NEAR A RED DRAGON: SOUTHEAST ASIA-CHINA RELATIONS

(This House as a SEA nation to actively seek closer ties with

The People’s Republic of China: Affirmative)

INTLAW2 BLDI1 AB-DIA

Academic Year 2022-2023

By: Dinglasan Sean Christian B.

Dela-Salle College of Saint-Benilde
Political and Economic Conditions
The South China Sea being an active maritime area, with many
claimants including various South East Asian Nations adjacent to
the People’s Republic of China, has seen disputes between
claimants, even before the filing of the famous Philippine
Republic’s petition for the South China Sea Arbitration against
the People’s Republic of China. Disputes occur due to fishing
rights, maritime zone jurisdiction, oil and gas exploration, and
the implementation of military installations and personnel in the
region. The issues at hand between various claimants are in regards
to; 1) China’s nine dash line claims in the maritime zones of the
South China Sea, 2) creation of artificial islands for military
installations that include dumping, which also harms the marine
environment in the region, 3) large scale fishing methods used by
some parties causing irreparable damage to the marine environment,
4) and actions of China concerning the interference of PLA
(People’s Liberation Army) vessels violating the sovereign rights
and freedom under UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea) of adjacent nations facing China [A.C. Robles Jr, 2020].
Due to all these issues China has failed with its UNCLOS
obligations, of the prohibition of Chinese fishing vessels
practicing illegal fishing within the South China Sea violating
the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity), due to the use of
heavy equipment and harmful chemicals in extracting resources.
In tackling the issues at hand, we first must be given an
understanding of the vital importance of the sea to nation states
and governments, in progressing and furthering their domestic and
foreign policies. The sea is of a cultural, political, and economic
importance, coastal states utilize the sea for purposes such as,
tourism, exercise of power, exploitation of resources (e.g. oil,
natural gas, commodities, food, and raw materials), and trade. Its
role can be categorized into two, an active and a passive role; 1)
active in terms of commerce, military, and migration, 2) passive
in terms of being a barrier or buffer between island states,
providing protection against political or military actions [T.
Yoshihara, 2007]. The geographical conditions in the South China
Sea naturally permits littoral states in the region to look
seaward, and focus their policy now or in the near future towards
the sea. Concerns that are present, in regards to security,
resource demands, and jurisdiction of states in certain maritime
zones, are important to consider whether states adjacent to
Mainland China should establish closer and active relations with
the People’s Republic of China.
The economic and political conditions of South East Asian
states require them, in my own perspective to adopt a dualist
approach in regards to their China Policy, due to their weak
economic and military power. Dualist approach to China Policy means
that, although South East Asian Countries (e.g. Indonesia,
Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam etc.) see the People’s
Republic of China as a great military threat, it also realizes and
acknowledges that the People’s Republic of China is a major
economic partner for development, investments and joint ventures
[T. Yoshihara, 2007]. To understand the context of this argument,
we can see examples to policies of South East Asian Countries that
have claims in the South China Sea, for example, Indonesia’s major
export market is the People’s Republic of China but contests its
presence in the maritime zones that it claims, Singapore hosts US
Navy logistics and vessels, Thailand is a major Non-NATO ally, but
supports the One China Policy, the Philippines is still willing to
be obligated with its Mutual Defense Treaty with the US and relies
on Chinese investment for infrastructure and industrial related
projects, and Vietnam supports US presence in the South China Sea
and allows port visits from the US Navy.
In determining the exercise of political power and policies
of South East Asian states, we will only focus on ASEAN states
that have strong claims in regards to the South China Sea issue,
because this paper will only tackle the South China Sea issue
specifically. Each South East Asian states that have claims in the
South China Sea have an active approach in handling their policies
regarding the People’s Republic of China’s actions within the
proximity of their claimed maritime zones, although each in a
different manner, they are executing their political power to the
fullest extent. Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines
are example of states with claims in the region that adopts an
active approach against the People’s Republic of China, through
actively participating in military naval exercises with the U.S.
