the urgency and effectiveness of the activities done by Singapore
and the Philippines and incorporates "competent bureaucracy" as one of the
influencing elements for how they carry out their pandemic reactions. In a different
book by Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity (1995), he
makes the case that trust is the members' feeling of security as a result of a
community's consistent, cooperative conduct as well as the presence of shared
standards and ideals. Rarely is there an activity that does not call for social interaction
amongst people. As we examine how citizens respond to rules and decisions as well
as how they converse among themselves about whether or not they could rely on the
government in response to how the government was able to attend to their overall
well-being, this research considers "social trust" to be one of the responsible aspects
for how the two countries fared in their pandemic response. This research also
benefited greatly from the contributions of Fukuyama, particularly in the shape of his
article "Pandemics and Political Performance" (2021), which he co-authored with Luis
Calva. In this piece, he expanded on social trust, state capability, and the final element
we looked at: "political leadership." Fukuyama emphasized how crucial it is for a nation
to establish an effective public-health system that can react to health crises like the one
we are presently experiencing. State capability by itself, though, is insufficient. Social
trust on the other hand, is a two-way street with the citizens having to trust the
government and vice versa so as to ensure that they will have enough incentive to
naturally follow public-health mandates. Finally, political leadership is essential in cases
of public emergencies where the responsible political leaders must respond quickly.
The safety of their own country may depend on the political leaders' differing
perspectives on the deadly virus.
 Additionally, in a study entitled comparative study of Vietnam's and the
Philippines' COVID-19 Reaction Utilizing Historical Institutionalism, Peter Del Rosario,
Mitchel Ofilada, and Rose Ann Vicente collaborated. The researchers made use of
Vietnam's 2007 Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases, which produced
a reasonably priced healthcare system, successful mass testing and contact tracing
methods, and judgments that were backed by science. All of these elements helped
Vietnam manage the pandemic successfully. However, the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act of the Philippines from 2013 was never put into effect, which is why
its militaristic measures to stop the spread of the pandemic, along with its pricey and
largely private healthcare system and tight focus on prolonged lockdowns, were
ineffective. In contrast to earlier studies that concentrated on the countries' policies
during the pandemic, this study mainly relied on its analysis of both the states'
historical healthcare governance and its role in managing COVID-19.

It is also important to note that the materials mentioned above have a lot of
gaps. Fukuyama's technique of gauging governance was criticized for being overly
preoccupied with measuring the powers of the executive and undervaluing the capacity
of governments to carry out their duties (Voeten, 2013). Fukuyama's definition of
governance as "governing by government" was deemed "too limited" by Thomas Risse
because it ignores the fact that state capability and quality of governance are
fundamentally dissimilar and as a result, are unrelated. Fukuyama's book on social
trust is also receiving criticism. It was noted that Fukuyama himself concurs that the
importance of culture and social trust is ambiguously quantified (Ikenberry, 1996).
Although the article on Pandemics and Political performance is a valuable source,
Fukuyama and Calva should have expanded on it to create a more thorough study in
order to go into further detail on the three factors. More so, this study aims to bridge
the gap between these criticisms, and thus provide a substantive purview that
Fukuyama’s definition of pandemic success is relative to a country’s bureaucracy, trust,
and leadership.
II. METHODOLOGY

The research methods and tools that were employed by the researchers to
complete their study are covered in this chapter, which also discusses the tactics and
strategies used in the research process to comprehend data analysis and interpret
acquired data. In this chapter, the researchers outline the key elements that support
the study's validity, such as the conceptual and operational frameworks, the study's
scope and limitations, and the strategies, techniques, and tools utilized to collect and
analyze data.

The Philippines and Singapore will serve as the study's units of analysis, and
the researchers will examine three elements to gauge the effectiveness of their
pandemic responses: competent bureaucracy, social trust, and political leadership.

1. Conceptual Framework

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

As shown from the figure above, three elements—competent

bureaucracy, social trust, and political leadership—will be used to compare the
effectiveness of the pandemic responses in Singapore and the Philippines.
Francis Fukuyama's conceptual definitions served as the basis for the ones that
 the researchers employed. The following terms were defined by the
researchers: (1) competent bureaucracy, which refers to the government's
capacity to enact laws, uphold them, and provide the people with these services;
(2) social trust, which refers to how citizens view their government and how
much they depend on it for their own welfare; and (3) political leadership, which
refers to those in positions of authority within the state and other institutions.
The degree of social trust varies between the two countries, in addition to how
each state and its political leaders approached the pandemic differently. The
study's goal is to evaluate and contrast how the aforementioned factors affected
the effectiveness of Singapore's and the Philippines' pandemic responses.

2. Operational Framework

Figure 2. Operational Framework

Regarding the operational framework, the researchers operationalized

the following: (1) responsiveness to the crisis—by examining the services and
legislation implemented—as the basis for identifying the nation's competent
bureaucracy; (2) faith of the citizens—evaluating their attitude towards safety
government protocols and health officials as well as how citizens perceived the
community initiatives provided by their fellow citizens—as the basis for
influencing social trust; and (3) heads of state—from being empowered to make
decisive actions to their efficient communication and level of cooperation with
 other legislative bodies and civil societies. All of these are intended to serve as a
basis for comparing the success and effectiveness of Singapore's and the
Philippines' pandemic responses.

The objective of this study is to compare the COVID-19 pandemic responses of

Singapore and the Philippines by examining their bureaucracies, public trust, and
political leaders' performance. The units of analysis were Singapore and the
Philippines, as noted in the introduction. The information regarding the two countries
will be compiled from existing studies, journals, articles, and documents due to the time
and environmental constraints for which this study has been conducted. The
information acquired is restricted to materials that are available online, including works
from government agencies and research organizations as well as SAGE journals and
PIDS, among others.

In addition to a qualitative research design, this study will use a comparative

case technique. As they break down the issue and identify each distinct component
that contributes to the phenomenon as a whole, the researchers will investigate and
comprehend the intricacy of the phenomenon. Through the lens of Francis Fukuyama's
The Geopolitics of COVID, the researchers' secondary data collection, document
analysis, and comparative process tracing are applied in the study. In order to compare
the effectiveness of the Philippines to Singapore, the researchers will delve further into
the aforementioned drivers of Francis Fukuyama's pandemic response success. The
researchers will evaluate the two nations side-by-side to see which provided the best
response to the COVID-19 epidemic. Moreover, to supplement the data and
information required in the study, the researchers will also use observations,
documents and artifacts, reflective tools, and other additional resources.

Based on the three factors mentioned in the conceptual and operational

framework, the researchers have produced tables. The aforementioned tables will be
compared on the basis of the unit of analysis—Philippines and Singapore—and their
three factors—competent bureaucracy, social trust, and political leadership—in order to
forecast how well the country responded to the pandemic. The researchers will use the
required information or data provided by the existing studies, journals, publications,
and documents to analyze and interpret the study's findings. The researchers will move
on to documentation, analysis, and interpretation once data collection is complete. In
order to assess the reliability and factual accuracy of their analyses, the researchers
will take an effort to ensure that they are free of all biases. Having said this, the
researchers have taken utmost care to collect information solely from reputable
sources whose contents are verified, accurate, and properly validated. Despite the time
restrictions, the researchers worked tirelessly and avoided taking any unethical quick
cuts. To correctly give credit to the designated authors, they made sure to include the
necessary citations and to do it in the correct manner.
III. RESULTS

The data collected through the researchers' secondary data gathering and
document analysis were analyzed in order to complete this study. The findings from the
data are presented in this chapter. The tables that follow offer numerous ranges of
categories and classifications that are appropriate for the study's research question.

