CHAPTER 3

3.1. Introduction

3.2. Errors in Semantic interpretation

3.3. Pedagogical interpretation

3.4. Sunyata as apophaticism

3.5. Benefits of Madhyamika Method

3.6. conclusion
3.1. Introduction

3.2. Errors in Semantic interpretation

This ‘semantic reading of Nagarjuna’s theory, despite its importance as a criticism of the
metaphysical interpretations, seems to be defective and improbable. Regardless, it is
presented as the sole alternative to the metaphysical interpretations. Four arguments are
discussed in this section to demonstrate those flaws in their interpretation.This includes
arguments against their claim for the existence of the ‘conventional only’, which appear
clearly inconceivable without the presupposition of something ‘real’, as well as verses in
Nagarjuna that are in opposition to the semantic interpretation, which seem too great and
significant to be ignored.

In addition to these reasons, Siderits is also aware that his interpretation disagrees with
some passages in Nagarjuna’s works. Thus, rather than relying on its undeniable textual
reliability to justify his anti realist reading, he turns to extra textual considerations. 1 In
doing so, he appears to indirectly support those scholars who argue that it is impossible to
resolve the diverse interpretations of Nagarjuna's philosophy based just on passages from
his works.2 They suggest that in order to reconstruct Nagarjuna's philosophy, it is
necessary to consider factors that vary from it, such as the viewpoints of his later
commentators.3

3.2.1. Impossibility of Conceiving the Conventional Without the Real

Siderits and Garfield's semantic interpretation can be described as follows: ultimate truth
is the vision of the lack of any ultimate reality, implying that only conventional realities
exist, and conventional truth is the belief that things are not conventional realities but
ultimate realities.4 to be more specific, According to this view, "conventional truth
consists of the belief that things possess svabhva”,5 hence the ordinary manner of

1
Siderits, Nagarjuna as anti-realist, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 324.
2
Griffiths, Review of D. Burton’s Emptiness appraised. Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 7, 24.
3
Tillemans,What are the Madhyamikas refusing, In Three mountains and seven rivers, 519.
4
ooooooooooooooooo
5
ooooooooooooooo
perceiving things is to see them as real, substantial, and possessing svabhva. On an
epistemological level, the conventional condition is defined by the tendency to think of
objects as having substantiality and then project these ideas onto a reality that lacks
substantiality. However, this view is at conflict with the understanding of Nagarjuna's
thought for two reasons, both textual and logical in nature.

Most verses of the Mulamadhyamikakarika, according to Candrakrti, were composed by

Nagarjuna with the intention of "opposing the superimposition (adhyropa) of a false own-
nature (svarpa),"6 in other words, to put a end to the conventional way of seeing. To
emphasize this delusive nature of conventional reality, chandrakirti adds:
All entities are apprehended in terms of their two natures,Depending upon whether they are perceived by
correct or false perception. The object of the correct perception is reality, And what is seen falsely is the
conventional truth.7
As a result, claiming that the ultimate truth is that only conventional realities exist cannot
be justified in light of the textual tradition. Another problem with semantic interpretation
stems from their assertion that "the ultimate truth is that ultimate reality does not exist."8
It appears to be a logical error, because notions like 'conventionality' or 'conceptual being'
are inconceivable without some sense of reality or independent existence. Contrary to
what semantics claims, denying any reality beyond the conceptual not only imply
'eliminating reality,' but rather it asserts the conceptual as the only ‘real.' Ironically, this
viewpoint resembles an idealistic one9, in which the only reality is the mind-dependent
reality of mental constructions alone. However, their position will then become a
metaphysical-realist perspective from which semantic interpreters, claims to take a
distance.10

6
Prasannapada 58. 10
7
freedom from extreemes,160
8
0000000000000
9
Idealism which considers that reality is a mental construct which has existence to the extent that it is
percieved by a human.
10
Siderits, Buddhism as a philosophy,181.
As a response to this logical objection, semantic interpreters argue that it is possible to
establish the existence of something that is merely conventional, without it deriving from
any ultimate reality. As an example, as discussed in the preceding chapter, both Siderits
and Garfield appeal to the establishment of money. Siderits states that since the end of the
gold standard, the value of a banknote is in no way intrinsic, nor does its value derive
from anything other than the function of exchange that people who belong to a given
monetary system conventionally recognize in it. However, This appears to be a weak
example, because we know that the conventionality of a banknote is dependent on the
reality of the values it represents. It would not be possible, nor would it make sense, to
build a monetary system if real goods did not exist.11

