Khomeini in Najaf

Khomeini in Najaf: The Religious and Political Leadership of an Exiled Ayatollah
Author(s): Elvire Corboz

Source: Die Welt des Islams , 2015, Vol. 55, Issue 2 (2015), pp. 221-248
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24894181
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DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 55 (2015) 221-248 DIE
WELT DES
ISLAMS
BRILL brill.com/wdi
Khomeini in Najaf: The Religious and Political

Leadership of an Exiled Ayatollah
Elvire Corboz
School of Culture and Society - Arab and Islamic Studies, Aarhus University
elvire. corboz@cas. au.dk
Abstract
The thirteen years Khomeini spent in exile in the Iraqi shrine city of Najaf is still a little
known page of his life. Based on a collection of published interviews with Iranian cler
ics, this article explores the social mechanisms of his growing authority, both as a
religious scholar and a revolutionary figure. His leadership practices were, the article
argues, a mirror of his position of in-betweenness characterized by his physical pres
ence in Najaf and his continued attachment to the home country. The social dynamics
at work inside the Iraqi seminaries are explored first to situate Khomeini in his place of
exile. While he was kept at a distance by Najaf's most influential clerical groups, he also
had access to a social base of his own, a group of supporters composed mainly of Iranian
students and low-ranking scholars. The local and transnational development of
Khomeini's religio-political leadership is addressed next. His scholarly and social activi
ties among Najaf's community of learning allowed him to consolidate and spread his
religious influence. His political activities were less overt than generally assumed; he
kept a low profile in Najaf s public sphere yet maintained a political presence transna
tionally through his network.
* The author would like to thank Rainer Brunner, Benoit Challand, Mirjam Künkler, Sabrina
Mervin, and Babak Rahimi for their generous comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Versions were also presented at the Princeton University Middle Eastern Studies Seminar in
2011, the "Traditional Authority and Transnational Religious Networks in Contemporary Shi'i
Islam" workshop at the University of Oxford in 2012, and at the Mellon Islamic Studies
Initiative Workshop "Studying Shi'i Islam: Prospects and Challenges" at the University of
Chicago in 2013; the author thanks the discussants of the paper and the other participants for
sharing their thoughts. Taylor Moore also provided some editing assistance.
© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/15700607-00552P03

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222 CORBOZ
Keywords
Shi'ism - 20th century - Najaf - social history - Khomeini - religious authority - exile
Khomeini: "If Imam Hassan had as many followers as you have he would
have led an uprising. [...] you have followers in all Islamic countries."
Hakim: "I do not see anybody who would follow us if we took action."
Khomeini: "You order an uprising and I will be the first to follow you."
Hakim smiled and remained silent.1
One evening of October 1965, Ruholläh Khomeini (d. 1989) and Mohsen Hakim
(d. 1970) exchanged views on the political potential of Shi'i clerics in fomenting
a popular uprising in Iran. This conversation took place at the religious semi
naries of Najaf in Iraq. Two years earlier, Khomeini had emerged in Iran as the
vocal figurehead of an Islamic opposition movement to the monarchy (the so
called nahzat-e eslämi). His life soon became one of exile, only coming to an
end in 1979 after the Iranian people eventually rose. The long years Khomeini
spent away from home, thirteen of which in Najaf, have not received much
scholarly consideration,2 and when they have, the focus has been his intellec
tual production.3 Most famously, the doctrine of veläyat-efaqih (guardianship
of the jurist) he expounded in 1970 was to provide the theoretical basis for the
position of guardian jurist (vaU-ye faqih.) he later assumed at the head of the
1 Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (London and New York: l.B. Tauris, 1999), p. 143.
2 In Western scholarship, Baqer Moin's work remains the most central account of Khomeini's
life, with also one chapter dedicated to his exile (Moin, Khomeini, ch. 8). See also Baqer Moin,
"Khomeini's Search for Perfection: Theory and Reality", in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed. Ali
Rahnema (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994); Hamid Algar, "A Short Biography", in
Imam Khomeini: Life, Thought and Legacy, ed. Abdar Rahman Koya (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic
Book Trust, 2009); Gabriele Thoss and Franz-Helmut Richter, Ayatollah Khomeini: Zur
Biographie undHagiographie eines islamischen Revolutionsßihrers (Münster: Wurf, 1991).
3 This preference to focus on Khomeini's political thought and worldview is also apparent in a
recent collective volume on Khomeini (Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ed., A Critical Introduction
to Khomeini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 55 (2015) 221-248

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KHOMEINI IN NAJAF 223
Islamic Republic of Iran.4 To complement existing accounts of Khomeini's in

tellectual development in the pre-revolutionary era, this article aims to shed a
sociological light on the practical consolidation of his religio-political leader
ship during his time in Najaf.
The position of Khomeini is best understood from the perspective of the
state of in-betweenness warranted by the condition of being an exile.5 It testi
fies to his dual orientation towards the 'here and there' of a life led in Najaf
away from home. This situation owed both to the distance he was kept at so
cially by the well-established and most influential clerical groups in the Iraqi
hawza (seminaries), and to the liminal space in which he maintained himself
to signify his continued attachment to his home country. Accordingly, his lead
ership practices mirrored the perpetual shifting of his position between align
ment and non-alignment with his host locality.
The social environment of the seminaries of Najaf, characterized by their
informal network-type of organization, provides the basis for the exploration
of how Khomeini was able to promote his leadership in his place of exile. This
article will first situate him in relation to the informal power centers clustered
around the most prominent ayatollahs (äyatalläh, 'sign of God') in the Iraqi
hawza at the time. The presence of Khomeini met resistance, yet Najaf's inter
national community of learning also offered him, as discussed next, network
ing opportunities to be used for the consolidation of his own power center. A
number of dedicated individuals helped his integration in the Iraqi seminaries.
At the same time, this network, being composed mainly of Iranians, consti
tuted a liminal social space between his new place of residence and his home
country.
This is the backdrop against which Khomeini negotiated his claim to leader
ship in his Iraqi exile. This claim was twofold. It entailed on the one hand the
gradual consolidation of his religious stature as a source of emulation (marja'-e
taqlid; pi. maräji'), starting in the early 1960s during the more full-fledged
marja'cyya of the Iraqi Mohsen Hakim and then, after the latter's death in 1970,
more forcefully in competition with the Iranian but Najaf-based Abu'1-Qäsem
Ku'i (d. 1992), among other contenders.6 On the other hand and at the same
4 For the English translation of the lectures, see Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution:
Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans, and annot. by Hamid Algar (Berkeley:
Mizan Press, 1981).
5 Babak Rahimi further argues that Khomeini's situation of in-betweenness contributed to the
development of his more radical ideas (Babak Rahimi, "Contentious Legacies of the Ayatollah",
in Critical Introduction to Khomeini, pp. 2g6f.).
6 In Qom for instance, the main maräji' were Mohammad-Käzem Sari'atmadäri (d. 1986),
Shehäb-al-Din Mar'asi Najafi (d. 1990), and Mohammad-Rezä Golpäyegäni (d. 1994).

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224 CORBOZ
time, Khomeini's activism against the Iranian monarchy burnished

tials as a political leader. The line between the two facets of his lea
clearly blurred, with each reinforcing the other. For analytical pu
ever, the activities aimed to promote his marja'iyya and those at th
his political leadership of the nahzat-e eslämi will be detailed separ
The practices which formed the basis for Khomeini's dual cla
ship during his exile were shaped by, while also helping maintain,
in-betweenness. His claim to the marja'cyya required him to co
position within the Shi'i community of learning. To this end, he p
main activities through which the high-ranking scholars establ
works in the seminaries, such as teaching, meeting with the stude
tering for their material needs. However, he did so without alway
the established conventions, a freedom his position as an outsid
lowed him to arrogate to himself. Similarly, Khomeini's politic
practices confirm the 'here and there' of a life in exile. He was the
an opposition movement aimed at regime change in Iran, yet it
environment unpropitious to political activism that he would h
Looking at the nature of his activism from the perspective of Najaf
that Khomeini was not overtly political, at least not until 1977. Mor
not, he played by the rules of the politically cautious hawza. It wa
place of exile but rather back home in Iran and in the diaspo
sumed political visibility, a transnational process sustained by the
the nahzat-e eslämi and its network of militant clerics. Put differ
bivalence of Khomeini's activism aimed to reconcile the reality
cality with the transnational essence of his political mission.
Any attempt to retrace Khomeini's life raises the question of
bulk of the primary material used in this article consists of a seri
memoirs (käterät) narrated by former clerical members of the nah
The massive collection, edition, and publication of these memoi
an ongoing oral history project run by the Markaz-e Asnäd-e
Eslämi (Islamic Revolution Documentation Center) in Tehran, a
other Iranian institutions undertaking similar work. This mate
7 The individuals whose memoirs I have consulted are 'Ali Äl-e Eshäq Ko'ini,
Zanjäni, Mahmud Do'äyi, Mohammad-Rezä E'temädiyän, Esmä'il Ferdusipur
Hosayni Siräzi, Ja'far Karimi, 'Abbäs Kätam Yazdi, Moslem Malakuti, 'Ali-
Komeyni, Mohammad Mohammadi Raysahri, 'Ali-Akbar Mohtasamipur, Mo
Rahimiyän, Häsem Rasuli Mahalläti, Hasan Ruhäni, Mohammad Samämi, an
Yazdi.

