Ars Disputandi

ISSN: 1566-5399 (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpt17

How to Relate Science and Religion: A

Multidimensional Model

Taede A. Smedes

To cite this article: Taede A. Smedes (2005) How to Relate Science and Religion: A
Multidimensional Model, Ars Disputandi, 5:1, 107-111, DOI: 10.1080/15665399.2005.10819875

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2005.10819875

© 2005 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &

Francis.

Published online: 06 May 2014.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 1080

View related articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjpt17
 Ars Disputandi
Volume 5 (2005)
ISSN: 1566 5399

Taede A. Smedes How to Relate Science and Religion: A

FACULTY OF THEOLOGY,
LEIDEN UNIVERSITY, THE Multidimensional Model
NETHERLANDS

By Mikael Stenmark

Grand Rapids, MI/Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing

Company, 2004; xx + 287 pp.; pb. $ 28.00; ISBN: 0 8 28 2823 x.

[1]
Publications in the eld of `science and religion' are booming business.
New books on the subject appear almost every day. However, rarely does one
encounter a book of philosophical depth that attempts to map out the many social,
philosophical, and religious complexities of the interaction between science and
religion. This book by the Swedish philosopher of religion Mikael Stenmark tries
to provide this. This book can be considered as the third part of a trilogy, of which
the rst two volumes are Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life1 ,
and Scientism.2 The book presently under review, with the more general title How
to Relate Science and Religion takes up and extends ideas and arguments from
the former books but it also attempts to take the religion and science discussion
to a higher level.
[2]
The heart of the book is Stenmark's `multilevel' or `multidimensional'
model of possible relationships between science and religion. This model Sten-
mark describes as `a relational model . . . that takes into account the fact that
science and religion are social and dynamic practices and thus not static entities.
Therefore it is not possible to determine a priori where the borderline goes be-
tween science and religion since that could change as these practices develop and
transform over time' (12). This multidimensional model should be able to map
the interactions between science and religion, while acknowledging the contextual
character of those interactions. Relations between science and religion are pos-
sible at four levels: the social level (the social interactions between practitioners
of both science and religion), the teleological level (the aims that practitioners
of both science and religion have in mind when they do what they do), the epis-
temological level (beliefs, methods, theories and concepts), and the theoretical
level (the subject matter and content of both science and religion). The rest of
the book is structured according to these levels. Chapter 1 introduces Stenmark's
multidimensional model. Chapter 2 deals with the social dimension of science
and religion. Chapter 3 deals with the aims of science and religion. Chapters 4 6
deal with the epistemological dimension, and chapters 7 9 with the theoretical
1. Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life: A Critical Evaluation of Four
Models of Rationality (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press 1995).
2. Scientism: Science, Ethics and Religion (Aldershot: Ashgate 2001).

c July 19, 2005, Ars Disputandi. If you would like to cite this article, please do so as follows:
Taede A. Smedes, `Review of How to Relate Science and Religion: A Multidimensional Model,' Ars Disputandi [http:
//www.ArsDisputandi.org] 5 (2005), paragraph number.
 Taede A. Smedes: Review of How to Relate Science and Religion: A Multidimensional Model