1. Competent Bureaucracy
Selected legislations provided by the Philippine and Singaporean government in the
conduct of addressing the pandemic concerns

COUNTRY Laws Lockdown Budget

5.024 trillion
Bayanihan to Heal
PHILIPPINES “Hard Lockdown” Philippine Peso
as One Act 2020
(2022)

COVID-19
93 billion
(Temporary “Circuit Breaker
SINGAPORE Singapore Dollars
Measures) Act Period”
(2020)
2020
Figure 1.1 Legislations

Laws enacted
Because of the differences in the two nations' legislation, the Philippines was
able to sign the bill around a week before Singapore. Unlike the Philippines, Singapore
already had an epidemic law in place: the Infectious Diseases Act of 1977. The World
Health Organization (WHO) designated COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020, and
asked all states to act promptly and forcefully to prevent or stop its spread. Despite the
fact that both Singapore's COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act and the Philippines'
Bayanihan to Heal as One Act are aimed at reducing serious health risks and
disruptions posed by COVID-19 on people's lives and livelihoods—including the
economy as a whole—both pieces of legislation give the executives the necessary
additional and special powers.
Lockdowns restrictions and budget allocations
Lockdowns were also used by the two nations in accordance with these rules to
drastically curtail movements and contacts in public and private settings, hence
reducing the dangers of the COVID-19 virus spreading. Both countries also
implemented lockdown measures that restricted international travel, shut down
non-essential businesses, adapted to home-based learning, required the use of face
masks and temperature screening in public areas, required strict contract tracing, and
isolated infected and exposed people. The Philippine government came under fire for
using severe lockdowns while still failing to flatten its COVID-19 curve despite
enforcing one of the longest lockdowns in history. In order to counteract the Covid-19
outbreak, the Singaporean government also implemented a number of "Circuit
Breaker" measures. In terms of the national budgets for COVID-19, the Philippines
produced the highest amount, 5.02 trillion Philippine Pesos, in 2022, while Singapore
drew on its past reserves to produce the highest amount, 93 billion Singapore Dollars,
in 2020—of which, 52 billion Singapore Dollars, were from the nation's past reserves.

Selected services provided by the Philippines and Singapore during the COVID-19

Education, Skills Assistance &

COUNTRY MSMEs
& Jobs Grants

TESDA’s
PHILIPPINES Scholarship SBCorporation ECQ Ayuda
Programs

SGUnited Jobs and SME Working Covid-19 Support

SINGAPORE
Skills Package Capital Loan Grant
Figure 1.2 Services

Education, employment and assistance

During the pandemic, services were given in Singapore and the Philippines. The
Philippines’ Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) offered
scholarship programs totaling 3 billion Philippine Pesos for jobs, education, and
training. Through upskilling and reskilling, this will support affected and temporarily
displaced workers. Instead, Singapore also offered the SGUnited Jobs and Skills
Package, which aimed to create 100,000 opportunities in general employment, training,
and skill areas. Through the Philippine’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the
SBCorporation extended its MSME borrowers and partner financial institutions a
one-month moratorium on loan payments from March 16 to April 14, 2020, in order to
boost MSMEs (PFIs). Similarly, the maximum loan amount for Singapore's SME
Working Capital Loan has been increased to one million Singapore dollars. The
Philippines' Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) distributed 1,000
Philippine Pesos of financial assistance per low-income individual, with a maximum of
4,000 Philippine Pesos per low-income family affected by the implementation of
Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) in NCR, as part of their assistance programs,
whereas Singapore's Covid-19 Support Grant is available to Singapore citizens or
permanent residents aged 16 and above who are currently involuntarily unemployed
due to retrenchment or contract termination, or who are currently on involuntary no-pay
leave (NPL) for at least three consecutive months, or who are currently experiencing a
monthly salary reduction of at least 30% due to the economic impact of COVID-19.

2. Social Trust
Filipinos and Singaporeans’ confidence in government handling and health authorities
during the COVID-19 pandemic

Satisfaction with Their

Trust in Health Authorities
COUNTRY Government
Highest rating Lowest rating Highest rating Lowest rating

PHILIPPINES 74% 46% 63% 84%

SINGAPORE 90% 57% 84% 78%

Figure 2.1 Citizen’s confidence and satisfaction

Government handling and health authorities

The percentage of citizens in each country who had faith in how their
governments handled the COVID-19 pandemic was demonstrated in a YouGov survey
in 2020, which they also referred to as YouGov COVID-19 tracker. The survey was
conducted from March 10, 2020 to July 30, 2022. Looking at the two countries in study,
in terms of the satisfaction with their government, Singapore reached its highest peak
at having a 90% citizen-rating which was recorded on April 8, 2021; then dropping at
the lowest rating of 57% which was recorded on October 20, 2021. As for the
Philippines, the highest rating of 74% that was recorded on May 17, 2020 was
significantly lower than Singapore. While the lowest rating of 46% was recorded from
the periods of September 12 to September 26, 2021.

While examining their trust in health authorities which was dated from May 27 to
September 16, 2020, Singapore received a consistent 84% highest rating from periods
of May 27 to June 24, 2020, then reaching its peak again on August 20, 2020; whereas
the lowest rating dropped to 78% on July 23, 2020. As for the Philippines’ records, the
country received a 63% highest rating on May 28, 2020 which again was significantly
lower than that of Singapore; while the lowest rating of 55% was recorded last
September 21, 2020.

Filipinos and Singaporeans’ attitude towards safety measures and government

protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic

Safety measures and Government Protocols

COUNTRY
Willingness to take the Practices social and Wearing face masks &
vaccine physical distancing shields

PHILIPPINES 95% 85% 88%

SINGAPORE 99% 86% 93%

Figure 2.2 Citizen’s attitude

Safety measures and government protocols

Moving towards the Filipinos and Singaporeans’ attitude towards safety
measures and government protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic, the survey was
conducted during the periods of December 13, 2020 to July 30, 2022. On this part, this
study only considered the highest percentage that both countries reached. Almost all
citizens in Singapore are willing to take the vaccine (or already have done so) with a
99% rating; while a three percent difference was recorded with the Filipinos’
willingness—having a 96% rating. For the Philippines, the highest rating (95%) was
obtained on December 1, 2021, which is a little later than Singapore, when the same
rating was recorded in August of the same year. Additionally, the survey from February
2020 to July 2022 regarding the citizens who avoided going into crowded places—a
total of 86% (highest peak which was recorded on April 23, 2020) practiced social
distancing in Singapore while there are a total of 85% (highest peak which was
recorded from March 29 to April 12, 2020) in the Philippines. Lastly, wearing face
masks and shields when in public places demonstrated a 93% for Singapore while the
Philippines had a much lower percentage of 88%.