Claims satiating that it is possible to conceive of a conventional existence without

recognising any reality upon which it can be constructed are analogous to saying that the
world could be an illusion that arises from nothing, with no objective or subjective
grounding. This viewpoint contradicts both the textual tradition and a logical
understanding of madhyamika thought. It would be absurd to define this reality as only a
delusion or a convention. In Kantian terminology, the phenomena becomes reality in the
absence of a noumenon.

3.2.4. Semantic Interpretation Indistinguishable from Nihilism (Proximity to)

Despite semantic interpreters attempt to distance their reading from objections of

nihilism, their arguments remain unconvincing. Buddhist scholar E. Chinn, In his
analysis of Garfield's antirealist position, concluded that it “verges at times on
nihilism”.12 Garfield, concerned of being accused of nihilism for his interpretations of the
two truths, attempts to defend his account of emptiness by asserting through axiomatic
affirmations that: "The emptiness of all phenomena that Nagarjuna defends is not

11
Ferraro, criticism of msiderits, 212.
12
Chinn, Nagarjuna’s fundamental doctrine of pratıtyasamutpada, Philosophy East and West, 51(1), 68.
nonexistence: to be empty of essence is not to be empty of existence. Instead, to exist is
to be empty. To be devoid of essence is to simply exist in a conventional manner."13

Yet, if we analyze the reasoning of interpretations that are convinced of Nagarjuna’s

nihilism, we find that their arguments do not differ significantly from Garfield's. The
conclusions of authors who held a nihilistic position on madhyamika, such as Burton,
Wood,14 Oetke,15 and Narain16 appear indistinguishable from the semantic positions.
According to Burton, who advocated for a nihilistic reading of Nagarjuna, dependently
arisen entities lack svabhva, implying that they are not real. That is to say, they are only
conceptually constructed entities. Dependently originated entities have an existence that
is wholly dependent on the constructing activity of mind, similar to a dream or an
illusion.17 As a result, Burton believes that this position entails that nothing exists, and
hence it falls under the category of nihilism.18

From the semantic perspective, it is unclear how such affirmations can be distinguished
from theirs. Indeed, Garfield and Siderits, like the nihilist interpreters, asserts that things
exist only conventionally or conceptually; that dharmas do not exist in the ultimate sense;
and that there is no other reality that transcends dharmas. The only difference is, whereas
Burton concludes from this viewpoint that "the philosophy presented by these writings is
pure and simple nihilism,"19 while semantic interpreters refuse to designate it as such.
Nonetheless, it appears that this is only a matter of assigning different names to
interpretive perspectives that are otherwise indistinguishable.

3.2.5. Siderits position entails metaphysics from paper 2

13
Garfield, Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika, 27.
14
Wood,Nāgārjunian disputations,174.
15
Oetke,Nihilist and non-nihilist interpretation of Madhyamaka. Acta Orientalia, 57, 59.
16
Narain,The Mādhyamika mind, 100.
17
Burton, Emptiness appraised,99.
18
Burton, Emptiness appraised, 111.
19
Burton, Emptiness appraised,99.
Another weakness is that, despite his assertion that semantic interpretation allows him to
avoid realist metaphysical positions, we could find a realistic orientation in his method.
Siderits argued that ultimate truth is the belief required "to obtain liberation," 20
corresponding to a reality in which nothing is really existing and everything is
conventional, yet this position resembles a form of realism since it accepts that there is a
reality and also a metaphysical view, because it maintains that this reality is completely
non-substantial.

therefore, although claiming to be anti-realistic , they accepts that things exists

conventionally, which is the same as admitting that things exist in some way. Only a
substantialist theory, according to Siderits, can be considered realistic. 21 However, the
philosophical concept of realism only establishes that reality exists in some way, and not
what that way is. Therefore, To state that things only exist conventionally is to suggest
that they exist in some way. Thus, the theory that everything is conventional does not rule
out realism,but merely qualifies it as anti-substantialist.22

