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Barber & Sa Foreign Policy1
Barber & Sa Foreign Policy1
Shortly before the 1994 election, which marked the birth of the new South
Africa, Nelson Mandela published an article in Foreign Affairs. In this he
outlined the principles and aims of the foreign policy of a future African
National Congress (ANC) government. Emphasizing that he wrote not as an
individual but as party leader, he echoed views that had already been agreed by
an ANC working group, in which Thabo Mbeki had played a prominent part.
In March 2004 the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) released a Strategic
Plan for 2003–2005, which repeated some but not all the original principles.1
This article seeks to examine how far ANC governments—under Presidents
Mandela and Mbeki—have succeeded in implementing those stated principles.
* I am indebted to Professor Deon Geldenhuys of Johannesburg University for his valuable comments.
1
Nelson Mandela, ‘The new South Africa’s future foreign policy’, Foreign Affairs 72: 5, 1993; ANC, Foreign
Policy in a New Democratic South Africa (Pretoria: ANC, 1993). For the 2004 DFA paper, see www.dfa.gov.za.
Mandela’s government
Although the ANC won a decisive election victory in 1994, Mandela was
obliged by the terms of the constitutional settlement to form a Government of
National Unity (GNU), based on the levels of support gained respectively by
the main parties at the election. As a result, the GNU cabinet initially did not
consist solely of ANC ministers, but included others from the National Party (NP),
led by F. W. de Klerk and representing a majority of whites and Coloureds,
and from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi,
supported mainly by traditional Zulus. Nevertheless, Mandela ensured that the
international face of the new government was exclusively in ANC hands. He
did so by involving himself and Mbeki (First Deputy President) in foreign policy,
and by appointing ANC stalwarts to appropriate departments: Alfred Nzo and
Azid Pahad to foreign affairs, Alec Erwin to trade, and Joe Modise and Ronnie
Kasrils to defence. By contrast, F. W. de Klerk, the Second Deputy President,
was pushed to the sidelines. Resentfully, he wrote that while he was eager to
promote the new South Africa abroad, ‘I was never asked to represent the country
at international meetings.’2 Within a couple of years he became so frustrated
that he led the NP out of the GNU, whereas the IFP ministers remained in
post. However, in its early years in office the ANC had to rely on the old civil
service, including the DFA. This came about through a ‘sunset clause’ in the
constitutional settlement, which secured for a period the positions of existing
civil servants, and helped to cover the ANC’s lack of experience in running a
large complex state. ‘We were’, Mandela admitted, ‘taken from the bush, or from
the underground or from prison, to come and take charge. We were suddenly
into this immense responsibility of running a highly developed country.’3
2
F. W. de Klerk, The last trek: a new beginning (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 347.
3 Anthony Sampson, Mandela: the official biography (London: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 495.
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The new South Africa’s foreign policy
A further salient factor was that the new government was born into a world
in flux. During the long years in exile, the ANC had moved to the left. That
came about because the Soviet Union gave not only diplomatic support, but
training and supplies for the ANC’s military wing (Umkhonto we Sizwe or
‘MK’). In contrast, western states refused to support the armed struggle, and
some leaders —Margaret Thatcher among them—branded the ANC terrorists.
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complained that the ANC had abandoned its development aims and had
succumbed to ‘international pressures to integrate further into the global
economy’.8 Yet, backed by the patronage of office and a sense of common
destiny, the ANC held together.
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The new South Africa’s foreign policy
developing worlds’. Erwin explained this in terms of the country’s economic
structure (with its First and Third World elements), its geographical position
astride the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and its global trading interests.10 The
adoption of this bridging role has not been universally popular inside the ANC:
some have accused the government of kow-towing to the developed world.
Even a government official complained that South Africans were required to
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visits to Nigeria by Mbeki and Archbishop Tutu.
At this point, in November 1996, Mandela attended his first Common-
wealth Conference, in New Zealand. On arrival, when questioned about
Nigeria, he said he was sanguine about the situation. However, next day news
came that the executions had taken place. Furious and humiliated, Mandela
called for action. Following his lead, the conference suspended Nigeria from
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The new South Africa’s foreign policy
elsewhere on the continent complained about South Africans undermining
local firms, creaming off profits and absorbing capital investment—and about
the continuing prominence of white businessmen. They accused Pretoria of
exploitation and neo-colonialism. When they looked at the trade figures, they
noted the marked tilt in South Africa’s favour: in 2000, for instance, its imports
from Africa totalled R4,340 million, compared with exports of R27,245 million,
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and Namibia, Mugabe sent some 10,000 troops into the DRC, a contribution
for which he and his family, cronies and senior officers were rewarded by Kabila.