Navy and procurement weapon and information systems, to have the
capabilities to respond and monitor the actions of Chinese vessels
militarily. While Vietnam does not actively participate in joint
military exercises with the U.S., they allow port visits and even
supports U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region as a way to
balance against their larger neighbor which is Mainland China.
Unlike other states that are democratically structured Vietnam’s
policy is an interesting topic to tackle, they employ and fund a
maritime militia like the People’s Republic of China to operate in
certain maritime zones of contested regions [G. Poling, 2021].
Contesting states against the People’s Republic of China are
exercising their political power to counter China’s influence as
stated in the latter paragraph, but it must be noted that they
still consider Mainland China as their top 1 major trading partner.
Trade between South East Asia and Mainland China has increased
from $235 billion in 2010 to $507 billion in 2019 [ASEAN-China
Economic Relations], this will keep on continuing as a trend due
to the large market that South East Asia and Mainland China poses,
with 1.4 billion population from the mainland and 600-700million
population of South East Asia. All South East Asian states that
have claims in the South China Sea, trades with the People’s
Republic of China on a large scale, exporting their raw materials
to the mainland and importing manufactured goods from Mainland
China. This fact will be considered in the proceeding parts to
argue as to why it is economically beneficial to actively seek
closer relations with the People’s Republic of China.
South East Asia and Mainland China are not the only states
that considers the South China Sea of vital importance, that will
affect their domestic and foreign policies. Japan, Republic of
Korea, and Republic of China (Taiwan), are North East Asian Nations
that relies on free passage in the South China Sea zone for their
political and economic influence, in terms of trade, and movement
of information, technology, commodities, and people. Losing access
to the South China Sea will greatly affect the domestic conditions
of their country, that means losing access to the world market.
These are capable states that are militarily and politically
competent compared to the rest of South East Asia, greatly
affecting the balance of power in the region on whether China can
control South China Sea exclusively for itself or for all states
concerned in the region. Japan and South Korea that has a strong
weapons and arms industry, can provide belligerents with needed
heavy weaponry with their strong industrial power in case
confrontations escalate further. We already see the potential of
South Korea as a major weapons and arms exporter, as they have
made their presence in Europe already in the ongoing Ukraine War
supplying small arms, ammunition, and tanks, siphoning deals
through other countries that are supporting Ukraine actively in
the war [D. Yoon, 2023].
Limitations and Parameters
In support of the proposition to seeking active-closer
relations with the People’s Republic of China, means to constantly
find ways to utilize and share resources in South China Sea,
without being prejudicial to the rights and obligations of the
fellow concerned states in the region to their constituents. Adding
to that, active-closer relations would also mean not endangering
the national security of South East Asian states and security of
South East Asia as a whole, whilst actively engaging with the
People’s Republic of China on economic and trade initiatives. If
South East Asian states does not actively seek cooperation with
the People’s Republic of China politically and economically, the
dispute in the South China Sea will continue to deteriorate. The
citizens of the states concerned in the region must feel and see
the economic benefits of fully utilizing the resources of South
China Sea. If food and energy prices can be lowered, then the view
that citizens have that the issue in the South China Sea is of
territoriality not of exclusive economic rights, can be
eliminated, which will offer better conditions for cooperation and
partnerships, improving the relationship of states with each
other. A point to be made, it does not mean that South East Asian
states should openly conform with the policies of the People’s
Republic of China, I am arguing that South East Asian states must
cooperate in open arms, but prepared in military and political
confrontations if national and regional security is at stake.