3.2.5. Texts dealing with Tattva, Dharmata, Nirvana, Paramartha in Nagarjunas

works
There is considerable evidence in Nagarjuna's work and that of his early commentators of
a recurrent idea of a plane of reality that transcends conceptuality, of something beyond
mental constructions (prajapti). Keeping only to the MMK, despite the fact that the same
notion appears in other writings attributed to Nagarjuna 23, and considering only the points

20
Ferraro, a criticism od siderits, 658.
21
Garfield, Madhyamaka and Classical Greek Skepticism. 117.
22
Ferraro, grasping snakes and elephants, 7.
23
YS 5, SS 1, RV 105.
in which we find explicit references, stanzas such as 15.6, 24 18.7,2518.9,26where reality is
invoked using the term 'True nature,' are not in any way negligible.

The phrases tattva and dharmat are used as synonyms for the Ultimate (paramrtha), as
well as nirvana. They point to a reality that is beyond conceptualization, and so beyond
the grasp of ordinary epistemic dimension. This reality has the same configuration as an
actual reality, whose existence semantic and nihilistic interpreters completely deny. In
light of these verses, their assertion that "there is no ultimate reality and only
conventional realities exist"27 is no longer valid.

Although Nagarjuna states that phenomenal entities are only mental constructs and not
real, and that he views emptiness to be empty, which belongs to conventionality. 28
However, we could find no verses that corroborate Nagarjuna's acceptance of the
conventional reality alone, and rejection of any ultimate reality. Indeed, a number of
explicit verses in Nagarjuna's work affirm the presence of a dimension (tattva, dharmata,
nirvana) that does not seems to be definable in conventional terms, but rather one that
possesses the quality of intrinsic existence (as devoid of any mental constructs), which is
systematically denied to entities that make up our conventional vision.

The verses of Nagarjuna covered here, as well as a logical analysis of his thought, make it
difficult to dismiss the possibility of an Ultimate Reality in his teachings. In conclusion,
the Ultimate Truth in Nagarjuna cannot be a mere negation of facts or the lack of
Ultimate Reality (paramrtha), as suggested by the semantic interpretation. Although any
attempt to comprehend Nagarjuna's texts is likely to necessitate a considerable amount of

24
“Those who see identity [svabhāva] and otherness [parabhāva], being and not-being do not see the reality
[tattva] in the teachings of the Buddha.”
25
“Where the range of the mind ceases, what can be expressed verbally also ceases; indeed, true reality
[dharmatā], like nirvāṇa, is neither created nor destroyed.”
26
“Independent (aparapratyayaṃ), at peace (śāntaṃ), not shattered by mental proliferation (prapañcair
aprapañcitaṃ), non-conceptual (nirvikalpam), without semantic differentiation (anānārtham): this is the
nature of reality (tattvasya)”.
27
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28
Mmk 13, 7-8.
rational reconstruction,29 semantic interpreters are compelled to introduce many more
notions than whic Nagarjuna's texts explicitly contain. therefore , thus we are forced to
consider other interpretations that are more consistent with the original textual details.

3.3. Pedagogical interpretation

As indicated in the previous section, the idea of "Tattva, Dharmatā, Nirvāṇa" which
refers to a plane of ultimate reality that transcends the ordinary epistemic dimension,
appears to be advancing towards a metaphysical viewpoint. this seems to contradict with
last chapter's assessment concerning the weaknesses of metaphysical interpretations. For
example, The assertion of an 'ultimate reality,' contradicts Nagarjuna's clear assertion
about 'not possessing a thesis.30' Furthermore, if ultimate reality transcends conceptuality
and discursiveness, wouldn't positing this contradict such a claim? And, in Nagarjuna's
philosophy, wouldn't acknowledging the presence of a 'reality' make it 'substantialistic'?
And, if that's the case, how can it claim to be a ‘middle way’ between nihilism and
substantialism ? Likewise, does the fact that 'emptiness is empty' not imply that the idea
of 'ultimate reality' is empty as well, and hence devoid of reality and independent
existence?31

Metaphysical readings criticised by semantic interpretation, are not, in fact, effective in

their attempt to provide a satisfactory response to these queries. But, there is a non-
metaphysical reading of Nagarjuna that can reconcile the affirmation of an Ultimate
Reality with these challenges. Therefore, this section will provide an alternate reading
that avoids the objective difficulties of semantic interpretation as well as the metaphysical
problems which Nagarjuna strongly opposes.