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thodological problems similar to any research relying on post-hoc narratives

which can lead to intentional or unintentional biases. The edited memoirs
seem to be the result of structured and guided interviews, as indicated by their
layout in small sections with some subheadings appearing recurrently in sev
eral volumes.8 Moreover, the risk of manipulation is increased in the case of an
oral history project aimed to serve the interests of a state developing a public
memory. The memoirs emphasize the centrality of the Islamic movement in
the Iranian revolution.9 They also propose an elite history which does not inte
grate common people's voices.
For the purpose of this article, however, the selectivity issue of an Islamic
and elite perspective on Iran's recent history is minimized because the focus of
the analysis is precisely Khomeini and his network, regardless of the larger
framework in which the Iranian revolution unfolded. If combined with an ef
fort at contextualization, the first-hand accounts of Iranian clerics who either
lived in Najaf or visited Iraq before 1978 can help reconstruct the otherwise
little-documented social dynamics at work inside the hawza. When using
these khätirät, I have left aside, though without making a value judgement, any
evident interpretative attempt made by the narrators, as well as the most fla
grant hagiographic descriptions of Khomeini's personality. In contrast, I have
privileged the anecdotes that punctuate the narratives. Other primary sources
include a selection of the published and unpublished reporting on the nahzat-e
eslämi by the savak, the National Intelligence and Security Organization un
der the Iranian monarchy, as well as a compilation of Khomeini's proclama
tions of the time.10
8 One of the published memoirs provides the questions asked in the interview (Mo'assasa-ye
Tanzim va Nasr-e Ätär-e Hazrat-e Emäm Komeyni, Gusayi az Käterät-e HoJjat-al-Esläm
wa'l-Mostemin Sayyed Mahmud Do'äyi (Tehran: Mo'assasa-ye Tanzim va Nasr-e Ätär-e
Hazrat-e Emäm Komeyni, 2008)).
9 For a review of the historiography of the Iranian revolutionary movement until the mid
1990s, see Charles Kurzman, "Historiography of the Iranian Revolutionary Movement,
!977-79" Iranian Studies, 28, no. 1-2 (1995), pp. 25-38.
10 As pointed to me by Babak Rahimi, the publication and re-edition of Khomeini's pre- and
post-revolutionary writings, sermons, and speeches have been subject to censorship in
the early 2000s during the reformist period. Although this article does not concentrate on
Khomeini's intellectual production per se, I have nonetheless used the earlier editions of
the statements and letters he issued during his exile.

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226 CORBOZ
Internal Politics in the "Den of Snakes"11
In October 1965, Ayatollah Shehäb-al-Din Mar'aäi Najafi of Qom sent the fol
lowing telegram to Najaf: "Ayatollah Khomeini - may his wisdom continue to
flow - has arrived in your community as a guest and requires the greatest pro
tection. We request that you do what is required."12 The recipients of the tele
gram were the three maräji' established in the Iraqi hawza: Mohsen Hakim,
Abu'1-Qäsem Ku'i, and Mahmud Sahrudi (d. 1975). The reception Khomeini re
ceived from his "hosts", their close entourage (bayt, lit. household), and their
larger student network offers a glimpse at the internal dynamics regulating
hawza politics. It also reveals that games of power and influence were played
out with diverse intensity at the higher and the lower echelons of the commu
nity of learning.
In general terms, Khomeini's settlement in Najaf was not looked upon parti
cularly favorably in the seminaries, a situation that could well jeopardize his
capacity to find a place for himself in his new home. First, his scholarly stand
ing was not really acknowledged. The 1000-year old hawza of Najaf was proud
of its long tradition of scholarship. In spite of the steady rise of Qom as a cen
ter of learning from 1920, Iraq-based scholars did not regard the Iranian se
minaries, where Khomeini had made his career, very highly. Moreover, Najaf
hosted scholars who were his seniors. In face of their overshadowing fame, he
risked to become not more than an ordinary teacher, and to eventually fall into
oblivion.13
Second, Najaf was not a propitious environment for the consolidation of

Khomeini's political leadership. The stance of the leaders of the hawza towards
n Moin, Khomeini, p. 140.

12 Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, ed., Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, with a preface by
Hamid Ruhäni ([Tehran]: Markaz-e Cäp va Nasr-e Sazmän-e Tabligät-e Eslämi, 1990),
pp. 237fr.
13 These were concerns expressed by members of Khomeini's network. See Hasan Ruhäni,
Käterät-e Hojjat-al-Esläm wa'l-Moslemin Doktor Hasan Ruhäni (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e
Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2008), p. 312; Mohammad Yazdi, Käterät-e Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi,
ed. Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi,
2001), pp. 334f.; Moslem Malakuti, Käterät-e Äyatalläh Moslem Malakuti, ed. Abd-al
Rahim Abädari (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2006), pp. i88f.; Abbäs-'Ali
Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati az Enqeläb-e Eslämi-ye Iran: Käterät-e Hojjat-al-Esläm wa'l-Mosle
min 'Abbäs-'Ali 'Amid Zanjäni, ed. Mohammad-Ali Häjji Baygi Kondari Eslämi (Tehran:
Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2000), p. 82;Ja'far Karimi, Bist vaPanjSäl dar Kenär-e
Emäm-e RäheL Käterät-e Hazrat-e Äyatalläh Sayyed Jafar Karimi, ed. Rasul Ja'fariyän
(Qom: Nasr-e Movarrekh, 2008), p. 99.

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his opposition to the Iranian monarchy needs to be clarified. On the one hand,
the modernization reforms of the White Revolution launched by Mohammad
Rezä Shah in the early 1960s was a source of concern for the clerical establish
ment at large, and Mohsen Hakim and Abu'1-Qäsem Ku'i readily denounced
them as being un-Islamic. They did not either remain silent at the monarchy's
use of force against the opposition movement instigated by Khomeini in 1963.14
On the other hand, and as expressed by Mohsen Hakim in this article's intro
ductory quote, the maräji' of Najaf did not believe that the way forward was to
foment rebellion against the Iranian state. They feared that a revolutionary
movement, which could well fail, would lead to more repression for which the
clerical leadership would be blamed by the people. The future of Iran without
Mohammad-Rezä Shah was another source of anxiety. A power vacuum, it was
thought, would allow a communist takeover, a scenario that constituted a big
ger threat to Islam than the monarchy's modernization policies.15 Additionally,
the status of the Iranian monarch as the head of the only Shi'i state, which he
stressed with signs of personal piety and patronage, made him quite popular
outside Iran.16 To some extent, it is probable, as claimed by some, that
Mohammad-Rezä Shah could count on the support of some clerical segments
in the Iraqi seminaries thanks to close - and sometimes financial - ties with
them.17 Finally, Najaf's own difficult relations with the Iraqi regime, in particu
lar after the coming to power of the Ba'th party in 1968, also made the religious
establishment more wary of antagonizing the Iranian monarchy.18
A closer look at Khomeini's relationship with the clerical community of
Najaf is worth taking. His arrival in the Iraqi city on 14 October 1965 led to a
series of welcome and return visits between the maräji' and the newcomer. But
considering that these customary visits were among the few instances when
14 Mohammad Moljammadi Raysahri, Käterahä, vol. 1 (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e

Eslämi, 2004), p. 49. On Mohsen Hakim's and Abu'l-Qäsem Ku'i's involvement in Iranian
political affairs during this period, see Elvire Corboz, Guardians of Shi'ism: Sacred Author
ity and Transnational Family Networks (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015),
pp. i66ff.
15 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 129; ['Abbäs] Kätam Yazdi, Käterät-e ÄyataUäh Kätam Yazdi,
ed. Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi,
2002), p. 94; telephone interview with Kalil Tabätabä'i, 16 March 2012.
16 Ali-Akbar Mohtasamipur, Käterät-e Hojjat-al-Esläm wa'l-Moslemin Sayyed 'Ali-Akbar
Mohtasamipur ([Tehran]: Hawza-ye Honari-ye Daftar-e Adabiyät-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi,
1997), p. 460; Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 130; Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, p. 74.
17 Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 130.
18 Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (Lon
don and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 72.