Community initiatives provided by the Philippines and Singapore to their fellow citizens
during the COVID-19

COUNTRY Program Initiatives Reception

Many Philippine
Tulong Kabataan-UPM government officials and
PHILIPPINES military personnel claim
Community Pantries organizers are communist
rebels

Be Kind SG Singaporean officials and

SINGAPORE citizens express fondness
KampungKakis App for strong community spirit
Figure 2.3 Community initiatives

Citizen volunteerism during the height of the pandemic

Many volunteer initiatives, programs, and projects were developed in the
Philippines to assist the Filipino people during the COVID-19 Pandemic, particularly
during its height. There are many collective movements, but there are also many
ordinary people and groups that contribute to the best of their talents and resources.
The youth, most especially, have immersed themselves in volunteer work because their
being able-bodied allows them to better extend help without as much compromise to
their health as the children and the elderly. Due to the scarcity of face masks at the
beginning of the pandemic because people were hoarding them (some wanted to stock
for their family’s use while others wanted to sell it for a higher price to those in dire
need). In 2020, it was reported that 13% of Filipinos do not own face masks. This
would translate to about 14.2 million people who are not in possession of a vital form of
protection against the COVID-19 virus (Philstar, 2020). Tulong Kabataan-UP Manila is
an organization led by students that calls for donations of face masks, alcohol, PPEs
and other medical equipment in order to help patients, health workers and interns of
the Philippine General Hospital (Guillermo, 2020). PGH is one of the major hospitals
that have dealt with many COVID-19 patients but according to Dr. Antony Leachon,
even though they have the “best and brightest medical professionals beating the worst
cases there”, PGH has the “worst infrastructure” (Sandoval, 2020) That and the overall
lack of prioritization for the medical sector create hurdles that prevent healthcare
workers from acquiring necessary equipment to properly do their job and ultimately
hinder their ability to care for patients and themselves.

Aside from Tulong Kabataan projects, Community Pantry Initiatives are the most
renowned volunteer launch that would come to mind because volunteers received just
as much backlash as the help they provided. Ana Patricia Non is the pioneer for the
aforementioned program. She had put up a simple bamboo cart along Maginhawa St.,
Teachers Village, Quezon City and with it, a placard that encourages passersby to give
whatever they can and to take as much as they need. This garnered so much attention
that it soon became a viral concept where many other Filipinos were inspired to make
their own version of the community pantry in their locality. In a crowdsourced digital
map, 900 community pantries can be found all over the nation as of
today(See:https://saanyan.github.io/saanmaycommunitypantry/). Activist groups,
church organizations and concerned civilians cooperated through organizing, gathering
resources and soliciting donations to sustain the community pantry that caters to the
needs of the poorest and most vulnerable.
 However, these acts of service are not received so well by government leaders
and military officials. Tulong Kabataan released a statement condemning the
red-tagging and death threats they have received through their public phone number
displayed for donations. Lorevie Caalaman of Tulong Kabataan Metro Manila
pronounced that the accusations and threats stemmed from government officials
claiming that donations are not needed and medical equipment such as face masks
and PPE are not in scarcity despite hospitals themselves reaching out to citizens and
asking for donations of such necessary items (Leon, 2020). The Community Pantries
experienced the same difficulties. A few days after Non's proposal gained popularity,
the government's armed anti-communist task force began investigating the organizers'
backgrounds, claiming that the organizers were members of the Communist Party. This
could all be traced back to Non's comments in an interview, in which she stated that
she was weary of whining about the government's inactivity and chose to take action
through the Maginhawa Community Pantry. Lieutenant General Antonio Parlade Jr.
said that the volunteers were distributing food “and with it is the poison of hate and
mistrust towards a government that is ceaseless and faithful in its service to the Filipino
people. This is simply not right and in defense of our people and State, must be
corrected,”. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte also condemned the
community pantry and called it “just for show'' and that the organizers were “mindless”.
Due to all the threats, many had to lay low and temporarily close their community
pantry despite their genuine intentions to do good in the community (Mongoya, 2021).

Singaporeans, on the other hand, participated in a variety of volunteer

programs, such as Sherry Soon's local grassroots organization Be Kind SG. The group
encourages microvolunteering, which allows individuals who work to engage in the
events. Soon rallied corporate sponsors, schools, non-profit organizations, and the
Singapore Prison Service in February 2020 to present 7,000 care packages comprising
food, toiletries, and thank-you letters to healthcare professionals. Furthermore, the
organization worked with over 80 food and beverage enterprises and 100 volunteers to
provide 775,000 meals to 15,000 clients (Menon, 2020).
 There have also been volunteers that decided to utilize digital methods to make
their desire to help people through the pandemic a reality. Mae Tan, Michelle Lau and
Denise Tay found that the underprivileged, less technologically literate and living alone
are being left behind in times of crisis and so they started the KampungKakis app, a
neighborhood buddy system that connects people in need to those who can lend a
hand. Tan came to have the idea for KampungKakis when she was recuperating from
COVID-19 in the hospital where she got to thinking how she could pay-it-forward to the
healthcare staff. At the hospital, she witnessed how vulnerable the elderly were and so
she decided to center her help around helping the elderly, most especially those living
alone (Chia J., 2021). “Kampung” means village in Malay and “Kakis” is a local term for
buddies (Chia C., 2020). How the app works is that elderlies, disadvantaged families,
isolated individuals and students are connected to volunteers based on proximity,
assistance type and spoken language. The help they offer ranges from friendly
check-ins, looking for available resources, picking up meals and groceries, assisting
seniors to medical appointments and even helping children keep up with their school
work, especially those facing financial challenges (KampungKakis, 2020).
KampungKakis cooperates with many other organizations in order to get their
beneficiaries in touch with the correct agencies to address their needs like NTU
undergraduates who assist with student tuition support, Willing Hearts who give out
daily meals and the Mind the Gap Fund through A Good Space and the Cassia
Resettlement Team that provides additional financial assistance (Chia C., 2020).

Singapore’s government officials express their gratitude towards the volunteers

who help them alleviate the burden that the COVID-19 has brought to their nation.
Then Minister for Culture, Community and Youth Grace Fu recognizes how the
community went all out to volunteer and donate. She says the pandemic did not let
Singaporeans’ caring spirit falter but rather it brought out the best from them. It also
showed how many people care about Singapore deeply and with this she encourages
them to further grow the spirit of Singapore Together to overcome whatever challenges
to collectively “emerge as a stronger society”. Former Minister for Social and Family
Development Desmond Lee also articulated his appreciation for the strong community
spirit that Singaporeans exhibited despite the hurdles presented by COVID-19. There
was no help deemed too small as everyone from different walks of life did their best to
contribute to those in need. He also promotes a sustained support beyond COVID-19
that would enable their social service agencies to better serve them as their society
grows and becomes more complex (Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth).

3. Political Leadership
Policies and institutional cooperation encouraged by political leadership
COUNTRY Heads of State Policy Responses Task Force

Inter Agency Task

President Rodrigo Rodrigo Duterte
PHILIPPINES Force on Emerging
Roa Duterte Policy
Infectious Diseases

Prime Minister Lee Lee Hsien Loong Multi-Ministry Task

SINGAPORE
Hsien Loong Policy Force
Figure 3.1 Political Leadership

Empowerment, communication, and cooperation

The Philippines' response to COVID-19 has been referred to as one of the worst
and most severe lockdowns in global history. The government's reliance on punitive
measures resulted from securitizing the COVID-19 epidemic and perceiving the virus
as a "existential threat." The administration placed a high level of faith in the military
and police to maintain law and order and ensure that all safety procedures were
implemented. Duterte has utilized the "iron fist" as a prop in his limited "repertoire." to
act as a "vigilante president" and demonstrate leadership, distracting from the larger
picture of his failure to successfully aid the country's impoverished majority

As a result, some experts and observers have characterized the government's

reaction as "draconian," "militarized," or "police-centric" (Maru, 2020). According to the
administration, all of these steps were part of the country's "war" against COVID19.
Deep-seated class biases, as well as President Rodrigo Duterte's authoritarian
tendencies, inspired the targeting of the "undisciplined." Furthermore, Duterte
proceeded to militarize the response apparatus by delegating substantial managerial
responsibility for society to military and PNP officers and by appointing former generals
to key positions within the IATF-EID. According to an announcement made by Duterte
(2020b) on March 24, 2020, the National Action Plan, described as the government's
"overall national strategy to deal with the COVID-19 problem and its aftermath," was to
be implemented by the PNP, the Department of National Defense (DND), the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The National Task Force (NTF) was formed to put the plans into action,
directed by DND Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, with DILG Secretary Eduardo Ao acting
as his co-chair and Peace Process Adviser Carlito Galvez serving as the principal
implementer. During the lockdown, the impoverished socioeconomic conditions
deteriorated dramatically, to the point that Duterte threatened to kill demonstrators
seeking food. In a developing country like the Philippines, however, social isolation and
working from home are reserved for the privileged and a small middle class. Being held
in congested slums locked down provides little safety. This could make matters worse
as Singapore has discovered with the virus spreading rapidly in dormitories housing
migrant workers. The daily income on which the poor depended for subsistence has
also been gone.