3.3.1. Realist Anti Metaphysical Reading

29
Arnold, Madhyamaka Buddhism, [online].
30
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31
Ferraro, a criticism od siderits, 217.
This will be a realist and antimetaphysical interpretation of Nagarjuna's thought,
avoiding both anti-realistic and metaphysical interpretations weaknesses. It is realist
insofar as it admits the existence of a mind-independent reality (tattva, paramrtha) which
is distinguished from the ordinary workings of the mind, that are characterised by mental
Constructions (prapanca) and are centred on the idea that things are substantial And it is
antimetaphysical since Nagarjuna just posits or assume this reality but never describes or
verbalises it. If such were the case, it would also be considered a view (dristi), which is a
proper 'metaphysical position.'

In philosophy, the term metaphysics can include a wide range of meanings. On the basis
of some definitions, it is conceivable to accept a realist perspective as a metaphysical one.
thus, for the proper interpretation of this approach it become necessary to distinguish
between a realist metaphysics, which simply poses reality as such, and a metaphysics
that also tries to describe how reality is. Considering this broad meaning of the term, we
could distinguish between these two types of metaphysics as: a) Metaphysics 1, which
simply presupposes that reality exists, and b) metaphysics 2, which offers some kind of
definition of reality itself. On this basis, this interpretation holds that in Nagarjuna we
only find a Metaphysics 1 and a rejection of all kinds of metaphysics 2, implying that the
simple position of the existence of reality should not be considered as a 'metaphysics.'
therefore, we can state that Nagarjuna is a realist, insofar as he presupposes that reality in
itself exists, and an anti metaphysician , as he refuses to offer or adhere to any definition
of reality.

Concerning the meaning of dristi, which Nagarjuna claims he does not possess and
rejects. Semantic interpreters apparently believe that the term dristi is equivalent to all
forms of metaphysics in the wider sense, implying both metaphysics1 and metaphysics 2
and thus nagarjuna was asking us to reject all dṛṣṭi, including that of the mere position of
reality in itself.32 On the other hand, according to the textual occurrences of the term
dristi, the expression only means a 'speculative point of view', or a 'theory,' and does not
32
Garfield,The fundamental wisdom of the middle way, 214.
qualify the simple assertion that the real exists in a certain way, as in the metaphysics 1.
therefore , the fact that nagarjuna affirms the existence of Reality (tattva, paramrtha), as
well as the possibility of knowing it as Ultimate Truth (nirvana), does not appear to
configure a dristi. What characterizes Nagarjuna as an antimetaphysical philosopher is his
condemnation and invalidation of any attempts to articulate the tattva or to give any
verbal expression to Ultimate Truth.

Nagarjuna says that reality is: “santa, prapancair aprapancita, nirvikalpa or ananartha,”33
which means reality is “free from svabhava (intrinsic nature), not formed by mental
fabrication, not thought, and without distinctions.” In this verse, Nagarjuna distinguishes
the epistemic experience of his vision from that of 'conventional truth,' which is
characterised by intrinsic nature (svabhva), mental fabrications (prapaca), thought
(vikalpa), and having numerous meanings (nanartha). To assert that an ultimate truth
other than the conventional exists does not suffice to configure a theory (dṛṣṭi), which is
equivalent to some form of description of reality (tattva). Similarly, when Nagarjuna says
that ultimate reality is beyond conceptual capacities of ordinary man, he is only stating
that ordinary conceptual tools are insufficient to grasp the Reality; it does not imply that
the reality (tattva) itself has the characteristics of ineffability or unconceptualizability. He
does not characterise absolute truth, he says nothing about reality, and hence he is not
contradicting himself.