dimension. Finally, chapter 9 sums up the conclusions and discusses the rela-
tion and differences between Stenmark's model and Ian Barbour's well-known
four-fold model of `con ict,' `independence,' `dialogue,' and `integration.'
[3]
This is by no means an easy book to read. Not because of Stenmark's
style of writing, which is careful, accessible and unhampered by technical ter-
minology, but because of the book's organic and multi-layered character. It is
partly a collection of several articles that Stenmark has published in recent years.
However, Stenmark thoroughly reworked the articles so as to bring out more
clearly the interdependence of the several strands of argument contained in his
work. So, one could say, the book is an `emergent phenomenon' growing from
different and seemingly independent elements into a new, coherent, and uni ed
whole structured around his multidimensional model. Also, the book contains
replies to critical responses Stenmark has received over the last years. He replies
to criticisms by Vincent Brümmer, Wentzel van Huyssteen and Gordon Kaufman.
This again indicates the organic unity of the book, as partly the product of a lively
interaction between scholars from different backgrounds. However, it also wants
to stimulate further discussions and so does not purport to give de nite answers
to all questions. Even more, the book hardly contains any straight answers, but
Stenmark develops a set of conceptual distinctions and offers different possibil-
ities of approaching discussions about the relation between science and religion
while also warning for pitfalls. This means that the book is really about relating
science and religion: it is a philosophical, theological, and methodological meta-
exploration of the many issues arising from the question how to relate science and
religion. Thus one will not nd any discussion about, for instance, how Big Bang
cosmology relates to the Christian creation stories. But one will nd thorough
discussions on, for instance, rationality in religion and science and the relation
between ideology and science.
[4]
Stenmark constantly emphasizes plurality. There is a plurality of so-
cial practices (learning process, the place of authority, individual and collective
practices), of goals (epistemic and practical, personal and collective, manifest and
latent), of epistemologies (i.e. views on what epistemological criteria de ne sci-
ence and whether or not those criteria are also applicable in religion; is God a
hypothesis?; evidentialism, language-games, postfoundationalism, pragmatism;
is there something like a religious rationality?), and there is a plurality of theo-
retical issues (e.g. how scienti c data relate to religious beliefs; do science and
religion overlap?; can and should science shape religion or is it rather the other
way around?). In addition to plurality Stenmark also distinguishes some trends
in the eld of science and religion. There are `scienti c expansionists' who ar-
gue that `the boundaries of science can and should be expanded in such a way
that something that has not been understood as science can now become a part
of science' (xi xii). Stenmark dealt with scienti c expansionism in his previous
book on Scientism and so pays relatively little attention to it here. More attention
is devoted to the group of `religious expansionists' (those who maintain `that the
boundaries of religion could and should be expanded in such a way that religion
in some way becomes an important element of the scienti c enterprise' [xii]) and

Ars Disputandi 5 (2005), http://www.ArsDisputandi.org

 Taede A. Smedes: Review of How to Relate Science and Religion: A Multidimensional Model

`ideological expansionists' (those who argue that the sciences are or should be
politicized or ideologized on the basis of class or gender). Finally, there are `sci-
enti c or religious restrictionists' who argue that science and religion should be
kept separate. Stenmark provides a lot of conceptual distinctions and gives an ex-
tremely balanced and nuanced account of different positions as well as arguments
for or against those positions. The only alternative Stenmark explicitly rejects is
the `independence' position, since he argues that `everything we can learn in one
area of life from another area that can improve our cognitive performance ought
to be taken into consideration by rational people' (59, 81). I do admit, however,
that all this nuance and argumentation sometimes tired me out, even though I am
conscious of the fact that the reality of the matter is even more complex.
[5]
I found especially interesting Stenmark's discussion of the (potential)
in uence of religion and ideology upon science in chapters 8 and 9. He shows
himself to be quite open-minded to ideology3 and religion in science. Stenmark
argues that `the idea of a worldview-neutral science should be abandoned' (207)
complete scienti c objectivity is an illusion. Actual scienti c practice is ` lled with
ideological and religious partisanship and bias' (207). But this is not necessarily
a bad thing. Quite the contrary, Stenmark argues that in the `problem-stating,'
`development' and `application' phases of science, ideological and religious factors
can be fruitful for scienti c research, if only one is explicit about one's worldview
and allows for a plurality of other possible worldviews (cf. 219f.). According to
Stenmark, religions and ideologies could be allowed `to have a heuristic role in
construing hypotheses within the sciences' (223). This is quite an interesting and
potentially controversial statement in an era where vehement discussions about
for instance Intelligent Design start swarming the intellectual globe.4 Stenmark
answers the main question whether worldview has and should have a place in
science af rmatively, with one major exception: in the `justi cation' phase, `ide-
ologies and religions ought not to be among the grounds for accepting and rejecting
theories in science. Theories should be accepted by the scienti c community only
in the light of considerations that involve empirical data, other accepted theo-
ries, and cognitive values such as consistency, simplicity, and explanatory power'
(231). In theory-validation ideological and religious convictions should be left
out. If one takes Stenmark's arguments seriously (without the intention of mak-
ing him an ID-sympathizer), one thus should give the ID-hypothesis the bene t of
doubt, while acknowledging that the real benchmark test for ID comes in justifying
the ID-hypothesis by empirical validation. Whether or not the ID-hypothesis is
religiously inspired and is being propagated by scholars with mainly protestant
backgrounds should be of no importance as long as the ultimate validation of data
proceeds without recourse to any speci c worldview.
3. Stenmark uses `ideology' in this context to refer to `a system of beliefs and values which
are held in common by a group and which have a sociopolitical function' (195).
4. At the time of writing this review, a major discussion in the Netherlands about ID has
been going on for some time, initiated by the Minister of Education, Maria van der Hoeven. Many
Dutch critics of ID argue that it is a kind of creationism and therefore does not deserve any scienti c
credit.