According to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, the Covid-19 outbreak has taught
Singapore crucial lessons "for which we have paid dearly," lessons that must not be
lost. "We must utilize the reforms forced upon us by the crisis to improve the way we
do things," said the prime minister. Lee attributed Singapore's ability to withstand the
epidemic to its strong healthcare system, efficient public health response, and high
level of public confidence. But even as we give thanks, we must make serious
preparations for the next epidemic. Lee said Singapore must maintain its high
standards for medical quality by investing in healthcare professionals, good medical
facilities, and infrastructure. He used the Ministry of Health's proactive investigation of
any problems, such as when someone received the incorrect dose, and regular
publication of statistics on major adverse events following Covid-19 vaccination as an
example. The prime minister stated, "Some may be tempted to think that it would have
been easier to keep things quiet but it would have been very unwise. A successful
public health response, according to Lee, also assisted Singapore in handling the
Covid-19 incident. "Rumors will spread, people will progressively lose faith in the
system and we will eventually pay a great price—the loss of public trust,". This refers to
the application of public measures, including non-medical treatments, to control the
pandemic's trajectory and stop the virus from spreading.
IV. DISCUSSION

Responsiveness to the crisis

In terms of urgency, the Philippines was able to pass Bayanihan to Heal as a

single act one week before Singapore's COVID-19 Temporary Measures Act.
Singapore, on the other hand, was prepared before the COVID-19 Pandemic hit with
its pre-implemented Infectious Diseases Act of 1977, which formed a clear framework
for them to build their pandemic response program on. The main program of the
Philippines during the peak of the pandemic was a complete lockdown reinforced by
military officers stationed at particular checkpoints who also patrolled at night to ensure
that nobody was out and about on the streets after curfew. Benedicto Yujuico, the
president of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry expressed his dismay
towards the repetitive lockdowns when the Philippines has had the longest lockdown in
the entire world, yet failed to control the number of COVID-19 cases. The prolonged
lockdown even went as far as lowering our Gross Domestic Product compared to other
countries due to the almost non-existent face-to-face interactions of Filipinos
(ABS-CBN News, 2021).

Singapore on the other hand, imposed their circuit breaker lockdown together
with forming a multi-ministry task force solely formed to deal with the outbreak and
travel restrictions from incoming flights who have been to mainland China prior to their
flight into Singapore. The circuit breaker meant most workplaces would have to close
down except those providing essential services. The lockdown duration in Singapore
may have not reached as long as the Philippines did, but the former saw positive cases
significantly dwindling down (Baker, 2020). According to Worldometers data, as of
August 2022, Singapore has a total of 1,794,069 Coronavirus Disease
Cases—1,708,080 of which have recovered, whereas 1,559 have been pronounced
dead. Philippines, on the other hand, has a total of 3,831,941 Coronavirus Disease
Cases—3,730,889 of which have recovered, whereas 61,036 have been pronounced
dead (Worldometer, 2022). There has been a huge gap between the number of deaths
and total number of cases between the two countries. Furthermore, the Philippines not
only took rapid action to battle the pandemic, such as enhanced community quarantine
(ECQ), but also developed an emergency subsidy program with huge public spending
to assist impacted homes and businesses. These subsidy measures, however, were
unable to avert massive economic losses in the National Capital Region (NCR) and
other high-risk provinces. Similarly, demand and income for micro, small, and
medium-sized firms (MSMEs) fell dramatically (Shigehiro & Lakshman Nagraj, 2021).

This simply means that it did not matter if the Philippines had adopted their
program earlier when they depended only on the lockdown to safeguard their
populace, as opposed to Singapore, who likewise established a lockdown but made
numerous measures to prevent the mounting instances. In fact, the World Health
Organization praised Singapore for its management in terms of reducing viral
transmission by early discovery through active contact tracing and testing (Geddie &
Arvindan, 2020).

Faith of the Citizens

The pandemic has had a "rally around the flag" implication across several
nations, increasing faith in political institutions and other societal groups to various
extents (Jennings, 2020). This was evident in the data we obtained from the YouGov
poll which showed that Singapore fared much better than the Philippines in terms of
citizens' trust and satisfaction in government handling and health authorities during the
COVID-19 outbreak. There are significant differences in the low ratings given by the
citizens of both nations. The Philippine government was given substantially a much
lower evaluation by its people, despite Singapore's receiving such poor marks as well.
Furthermore, compared to Filipinos, Singaporeans expressed far more faith in their
health authorities—once again outranking the Philippines along with the low ratings
percentage assessing their trust in health authorities.

Epstein (2012) noted that individuals play a fundamental part in creating

significant public policies. His study on the Importance of Public Opinion demonstrates
that citizens have a wide range of knowledge and standards for an effective
governance—urging that the government should take proper measures in a crisis, that
it should be a responsible body, that it be transparent to the people, and that it create
policies based on scientific findings and evidence. Hence, this paper postulates that
the reason why Filipinos gave their government a much lower rating is because the
expected actions or initiatives that their government would take were deemed
inadequate due to the Philippines' ineffective governance, lack of accountability, and
lack of transparency. This has led to socioeconomic inequalities, polarizing political
beliefs—further damaging the public trust and resilience that the citizens have for their
country.

Singaporeans, on the other hand, have great appreciation for their government's
response to the epidemic, which resulted in a comparatively low number of
virus-related mortality. Singapore was also placed first on Bloomberg's COVID-19
resilience rating during the epidemic (The Straits Times, 2021). This was due to the
government's insistence on prioritizing testing of people with flu-like symptoms when
the COVID-19 pandemic first hit Singapore in 2020. Additionally, its brief and abrupt
lockdown managed to keep the healthcare system operational and the economy
moving. It also efficiently prioritized its resources, has been urgent without trying to
rush its decisions, and managed its communication with the general population well,
fostering a high level of trust between both the government and health authorities.

Looking at both countries' attitude towards safety measures and government

protocols, there’s not much of a difference between Singapore and the Philippines.
However, it was still demonstrated that the peak of the percentage of Singaporeans
adhering to these protocols was higher as compared to the Filipinos. Wearing face
masks, avoiding social gatherings, and taking additional precautions to generate
populations with increased vulnerability to COVID-19 were the primary mitigation
strategies used during the Circuit Breaker period, and Singaporeans had high levels of
adherence to these strategies from the beginning of the outbreak. Conversely, a
number of Filipino citizens expressed their disapproval and opposition to the
government's measures to combat the pandemic, particularly with regard to the
consequences and impacts on people: limiting face-to-face contact, having to wear
face masks or shields, and instituting quarantines. Since the number of COVID-19
cases in the country was still high, Filipinos claimed that some restrictions were
inadequate, while others lacked scientific basis (Vincentino, et. al. 2022). This may
imply that if government officials provide directives regarding taking preventative steps
to avert COVID-19, people would comply if their decisions are fair and in the right
course of action. If citizens can perceive that the COVID-19 measures are fair and just,
they will abide by its rules since they often use fairness as a measure for what is moral.