It is important to note that the People’s Republic of China
and states adjacent to it adjust their South China Sea policies,
according to the demands of the people and the political will of
the government to pursue national interest. There are many factors
to consider why contested regions in the South China Sea still see
clashes between government vessels and aggressiveness against
foreign fishing vessels on either side. If South East Asian States
in the region actively seeks closer relations with the People’s
Republic of China, the government would have to conform to the
demands of the people and the people to encourage the political
will of the government to pursue a state’s national interest. But,
the demands of the people can be prejudicial to the relationship
of a government to another foreign government, as the conflict in
the South China Sea region overlaps within the EEZ of contesting
states. A state’s population being ignorant of international law,
can easily be swayed to believe that the South China Sea issue is
of a territoriality issue, not of economic issue, and push against
joint-ventures and economic partnerships. For this reason, despite
the provisions of UNCLOS in regards to the sharing of resources,
even within the EEZ of states, the People’s Republic of China and
adjacent states to it comes into conflict with each other (this
will be discussed further on the proceeding parts). Politics play
a role in furthering or hampering progress and development,
governments will adjust their stances according to the demands of
the people, especially in a century where the demands of the people
whether economic or cultural is the determining factor whether a
ruling government will survive or endure for years to come.
Joint venture with the People’s Republic of China entails
cooperation and partnership in exploring and extracting marine
resources in the South China Sea, whether living or non-living
resources. Eliminating restrictions in order to further the need
to extract resources in the region, especially in a time when the
Asia-Pacific region is increasing its demands for energy and food
resources as populations and economies rise. When it comes to joint
ventures and extraction of resources, especially of natural gas
and oil, areas in the South China Sea also faces geological and
technological concerns [U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2019]. The region is prone to typhoons and earthquakes, strong
currents and submarine valleys pose a challenge in effective gas
infrastructure. National oil companies see it fit to partner with
international oil companies, due to the fact that they have a
limited capacity to extract resources in areas, whether contested
or not. It wouldn’t matter how much a country can claim a certain
area or zone, if it does not have the capacity to make use of its
maritime areas that are rich in marine resources. In the future,
national oil companies operating in the South China Sea, whether
from ASEAN states or the People’s Republic of China, would need to
partner up collectively, due to the fact that national oil
companies cannot tackle the challenges alone to extract resources
in the South China Sea.
Boldly speaking, all contesting states in the region only
wants to provide for their constituents and ensure the livelihood
and economic security of their populations. Ensuring this, may
require muscle and power, to which civilized men who have enjoyed
peace throughout their lives cannot simply fathom. States are
actors that does not think like an individual does, it provides
for a whole population in a world where there are walls and lines
that nation states determine which cannot be crossed. Sometimes
these walls and lines must be crossed, through political will of
a government against another state for the benefit of the
population’s economic well-being. This is the present situation on
the South China Sea, all contesting states are capable of military
and violent means to provide for their people, that no law, no
matter how binding it is, can stop the inherent duty of a state,
which is the need to provide for the people.
Territorial Jurisdiction of the Sea
A Coastal State’s level of jurisdiction over its maritime
zones are embedded in the Articles 55 and 56 of the UNCLOS. In the
exclusive economic zone, a Coastal State has only “sovereign
rights” not “sovereignty”, meaning the EEZ is only an extension of
a territory. In determining the “sovereign rights” of a Coastal
State’s EEZ, it is stated in Article 56 of UNCLOS that the Coastal
State has rights for the exploitation, exploration, conservation
and managing of non-living and living resources, including the
production of energy from water within its EEZ, and that exercising
rights and duties in the EEZ, the Coastal State shall have due
regard to the rights and duties of other states and act in a manner
compatible with the provisions of the UNCLOS. Understanding that
the EEZ does not fully embody a territory of a state, but only an
extension of it, affirms that issues within the EEZ cannot be made
into an issue of territoriality. In this regard issues relating to
certain maritime zones in South East Asia, and violations
concerning encroachment within the EEZ of Coastal States, can only
be on the bounds of the rights to the exploitation and management
of resources within the EEZ as stated in the Article 56 of UNCLOS.
Given the conditions and importance of the South China Sea to
all parties concerned who wish to access its vital resources and
strategic location, I argue that South East Asia must actively
seek closer ties with China in exploring joint-venture activities
for economic and resource exploitation projects, especially in
extracting resources in the South China Sea that requires huge
investments in technology and heavy equipment, like oil drilling.