Ars Disputandi 5 (2005), http://www.ArsDisputandi.org

 Taede A. Smedes: Review of How to Relate Science and Religion: A Multidimensional Model

[6]
However, this also brings me to my rst critical remark. Stenmark
argues that `The justi cation of scienti c theory should not be determined by
moral, personal, ideological, or religious ideas, but by interscienti c norms' (231).
However, he does not make clear what those interscienti c norms are, except
that they involve `empirical data, other accepted theories, and cognitive values
such as consistency, simplicity, and explanatory power' (231). It seems then that
Stenmark argues that these interscienti c norms constitute a `neutral zone' in
which scienti c theories can be judged. However, how did these norms come
to be? Are these norms themselves neutral? Are empirical data neutral? And
if so, what about the theory-ladenness of empirical data? The point is that ID-
proponents claim that science is nowhere neutral, but rests in all its phases on a
naturalist metaphysics. Similar criticisms of the neutrality of science can be heard
from Marxists, feminists and many other critics of science. I agree that, in itself,
the ideal of a worldview neutral justi cation phase has something about it, but at
the same time, it is dif cult to see how it ever can be.
[7]
When I read the book, two other remarks came to mind. First, Sten-
mark argues for a contextual and dynamic approach to the science and religion
dialogue. However, he does not really specify how this contextuality should be
taken. `Dynamic' seems to have a temporal ring to it, indicating that the character
of the dialogue can change over time. However, as David Livingstone has pointed
out recently5 , there is also a strong geographical aspect to the dynamics of science,
so that the character of the science and religion dialogue changes possibly from re-
gion to region. Stenmark does not explicitly address this spatial aspect of regional
variation. Nor does he address alterations in the public perceptions on science
and/or religion which may also in uence the interaction. Secondly and related
to the rst point, Stenmark nowhere mentions how interactions between science
and religion can change. Most of the examples in the book (such as Plantinga's
plea for an 'augustinian science' or Richard Dawkins's scienti c expansionism) are
taken from the contemporary science and religion and thus have a static character,
mirroring some positions in the present science and religion spectrum. Stenmark
may argue that it is the task of historians to describe the changes in the interac-
tions,6 but it would have been nice if he had mentioned some historical examples
that illustrate the dynamic character of the dialogue.
[8]
Despite these critical remarks, I believe this is one of the more important
works that has come out of the science and religion eld recently, but it is dif cult
to predict the impact of this book. As Stenmark shows in the last chapter, Bar-
bour's four-fold model is useful for its simplicity, but ultimately unconvincing and
5. Cf. D.N. Livingstone, Science, Space and Hermeneutics: Hettner-Lecture 2001. Hei-
delberg: Department of Geography, Heidelberg University 2002 and Putting Science in its Place:
Geographies of Scienti c Knowledge. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press 2003.
6. He argues for `a scienti c education which contains a study of examples of worldview
in uences on past and present scienti c research, so that scientists can develop a better and less
naïve understanding of how their own and other people's ideological or religious commitments
interact with scienti c practice at different levels' (249). In my view, this gives to historians a
crucial role in studying and describing histories of science and religion interactions.

Ars Disputandi 5 (2005), http://www.ArsDisputandi.org

 Taede A. Smedes: Review of How to Relate Science and Religion: A Multidimensional Model

even incoherent. Stenmark's model, although admittedly also a simpli cation,

seems to do more justice to the complexity and contextuality of reality, but at the
expense of simplicity. Simply put: it is not as intuitively graspable as Barbour's
model. Nonetheless, Stenmark has developed in this book a basic but very useful
conceptual instrumentation for scholars to assess speci c discussions on the rela-
tion between science and religion. It should be of interest to all those interested
in the interaction of science and religion.

Ars Disputandi 5 (2005), http://www.ArsDisputandi.org