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228 CORBOZ
Khomeini interacted with his peers, one can get a sense of the min
integration that would be characteristic of his entire exile. The firs
a visit was Abu'1-Qäsem Ku'i. After a warm start, the meeting was
Ku'i became irritated at the silent, non-engaging attitude and the
ture of his host, and he left.19 The ayatollahs' second encounter w
Khomeini had taken the advice of one of his students that he should
special thanks to Ku'i for having denounced the Iranian monarchy'
of their opposition movement back in 1963.20 He also refrained fr
politics with Ku'i who, at any rate, was less inclined than before t
Iran's internal affairs. The welcome and return visits between Khomeini and
Mahmud Sahrudi, another of Najaf's maräjl', were convivial. Sahrudi liked to
tell jokes, and since he had no interest in politics,21 no political topics were
discussed during these meetings.22
Mohsen Hakim and his bayt were probably the most skeptical of Khomeini.
The Iraqi marja' already showed him disrespect by not visiting him on the day
of his arrival but the following evening. This first encounter was short and did
not go well.23 Khomeini's disciples were nevertheless content, as claimed by
one of them, to have taken pictures of the two clerics sitting together as evi
dence to be used back home against the state's propaganda that Hakim op
posed their leader. But they realized the next morning that someone, probably
from the Iraqi ayatollah's entourage, had taken the film roll from where they
had forgotten it. To them, this was a missed opportunity to publicize the meet
ing for the benefit of the nahzat-e eslämi24
All in all, Khomeini's relationship with his peers could be described as being
neither friendly nor cold.25 If a facade of unity based on courteous indifference
ig 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 120.

20 Häsem Rasuli Mahalläti, Käterät-e Äyatalläh Sayyed Häsem Rasuli Mahalläti, ed. Ahmad
Rasidi (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2004), p. 94. The messages of protest
sent by Abu'l-Qäsem Ku'i to Iran, either directly to Mohammad-Rezä Shah and the prime
minister, or to the religious establishment in Qom, are published in Markaz-e Asnäd-e
Enqeläb-e Eslämi, ed., E'lämiyyahä, Ettela'iyyahä, Bayäniyyahä, Payämhä, Teiegräßiä va
Nämahä-ye Äyat-e 'Ezäm vaMaräji'-e Taqlid, vol. 2 (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e
Eslämi, 1995), pp. 75, 80, 85,101-5,178,212,221,224,235,275.
21 Mahmud Sahrudi had nonetheless sent a few telegrams of complaints at the monarchy in
1963 (Ahmad Naqibzädah and Vahid Amäni Zaväram, Naqs-e Ruhäniyat-e Si'a dar
Enqeläb-e Eslämi-ye Irän (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2003), p. 145).
22 Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, p. 78.
24 Ibid. pp. I2if.
25 Telephone interview with Kalil Tabätabä'i, 16 March 2012; interview with Hasan Bojnurdi,
Tehran, 14 November 2006.

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was maintained at the highest spheres of Najaf's clerical community by the

maräji' themselves, the attitude of their own bayts indicates that antagonism
was nonetheless palpable, even though it was contained. Symbolically, three
powerful members of Mohsen Hakim's bqyt refused to visit Khomeini upon his
arrival or to be in contact with him afterwards.26 So did Mohammad Ruhäni (d.
1997), at the time a close student of Abu'1-Qäsem Ku'i and reportedly the most
critical voice of Khomeini.27 The close entourage of the maräji' also sought to
marginalize the exiled ayatollah by co-opting the freshly-arrived Iranian stu
dents away from him through material and mental means of persuasion.28 In
an attempt to keep the hawza unified, however, Mohsen Hakim instructed his
bayt to refrain from speaking badly about Khomeini.29
The lower echelon of the community of learning, the junior scholars and
students, were those who handled verbal attacks and the most overt acts of
disrespect against Khomeini. They denigrated his scholarly status. "His turban
is small" or "his beard is short" were comments heard on the streets of Najaf.30
His 1970 lectures on velayat-e faqih were also turned in derision.31 Similarly,
Khomeini's stature as a political leader met resistance. A resident of the school
where he led his evening prayer is remembered for his attempts to disrupt the
daily reunion. He made noise or threw light at his room window where a cur
26 Kätam Yazdi, Käferät, pp. 8if.; 'Amid Zanjäni, Käterät, p. 136; Mohtasamipur, Käterät,
p. 509; 'Abd-al-Vahhäb Faräti, Tärik-e Safähi-ye Enqetäb-e Eslämi (Tehran: Markaz-e
Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2000), p. 31.
27 Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 137; Mohtasamipur, Käterät, pp. 507ff.; Monir-al-Din Hosayni
Siräzi, Käterät-e Hojjat-al-Esläm wa'l-Mostemin Marfium Sayyed Monir-al-Din Hosayni
Siräzi, ed. Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e
Eslämi, 2004), pp. 2i6f. Mohammad Ruhäni eventually visited Khomeini to pay him his
respect on the occasion of the death of his son Mostafa in 1977 (Kätam Yazdi, Käterät,
pp. i55f.). For information about the antagonistic attitude of other members of Ku'i's
entourage towards Khomeini, see Hosayni Siräzi, Käterät, pp. 2i6f.; Mohtasamipur,
Käterät, p. 509.
28 Mohtasamipur, Käterät, pp. so6ff., 510. See also KätamYazdi,Käterät, pp. 82ff.; Mohammad
Samämi, Käterät-e Hojjat-al-Esläm wa'l-Mostemin Mohammad Samämi, ed. Ali Maleki
(Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2005), p. 105; Rasuli Mahalläti, Käterät,
P-95
29 Hasan Täheri Korramäbädi, Käterät-e Äyatalläh Täheri Korramäbädi, ed. Mohammad

Rezä Ahmadi (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 1998-2006), p. 41; Faräti,
Tärik-e Safähi, p. 38; Mohammad-Bäqer Hakim, Mawsu'at al-Hawza wa'l-Marja'iyya, vol 3:
Al-Emäm al-Hakim (Najaf: Mo'assasat Torät al-Sahid al-Hakim, 2005), p. 321.
31 Karimi, Bist va Panj Säl, pp. i4off.; Malakuti, Käterät, p. 190; Hosayni Siräzi, Käterät, p. 201.

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230 CORBOZ
tain made of the Iranian Lion and Sun monarchical flag was hangin
More explicitly, Khomeini was decried for the personal gains he w
to derive in terms of his own authority status from his political m
His supporters in Najaf were for their part called Tudehi or comm
Khomeini was anxious to know what was said about him. He had one of his
students be his eyes and ears in the seminaries and give him daily reports
about any hearsay, no matter how trivial.35 His partisans were also ready to
counterattack, if needed. Illustrative is the wide rumor campaign they
launched against the above-mentioned Mohammad Ruhäni, claiming that he
was on the Iranian embassy's payroll.36 Khomeini nevertheless advocated re
straint37 In a passionate tirade delivered in class in 1965/66, he expressed his
distress at partisanship within the student community of Najaf:
What is this, this factionalism!? This one follows that teacher, that one
that other teacher! This is wrong. [...] Don't act in this way. [...] Does reli
gious duty demand that you insult Muslims? Treat your teachers with
insolence? Abuse other human beings like yourself? Is this your religious
duty?38
Mostafa Khomeini (d. 1977), Khomeini's son and companion in exile, also opt
ed for a soft approach to their detractors. He entertained good ties with them
to indirectly provide a better picture of his father.39
32 'Ali Äl-e Eshäq, Käterät-e Äyatalläh 'Ali ÄL-e Eshäq, ed. Mohammad-Rezä Samsä and
Tähera Mehrvarziyän (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2006), p. 190.
33 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 132.
34 Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, p. 132.
35 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 81. This disciple, 'Amid Zanjäni, left Iraq in 1969 or 1970, and
while it is not clear whether Khomeini designated someone else to fulfil this task after
him, one can assume that he did.
36 Ibid. p. 138; Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, p. 132. Past claims about Mohammad Ruhäni have now
been rectified (Hosayni Siräzi, Käterät, p. 217).
37 Al-e Eshäq, Käterät, pp. igof.
38 Ruholläh Komeyni, Sahifa-ye Nur: Majmu'a-ye Rahnamudhä-ye Emäm Komeyni, ed.
Sazmän-e Madärek-e Farhangi-ye Enqeläb-e Eslämi, vol. 1 ([Tehran]: Vezärat-e Farhang va
Ersäd-e Eslämi, Sazmän-e Madärek-e Farhangi-ye Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 1991, 2nd ed.),
pp. 177-85
39 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, pp. i38f.; Samämi, Käterät, p. 115; Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, pp. 147
51; 'Ali-Akbar Mas'udi Komeyni, Käterät-e Äyatalläh Mas'udi Komeyni, ed. Javäd Emämi
(Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2002), p. 313. This claim is corroborated by
the fact that an important member of Mohsen Hakim's bayt, Ebrähim Tabätabä'i, was a