3.3.2. Sunyata in this reading

We will consider the meaning of sunyata in light of this perspective. To begin with, this
approach does not regard the idea of sunyata as an attempt by Nagarjuna to describe the
ultimate truth. In other words, emptiness is not a definition of the tattva as non-
substantial, devoid of reality, dependent co-origination, or anything else an empty reality
may mean. In the case of the verses 34, where tattva is qualified as santa svabhvata, it does
not mean that it is empty. The tattva only lacks the proper nature of phenomenal beings
33
MMK.18.9
34
MMK.18.9
as they are conceived in the ordinary world. However this tells us nothing about what
tattva is.Thus, sunyata is only to be considered as a conceptual tool for 'emptying' all
metaphysical approaches, i.e. attempts to define supreme truth; it is also not to be
regarded as a view (dristi): empty, non-empty, both or neither are not labels applied to the
tattva.If we used them as labels, it would inevitably result in the configuration of a dristi.

3.3.3. Sunyata is not equivalent to Ultimate truth PEDAGOGICAL READING

If emptiness is characterized as 'nothingness' or 'the absolute,' it corresponds to a
metaphysical description of supreme truth. This is the flaw with Semantic views: they
take emptiness to be the ultimate truth. However, in Nagarjuna's works, there is very little
explicit textual support for the equivalence of emptiness and absolute truth. No passages
in the MulaMadhyamikaKarika that discuss sunyata support the conclusion that it should
be regarded as a predicate of Ultimate Truth. One apparent exception is the verse, where
nagarjuna states :
dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā |lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca
paramārthataḥ || 8 || The Dharma teaching of the Buddha rests on two
truths:conventional truth and ultimate truth.35

This verse distinguishes between ultimate and conventional truths, and appears to assert
that Reality(dharma) teaching is founded on these two facts. nagarjuna further makes it
clear in following passages that emptiness is a teaching of the Ultimate kind. However,
we could observe that Nagarjuna does not speak of doctrines "equivalent" to two truths,
but rather of "teachings" (dharm-deana) "based on" (samupritya) two truths. The
distinction between being "equivalent to" and being "based on" is important and crucial.
When a teaching and a truth are equivalent, it is possible to speak about the truth merely
by demonstrating the teaching; but, a teaching that is "based on" a truth does not
necessarily provide any sort of indication regarding that truth. 36 therefore, the coming
sections will analyze which teachings are based on these two truths.

35
MMK.24.8
36
Ferraro, outline of a pedagogical interpretation of nagarjuna, 9.
3.3.3.1.Teachings based on two truths

Based on the evidence from chapter 24 of mmk, which deals with the two truths, we can
conclude that the Four Noble Truths and their corollaries are based on ordinary truth, but
the teaching on emptiness is based on Ultimate truth. We can find textual support for this
assumption in S'S37, which states:
“Though the Buddhas have spoken of duration, origination, destruction, being, non-being, low, moderate,
and excellent by founded on worldly convention, [they] have not done [so] in an absolute sense”.

This verse, confirms the view that the relation between the teachings of the Buddhas and
the two truth is not one of equivalence or identity , but one of dependence. The teachings
that are referred to here as "based on worldly convention" are those that include concepts
like "duration," "origination," "destruction," and so on 38. Thus, teachings like the Four
Noble Truths, which clearly employ concepts like "being" and "non-being," 39 are
Conventional Truths, but the doctrine of emptiness, which questions and negates these
notions, is based on Ultimate Truth.

To further clarify, The teaching of the Four Noble Truths is established based on the
categories of 'individual substance,' as it begins with the premise of individual suffering,
then identifies its unique causes, and then proposes a path to end it individually; but,
teaching on emptiness, on the other hand, is referring, to the negations of those same
categories. As a result, the idea of emptiness empties the noble truths as well as any other
teaching of substantiality. According to another verse, the teaching of emptiness is
identical to both the teaching of dependent co-origination and the teaching of the middle
way.40 This indicates that these teachings are philosophical propositions based on
ultimate truth, rather than ultimate definitions of Ultimate truth.

