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British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
How to Conceptual
Plurality/Difference
and 6Syncretism' in
Mehmet F. Köprülü
MARKUS DRESSLER*
Introduction
ISSN 1353-0194 print/ISSN 1469-3542 online/10/030241-20 © 2010 British Society of Middle Eastern Studies
DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2010.524433
242
243
244
such a crucial role in the Turkists' ideas about national awakening, was f
finest, undiluted ways among the peripheral Turkmen tribes of Anatol
In other aspects, however, Köprülü's description of the relationship
urban and rural life departed significantly from Ibn Khaldun. For on
Khaldun's text the dichotomous nature of urban and rural culture wa
larger, cyclical conception of Islamic civilization, where forces fr
countryside would periodically enter the urban centre and replace, in f
the urban culture. In Köprülü's work we find a more static juxtapositio
and periphery. Also different is the way they each evaluated the rela
between centre and periphery with regard to religiosity. While there is no
value difference between urban and rural forms (and everything in b
socio-economic organization and culture in Ibn Khaldun's text, he did a
rural people tended to be more religious due to the hardships of life.20 Ibn
leads extensive discussions about different forms of Islam, and point
social role of religion in almost proto-Durkheimian fashion, but h
correlate inner-Islamic differences, for example between jurists and mu
one side, and the Sufis on the other,21 with his distinction between urban
life. In Köprülü's work, on the other hand, we can see the impact of Orient
Islamic revivalist thought, which made him depict the cultural periphery in
of religion as impure and inferior (expressed through notions of '
'heterodox' Islam) in comparison to the scriptural and law based Islam
associated with urban contexts. In other words, Köprülü can be seen a
representative of a tradition of thought that connects the (Khaldunian)
opposed but complimentary character of urban and rural Islamic
respectively, with the Orientalist distinction between 'orthodox' and 'h
Islam. Talal Asad has written about this move and criticized in particu
Gellner for presenting Islamic culture in a way that reifies essentialist
Islam in contrast to a (in the process equally essentialized) Chris
Fundamentally, Asad argued that '[i]t is wrong to represent types of Isl
correlated with types of social structure' and proposed instead a
approach to the Islamic tradition.22 The linking of notions of political
(centre/periphery model), and normative theology (orthodoxy/hetero
way to organize hierarchically different forms of Islam is akin to fu
models of social organicity and very popular in modernist historiograp
exactly the easy flow of such models that should make one suspicious
The example of Ibn Khaldun shows that the use of structural and fun
categories to describe the dynamics of Islamic civilization is not a prer
Western Orientalists, but has roots in the Islamic scholarly tradition
Neither is a concept of Islam that organizes practices in a hierarchica
defines criteria for right and wrong distinctively Orientalist and Western (
here understood not in a geographic sense but in the sense of a commitm
project of secular Western modernity and therefore my definition does not
20 Fuad Baali, Society, State, and Urbanism: Ibn Khaldun's Sociological Thought (New York: SUNY
2 ' See, for example, Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, p. 360.
22 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington: Center for Contemporary
Georgetown University, 1986), p. 7.
23 Sociological functionalism evaluates the meaning of religion in accordance to its social fun
undergirded by an understanding of society as forming an organic whole, the parts of which are
related.
245
246
247
248
249
250
44 For discussions of their work and politics see Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought ofZiya Gökalp,
1876-1924 (Leiden: Brill, 1985): François Georgeon, Aux origins du nationalisme Turc: Yusuf Akçura
(1876-1935), (Paris: Inst. d'Études Anatoliennes, 1980).
45 Köpriilii, Türk Edebiyati 'nda ilk Mutasavviflar, p. 300.
46 One has to concede that in his later academic work Köpriilii would for the most part refrain from such strong
normative language.
251
252
Apparently not very concerned about the work of signification done by apol
terms, Köprülü employed them as if they were but descriptive categories. W
50 The overview of such Islamicist conceptualizations provided by Langer and Simon shows this clea
Langer and Simon, Dynamics of Orthodoxy·, for the term orthodoxy cf. also Wilson, Failure of Nomen
51 For a historical overview of the concepts used by Islamic heresiographers in their attempt to
inner-Islamic difference, in the process reifying normative standards of Islam, see Ahmet Ya§ar Ocak,
Toplumunda Zindiklar ve Miilhidler. Yaluit Dairenin Divina Çikanlar (15. - 17. yiizytllar) (Istanbul: T
Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfi, 1998), pp. 1-68.
52 See Langer and Simon, Dynamics of Orthodoxy, pp. 284f.; cf. Ocak, Osmanli Toplumunda Zindiklar.
53 It has been shown for many different cultural contexts that boundaries between pre-modern religious trad
were often much more fluid than apologetic and heresiographic as well as ethno-religious/nationalist d
are willing to concede. See Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman
(Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1995), passim; Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Pos
Theory, India and 'The Mystic East' (London: Routledge, 1999); Boyarín, Dying for God, and Se
Differences.
