Part-III GC Asif Zamir

Ladies and gentleman

1. After having fair idea of strategic environment, main contours of Battle,
I will be covering 3rd segment of presentation that is Analysis
2. In order to analyze battle with respect to Operational Art, , Lines of
Operations with respect to Japanese battle planning and LOO for US fleet
have been formulated.

3. As displayed, entire Japanese operational landscape was divided into

four parts including Force Preparation and Staging, Shaping, Striking and
Exploitation.
The vital Decisive Points in this war was dependent on Naval Air power, Sea
Forces, ISR and sustainability.
Strategic End State control over Pacific Ocean gained
Ops End State US Naval Fleet neutralized.
CoG was US Carriers

…I will be presenting you planned decisive points for Japanese

1 Positioning of 06 submarines
2 Reconnaissance Mission to ascertain US carriers
3 Positioning of Strike Force-II for Aleutian Islands
4 Positioning of Midway Invasion Force, Main Force, Main Strike Force
5 Reconnaissance Mission planned to ascertain US carrier position in
battle area
6 Attack by Strike Force-II on Aleutian Islands
7 Attack by Admiral Nagumo Strike Force-I on Midway lsland
8 Reconnaissance Mission to locate carriers for subsequent aerial attack
9 Strike by Admiral nagumo Strike Force on US carriers
10 Annihilation of US CVBG
,
4. Japanese missed vital decisive points on the onset of war for which
they had to pay heavy price. Overlooked vital decisive points includes
Submarine positioned late thus US carriers movement from pearl Harbour
remained unnoticed
Mission “K” not carried out hence US carriers location remained unknown
Japanese Invasion Force was attacked by US Midway Force, same was not
shared by Commander Invession Force, hence Admiral Nagumo Commander
main striking force remained ignorant of vital information
Limited reconnaissance done with the (range of 250 nm), US Task force 16
& 17 position remain undetected

Ladies and Gentleman,

5. Admiral Nimitz was well aware of Japanese fleet deployment and
strike plan. He planed entire battle in well coordinated and sequential manner
away from his own carriers. The Line of Ops is as flashed.

The vital decisive points for US fleet included

1, 2 Strengthening of Midway and submarines positioning

3 Recovery of York Town and Preparations for battle
4, 5, 6 Reconnaissance Mission & Positioning of carriers
7, 8 Bombing attack from Midway after Invasion force was
scanned by reconance aircraft
9, 10,11 Attack from Hornet, Enterprise, York town
12 04 Carriers Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, and Hiryū, destroyed
Critical path, Decision Points and Intermediate End points have also been
depicted on the slide
6. Lets analyses Battle of midway wrt elements of Operational Art
As displayed on the screen. I will be touching few of them.

7. Centre of Gravity
CoG for Japanese fleet was aircraft Carriers
Its critical capability included Firepower, Speed, Manoeuvrability
reach and mass sea control and sea denial

Its critical requirements included POL requirements, Carrier battle group,

naval crew, reconnaissance and Intelligence
CV included Fire Fighting and Damage Control
, JN-025 and Distance between forces

10. CoG selection is based on military objectives

Japanese Identified US Carriers as COG
But they Failed to identify own correct COG in planning Process
During battle, 04 main Carriers were closely positioned thus making them
vulnerable
Japanese identified correct US Naval fleet COG but failed in Identification
and Protection of own COG

11. When we analyse US Pacific fleet wrt CoG

aircraft carriers was US pacific fleet CoG
Its critical capability included Force / Power Projection , Distant Deployment

, Defence against IJN attack, Reconnaissance

Its critical requirements included Refuelling/Replenishment

, Carrier battle group, Maintenance, Ops and Logistic facilities, naval Crew
Radar, Forward Base
CV included Logistical Support
and Forward base

US leadersip Identified Japanese Carriers as COG

They Identified own COG correctly and hence distributed fighting fleet in Two
Task Force No 16 & 17
Both Tasks force Carriers were separated in terms of Time & Space
Admiral Nimitz Did not deploy main force to protect Aleutian Islands
US Precisely targeted co-located Japanese CoG while ensuring protection of
own CoG

12. Next is Decisive Point

Decisive points are Vital during campaign planning to exploit vulnerabilities
Japanese missed the dp identification during planning phase
They Planned Recce mission for Pearl Harbor – same was not flown
Advance submarine deployment was also not achieved a critical decisive
point which was missed by Japanese.
Japanese did not identify “Decisive Point” during initial planning & war
gaming Point (dp)
Incase of US fleet,
US Identified Decisive Points correctly through careful planning keeping in
view the naval assets
Expeditious recovery of Yorktown in 03 days boosted force composition
They Positioned aircraft carriers at “Point Luck” keeping in view own strike
plan US Identified Decisive Points correctly and executed actions
sequentially to hit CoG