South East Asian states, have no capacity to fully exploit living
and non-living resources in the South China Sea, if it is able to,
it is still bound by international law to share and establish
equitable cooperation of exploiting resources within their EEZ
[UNCLOS Article 69 No.3, 1982]. Even though the People’s Republic
of China has disregarded the ruling of the RP-PRC South China Sea
Arbitration, activities conducted by the People’s Republic of
China relating to exploitation of living and non-living resources
are within the bounds of international law, on the grounds of
UNCLOS Articles 55 to 75 relating to the coastal state’s
obligations and rights of access within the EEZ [J. G. Bernas,
2009].
The People’s Republic of China is permitted by international
law to access vital resources within the South China Sea. With the
invocation of Article 70 on The Law of the Sea, states that
“geographically disadvantaged states” shall have the right to
participate on the exploitation of resources within the EEZ of
coastal states of the same region or subregion, while Article 62
states that when a coastal state does not have the capacity to
harvest allowable catch, it must grant other states access,
especially states that are categorized as “geographically
disadvantaged”. Geographically disadvantaged states constitute
“states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, whose
geographical situation makes them dependent upon the exploitation
of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of other
States in the subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish
for the nutritional purposes of their populations or parts thereof”
[UNCLOS Article 70, 1982]. The People’s Republic of China can be
categorized as a “geographically disadvantaged” state in this
regard (see table 1 as reference). The People’s Republic of China
is dependent upon the exploitation of marine resources of the EEZ
of other states overlapping many adjacent states EEZ facing
Mainland China proving that within the bounds of International
Law, they must be allowed to exploit the resources in the South
China Sea, including those within the EEZ of South East Asian
states, in order to protect the livelihood and food security of
the Chinese public.

Table 1. Map Showing the Exclusive Economic Zones of States in

South East Asia

Invoking Articles 55 to 75 of the UNCLOS, would give the

People’s Republic of China a right to exploit the resources in
certain maritime zones of the South China Sea inside the EEZ of
other states. States may contest the lawfulness of China’s claims
and actions in the region on the grounds of violating the CBD
(Convention on Biological Diversity), due to the harmful effects
of large-scale fishing activities, and creation of artificial
islands on the marine environment. If states naturally adhere to
the constitutional supremacy principle, then the People’s Republic
of China can disregard International Laws and Conventions, because
they are acting accordingly for the domestic needs of the state,
economically and politically, on the grounds of their
constitution. Chapter II Fundamental Rights and Obligations of
Citizens Articles 42 and 50 of the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China states that, “the state shall create employment
opportunities and strengthen worker protections” and “the People’s
Republic of China shall protect legitimate rights and interests of
Chinese nationals overseas” [Constitution of the People’s Republic
of China, 1982]. It is an inherent duty of the state to provide
and protect the needs of their people, acknowledging this, the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China obligates them to
protect their claims in the South China Sea, as the sea is crucial
to employment, food security, and overall economic opportunities
for Chinese nationals. Adhering to the constitutional supremacy
principle, the duties and obligations of a government to its
citizens deserve preferential consideration when they collide with
treaty and international law obligations.
If concerned states acknowledge and adhere to the
constitutional supremacy principle and widely uses it in their
domestic legal practice, then the People’s Republic of China can
adhere to the constitutional supremacy principle. In adopting the
principle of reciprocity, the People’s Republic of China also
enjoys the privileges that adjacent states have, in regards to
using international law mechanisms and principles. States that may
argue regarding the violations of the People’s Republic of China
have with its CBD obligations, would have to ensure that they also
are fully in compliance of the CBD. the People’s Republic of China
may invoke that on the grounds of the principle of reciprocity, a
contesting state must prove first that they fully comply with their
CBD obligations, to make a contesting state’s claim viable.