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All in all, the statement of a cleric studying in the hawza at that time sum
marizes well the atmosphere in Najaf: "At the time when I was in Najaf, I had
ties to both the bayt of [Mohsen] Hakim and the bayt of the Emäm [i.e. Kho
meini]. This was the reason why the partisans of both bayts bore a grudge
against me."40
Khomeini's Partisans in Najaf
Khomeini was not without supporters in the Iraqi hawza and the nature of his
network is worth considering more closely. Most members of this network
were Iranians having pre-existing ties with him, but their trajectory to Najaf
differed.
Khomeini could count on the support of a number of Iranians who were

already settled in the Iraqi shrine city by the time he was exiled there. Shaykh
Nasralläh Kalkäli was one of them. A pivotal figure in the seminaries, though
not as a scholar but as a financier, he had been a representative of Ayatollah
Mohammad Hosayn Borujerdi (d. 1961), Qom's famous marja' of the mid-20th
century. Kalkäli then became an active lobbyist for the marja'cyya of Khomeini,
with whom he had been friends in their youth in Iran.41 Najaf also hosted sev
eral Iranian students and scholars who had had attended the hawza of Qom
prior to their migration and become acquainted with Khomeini in those days.42
Although they were based in Iraq when the nahzat-e eslämi started off in Iran
in 1963, they took upon themselves to support it transnationally. Their activi
ties, which aimed at raising awareness about the monarchy's repression of its
opposition, included visits to the high-ranking scholars of Najaf to ask for their
intercession, the submission of petitions to the embassies of Muslim states in
Baghdad, and the holding of mourning ceremonies in the memory of those
killed back home.43 It is no surprise, then, that when news was received on
strong critic of Khomeini the father but nonetheless entertained good ties with Khomeini
the son (telephone interview with Kalil Tabätabä'i, 16 March 2012).
40 Äl-e Eshäq, Käterät, pp. 4if.
41 Ibid. p. 110; Mohammad-Hasan Raljimiyän, Hadit-e Ruyis: Käterät va Yäddästha-ye Hojjat
al-Esläm wa't-Moslemin Mohammad-Hasan Rahimiyän (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e
Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2003), p. 238.
42 Among the clerics whose memoirs I have consulted, this was the case of 'Ali Äl-e Eshäq
Ko'ini, 'Abbäs-'Ali 'Amid Zanjäni, Ja'far Karimi, 'Abbäs Kätam Yazdi, Moslem Malakuti,
and Mohammad Yazdi. Another, Mohammad Samämi, was born and educated in Najaf.
43 Karimi, Bist va Panj Säl, pp. 79ff., 88-91; 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 73; Samämi, Käterät,
pp. 91-4.

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232 CORBOZ
that night of October 1965 that Khomeini and his son Mostafa had
Iraqi soil, excitement ran high among this group of Najaf-based
once, about a dozen of them made their way to Käzemayn near Bag
the newcomers were staying. They could not see Khomeini as he w
but they were content to have a chat with Mostafa.44 Nasralläh
worked hard to ensure that the arrival of the exiled ayatollah wou
noticed and he organized, to this end, receptions in his honor in th
days.
Khomeini's support base in Najaf also included Iranians who had arrived
more recently. They were his students in Qom and they decided to join him in
his place of exile, sometimes also to escape state persecution in Iran.45 Kho
meini did not seem keen to see them migrate and advised against this. If too
many were to leave, the standing of the Iranian hawza would be weakened.46 A
more pragmatic consideration for Khomeini was that, in order to keep in touch
with his home country, he could benefit more from the travel of visitors back
and forth between Iran and Iraq than from the permanent settlement of his
students in Najaf, the majority of whom traveled clandestinely and could not
leave easily afterwards. One should however not overstate the capacity of stu
dents and scholars to visit the Iraqi shrine city from Iran in those years. From
1969 to 1975, strained diplomatic relations between Tehran and Baghdad re
stricted border crossings. Furthermore, the scrutiny of the savak made any
trip between the two countries quite an adventure.47 Yet some people man
aged to visit Najaf.48 During their time in the Iraqi city, they attended Kho
meini's daily prayer, as well as his class. They also participated in the discussion
sessions held in his biruni (office, in the Najaf jargon) and had sometimes the
privilege of meeting with him. Upon their return to Iran, they were proud of
narrating their first-hand experience of Khomeini's life and activities, while
44 Malakuti, Käterät, p. 183; 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, pp. 74f.

45 This trend raised enough the attention of the savak that it drew lists of those leaving the
country (Akbar Fallähi, Sälhä-ye Tab'id-e Emäm Komeyni (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnäd-e
Enqeläb-e Eslämi, 2006), pp. 151-4). The students who went to Najaf after Khomeini set
tled there, and whose memoirs I have consulted, include Mahmud Do'äyi, Esmä'il Ferdu
sipur, Monir-al-Din Hosayni Siräzi, 'Ali-Akbar Mohtasamipur, and Mohammad-Hasan
Rahimiyän.
46 Ibid. p. 155; Yazdi, Käterät, p. 340.
47 For lengthy accounts on the difficulties encountered during such trips, see Rasuli
Mahalläti, Käterät, pp. 80-5; Rahimiyän, Hadit-e Ruyis, pp. 133-6.
48 The individuals who visited Najaf for short periods, and whose memoirs I have con
sulted, include Mohammad-Rezä E'temädiyän, 'Ali-Akbar Mas'udi Komeyni, Mohammad
Mohammadi Raysahri, Hääem Rasuli Mahalläti, and Hasan Ruhäni.

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they also brought along correspondence for his family, representatives or the
members of the nahzat-e eslämi.
As the above indicates, Khomeini's network was comprised of individuals
whose experience of the seminaries in Najaf varied depending on the time
they had spent there. It also seems that this network was not completely uni
fied. Two tendencies existed in its core: one particularly attracted to, and sup
portive of, Khomeini's stature as a religious scholar, and another that was more
inclined to his political leadership. One can find hints about this in a couple of
käterät where the narrators explain, on the basis of a hagiographic portrayal of
Khomeini's multifaceted qualities, that it was natural that some individuals
were drawn by his scholarly prominence, morality or asceticism, while others
cherished more his bravery and the political struggle he embodied. An esti
mate of the size of the latter trend would be about twenty-five people, includ
ing six or seven pivotal activists who also formed a group called the Combative
Clerics Outside the Country Group in Najaf in the early 1970s.49 Tension be
tween the less and the more politically-inclined members of Khomeini's en
tourage was palpable. Occasionally, verbal disputes turned into fights. At one
point, Khomeini was forced to intervene. Because of disturbances in his biruni
between his head office administrator and his more radical students, he saw fit
to send the former to Iran to have him work in his Qom office.50
These different tendencies among Khomeini's inner circle owed to two in
terrelated factors. One was generational. While his partisans came mainly from
the younger and lower ranks of the community of learning, the age of this
group still ranged from about eighteen up to forty or so. Broadly speaking, the
younger the partisan the stronger the political inclination. The other factor
was the trajectory of his supporters to Najaf. The clerics who had lived in the
Iraqi hawza for a longer time adopted a more cautious attitude towards revolu
tionary activism than the recent and also younger migrants who had been po
liticized under Khomeini's aegis in Qom.51 As such, Khomeini's close entourage
undertook multifaceted activities in support of his dual leadership roles. Some
of its members concentrated efforts for the promotion of his marja'iyya, a top
ic discussed next, while others were more involved in the transnational politics
of the nahzat-e eslämi.
49 On the formation and membership of this group, see Mo'assasa-ye Tanzim va Nasr-e
Ätär-e Hazrat-e Emäm Komeyni, Käterät-e Sälhä-ye Najaf (Tehran: Mo'assasa-ye Tanzim
va Nasr-e Ätär-e Hazrat-e Emäm Komeyni, 2010), pp. n8f.; Mohtasamipur, Käterät, p. 505.
50 Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, pp. 125,130; Rahimiyän, Hadit-e Ruyis, pp. 239fr.
51 Rahimiyän, HacLit-e Ruyis, p. 239.