Since coming to power in 1980 Mugabe’s government had gained a mixed
reputation in Zimbabwe. In its early days serious allegations were made about
the brutal use of force against the Ndebele—the main supporters of Joshua
Nkomo’s ZAPU. Nkomo himself fled to London in fear of his life. However,
Policy adjustments
In attempting to implement its stated principles, Mandela’s government had
several successes, both in broad terms (for example, in its impact on inter-
national organizations) and in specific cases (for example, in the help given to
Mozambique during the floods of 1999, when the South African forces helped
to save many lives). Yet, inevitably, the overall picture was mixed. Alongside
the successes, Pretoria had either to abandon or to compromise some
principles. It came to appreciate that to achieve its ends it depended on the
capacity and willingness of others to cooperate. For example, ‘universalism’
foundered on the rocks of ‘the two-China’s policy’. The new government had
inherited from its white predecessor strong links with Taiwan. The Taiwanese,
who were not averse to chequebook diplomacy, had already made substantial
investments, with the offer of more to come for the RDP, and they had contri-
buted to ANC election funds in 1994. Mandela was eager to preserve the links
with Taiwan, while building good relations with mainland China. However,
Beijing would not countenance that, stating baldly that South Africa must
choose: it was ‘them’ or ‘us’. After some hesitation, Mandela eventually cut
18 Jonathan Moyo, ‘The African Renaissance: a critical assessment’, Sappho (Harare)11: 7, 1998.
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The new South Africa’s foreign policy
formal links with Taiwan. There was also a shift of direction in the arms
industry. At first it was assumed that the ANC would run it down, but when
the industry’s advocates pointed to its importance in the national economy the
government decided to allow it to continue, while ensuring that it was more
selective in its sales. In the event the industry expanded.
The government also adjusted its views with regard to human rights, a
Mbeki’s government
The 1999 and 2004 elections consolidated the ANC’s hold on political power,
and although the constitutional obligation to offer seats to other parties no
longer applied, Mbeki retained IFP ministers until 2004. Yet within this broad
picture of continuity there were significant changes. The most striking came at
the top, with the replacement of the charismatic Mandela by the reserved,
enigmatic Mbeki. Mbeki was already influential in foreign policy work in
Mandela’s day, and towards the end of his presidency Mandela admitted that
‘the de facto ruler is Thabo Mbeki. I am shifting everything to him.’20 Now
Mbeki became dominant. Alongside him was a new foreign minister, Dr
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who replaced Nzo on his death. Although a more
forceful character than Nzo, she followed closely the Mbeki lead. A distinctive
feature that Mbeki brought to policy-making was an ideological element, in
which Laurie Nathan has identified three core elements: ‘democratic; Africanist;
19 ANC, Developing a strategic perspective on South Africa’s foreign policy (Pretoria: ANC, 1997); DFA (Selebi
paper), Thematic Review—Strategic Plan (Pretoria: DFA, 1998).
20
William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC (Cape Town: Zebra Press,
2005), p. 62.
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and anti-imperialist’. Nathan concluded that while Mbeki’s Africanist and anti-
imperialist elements sit easily together, that is not necessarily the case with
‘democratic’; and, as noted above, the ANC had come to link ‘human rights’
with ‘democracy’. When clashes occurred, Nathan concluded, ‘usually the
democratic position gives way’.21
A further pointer to the relative decline of democracy and human rights as a
Focus on Africa
Mbeki has given top priority to Africa. ‘I am an African,’ he proudly pro-
claimed in May 1996—identifying himself with the triumphs and tragedies, the
good and evil, the strengths and weaknesses of the continent’s peoples. He
spoke of past wrongs, when ‘the strong had annulled the injunction that God
created all men and women in his image’; when race and colour were ‘used to
determine who is human and who is subhuman’. Yet, despite that, his message
was one of hope, based on the courage, resilience and ability of the African
people.23 His commitment to Africa has never faltered, and, despite many
setbacks, he believes that it ‘will prosper and confound its critics’. It was in this
spirit that Mbeki called for an African Renaissance. According to Vale and
Maseko, this turned out to be ‘high on sentiment, low on substance’.24 Yet a
broad and flexible approach had advantages, for by stressing different aspects he
could call on fellow Africans to wage ‘a war against poverty, ignorance and
backwardness’ while at the same time appealing to American businesspeople to
invest in a continent that offered excellent prospects for profit.