With regards to the emergence of mutual aid initiatives in Singapore and the
Philippines, the two nations have different reasons as to why citizens decided to take
their time and resources to help those in need. Filipino volunteerism during the
COVID-19 Pandemic is rooted in lack of resources, dependence on Filipino resiliency
and a lacking government. According to a SWS survey performed between May 4 and
10, 2020, 3.9 million households have been enduring involuntary hunger over the
previous three months. This was the highest hunger rate recorded during the tenure of
former President Duterte. According to reports, the hunger rate climbed in all areas, but
the greatest increase occurred in densely crowded Metro Manila (Lalu, 2020). For this
reason, most volunteer work is done in the nation’s capital. According to the
Community Pantry tracker, community pantries in Manila right now amount to almost
500 as compared to other localities in the Philippines with only 1 or 2 digits in their
community pantry total.

According to the Amihan National Federation of Peasant Women—Anakpawis

Party List and the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas—the Duterte administration's
anti-poor policies have resulted in perpetual hunger for Filipinos. His policies resulted
in loss of livelihood, increased food prices and insufficient aid. Moreover, they said that
the government did not produce a comprehensive plan to combat the pandemic which
led to the country’s recession and high inflation rate. They condemn how the military
sector continues to receive the most budget while the poor are left to deal with their
hunger (Ocampo, 2021). Even with all these remarks of dissatisfaction from the Filipino
people, the government refused to do better nor support mutual aid initiatives from the
people when it actually stemmed from the very lack of provisions coming from the
government.

The lack of medical supplies of major hospitals that cure patients with COVID-19
is even filled in by private individuals and organizations because the government does
not want to acknowledge the debilitating state that the health sector has come to face
due to the pandemic. This is amplified even more because the government refuses to
invest in them and instead prioritizes military power to enforce rules. Just like the threat
to safety that Tulong Kabataan-UPM and Community Pantry Pioneer Ana Patricia Non
faced, it showed just how much the Philippine government fears dissent and any action
that even remotely implies that the government was lacking in any way. Furthermore,
this creates a divide amongst citizens because supporters of the administration would
be influenced to think that those volunteers are the enemies. Instead of showing
appreciation for the kind deeds of the volunteers, it merely polarizes our country and
especially so at a time where nation-wide cooperation is needed; all because the
government speaks ill of community initiatives.

Singapore faces a completely different situation. In an opinion piece by Paul

Teng (2020) entitled “Assuring food security in Singapore, a small island state facing
COVID-19”, he wrote about how Singapore dealt with the COVID-19 pandemic proved
that its food security maintenance is effective and thus could serve an example for
other small states. In 2019, they introduced the Singapore Food Story, which focuses
on three themes. The first is urban agriculture and aquaculture, in which indoor and
outdoor farms are operated using advanced technology, the second is future food, in
which alternative proteins such as plant-based protein, cellular meat, and the like are
cultivated, and the third is food science and technology, which would lay the
groundwork for agricultural and food processing innovations. With thorough and
elaborate plans for food security from their government such as these, Singapore was
able to cope better in terms of hunger during the thick of the COVID-19 Pandemic. The
Ministry of Social and Family Development spokesperson stated that Singapore has
coped with food insecurity “relatively well” in the international level because hunger
rates consistently remained low thanks to their economic and social policies along with
collective community support for those in need. Chief Executive Sim Bee Hia
encourages conversations regarding food insecurity because it allows Singaporeans to
admit that they need food support even able-bodied people who have become
unemployed. (Ming, 2021)

For Singapore, they recognize the importance of admitting that the nation is
having a hard time so that the government would be able to know how to approach the
problem together. This is the reason why they have one of the most effective
COVID-19 responses because their capable government is coupled with mutual aid
initiatives that are born from their community spirit. Their volunteers are not working to
fill in the inadequacies of their government but rather as an additional help because
they recognize that their government is also struggling. So they willingly give their time
and resources to alleviate the burdens that the COVID-19 virus has brought to their
people. Their government, then, accordingly expresses its gratitude to the citizens for
greatly contributing to the betterment of their nation. It is this teamwork that places
them above other countries who war within themselves instead of unifying themselves
in times of such crisis.

Heads of State

Comparing the Philippines Singapore’s political leadership, one can see that
President Duterte’s policy was more individually motivated relying on the police and
military to contain the spread of Covid-19, while Prime Minister Lee Hsiem loong’s
policy was more reliant on effective coordination among government bureaucracy.
Results show that Singapore’s political leadership is more effective, as it created a task
force that focused on better coordinating departments and agencies to address
pandemic responses.
 The policy of securitising the pandemic in the Philippines is evident if we look at
the formation of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Emergency Infectious Diseases
(IATF-EID). It showed the administration's reliance on the police and military as the
task force was composed mainly of police and military personnel [Hapal, 2021], rather
than healthcare professionals and epidemiologists. Even with emergency powers
granted by the congress through Bayanihan Act to Heal as One (RA 11469), Duterte’s
leadership was unable to utilize his power to properly enhance coordination among
government departments and agencies, as it granted him the authority to exercise
special necessary powers in handling pandemic response. Duterte’s leadership helped
push the government response to be focused on law enforcement policies.

Notable inefficiencies in the task force was that the DOH, although it issued
guidelines, was not empowered to directly control other departments in pandemic
response. Example would be the DOH guideline for the DPWH, in creating Covid-19
facilities in the Cultural Center of the Philippines and other places in different localities.
The guideline for the DPWH to create Covid-19 facilities was followed, but there were
no guidelines on how the facilities would be used, the outcome was that the Covid-19
facilities created by the DPWH were not used. This shows that the IATF-EID was not
empowered to cater to the needs of pandemic response, and that departments were
lacking in proper coordination, especially the DOH as the chair of the IATF-EID, it was
either lacking in leadership or it could not communicate with other departments well
enough for the task force to be effective in implementing its pandemic response.

The political leadership of Singapore did not act with impunity in enforcing
lockdowns, as it did not rely on police and military force, unlike political leadership in
the Philippines that relied on iron fist to curb the pandemic. Evidence of the President’s
draconian pandemic response is discernible during his televised speech on April 16,
2020, where he said the following lines: “The military and police will take over, I am
ordering them now to be ready. The police will enforce social distancing and curfew.
Just like martial law.” (Presidential Communications Operations Office, 2020).
Philippine political leadership resulted in an uncoordinated and a police centric
pandemic response.

Comparing the two countries, we see that Singapore was more empowering in
its pandemic response, due to the fact that the Multi-Ministry Task Force, led by the
Ministry of Health, was able to immediately coordinate and enhance inter-departmental
cooperation from the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic (Walid Jumblatt Abdullah &
Soojin Kim, 2020). This level of effective communication shows that the Ministry of
Health was empowered to lead the task force with other ministries involved, and those
ministries followed the conduct implemented by the Multi-Ministry Task Force. The role
of the Prime Minister of Singapore—Lee Hsien Loong—in pandemic response was
more in addressing the public and giving powers to the Multi-Ministry Task Force, the
main policy making in handling pandemic response. During his televised speech on
April 21, 2020, he emphasized on the importance of pandemic policies as an
impermanent affliction in order to crack down the virus, which was contrary to the
Philippine President’s draconian approach. PM Lee said his speech in the following
lines: “Many will be disappointed by the extension of the circuit breaker, especially our
businesses and workers, but I hope you understand that this short-term pain is to
stamp out the virus, protect the health and safety of our loved ones and allow us to
revive our economy.” (Prime Minister's Office, 2020). Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
did not securitize the pandemic issue. Instead, Multi-Ministry Task Force’s technocrats
handled the administrative works of policy decision-making.