13. Next is Balance (Operational Art)

Japanese planning never catered for maintaining Balance since start
Dispersed assets deployment shifted Balance despite of the facts that
Japanese had 8 Vs 3 carriers
Intelligence failure played pivotal role in off-setting Balance
Japanese Plan to attack Aleutian first was sound plan to off-balance US
However Planning did not cater for contingency plan to retain Balance
Dispersed diployment, compromised information security didn’t grant
Japanese the much needed Balance
In case of US fleet US Exploited intelligence domain and maneuvered
resources efficiently to maintain balance
Offense and Defense balance was maintained
“Midway” defenses was strengthened by AAG, Reccee , bomber aircraft
and land mines
Naval assets deployed and balance was maintained through mutually
supportive groups
US maintained “Balance” through Offense and Defense actions by
correct decision making in TSR Matrix

14. Culmination Point

Culmination has both offensive and defensive application
Japanese overlooked Culmination point during planning
Japanese had reached culmination point after losing 03 carriers but they
remained Offensive went beyond .
Japanese did not cater for any culmination point in their planning in
both offensive & defensive mode
In case of US fleet
US planned to draw Japan to offensive culmination point
Decisive attacks ensured US fleet to remain below Defensive Culmination
Point
US imposed Offensive culmination , and ensured events remain below
its defensive culmination point

Ladies and Gentleman,

 During course of study, panel has critically analyzed Historians
analysis regarding Battle of Midway. Analysis drawn by Historians are as
follows:-
 Japanese information security was breached which subsequently
played pivotal role in their defeat
 Cancellation of “K” Mission and delayed positioning of submarines
was detrimental as it deprived Japanese commander of vital information
 Japan launched offensive without knowing about enemy carriers’
location
 Admiral Nagumo’s decision making under stressful situation remained
questionable
 Intel exploitations followed by efficient application of force by US
surprised the Japanese back
 Japanese planning was fogged by over confidence coupled with
complacency
Ladies and gentle man,

The battle has been thoroughly analyzed by the panel. Our analysis revolves
around famous quote by Sun tzu

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
hundred battles.
If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory gained, you will also
suffer a defeat.
If you know nether the enemy, nor yourself, you will (sakhum) succumb in
every battle

Now Question arises whether Japanese were knowing their enemy and
themselves?
Analysis revealed that
 Japanese assumption that US carriers were still operating in (saalmen)
“Solomon Sea” was wrong
 Japanese were ignorant that carrier Yorktown hit during Battle of Coral
sea did not eventually sink
 Japanese took it for granted that they would get a 2nd chance for
Surprise attack after Pearl Harbour
 US capability of information code breaking was unknown to Japanese
Facts revealed that Japanese were not knowing their enemy

Now lets analyze whether Japanese were knowing themselves

 Information security regarding battle of midway attack breached but
remained unknown to Admiral Yamamoto
 Naval Assets deployed at contact point were not a match for adversary
 Leadership was incompetent in tactical decision making under
stressful conditions
 Japanese were unaware of own vulnerability against enemy air attacks
while launching & recovery of own air assets
Hence panel concluded that Japanese were not knowing themselves
(eether) either
Ladies n Gentleman
Japanese Lost the war due following factors :
 Japanese attempted to surprise the enemy but instead, they were the
one who got surprised
 Japanese did not prioritize intelligence gathering regarding enemy force
disposition thru submarine and flying boats
 Increased level of radio Tx noise was observed during “Staging” but
did not ring a bell to naval commanders which speaks of (Lack of
Anticipation)
 Invasion Force was attacked by US aircraft on 2nd June, same was not
shared to higher command (Lack of Coordination)
 Admiral Nagumo received intel of US carrier presence after reaching
the battle area, did not react (Lack of anticipation)
 Japanese failed to anticipate information security breach during
planning, staging and execution
 04 major carriers carrying 261 aircraft positioned in close proximity
increased vulnerability (co-located CoG)
 Admiral Nagumo went into “Decision Paralysis” during critical situation
; he did not launch offensive attack .
 Carrier striking group maneuvered towards US Navy carriers after 1st
air attack and went within enemy’s reach

 Admiral Yamamoto’s reserve force was positioned too far away (520
NM) from main battle area

 Japanese Damage Control was far inferior compared to US

 Huge Naval Assets including
 04 Carriers, 114 aircraft, 09 battle ships, 45 Destroyers, 18 cruisers
remained under utlized (Balance not maintained)

 Slide depicts the total Japanese assets available in battle field.

 Main Force and Midway Invasion Force was not utilized in battle

 Aleutian island Striking force comprising of 02 carriers , 90 aircraft

deployed to divert enemy assets. Assets were under utilized.
 Striking Force-1 assets were deployed in main battle. Japanese assets
at point of contact were almost at parity with US.

 The fate of the naval battle was decided by the lethality of air power

 Synergistic application of air power enabled US fleet to win despite

being outnumbered

 Balance of Battle of Midway was shifted due flexibility and reach of air
power

Dominance of airpower role in sea and land forces strategic and tactical
planning speaks of its vitality and significance in modern warfare

Ladies and gentleman,

After comprehensive analysis, The panel will present the end state of
battle with an attempt to draw some valuable lessons