Therefore, adjacent countries to China must ensure that they are
meeting their obligations under the UNCLOS or the CBD, before they
can make claims against China on the grounds of International Law.
It is also a fact that the EEZ is only an extension of a
Coastal State’s territoriality, not necessarily making it a
territory of a Coastal State, that is why in a legal perspective,
the activities of the People’s Republic of China in the EEZ of
other Coastal States cannot be viewed as a territorial issue.
Coastal States may contest their claims regarding their sovereign
rights as to the exploitation and management of resources within
their EEZ, but they cannot contest their claims of territorial
jurisdiction within the EEZ as it is not considered as territory
of a state only the rights of a state to enjoy its economic use
exclusively, on the grounds of UNCLOS Articles 55 to 75. Only when
issues arise within the territorial sea and internal waters, can
a Coastal State consider an action perpetrated by the People’s
Republic of China, as a violation of its sovereignty or territory,
and can make use of military or political means, to eliminate a
threat. These reasons limit the claims of Coastal States in certain
maritime zones of the South China Sea, to only exercise non-
militaristic policies against the People’s Republic of China.
The Necessity to Seek Closer Ties
I argue that South East Asia must actively seek closer ties
with the People’s Republic of China, because, it is in the best
interest of states to fully exploit and make use of the resources
in the South China Sea. In doing so, requires huge effort and
investments, an access to equipment and facilities, whether
harvesting and post-harvesting facilities. The People’s Republic
of China, being an economic powerhouse, has the capabilities to
fully exploit the resources in the region, in a way economically
weak countries cannot, because most South East Asian countries do
not have the technology, equipment, and facilities to exploit
marine resources on a large-scale. That is why the economic
policies of South East Asian states must actively seek cooperation
with the People’s Republic of China on joint-ventures to drill oil
and fish the maritime zones to the full extent. This can provide
South East Asian nations and the People’s Republic of China food
security and energy security. With South China Sea holding one
third of the world’s marine diversity and an estimated reserve of
200 billion oil barrels and 200 trillion cubic feet of natural
gases [Xander Vagg, 2012], if extracted and shared, would ensure
the food and energy security of South East Asian states and the
People’s Republic of China. The People’s Republic of China and
states adjacent to it, must create provisions in their domestic
laws regarding fishing rights and drilling rights, that will allow
them to actively and jointly exploit maritime resources in their
EEZ with their neighbors. Granting South East Asian states and the
People’s Republic of China, a free market access to energy, food
resources and raw materials that in the future will be exploited
on a large scale in South China Sea. This can, in the near future,
decrease food and energy prices, if done accordingly for the
benefit of all, to provide for the economic needs of the people in
the South China Sea region.
I support the proposition to actively seek closer relations
with the People’s Republic of China, due to the fact that the
capacity of South East Asian states to fully exploit resources in
South China Sea is limited especially when it comes to natural gas
and oil resources. It is the duty of the state to provide for the
people, that is why South East Asian states must utilize the
economic benefits that China can provide, but with limitations to
preserve and protect national and regional security.
To summarize my arguments on why it is necessary for South East
Asia to actively seek closer ties with the People’s Republic of
China, is because;
1.) This will present dialogue for future prospects regarding
peace and security.
2.) It can enhance the economic security of South East Asia.
3.) Mainland China is a major trading partner of ASEAN.
4.) It is a government’s inherent duty to provide for the
people’s economic and national/regional security,
upholding peace and order to renounce war as a foreign
policy instrument adhering to international law
mechanisms.
5.) Under the provisions of UNCLOS a state’s EEZ does not
constitute sovereignty, only sovereign rights, therefore
the People’s Republic of China does not violate the
sovereignty of adjacent states if they explore and exploit
resources within the EEZ of adjacent states.
6.) South East Asia being a region of states adjacent to
mainland China with their own political and cultural way
 of life, must abide by their international obligations no
matter what challenges they face, this will determine the
future geopolitical conditions whether international law
will unite or divide states to the point of conflict,
economic or military.