Regarding legislation, no emergency powers were invoked or granted to the

Prime Minister, to deal with pandemic response. Pandemic response legislation
depended on existing conditions under the Infectious Diseases Act, which was also
built up during the 2003 SARS outbreak. Coordination among other agencies by the
Ministry of Health was encouraged by the Multi-Ministry Task Force. Under Gan Kim
Yong, the ministry worked with the following ministries: trade, national development,
education, communications and information, manpower, environment, water resources,
social family and welfare, and transport. One notable instance where the Ministry of
Health instantly made measures to address pandemic response, was during the rise of
cases in foreign worker dormitories, where the ministry instantly cooperated with the
Ministry of Manpower, to provide services and better dormitory conditions for foreing
workers. The results of Singapore’s political leadership was a low mortality rate
compared to most countries and a more well coordinated pandemic response amongst
different departments and agencies (Asia Pacific Observatory on Health Systems and
Policies, 2021).
V. CONCLUSION

When the COVID-19 pandemic initially began, it has been evident that not all
countries had the same levels of capabilities in terms of healthcare systems, political
structures, or economic competence. These realities demonstrated that there is
nothing like a ‘perfect ten’ in every pandemic response—yet it is important that
governments maximize their resources and exert their capabilities in response to the
citizen's concerns as they possibly can. The profound disparity in how several nations
fared throughout the pandemic indicates more serious political and governance
shortcomings that are now well recognized. This study resulted in the conclusion that,
although the reasons for the varying outcomes are undoubtedly multifaceted, three
significant factors provided by Francis Fukuyama—competent bureaucracy, social
trust, and political leadership—stand out from the perspective of how countries
progress during the long periods of the outbreak. When examining the two countries’
response based on these influences, it had become apparent that Singapore was
better prepared to rise up to the challenge brought about by the global health crisis
while the Philippines settled for less than sub-optimal performance despite the
overwhelming fatality rates and flunking economic performance.

Overall, this study demonstrated that Singapore's competence in handling the

COVID-19 is entirely predicated on its effective political leadership, with carefully
orchestrated and collaborative actions throughout all government structures and
sectors; well-ordered public administration, particularly in its public healthcare system,
and high concentrations in competent bureaucracy. These factors have significantly
aided the government in passing pandemic-related legislations instantly and ensuring a
significant impact on high levels of social compliance among Singaporean citizens and
residents. These considerations have also enabled Singapore achieve a highly
regarded pandemic response among its population and the international community.
Given these realities, the efficient management of Singapore may serve as a model for
controlling the virus outbreak and its potential spread.
 On the other hand, the Philippines questionably approached the rising
COVID-19 cases with the government enforcing strict military measures that
undoubtedly did not provide proper policy actions that could have addressed the
pandemic effectively. The political leadership of Duterte enabled a pandemic response
that is centered on enforcement rather than coordination and cooperation. With the
government’s incompetent departments and agencies, pandemic response lacked
institutional capacity to cater to the needs of the citizens during lockdown, especially
the low-income population. The combination of strict enforcement measures motivated
by Duterte and incompetent institutions that could not properly deliver public services,
resulted in a low compliance during the implementation of guidelines while on
lockdowns. In light of this, the Philippine's pandemic response can be described as
counterproductive and police-focused if we take into account all of the country's
dysfunctional institutions, the president's heavy-handed policies, and the lack of social
support from its citizens. Thus, utilizing the three parameters, the researchers were
able to conclude that Singapore is more successful than the Philippines in managing
and addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.

With all this being said, the researchers made the following recommendations
for future studies. Firstly, researchers who plan to conduct a similar study could select
a specific COVID-19 pandemic response from a particular country and analyzing it
solely on its own would be a possibility. Like in the case of the Philippines, it would be
valuable to look into the achievements and inadequacies of the COVID-19 response of
the government. Secondly, another opportunity to take for future research in the same
field is to compare two regional organizations and analyze their response to COVID-19
pandemic as a collective. This will require a much thorough and intensive research
process in order to fully understand and thus deduce which of the two fared better over
the other at facing a massive global health crisis. Lastly, analyzing how globalization
has caused increased COVID-19 transmission amongst countries but also became a
means for sending and receiving necessary medical aid to survive the pandemic is also
an interesting topic to pursue.
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ANNEXES
1. Competent Bureaucracy
Selected legislations provided by the Philippine and Singaporean government in the
conduct of addressing the pandemic concerns
COUNTRY LEGISLATION

Bayanihan to Heal as One Act 2020

What: Republic Act 11469 was signed into law on 23 March 2020
(also known by its short title as the Bayanihan to Heal as One
Act) declaring a national health emergency throughout the
Philippines as a result of the COVID-19 situation. In it Congress
authorizes the President to exercise the necessary special
powers, for a limited time and subject to certain restrictions, to
address a problem that poses a clear and present danger to the
PHILIPPINES
people.

Why: When the World Health Organization (WHO) on 11 March

2020 characterized COVID-19 as a pandemic, WHO called on all
countries to take urgent and aggressive action to mitigate or
prevent its spread. The Philippine Congress promulgated the Act
in view of the serious health threats and disruptions posed by
COVID-19 on the lives and livelihoods of people and the
economy as a whole (Tigno, 2020).

COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act 2020

What: The act grants the executive greater powers to issue

control orders to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and provides
temporary relief to financially distressed individuals, firms, and
other businesses, as well as to those unable to perform contracts.
SINGAPORE It also contains temporary measures concerning the conducting
of meetings and court proceedings and on the remission of
property taxes (Library of Congress, n.d.).

Why: To alleviate the impact on businesses, the Parliament of

Singapore passed the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act
2020 (the “Act”) on 7 April 2020 (Eng and Co LLC, n.d.).

COUNTRY LOCKDOWN

“Hard Lockdown”

What: President Rodrigo Duterte ordered weeks of strict

PHILIPPINES
lockdown that involved longer curfew hours and militarized
checkpoints (Chiu, 2021).
 Why: Containment in the Philippines is weak and the country has
been pushed into hard lockdown at least four times during the
pandemic (Hartigan-Go & Mendoza, 2021).

“Circuit Breaker Measures”

What: The Multi-Ministry Taskforce will be implementing an

elevated set of safe distancing measures, as a circuit breaker to
SINGAPORE
pre-empt the trend of increasing local transmission of COVID-19.

Why: The aim is to significantly reduce movements and

interactions in public and private places (Ministry of Health, n.d.).

Selected services provided by the Philippines and Singapore during the COVID-19
COUNTRY SERVICES CATEGORY

TESDA’s Scholarship Programs Education, Skills

& Jobs
Agency: Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority

What: TESDA’s Scholarship Programs

amounting to PhP3 billion will support
affected and temporarily displaced workers
through upskilling and reskilling. It also offers
free courses for all who would like to acquire
new skills in the convenience of their own
homes, mobile phones and computers
through the TESDA Online Program.

PHILIPPINES SBCorporation MSMEs

Agency: Department of Trade and Industry

What: The SBCorporation is offering a one

month moratorium on loan payments
covering the period of March 16 to April 14,
2020 to its MSME borrowers and partner
financial institutions (PFIs).