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234 CORBOZ
A Religious Scholar and the Quest for Social Capital in th
The rise of a religious scholar to the marja'iyya owes to a quite ill-

of religious and social credentials. Scholarly excellence is a precond
recognized as a source of emulation. In practice, and given that
scholars in the religious sciences play a crucial role in presenting t
candidate to the faithful, one also needs to develop strong social n
the seminaries. The hawza is therefore a source of social capita
leadership. It is in there that a marja' emerges before his authorita
can develop in fuller strength into the transnational geography of
While Khomeini had earned enough fame in the seminaries of Qo
most committed disciples to put him forward as a marja' prior to
was within Najaf's community of learning that he also had to a
after he settled in Iraq. It is worth noting that during the first year
specifically when Mohsen Hakim was still alive, Khomeini did not
forcefully with the Iraqi marja' and the two other well-established
Najaf, Abu'1-Qäsem Ku'i and Mahmud Sahrudi. Rather he prepared
for a fiercer participation in the impending race for religious lead
Hakim passed away.
Khomeini sought to gain social capital through the activities
maräji' usually engage for the same purpose, and this in accord
hawza's framework of learning and scholarship. He did not full
accepted practice, however. Significant in this regard was the unco
move he made right upon his arrival in Najaf. After his meetings
Hakim, Abu'l-Qäsem Ku'i, Mahmud Sahrudi, and other senior
started to visit the students of Najaf - students normally com
ranking scholars, not the other way around. He held public gather
ferent school every night until he covered them all, even the scho
the poor and distant neighborhood where the Afghan student
lived.52 Khomeini nevertheless later adopted the common pr
wants a marja' to welcome his disciples, followers, and visitors in
allocated half an hour of his evening schedule to this activity, bef
his way to the Emäm 'Ali Shrine for his daily visitation of this holy
Teaching is an activity that is most central to network-building
seminaries. The story about Khomeini's decision to start giving cla
goes as follows. When asked to do so by the Iranian students w
from their days in Qom, he first made a rhetorical attempt to de
52 Mohtasamipur, Käterät, pp. 4gof.; 'Amid Zanjäni, Revayati, pp. 8of.

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student in Najaf"; "I'm a guest here",53 he retorted with all the humility that was
expected of him. Then he could start teaching. He dedicated his first course to
Mortazä Ansäri's seminal work al-Makäseb, a choice that was not incidental.
He aimed to show his expertise in law and prove wrong those who doubted his
credentials in this field.54 He also refrained from teaching 'erjan (mystical phi
losophy) because this subject was regarded with disdain by some circles in the
Iraqi hawza.55
Accounts about the level of attendance in Khomeini's class are at variance.
One says that numbers were not high initially, but increased gradually.56 An
other describes the opposite evolution, explaining that some students only at
tended the first sessions out of curiosity while others were persuaded by the
negative propaganda against Khomeini to drop his class.57 The figure of 300
350 regular students out of a total scholarly community of 2,500 (about ten per
cent of which were Iranians)58 is mentioned, along with a list providing about
50 names.59 Class attendance is not an exact indication of the size of the stu
dent network that will put its weight behind the teacher, however. The hawza
educational system is characterized by its fluidity, and many of those enrolled
in Khomeini's class also had Mohsen Hakim, Abu'l-Qäsem Ku'i, Mahmud
Sahrudi, and other scholars as their teachers.
Still, Khomeini had students particularly supportive of him. They readily
lobbied on his behalf to convince those skeptical of his scholarly credentials by
explaining that his lectures were of the same level, if not higher in some as
pects, than those of the other maräji' of Najaf.60 A number of mid-ranking
scholars also vouched for Khomeini and encouraged their own students to at
53 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 83; Yazdi, Käterät, p. 335.

54 Ruhäni, Käterät, pp. 3i2f.
55 On Khomeini and mysticism, see, for instance, Lloyd Ridgeon, "Hidden Khomeini: Mysti
cism and Poetry", in A Critical Introduction to Khomeini.
56 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, pp. 83E, 90.
57 Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, pp. 82ff.
58 According to savak reporting, the number of Iranian scholars in Najaf in 1973 was esti
mated at 250 out of a total of 3,000; three years later they were 240 as compared to a total
community of 2,500 (Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, file 858, p. 26 (9 September
!973): Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, file 866, p. 42 (13 November 1976)). These fig
ures are from after the massive deportation by the Iraqi Ba'th government of more than a
hundred thousand so-called Shi'a of Persian origin between 1969 and 1971.
59 Mohtasamipur, Käterät, pp. 503fr. See also the names of a few of Khomeini's students in
Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, pp. 92ft.
60 Ruhäni, Käterät, p. 313; Samämi, Käterät, p. 105.

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236 CORBOZ
tend his class.61

exercise ejtehäd
cally gave schola
the ejäzat aL-ejt
also used this do
the death of the
cy was involved
confirm the util
ship.
Also important for the consolidation of one's social capital in the hawza is
the leading of the daily prayers. Khomeini performed the mid-day prayer in the
Shaykh Ansäri Mosque, the location of his classes, and the evening prayer in
the Borujerdi School. A school was an unusual place to choose for this activity.
Because the other maräji' led their prayers in a mosque where they also at
tracted local lay believers, this might reveal that Khomeini was less interested
in reaching out to the Shi'a of Najaf as he was in connecting with the (Iranian)
student community enrolled in the seminaries. The Borujerdi School, which
offered housing to the students, was indeed the "so-called hangout spot for the
young forces that were aligned with the nahzaf.63
Another, more mundane yet highly important, practice by which the maräji'
develop networks in the Shi'i seminaries is the distribution of stipends to the
students and the payment of the teachers' salaries. The following comment
captures well the correlation between such patronage and the marja'iyya:
It is possible that someone is very knowledgeable, but if he does not give

stipends, he will not become known as marja'-e taqlid. [...] In fact the
people will give [their] blood on the order of anybody who gives money.
Therefore, a link between the stipends and the marja'iyya always exists.64
In this context, the hawza is often turned into a battlefield when the highest
ranking religious scholars play games of influence over the distribution of
money. Najaf in the days of Khomeini's exile was no exception.
Because the maräji' rely on the koms (Shi'i tax equating to one fifth of one's
annual revenue) and other voluntary donations they receive from followers in
order to provide patronage in the seminaries, the amount of their stipends
61 Malakuti, Käterät, pp. 42, igof.

62 Äl-e Eshäq, Käterät, p. 58.
63 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 103.
64 Ruhäni, Käterät, p. 252.

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varies in accordance with the overall financial capacity of their marja'iyya. A

ranking order for the stipends is therefore naturally established. Mohsen
Hakim was the most generous provider, and in 1967 he distributed three Iraqi
dinars to the married Arab and Iranian students and one dinar and a half to
those who were single. Abu'1-Qäsem Ku'i came second, giving the same two
categories two dinars and one dinar respectively; Mahmud Sahrudi offered one
dinar and half a dinar, along with a daily portion of bread.65 The single dinar
paid by Khomeini was, according to sympathetic accounts, a sign of respect
towards his peers.66
Khomeini nonetheless created turmoil in the hawza. He broke with a cus
tomary practice that made a distinction between the students on the basis of
their ethnic background: Arabs and Iranians received twice or four times the
amount distributed to their Afghan, Pakistani, and Indian counterparts. In an
attempt to reach out to a broader student community, he offered equal sti
pends to all, thereby forcing his colleagues to follow suit.67
Eventually, Khomeini started to exploit the power of money more forcefully.
He used the demise of Mahmud Sahrudi in 1975 as a pretext to initiate a drive
towards stipend increase in competition with Abu'1-Qäsem Ku'i, who had be
come the most important marja' after the death of Mohsen Hakim five years
earlier. The race started with Khomeini's stipend passing from three to five
Iraqi dinars and Ku'i's from five to seven dinars, then to ten and twelve dinars
respectively, and so forth. In 1977, Khomeini ignored a request from his col
league to stop the escalation. While Ku'i did not go beyond thirty dinars, Kho
meini did. In late 1978 when the Iranian revolution was at its height, his stipend
amounted to fifty dinars.68 The two ayatollahs engaged in similar competition
over the distribution of stipends to the students enrolled in the seminaries of
Qom, as reported by the savak at the time.69
65 Mohtasamipur, Käterät, p. 115.