253
34 Derrida has referred to this process as globalatinization. See Jacques Derrida, 'Faith and Knowledge. The Two
Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits of Reason Alone', in Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (eds.), Religion
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 1-78. For a sharp methodological criticism of this
translation process see also Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion. Myths, Knowledge, and
Ideology (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2003).
55 King, Orientalism and Religion, p. 148.
254
255
256
closely aligned to said foundational texts - and in this way could be und
contributing to the formulation of an Orthodoxy of Islam' [emphasis
I do think that the critical questions raised by Ovamir and Wilson rega
system of reference for Asad's notion of orthodoxy are valid, especia
connects them to Asad's preference/privileging of textual authority (
Hadith) over other sources of Islamic authority (ritual and personal cha
example) in this text. However, it is important to recognize that Asad's r
of the Koran and the Hadith as foundational texts of Islam should not be read as a
theologico-political, but rather as a historical/anthropological statement.
One should also note that Asad did not conceptualize 'orthodoxy' with reference
to 'heterodoxy' as its binary other. Here and elsewhere Asad is very critical of
binary oppositions.66 As a 'relationship of power', his notion of orthodoxy contains
that which is disputed within itself, rather than projecting it outside of itself as
dichotomized other (i.e. as 'heterodoxy'). Pursuing a genealogical approach he is
not interested in the systematics of categories, but rather in explaining their work in
discourse and practice. Put differently, if I understand him correctly, orthodoxy is
not a phenomenological category for him and to this extent should not be
understood as tacitly fostering a particular substantive definition of Islam - which
is why it cannot have a binary other. As empirical category it does reflect discursive
positions, but is not interested in qualifying dogmatic or political/historical claims.
Given all the methodological and theoretical problems of binary concepts in
general, and the orthodoxy/heterodoxy binary in particular, I argue against using
the latter as an analytical category except for the specific heuristic purpose of
subverting essentialist readings of religion. The methodological problems
that accompany such binary concepts are manifold. Firstly, the very logic of the
binary construct tends to reify functional perspectives, which, if brashly and
uncritically read backwards through history, can lead to questionable teleological
longue durée assumptions in disregard of historical contingencies, intra- and
inner-religious convergences, and the fluidity of religious boundaries in many pre
modern contexts.
Secondly, and related to the first point, the binary construction partakes in
defining religion in a static way that is more likely to cement truisms about religious
essences and differences than asking questions about discursive power, and how
inner- as well as intra-religious boundaries are established and made appear evident
in the first place. Instead of reifying particular notions of Islamic culture through
binaries introduced from outside, we should scrutinize the work of such binaries in
scholarly discourses, and within the vernacular languages into which they are
translated, as well as ask critical questions concerning the work that they do when
moving back and forth between ernie and etic discourses.
Thirdly, and most principally, we should - in recognition of the imbalances of
power that shape discourses on religion (to which we as scholars of religion/Islam
obviously contribute) - within our analysis of things associated with non-Western
religions, and Islam more specifically, strive for perspectives that increase, rather
than decrease complexity.67 Reductionism should always be serving a clearly
',3 Wilson, Failure of Nomenclatura, p. 184.
66 Asad, Idea of an Anthropology, pp. I If.; idem. Formations of the Secular, p. 23.
hl I do not want to imply that Islam is non-Western in either a historical or ontological sense. The expression
'non-Western' only pays tribute to the normative powers of Western public and academic discourses, which still
mostly treat Islam as their 'non-Western' other.
257
defined heuristic purpose, and not turn into an iron cage that determines th
of a particular investigation. In other words, if binaries such as orthodo
odoxy are used at all, than they should be used with the goal of going be
confines - for example as a subversive tool in uprooting hegemonic stru
authority and their discourses (scholarly, political, dogmatic). The appr
of normalizing concepts such as the orthodoxy/heterodoxy distinction
generally disadvantaged by the politics of these concepts can be such a s
act. When Alevis, for example, turn to the term heterodoxy in their self-des
they challenge the power dynamics in the politics of theologico-
signification. Paraphrasing Bhabha, they produce ambivalence by articul
re-implicating signs of cultural difference. This re-signification can be u
as an act of resistance against dominant discourses of cultural hegemony
Conclusion
258
259
Acknowledgements
For valuable comments that helped me in my work on this article I am gratful to
Ahmet Karamustafa, Adam Becker, Ruth Mas, and Rosemary Hicks, as well as the
participants of a workshop at the Zentrum Moderner Orient Berlin (in July 2010),
where I had the chance to present an earlier versim.
70 Markus Dressler, Die alevitische Religion. Traditionslinien und Neubestimmungen (Würzburg: Ergon, 2002),
pp. 17f.
260