Borrowers may also request to pay only the

interest portion of their monthly payments for
the succeeding six months, and to resume
their regular monthly payments thereafter.
Loan terms may also be extended depending
 on how the current situation develops.

ECQ Ayuda Assistance &

Grants
Agency: Department of the Interior and Local
Government

Distribution of financial assistance of

PhP1,000 per low-income individual with a
maximum PhP4,000 per low-income family
who are affected by the implementation of
Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) in
NCR, pursuant to Inter-Agency Task Force
for the Management of Emerging Infectious
Diseases (IATF-MEID) Resolution No. 130-E
which took effect on August 6, 2021.

SGUnited Jobs and Skills Package Education, Skills

& Jobs
What: targeted at creating about 100,000
opportunities in 4 broad components:
Jobs: Creating up to 40,000 jobs in the public
(15,000) and private (25,000) sectors.
Traineeships: Creating up to 21,000
traineeships for first-time jobseekers and
4,000 traineeships for mid-career job
seekers.

Skills: Increasing capacity of training courses

for up to 30,000 jobseekers in year 2020 and
providing allowance of up to S$1,200 per
SINGAPORE month throughout the duration (between 6 to
12 months) of such highly subsidized course.

SME Working Capital Loan MSMEs

Increase the maximum loan quantum to S$1

million. The Government's risk share will also
be increased to 90% and SMEs may request
for deferment of principal repayment for one
year.

Covid-19 Support Grant Assistance &

Grants
Singapore Citizens or Permanent Residents,
aged 16 years and above, who are presently
 involuntarily unemployed due to
retrenchment or contract termination, or
presently on involuntary no-pay leave (NPL)
for at least three consecutive months, or
presently experiencing reduced monthly
salary of at least 30% for at least three
consecutive months as a result of the
economic impact of COVID-19. From 1
October 2020 onwards, to qualify for the
support grant, applicants must demonstrate
job search or training efforts and should not
own more than one property.

1. Social Trust

Filipinos and Singaporeans’ confidence in government handling and health authorities

during the COVID-19 pandemic

Note: Data and survey for this section was gathered from YouGov—an international
research data and analytics group—having a strong record for data accuracy and
innovation as the pioneer of online market research. YouGov focuses entirely on
obtaining information during the COVID-19 and employs unique insights to provide
health organizations data that supports their understanding and defense against the
virus’ spread.

Satisfaction with their government

COUNTRY

*comparison of the Philippines and Singapore’s ratings

 Highest rating
Lowest rating
% of people in each market
% of people in each market who
who think the government is
think the government is handling
handling the issue of
the issue of coronavirus poorly.
coronavirus very well.

46% rating first recorded on

74% rating recorded on May
September 12, 2021. A same
17, 2020 – a week away from
rating was recorded the following
the first administering of the
week, September 26, 2021.
PHILIPPINES survey.
(Survey was
Additional notes: The highest
conducted from Note: A 72% rating was
peak of rating (74%) was
periods of May recorded on the first week of
recorded only at one week. The
10, 2020 to July conducting the survey (May
following weeks were followed by
13, 2022) 10, 2020) while a 69% rating
much lower ratings ranging from
was recorded on July 13,
51% to 64% which was recorded
2022 – the last recorded
from May 24 to November 22,
rating on the survey.
2020.

A 90% rating was recorded for

The lowest rating was at 57%
two consecutive weeks – from
which was recorded on the same
March 25, 2021 to April 8,
SINGAPORE year, October 21, 2021.
2021)
(Survey was
conducted from Additional notes: The highest
Note: A 74% rating was
periods of May 7, peak of ratings ranging from 85%
recorded on the first week of
2020 to July 13, to 90% was recorded from
conducting the survey (May 7,
2022) November 5, 2020 to April 8,
2020) while an 81% rating
2021. While the lowest rating
was recorded on July 13,
started from September 8 to
2022 – the last recorded
December 1, 2021.
rating on the survey.
 Trust in health authorities

COUNTRY

*comparison of the Philippines and Singapore’s ratings

Highest rating
% of people in each market
who have a fair amount of
confidence in the health
authorities of their own
country in responding to the
virus.
Lowest rating
% of people in each market who
have less confidence in the health
authorities of their own country in
responding to the virus.

63% rating recorded on May

55% rating recorded on
28, 2020 – the first week of
September 21, 2020.
administering the survey.
PHILIPPINES
(Survey was Additional notes: The ratings for
Note: A 63% rating was
conducted from the citizen’s trust in health
recorded on the first week of
periods of May authorities has been almost at the
conducting the survey (May
28, 2020 to same level from the start of the
28, 2020) while a 55% rating
September 21, survey until the last week of
was recorded on September
2020) conducting the survey, ranging
21, 2020 – the last recorded
from 55% to 63%.
rating on the survey.
 An 84% rating was recorded
for three consecutive weeks The lowest rating was at 78%
starting from May 27, 2020 to which was recorded on July 23,
June 24, 2020). The same 2020.
SINGAPORE
rating was also recorded on
(Survey was
August 20, 2020. Additional notes: same as the
conducted from
Philippines, the ratings for the
periods of May
Note: An 84% rating was citizen’s trust in health authorities
28, 2020 to
recorded on the first week of (Singapore) has been almost at
September 21,
conducting the survey (May the same level from the start of
2020)
27, 2020) while an 82% rating the survey until the last week of
was recorded on September conducting the survey, ranging
16, 2020 – the last recorded from 78% to 84%
rating on the survey.

Filipinos and Singaporeans’ attitude towards safety measures and government

protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic
 Safety measures and government protocols

COUNTRY

*comparison of the Philippines and Singapore’s ratings

Willingness to take the vaccine

% of people in each country who have already took the vaccine

The highest (95%) rating was recorded on December 1, 2021 – a

PHILIPPINES
little bit late as compared to Singapore which the same rating was
(Survey was
reached in August that same year.
conducted from
periods of
The lowest ratings which ranges from 45% to 50% was recorded
December 20,
during the following weeks (January 3 to May 14, 2021) after the
2020 to July 13,
first survey was conducted.
2022)

SINGAPORE
99% rating was first recorded on January 26, 2022 and followed
(Survey was
by the same rating on April 13, 2022.
conducted from
periods of
The lowest rating (47%) has been recorded for only a week. After
December 20,
that, the ratings consistently rose from 61% upto 99% (January
2020 to July 13,
28, 2021 to July 13, 2022)
2022)
 Safety measures and government protocols

COUNTRY

*comparison of the Philippines and Singapore’s ratings

Practices social and physical distancing

% of people in each country who claims that they are avoiding
social gatherings/crowded places in public

The highest (85%) rating was recorded for three consecutive

PHILIPPINES
weeks from March 29 to April 12, 2020. The same rating was
(Survey was
recorded again in December of the same year.
conducted from
periods of
After the ratings rose by 84% in March 2020, it has been rising
February 20,
and lowering alternately. The first rating was recorded at 49%
2020 to July 13,
while the last week of conducting the survey was recorded at 69%.
2022)

SINGAPORE
(Survey was
An 86% rating was recorded on April 23, 2020.
conducted from
The lowest rating (44%) has been recorded for only a week. After
periods of
that, the ratings had also. been alternately lowering and rising.
February 20,
The last recorded rating was 58%.
2020 to July 13,
2022)
 Wearing face masks & shields

COUNTRY

*comparison of the Philippines and Singapore’s ratings

Practices social and physical distancing

% of people in each country who claim that they are wearing face
masks and face shields when in public places.