66 Mas'udi Komeyni, Käterät, pp. 324f.; Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, p. 121.
67 Malakuti, Käterät, p. 193; Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, p. 116; Äl-e Eshäq, Käterät, p. 128.
68 Mohtasamipur, Käterät, pp. n8f. The final figure of fifty dinars is also provided in Moin,
Khomeini, p. 146. Khomeini's capacity to allocate more and more resources to the student
community can attest, while also taking into account the overall positive impact of the oil
boom on Shi'i religious contributions, to the consolidation of his popularity in the course
of the 1970s.
69 Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, file 865, pp. 2ff. (5 April 1976). See also the figures
provided by Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 81. Like in Najaf, Khomeini
further raised the stipends he distributed in the Iranian seminaries during the first
months of the revolution (Daftar-e Adabiyät-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, in collaboration with

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238 CORBOZ
As the maräji' would be expected to distribute patronage to the

of learning without discrimination on the basis of the recipien
legiances within the hawza, Khomeini is said to have been again
allocating a higher stipend to his inner circle of supporters in
suggested to him by his son Mostafa. He nonetheless gave extr
least one of his politically-active disciples who did not receive a st
anybody else, probably because of his lack of assiduity in his s
thermore, when Khomeini was about to leave Iraq in October 1978
anxious that his colleagues might cut the stipends of the revo
dents staying behind in Najaf. This is why he asked the two as
trusted with the management of the money he left behind to com
needed, those penalized because of their political activities.71
Looking beyond the hawza, the study of Khomeini's marja'iy
the question of the connections he established with believers thro
work in different parts of the Shi'i world. These connections were
with Iranians. Crucially, Khomeini had a network of students
back home to put his name forward in the seminaries, the mosque
places of worship. Once he completed his Tahrir al-Wasila (A C
Questions), the work that became used as his resäla 'amalcyya
tise), copies rapidly reached the hands of his lobbyists in Iran
could refer his followers to it.72 Since Iraq was a favorite destinat
gious tourism, Khomeini also had the opportunity to be in direct
the Iranians who visited the holy city of Najaf. Not all pilgrims w
meeting with him or attending his prayer, however.73 At any rat
pilgrims also fluctuated along with the diplomatic relations be
and Baghdad, and a ban on religious visitation was in effect from
Khomeini's Iranian followers probably contributed most of the
at his disposal, and this in spite of the efforts made by the savak
Markaz-e Asnad-e Vezärat-e Ettelä'ät, Säväk va Ruhäniyat, voL 1: Boltanhä-

Säväk az 25/12/49 tä 30/6/57 (Tehran: Hawza-ye Honari-ye Sazmän-e Tab
1992), p. 275).
70 Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, pp. 117, i2of.
71 Ibid. p. 136; Karimi, Bist va Panj Säl, p. 165.
72 See the SAVAK report of 1968 reproduced in Markaz-e Barrasi-ye Asnäd-e Täriki-ye
Vezärat-e Ettelä'ät, Yärärt-e Emäm beh Reväyat-e Asnäd-e Säväk, voL 1: Sahid Äyatalläh
SayyedMohammad-Rezä Sa'idi ([Tehran]: Markaz-e Barrasi-ye Asnäd-e Täriki-ye Vezärat-e
Ettelä'ät, 1997), p. 180.
73 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, p. 91; Karimi, Bist va Panj Säl, pp. u6f.; Samämi, Käterät, p. 107.
The memoirs justify that Iranian pilgrims refrained from being in contact with Khomeini
because of the fear instilled by the savak.

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financial network.74 Part of the koms collected in his name in Iran was used
inside the country, for instance to support scholarly life in the seminaries of
Qom. The informality characteristic of Shi'i flows of money also ensured the
transfer of funds to Najaf. Iranian merchants involved in business in Iraq, the
drivers of transportation companies operating between the two countries, as
well as other travelers played a crucial role in this regard. An alternative chan
nel was to wire money collected in Iran to Iraq through Khomeini's network of
supporters in neighboring Arab countries or in Europe. Whenever the pilgrims
were allowed to visit Iraq, they could also pay their religious taxes directly to
his office in Najaf. Moreover, the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca was a particularly
important time of the year for the collection of koms. Khomeini sent represen
tatives from Iraq to Mecca and Medina to undertake this specific task.75
Khomeini's network also tried to extend the reach of his marja'iyya to non
Iranian Shi'i communities. His students in Najaf used the opportunity of the
preaching trips they undertook in various Iraqi towns and villages during the
kawza holidays to spread his name.76 It seems however that the number of his
followers in Iraq remained quite limited, and similarly in other Arab countries,
with the exception of some Shi'a in the Gulf. Khomeini's fame radiated more
strongly further away among South Asian coreligionists,77 thanks to Nasralläh
Kalkäli's strong connections with clerics in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India.78
All in all, the picture of Khomeini's claim to the marja'iyya illustrates that
being an exile in the Iraqi kawza was not a complete setback. Whether his ob
jective was to consolidate his religious stature as a source of emulation above
all, or to use it for political goals, cannot be ascertained. It was probably a com
bination of both. At any rate, the social networks he developed in accordance
with the framework of learning and scholarship in the kawza were also, we will
see, a transnational channel for his practice of exile politics.
A Political Leader in the Passive hawza
Khomeini the exile is often remembered for the lectures on Islamic govern
ment he gave in 1970 as well as for his statements against the Iranian monarchy.
74 On the SAVAK's measures to prevent the collection of koms by Khomeini's representatives

and on the countermeasures the latter enacted to maintain access to these religious
tithes, see Fallähi, Sälhä-ye Tab'id, pp. 271-4.
75 Ibid. pp. 274f.; Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, pp. 111, ii3f.
76 Karimi, Bist va Panj Sät, pp. ioif.; Mohtasamipur, Käterät, pp. 455f.; Kätam Yazdi, Käterät,
pp. 10 if.
77 Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, pp. 102, 129; Fallähi, Sälhä-ye Tab'id, pp. 278-81; 'Amid Zanjäni,
Reväyati, p. 91.
78 Äl-e Eshäq, Käterät, p. 110; Rahimiyän, Hadit-e Ruyis, p. 238.

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240 CORBOZ
The diffusion of his political views from Najaf to Iran and elsewhe
ly significant. Nonetheless, a closer consideration of his practice of
exile calls for a distinction to be made between the local, somewha
definitively ambivalent, shaping of his political voice, and its t
stronger, echo. On the one hand, Khomeini downplayed his politica
Najaf's public sphere to instead concentrate on more private and co
of activism. Indicating that he took the social environment of his
into account, this strategic decision was informed by his marginal
in the community of learning. Moreover, the prospect of his return
so uncertain - the success of the struggle against the Iranian mona
not be anticipated - that he might have opted for caution to avoid
his chances to consolidate his position in the hawza. On the oth
meini's political significance was maintained transnationally. Little
in Najaf, his stature and endeavors as the figurehead of the na
found greater resonance in other horizons thanks to the activities
ment's network.
There is no doubt that the hawza of Najaf was an unpropitio

Khomeini to raise his political profile as much as he might have w
was distressed by the passive attitude of the clerical establishment
addressed regularly in his writings and speeches.79 While his p
scholars of Najaf ought to assume political responsibility could be
as a quite confrontational stance to take, the mere fact that he ma
was nonetheless a sign that he did not plan on creating political tu
tal disregard of the community hosting him. If he were to eng
tional activities against the Iranian monarchy, he had to convince
of the hawza about the necessity of the struggle, or at least to ob
dorsement. Khomeini tried to do this when he visited Mohsen Hak
after his arrival to Najaf in 1965 and brought up the topic of the
the clergy should play in the face of oppression. Hakim clearly dis
arguments on the benefits of leading an uprising, as the introduct
this article indicates.
Probably also because he was kept in check by the Iraqi marj
played by the rules of the game and refrained from undertaki
tivities in the open. He could nonetheless opt for a covert form of
79 Hamid Dabashi, Theology ofDiscontent: The Ideological Foundations of th

tion in Iran (New York and London: New York University Press, 1993); Devi
"The Portrayal of an Academic Rivalry: Najaf and Qom in the Writings a
Khomeini, 1964-78", in The Most Learned of the Shi'a: The Institution of the
ed. Linda S. Walbridge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 22iff.