37
Ss.1
38
000000000
39
For example, suffering exists in the first truth and ceases or no longer exists, in the third noble truth.
40
MMK.24.18: “What is dependent co-origination we call emptiness ; this is a dependent convention, and it
is what we call middle path”
3.3.3.2. Conventional truth

We saw that teachings such as the four noble truths, the prattyasamutpda, and the
dharmas, which are all based on the categories of individual substance, causation, being,
and non-being, are all founded on conventional truth.41 conventional truth consists of, the
way ‘ordinary man’ understands reality, that is, by projecting the idea of svabhāva upon
it.
Conventional truth is thus nothing more than the ordinary cognitive approach; that is,
what appears to the world to be real. This truth should be considered in a purely
epistemological sense as what is seen or considered as real. It is not an alternate reality to
the Ultimate reality; it is just a way of seeing things that are considered to be true in the
level of worldly interactions (loka-vyavahra). 42

3.3.3.3. Ultimate Truth

The doctrines based on ultimate truths, such as emptiness, dependent co-origination, and
the middle way, have the epistemological characteristic of contradicting or negating the
basic logical categories on which ordinary truth is built. 43 Thus, in a rigorously apophatic
manner, the teachings based on ultimate truth assert that reality does not conform to the
vision we typically have of it on both the phenomenal level and as dharmas . Both lack
the reality that common sense and earlier Buddhist teachings of realistic-pluralistim
ascribe to them. These teachings based on Ultimate truth undermine the categories of
being and non-being, which are unavoidable at the conventional level.

These teachings lead us to a vision of the reality that, aside from the qualifier of
Ultimate,44 can only be interpreted in a negative way: a mode of 'knowing' that is distinct
41
Prasannapada 494.
42
Ferraro, outline of a pedagogical interpretation of nagarjuna, 14.
43
Vv 70
44
Bhaviveka, Madhyamakaratnapradīpa,172.
from the ordinary; hence, a mode in which the categories of individual essence,
causation, being, and non-being do not apply. These teachings, which are the only source
for dealing with the matter of ultimate truth, could say nothing more on the subject.
Which is to say that ultimate truth can only be posed, suggested as an epistemic
alternative to conventional truth, but it cannot be characterised or described. Thus,
sunyata is only an epistemic tool based on ultimate truth that can aid in the attainment of
Ultimate Truth.

3.3.3.4. Skillful means

Upaya-kausalya, or skilful means, is the employment of different philosophical

approaches, sometimes based on the vision of ordinary men, sometimes on that of the
enlightened, by the Buddha as a pedagogical method to instruct his listeners, who have
varying levels of philosophical and spiritual maturity. As Aryadeva explains, "just as a
barbarian cannot be guided in a foreign language, ordinary people cannot be guided
except by way of the ordinary,"45 it is sometimes necessary for the teaching to include the
categories of individual substance and so on of ordinary truth, depending on the
circumstances.
however, in the case of more intellectually equipped followers, it becomes possible and
essential to change the method and present teachings that contradict and contrast
conventional truth. The fact that the Buddhas' teachings are dependent on the abilities and
ideas of their listeners imply that no explanation of reality can be regarded final and
definitive. Even the doctrines of anatman and emptiness cannot be said to be more true in
absolute terms than the teachings of Four Noble Truths . This is because, as previously
stated, these teachings do not express or correspond to the truths upon which they are
based. The most important factor in justifying a doctrine is its effectiveness, not its
truthfulness. The notion of uapya is based on the idea that words and philosophies are not

45
Catuḥśatakaśāstra-kārikā.194, translation: Sonam.
an end in themselves, but rather a means to an end: they should be viewed as a raft, "to be
used to cross the stream, and not with the purpose to cling on to it”.46

In the context of skilful means, nagarjuna's teachings based on ultimate truth should not
be regarded as a definitive philosophical method or as an absolute metaphysics. His
reasoning, on the other hand, is only relevant in the context in which it is presented: as a
critique of early Buddhist scholastic teachings that formed a realist-pluralistic
metaphysics, despite the Buddha's order not to embrace any point of view.47

Emptiness, dependent origination, and the middle way, have no absolute significance;
they are solely intended to be a pedagogical and soteriological device to counter the
typical 'philosophical' tendency to absolutize theory and mistake the raft for the shore to
reach. It is critical that the audience he addresses does not make the error of considering
his teachings absolute, but rather recognize their merely instrumental aspect. emptiness
was defined by the Buddha as a ‘means for the relinquishing’ of all point of views.48
Thus, true goal of sunyata is not to settle Buddhist doctrines, but to eliminate all
metaphysical systems, including itself. as long as it acknowledges the existence of a
vision of reality that transcends ordinary epistemic levels, it is a realist approach; on the
other hand, since it does not propose any definition of that reality and basically opposes
the tendency to attach a predicate to ultimate, it qualifies as a 'anti-metaphysical reading'
and as a radical Apophaticism.