An 88% rating was first recorded on October 11, 2020. The same
PHILIPPINES
rating was recorded again on July 18, 2021.
(Survey was
conducted from
After the ratings rose by 84% in April 2020, it has been rising and
periods of
lowering alternately. The first rating was recorded at 62% while the
February 23, 2020
last week of conducting the survey was recorded at 84%.
to July 13, 2022)

SINGAPORE A 93% rating was recorded on June 17, 2021.

(Survey was The lowest rating (21%) has been recorded for only a week. After
conducted from that, the ratings took a major leap. Following the lower ratings, it
periods of significantly rose to 37% then 73% until it reached a peak of 90%
February 23, 2020 rating. The first rating was recorded at 24% while the last week of
to July 13, 2022) conducting the survey was recorded at 84%.

COUNTRY PROGRAM INITIATIVES RECEPTION

Tulong Kabataan-UPM ● Tulong Kabataan released a

Who they are: Tulong
Kabataan is a relief and
rehabilitation network initiated
by Kabataan Partylist to help
victims of floods, typhoons,
and other natural disasters.
statement condemning the
red-tagging and death threats
they have received through
their public phone number
displayed for donations.
● A few days after Non’s
initiative became popular, the
 What they contributed: called
for donations of face masks,
alcohol, PPEs and other
medical equipment in order to
help patients, health workers
and interns of the Philippine
PHILIPPINES General Hospital.
Community Pantries
What they are: food banks
established by Filipinos during
the country's COVID-19
community quarantine.
What they contributed: served
as a neighborhood supply for
food, beverage and other basic
necessities to people without
means to get access to these
items.
Be Kind SG
Who they are: a non-profit,
non-religious and non-political
volunteer-led group with
numerous advocacies.
What they contributed:
distributed 7,000 care
packages for healthcare staff
containing snacks, toiletries
and thank-you notes. They
also collaborated with over 80 ● Former Minister for Social
food and beverage
establishments and gathered
100 volunteers to distribute
775,000 meals to 15,000
beneficiaries.
KampungKakis App
SINGAPORE Who they are: a neighborhood
buddy system to support the
elderly and ​vulnerable
government’s military-led
anti-communist task force
started to look into the
background of the organizers
because they claim that the
organizers were part of the
Communist Party.
● Former Philippine President
Rodrigo Duterte also
condemned the community
pantry and called it “just for
show'' and that the
organizers were “mindless”.
Due to all the threats, many
had to lay low and
temporarily close their
community pantry despite
their genuine intentions to do
good in the community.
● Then Minister for Culture,
Community and Youth Grace
Fu recognizes how the
community went all out to
volunteer and donate. She
encourages them to further
grow the spirit of Singapore
Together to overcome
whatever challenges to
collectively “emerge as a
stronger society”.
and Family Development
Desmond Lee also
articulated his appreciation
for the strong community
spirit that Singaporeans
exhibited despite the hurdles
presented by COVID-19.
 residents during the COVID-19
pandemic and beyond

What they contributed: the

help they offer ranges from
friendly check-ins, looking for
available resources, picking up
meals and groceries, assisting
seniors to medical
appointments and even
helping children keep up with
their school work, especially
those facing financial
challenges.

2. Political Leadership

COUNTRY POLICY RESPONSES

Rodrigo Duterte Policy: Enforcement to Contain

What: President Rodrigo R. Duterte of the Philippines' populist

legacy was damaged by the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. At
least prior to COVID-19, Duterte demonstrated his ability to
provide effective governance in several sectors. Duterte, in
contrast to several other populists, appointed capable technocrats
to manage some aspects of policy, particularly those that were
economic in nature. The nation has had trouble containing the
pandemic despite establishing one of the toughest and longest
lockdowns in history. Although Duterte appears to have prevailed
in his assault on press freedom and human rights, his
government's track record in combating at best, the virus has
been patchy. The irony of Duterte's populist tenacity in the face of
his inadequate pandemic response draws attention to his mastery
of political maneuvering in a fragile state. Political coalitions
(including leadership, classes, and parties) and a balance of
social forces are two important inputs needed to apply state
capacity to a variety of objectives (Teehankee, 2022).

PHILIPPINES Why: The COVID-19 outbreak now poses a threat to highlight the
serious weaknesses in Duterte's kind of performative populism.
The Philippines has experienced one of the worst outbreaks in
Southeast Asia and one of the worst economic recessions in the
developing world while Duterte has been president. As opposed
to economic issues, where Duterte relied on technocrats to create
 viable policies, he personalized the COVID-19 disaster by placing
himself, like many other populists, at the core of the response
rather than public health professionals. Additionally, he has
placed an undue reliance on retired generals and police officers
who lack public health knowledge to manage critical components
of the issue, such as finding contacts and purchasing vaccines
(Heydarian, 2021).

Lee Hsien Loong Policy: Cooperation and Execution

What: In order to combine accepting foreign workers with

addressing the economic and social problems of its inhabitants,
Singapore will reevaluate its foreign worker policies, according to
Prime Minister (PM) Lee Hsien Loong. Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong spoke during the debate on the Motion of Thanks to the
President about how Singapore handled the COVID-19 outbreak,
how to strengthen social safety nets in the face of COVID-19 and
other challenges, and how to achieve a better balance in politics
and forge political consensus. Since gaining independence,
Singapore had gone through a number of significant crises, yet
with each episode, it had grown stronger.

How: The COVID-19 virus has put every nation in the globe to
the test, and Singapore's response was not without flaws. The
following are some things the government could have done
differently: Realizing COVID-19 patients were contagious even
when asymptomatic; putting all returning overseas Singaporeans
SINGAPORE in quarantine rather than just those from specific nations; testing
everyone before releasing them from quarantine, even if they
don't exhibit symptoms; and requiring the wearing of face masks
sooner. Singapore has achieved good health outcomes, with a
low mortality rate, a reducing rate of new infections, and fewer
than 100 hospitalized patients. Singapore's healthcare system
was expanded, the SAF and Home Team were mobilized to help
with testing and ensure the well-being of migrant workers, and a
circuit breaker was implemented in April 2020, all of which helped
to flatten the curve.

COUNTRY TASK FORCE

Inter Agency Task Force on Emerging Infectious Diseases

What: The Inter-Agency Task Force on Emerging Infectious

Diseases (IATF-EID), led by the Departments of Health (DOH)
 and Foreign Affairs (DFA), a task force established by the
Philippine government's executive to address issues relating to
newly developing infectious diseases in the nation.

Why: If we examine the establishment of the Inter-Agency Task

Force on Emergency Infectious Diseases, the securitization of the
pandemic in the Philippines is clear (IATF-EID). It demonstrates
PHILIPPINES the administration's reliance on the military and police because
these individuals made up the majority of the task force rather
than medical experts and epidemiologists (Hapal, 2021).

Multi-Agency Task Force

What: Oversee the nationwide, comprehensive response to the

unique coronavirus outbreak. To safeguard Singaporeans and
maintain vigilance against the disease's spread, coordinate the
community's response. collaborate with the global community to
combat the outbreak.

Why: At the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, the

Multi-Ministry Task Force, directed by the Ministry of Health, was
SINGAPORE able to swiftly coordinate and improve interdepartmental
cooperation (Walid Jumblatt Abdullah & Soojin Kim, 2020). This
level of efficient communication demonstrates that the
Multi-Ministry Task Force's behavior was adopted by the other
participating ministries, and that the Ministry of Health was given
the authority to lead the task force. Singapore's Prime Minister
Lee Hsien Loong played a larger role in the pandemic response
by speaking to the public and granting authority to the
Multi-Ministry Task Force, which was in charge of developing the
key policies.