7.) South East Asia is at the forefront of a war, to determine
whether international law is actually binding or not.
Policy Recommendations
In the hopes to seek and active and closer relations with the
People’s Republic of China, South East Asian states must adopt
policies that would enable all states in the region to share and
access resources in the region, but not prejudicial to national
and regional security of South East Asian states. My economic
policy recommendations to ensure that the marine resources in South
China Sea are exploited fully and shared among states, all
concerned states in the region must; 1) create and adopt legal
provisions that can actively invite and allow foreign investments
and projects for oil drilling and marine resource harvesting within
a state’s EEZ, 2) grant a free market access to resources that are
exploited in the region and eliminate protectionist policies that
can harm a state’s access to food and energy resources, 3) exempt
tariff laws and regulations on the import and export of resources
specifically exploited in South China Sea. These policies can be
implemented through a multilateral body such as the ASEAN
(Association of South East Asian Nations) through a treaty
creation, requiring its provisions on tariffs and granting project
access relating to oil drilling and marine harvesting to be
transformed into domestic laws of concerned states. Adopting these
policies can lower food and energy prices in the region if
resources in the South China Sea are utilized to the full extent.
A free market access to these resources in the future, can provide
states with food and energy security, which in the future can
reduce tensions in the South China Sea region and preserve global
peace and security.
When it comes to national and regional security policies to
avoid conflict or ensure that the national interests of South East
Asian states are not endangered while pursuing active relations
with the People’s Republic of China. South East Asia must continue
to bolster its conventional warfare capabilities, and participate
in military exercises with the United States Navy, in order to
have capabilities to counter the People’s Republic of China in
case they endanger regional security in the Asia-Pacific region.
South East Asia must; (1) constantly procure weapon systems and
which systems would be best to counter a possible Chinese threat
in the South China Sea, (2) participate in military naval exercises
with neighboring countries and especially the U.S. navy, (3)
through political will, reform their military from unconventional
methods of warfare to conventional methods of warfare by
eliminating politics and bad practices in military academies, (4)
encourage technological change in military to develop and procure
new information systems in order to monitor and track naval and
aerial movements in South China Sea, as an early warning and
detection system to counter possible threats that could endanger
national and regional security.
To simply summarize, my policy recommendations in regards
with South East Asia seeking active closer relations with the
People’s Republic of China, it comes into two, economic policies
and national security policies of South East Asian states. For
economic policies South East Asia must; (1) invite and allow
Chinese ventures in oil and natural gas in the region, because
national oil companies have no capacity to fully extract and
explore such resources, and (2) promote and encourage non-
protectionist policies that would enable a free market access to
exploited resources in the South China Sea, for flow of goods to
circulate equally among states. For security policies, South East
Asia must; (1) procure more weapons, (2) promote and encourage
military cooperation between states, (3) develop more deterrent
capabilities against possible threats like China.
I thus argue that seeking close economic cooperation would
ease tensions in the South China Sea region. This can be
beneficial, as states will be able to share resources in the region
and preserve peace and security for the coming future. While we
must cater to the economic needs of states, we also must ensure
that the national and regional security of South East Asia must
not be endangered, so it must be protected with policies that
promote stronger military capabilities and presence at any moments
notice.
Conclusion
On conditions that the People’s Republic of China, really
pursues total control of the South China Sea, and adheres to a
protectionist policy to exclusively enjoy and exploit resources,
and disregards the economic claims of other states that can harm
the domestic conditions of South East Asia’s energy and food
security, then South East Asia can also invoke their rights on the
bounds of international law, or use any means, whether political
or military.