3.3.4. Sunyata as apophaticism

Sunyata is only an Apophatic instrument that can aid in the elimination of all views in
order to provide a direct experience of the ultimate truth. In this perspective, the two
truths should be viewed as two distinct cognitive approaches to reality. First, there is the
conventional approach, which is centred on the categories of substance, causation, and
other similar categories, and then there is the extraordinary epistemic approach, which is
46
Mahjima nikaya 38.
47
Dinka nikaya 1
48
Mmk 13. 8.
beyond any reasoning or discursive explanation. 49 All that can be said about it is that it is
superior to conventional truth.

Nagarjuna's view on ultimate truth could be defined as radical apophaticism. The

emphasis on apophatism can be seen in varying degrees in most religious and
philosophical traditions. What separates the apophatic method of buddhism from other
apophatisms is that it also performs this negation on an ontological level. 50 according to
Buddhism, Even the notion of Being is the product of conventional discourse in the
mundane world and must be denied or emptied out.When the ultimate becomes an object
of philosophical reflection, this unavoidably leads to its reification, or at the very least,
the objectification of this subject. Thus, the basic thrust of Madhyamika is toward
comprehending our experience in its immediacy without constructing fixed views that
distort that experience.51

Most metaphysical systems take an essentialistic turn in which they examine what things
are, focusing their whole philosophy on the quest for Being. 52 Naturally, these
essentialists will find it difficult to accept the Buddhist stance that it is possible to reach
the goal without first knowing what the goal is. Buddhism answers this by claiming that
the need for this prior knowledge has no bearing on the spiritual life, because knowing
and expressing anything about the ‘goal’ would entail reducing it to the limited
parameters of conventional level, and thus reducing it to something finite, limited, and
imperfect. Because ultimate reality is beyond all mental constructs, there is no way to
know what it is because no one has ever reached at it to identify it. However, once it is
attained, positive discourses are no longer relevant. The ultimate end cannot be known
until it is attained.

3.3.4. . Transcending all conventional Discourse.

49
MMK.18.9
50
Panikkar, the silence of God,103.
51
Keenan, meaning of christ, 133.
52
Panikkar, the silence of God , 104.
According to the Madhyamika thinkers, illusory experience of the conventional level is
generated by the fabrication of language, in which words are taken to represent the reality
of things.53 The construction of meaning in concepts is termed as fabrication
(praparica).54This conceptual or verbal expression is based on clinging to essences, as if
they could provide a reliable source of true knowledge. since ultimate truth is not
revealed to us in its pure immediacy, but rather distorted through the lens of our language
constructs and notions, Nagarjuna gave precedence for negation of these constructed
essences rather than any form of affirmation.55

in Nagarjuna's works, we could observe the absence of any positive affirmations to

questions concerning ultimate reality. His argument for the incoherence of these
questions is that their responses will inevitably be conditioned by these same questions.
Because all questions are necessarily arising within the conventional level of human
intellects, the answers will be as limited and conventional as those questions. 56 Then it is
scarcely be the ultimate solution that is sought and expected. What is sought is a response
that will raise us above all illusory or conventional levels; but, as Nagarjuna points out,
no answer to a conventional question will ever rise above conventionality. Any answer
we formulate will be based on a particular sort of metaphysics. Even if such an answer
could be found, it would only be the absolutization of conventionality, the false capturing
of the Absolute in language. As a result, the sole option is to remain silent, which is
superior to every discursive answers.57

3.3.4. . Nothing can be uttered on Ultimate truth.