Relations with Nigeria improved greatly following the death of Abacha in
1999. The stronger links that ensued were illustrated by Mbeki’s official visit to
Nigeria in October 2000, and a reciprocal visit to South Africa by President
Olusegun Obasanjo. During these exchanges it was agreed to form a binational
commission, with Deputy President Jacob Zuma leading for South Africa.
Eager to strengthen the ties further, Pretoria urged various companies—
including such giants as Anglo-American, SA Breweries and Standard Bank—
to follow up the initiative. Investment and trade in goods and services between
these two African companies grew rapidly. In 1998 trade between the two was
worth R721 million; by 2003 it had risen to R5,312 million.25
21
Laurie Nathan, ‘Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy’, International Affairs 81:
2 (2005), p. 363.
22 Mail and Guardian, 30 May 2005.
23
The African Renaissance, occasional paper no. 8 (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1998).
24
Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko, ‘The African Renaissance’, International Affairs 74: 2 (1998).
25 SAIIA Yearbook 2000/1, p. 495; 2004/5, p. 444.
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The new South Africa’s foreign policy
NEPAD and the African Union
Mbeki’s efforts are not confined to bilateral issues. He occupies an increasingly
prominent role in continental affairs, a position he enjoys not only as the leader
of a relatively powerful state, but by virtue of a combination of personal
characteristics—hard work, determination and vision. In July 2002 Mbeki
chaired the first session of the African Union (AU), retaining the position for
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agreed to increase aid over the next five years by 50 per cent. Washington also
announced an extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act beyond
the initial end date of 2008, and signed a free trade agreement with the Southern
African Customs Union (South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and
Namibia). In 2005 there have been renewed bursts of international concern
about Africa, with mass campaigns to ‘make poverty history’ and initiatives led
30 Myles Wickstead, ‘Building a strong and prosperous Africa’, Optima 51: 2, June 2005.
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The new South Africa’s foreign policy
and retraining of the forces embarked upon under Mandela had largely been
achieved. By 2005 there were almost 3,000 South African troops involved in
peace missions, and between 1999 and 2005 14,300 tours of duty had been
undertaken. The main efforts were in the DRC and Burundi, but there were
also small groups in the peace zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Sudan’s
Darfur region. In Burundi their first tasks were to bolster the authorities by
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against the government, he told the judiciary it had no right to overrule the
President. ‘It can’, he said, ‘clearly be interpreted as an action of utter judicial
indiscretion, or as I regard it, as an outrageous and deliberate act of impudence.’32
Soon afterwards he removed some independently minded judges and filled the
posts with ZANU (PF) supporters.
As a result of the government’s behaviour Zimbabwe’s economy has col-
32
Martin Meredith ‘Mugabe: power and plunder in Zimbabwe’, Public Affairs, 2004, p. 153.
33 Diana Games, The Zimbabwe Economy, SAIIA Report Number 30, 2003.
34 Gumede, Thabo Mbeki, p. 189.
35 Nandile Ngubentombi, ‘South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe’, SAIIA Yearbook 2003/4, p. 159.
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The new South Africa’s foreign policy
Zimbabwe has prevailed’. It was supported by the OAU observers, who found
the election ‘transparent, credible, free and fair’, while Nigerian observers dis-
covered nothing to undermine the integrity of Mugabe’s victory. Then in January
2005 the SADC states announced their support for Mugabe’s land reforms and
opposed sanctions against Zimbabwe.
Mbeki accepts that Zimbabwe has problems. But he has rejected Britain’s
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Indeed, William Gumede states that ‘Mbeki felt contempt for the ailing
octogenarian whom he saw as one of the last incarnation of Africa’s “big men”—
corrupt leaders who plundered the national coffers to line their own pockets’.
For his part, Mugabe ‘holds a dim view of Mbeki, whom he regards as an
arrogant young upstart who should defer to him as an elder statesman’.39 To
explain Mbeki’s attitude we therefore have to move away from personality.
39 Malala, ibid.
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by Tony Leon. For Mbeki that was like a red flag to a bull, and his response has
been to vacillate and preach quiet diplomacy.
The fourth factor which comes into play is Mbeki’s enthusiasm for main-
taining African unity in international affairs. He believes that we live in an
unjust world, in which the western states impose their will on poorer, weaker
peoples. He is convinced that in such a situation it is only by remaining united
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righteous cause. The driving force was a great moral campaign, in which it
successfully fought to build a democratic society. As a result, and without
experience of government, the ANC assumed that, having set South Africa to
rights, it could make a similar contribution to the world, and so adopted an
idealistic approach. Thus the gap between principle and practice emerged
perhaps more clearly than in other cases.
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