To conclude this paper, South East Asia must actively seek
closer relations with the People’s Republic of China, while
continuing to adopt a dualist approach with their relationship to
the People’s Republic of China. Although it must actively seek
closer relations economically and politically, it still should
continue to see the People’s Republic of China as a military threat
and create deterrence capabilities to counter possible actions
that will be prejudicial to South East Asia’s military and economic
security. All contesting states should also see that they all are
carrying out their inherent duty to provide and protect what’s for
their people, and in doing so must not disregard that an inevitable
military conflict could, at any time happen, if sharing and
cooperation is not prioritized. Striving for closer relations does
not entail, disregarding a possible military conflict with the
People’s Republic of China. States have the inherent right to adopt
any possible measures to counter threats that endanger the security
and livelihood of their people, it has been so since the dawn of
civilization, even before international law has been formed. War
and trade or military actions and economic cooperation, has been
for centuries, a constant state practice, and states will continue
to practice these methods of policies. Understanding this, we must
actively seek closer relations with the People’s Republic of China
to ensure peace and security in the South China Sea region, and
avoid a possible military conflict that could negatively affect
everyone around the globe.
 SOURCES:
[1] Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Canada. (2020,
September 13). The history and reality of the South China Sea
issue. 中华人民共和国驻加拿大大使馆. https://ca.china-
embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202009/t20200913_4615002.htm
[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.
(2023, January 5). Joint statement between the People’s Republic
of China and the Republic of the Philippines. 中华人民共和国外交部
. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/20230
1/t20230105_11001064.html
[3] Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas or Peasant Movement of the
Philippines (KMP). (2023, January 6). Farmers to marcos Jr: Bare
details and conditionalities of Chinese agri-fisheries deals.
updates from the peasant movement of the
Philippines. https://peasantmovementph.com/2023/01/06/farmers-
to-marcos-jr-bare-details-and-conditionalities-of-chinese-agri-
fisheries-deals/
[4] World Integrated Trade Solution. (n.d.). Indonesia trade |
WITS data. World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) | Data on Export,
Import, Tariff,
NTM. https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/IDN
[6] Wingfield-Hayes, R. (2023, February 1). US secures deal on
Philippines bases to complete arc around China. BBC
News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64479712
[5] Staff Writer. (2021, July 5). China outspends US in ASEAN
investment blitz. Nikkei Asia.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-
outspends-US-in-ASEAN-investment-blitz
[6] Devonshire-Ellis, C. (2022, August 15). 2023 foreign
investment opportunities in the Philippines. ASEAN Business News.
https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2023-foreign-investment-
opportunities-in-the-philippines/
[7] Alfredo C. Robles, J. (2019). Endangered species and fragile
ecosystems in the South China Sea: The Philippines v. China
arbitration. Springer Nature.
[8] Yoshihara, T., & Holmes, J. R. (2007). Asia looks seaward:
Power and maritime strategy. Greenwood Publishing Group.
[9] United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea. Welcome to the United Nations.
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/
unclos_e.pdf
[10] Tufts University. (n.d.). Chapter 10: The South China Sea
tribunal – Law of the Sea. sites.tufts.edu - Tufts Self-Serve Blogs
and Websites. https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-ten/
[11] Bernas, J. G. (2009). Introduction to public international
law.
[12] Yoon, D. (2023, February 2). Ukraine war drives rapid growth
in South Korea’s arms exports.
WSJ. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-war-drives-rapid-
growth-in-south-koreas-arms-exports-11675345212
[13] National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China.
(2020, March 18). Constitution of the People's Republic of China.
中国人大网
. https://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/constitution2019/201911/1f65
146fb6104dd3a2793875d19b5b29.shtml
[14 U.S. Energy Information Agency. (2019, 15). International.
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-
interest/South_China_Sea
[15] Vagg, X. (2012, December 4). Resources in the South China Sea.
American Security Project.
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/resources-in-the-south-
china-sea/
[16] Poling, G., Natalegawa, A., & Hudes, S. (2021, July 6). The
unlikely, indispensable U.S.-Vietnam partnership. CSIS | Center
for Strategic and International Studies.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/unlikely-indispensable-us-vietnam-
partnership
[17] ASEAN-Economic Relations.
(n.d.). Overview. https://asean.org/our-communities/economic-
community/integration-with-global-economy/asean-china-economic-
relation/