In his writings, Nagarjuna makes no direct references to the supreme epistemic level. It is
impossible to establish a predicate for Ultimate Truth since it is never the subject of any
discursive judgments. The uniqueness of his philosophy is exactly his programmatic

53
Prasannapada, 223-24.
54
Stecherbatsky, concept of buddhist nirvana, index, 38.
55
Keenan, meaning of christ, 135.
56
Panikkar, the silence of God, 150.
57
Panikkar, the silence of God, 151.
refusal to provide any form of definition for the Ultimate. Because no position or view
can substitute for a direct encounter with the ultimate, it is precisely the fabrication of
views that prevents us from realizing it.

according to the Buddhist perspective, religious meaning cannot be articulated in

theoretical terms, , because language has no valid objectifying function when things are
empty of essence. Nagarjuna argues that “when the object of thought is no more, there is
nothing for language to refer to.”58 Language is incapable of producing affirmative
statements because it believes that words actually correspond to essences, but in fact, no
such essences exist. Madhyamika presents its teachings as pointers to a direct experience
of the Ultimate in a context where all human affirmation is a negation and a limitation on
the Ultimate rather than a positive assertion of anything. In a similar manner, Saint
Gregory of Nyssa speaks of the ineffability of the ultimate: "That which it is necessary to
know of God consists in knowing that to know God is nothing other than discovering that
nothing of what the human intellect can know is knowledge of God."59

3.3.4. . Every thing is Buddha nature

Nagarjuna proposes an equation between samsara and nirvana in MMK.25.19-20.80.This
passage implies that the two truths do not refer to two distinct realities, but rather that the
object of both visions is the same. In other words, nirvana is not the attainment of another
level of reality, of an ontological dimension beyond ordinary vision: the reality of
samsara and nirvana are the same. The first mode superimposes the notion of svabhva on
reality; about the second mode nothing can be said except that it is, distinct and ulterior
mode in relation to the ordinary.
From a soteriological standpoint, Buddhism sees the human predicament as originating in
an original purity characterised by joy or peace rather than suffering. Suffering then
appears as a kind of superstructure that is adventitious to the humankind and from which
it must be liberated. Thus, the ultimate ground of reality or true nature of everything is

58
Sprung, lucid exposition of the middle way,177.
59
Gregory of nyssa, life of moses, pg 44. 376.
peace or bliss60. According to the Buddha, human liberation is attained by removing this
superstructure of suffering, which then leads us back to our original condition of peace or
joy. Later tradition confirms this, with nirvana being referred to as "supreme felicity" 61:
"Nirvana is the ultimate bliss."

3.6. conclusion
Madhyamika thinking has gone through different interpretive methodologies, one of
which being the semantic interpretation of some modern scholars, which was examined
here and found to have several inadequacies. Their interpretive methodologies show both
logical and textual inconsistencies. In most situations of interpretative methods involving
ancient texts, the phenomenon of isogesis, which is the inclination of interpreters to
incorporate or project into the text notions and meanings from their own cultural and
philosophical background, is unavoidable. This tendency can be seen throughout their
interpretations, but in a more subtle way. Their primary philosophical background was
that of the later Tibetan school of gelug.The differences in later interpretations of
Nagarjuna's works are very obvious; therefore, claiming their viewpoint based only on
one of such later traditional interpretations as the sole approach toward madhyamika is
not justifiable in this context.

These facts compel us to reconsider Nagarjuna's philosophy in a more clearer

perspective. This would enable for a much more coherent reading of his philosophy,
taking into consideration both the textual and logical components. This understanding of
Nagarjuna's teaching as a pedagogical approach provides us with the key to
understanding the fundamental elements in his philosophy. The idea of sunyata is
recognized to be a conceptual instrument whose entire purpose as a skillful method is to
eliminate all false views. This approach is identical to the apophatic method because it
also negates all fabricated views in order to directly attain ultimate reality.

60
Santideva, bodhicaryavatara, 8; 88
61
Dhammapada, 15, 8
In his texts, Nagarjuna clearly emphasises the irelevance and limitations of any discursive
thought or construed metaphysics to attain the ultimate. He also demonstrated that the
same impulse to construct an illusory reality and then cling to it is the source of apparent
suffering. Thus, contrary to the sematic interpretation of proclaiming the supreme truth as
the absence of any absolute reality, this view makes it evident that the Buddhist Path
proposed by Nagarjuna in his writings can lead to a supreme, trans conceptual, and trans
discursive epistemic dimension of ultimate reality which is the true nature of everything.
The ordinary mode of seeing and conceiving phenomena can be transcended by an extra-
ordinary cognitive modality, nirva, the 'truth of the ultimate level,' the vision of reality as
it is in itself (tattva), devoid of 'substantialistic' projections, can be attained through the
process of negation or the sunyata of every 'thing'.