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fulfill his transnational political mission. A story narrated by one of his disci
ples shows how Khomeini forced the hand of Mohsen Hakim from behind the
scene:
The Emäm told me: "You heard that Mr. [Hosayn 'A
arrested [by the Iranian authorities]?" I answered: "Yes."
some of your friends and go to the house of Mr. Hak
insistence that he takes action for the release of Mr. Montazeri from
prison."
Nobody should know on whose behalf the student was acting, Khomeini in
sisted. The plan worked well. Although Hakim probably knew who was pulling
the strings, he sent a letter to Iran expressing his concern about the affair and,
in a matter of days, Montazeri was released from prison.80 This episode took
place in 1966 and was neither the first nor the last instance when the Iraqi
marja' interceded on behalf of Iranian political prisoners.81 Mediation by the
religious scholars whom Khomeini denounced as being too passive proved
more useful to serve the immediate interests of the nahzat-e eslämi than its
exiled leader who was unable to negotiate with the Iranian authorities.
Khomeini also expressed his views on a number of matters related to Iran
and the Muslim world, yet in a manner that was not too disruptive of scholarly
life in the Iraqi hawza. Accordingly, his preferred medium to comment on po
litical issues was through correspondence with activists in Iran and student
associations in Western countries. This private form of activism allowed Kho
meini to say his message without assuming a political visibility inside Najaf
which was likely to be ill-perceived. At the same time, his letters and telegrams
had a public impact transnationally; they were photocopied to be circulated
and read in religious and political gatherings in Iran and abroad.
Almost two years into his exile in Iraq, Khomeini eventually released his
first public statement: a call for Muslim solidarity during the Six-Day War of
June 1967. This message should be contextualized. It actually came one day
after Mohsen Hakim made two statements about the war - one being a call for
jihad (armed struggle) against Israel.82 One year later, Hakim received Yäser
80 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, pp. 101-7.

81 Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, ed., Asnäd, p. 320; Samämi, Käterät, pp. 78f.;
Mohtasamipur, Käterät, pp. 4gif.
82 Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, ed., Asnäd, pp. 245f. In 1948, Mohsen Hakim had
already condemned the creation of Israel in a letter to the United Nations, and he later
criticized Iran's recognition of the Jewish state 'Adnän Ebrähim Sarräj, Al-Emäm Moosen

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242 CORBOZ
'Arafat and issued a religious edict (fatwä) permitting believer

ranks of the Palestinian resistance movement.83 Khomeini only me
er-rank Palestinian representatives at that time.84 Both ayato
dered licit the allocation of zakät (religious alms) for financing
Liberation Organization's activities.85 What this could indicate is th
political acts emboldened Khomeini to be politically vocal in the
Mohsen Hakim's death in June 1970 was a further opportunity f
to raise his political profile more publically. That he gave his polem
on Islamic government during what would be the Iraqi ayatollah
was not coincidental. Moreover, it was after Hakim's demise that h
for the first time, a political message to Muslim pilgrims on the oc
hajj to Mecca.86 In the following months, Khomeini also issued
ment to the Iranian nation to denounce the ceremonies organized i
the 2,500 anniversary of the monarchy and another one against th
religious corps established in 1971 as part of the White Revolution
ing of Khomeini's political assertiveness in his Iraqi exile is remini
launch of his political movement in Iran in the aftermath of Hosa
di's death.
Khomeini's most politicized disciples in Najaf also formalized the
with the establishment of the Combative Clerics Outside the Coun
1972. In the autumn of that year, a savak official reported on the
bring their political movement out in the open on the streets of N
ing to the report, they used the religious celebrations held for th
Fätima, the daughter of Prophet Mohammad, as a platform to
the Iranian monarchy. Their choice to politicize this event in p
symbolic significance. Khomeini was not only himself born on Fät
al-Hakim (i889-1970): Deräsa Tärikiyya Tabhato Sirataho wa Mawäqefa

al-Siyäsiyya wa'l-Eslähiyya wa Atarahä 'alä al-Mojtama' wa'l-Dawlafi al- 'Eräq
al-Zahrä', 1993), pp. 260,286.
83 See thefatwä in Sarräj, Al-Emäm Mohsen al-Ifakim, pp. 28yf.
84 For the published text of Khomeini's discussion with this Palestinian
Komeyni, Sahifa-ye Nur, vol. 1, pp. 252t
85 It is difficult to ascertain whether it was Khomeini or Hakim who first auth
of alms money in support of the Palestinian resistance because the fatwä iss
is undated (Sarräj, Al-Emäm Mohsen al-Hakim, p. 291). More generally on M
stance on the Palestinian question, see ibid. pp. 260-6.
86 For the Persian text of this message, see Komeyni, Sahifa-ye Nur, vol. 1,
English translation, see Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, pp. 195-9.
87 For the text of the message about the religious corps, see Komeyni, Sahif
PP- 3i5ff

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day, but he had already chosen that date in 1964 to give the incendiary speech
against the granting by the Iranian monarchy of capitulatory rights to Ameri
cans which resulted in him being sent to exile.88 The purpose of holding this
political rally in 1972 was therefore to affirm Khomeini's unwavering commit
ment to the cause in spite of his physical distance from home and of the time
that was passing. At any rate, the Najaf-based Iranian activists ended up clash
ing with the followers of Abu'1-Qäsem Ku'i and Mahmud Sahrudi who had ad
vised against the politicization of Fätima's birthday celebrations.89 The
difficulty to publicize their political struggle inside the Iraqi hawza can explain
why the Combative Clerics Outside the Country Group did not often organize
activities in Najaf's public sphere and instead concentrated efforts for the co
ordination of the nahzat-e eslämi with the outside, as we will see.
Khomeini's political assertiveness of the early 1970s was also invigorated by
the diplomatic crisis between Baghdad and Tehran. Having found common
cause with the exiled Iranian ayatollah, the Iraqi regime was inclined to a rap
prochement with him. Although one cannot speak of a concerted plan of ac
tion against the Iranian monarchy, members of Khomeini's entourage, among
whom his son Mostafa, were in contact with the Iraqi authorities to negotiate
arrangements for their political activities. For example, they obtained permis
sion to broadcast a daily program on Iraqi radio called the Clergy Movement in
Iran.90 Baghdad's support for the nahzat-e eslämi nevertheless contained a risk
for Khomeini's own stature in the hawza of Najaf. The following statement by
the son of Abu'1-Qäsem Ku'i reflects a belief commonly held at the time: "Kho
meini is colluding with the Iraqi Ba'thi government; the best sign of this is that
while no single 'uiama' and their sons have the right to leave Iraq, Khomeini's
son has gone to the pilgrimage in Mecca with his wife."91
As the above indicates, the early 1970s witnessed the emergence of a more
politically assertive Khomeini. However, his activism was inconsistent and
should still be described as purposefully contained. If one were to gauge the
strength of his activism by the amount of his public statements, it is worth not
ing that it was more occasionally than regularly that he issued them. Khomeini
became more forcefully and openly vocal only with the advent of Iran's revolu
88 For the English translation of this speech, see Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, pp. 333-9.
89 Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, file 1084, p. 42 (9 September 1972).
90 For the account by the manager of this radio programme, see Mo'assasa-ye Tanzim va
Nasr-e Ätär-e Hazrat-e Emäm Komeyni, Gusayi, pp. 80-95.
91 Markaz-e Asnäd-e Enqeläb-e Eslämi, file 861, p. 111 (28 Januaiy 1975).

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244 CORBOZ
tionary movement in late 1977, with an apex reached after he mov

Baqer Moin has explained that the number of his statements w
cause Mohammad-Rezä Shah was in a strong position until the
Alternatively, the reason might lie in the position in which Kh
himself in his exile. One could argue that his concern with the rea
already marginalized position in the hawza of Najaf took preced
inclination to lead a political struggle back home which outcom
uncertain.
To understand this, one should note that Khomeini did not abandon his role
as a religious figure for the expediency of his political leadership. For instance,
he waited a full month after the killing in Iran of his friend Ayatollah Moham
mad-Rezä Sa'idi (d. 1970) to respond to the many letters of condolence he re
ceived with a politically-loaded telegram against the Iranian monarchy.94
He justified the delay of his reaction: his status as a marja' required him to ob
tain reliable information about the exact circumstances of Mohammad-Rezä
Sa'idi's death before he could express his opinion.95 More generally, Khomeini
limited his political statements to religious occasions, taking the risk of a time
lag between unfolding events and the comments he made on them. To some
extent, this had to do with the context in which the nahzat-e eslämi dissemi
nated his revolutionary message in Iran - in the mosques and other places of
worship.96 The practice was also a way for Khomeini to affirm his religio-polit
ical leadership without allowing for a separation between its two facets.
All in all, the above suggests that Khomeini's political voice was somewhat
quieter than generally assumed. It was in the transnational sphere, rather than
in Najaf itself, that his voice was made to resonate more loudly. His student
network in the hawza played a crucial role in this regard, as well as the Com
bative Clerics Outside the Country Group once it was created. They dis
seminated Khomeini's message outside Iraq, initiating a snowball effect that
Hamid Dabashi's analysis of Khomeini's writings in the pre-revolutionary era is extremely

valuable, yet it leaves the reader with the impression that Khomeini's activism in Najaf
was more intense than it probably was (Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, ch. 8). This is due
in part to the fact that he analyses Khomeini's public statements and private letters one
after the other.
Moin, "Khomeini's Search", p. 89.

Komeyni, Sahifa-ye Nur, vol. 1, pp. 28of. On the political reflection of the killing in Najaf,
see a savak report published in Markaz-e Barrasi-ye Asnäd-e Täriki-ye Vezärat-e Ettelä'ät,
Yärän-e Emäm, voL 1, p. 591.
Markaz-e Barrasi-ye Asnäd-e Täriki-ye Vezärat-e Ettelä'ät, Yärän-e Emäm, voL 1, pp. j-j.
Misagh Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran,
Nicaragua and the Philippines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 133-45

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allowed the larger network of the nahzat-e eslämi to spread it further. They
prepared propaganda material in print and on tape, and also established a
clandestine publishing house. Opposition material was sent to Iran by mail or
through Iranian and Afghan pilgrims for duplication and dissemination. The
travel abroad of hawza students during the holidays and the kajj was another
common means used by the Najaf network of the nahzat-e eslämi.97
Even when Khomeini's political voice was silent in Najaf, his presence could
be felt transnationally. As powerful as any diatribe against the Iranian monar
chy were the mundane stories narrated in public gatherings in Iran about his
refusal to install in his house an air-conditioning system that would have made
the Najafi summers more bearable, or to adopt the habit of the other maräji'
who escaped to the nearby and cooler town of Kufa during these months.98
Not just mere anecdotes, such narratives about Khomeini's asceticism gave
continued visibility to his condition of exile." They emphasized his shared
suffering with the Islamic movement's activists who languished in the Shah's
prisons or in exile, and more generally with the people of Iran. Also reminis
cent of the gayba (occultation) of the Twelfth Imam, a central theme of the
Shi'i creed, Khomeini's absence embodied the righteousness of the struggle
against the unjust monarchy.
Eventually, Khomeini's political voice gained strength in the wake of the
suspicious death of his son Mostafa in October 1977. From that point, and even
more so with the start of the Iranian revolution proper, the prospect of a suc
cessful upheaval in Iran took precedence over any more cautious consider
ation of the Najaf milieu. The political statements Khomeini now issued
regularly, and the fact that he did not hesitate anymore to deliver them publi
cally in Najaf's Shaykh Ansäri Mosque, attest to this reordering of priorities.
Khomeini's exile was soon to come to an end. He left Iraq abruptly in October
1978. Paris was his next stop; until his triumphant return to Tehran.
97 Rahimiyän, Hadit-e Ruyis, pp. 142t., 242k

98 Äl-e Eshäq, Käterät, pp. i3of.; 'Amid Zanjäni, Reväyati, pp. gif.; Ruhäni, Käterät, pp. 302t;
Kätam Yazdi, Käterät, pp. i38f. For a SAVAK reporting that these stories were told in Iran,
see Markaz-e Barrasi-ye Asnäd-e Täriki-ye Vezärat-e Ettelä'ät, Yärän-e Emäm, voL 1,
pp. 126f.
99 For a discussion on the importance of ascetism and austerity in Khomeini's writings, see
Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, p. 480.

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246 CORBOZ
Conclusion
A new era of Iran's history started when Khomeini's exile ended. The story of
the years he spent in Najaf provides material to assess the significance of this
period over time once the Islamic Republic was established.
A first aspect to be considered is Khomeini's religio-political standing. In his
1970 lectures on veläyat-efaqih, he did not explicitly indicate that he should be
the one to assume the position of guardian jurist, were his envisioned Islamic
state ever be established. But he naturally assumed it in 1979. Charisma, tactics,
and other contextual factors notwithstanding, the religious and political cre
dentials he acquired during the pre-revolutionary era, as well as the network
he maintained, contributed to make this possible. The constitutional amend
ments needed after his death, in particular the removal of the qualification of
marja' to be vali-ye faqih, later confirmed that the possibility for a combined
religio-political leadership at the head of the Islamic Republic owed much to
his persona. As such, this ideal did not survive him.
A second topic of interest refers more precisely to Khomeini's network. By
taking a glimpse at the social history of the hawza of Najaf in the 1960s and
1970s, this article has confirmed the generally-acknowledged - yet little-docu
mented - significance of networks for the constitution of clerical leadership.
Khomeini's network sustained both his religious and political roles. Some of
his close disciples actively engaged in the promotion and management of his
marja'iyya, while others contributed political tasks for the nahzat-e eslämi. Al
though not completely clear-cut, such dichotomy in the roles of Khomeini's
students in Najaf had later implications in the positions they were attributed
in the Islamic Republic. The former group was entrusted with juristic positions
in the state apparatus, responsibilities in the administration of Khomeini's
personal office, or the charge to act as his representatives. The most politically
active students in the Iraqi seminaries were ambassadors or ministers to be.
The trajectory of these few select individuals might be representative of a larg
er trend in the transformation and institutionalization of the nahzafs network
as a whole after the Iranian revolution.
Given the international profile of the community of learning in the hawza

of Najaf, any discussion of Khomeini's network during his exile also begs the
question of whether it was from this network that the Islamic Republic of Iran
later developed its transnational connections to a variety of Shi'i political
groups in the Arab world and beyond. Such a cause and effect relationship can
not be established, at least not on the basis of the sources used for this article.
Khomeini did not have much of a relationship with the Najaf-trained leaders
or leaders-to-be of these groups. A prominent figure who is significant by his

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quasi total absence in the narratives provided in the käterät is Mohammad

Bäqer Sadr, the figurehead of the Iraqi Islamic movement. As also suspected by
Chibli Mallat, the degree of interaction between the two clerics was minimal
for most of Khomeini's exile, until the start of the Iranian revolution when
common ideological concerns brought them closer.100 The Iraqi Da'wa Party
did not engage Khomeini either.101 Similarly Mohammad-Bäqer Hakim, who
was Mohsen Hakim's most politically-inclined son, did not have any contact
with him in Najaf. He nonetheless later obtained the backing of the Islamic
Republic for his Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Closer ties
existed between Khomeini and Mohammad Siräzi of Karbalä',102 whose trans
national network known as the Siräziyyin later became an important actor in
the export of Iran's Islamic revolution in the Gulf. Although South Asian stu
dents found inspiration from Khomeini's presence in Najaf, an example being
Äref Hosayni from Pakistan,103 they were not part of Khomeini's inner circle
which was mainly comprised of Iranians. One could therefore presume that it
was less the independent appeal of Khomeini's leadership than its institution
alization within the Islamic Republic that allowed his model to find resonance
in the wider Shi'i world after the revolution.
Third, the long years Khomeini spent in the Iraqi hawza raise the issue of
the historical background of the so-called Qom-Najaf rivalry. Khomeini had
high esteem for Qom where he was trained, yet his leadership practices re
vealed that he did not dismiss the importance of Najaf altogether. With the
prospect of his return to Iran being for a long time unlikely, he naturally enter
tained the hope to consolidate his religious authority in his new place of resi
dence. The ambivalence of his political practice also confirms that Khomeini
took into account the context in which he lived. He adapted to the politically
cautious Iraqi hawza by downplaying his revolutionary profile in its public
sphere. Eventually, his growing disenchantment with Najaf became visible
100 Chibli Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi'i
International (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. sof. For an analysis of
Sadr's attitude towards Khomeini and the Iranian Islamic movement, see Kätam Yazdi,
Käterät, pp. 187-99.
101 This is explained by the fact that the Da'wa Party adopted an ambivalent, or at least a non
confrontational, attitude towards the Iranian monarchy (Laurence Louer, Shiism and
Politics in the Middle East, trans. John King (New York: Columbia University Pres, 2012),
p. 21).
102 Fallähi, Sälhä-ye Tab'id, p. 169.
103 Mariam Abou-Zahab, "The Politicization of the Shia Community in Pakistan in the 1970s
and 1980s", in The Other Shiites: From the Mediterranean to Central Asia, ed. Alessandro
Monsutti, Silvia Naef, and Farian Sabahi (Bem and New York: Peter Lang, 2007), pp. iosf.

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248 CORBOZ
with the advent of the Iranian revolution, as was illustrated by the

his stipends increase and his more assertive public political stance.
and until recently, Najaf's decline allowed the Islamic Republic of I
mote Qom's ascendency in almost total ignorance of the Iraqi semin
Qom-Najaf rivalry did not become obsolete, however, nor did t
potential of Najaf become null. Almost forty years after Khomeini l
of exile, Supreme Leader Ali Kämena'i seeks to project his infl
Iraqi hawza now headed by Ali Sistäni, Abu'l-Qäsem Ku'i's succes

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Khomeini in Najaf

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Khomeini in Najaf: The Religious and Political Leadership of an Exiled Ayatollah

Author(s): Elvire Corboz

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